MANAGING THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION
Planners used maps, models, surveillance and intelligence from enemy prisoners and returned American POWs.
DIA coordinated the intelligence and dedicated its best and brightest to the mission. John Hughes served as the overflight intelligence collections manager. DIA Director Lt. Gen. Bennett personally conducted enemy capabilities analysis and provided logistical intelligence to determine the best routes into and out of the camp. He also went so far as to direct DIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Dick Stewart, to override anyone who imperiled the mission.
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Marine Corps 1st Lt. James Brinson, Jr. was instrumental to the raid. A platoon commander and Purple Heart recipient who served in Vietnam, he brought practical experience to the team. At DIA, he led the analysis on enemy ground force capabilities. This was vitally important to help military planners understand the likely responses and capabilities of locally based North Vietnamese forces.
Brinson created precise maps of the Son Tay camp and worked with a CIA modeler to develop the model used during the planning and rehearsal of the operation.
On November 18, 1970 — three days before the scheduled raid — new intelligence showed that the Son Tay prisoners were likely moved to another camp. President Nixon was updated and briefed that there was only a 50% chance of success as a result. He still gave the green light, and the raid proceeded as planned.