Down a lonely stretch of I-270 just south of Frederick, Md.,
there’s a spot where a railroad junction meets the Monocacy River, a little-known
tributary of the Potomac. The quiet picturesque farmland conceals a somber
past. Here, along this stretch of river, the blood of thousands was spilled in
a battle that determined the fate of Washington, D.C., and potentially that of
the Union itself. The Battle of Monocacy was fought over this ground on July 9,
1864.
More than 150 years after that sweltering July day where
Confederate and Union forces clashed, Defense Intelligence Agency employees
embarked on a staff ride July 19 to study the strategic importance of the
battle and the tactical decisions that were made during its course. Led by DIA
analyst Greg Elder, a Civil War historian, the participants reviewed the scope
of the battle in a classroom setting and then took to the field to study how
and why the decisions of that day were made by analyzing terrain and
environmental features of the battlefield. Monocacy has often
been called an intelligence failure. However, history shows Union leadership failure
was the primary cause, not intelligence collection.
The Battle of Monocacy was fought between the Confederate
forces of Gen. Jubal Early and the Union forces of Gen. Lew Wallace, also known
for writing “Ben-Hur.” In June 1864, while Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s Army of the
Potomac was undertaking the Siege of Petersburg in an effort to defeat Gen.
Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, Early had been detached with one of
Lee’s three corps. His mission was to march down the Shenandoah Valley, defeat
the Union forces there, and, if possible, threaten Washington, D.C. After victories at Lynchburg, Va., and
Martinsburg, W.Va., Early crossed the Potomac on July 5 and was quickly
marching toward Washington.
One of the focuses of
the staff ride was the role that intelligence had in bringing these conditions
to pass. By July 1, Grant, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Henry Halleck and Secretary
of War Edwin Stanton all had intelligence reports regarding Early’s movements
but failed to pass them along to each other or to the regional commanders. It
was actually a civilian, John Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, who delivered the intelligence that saved Washington after his
railroad depot at Martinsburg had been destroyed. After telegraphing Stanton
with no result, Garrett went to Wallace, who was in command of the defense of
Baltimore, and informed him of Early’s attack. Believing either the capital or
Baltimore were at risk, Wallace marched his forces to Monocacy Junction to
defend the approaches to both. On July 9, 1864, Wallace and 5,800 Federals
stood again Early and 14,000 Confederates in an attempt to save Washington, D.C.
The DIA staff ride showed how information was collected from
a multitude of sources that should have alerted Union leadership – Grant, Halleck
and Stanton – of the impending assault. However, it was a command and
communications failure, not an intelligence failure, which led to Wallace
acting alone. Had information been
shared, the battle might never have come to pass.
Elder led the team to several locations on the battlefield
and demonstrated how Wallace’s forces defended against Early’s assault. Though
the Federal forces lost, they successfully delayed the Confederates by three
days - just enough time for Grant to send forces from Petersburg, Va., by boat
to defend Washington at the Battle of Fort Stevens on July 11-12, 1864.
There were more than 2,000 American casualties that day on the banks of the
Monocacy River, Union and Confederate alike. To this day it remains hallowed
ground. It is one of the smallest but most strategically significant battles of
the Civil War. Had Wallace not acted on his own initiative, or had Union
leadership acted on the intelligence they received, the battle might not have been
fought. Conversely, had Wallace not taken the initiative, the United States as
we know it might not exist today. This battle shows the importance of
intelligence collection and of communication between commands. In the end, the
fate of the Union was decided along a sleepy little river by the name of Monocacy.