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SECTION 1 OF 2
/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/
BODY
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO USAMA BIN LADIN AND AL QAEDA IN THE EARLY
1990'S (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL (b)(3):10 USC 424
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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SUMMARY: (U) THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD LITTLE INTEREST
IN AL QAEDA AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EARLY 1990'S.
IRAQI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WAS CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH IRAN AND
INTELLIGENCE THAT WOULD IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, LEADING TO
EASED SANCTIONS.
TEXT: 1. (U) LACK OF INTEREST IN EXTERNAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD LITTLE INTEREST IN EXTERNAL
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EARLY 1990'S. THE IIS DID NOT HAVE
MUCH DETAIL ON OR INTEREST IN USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL) AND THE AL QAEDA
(AQ) ORGANIZATION. THE IIS LEARNED ABOUT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING IN 1993 AFTER THE CAPTURE OF AN IRAQI AMERICAN SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING.

IRAQ DID NOT PURSUE RELATIONS WITH UBL BECAUSE UBL CALLED IRAQ'S REGIME "INFIDELS".


3. IIS M4.

A. M4 FOCUS. THE IIS M4 DIRECTORATE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. THE IRANIAN THREAT WAS A MAJOR FOCUS; CONCERNING OTHER COUNTRIES, THE FOCUS FOR M4 WAS ECONOMICAL, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT COULD BE USED TO HELP BUILD BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE RULING PARTIES OF THE FOREIGN COUNTRIES. DUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS, TIMES WERE VERY HARD IN IRAQ. THE IIS WORKED TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. TO HELP EASE THE SANCTIONS, BUT THE IIS LACKED THE ASSETS TO DO SO. AT ONE TIME, MUHAMMAD TURKEY AL-DURI, A SECTION DIRECTOR IN M4, ATTEMPTED TO USE HIS TIES TO FOREIGN MINISTER YUSIF BIN ALAWI FROM OMAN TO AFFECT IRAQ'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.

B. M4 FLOW OF INFORMATION. INTELLIGENCE FLOW IN THE M4...
FOLLOWED A TYPICAL SCHEME. IIS AGENTS GATHERED INTELLIGENCE AT THE EMBASSIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THE AGENTS SUBMITTED THE INTELLIGENCE TO RESPECTIVE M4 DEPARTMENTS AT THE IIS. THE DEPARTMENT WOULD THEN FORWARD THE INTELLIGENCE TO THE RESPECTIVE SPECIALIZED SECTION COVERING THE SPECIFIC COUNTRY. THE COUNTRY SECTION WOULD THEN SUBMIT THE INFORMATION TO THE BRANCH WHICH HANDLED INTELLIGENCE ON SEVERAL COUNTRIES. THE BRANCH THEN SUBMITTED THE INTELLIGENCE TO ONE OF FOUR REGIONAL SECTIONS. THE REGIONAL SECTION REPORTED THE INTELLIGENCE TO THE M4 DIRECTOR. THE INTELLIGENCE THEN FLOWED FROM THE M4 DIRECTOR TO THE DEPUTY IIS DIRECTOR AND FINALLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF IIS. THE DEPUTY IIS DIRECTOR RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE/OPERATIONAL UPDATES FROM THE M4 THROUGH DAILY E-MAILS. THE M4 DIRECTOR PROVIDED A DAILY SUMMARY OF M4 ACTIVITIES AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERED FROM IIS AGENTS ABROAD. THE M4 SUMMARY TO THE DEPUTY IIS DIRECTOR INCLUDED INFORMATION CONCERNING AGENT - SOURCE MEETINGS AND INFORMATION PROVIDED.

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(e); (b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(3); 50 USC 3024(i)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act