DIA has a long history of diplomatic efforts. Supporting mutually beneficial endeavors, sharing intelligence, and handling incidents abroad before they escalate have been core missions of DIA since its earliest days. Founded in 1965, the Defense Attaché Service has more than 100 Defense Attaché Offices today. DAOs are staffed with military and civilian professionals who are trained as diplomatic specialists. Defense attachés are often versed in the culture, history and military capabilities of the countries in which they serve.
One of the most effective ways DIA protects the nation is by preventing wars and conflicts, aiding our allies, and validating disarmament. It could be argued that there is no better way to support the warfighters than eliminating the need to send them into war.
On April 1, 2001, an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft was conducting a routine flight over the South China Sea. A Chinese pilot, attempting to intimidate the American crew, flew too close to the EP-3, causing a collision. The American pilot was forced to make an emergency landing at a Chinese military base. The plane was confiscated by the Chinese military, and the crew was detained.
Brig. Gen. Neal Sealock, the defense attaché in Beijing; Capt. Brad Kaplan, U.S. Navy; and Consular Officer Ted Gong, U.S. State Department, immediately traveled to an airbase near the incident and began working for the release of the 24 crew members and the return of the plane. Brig. Gen. Sealock took the lead in negotiations, and provided frequent updates directly to President George W. Bush.
A skilled diplomat as well as negotiator, Brig. Gen. Sealock also addressed the international media covering the incident. His daily briefings during the 11 days the crew was held provided updates on the situation and a counterpoint to the Chinese media’s depiction of events.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld briefs reporters about the collision of the U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter on April 13, 2001.
Brig. Gen. Sealock’s diplomatic actions kept the EP-3 incident from escalating into a larger conflict with the People’s Republic of China. The negotiations were tense but swift, with both nations agreeing to a solution in less than two weeks.
Eleven days after the negotiations began, the crew was released. The plane was released April 29, 2001, with its recovery scheduled for June 14-July 14.
The recovery of the EP-3 aircraft was more complicated than sending in a crew to repair the plane and fly it home. The Chinese had disassembled the aircraft to study it. Additionally, the Chinese government required that the EP-3 leave on a non-U.S. commercial airlift. The U.S. Navy contracted a commercial company to provide a Russian An-124 and flight crew. The U.S. personnel who worked on the EP-3 flew in and out of China separately.
The recovery effort required 10 sorties into and out of China, more than 600 itemized entries in English and Mandarin, and involved more than 162 tons of equipment and aircraft parts. The EP-3, nestled into the An-124, landed in Marietta, Georgia, July 5 — eight days ahead of schedule. On November 15, 2002, the reassembled EP-3 took off again, ready for service.
Spouses play an important role in the Defense Attaché Service. Frequently joining the attaché on assignments, they oversee the well-being of the staff; act as social coordinators, confidants and household managers; and fulfill countless other duties officially and unofficially assigned.
To help prepare spouses for both the opportunities and rigors that come with the posting, DIA — with the aid and support of several attaché spouses, including Donna Sealock — established a 13-week Spouse Training Program. The program, which runs in conjunction with the Attaché Training and Attaché Staff Training Program, emphasizes approaching the tour as a team. The program includes three main instructional blocks: safety and security, representation and diplomacy, and communication and leadership.
Three months before it collided with the EP-3, the same Shenyang F-8 flew recklessly close to another EP-3. The U.S. flight crew of that January 2001 flight took this photograph of the hostile plane.
After being detained for seventeen days, Sergeant Richard Pray, USMC, other crew members from the EP-3 are welcomed home at Hickam AFB, Hawaii.
The EP-3 sits at Hainan following the collision, its radome detached completely and its outer left propeller severely damaged.
Brigadier General Neal Sealock’s Notebook, 2001Brigadier General Sealock used this notebook while serving as the defense attaché in Beijing. He took notes to record direct discussions with President George W. Bush, to work out strategies, and to track daily requirements during the EP-3 negotiations.
Dog Tags Issued to Brigadier General Neal Sealock, 1974.
“General Sealock is an outstanding defense attaché. His performance … representing the United States as a primary interlocutor with the People’s Liberation Army, and … serving as our ‘eyes and ears’ in China has been stellar.”—Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, August 2001
This uniform, seen during the numerous press conferences, was worn by BG Sealock throughout the EP-3 crisis.
The cover used to complete BG Sealock’s uniform was graciously donated by former DIA director LTG Patrick M. Hughes.
The disassembled EP-3 Aries II is loaded into a Russian-built Antonov An-124 cargo bay for return to the United States on July 2, 2001.
The An-124 arrives with the EP-3 at Marietta, Georgia, on July 5, 2001.
The EP-3 is reassembled and refurbished at Lockheed Martin.
The EP-3 takes flight again on November 15, 2002. EP-3 images courtesy of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company.
The EP-3 was returned to the U.S. after the Chinese exploited it to learn about American technology. Although the plane was repaired and even upgraded after its return, some pieces could not be reused.
Chen Ci, China’s Director General of the Foreign Affairs office of Hainan Province, China, guides BG Sealock to a joint press conference in Haikou.
The “Five Eyes” partnership — which includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States — is the longest-standing known intelligence-sharing relationship in history.
Its origins date back to World War II, when the United States and the United Kingdom began sharing intelligence to aid each other in the war effort. After the war, the agreement was continued in response to the growing Soviet threat and an uncertain international environment. Canada, Australia and New Zealand joined soon thereafter.
DIA’s establishment in 1961 led to even more robust intelligence under the Carrol-Strong Agreement, which formalized intelligence sharing between DIA and the British Defence Intelligence staff.
Today, the Five Eyes partnership continues to be a key element in providing collective security for its members. DIA works to increase intelligence sharing with our closest allies to the maximum extent allowed by U.S. law to protect our allies, prevent conflict, pool resources and enable diplomacy.
The Five Eyes partnership proved its worth throughout the Cold War. Intelligence sharing allowed for greater security cooperation among its members.
The Soviet Union took the opposite approach with its Warsaw Pact partners. The KGB maintained only one-way intelligence communications, instituting measures to limit intelligence cooperation and information sharing. All Warsaw Pact members provided intelligence to Moscow, but none were granted comparable access to Soviet intelligence.
The intelligence cooperation among the Five Eyes partners, combined with their ability to readily adapt to advancing technologies, gave them an important and enduring advantage.
U.S. and Five Eyes service members honor the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps at a ceremony in 2011.
U.S. military and Royal Canadian Army forces board a helicopter at a mountainside landing zone during operations in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, May 7, 2002.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s edited copy of the final draft of the Atlantic Charter. The charter outlined the objectives of the Allied powers concerning the war and the postwar world.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) leadership: sitting in front, left to right, are Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder (UK), General Dwight D. Eisenhower (U.S.), and General Sir Bernard Montgomery (UK). Standing, left to right: Lieutenant General Omar Bradley (U.S.), Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey (UK), Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory (UK), and Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith (U.S.).
From left to right: Flags of the Five Eyes Member Nations: United States of America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom
Arms control and disarmament treaties offer a diplomatic avenue to reduce tension and avoid conflict. DIA plays a role because of its expertise in several key areas of foreign military capabilities and operating environments.
Before the U.S. entering into negotiations, DIA establishes a baseline of knowledge on military capabilities and provides assessments on issues that are likely to be addressed.
Once a treaty is ratified, DIA analyzes activities that have implications for treaty obligations, seeking out inconsistencies and assessing compliance to help inform the interagency process.
In June 1987 alone, DIA supported a staggering number of treaty and compliance issues associated with international arms reduction.
INF Treaty between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., 1987 Analysts tasked with assessing Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty were provided with copies of the agreement.
The INF Treaty is graciously loaned by former DIA Chief of Staff Sharon Houy. Ms. Houy supported the INF negotiations and compliance missions.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the INF Treaty was revised to include the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Compliance oversight procedures were to continue for the life of the treaty. In 2018, DIA reported that Russia had been in violation of the INF agreements since 2014. Russian development of a new ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers placed the three-decade-old treaty at risk. These findings, along with growing concerns about other nuclear-capable countries, prompted the United States to reevaluate the treaty’s effectiveness. In 2019, the United States withdrew from the treaty.
Many Americans working through the negotiations and supporting the treaty mission received a small piece of a destroyed SS-20 ballistic missile and Soviet organizational pins. These were gifts from Soviet counterparts also supporting the treaty mission.
The missile fragment and pins are graciously loaned by former DIA Chief of Staff Sharon Houy. Ms. Houy supported the INF negotiations and the compliance mission, tracking the removal of SS-20 ballistic missiles.
Inspectors and escorts oversee destruction of U.S. Pershing II missiles in January 1989. Under INF, the U.S. committed to eliminate its Pershing ballistic missiles and BGM-109G cruise missiles.
President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sign the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987.
The SS-20 missile was a key focus in arms control and reduction negotiations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Here, an SS-20 Transporter Erector Launcher vehicle is shown with an inset detail of the missile.
This painting was used in the 1984 edition of Soviet Military Power to show how SS-20 missiles were typically positioned in wooded areas for concealment. Soviet Military Power was a series of books produced by DIA to make unclassified intelligence accessible to the public. The books used summaries, maps, graphs, and artistic renderings to explain DIA findings to a non-military audience.
Russia completed flight testing of the 9M729/SSC-8 Novator missile system by 2015. The testing appeared to purposefully disguise the true nature of their testing activity, as well as the true capacity of the missile, which is believed to exceed the limitations established in the INF Treaty.
"The Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS-20s ... In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles in its development."
—George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, 1988
"Where limits or reductions have existed, such as with the INF Treaty or the 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the United States assesses that Russia has not fulfilled them. This is exemplified by the development of the 9M729 ground launched cruise missile."
—Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr., Director, DIA, May 29, 2019
DIA can take on diplomatic missions at the request of another nation. These missions have a strong focus on building technical, administrative and operational capacity to mutually address common threats.
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush directed the Department of Defense to undertake a new counterdrug mission focused on detection and monitoring. DIA, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies, supported DoD in this mission. Beginning in the 1990s, DIA and Latin American counterdrug forces worked together on counternarcotics efforts that continue to this day.
To curtail drug production and trafficking, DIA officers can serve in either clandestine or overt positions. Officers are often officially stationed as part of a counterdrug team but may be involved in field activities throughout the country as needed to support the mission.
DIA provides intelligence for many counterdrug activities. Each mission is unique but often includes analyzing link charts, studying leadership structures and their vulnerabilities, conducting surveillance, and managing human sources.
There is often a secondary benefit to these actions: Insurgencies relying on drug trafficking for revenue find themselves with less money, and therefore, their activities are also curtailed.
The 1997 National Counterdrug Office Cocaine Assessment book shows common drug movement corridors from South American producers to other locations, including the U.S. The study revealed that the main pathway for cocaine entering the U.S. “remains the Mexican-Central American axis, which carried more than half the flow through the transit zone.”
The chart shows the change in Andean coca cultivation as a percentage of hectares since 1995. The simultaneous reduction in Peruvian production — and increase in Colombian production — was most likely due to U.S.-assisted counterdrug efforts to disrupt the Andean air transport corridor, often called the “airbridge.”
In 1997, Peru, then the world’s largest coca producer, asked the U.S. for assistance in disrupting the narcotics trade in their country. DIA provided analytical support to other U.S. agencies to assist Peru in developing its counternarcotics infrastructure.
During this operation, Capt. Mayra Wohnig, U.S. Air Force, an officer assigned to DIA, worked directly with Peruvian law enforcement, conducting a comprehensive study of the drug trafficking threat along Peru’s rivers. She met with members of the Peruvian National Police, as well as the Peruvian Air Force and Navy, along with her colleagues in the U.S. Embassy. Her work was a piece of the U.S. Embassy’s support to Peru’s own counterdrug efforts.
The mission resulted in significant decreases in the transportation of cocaine out of Peru and onto the global market. As a result of these combined efforts, from 1995 to 1997, Peruvian cocaine production fell by 40%.
Capt. Mayra Wohnig used this Peruvian National Police badge and identification card during her counternarcotics deployment.
Capt. Wohnig, U.S. Air Force, received this Certificate of Appreciation from the Drug Enforcement Agency for her outstanding support to its counterdrug support mission Peru.
Counterdrug enforcement officers find many illegal items in the line of duty, including bricks of cocaine and weapons.
A U.S.-supported counterdrug patrol mission flies over mountainous terrain to support an allied nation’s efforts to interdict drug operations.
Coca plants provide raw material for the production of refined cocaine.
The chart shows the change in Andean coca cultivation as a percentage of hectares since 1995. The simultaneous reduction in Peruvian production—and increase in Colombia—was most likely due to U.S.-assisted counterdrug efforts to disrupt the Andean air transport corridor, often called the “airbridge.”
Captain Wohnig used this Peruvian National Police badge and identification card during her counternarcotics deployment.
Captain Wohnig, U.S. Air Force, received this Certificate of Appreciation from the Drug Enforcement Agency for her outstanding support to its counterdrug support mission Peru.