DIA started the 1990s on a high note.
For years, DIA economic analysts had predicted the looming collapse of the Soviet Union in annual reports to Congress. In June 1991, the DIA and CIA published “Beyond Perestroyka: The Soviet Economy in Crisis,” and noted that “great political skill will be needed to retain — and, in the case of the central government, regain — popular trust and put through effective but often initially painful reform measure. However, the alternative is a complexly bleak Soviet future.” Indicators of economic collapse, such as inflation, deficit spending and the printing of money all suggested that 1991 would lead to crisis.
If the Soviets imposed rigid controls on their economy, they might slow the collapse, but would also suffer popular resistance in the form of demonstrations, strikes and outright rebellion.
The form of catastrophe the collapse of the Soviet economy took was not clearly forecasted, but DIA got the larger part of the call to senior policymakers right.
DIA started the 1990s on a high note. For years, DIA economic analysts had predicted the looming collapse of the Soviet Union in annual reports to Congress. In June 1991, the DIA and CIA published “Beyond Perestroyka: The Soviet Economy in Crisis,” and noted that “great political skill will be needed to retain — and, in the case of the central government, regain — popular trust and put through effective but often initially painful reform measure. However, the alternative is a complexly bleak Soviet future.”
Indicators of economic collapse, such as inflation, deficit spending and the printing of money all suggested that 1991 would lead to crisis. If the Soviets imposed rigid controls on their economy, they might slow the collapse, but would also suffer popular resistance in the form of demonstrations, strikes and outright rebellion.
The form of catastrophe the collapse of the Soviet economy took was not clearly forecasted, but DIA got the larger part of the call to senior policymakers right.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, two major trends dominated the Intelligence Community in the early 1990s: increasing pressure to cut resources, and the need to respond to a radically changed national security environment. DIA, in particular, was called upon to respond to ongoing and emerging global challenges in the midst of downsizing and reshaping itself for the future.
Since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Agency had functioned as a combat support agency, and as a major producer and management element in the Intelligence Community by providing operational forces and defense decision-makers with comprehensive intelligence data. By the early 1990s, the focus of the DIA shifted from supporting decision-makers and military planning to supporting operational forces.
DIA was put to the test early in the decade with Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM.
The scope of DIA’s support to Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM from Aug. 2, 1990, to April 15, 1991, was unprecedented. It was the culmination of 30 years of building the infrastructure, relationships, integration of technical advances, and expertise to provide critical intelligence in a war situation.
DIA was well-prepared for a conflict with Iraq, having forecasted an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait years earlier. DIA developed and disseminated “Scenario: Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait” to USCENTCOM in August 1988. DIA also worked with USCENTCOM to increase the warning level for Iraq in April 1990.
On July 19, 1990, DIA received the first reports of two Iraqi divisions near the Kuwaiti border and activated the Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group at the Pentagon.
In that same week, DIA raised its WATCHCON level twice based on the concentration of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border and the failure of diplomatic initiatives.
Starting on July 23, 1990, DIA began twice-daily production of defense special assessments on the developing situation — warning policy officials of the possibility of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait.
On July 27, 1990, the Department of Defense approved the defense intelligence officer for the Middle East and South Asia and analysts for the Middle East/Africa Division Directorate of Research to meet with the Kuwaiti ambassador at the Pentagon and tell him unequivocally that Iraq was about to invade Kuwait.
DIA established the Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force, run by DIA Deputy Director for JCS Support Admiral Mike McConnell, in the National Maritime Intelligence Center at the Pentagon and established a 24/7 all-source crisis collection team to aid the task force.
On August 1, 1990, DIA analysts confirmed the movement to forward assembly areas of Iraqi artillery units required for offensive operations.
Following the invasion, the Agency established a DoD Joint Intelligence Center to coordinate the military intelligence produced by more than 30 intelligence entities, deployed more than 100 analysts to the Middle East in support of combat operations, and embedded 634 dedicated DIA personnel to the Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force.
Over 5,200 requests for information were forwarded to the task force.
DIA managed the movement of over 215 tons of intelligence materials to USCENTCOM and its warfighting components. Counterintelligence agents and analysts worked tirelessly to secure U.S. forces and communications, staying ahead of Iraqi collection efforts.
For its support in Operation DESERT STORM, DIA received a Joint Meritorious Unit Award highlighting that “during this period, DIA analyzed force capabilities, movements and intentions prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and provided consistently outstanding, dedicated intelligence to the National Command Authority and field commanders throughout the operations.”
On August 1, 1990, DIA analysts confirmed the movement to forward assembly areas of Iraqi artillery units required for offensive operations.
Following the invasion, the Agency established a DoD Joint Intelligence Center to coordinate the military intelligence produced by more than 30 intelligence entities, deployed more than 100 analysts to the Middle East in support of combat operations, and embedded 634 dedicated DIA personnel to the Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force. Over 5,200 requests for information were forwarded to the task force.
DIA managed the movement of over 215 tons of intelligence materials to USCENTCOM and its warfighting components.
Counterintelligence agents and analysts worked tirelessly to secure U.S. forces and communications, staying ahead of Iraqi collection efforts.
For its support in Operation DESERT STORM, DIA received a Joint Meritorious Unit Award highlighting that “during this period, DIA analyzed force capabilities, movements and intentions prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and provided consistently outstanding, dedicated intelligence to the National Command Authority and field commanders throughout the operations.”
Based on the lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM, all national level agencies combined their separate deployed intelligence support cells into DIA-led national intelligence support teams.
Composed of personnel from DIA, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, NISTs deployed upon request by the military commander to facilitate the flow of timely all-source intelligence between a joint task force and Washington, D.C., during crises or contingency operations.
In the 1990s, DIA NISTs provided intelligence support to Operations PROVIDE RELIEF (Kenya), SOUTHERN WATCH (Saudi Arabia), RESTORE HOPE (Somalia), DENY FLIGHT and PROVIDE PROMISE (the Balkans), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia), GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE and GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL (Zaire), JOINT GUARD and JOINT FORGE (Bosnia), SHINING, PRESENCE (Israel), JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo), and NOBLE ANVIL (Albania). DIA was awarded a Joint Meritorious Unit Award from the Secretary of Defense in August 1994 for support to several of these operations.
By the end of the decade, it was clear that the nature of the threat to national security was changing, and with it, the type of support DIA provided. Throughout May and June 1996, counterintelligence detachments in Saudi Arabia provided timely information to national level agencies concerning suspicious activity near the U.S. barracks at Khobar Towers.
The information, although inconclusive, was subsequently summarized in a June 17, 1996, DIA publication, warning of a possible attack and noting that Saudi officials were tightening security near Khobar Towers.
Eight days later, a truck bomb detonated adjacent to the building that housed members of the U.S. Air Force's 4404th Wing. In all, 19 U.S. servicemen and a Saudi local were killed. Then, on Aug. 7, 1998, a large bomb exploded outside the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.
As al-Qaida and other terrorists groups increased their operations against the United States, DIA devoted more resources against the threat and developed a plan to completely revamp its counterterrorism capabilities.
The requirement was multi-tiered, but expanding support for counterterrorism operations and contingency planning were among the most important. The first priority of this expansion was al-Qaida — including its leadership, networks, and facilities in Afghanistan.
DIA briefed Congress on the concept on Sept. 10, 2001.