THE DIA MUSEUM
 
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SUPPORTING
OPERATIONS

An image of the Supporting Operations section showing off artifacts of museum
An image of a top-down floor plan with a section on the right filled in with color indicating the section in relation

Even before it was officially a combat support agency, DIA offered operational support when it was requested. The official designation came with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. DIA’s new role was established to offset a common issue in joint military actions: Coordination of intelligence is difficult when there are multiple military intelligence organizations with equal but separate authorities. Some high-profile failures occurred not because the U.S. was outfought but because the military branches were out of communication.

By establishing DIA — an agency representing all of the military — as the coordinating force for joint military actions, actions were streamlined, and overall mission success rates improved.

A GLOBAL PRESENCE

 

DIA is headquartered in our nations capital. However, nearly 50% of our employees work outside the Washington, D.C., region.

In Washington, D.C., we focus on the intelligence needs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and White House. Outside of the Washington region, we serve the combatant commands, deployed warfighters and U.S. embassies.

This interactive display shows DIA's global presence: where we are, who we serve, and what we do from our geographically diverse locations.

“DIA's ability to provide intelligence on foreign military capabilities to defense and military leaders seamlessly from around the globe is an essential instrument in our nation's defense. I relied on them heavily."

Dr. Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence (1991-1993) and Secretary of Defense (2006-2011)

BUILDING OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

 

DIA has provided operational support in various forms throughout its history. Prior to 1986, DIA provided operational support on request or in an advisory capacity. Today, combat support is a core agency mission.

Humanitarian and Contingency Operations, 1990s

Throughout the decade, DIA provided direct operational support to numerous humanitarian and contingency missions, including PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVIDE PROMISE, RESTORE HOPE, DENY FLIGHT, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATE FORCE, SILVER ANVIL, JOINT GUARD, JOINT ENDEAVOR, ASSURED RESPONSE, QUICK RESPONSE, DESERT STRIKE, SILVER WAKE, SHEPHERD VENTURE and ALLIED FORCE. DIA also provided support to the ceasefire efforts in Angola.

Image of Timeline, Featuring Vietnam (1972), Grenada (1983), and Libya (1986).

Key Moments of DIA’s Operational Support

Operations LINEBACKER and LINEBACKER II Bombing Campaigns, Vietnam, 1972

DIA drafted target lists for airstrikes, conducted battle damage assessments, and analyzed the effectiveness of the two campaigns.

Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada, 1983

In the planning stages, DIA provided U.S. Southern Command with information on the size, composition and location of Grenadian military forces and their Cuban allies, as well as target lists and analysis of landing beaches. During the operation, DIA conducted document and materiel exploitation.

Operation EL DORADO CANYON, Libya, 1986

This operation was conducted against Libya on April 15, 1986, in response to the Libyan state sponsorship of the La Belle disco bombing in Germany ten days earlier. The operation used DIA intelligence for planning and targeting. DIA won its first Joint Meritorious Unit Award from the secretary of defense for its support of this operation.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986

The act designated DIA as a combat support agency and ultimately made DIA responsible for integrating national-level intelligence during operations.

Operation JUST CAUSE Panama, 1989

In the first post-Goldwater-Nichols operation, DIA established the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center and Intelligence Support Teams. These groups deployed to facilitate information sharing between small unit and national efforts.

Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM Iraq, 1990-1991

DIA expanded the OICC and deployed nine Intelligence Support Teams alongside the first U.S. military forces to arrive in the region. Analysts and an intelligence production team deployed to the Middle East and U.S. Central Command, respectively. As the operation evolved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned DIA the role of reviewing the military intelligence produced by over 30 intelligence entities.

Image of Timeline, Featuring Panama (1989), Iraq (1991), and Angola (1995).

SUCCESSES OF OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD & DESERT STORM

 

DIA came into its own as a combat support agency during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. During 1990-1991, DIA assigned more than 2,000 people to support these operations.

DIA was responsible for integrating and deconflicting intelligence efforts from the national level and creating national-level assessments on the conflict for senior U.S. leaders. In addition, DIA was responsible for order of battle preparation, targeting, imagery exploitation and battle damage assessments. DIA also supported operations against Iraqi SCUD missiles by using national-level assets, such as satellites, to provide launch warnings and support SCUD hunting. In 1991, DIA received the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its operational support prior to and during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

“The great military victory we achieved in DESERT STORM and the minimal losses sustained by U.S. and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis.”
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command, 1991
Image of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

PREPARING FOR DEPLOYMENT

Most DIA officers deploy in their capacity as subject matter experts or intelligence collectors. However, since deploying to a combat zone is inherently dangerous, all personnel receive firearms certification and training in first aid, counterintelligence, operational security and defensive driving.

DIA employees often participate in multiple deployments in support of operations. Longtime employee Al Bolden deployed numerous times, including for a noncombatant evacuation operation in Zaire (in today's Democratic Republic of the Congo), code-named Operation GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL in 1997 (left), and to Afghanistan in 2011 (right, with a fellow DIA employee).

DIA deployed an Intelligence Support Team to Bosnia to assist U.S. and NATO efforts to stop the genocidal war raging there. The teams brought sophisticated, secure communications equipment to the combatant commands to support rapid turnaround of intelligence requirements from the field.

In the rightmost photo below, a deployed DIA officer in Iraq stands next to a bombed section of wall during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The hole created a framed view of the Perfume Palace on the grounds of the U.S. headquarters at Camp Slayer.

Black and white image of soldier interacting with electronics.
Image of 2 people posing for a photo.
Image of 2 soldiers posing for a photo in front of the Headquarters for Task Force Eagle.
Image of a person standing next to a hole in the wall reaving a building in the background.
Image of General Colin Powell presenting the Meritorious Unit Award.
Image of JMUA citation signed by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.
“No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a success story.”
General Colin Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991

AN EVOLVING STRATEGY

After becoming an official combat support agency in 1986, DIA created Intelligence Support Teams. These standing teams deployed within 24 hours of activation. During the 1991 Gulf War, DIA deployed nine ISTs.

The team approach was highly effective, but was limited by the lack of infrastructure. DIA developed a more robust solution.

By 2003, DIA deployed its officers to fully integrated facilities capable of supporting a significantly larger workforce. These facilities, built up prior to the arrival of most of the deployed officers, provide necessary infrastructure and secure communications.

DEPLOYING FOR DIA

DIA is likely to be involved anytime the Department of War is called upon to resolve a conflict or crisis, and deployment in support of operations is ingrained in DIA’s culture. Agency personnel, both military and civilian, understand that they can be deployed in support of an operation at a moment’s notice.

Since 2001, DIA personnel have deployed more than 10,000 times, with many individuals going on multiple deployments. Assignments can be almost anywhere in the world and can range from weeks to months.

As DIA’s support to combat operations grew, so did the Agency’s deployment footprint. The number of deployed personnel increased, as did their range of responsibilities. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, DIA deployed individuals by the dozens. By Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, DIA deployed thousands.

"Operation IRAQI FREEDOM changed DIA from a 'headquarters operation with deployed elements' to a 'deployed operation with a headquarters element."
Gary Greco, Senior Civilian Intelligence Officer, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 2003-2004

THE IRAQ WAR

 

Iraqi Freedom

The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq benefited from nearly twenty years of foundational military intelligence developed by DIA. Foundational military intelligence is the comprehensive understanding of foreign military capabilities, supporting infrastructure, and technical characteristics of adversarial weapons.

This type of intelligence was at the heart of DIA’s support to operational planners during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Strong intelligence partnerships with allied nations gave the U.S. another huge advantage in preparing for the operation.

The U.S. military conducted one of the most successful conventional operations in history, defeating the Iraqi military in a matter of weeks with minimal U.S. casualties. After military operations concluded, the U.S. began searching for the deposed Iraqi leaders and for weapons of mass destruction. The Iraq Survey Group, co-managed by DIA and CIA, was founded in large part to support these missions. DIA’s role and involvement would later diversify and grow as the situation on the ground evolved from a conventional military operation to a counterinsurgency.

Saddam Statue being torn down - Left view
Saddam Statue being torn down - Center view
Saddam Statue being torn down - Right view
ABOVE: Iraqi citizens and U.S. soldiers work together to topple a statue of Saddam Hussein after the fall of Baghdad.
Image of U.S. tanks moving through desert corridors that DIA helped identify as optimal. ABOVE: DIA’s analysis on resources and infrastructure identified hardened corridors through the desert for optimal use of tanks and heavy equipment during the Gulf War and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Taking Down The Regime

 

Saddam Hussein was the undisputed ruler of Iraq, but he was not the only person in a position of power. In order for the U.S. to win the Iraq War, the entire regime needed to fall. Most of the regime’s leaders were harder to recognize because, unlike Saddam Hussein, they were not in the public eye. DIA needed a way to help the ground forces easily identify members of the deposed regime.

Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti — commonly called “Chemical Ali” because of his use of chemical weapons — stands trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide following his capture in August 2003. He was executed on January 25, 2010.

Members of the Iraq Survey Group sift through thousands of Iraqi government documents for pertinent intelligence about the regime and weapons of mass destruction.

"The last thing you want to do as a soldier is read a training manual. We wanted to get this information out in an innovative way, one that was effective and fun."
Second Lieutenant Hans Mumm, one of the originators of the deck of cards
Chemical Ali
Iraq Survey Group docs

Playing Cards

Thinking outside the box, several analysts at DIA Headquarters ranked Iraqi leaders by level of importance and assigned them a position in a standard 52-card deck. Originally conceived as a tool for analysts, the cards proved to be indispensable to those supporting operations on the ground in Iraq, as well as for those providing information to the public. By May 2003, 1,900 decks were released to U.S. troops

Gen Brooks
Deck of cards

TOPPLING A TYRANT

 

Saddam Hussein had been in power since 1979, brutally thwarting any opposition parties for nearly three decades. His use of chemical weapons against Kurds and Shia Muslims in Iraq, his war of attrition against Iran, and his invasion of Kuwait earned him the title “The Butcher of Baghdad.”

While Hussein stayed in power after the first Gulf War, his government collapsed shortly after the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. When Baghdad fell in April 2003, Hussein fled the city.

"We have the Ace of Spades"
L. Paul Bremer III, Head of the Coalition, Provisional Authority–Iraq

With each new arrest, including the capture of Saddam Hussein, senior military officials would make the public announcement starting with a reference to the arrestee’s position within the deck of cards.

Saddam Most Wanted list
Broken Statue Playing cards poster
1 / 3
Capture of Saddam Hussein, slide 1.

Symbols of Wealth and Power

Hussein’s displays of wealth and power helped cement his image as the undisputed ruler of Iraq. Items such as the golden guns were provided as gifts for loyalty, while the black helmets worn by the Fedayeen guards evoked fear of the regime as they carried out their mission to maintain local stability and dedication to the Ba’athist party.

Embassy plaque
Fedayeen helmet
Gold AK-47
Saddam Hussein portrait

CAMP SLAYER

 

Camp Slayer was established by the U.S. military in early 2003. Located on the southeastern corner of the Baghdad International Airport, it is part of the former Al Radwaniyah Presidential Complex.

Camp Slayer provided a location for numerous elements of the U.S. Government to coordinate operations. Most notably, it was the headquarters of the Iraq Survey Group until 2005. Camp Slayer was returned to Iraq in 2011.

Camp Slayer Topographic Map

DIA used this scale model of Camp Slayer as part of the logistical preparations for the 2003 invasion. Camp Slayer was handed back to the Iraqi people in 2011.

Aerial map of Camp Slayer

Letter from the President to ISG

Bush Letter

President George W. Bush sent a letter of thanks to the members of the Iraq Survey Group. The 1,500-member ISG comprised scientists, engineers, doctors, analysts, interrogators, linguists, technical experts and numerous other specialists.

Perfume Palace

The Perfume Palace stands on the grounds of Camp Slayer. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, it was the forward element for all U.S. intelligence activities. DIA’s logistics and facilities teams arrived ahead of the majority of the deployed personnel. In short order, they established a secure facility with communications and western-style infrastructure. This hub of activity was in use 24 hours a day for the duration of its eight years in use.

Due to the high threat level and number of attacks in the area, Camp Slayer was heavily fortified. The Perfume Palace could be seen from the security perimeter.

Perfume Palace
Bunker
Living quarters
IED Explosion
Iraqi leaders poster Music player

Al-Masri items

Abu Ayyaub al-Masri was the leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq from 2006 until April 2010, when he was killed in a raid on his safe house. DIA conducted substantial analysis on him and supported military operations against him. These items were obtained during April 2010 raid.

ABC News
Iraqi leaders
US Soldiers
IDs

ABC News broadcasts the successful raid against Abu Ayyub al-Masri, leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, and Abu al-Baghdadi on April 19, 2010

The End of the War

 

After the Ba’athist regime was disposed in May 2003, the war was technically coming to a close. The Iraq Survey Group, which deployed in June 2003 and was principally staffed by DIA, began a momentous effort to find weapons of mass destruction. Their search involved exploiting millions of documents, conducting thousands of interrogations, and inspecting hundreds of sites. Ultimately, ISG issued an official report stating that, at the time of the U.S. invasion, Iraq no longer held WMD.

Final report
ISG in chem gear
ISG Flag Soldiers at gas station

The Beginning of the Insurgency

As the ISG was conducting its WMD mission, a large-scale insurgency arose throughout Iraq. DIA rapidly transitioned its mission responsibilities to support U.S. counterinsurgency operations. Between 2003 and 2011, DIA filled thousands of deployments, produced a staggering array of target support packages, and provided timely all-source intelligence analysis to all levels of military and government officials. DIA officers based in Washington, D.C., worked around the clock to ensure that the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had the latest intelligence assessments on what was happening. DIA officers based at U.S. Central Command did the same for the USCENTCOM commander.

“As the Joint Special Operations Command J2, CENTCOM J2, and ISAF J2, I leaned heavily on DIA's expertise when it came time to present critical intelligence assessments to my commanders. I could not imagine going to war without my DIA teammates.”
- Lieutenant General Robert Ashley,
U.S. Army, 2018

Supporting the Intelligence Mission in Afghanistan

 

The Hunt for bin Laden

DIA played an important, and often leading, role, in the two-decade-long hunt for Osama bin Laden. Finding the al-Qa’ida leader required a comprehensive approach by the U.S. Government. From the early 1990s through the weeks following the successful 2011 raid on bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, DIA engaged in a multi-tiered effort to track al-Qa’ida leadership, networks and facilities.

In the 1990s, DIA provided operational intelligence on al-Qa’ida, often including the whereabouts of bin Laden and other key members of the organization. Following the attacks on 9/11, DIA quickly placed collectors on the ground, deployed personnel, and provided direct support to hundreds of operations against al-Qa’ida and bin Laden.

Image of a night time operation to arrest a Taliban leader.

An operation is conducted to arrest a Taliban leader in Wardak province, Afghanistan, on December 21, 2012.

Image of newspaper headlines announce Osama Bin Laden's death.

Pre-9/11 Efforts

Al-Qa’ida and Osama bin Laden became notorious after 9/11. DIA, however, had been tracking their activities for years prior to the attacks. Al-Qa’ida was known as a terrorist organization for years, and, due to the political instability in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1979, the country was susceptible to coups and extremism.

DIA’s focus on Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida escalated after the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Shortly after the bombings, DIA established the J2 bin Laden targeting cell within the Pentagon. DIA counterterrorism analysts worked with the larger Intelligence Community, providing intelligence on terrorist training facilities and Osama bin Laden’s movements and residences.

Image of The Pentagon Burning after 9/11.

FIND, FIX, ENGAGE, ANALYZE

Within days of the 9/11 attacks, DIA had additional operatives on the ground in Afghanistan. DIA mapped al-Qa’ida’s leadership, targeted its network, and established likely links to Osama bin Laden.

By 2005, DIA’s Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism had identified and provided substantial intelligence on an al-Qa’ida courier. Years later, tracking this courier led to the compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where bin Laden was killed in a U.S. raid.

In the weeks leading up to the raid, DIA deployed personnel to participate in the Joint Operations Abbottabad Intelligence Community Integration Team, a collaborative entity. The team helped provide intelligence that enabled the operation against bin Laden. They worked with other Intelligence Community partners and designed clandestine operations to provide the needed insight for the raid.

Exploiting Tarnak Farm

 

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, al-Qa’ida had access to facilities like Tarnak Farm in Afghanistan. At Tarnak Farm, al-Qa’ida coordinated attacks, recorded and disseminated propaganda, and conducted leadership councils. DIA actively watched the facility via Operation EAGLE EYES Predator feeds from 2000 to 2001, confirming that Osama bin Laden was frequently there. Numerous items, including passports and passport stamps, were discovered during exploitation of the facility.

Aerial image of al-Qa'ida camp.
Image of the Sea vessel USS Cole
“DNA samples collected from his body were compared to a comprehensive DNA profile derived from bin Laden’s large extended family. Based on that analysis, the DNA is unquestionably his. The possibility of a mistaken identity on the basis of this analysis is approximately one in 11.8 quadrillion. I’ll let you count the zeroes.”
Senior Intelligence Official, background briefing at the Pentagon on intelligence aspects of the U.S. operations involving Osama bin Laden, May 7, 2011
11,800,000,000,000,000

Raid and Forensic Analysis

On May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed in his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Between September 11, 2001, and the raid, DIA filled more than 1,500 deployments in response to the search for the al-Qa’ida leader.

After the Abbottabad operation, DIA immediately provided more than twenty personnel to the Joint Operation Abbottabad Media Exploitation Task Force to conduct document and media exploitation, or DOMEX.

DOMEX involves translating every document, analyzing every recording or electronic device, and pushing key findings back out to military operators who can act on the information.

DNA Analysis

DIA led a scientific U.S. Government coalition following the raid, which confirmed Osama bin Laden’s identity by applying technical procedures unique to DIA’s Directorate for Science and Technology.

After the Raid

Following the raid, DIA published more than 150 analytic products, including a recommendation to raise the Department of Defense Force Protection Condition both in the U.S. and around the world. It also completed a comprehensive global threat review. DIA forecasted that the terrorism threat would increase, which proved accurate.

Document Exploitation

Documents obtained in the aftermath of the raid in Abbottabad revealed plans for additional attacks on the United States, focusing on the anniversary of 9/11 and the Christmas holiday. Bin Laden’s will disclosed the immense wealth he brought to al-Qa’ida.

Image of a piece of paper with writing on it from Osama Bin Laden's Notebook.

Osama bin Laden’s Notebook

 

This notebook contains handwritten notes almost certainly from bin Laden from February 2010. It provides information for executing operations inside the United States. Recommendations include conducting large operations on days relevant to Americans and potential cities to target.

In addition to general instructions for operatives, there are specific plans for one individual. The writer also mentions plans targeting the President, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and a detailed explanation on how to conduct operations on a train.

Osama bin Laden’s Will

 

Osama bin Laden’s handwritten will details the dispersal of his $29 million. He states that he received $1.1 million in Sudan, $800,000 in Jalalabad and $1.25 million in Kandahar, according to an unidentified middleman.

Among the directives is a request for his family members to spend funds on jihad in Sudan. The will also distributes small amounts of money and gold to his family.

Image of a piece of paper with writing on it from Osama Bin Laden's Will.

THE HUNT FOR BIN LADEN COLLECTION IN AFGHANISTAN

 

DIA’s first human intelligence collectors and linguists entered Afghanistan in late September 2001. DIA’s Directorate of Operations directly supported asset recruitment, interrogation, translation, document exploitation, tunnel analysis, and biometric identification of terrorists and insurgents. Deployed collectors worked directly with analysts in Afghanistan and at headquarters to pass information and develop new collection requirements. These collectors often provided the most timely and direct intelligence on al-Qa’ida movements and networks.

”Simply put, intelligence support to operations in Afghanistan would be unimaginable without DIA."
-Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, deputy commander United States Cyber Command and twentieth director of DIA
Image of two official certificate documents separated by 2 stacked coins depicting front and back graphics.

National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citations

Image of a white dress or garb.

Blending In

In the weeks following the attacks, DIA deployed intelligence collectors to Afghanistan to interact with local tribes and communities who were known to oppose the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. In order to blend into the environment and facilitate relationships with the Afghan people, many DIA personnel adopted native dress.

Image of several people with backpacks walking towards a helicopter. Image of a soldier engaged in conversation with a group of Afghanistan locals. Image of several soldiers and personnel facing the camera holding up pieces of paper.

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

 

Lessons Learned

In December 2014, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM officially ceased, although the tensions in the region did not diminish. U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan continued under the name Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.

The many factions — tribal groups, warlords, narcotics producers, the Taliban, al-Qa’ida and others — have multiple motivations, including ideology, power and ethnic tensions. Unlike a war where both sides fight for territory and resources, the various groups in Afghanistan are fighting for differing causes, but their battles are occurring simultaneously. Conventional measures of success have to be reconsidered when the various sides are fighting for different gains.

Continuing Missions

Forward-deployed operational collection is a vital component of supporting operations. In Afghanistan, this included a range of efforts well outside the traditional HUMINT mission of asset recruitment.

DIA deployed with Joint Special Operations Command elements in the field, conducted interrogations, explored and policed adversary tunnels, performed biometric and forensic collection, and exploited captured documents. In many cases, DIA collection enabled operations that thwarted enemy attacks and saved lives. To provide insight into the adversary’s objectives and perspectives, DIA’s media exploitation professionals recovered propaganda material, translated it and disseminated it to the Intelligence Community.

Adversaries in Afghanistan and elsewhere will continue to use traditional and non-conventional means to threaten U.S. interests. As adversaries adapt, DIA collection efforts are critical to obtaining a decisive advantage.