DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WAR IN THE WESTERN TVD (U)
VOLUME I

NOVEMBER 1984

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WAR IN THE WESTERN TVD (U)

DDB-2600-3858-84-(N)

Information Cutoff Date: 1 January 1984

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SUMMARY

The Soviets would create at least five TVD commands to control military operations in the Eurasian landmass. Each TVD would have flexible boundaries dependent upon actual and projected wartime scenarios. Three of these TVDs probably would oppose NATO, with the Western TVD having the primary role.

Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces operating in the Western TVD would come from three Soviet military districts—Belorussian, Baltic, and Carpathian; the Soviet Groups of Forces in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; the national forces of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia; and the Combined Baltic Sea Fleet. Control would be vested in the High Command of Forces in the Western TVD, commanded by a Soviet general officer.

Soviet long-term political goals, when translated into military objectives for the Western TVD, include the destruction of NATO military forces, the defeat of US forces and the prevention of further US reinforcement or military action in NATO's Central Region, and the eventual Soviet occupation of the entire European continent. The Soviet Union pursues these ultimate objectives in peacetime by nurturing West European perceptions of the superiority of Soviet military power.

In peacetime, the Soviets have fashioned the Warsaw Pact into an organization capable of transitioning to war rapidly, from the Ministry of Defense down to the individual military districts, fleets, and air elements. In addition to the assets subordinate to the military districts, groups of forces, and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries that would comprise operational formations, other resources include strategic forces and reserves of the Supreme High Command (VKG), such as the Strategic Rocket Forces, airborne divisions, Military Transport Aviation, ballistic missile submarines, air armies, and a variety of logistic assets.

The Soviet force structure is configured so that a considerable number of forces can initiate combat operations rapidly in case war begins after only a brief period of preparations. This ready element is backed up by the remaining elements that take longer to prepare but that provide a sustaining element to their combat operation. For example, of the 104 ground maneuver divisions available in the Western TVD, 57 are considered by the Soviets as "ready" divisions that can be committed to combat after a short period of mobilization and little or no postmobilization training. The rest are "not-ready" cadre and mobilization-base divisions that require extensive mobilization and postmobilization training to attain the proficiency deemed necessary for commitment to offensive operations in a mid-to-high intensity combat environment. In addition, they have sufficient resources (road, rail, air, and inland water transportation) to assemble forces rapidly. Deployment airfields are available to support forward deployments prior to the outbreak of war. With 14 days' preparation, the Soviets can mobilize their entire force structure. The "ready" force elements would be fully prepared for offensive operations. The "not-ready"
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elements require up to 40 or more days of mobilization and training to prepare for offensive operations. Thus, the latter are not fully prepared in a 14-day scenario.

An offensive in the Western TVD probably would begin with three fronts in the TVD's first echelon. At least two more fronts would be in the second echelon. The three first-echelon fronts would operate with a Soviet-Polish Front in the north, a Soviet-East German Front in the center, and a Czech-Soviet Front in the south.

The Poles would provide a substantial portion of the forces for the northern approach across northern Germany into Denmark and the Netherlands. The operations of the front would be supported substantially by the Combined Baltic Fleet. Broad objectives would include gaining control of northern Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark and obtaining control of the Baltic Sea and the airspace above it. The Soviet-East German Front would attack into central FRG and facilitate subsequent operations into France. The Czech-Soviet Front would attack across southern West Germany, also facilitating operations into France. Second-echelon fronts (from the Belorussian and Carpathian MDs) probably would be committed for operations behind the Soviet-East German and Czech-Soviet Fronts, for subsequent operations into France.

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces are not without vulnerabilities. First, as has been stated earlier, Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces would prefer to engage in conventional warfare against NATO although they would be prepared to use nuclear weapons at any time. If they intend to attack NATO after a 30-day mobilization (required to reach full combat potential), this would all but insure that NATO forces would be well prepared and positioned, thereby requiring early employment of nuclear weapons (which they would like to avoid, if possible). Second, the C3 network necessary for the conduct of a European offensive is substantial; the requirement for interoperability of this complex system may be a severe vulnerability. Third, while Soviet aviation forces are more numerous than those possessed by NATO, these aircraft (and their related equipment) are not as capable as NATO's. Fourth, Combined Baltic Fleet operations will depend on the success of the air operation. Fifth, while rear service preplanning for theater support is emphasized and the prestocking of logistic assets within the TVD has been extensive, the substantial Warsaw Pact reliance on newly mobilized rear service personnel at all levels has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of logistic system operations in wartime. Additionally, the widespread interdiction of key lines of communications (particularly along major river lines) would create lengthy delays in the forward movement of troops and materiel.
CHAPTER 1

THE WESTERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

A. SOVIET PEACETIME POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

(U) Soviet military thought on the nature of war in the Western TVD, the technological means required to wage war, and the application of force are the natural consequence of decisions made at the highest levels of the party hierarchy. These decisions are in concert with both global Soviet objectives and specific Soviet aims in Western Europe.

(U) The fundamental tenets of Soviet military doctrine are determined by the political objectives pursued by the party leadership and thus become the official policy of the Soviet Union. These objectives provide a theoretical foundation and framework from which Moscow seeks to undermine US influence and US resolve to pursue its interests worldwide, while avoiding, if possible, direct military confrontation. Moscow believes that a shift in the "correlation of forces" has created conditions which favor Soviet goals and restrain US ability to react. Moscow finds that in some regions of the world conditions are such that not only is it more advantageous, but also possible, to achieve its objectives by using nonmilitary means.

(U) Moscow views Western Europe—and the countries in the Western TVD in particular—as its highest priority objective and the centerpiece of its strategic planning. The foremost Soviet objective is to weaken and dissolve NATO's political and military cohesion (to include a forced withdrawal of US forces from Europe, leading to a neutralized Western Europe) while at the same time protecting and consolidating its hold on Eastern Europe. Control over this region and its economic and technological wealth would insure, by Soviet calculations, a decisive step toward attaining global preeminence. Moscow has attempted to accomplish this by:

-- Developing an overwhelming military force, including the use of international negotiations to maintain and improve its posture.

-- Fostering closer economic ties, to include obtaining economic aid from the West and gaining access to technology.

-- Signing accords that codify the division of Europe while adding the illusion of stability.

-- Furthering detente on Soviet terms, which does not preclude subversion and indirect support for terrorism.

-- Active measures campaigns on controversial issues such as INF, enhanced radiation weapons, START, unilateral disarmament, and nuclear free zones.

-- Subversion aimed at NATO's flanks: Northern Europe, Greece, Turkey, and Spain.
(U) The Soviet Union is conducting an extensive, coordinated campaign to undercut recent NATO decisions on nuclear force modernization and to erode the alliance's resolve to support collective and individual defense efforts. While the broader goal is to sever security ties between the US and its allies, the utmost emphasis has been placed on operations to block NATO's intermediate nuclear forces (INF) modernization program. This effort is important because Moscow probably calculates that a collapse of the INF program would cause a severe political crisis for the Western alliance and leave Moscow dominant in Europe. The principal target of this strategy is the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which the Soviets view as the key continental NATO member. Soviet efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the FRG from NATO undoubtedly aim at using such action as a catalyst to precipitate the demise of NATO.

(U) Economic cooperation is the other major instrument of Soviet policies in the West European countries. It aims not only at gaining access to their markets and technology, but also at developing closer ties between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Soviet Bloc. The FRG has become the largest Western economic partner of the USSR, with a tenfold increase in trade since former Chancellor Willy Brandt signed the August 1970 non-aggression treaty with Moscow. The expansion of bilateral economic agreements often has had the effect of neutralizing the ability of the European Economic Community to better manage and control trade with the Soviet Union and to prevent the formulation of commonly shared policy guidelines to govern trade with Moscow. The Soviets also have been pleased with the willingness of West European countries to participate in the construction and use of the Soviet gas pipeline and their overall reluctance to follow any US efforts to implement economic sanctions against the USSR.

(U) Although Moscow continues to pursue its objectives in Western Europe by nonmilitary means, the significance and value of its growing military strength are crucial preconditions for such policy. While refraining from blatant threats of force, the Soviet Union strives to nurture West European perceptions of the superiority and proximity of Soviet military power. The Soviets calculate that such views help bolster perceptions in the West favoring accommodation and compromise rather than confrontation. Thus, military force—specifically the threat of its use rather than its actual employment—has become a vital tool of Soviet leverage in Western Europe.

B. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

(U) The political objectives sought by the leaders of the Soviet Union have generated certain military requirements. These requirements regulate both the development of the USSR's military capability and the manner in which the Soviet Armed Forces are employed. Consequently, Soviet military doctrine seeks to address these matters in a systematic and scientific manner by defining proper guidelines for the generation and application of military power.
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These guidelines provide a conceptual framework for describing the nature of military operations. This framework is based on a set of "scientific principles" which help describe the nature of modern war and the requirements for successful prosecution of a military campaign. The Soviets believe correct application of these principles to be a fundamental prerequisite to determining strategic objectives, operational planning, and tactical execution. Further, the Soviets stress the need for a flexible response (not to be confused with US nuclear doctrine). Soviet theorists often note that this is particularly important in nuclear warfare, given its dynamic nature, during which dramatic, abrupt changes in the military situation must be expected.

The Soviets have developed an organizational scheme, including command and control channels, that facilitates the application of military power in an effective manner. A critical element in this scheme evolves from the Soviet theory on the nature of military geography.

The broadest concept in military geography is that of the theater of war (TV). A TV is "the territory of any one continent--together with the sea areas adjoining it and the air space above it--on which hostilities may develop." The concept of a TV is continuously evolving. Recent writings indicate that the TV might not have precisely defined boundaries (subject to change during the course of a war) and that it might, should the need arise, encompass more than one continent. Although the geographical extent of the TV has become less specific, its purpose--to provide military strategists with a criterion for categorizing operations on a global scale--has remained basically the same.

The Soviets believe that wartime operations within potential TVs could differ significantly both strategically and tactically. In a western TV, for example, the Soviets' primary adversary would be NATO--a technically sophisticated, well-trained, and nuclear-equipped enemy. In an eastern TV, on the other hand, their primary adversary probably would be China and/or Japan and the US. A land war in an eastern TV could be more manpower intensive than one in a western TV. Other approaches to military planning and operations may be required in various TVs by differences stemming from the conduct of naval operations; terrain; social and cultural patterns; languages; military doctrine, tactics, and force composition; strategic goals; and force coalitions.

The Soviets have defined theater of military operations (TVD) as "a particular territory, together with the associated air space and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), within whose limits a known part of the armed forces of the country (or coalition) operates in wartime, engaged in strategic missions which ensue from the war plan." A TVD may be ground, maritime, or intercontinental; depending upon its military-political or economic importance, a TVD may be either main or secondary. Control of TVD forces will be exercised by the Supreme High Command (VSK) through its executive arm--the General Staff (figure 1). As many as five TVDs may be established within the Soviet/Eurasian landmass (figure 2). Some of the military districts (MD) within the TVDs are pivotal and their subordinations are scenario dependent.
Although the Western TVD is geographically rather well defined, its boundaries and force structure remain flexible. The Western TVD commands those forces facing NATO in central Europe (figure 3). The second echelon or reinforcing forces are dependent upon the situation.

During peacetime, the military district (MD) and group of forces (GOF) headquarters perform day-to-day administrative functions. During wartime, the MDA/GOF's generate the combat fronts for the TVDs. After the front staff has been deployed, the remaining MD/GOF headquarters structure would perform important local ground defense, logistics, air defense, civil defense, mobilization, and administrative functions.

The forces available to the MD or GOF commander during peacetime would be used to generate the combat oriented fronts. Strategic forces (land based missiles, strategically designated ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers) would not come under the control of the MD. Instead, they would be controlled directly by the VGG. The airborne troops (VDV), transport aviation (VTA), or the air armies of the VGG could support combat operations once allocated by the VGG (through the General Staff) to the TVD commanders. The Combined Baltic Fleet would be subordinated quickly to the Western TVD.

C. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The Soviets have devoted considerable energy towards achieving military superiority in the Western TVD. That superiority is essential to secure their military objectives in the region. Soviet military strength in Europe serves both peacetime and wartime purposes. During peacetime, it intimidates the NATO powers and encourages the belief that armed resistance to Soviet power is futile. It also is used as a bargaining chip to gain political concessions from other European states with the hope of eventually eliminating a US presence on the continent. The Soviet Armed Forces further serve to enforce the de facto division of Europe by protecting Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

During wartime, the Soviet Armed Forces would be used to achieve the Soviet Union's long-term political goals. When translated into military objectives for the Western TVD, these goals include the destruction of NATO's military forces, the expulsion of US forces from the Central Region, the prevention of further US reinforcement or military involvement in that region, and the eventual occupation of the entire continent.

The Soviets believe that their military goals could be achieved rather quickly by a very rapid advance through the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), coupled with a decisive defeat of NATO forces. A victory of this type, Soviet military theorists argue, would demoralize the NATO alliance and cause splits in its ranks which could be exploited further by both military and political means. To this end, military operations in the Western TVD would include attacks against Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands, with the aim of depriving the US of viable lines of communication to the North German Plain. Simultaneously, the main Soviet attack in Germany would seek to push NATO forces across the Rhine River.
before any substantial US countereffort could be mounted. This could be
followed by an equally rapid advance into France, aimed at forcing the
European countries to come to terms with the USSR and abandon their ties
with the US.

The Soviets would prefer to conduct a conventional war, but they are
prepared to fight a nuclear war, if necessary, to achieve their ultimate
objectives. They have developed an armed force which can operate in a
nuclear environment and one which they believe will be able to secure
victory.

Soviet military victory would be followed by the establishment of
pro-Soviet governments throughout the occupied region. The Soviets would
enforce close political and economic ties and would seek to destroy all
other potential sources of opposition to their control. Key population and
economic centers would be placed under the direct administrative control of
Soviet officials; the Red Army would take direct control of areas containing
critical national resources.

The aforementioned military and strategic objectives are achieved by
operational-strategic formations such as the front, by the reserves of the
VGK, and by active units of the VGK (two active air armies designated for
operations in the Western TVD, for example). To accomplish strategic aims
in the Western TVD, operational objectives must be achieved, which in turn,
are dependent upon the successful accomplishment of tactical objectives.
Tactical objectives are achieved by maneuver divisions, regiments, and
battalions to a depth of approximately 20-35 km; tactical objectives
basically entail the defeat of opposing units.

Operational objectives are achieved by armies and fronts at depths
greater than 100 km. Several points relating to fronts and armies should be
noted:

-- A front is an operational-strategic formation.

-- Weapons and units may be designated tactical, operational, and/or
  strategic.

-- Forces may be differentiated according to the echelon that controls
  them (VGK vice frontal forces) and the characteristics of the
targets they would attack.

-- A geographical line of demarcation exists within the TVD. Frontal
  forces have responsibility for activity up to that line; strategic
  forces attack targets beyond the line of demarcation.

While the weapons mix and the type of force used in the strategic
operation may vary (from the air operation of the VGK, special operations
groups, and airborne operations to such force types as the operational
maneuver group—or a combination thereof), the target groups would remain
the same. They include NATO nuclear-capable missiles, airfields, and
aircraft; nuclear weapons storage sites; and critical command, control, and
communications nodes.
(U) The Council includes as participants those Politburo members with defense and security related responsibilities as well as military representatives, including Minister of Defense Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov. While final approval of major policy decisions is reserved for the Politburo, policy recommendations are formulated in the Defense Council. Council recommendations probably are ratified by the Politburo on virtually a pro forma basis. Andropov was identified publicly as Council chairman, as was his predecessor in the post of General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev.

(U) The Defense Council is served by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the GS, both of which are responsible for the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Ustinov, as Minister of Defense, is charged with implementing Soviet military policy and doctrine. He serves as the principal interface between the military and the party/state apparatus. Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov is the military figure who deals directly with the uniformed military establishment and the chiefs of the five services.

The GS is the most important link between the national command authorities (the Defense Council) and the armed forces. Because the GS exercises actual operational control over the armed forces, it has the responsibility for translating strategy, doctrine, and policy into action. The GS also plays an important role at the national level by ensuring that the most authoritative information is made available to the Defense Council to aid decisionmaking. The GS serves as the Council's secretariat; as such, GS officers are closely involved in preparing support documents, meeting agendas, and Council decision papers.

These responsibilities make Chief of the GS Ogarkov the single most important individual in the day-to-day operations of the armed forces. Ogarkov is assisted by a highly skilled staff of professional officers. This elite corps has been characterized as the "brain of the army" by Soviet military leaders. The GS organization is designed to provide a basic command structure for controlling the Soviet Armed Forces. Its most important element, the Main Operations Directorate, operates in part as a military support staff for the Defense Council. The Main Operations Directorate draws up war plans based on estimates provided by the GS Main Intelligence Directorate.

The Soviets attach great importance to their ability to effect a rapid transition from peace to war with minimal disruption of their command structure. DIA believes that during wartime the Soviets would create a wartime management system derived directly from their peacetime command structure. Ultimate command and control of the overall war effort probably will be vested in a single body, with functions and powers similar to those of the State Defense Committee (GKO) during World War II. In their writings the Soviets describe the GKO as a model to be followed in a future war. This has led DIA to the assumption that a modernized version of the GKO would be formed, probably around the nucleus of the existing Defense Council, with staff and support possibly from various elements in the Central Committee Secretariat and the Council of Ministers. The modernized GKO-type organization would be headed by the Supreme Commander in Chief in
CHAPTER 2

PEACETIME ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE TVD

A. ORGANIZATION

1. Political

(U) The Soviet Union is a highly centralized political alliance of 15 union republics whose boundaries, languages, and population mix are the product of various historical influences. The structure of each republic government resembles that of the USSR itself. In the western region of the Soviet Union (the area from which forces for the Western TVD largely will be drawn) the principal republics are the Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR (Figure 4). Below the union republics are territorial-administrative subdivisions which include autonomous republics (patterned in their state structure after those of union republics), followed by kray, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, national districts, cities, urban rayons, and rural rayons. At each of these latter levels, administrative authority is exercised through the chairman of the executive committee (ispolkom) in the local Soviet (council). The size and makeup of the support structure of the ispolkom varies according to its territorial level, population, and economic importance. In smaller republics, such as those in the Baltic states, authority is exercised directly from the republic to cities and rural rayons. For the remainder of the country, however, the oblast level entity represents the principal building block of Soviet state administration.

(U) State administration and economic management are conducted primarily through ministries, state committees, and comparable entities at the national and republic levels. Their managers form the various councils of ministers, the chairmen of which head the government apparatus of the USSR and those of its constituent republics. The ministerial entities are responsible for specific sectors such as defense, state security, public order, individual industries, health care, and transportation and for functions such as planning, supply, and pricing. Their activities are coordinated by the respective national and republic councils of ministers acting under guidelines established by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo and implemented by appropriate departments of the Central Committee.

2. Military

(U) In the Soviet Union, the primary peacetime body for national security policy is the Defense Council. The Defense Council's authority covers virtually all major military issues, including strategic and nuclear weapons policy, international negotiation positions, weapons acquisition choices, shifts in military doctrine, and use of the armed forces.
his role as head of state and party. It would focus primarily on mobilizing the entire nation to support the war effort. In that capacity, the GKo-type organization would be the supreme wartime authority, defining Soviet objectives and allocating national resources to achieve those objectives.

It must be emphasized that these references to a GKo-type organization do not necessarily imply that a new organization would be created. The present peacetime Defense Council already has the legal basis and organizational resources needed for deciding and implementing strategic policy; however, this authority probably would be expanded in wartime. In the initial stages of war, it is likely that the Soviets would prefer to rely heavily on advance planning and preparations, with essential decisions reserved to Defense Council members.

Control over the actual military effort during wartime would rest with the Stavka (Headquarters) of the Supreme High Command (VGK). The military command organization would be subordinate to the GKo; the Supreme Commander in Chief would serve as chairman of the Stavka. The post was formerly held by Brezhnev and subsequently was held by General Secretary Andropov. It is not known which of the nation's senior military leaders would be included in the Stavka/VGK. Historical precedent suggests that probably the Minister of Defense, the three first deputy ministers, the Chief of the GS, the chief of the five services, and the deputy ministers for rear services and civil defense would be included. Whatever the actual membership of the Stavka, GS elements would constitute the principal source of staff support.

(U) As in the peacetime command structure, the GS acts as a critical link between the national command organization and the field units themselves. The GS would control the armed forces through intermediate-level commands established in the TVDs.

3. Military Districts

(U) The 16 military districts (MD) of the Soviet Union, not to be confused with the 15 union republics, serve as a geographical framework for military administrative purposes. The MDs are, in effect, a territorial extension of the MOD, encompassing various local military units and organizations (such as the military commissariats) and military-educational institutions. The main functions served by the MDs are training (both political and military) and mobilization. The MDs provide the organizational structure for the coordination and implementation of civil defense measures. The MDs also administer an extensive network of service and support organizations and facilities through their rear services and those branch and service representatives with rear services responsibilities. In the Western TVD, the primary MDs are the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian (figure 3).
4. The Structure of the Warsaw Pact (WP)

(U) The primary pro-Soviet multilateral military/political alliance is the Warsaw Pact, which encompasses the Western TVD. The Pact serves both as a counter to NATO and as a formal vehicle for the perpetuation of close ties between the Soviet Union and its six East European allies. Because it is a political and a military organization, the WP brings together both the heads of the signatory governments and their military representatives. This arrangement enables the Soviet Union, as the strongest member of the Pact, to wield an indisputable degree of control over the military forces of the other Pact countries. Bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance between the USSR and the six other signatories reinforce Soviet control over the collective defense of the area and enhance Moscow's political dominance. The Warsaw Pact is organized to provide the Soviets with the mechanisms needed to exercise unified control over the national security structures of the non-Soviet states.

(U) The Council of Defense Ministers (formed in 1969) is the senior military organ of the Pact; it is chaired by Soviet Marshal Kulikov and includes the deputy ministers of defense from the other Pact countries. Several Soviet military representatives also sit on the Council, most notably First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff Gribkov and the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General Podgornyy. The Council meets infrequently and actual operational control over the Combined Armed Forces of the WP is exercised through the Joint High Command (JHC) and its Staff. Kulikov heads that Command in his capacity as the First Deputy Minister of Defense for WP Affairs. Each Pact country has a senior military officer as a permanent representative on the JHC Staff. A Soviet general is assigned to each of the national high commands of the Pact countries as well, with the exception of Romania.

5. Soviet Groups of Forces

(U) Large concentrations of Soviet forces organized into four separate commands known as Groups of Forces (GOF) are present throughout Eastern Europe. This formal designation was adopted first in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in March 1954 after the "occupation" function of these Soviet troops theoretically was discontinued. Regardless of this change in title, Soviet forces continue to act as military occupation forces, with a mission to remind East Europeans of Soviet military strength. These forces have been used to crush revolts in the GDR (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). During a war, the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), the Northern Group of Forces, the Central Group of Forces, and perhaps even the Southern Group of Forces would generate fronts for combat operations in the Western TVD.

(U) The German Democratic Republic has the largest concentration of Soviet troops outside the Soviet Union. The importance of GSFG to the Soviet hierarchy is displayed by the fact that only seven positions in the Soviet military structure are designated glavnokomanduyushchiy, or commander in chief (CINC). These are the CINC's of the Warsaw Pact forces, the five Soviet services, and the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. The CINC of GSFG, General of the Army M. M. Zaytsev, is also a full member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
(U) Of the three other Groups of Forces, the Northern Group is located primarily in western Poland. The Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia is an outgrowth of the 1968 Soviet invasion of that country. The Southern Group of Forces is located in Hungary. In May 1957, following the Soviet invasion that crushed the Hungarian revolt of the previous year, the two governments signed an accord legalizing the continued presence of Soviet troops in Hungary.

B. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

1. General

Peacetime missions of those forces comprising the Western TVD include maintaining domestic order, retaining in power governments acceptable to the leadership of the USSR, training of personnel, preparing for rapid mobilization, and assuming full combat readiness.

In planning for a war against NATO, WP planners recognize that the decisive operations will occur in the Western TVD. Consequently, the WP maintains not only a large force in the area but one consisting of the most modern, best equipped, and most ready units. This is especially true of forces in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

2. Frontal Forces

Approximately 40 percent (92) of all active Warsaw Pact maneuver divisions are located in the Western TVD. Soviet and to a lesser extent, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NWSP) units in this TVD are usually the first to implement new structural changes on a large-scale basis and the first to field large numbers of newer models of equipment.

The force structure in the TVD has experienced steady growth over the past 10 years. The number of active tank and motorized rifle divisions has increased by three since 1970. Assessed peace-authorized personnel strengths have increased by about 175,000 over the same period, both as the result of new units being identified and changes in the structure of existing units. Newer items of equipment, such as the T-64 and T-72 medium tanks, self-propelled artillery, and SAM systems, have entered the force in large numbers over the past 10 years (figure 6). Noteworthy is the decline in numbers of T-64 tanks between 1970 and 1974, when they were removed from service due to reported engine problems, and the declining growth of both the T-64 and T-72 tanks beginning about 1980, probably portending the beginning of issue of the next Soviet tank to Soviet forces. The rate of introduction of the T-72 should increase, however, as Poland and Czechoslovakia begin coproduction of the T-72.

In the Western TVD, the number of main battle tanks has increased by about 7 percent since 1970, armored personnel carriers (less infantry combat vehicles) by 2 percent, artillery pieces by 61 percent, and antitank weapons by 107 percent. These rates are somewhat lower than comparative growth rates for the Warsaw Pact as a whole over the same period in all categories except antitank weapons (figure 7). Growth rates for the Warsaw Pact are influenced to some degree by the buildup along the Sino-Soviet border.
Overall, WP frontal forces in the TVD contain about 40 percent of all tanks (25,000) and an appreciable share of other weapons systems as shown in figure 8. Based on weighted equipment values (WEV), the Western TVD share of total force capability is slightly greater (figure 9) reflecting more modern weapon systems. WEV scores are determined using a methodology which awards values to various types of equipment based on their contribution to offensive combat. This methodology takes into account firepower, mobility, protection, and combat conditions. WEV scores allow units to be compared/analyzed based on qualitative factors (effectiveness of weapons assigned) as well as quantitative factors (number of weapons assigned).

The tank inventory for Soviet forces in the Western TVD is composed of 45 percent of the latest models (T-64 or T-72) as opposed to 25 percent of the total Soviet force. All Soviet divisions in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have a SAM-equipped air defense regiment, as does about one-third of the divisions in the Baltic, Carpathian, and Belorussian MDs. All Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe and about 90 percent in the western MDs have one BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiment. Over 65 percent of Soviet self-propelled artillery pieces (15,200) are found within units in the TVD, and about half of all Soviet attack helicopter regiments (14) are located in the Western TVD.

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces in the Western TVD are assessed to be the most modern in terms of equipment and organization among the NSWP. The Polish and GDR forces are the best trained and equipped of the NSWP countries and come closest to matching their Soviet counterparts. Although by GSFG standards they are still equipped primarily with older models of combat equipment, newer items such as T-72 tanks, SP artillery, and SA-6/SA-8 SAM systems are now entering the inventory.

Ground maneuver formations in the Western TVD can best be described as being organized and equipped to fight a fast-moving "blitzkrieg" type war against NATO forces on either a conventional or nuclear battlefield. They are tank heavy, although recent organizational changes have enhanced their capability and flexibility to conduct combined-arms operations. They are well equipped to provide their own air defense, with SAM systems ranging from the shoulder-fired SA-7/14 at company level through the SA-4 at army/front level, complemented by gun systems. Over 30 units ranging from jamming battalions to SIGINT brigades provide an excellent capability to engage in electronic warfare. Additionally, they are the best equipped and trained for chemical warfare in the world.

Although equipment within units in the Western TVD is the most modern of any potential TVD, there is still a mix of newer and older types and models among and within the various forces. This will burden and complicate maintenance and logistic operations. Most equipment, even that assigned to units in GSFG, is maintained in conservation storage and is not used on a day-to-day basis. Such a practice, while assuring maximum equipment availability at the start of any conflict, does not allow for full exercise of the maintenance system during peacetime. Whereas there are large standing conventional forces, most Soviet units in the western MDs,
plus many NSWP units, will require extensive mobilization and additional training before they could be committed with confidence to offensive operations. The mobilization system has never been fully tested.

The fielding of modern equipment with both Soviet and NSWP units in the Western TVD is projected to continue. The new Soviet 152-mm self-propelled gun 2S5 and the 152-mm M-1976 are being deployed within the Western TVD as a replacement for the 130-mm field gun M-46. They have since been identified in at least five units in the GSFG. Fourteen Soviet divisions are currently known to have the new SS-21 tactical surface-to-surface missile, all in the Western TVD (10 in GSFG and 4 in the western MDs). Organizationally nondivisional artillery units in the GSFG and the Belorussian MD are transitioning from a six-gun to an eight-gun battery structure. This change is also occurring in divisional artillery, both in the GSFG and the western MDs.

Frontal and Army Aviation units available for employment in the Western TVD, like their maneuver forces counterparts, are generally early recipients of the newest equipment. While total numbers of fixed-wing aircraft and associated personnel have remained fairly constant over the past years, there has been an almost total replacement of older aircraft with the latest models. In addition, there has been a significant increase in the number of attack, assault, and general-purpose helicopters at all levels of combined-arms command. Most recently these forces have undergone a force structure change to streamline the C^3 employment of air assets.

In addition to helicopters, modern FLOGGER B/G counterair fighters, FITTER C/D/H/K and FLOGGER D/J fighter-bombers, and FITTER H/K and FOXBAT B/D reconnaissance aircraft have entered service with aviation regiments throughout the region. FOXBAT E interceptors and FENCER deep strike aircraft are now stationed in the GDR and would be employed as frontal assets in wartime. The modernization process has resulted in the complete phase out of FIREBAR, FITTER A, FRESO, and most FISHBED aircraft from Soviet units. A few BREWER D/E aircraft retain reconnaissance and electronic warfare roles. The types and capability of aviation ordnance also have improved dramatically since the early 1970s, with the addition of a variety of air-launched missiles, including tactical air-to-surface and anti-radiation missiles (TASM and ARMs). Improved air-to-air missiles (AAMs), cluster bombs, and other specialized conventional munitions are also available.

Improvements in the East German, Czech, and Polish AFs have been less dramatic. Sizeable numbers of the FRESO, FACOT, BEAGLE, and older FISHBED aircraft remain, although later model FISHBEDs, FLOGGERs, and FITTERs of various types are entering the inventories. Some of the ordnance and munitions improvements appearing in Soviet aviation are beginning to reach NSWP units, but ASMs have yet to be provided. Improvements of NSWP helicopter forces likewise have been slow, with a small number of HINDs appearing to supplement existing HOUND, HIP, and HOPLITE units.
Additional significant resources available to Western TVD frontal forces include air assault brigades (assigned at front level) and battalions (at CA/T army level). These units give these commanders an additional option for conducting operations in depth and seizing key objectives in advance of overland forces. The establishment of Army Aviation in Western TVD fronts and front components provides these same commanders the helicopter airlift necessary to employ these forces in pursuit of assigned objectives. Air assault forces are available for early capture of enemy airfields or potential mobility obstacles such as bridges and river-crossing sites, road junctions, mountain passes, or other likely choke points. They also would be useful for raiding operations and neutralization of opposing nuclear weapons systems and C3I facilities. Their parachute assault capability allows them to deploy in the enemy rear from front or VTA fixed-wing transports as well as assigned helicopters. See table I for a summary of major frontal force elements assigned to the Western TVD.

3. Naval Forces

The Western TVD will be supported by the combined forces of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the Polish and East German Navies linked together in the joint forces structure of the Combined Baltic Fleet (CBF). The Combined Baltic Fleet would be commanded by the Commander of the Soviet Baltic Fleet—currently Admiral I. M. Kapitanets—who, in turn, would report to the TVD High Command. Portions of the CBF would be subordinated to the Northern Front commander when conducting operations in support of that front.

Combined Baltic Fleet surface assets are designed for operations in the closed seawaters of the Baltic; few are likely to deploy from this area in wartime. The fleet includes few principal surface combatants, but it does have a large number of patrol combatants and mine warfare units. All submarines, including six ballistic missile submarines assigned to the fleet, are conventionally powered.

a. Submarines

(1) Ballistic Missile

Since 1976, six GOLF II Class conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines (SSB) have been assigned to the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Likely targets for these units are in Europe, possibly naval bases. Choke points in the Baltic Sea offer an opportunity for ballistic missile antisurface ship strike operations; however, there is no evidence that the GOLF IIs will be used for this type target.

(2) Cruise Missile

Cruise missile submarines (SSG) assigned to the Soviet Baltic Fleet are of the older, conventionally powered WHISKEY LONG BIN, and JULIETT Classes. Their mission is antisurface ship attack, possibly including antiair carrier warfare (ACW) in the North Sea.
(3) Attack

The general-purpose attack submarines (SS) assigned to the fleet are also of older, conventionally powered classes, principally the WHISKEY Class. A few of the submarines could be expected to be deployed into the North Sea or its approaches to attack targets such as carriers and amphibious groups or to conduct barrier operations. They also probably will lay mines in the approaches to the Danish Straits. In the Baltic, SSs would be a part of the mixed naval force tasked with countering the eastward movement of NATO units.

b. Surface Combatants

Combined Baltic Fleet surface forces are designed for operations in the close-in waters of the Baltic Sea. Based on normal operating and training patterns, most surface ships would remain in the Baltic to participate in sea supremacy operations, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW), disruption of NATO minelaying, and protection of Warsaw Pact sea lines of communication. CBF surface combatants also would provide naval gunfire support of amphibious operations.

(1) Patrol Combatants

A large number of missile-equipped patrol combatants and coastal patrol craft are assigned to the CBF. These units would have the primary mission of countering a NATO eastward advance and supporting CBF offensive operations.

(2) Amphibious Warfare Ships

The fleet has substantial assets for transporting amphibious assault forces in support of the Northern Front. These include landing ships and craft and air cushion vehicles. Merchant ships, both conventional cargo and roll-on/roll-off, also will be used mainly to transport follow-on forces.

(3) Mine Warfare Ships

Warsaw Pact military writings stress the disruption of minelaying operations as the most effective mine countermeasure. Failing this, the CBF would use more than 200 mine warfare ships and craft to clear NATO offensive and defensive mines.

c. Naval Air

The Combined Baltic Fleet Air Force would have the major responsibility for antishipping attacks against NATO surface ships in the Baltic and North Seas. Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) units also will participate in minelaying operations (particularly in straits areas), ASW operations in conjunction with naval surface forces, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare operations.


**SECRET**

**d. Naval Order of Battle**

(U) Table 2 provides the naval order of battle for the Baltic.

4. **Air Defense Forces**

a. **Reorganization**

A major reorganization of the Soviet Air and Air Defense Forces beginning in 1978 has resulted in changes to both Soviet Air Forces and PVO Strany. For the most part, the new structure features a realignment of air and air defense assets positioned in the peripheral military districts of the Soviet Union. This restructuring enhances the Soviet capability for a more timely transition from peacetime to wartime posture and improved operational command through centralization of force authority at the front and theater echelons. At the national level, the reorganized PVO Strany has been designated Voyska PVO, meaning air defense forces.

The consolidation of Soviet air defense units in the Western TVD merges the control of the ground-based tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAM), strategic SAMs, and air surveillance assets. These SAMs and air surveillance radar units are controlled by the MD commander of the GOF commander through the air defense (AD) of the MD or the AD of the GOF. (Military District control of strategic SAMs in some MDs has been authorized in only part of the MD. The term Air Defense Area (ADA) has been introduced to describe the area within the MD where strategic SAMs are controlled by the MD commander; for the Western TVD, ADAs coincide with the MDs.)

In these same peripheral areas, interceptor units have been removed from the old PVO system and combined with most of the former Frontal Aviation (FA) units to form the Air Forces (AF) of the MD. Although many units within the AF of the MD may retain their pre-reorganization mission as their primary mission, the MD or front commander may now allocate his air resources more flexibly in accordance with his needs in a particular situation.

b. **Air Defense Structure**

As shown previously in figure 5, the Western TVD includes three Soviet MDs and the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These are also the geographic boundaries of the air defense units subordinate to the Western TVD. As a result of the reorganization, it is difficult to define which air units will be used in an air defense role. Indeed, some units may be used for air defense during part of the war or for strike or strike support at other times. When a front is formed, it is anticipated that the mobile SAMs and radars integral to armies, divisions, and regiments will deploy out of the MDs, leaving behind strategic homeland air defense units under the control of a residual MD command.

**SECRET**
A similar situation occurs for the tactical and strategic air formations within the TVD. Units with a primary tactical air mission most likely will move forward with the front, while the aircraft with a strategic intercept role will remain to protect MD areas. The MD air defense commander or the national air defense HQ of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia each has three major operational components for air defense: interceptor aircraft, SAMs, and air surveillance radar units. The structure provides for point defense of airfields and important industrial centers and area defense of ground force formations, national territorial airspace, and the air approaches to the Soviet Union.

c. Organization

Each NSWP country is perceived as a Soviet air defense district (ADD) for purposes of air defense. Even in the reorganized MDs, air defense continues to be controlled through air defense zones (ADZ). Each MD or ADD usually is subdivided into two or three ADZs. Full operational authority probably is delegated to the air defense weapons operations center (ADWOC) that usually is located at a bunkered zone level headquarters. It is believed that the ADZ HQ also includes a filter center for collating, selecting, and forwarding pertinent air surveillance tracking data and a communications center. The ADZ HQ operationally can control subordinate SAM regiments and brigades and fighter regiments.

A senior GCI controller is located at the ADZ level and coordinates fighter operations through regimental tactical controllers (RTC) at each fighter base and fighter direction post (FDP) located at designated radar sites. Some weapons control centers below the ADZ have been consolidated. These combined command posts (CP) have been established to improve coordination of AD weapons and to reduce the overall vulnerability of an ADZ in the event the ADZ command post is neutralized or destroyed. By collocating a radar filter center at each combined CP, the weapons controllers benefit from some near real-time tracking data even when the ADZ is nonoperational. The air defense district, zone, combined command posts, SAM brigade/regiment, and fighter regiment control centers usually are protected by underground bunkers and are linked by landline and various types of aboveground communications.

d. Command, Control, and Communications C^3

Air defense assets of the Western TVD are directed through a series of command, control, and communications (C^3) nodes which are located in bunkered primary and alternate command posts or deployed in highly mobile vehicles. It is believed that the bunkered facilities control operations of the air defense units that remain at or near their peacetime locations. Mobile CPs add flexibility in maintaining command and control of the various air and air defense units.

Communications support for air and air defense forces is highly redundant, creating the optimum possibility of communications survivability. Landline is in place and is the most secure and reliable mode of communication. Multichannel voice, HF, UHF, VHF, and troposcatter are also used.
(1) Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)

Strategically employed SAMs are organized into regimental or brigade structures which are, in turn, subordinate to division level ADZs. The number and type of units subordinate to a SAM regiment or brigade can vary significantly. The number of regiments and brigades subordinate to an ADZ also may vary. A SAM regiment typically will control some 3 to 6 SA-2 and/or SA-3 battalions, while a brigade typically will control more battalions than the regiment and usually include SA-5 units. Brigades frequently are seen in defense of primary penetration corridors and priority target areas.

As noted, the SA-5 is often integrated into the SAM brigade structure with SA-2 and/or SA-3 battalions. Although this is the predominant structure, the SA-5 may be deployed remotely, having no other SAM units in the area, as an independent regiment directly subordinate to the ADZ headquarters.

To help cope with the modern air threat (low-altitude, high-speed penetration) and to facilitate the management of their increased air defense resources, the Soviets are emphasizing automated command and control systems such as ASURK and Vektor-2, supported by expanded communications systems. Such systems can aid the regimental or brigade commander in making near-real-time target assignments. It is believed that a semi-automatic command and control system will become the primary means of C^3 in all, or virtually all, strategic SAM regiments and brigades in the near future. Furthermore, the ASURK probably is being replaced as the primary automated C^3 system, a shift which began in the early 1970s, probably as a result of the increased reliability, accuracy, and capacity of the newer system.

Several benefits can be derived from such a C^3 network. Among these are more efficient battle management, more precise resource allocation, and more accurate data transfer. Another important benefit is the timely passing of tracking data to the firing sites, allowing the firing site to shift its fire control radar in a more efficient maneuver to a target's projected path and altitude. In this mode, the site could remain "radar silent" until the target could be engaged, thus delaying the target's knowledge of impending attack and thereby delaying evasive or countermeasure reactions.

(2) Aircraft

Each of the airfields which houses aircraft primarily dedicated to air defense is equipped with navigation aids, including precision approach radars, instrument landing systems, air traffic control communications, and surveillance radars; some also have height finders. These facilities are common to most Warsaw Pact airfields that are in continuous operation.
The fighter regiment headquarters normally is located at or near the airfield, and ready rooms are maintained for the pilots on alert duty for possible scrambling. The regimental CPs from which the fighters are controlled usually are located in a bunker at the airfield. The minimum radar equipment at the regimental CP probably is an early warning radar and a height finder. The regimental CP normally will pass the fighter to an outlying fighter direction post (FDP) which will vector the intercept. The capability of a given FDP is limited by the available communications and supporting radars.

Ground controllers communicate with airborne fighters using clear text HF/VHF/UHF voice transmissions or the visually displayed "LAZUR" data link system. All of the later generation aircraft assigned to fighter aviation regiments are assumed to carry "LAZUR" receivers and data display consoles. Also, probably all RCPs and FDPs in the forward area are LAZUR-equipped.

5. Strategic Nuclear Assets
   
   a. Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)

   An extensive force of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM/IRBM) launchers is deployed in the three western MDs (Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian) of the western USSR and is believed to be intended primarily for use against Western Europe. Currently there are 216 SS-4 MRBMs, and 135 SS-20 mobile IRBMs deployed in the three western MDs. Eight SS-4 and 18 SS-20 launchers are located in the Kiev MD. For purposes of this scenario the 90 SS-20 launchers in the Ural MD have been allocated to the Southern TVD--subject to change depending upon the situation faced by the Soviets. Table 3 provides a breakout of the MRBM/IRBM force.

   In addition to the significant assets of the MRBM/IRBM force, the Soviets have the option of employing a portion of their ICBMs in a peripheral role, if conditions warrant.

   b. Naval Systems

   Employment of ballistic missile submarines (YANKEE, DELTA, and TYPHOON) for SLBM strikes in support of operations in the Western TVD would be at the decision of, and under the direction of, the Soviet VGK. Although DELTA and TYPHOON SSBN Classes could strike theater targets if necessary, it is believed that these platforms are intended for intercontinental strike and as a strategic reserve. However, unlike the DELTA and TYPHOON SSBNs, a portion of the YANKEE SSBN force--probably at least two units--is estimated to be dedicated to continental theater strike missions. Fifteen YANKEE Class SSBNs (14 YANKEE I and 1 YANKEE II) are currently operational in the Northern Fleet (NORFLT). All of these platforms are home-ported at Sayda Cuba submarine base on the Kola Peninsula.
c. Air Armies of the VGK

Three of the five air armies of the Supreme High Command (VGK) would participate in Western TVD operations. At one time or another aircraft from the Smolensk, Legnica, and Vinnitsa Air Armies would be allocated to perform a variety of functions. Air army assets include medium bombers, fighters, fighter-bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. The Soviets view these forces as the basic shock elements of the initial air operation in the Western TVD. Their unique structure and organization enable these air armies to be employed rapidly wherever a need for massive firepower is required, regardless of location or local command responsibility. As VGK assets, they may operate directly under the authority of the VGK or under subordinate command levels as the VGK directs.

The deployment of such aircraft as BACKFIRE, FENCER, FLOGGER, and FOXBAT has made the air armies potent forces with good combat capabilities. Only the BADGER, BLINDER, and BREWER aircraft are relatively old. These aircraft can deliver a variety of munitions, including the latest bombs and missiles to operational and strategic targets. With FOXBAT and FENCER reconnaissance aircraft, the Soviets can provide intelligence collection coverage to the same depth as the strike operations.

6. Other Forces

a. Soviet Airborne (VDV) and Military Transport Aviation (VTA)

Airborne units allocated to the Western TVD, along with supporting VTA elements, are administratively supported in peacetime by the MD in which they are located. In peacetime, two airborne divisions are located in the Baltic MD.

b. Internal Security

The KGB (Committee for State Security) constitutes the principal forces by which the CPSU sustains its control over Soviet society. The KGB has several responsibilities, including intelligence collection and warning, internal and border security, covert operations, and leadership protection. Certain of these tasks are unique to the KGB. Others parallel the activities of ministerial entities, as in the case of communications. The KGB operates a highly centralized command structure from its Moscow headquarters down to local departments. Through this apparatus the Politburo is able to exert its power over all forms of activity within the USSR.

Regulation of the public order, as opposed to state security, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The MVD maintains national police and firefighting forces and operates the nation's prison system. Some MVD militia units also supplement KGB border troops and would be integrated into the civil defense service during wartime.
In the Western Border Guards District, which includes the three MDs in the Western TVD, the Soviets have both KGB border detachments and MVD divisions deployed. There are 17 KGB border detachments in the Western Border Guard District, with numerous small elements throughout the MDs. There are possibly two full MVD divisions assigned to the district, as well as additional MVD regiments.

7. Logistic Resources

a. General

The rear service infrastructure supporting the Western TVD incorporates a large and diverse number of multinational logistic units and resources ranging from tactical to strategic level. More specifically, the military logistic establishments of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies are divided into three support elements: the tactical, operational, and central rear services. Tactical rear services directly support units of division size (or their equivalent) and below, and are organic to tactical units. The operational rear services are tasked to provide logistic support to armies, fronts, or fleets and are included in the composition of such operational groupings. Most logistic resources, however, are found in the central rear services, which comprise the strategic logistic components of the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) Armed Forces. The central logistic components of each Warsaw Pact military establishment include a variety of rear services units, depots, and facilities capable of providing all kinds of logistic support. That is, within the central rear services there are motor transport, maintenance, recovery and evacuation, traffic control, lines of communication, construction and repair, security, medical and other units; ammunition, fuel, technical supply, major end item, clothing, ration, and other storage depots; and maintenance fabrication, medical, and other facilities. In addition to those logistic units and resources which are organizationally a part of the armed forces, all Warsaw Pact states have provisions for incorporating mobilized resources from their national economies into their central (as well as tactical and operational) rear services. These resources may be used to constitute logistic units or augment materiel holdings. The central rear services also receive newly produced materiel from the national economies for storage or distribution. A portion of the State Reserves in at least some Warsaw Pact countries is designated for use by the central rear services as well.

Central rear service resources are controlled operationally and/or administratively in peacetime by Ministry of Defense organizations and directorates, by force component headquarters or main directorates, and military districts. In wartime, central rear services would constitute in large measure, the reserves of the VGK and the NSWP High Commands. Central logistic assets also may be allocated to the Western TVD commander or to operational groupings within the TVD.

Central logistic organizations stock and supply huge quantities of military materiel and perform a variety of logistic functions in strategic rear areas. They serve as the link between Warsaw Pact national economies and deployed operational groupings, while at the same
time serving as the strategic reserve of logistic resources for Warsaw Pact forces. Central rear service responsibilities extend far beyond serving as national military resource pools or supply conduits for materiel produced by national economies. That is, central rear service components are expected to deploy and support directly operational formations in TVDs, and also are designated as the principal means of providing logistic support to national units and formations which become part of coalition armies, fronts, and fleets.

b. **Rear Service Logistic Assets in the Western TVD**

Logistics resources have been accumulated, echeloned, and prepositioned in peacetime within the Western TVD. A number of reasons for this are cited by Pact planners. It is recognized, for example, that the destruction of industrial facilities in a nuclear war could severely limit wartime production and the subsequent resupply of material items. The possibility of industrial destruction, then, is an integral factor in determining the amount of reserves to be stored in tactical, operational, and central-level depots and prepositioned within the Western TVD. Other factors that determine the amount of stocks to be accumulated, and the requirement for their echelonnement and prepositioning include: the distance of the TVD from the USSR, projected expenditure rates, allowances for contingencies, required level of reserves, and—particularly in light of enemy interdiction means—the potential of LOCs and the transportation system to provide uninterrupted materiel support.

In recognition of these factors, the Warsaw Pact has established large prepositioned stockpiles of consumable supplies for all command levels, to include stocks subordinate to Pact central rear services organizations. DIA's estimate of ammunition and POL stocks within the Western TVD is shown in table 4. It is not known what portion of these stocks is centrally subordinated. One early Soviet proposal was for prepositioned stocks of central subordination to be maintained at two echelons—in the "border zone" (NSWP countries and the border districts—MDs) and in the USSR interior MDs. Specifically, the proposal called for 50 to 60 percent of total prepositioned central stocks to be maintained in the border zone, with the remaining 40 to 50 percent retained in the USSR interior MDs. Numerous central depots and units have been identified in the USSR itself. Additionally, it appears that substantial prepositioned logistic resources in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR—both Soviet and NSWP—are centrally subordinated. It is believed that at least in part these centrally subordinated stocks are designated to constitute the rear service reserves of the Western TVD commander.

c. **Transportation Assets**

Highway, water, and air transportation means may supplement rail supply to the forward areas. In estimating the extent to which various transport means will be used, the following is projected by Soviet planners:
-- Eighty to 85 percent of the total shipments may be carried by rail in a nuclear environment, with some 90 to 100 percent of total quantities shipped by rail in nonnuclear operations.

-- Ten to 15 percent of the total may be shipped by motor transport.

-- Five to 10 percent may be transported by water means. Air transport probably would be limited to the shipment of high priority items such as missiles and critical medical supplies.

(8) The mobilized avtokolony motor transport assets will provide the majority of highway movement of supplies to the forward area (see chapter 4, section 3). The Soviets, however, recognizing that the strategic movement of armored forces by rail is increasingly vulnerable, have developed an additional strategic land transport capability. The three heavy-lift transport regiments that would be committed in the Western TVD have the capability to lift the armor assets of 50 Soviet tank battalions (31 tanks per battalion) from the Soviet Union across Eastern Europe to staging areas opposite NATO forces in 48 hours or less. These fully fueled and combat-loaded vehicles would arrive ready for immediate commitment to battle.

d. Role of the Military District in Logistics Operations

(5) The military districts in the Western TVD are assigned a major role in war effort support as the control for the process of reconstitution of military forces as well as civil defense and territorial air defense.

(3) During the period of hostilities the peacetime MD commander directs front assets, while a residual MD commander assumes responsibility for the successful conduct of reconstitution, civil defense, MD air/air defense, and rear services efforts. It is essential that the MD commander during wartime coordinates mobilization plans, deployment of field forces, and rear services with the operations of civil defense and air/air defense.

(4) Successful accomplishment of the MD mission during wartime depends to a large extent on the pre-war coordination of various MD assets. As military units deploy to assembly areas and disperse logistic stocks, and civil defense elements carry out extensive evacuation plans, the likelihood of transportation problems, for instance, takes on increased intensity. The Soviets have realized the integration of MD assets during peacetime at MD and subordinate levels will help ease the transition to a wartime period.

(7) Nuclear strikes will compound the problems of, and increase the need for, close coordination among MD elements. This will result in enormous responsibilities on the residual MD forces to provide extensive operations and to replace the potentially large amount of neutralized elements supporting mobilization, civil defense, and other MD missions.
Since the military district maintains the overall control of non-frontal assets during war, it becomes evident the MD is assigned an important role in the Soviet strategy for stabilizing rear echelon activities. As such, the MD may be assessed a priority mode in the conduct of successful Soviet/Warsaw Pact military operations.
CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT AND TRANSITION TO WAR

A. THEATER STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The Warsaw Pact theater force structure is controlled by the Soviet General Staff. A High Command of Forces in the Western TVD probably is set up to control operations within the geographic boundaries of the TVD. It occupies a bunkered facility and communicates via an extensive array of fixed and mobile communications facilities. Major wartime assets of the TVD probably include up to five fronts, the Combined Baltic Fleet, and the various national air defense forces. The latter are located in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in the western MDs of the USSR and are organized into a coherent, integrated air defense system under theater control. The Supreme High Command (VKG) probably retains control of certain forces that can be used to support TVD operations. These include the SS-4, and -20 MR/IRBM forces in the western USSR, the Legnica and Smolensk Air Armies, airborne forces, and front assets that include a sixth front held as an element of the reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK).

The Soviets organize theater forces into operational echelons in the theater. This refers to the deployment of theater forces in depth in accordance with the TVD commander's plan of operations. The first operational echelon consists of fronts, separate armies, and other groupings that initiate operations. The second operational echelon consists of forces in the interior of the TVD which are to be introduced into battle after D-day to sustain the offensive. The roles of second operational echelon formations include: reinforcing or providing replacements for first operational echelon formations; exploiting the success of first operational echelon formations on the main axes and helping secure subsequent operational and strategic objectives; initiating operations on new axes; and defending against deep enemy penetrations. In the Western TVD, the first operational echelon consists of three fronts formed from forces based in the forward area (GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) and drawn from air, missile, and fleet assets. The first-echelon fronts are as follows:

-- The Northern Front is composed primarily of Polish forces; its headquarters staff is drawn from the Polish Ministry of Defense. It is deployed in wartime to northern GDR and attacks into northern FRC, the Netherlands, and Denmark. It also is tasked to seize the Danish Straits in conjunction with airborne and amphibious operations. Under some contingencies, the Northern Front is not part of the first operational echelon. If preparation time is lacking, the Pact may initiate an attack with only two fronts formed from forces based in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The Northern Front would be committed to battle several days after D-day. In this situation, the front is part of the second operational echelon.
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--- The Central Front is formed from GSFG, NCF, and East German forces, with its headquarters staff drawn from the GSFG headquarters. This front will conduct the main theater attack across central FRG into Belgium, the southern Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

--- The Southwestern Front is composed of Czechoslovak forces; its headquarters staff is drawn from the Czechoslovak western MD headquarters. The Soviet CCF, organized as an army, is also assigned. The front's mission is to attack from Czechoslovakia into southern FRG and secure objectives on the FRG-Swiss-Austrian border (appendix A contains a detailed troop list of forces assigned to the fronts).

Ground maneuver forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs are the primary constituents of the second operational echelon. Some forces in these MDs will be assigned to the first-echelon fronts. The bulk of forces will be used to form additional fronts. The Soviets refer to these as second-echelon and reserve fronts. Second-echelon fronts are force organizations planned to be committed at a preplanned time and place. This planning normally is highly generalized prior to D-day but is refined as the theater campaign progresses. In the Western TVD, at least two such fronts (a Belorussian, a Carpathian, and, under some contingencies, a Baltic Front) will be formed. These fronts will be formed from MD assets, including the front headquarters and combat formations. (An MD headquarters will continue to exist and perform vital functions.) Significantly, until just prior to commitment to combat, these fronts are not organized for combat with a complete, planned force structure. Some first-echelon forces will be assigned to the control of a second-echelon front prior to the front's commitment in order to facilitate the front's entry into combat. Likewise, the front will have virtually no fixed-wing (and few combat helicopter) aviation units until commitment. It is not assessed that these combat aviation units in the western MDs will be assigned initially to the second-echelon fronts, that is, withheld from combat until those fronts are committed. Instead, they will be assigned, as appropriate, to the first-echelon fronts or retained under MD control. The front will have some helicopter units and aviation staffs so that future aviation operations can be planned and coordinated. However, the required aviation units will be assigned only shortly before the planned commitment of the front. Therefore, fronts of the second echelon, while they are mobilizing and preparing deploying forward, and waiting in concentration areas behind the first-echelon fronts, are incomplete fronts whose force structures will be expanded prior to commitment.

Reserve fronts are elements of the Supreme High Command (VKG) or possibly theater reserves, and prior to the commencement of the theater operations, are not assigned a time and place for commitment. They will be assigned missions in response to unplanned developments in the Western or adjoining TVDs. A typical mission may be to replace a first-echelon front rendered ineffective by enemy nuclear strikes. Prior to commitment, a reserve front has a smaller force structure than a second-echelon front. It may be no more than a skeleton of command and control and combat support units to which only a few maneuver units are assigned. A Baltic Front may be formed as a reserve front.

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B. TRANSITION TO WAR

Warren Pact ground maneuver forces must go through a particular set of processes to proceed from peacetime to wartime status. This process could include mobilization, training, movement to wartime deployment areas, final preparations, and final deployment for combat. The readiness of various elements of the Pact force structure varies greatly. Some units are maintained in a high readiness state and can complete the force generation process rather quickly. Other ground maneuver forces are maintained at a low readiness status and take 30 days or more to prepare for commitment.

In the Western TVD, Pact forces that constitute the first operational echelon are maintained at a relatively high readiness level. This reflects the Soviet leadership's practice of maintaining forces at high readiness in areas of potential threat. In contemplating an attack on NATO, the Soviets may consider initiating a quick attack with forward-based forces organized into two to three fronts supported by air defense, aviation, missile, and selected naval forces. Such an attack could be conducted in as little as 4 days and would hope to catch NATO unawares and unprepared. However, in other situations it may choose to make more extensive preparations to insure that its forces are fully prepared. Specifically, it would attempt to assure that its second operational echelon elements, which are kept at a lower readiness in peacetime, are mobilized, trained, and deployed so that they are available for commitment when and where required in the theater campaign. The force generation process described in the next section applies to the second situation.

C. FORCE GENERATION

Units within the Western TVD must undergo a period of preparation before they are able to conduct wartime operations. The time a unit requires to complete this preparation is closely related to its peacetime manning and equipment levels. Specifically, the time for a unit or force to complete each of the following is its aggregate force generation time line.

-- Mobilization and dispersal is the time required to alert a unit, complete recall of assigned personnel, review and initiate operations plans, and move the unit to a field dispersal location.

-- Postmobilization training and preparation is any time used to train mobilized personnel and prepare the unit for combat. This training is expected to take place after the expansion of the unit to its wartime manning, whether by selective callup or general mobilization.

-- Movement time is that time required to move a force from its field dispersal location to an assembly area in the operational rear of a theater of employment.

-- Final preparation time allows a unit to replenish its stocks of ammunition and fuel, replace any casualties, complete maintenance, and, importantly, fully integrate itself into the command structure of the theater, front, and army in which it is to serve.
Deployment to combat is the time required to move a unit from its assembly area in the operational rear to its zone of employment.

The mechanism which the Warsaw Pact utilizes to control the mobilization process whereby units transition from normal peacetime status to full wartime manning and equipment levels is a formal alert system made up of four stages.* These stages and their associated activities are outlined below:

- **Constant Combat Readiness** is the normal peacetime readiness level of Pact forces.

- **Increased Combat Readiness.** Activities conducted when this readiness level is declared include increased communication activities, increased security at the garrison, cancellation of leaves, ceasing of training activity, the acceleration of equipment maintenance, and the augmentation of hardened command posts by operations groups of predesignated personnel from peacetime garrison headquarters.

- **Readiness for Threat of War.** Units disperse from garrison of peacetime stations and prepare to receive reservists. Wartime C³ systems are activated.

- **Full Combat Readiness.** Reservists are augmented into units and units are fully prepared, as appropriate, for either combat, movement to anticipated combat zones, or training.

1. **Frontal Forces**

The Warsaw Pact maintains units at varying degrees of readiness in peacetime. Pact leaders believe that the readiness of forces in peacetime should be sufficient to insure their ability to undertake combat missions within prescribed time limits. They maintain their most combat-ready formations in Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent, along the Soviet western and eastern borders.

Pact readiness standards stipulate required quantitative and qualitative levels for manning, equipment, and unit training as peacetime measures of unit readiness. It is assessed that the readiness of Pact divisions is primarily based on peace-authorized versus war-authorized personnel and equipment levels.

The Warsaw Pact divides its units into two broad categories: "ready" and "not ready." Within these two broad categories, various manning levels can be discerned. The US Intelligence Community currently classifies active maneuver divisions as full-strength ready (FSR), reduced-strength ready (level I) (RSR-I), reduced-strength ready (level II) (RSR-II), high-

* The orderly transition of units through each stage of the alert system reflects deliberate preparations for war where the Pact has some control over events.
strength cadre (HSC), and low-strength cadre (LSC). FSR, RSR-I, and RSR-II units are considered "ready," and HSC and LSC units are "not ready" (or cadred). Mobilization bases which are inactive constitute the sixth manning level and also fall into the "not ready" category. A detailed description of the six manning levels of the current system is as follows:

--- Full-Strength Ready Divisions. Full-strength ready divisions do not require mobilization with reservists and have all their authorized equipment.

--- Reduced-Strength Ready Divisions. There are two general manning variations within these divisions--some are manned normally between 70 and 85 percent of wartime strength (RSR-I), others--normally from 55 to 70 percent of wartime strength (RSR-II). Internal manning patterns within these divisions also vary. Some divisions typically maintain one or more maneuver regiments and other selected units (such as the surface-to-air missile regiment and the FROG battalion) at, or near, wartime-authorized strength, while other elements are manned at much lower levels. In other divisions, one battalion in each maneuver regiment may be manned at, or near, wartime strength, while the other battalions are manned at reduced or cadre strength.

--- Cadre Divisions. There are two general manning variations--normally between 25 and 40 percent of wartime strength (HSC) and from 5 to 25 percent of wartime strength (LSC). Cadre tank divisions often are manned between 25 and 40 percent because of greater maintenance and crew requirements for tanks. All command positions at company level and above are filled, and sufficient enlisted personnel are available to maintain equipment in storage. Peacetime manning in cadre divisions generally limits training to the company level or, at best, battalion level except when reservists are mobilized to participate in field training exercises. Many low-strength cadre divisions would require the mobilization of 10,000 or more reservists to achieve their wartime-authorized manning levels.

--- Mobilization Base Divisions are division-configured equipment sets maintained in storage. They are unmanned in peacetime, but could be converted to active divisions by mobilizing reservists.

Units must undergo a period of preparation (which includes alert, dispersal, and mobilization) before they are able to conduct wartime operations. The time a unit requires to complete this preparation is related to its peacetime manning level. Therefore, unit preparation time is described on the basis of five levels in active divisions plus mobilization bases.

By examining alert, dispersal, and mobilization procedures within divisions, mobilization time lines have been developed for each of the five categories of active divisions plus mobilization bases. The time required for completion of alert, dispersal, and mobilization ranges from 1.5–2.5 days for full-strength ready divisions to 7–9 days for mobilization bases.
In addition to the alert, dispersal, and mobilization process, Warsaw Pact divisions may initiate a training program to achieve unit cohesion and improve their combat potential prior to commitment to combat. Postulated training programs have been developed based on the premise that mobilized divisions will complete a postmobilization training program that complements their peacetime training program. In addition to the time required for alert, dispersal, and mobilization, it is assessed that divisions would require postmobilization training of 4-5 days for reduced-strength ready-II units and up to 19-33 days for not-ready units, if they are to perform proficiently in offensive operations in a mid- to high-intensity combat environment. Full-strength ready and reduced-strength ready (I) divisions require no additional training. Combining the time for alert, dispersal, and mobilization with postmobilization training yields the overall force generation time lines shown in table 5.

Newly mobilized nondivisional units also require some training to attain sufficient proficiency to carry out their missions, except full-strength ready nondivisional units in the groups of forces, which require no training. Units held at reduced-strength ready status require only several days of individual refresher training in addition to time for mobilization. Units held in cadre or mobilization base status require varying types of individual refresher and unit training. Reservists integrated into some nondivisional units have identical civilian and military specialties and thus require little more than several days of refresher training. Most other combat support units require training to the company level; some, including artillery and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units, require unit training to battalion level. By analogy with the divisions, the following times are ascribed to nondivisional unit training:

- Individual refresher training—4 to 5 days.
- Company/battery-level training—8 to 18 days.
- Battalion-level training—19 to 30 days.

Location of training. Training can be carried out near peacetime garrison locations, in forward concentration areas after movement has been completed, or in training areas in a third location. The Soviets follow four modes for the location and sequence of training. Soviet selection of mode depends on many factors, including the availability of training facilities, the degree of desired concealment, and Soviet perceptions of the outbreak of war. In addition, various combinations of modes may be employed. These four modes are outlined below:

- Training conducted near garrison with troops housed in garrison. In this mode the division remains highly vulnerable to enemy air or missile strikes. However, its preparation activity is very unobtrusive and hard to distinguish from normal peacetime activity. Selected cadre and reduced-strength ready divisions in a situation of selective and phased preparations may train in this mode early in a crisis or preparation period to attempt to deny early warning to the enemy.
Training conducted near garrison after redeployment to dispersal areas. This mode is used if the Soviets believe that it will not be necessary to commit a unit to combat in the near future, and often it is used in conjunction with other modes. This mode reduces vulnerability to air or missile strikes but increases the probability of enemy detection because the garrison is empty. If training is conducted in the dispersal areas, it often involves only a portion of the unit's training program. For example, individual refresher training may be conducted in dispersal areas, followed by movement to a distant training area for the duration of training.

Training conducted at concentration areas after forward movement has been completed. Training is conducted in concentration areas when Soviet assessment of the imminence of hostilities requires the immediate availability of forces for commitment to combat.

Training conducted at a major training area away from garrison. This mode may be employed by some units to prepare for a war with NATO. Highly effective training can be conducted in major training areas having prepared ranges, maneuver areas, and other facilities.

Command, Control, and Communications Structure. Upon mobilization, divisions and nondivisional units would be integrated into an army- and front-level command and control structure prior to commitment or forward deployment. The Soviets recognize the importance of the command and control system and believe that it should be maintained at a level of readiness somewhat higher than that of its subordinate troop units. DIA estimates it would require about 3 to 5 days to fully establish the front/army command and control structure of a front formed from the groups of forces in Eastern Europe. In the internal military districts of the USSR, which have to mobilize and train supporting units, it would take roughly 7 to 10 days to establish a full front command and control structure.

Front-level headquarters do not exist in peacetime; in wartime, they would be organized from the headquarters elements of groups of forces or military districts. Those headquarters designated to form wartime fronts have the necessary personnel in peacetime to establish the wartime front staff. Front staffs are normally supported by a front signal regiment or brigade which establishes a front command post communications center; a rear CP signal regiment which provides communications for the rear services; and numerous radio-relay, wire and tropospheric-scatter battalions that provide multichannel communications among the CPs and to subordinate units. In addition, a security and service regiment provides transport, security, and logistic support for the staff. These supporting units are maintained at full strength in the groups of forces, but at reduced-strength ready or cadre levels in the USSR.

The Soviets maintain tank and combined-arms armies in peacetime with staffs controlling subordinate units. Armies generally are supported by a command post signal regiment, a signal battalion, and a security and service battalion. As with front units, in the groups of forces these units are maintained at full-strength and at reduced-strength or high-strength cadre levels in the USSR.
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In peacetime, the headquarters of Soviet military districts, groups of forces, and armies maintain numerous facilities to support a smooth transition to a wartime structure. Hardened command posts, manned by small shifts of duty personnel and located near garrison headquarters, provide sheltered locations to which staffs can deploy and control the mobilization and dispersal process. These wartime CPs have functioning radio, radio-relay, and landline communications to garrison locations and to superior and subordinate CPs. In addition, the groups of forces in Germany and Czechoslovakia maintain complex fixed radio-relay systems including many bunkered sites that can be converted rapidly to wartime front-level communications structures.

A front logistics structure also would be established to fully prepare the front for wartime operations. Preparations of the logistics structure include the mobilization of motor transport, medical, maintenance, and other logistic units, the setting up of army and front bases, and the outloading of supplies from fixed peacetime depots into those bases. Divisions normally carry 3 to 5 days of ammunition and POL loaded on their organic transport and thus can operate that long without resupply.

The movement of forces from garrisons or dispersal areas to concentration or departure areas in the theater is part of the force generation process which the Soviets refer to as the "strategic concentration of the armed forces." This is defined as the process whereby forces are assembled in TVDs in accordance with their operational and strategic missions. Frontal forces in the forward area have to accomplish relatively short moves to reach their wartime concentration areas. They will use primarily their own resources. The concentration of the remaining forces is accomplished by the massed movement of forces from the interior of the USSR, primarily by rail and motor transport. Strategic concentration is accomplished partially in peacetime; that is, first operational echelon forces are located near their planned areas of commitment. The process is completed by moving the remainder of the forces either just prior to a war, at its outbreak, or during the war.

Redeployment of forces will be accomplished by what the Pact refers to as combined movement, involving simultaneous use of several different modes of transportation—rail, road movement on organic wheels and tracks, and road movement with tracked vehicles carried on lowboy-type tank transporters. For long-distance moves from the western MDs to forward concentration areas, the Soviets prefer rail transportation to reduce wear and tear on equipment and troop fatigue. However, they realize that this may not be possible, particularly if the movement takes place after D-day. The Soviets expect their rail system to be heavily damaged by enemy nuclear strikes. They expect bridges, road, and rail junctions to be destroyed and obstacles to be created by contamination, floods, and ruins. Therefore, they believe that their forces will be required to move by a variety of means, including deployment over roads with tracked vehicles loaded on tank transporters.
The strategic concentration of the armed forces will be supported by centrally subordinated logistic resources including units, depots, and mobilized transportation resources normally in the civilian sector. The Armed Forces Chief of the Rear and the Military Transportation Service under him will be key in developing and implementing strategic movement plans. MD resources, both Soviet and NSWP, also will provide support during the redeployment. The strategic rear service entities, together with MD headquarters, organize and arrange transport for, coordinate, and initiate the departure of the relocating forces. East European territorial commands, both national and military district subordinated, are responsible for supporting the movement. Their functions include directing and controlling the movement to insure that TVD plans are met and to keep the LOCs functioning. To this end, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have considerable engineer, road and rail maintenance, and construction organizations to keep the LOCs functioning despite NATO attacks. Since most relocating western MD forces will pass through Poland, Polish elements devoted to movement support will be especially significant. These elements are components of the Polish Territorial Defense Forces (OT) and the Military Transportation Service, which are subordinate to the Polish Internal Front. The Internal Front is a major component of the Polish wartime force structure whose mission is the defense of the Polish homeland; the control, defense, and maintenance of the LOCs through Poland; and the provision of logistic support for transiting Soviet troops. (The Poles use the term "Internal Front" to distinguish these troops from those in the "External Front"--scheduled for operation outside Poland under Warsaw Pact command.) The Internal Front contains the engineer and construction units and stockpiles of bridging equipment necessary to maintain LOCs.

Although the capacity of the existing rail network is believed adequate to support the movement of reinforcing units, the apparent vulnerability of the system to interdiction and bridge destruction; the lack of sufficient bypasses around major cities; and the differences in Polish and Soviet rail gages have caused concern among Warsaw Pact strategists. Realizing that these problems could intensify as the war progresses, planners are taking measures to minimize the weaknesses of the transport networks.

In recent years, a number of prepared alternate river-crossing sites and bridge-component storage facilities have been identified along the Odra and Wisla Rivers (table 6). Most of Poland's east-west LOCs are intersected by these two waterways, which are potential major obstacles to military movement. Soviet military planners assess that the bridges across these rivers would be among the first targets destroyed by NATO forces. The Soviet aim is to lessen the impact of interdiction by diverting traffic onto temporary crossings and thus maintain forward movement capability. Most of the bridge component storage sites are well stocked with heavy bridging equipment. Many are both road and rail served, which provides additional flexibility to the transportation system (table 7).
Because of the differences in Soviet broad (5'0") and Polish standard (4'8 1/2") rail gages, trains entering Poland from the USSR must be transloaded at the border, except one line in southern Poland. The problem of transloading has been alleviated somewhat by the construction of several transloading zones along the border areas. These zones consist of parallel tracks of both gages with several station complexes interspersed. The GDR and Czechoslovakia have similar responsibilities for maintaining LOCs in their territory. They are believed to be engaging in similar planning, preparation, and LOC maintenance activities within their forces.

The Soviets will use a phased, sequenced procedure to conduct the strategic concentration. The Soviets recognize that the various elements of the frontal forces have differing missions and times when they must be available for commitment. They also recognize that the readiness times of individual units vary greatly. Therefore, the Soviets plan to echelon the forward movement.

Movement echelonment of forces conducting long distance movement in a time-constrained situation normally is based on getting units which are to be committed first deployed forward first, along with the required support elements. A second operational echelon front or army may be divided into two movement echelons. The first would include intelligence and security units; armies or divisions planned for early commitment; and SCUD, aviation, artillery, air defense, and selected engineer and chemical defense units. These would be supported by rear service elements sufficient to support the combat commitment of the first echelon for several days. These comprise the first echelon of the army or front rear. The second movement echelon includes the remaining front or army units supported by the second echelon of the army or front rear. Forces in the forward area may wait until just shortly before D-day to accomplish their relatively short moves.

Command and control of the strategic concentration of the armed forces is the responsibility of the Soviet Supreme High Command. It is exerted through the chain of command of the relocating forces, facilities subordinate to the General Staff, and systems subordinate to the USSR Chief of the Rear. The Chief of the Rear is responsible for planning and implementing the plans for strategic concentration in accordance with General Staff contingency planning and for ensuring proper support and direction of relocating forces.

Relocating fronts and armies normally requires two mobile command posts (CPs), each with an identical communications capability. The commander rotates between them. The CP used by the commander and his staff is the main CP; the other is the alternate CP.

The forward deployment of the forces will be supported by an extensive, redundant, and survivable communications system. The signal elements of the relocating forces will provide the required communications by interworking with a theater communications matrix under the control of the TVD command and/or the GS. The Soviets are preparing this TVD-level communications system in peacetime. These preparations include the establishment of permanently deployed landline, radio-relay, and tropospheric-scatter
communications and the construction of hardened/bunkered communications centers and command posts. As part of the theater preparations for war, signal units of the RVGK and the Committee for State Security/Directorates of Government Communications (KGB/UPS) establish mobile radio-relay and tropospheric-scatter multichannel lines of communication from the western MDs across Poland and Czechoslovakia. They link up with radio-relay and tropospheric-scatter communications networks established by the first-echelon fronts.

(6) Control of the railroads supporting the redeployment of the second operational echelon is an essential element of the command and control problem. The Soviet railroad system is managed by the Ministry of Lines of Communication (LOCs). It controls the railroad system through 32 regional railroad administrations, of which three are located in the Western TVD and headquartered at Lvov, Minsk, and Riga. These contain several operating divisions which manage the railroad within specified geographic areas.

(U) Within Soviet forces, transportation planning and control is the responsibility of the Military Transportation Service (MTS). The MTS plans and directs troop and military cargo movements; trains troops to accomplish moves by various modes of transport; and defines and submits to the civil transport ministries the requirements for transport during wartime operations in the TVDs.

(6) The MTS agency at the Ministry of Defense level is the Central Military Transportation Directorate. This directorate, subordinate to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services, plans and directs rail movements through groups of officers assigned to the Ministry of LOCs. MTS officers are assigned to key rail yards, rail stations, ports, and air transport facilities and are responsible for expediting military trains, protecting military cargo, supervising military loading/unloading operations, and enforcing military discipline on transiting troops. The MTS also operates the military transloading yards along the Soviet western border.

(6) NSWP rail elements are also tasked to support theater rail movement plans. Poland, where LOCs are the most critical in accomplishing the strategic concentration of the armed forces, also has a Military Transportation Service subordinate to the MOD Chief Quartermaster's Office with elements within the Ministry of LOCs that can plan, manage, and control rail support to military movement.

(6) The railroad communications system is also of extreme importance in controlling the relocation of forces. The system is used both by the railway authorities to control the trains themselves and by military headquarters to communicate with units loaded onto trains. The Ministry of LOCs operates its own communications system, which is designed to meet its internal operating requirements. Communications centers are located at each level of the organizational structure. These centers are connected by a network of cable, HF, VHF, and UHF radio and radio relay.
Final preparations and final deployments consist of the maintenance of equipment; replenishment of fuel, supplies, and ammunition; review and finalization of plans; dissemination of orders; movement to forward departure areas; and subsequent movement to the line of commitment. Time devoted to this activity varies according to the position of the unit in the echelonment scheme. First-echelon formations may move directly from their garrisons to the forward departure areas located 20-40 kilometers from the border, complete preparations, and move out to combat. Second-echelon division, army, and front concentration areas are located at increasingly greater depths in Pact territory and planned for commitment at increasingly greater depths in NATO territory. Thus, in some cases, they must be moved hundreds of kilometers to arrive at forward departure areas, with increased time devoted to maintenance and other preparations. It is assessed that second-echelon formations require the following times for final preparations and deployments:

Second-echelon division of first-echelon army—48-60 hrs.
Second-echelon army—103-117 hours.
Second-echelon front—in excess of 100 hours.

These time lines measure the time between the alert of the formation for commitment until the first unit crosses the commitment line. They include C3, logistic and troop preparations in the concentration areas, movement to forward departure areas, dispersal and final preparations in those areas, and final deployment to combat.

The aviation components of frontal forces are essentially full-strength ready units and thus require little time to accomplish the force generation process. To attain Full Combat Readiness, aviation units have to recall some personnel, increase maintenance, and fuel and arm aircraft. As the air forces proceed from Constant to Full Combat Readiness, each of the readiness categories requires a specified required availability of aircraft through specific air readiness levels that in turn define the time required to scramble the alerted force.

Frontal Aviation units may move frequently, both prior to and during operations. While tactical units may have to move to survive attacks, most moves probably will be undertaken to improve their operational capabilities over potential battle areas. The Soviets tend to group the movements of tactical air units into two categories: intertheater moves—for example, the movement of an air unit from a base in the Soviet Union to one in Eastern Europe; and intratheater moves. The first type tends to be over great distances and presumably is more likely to require extensive airlift support. The second type would occur more frequently, would involve much shorter distances, and usually would be undertaken in reaction to forward or rearward movement of the FLOT. Despite the improved range capabilities of Soviet tactical aircraft, Soviet planners anticipate that even their modern aircraft will have to redeploy as many as three times in the first several weeks of a successful Soviet ground offensive just to remain in range of the FLOT. Table 8 summarizes estimates of the times required to move an aviation regiment under several different situations.
The air forces of the front organization require more extensive preparation than that required to bring the individual flying units to full readiness. Logistic and command and control preparations also would be required. While 2-3 days would be needed to prepare the command and control system, it is estimated that 7-12 days would be required to prepare the logistic structure. Frontal Aviation requires extensive command and control preparations. Combat control parties must be organized to control tactical air operations, and coordination with ground and naval operations must be accomplished. Forces providing direct support to front- or army-level entities depend on a series of air/ground control teams to coordinate their operations with the ground forces. Although these teams do not exist in peacetime, except during joint air/ground field exercises, key headquarters elements of the network probably exist at the front and army level. On declaration of increased readiness, Soviet Air Forces are to organize individual teams, issue them equipment from storage and, dispatch them to designated ground maneuver formations. Under conditions of rapid conversion, these teams probably can be in place within about 48 hours.

In wartime, aviation rear services are modified and expanded and the pattern of logistic support becomes more decentralized. Greater responsibility for logistic management will devolve to intermediate rear services echelons at aviation supply bases. Substantial mobilization of manpower and equipment will be necessary for wartime operations.

The ground support units that provide supply and aircraft maintenance functions on airfields housing operational Soviet aviation units in Eastern Europe and in most peripheral military districts probably are manned at wartime strength. Thus, the airfields are fully capable of initiating combat operations without the need to augment personnel first. Above airfield level, the Soviet logistic structure is not manned at wartime strength. Effective conduct of extended combat operations in a major conflict would require the generation of new units and the augmentation of existing ones. In GSGF, for example, the aviation logistic network above regimental level is estimated to be at least one-third short of the personnel needed to fill out the wartime TOE. While not essential to begin combat operations, the missing personnel would have to be recalled to active duty and be in place shortly thereafter in order to sustain operations.

It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would mount an unprepared, standing-start attack on NATO from a peacetime force posture. Rather, the Soviets would prefer—and generally plan on being able—first to complete logistic preparations, expand their rear services, and complete mobilization of combat units. Minimum essential mobilization of the aviation logistic structure could be completed within 3 to 5 days, but the Soviets probably view 7 to 12 days as a more reasonable planning factor for achieving full readiness. Some of the mobilized reservists could be brought into potential combat areas quickly by military or civilian airlift, but the large numbers of additional personnel required to expand the rear services fully most likely would be moved by rail from the USSR.
2. Air Armies of the VGK

VGK air armies are maintained as full-strength ready units and thus require little time to attain readiness for war. The air armies require approximately 72 hours to complete extensive command and control arrangements, including the deployment of staff operations groups with supporting communications from air army headquarters to TVD and front headquarters. Logistics preparations may require 7-12 days.

3. Fleet Preparations

The Intelligence Community assesses that the Soviets probably would have more than half of their submarines and principal surface combatants available for combat operations within several days of notification (not including reserve units) and about 70 percent within 2 weeks. Given several days' notice, Soviet Naval Aviation should have more than 90 percent of its aircraft available, although this percentage could be sustained for only a short time.

On declaration of Increased Combat Readiness, the Combined Baltic Fleet (CBF) deploys intelligence ships to the western Baltic and Danish straits. Intelligence collection flights by the Baltic Fleet Air Force (BALFAP) increase in the western Baltic and along the Baltic coast of Sweden. Reserve ship activation begins. Maintenance and repair of ships not combat ready is accelerated. Procedures are followed to bring merchant ships under control and to recall them. In-area training by the CBF increases. Planning and preparation for forward deployment of selected ships, primarily amphibious and mine warfare craft, is initiated. Ships are loaded with fuel, ammunition, and stores. Some ships and aircraft may be dispatched to alternate and dispersal bases and locations. Submarine dispersal could begin at this stage of readiness.

On declaration of Threat of War Readiness, there are several planning factors. The CBF deploys a small (4-6) submarine force from Soviet bases to the North Sea. The CBF establishes defensive ASW barriers in the central Baltic with surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft. Offshore Defense Forces increase patrols; coastal defense forces take position. Hydrographic ships deploy to weather monitoring stations in the western and central Baltic. Alternate command posts are readied and C3 systems and centers are staffed and checked. The Soviets attempt to minimize displaying any change in normal operating routines when conducting checks. Previously designated fleet forces forward deploy to bases in the GDR and Poland. Combat ready GOLF II SSBs might deploy to stations in the Baltic Sea. Rear service surface forces forming mobile bases are deployed to predesignated anchorages and basing areas. Merchant ships and civilian ports are taken over by the navy.

When the General Staff declares Full Combat Readiness, the CBF changes over to Moscow time. Maritime border guard units subordinate to national naval command. C3 systems are fully deployed; auxiliary and rear command posts will have been manned and tested. Most AGIs and hydrographic ships begin returning to home waters. CBF subordinated special-purpose
forces deploy to targets in FRG and Denmark. The Polish 7th Sealing Division and 6th Airborne Division complete mobilization and conduct training and other preparations for assault on Bornholm Island. Prepositioned merchant ships and submarines lay time-delayed mines off NATO bases.

4. National Air Defense Forces

National Air Defense Forces consist of strategic SAMs, radar, and interceptor aircraft whose peacetime and wartime mission is the defense of the Warsaw Pact homelands against intruding enemy aircraft and cruise missiles. As noted in chapter 2, these forces are subordinate to the headquarters of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts and the national air defense organizations of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In accordance with the perceived Pact threat of a surprise air attack, air defense forces are maintained at a very high readiness status. Preparation includes the following activity:

-- SAM Units. Personnel are recalled and all launch sites and command posts are manned to capacity. Some SAM units deploy to alternate sites, and some additional SAM battalions are activated using stored equipment and reservists.

-- Radar Units. Personnel are recalled and all sites are fully manned. Some additional early warning sites may be deployed to improve low altitude coverage and survivability.

-- Interceptor Units. These units are full-strength ready aviation units. Their preparations generally resemble those of other aviation units, as described above.

Soviet air defense forces have a well-developed peacetime command and control system, consisting of air surveillance radar sites, air situation filter centers, weapon control centers, and force management authorities. They are connected through a communication system having a fair degree of redundancy even in peacetime. The alert system calls for air defense units to be able to come up to the highest state of combat readiness prior to mobilizing reserves.

Although the air defense command and control system is largely ready in peacetime, the Soviets plan to further strengthen it for wartime operation by improving its survivability and expanding its coverage. Specific steps called for by the General Staff alert system include: augmenting the manning and communications of peacetime command posts; establishing and manning alternate wartime command posts, redeploying a portion of the early warning radar sites to improve low-altitude coverage and survivability; and forming an emergency, backup early warning net by deploying radar equipment from reserves and/or withdrawing from operation a portion of the peacetime deployed system. The augmentation of command posts and the establishment of alternate command posts can be accomplished within 24 hours. The Soviets have earmarked personnel and communication equipment for these tasks and in some cases—particularly for high-level elements—may have cadre-strength teams permanently located at alternate positions in
peacetime. The movement and reorganization of early warning radars probably would be accomplished sequentially, with the expansion of low-altitude coverage having first priority. Nonetheless, both the expansion and establishment of a backup net would require about 24 to 48 hours.

5. Strategic Nuclear Assets

a. Strategic Rocket Forces

In peacetime, the Soviets maintain most but not all of their strategic nuclear forces at a high state of readiness.

SS-4 MRBMs are deployed in both hard (silo) and soft launcher configurations. From the normal state of Constant Combat Readiness, reaction time for launch from soft sites is about 2 hours. However, in a state of peak readiness, launch can be achieved in 3-5 minutes from the soft sites. At normal readiness, silo launches of SS-4 will take 5-15 minutes. Launch at peak readiness from silos also will be within 3-5 minutes. Refire time from SS-4 soft sites is 2-4 hours.

All in-garrison SS-20s probably are on alert, except for relatively brief periods when selected regiments are off line for training or maintenance. Launchers on alert in garrison could be launched within a maximum of 15-30 minutes. However, they would disperse to field launch locations prior to initiation of combat.

b. Naval Systems

It is believed that a portion of the NORFLY YANKEE I/II SSBN force routinely is maintained in a high readiness state (combat alert) while at base or in local waters. It is possible that some of these local area "combat alert" units might deploy for patrol operations in the western Atlantic during periods of crisis.

D. THEATER C^3 PREPARATIONS

The preparations of the individual force elements described above will be conducted simultaneously with the creation of an integrated theater command and control system. Theater C^3 preparations will include the activation of a TVD high command in its bunkered facility. Mobile signal units belonging to the RVCK will establish extensive high frequency radio, radio-relay, tropospheric-scatter, and landline communications systems that enable the TVD to communicate with the Soviet General Staff, subordinate headquarters, and the East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish General Staffs and Ministries of Defense. In addition, the KGB/UPS will set up a network of mobile communications down to army level that parallels military communications. KGB/UPS systems allow the USSR leadership to communicate directly with operational formations, bypassing the military chain of command and communications systems. It is estimated that 5 to 8 days are required to establish the theater C^3 system.
A critical Pact concern in preparing Western TVD forces for war would be the establishment of a theater logistic infrastructure capable of supporting multi-front combat operations. This aspect of theater force preparation is addressed in the next section.

E. THEATER LOGISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE: MANAGEMENT AND PREPARATIONS

1. Mobilization of Rear Services

Upon the order to mobilize, materiel stocks in fixed depots are removed from depots in accordance with a "dispersal plan." This plan stipulates the areas and locations to which stocks are to be moved and positioned. In addition, the plan provides for the allocation of transportation and loading/unloading means and sets out measures for concealing, protecting, and securing stocks during shipment and after arrival. Stocks designated to comprise theater logistic bases will be transported to sites encompassed by the base along major axes of advance. These sites may be prepared in peacetime, but in any event they are specified in the dispersal plan. Large quantities of operational-level stocks reaching base areas are maintained on motor transport and not unloaded. Stock deployment and dispersal are accomplished by a combination of motor transport and rail means, depending upon distances to be traveled, depot size, and availability of transportation. Stocks are removed initially from those major depots that are deemed particularly vulnerable to attack.

A number of imponderables are involved in estimating the rate at which depots can be dispersed. Dispersal time is a function of depot size, the state of mechanization, labor availability, transportation means available, general depot layout, and other factors.

Many rear service units assigned to the theater will require substantial mobilization. These units must receive reserve personnel called up by the military commissariats, together with vehicles and equipment from the civilian economy. In peacetime, these transportation assets belong to state enterprises, collective farms, and transportation conglomerates performing civilian tasks. However, certain of the vehicles and their drivers are selected and organized into motor transport columns, or avtokolony. These vehicles are maintained according to military specifications, are inspected yearly by personnel of the mobilization departments of the voyenkomaty, are given specific mobilization assignments, and are manned in peacetime by Category I reservists. In addition, the avtokolony undergo periodic alerts, often in conjunction with mobilization exercises. Some 690 avtokolony have been identified, predominately in the western USSR, containing an estimated total of over 240,000 vehicles. About 35,000 civilian trucks would have to be mobilized to fill out the force structure of active Soviet divisions and nondivisional units designated for employment in the Western TVD. Additional vehicles probably would be mobilized to constitute theater level transport units and other newly created units. Each NSWP nation has organizations analogous to avtokolony. The vehicle base in Polish, Czechoslovakian, and GDR organizations is believed adequate for mobilization needs. Once the mobilization order has
been received, rear service stocks, units, and facilities deploy by a combination of rail, road, water, and air. Their phased deployment to specified areas is based on detailed mobilization and operational and dispersal plans.

2. Theater Logistic Bases

In the Western TVD, logistic base infrastructure would be established from tactical to central/strategic level. As regards the central level, central rear services—in addition to fixed supply depots, repair facilities, and other installations—have mobile logistic units and facilities that are able to deploy for the reinforcement of full support of national force groupings. Central field rear service elements are deployed along major axes of advance and echeloned, as are operational rear services. As noted, at least some central stocks may be allocated to the Western TVD. Central field rear services and the logistic assets allocated to the TVD would comprise those same types of motor transport, maintenance, materiel, medical, line of communication construction/repair, traffic control, and other resources found in the operational rear services.

These logistic bases would maintain stocks of ammunition, POL, technical supplies, major end items, rations, clothing, and other items. Some of these service elements would advance behind first echelon armies using their own organic transport, while other central rear service components would depend upon the size and missions of the national—or coalition—formations they would be tasked to support.

Technical support may be provided by mobile, centrally subordinated rear service components directly supporting formations and units or by fixed facilities. Provisions may be made for the establishment of technical support facilities on the national territory of Pact nations within the TVD. The facilities may be subordinate to Pact central rear services or they may be civilian installations designated to support military formations (and thus probably placed under central rear service control). They would be used both to support the mobilizational deployment of Pact units and to repair equipment heavily damaged in combat and evacuated to the given facility. Medical support also may be provided by mobile, centrally subordinated medical units or central hospitals on national territory to which wounded would be evacuated for treatment from battle areas.
CHAPTER 4
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN TVD

A. THEATER CAMPAIGN: APPROACH AND CONSIDERATIONS

As addressed in detail above, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have assigned the Western TVD—incorporating critical military, economic, and political targets—one of the highest priorities in strategic planning and military resource allocation. As a consequence, Soviet and Warsaw Pact military planners have established large armed forces, developed extensive plans, and undertaken a broad spectrum of other preparations intended to support a military campaign in the theater. This study has described how the Warsaw Pact—drawing on these military resources, plans, and preparations—could mobilize, organize for combat, and otherwise make ready Western theater forces to undertake a strategic offensive. Specific Soviet/Warsaw Pact war plans and contingencies governing the employment of these forces are not known. However, based on Pact classified writings, exercises, and the disposition of forces and assets, it is clear that wartime strategic objectives of a Pact offensive in the Western TVD include the destruction of NATO forces in the Central Region and Denmark, the elimination of the countries in the Central Region from NATO, and the isolation of the region from outside reinforcement and supply. DIA believes that Soviet/Warsaw Pact plans and preparations in this regard are designed to facilitate a quick victory in a fast-moving, high intensity campaign, but that they also incorporate provisions and resources for a multiphase war of at least several months duration.

In addressing how the Pact would wage a war in the Western TVD to achieve its broad strategic objectives, DIA has identified and analyzed major components of the first phase of a likely theater campaign and have considered those strategic strike and logistic systems that would support and sustain theater forces. Specifically, this assessment of military operations in the Western TVD addresses:

-- The air operation, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact designation for the early, conventional combined-arms attack in depth against NATO nuclear systems, aviation and air defense resources, and the command, control, and communications systems that direct them.

-- Frontal operations, by combined-arms formations with the mission of defeating NATO forces in specific zones of operation, neutralizing NATO nuclear systems, disrupting mobilization and reinforcement activity, and seizing key military and political objectives.

-- Naval operations, by the Combined Baltic Fleet, which would be tasked to support the attainment of theater objectives by carrying out sea control, amphibious assaults, antiaircraft warfare, and fire support operations.

-- Strategic nuclear system support to Western TVD forces by the strategic strike assets of Soviet Air, Naval, and Strategic Rocket Forces.
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--- Theater logistic support for combined-arms ground and air forces operating within the TVD and the sustainability potential represented by Pact rear service resources.

(D) DIA has postulated both generic and specific targets and objectives for Western TVD forces that it believes are essential for the attainment of broad strategic goals and has assessed how theater forces might carry out their missions in support of these goals. While it has been described how theater forces could achieve their objectives in accord with assigned missions, it does not intend this to constitute a judgment on the likely success or failure of operations. Additionally, it has not examined in detail Soviet/Warsaw Pact responses to the myriad of developments and operational changes associated with a campaign of this scope, although a number of operational variants are addressed in the text below and in associated appendices. The campaign is assessed as one employing conventional weapons only, which is believed to be a preferred Pact option. However, since Pact forces would in such a variant anticipate escalation to nuclear operations at any time, Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear planning, preparations, and weapon system employment from tactical to strategic levels are addressed as well.

(E) Overall, it should be stressed that a strategic offensive in the Western TVD would comprise centrally planned and fully integrated operations by joint and combined Soviet/Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. Thus, while it is useful to examine the Western TVD campaign in terms of its major components and supporting systems, it is emphasized here, and below, that theater operations are thoroughly integrated and for the most part carried out concurrently. Bearing this in mind, then, the air operation will now be examined.

B. AIR OPERATION

(D) Soviet strategy in a war against NATO requires that NATO's nuclear assets be destroyed as early as possible. The assets include storage sites; the various land, air, and sea based delivery systems; and the command, control, and communication entities involved in their employment. In addition, the strategy further requires air superiority over the entire theater of operations, if possible, but if not, over such areas as are critical to mission accomplishment.

(E) To achieve these major goals, the Warsaw Pact plans a combined-arms attack in depth against NATO's nuclear resources, aviation, air defenses, and the C³ system which controls them. The scope of this operation encompasses an attack against NATO's key resources within the Western TVD and to such distance behind the FLOT/FEBA as to assure comprehensive target destruction. DIA believes that the preferred Soviet option calls for target destruction by conventional weapons only. It also believes that the Soviets would seek to continue successful offensive operations in a nonnuclear environment as long as possible. However, Pact planners anticipate that escalation to the nuclear level can take place at any time and prepare for nuclear operations through extensive planning and designating/reserving weapon systems for nuclear strikes.
In attacking the NATO targets noted above, a variety of weapon systems and forces will be employed, each performing its specialty in a way designed to complement the capabilities of the others. The forces selected to participate in the destruction process will be supplemented by electronic countermeasure units whose tasks will be to disrupt NATO's C3, weapon guidance, and navigation systems, and thus aid the attacking forces. The Soviets call this combined-arms activity an air operation. While the air operation is most often discussed as if it were a singular event, it is most likely that several coordinated simultaneous operations will take place as part of an integrated attack.

Coordination, force integration, and battle management for an air operation can take place at different levels of command, depending on the scope of an operation and the forces employed. Operations can be commanded by front or TVD commanders. However, the largest such operation, sometimes referred to as "the air operation" and usually associated with the Western TVD, most likely will be commanded by the WVK. Since the majority of forces participating in air operations are composed of aviation units, the senior aviation officer on the staff of the appropriate echelon will command all participating units until expected goals are reached and the air operation is dissolved. As mentioned above, an air operation need not be a singular event, nor must it be restricted to offensive activities. An air defense operation, for instance, is designed to defend troops and territory against enemy air and missile attacks, while air reconnaissance and air transport operations serve their specific purposes. Similarly, air operations, once concluded, can be re-initiated if circumstances dictate. This can occur if unforeseen complications arise which threaten major theater goal accomplishments or intelligence provides data on impending new threats not considered in the initial planning. Intelligence gathering plays a key role in structuring and equipping the forces ultimately selected by WVK or TVD commanders for air operations. Intelligence agencies concentrate on the quantity, quality, and disposition of enemy weapons systems, as well as on their employment and deployment practices. HUMINT, SIGINT, ELINT, and imagery provide the Soviets with information on installations, force structure, dispositions, hardness of protective structures, and vulnerabilities. The totality of this data continually updates intelligence assessments and is available to planners. It has served in the past as a determinant for Soviet force allocations in Europe and Asia and serves as an important tool in the force allocation process for air operations in the Western TVD. Based on the assessed capabilities of their intelligence agencies, it must be assumed that Warsaw Pact planners know the locations, size, and relative importance of NATO nuclear storage sites, wartime basing plans for aircraft and the timetable for arriving US air and ground force units, locations and functions of aerial ports, POMCUS sites, potential vulnerabilities of the NATO air defense system, and the locations, role, and relative importance of the individual C3 nodes of that system.

All of these factors, as well as the disposition of NATO navies and the threat posed by US cruise missiles, are used by planners in the force allocation process.
partially by large bodies of water, NATO's navies will operate in or along
the periphery of the Western TVD. All of these factors influence Pact
theater force allocations. Much of the force allocation process for air
operations has taken place already. That is, roughly three fourths of
Soviet and all non-Soviet Warsaw Pact aviation is based in Europe, with the
heaviest concentrations poised in the Western TVD. These forces are
continually improved to match their capabilities as closely as possible to
those of NATO's aviation. While improvements to Pact aircraft and weapons
systems are continuous, the capabilities of NATO's aircraft currently are
judged superior by Pact planners who take that into account as they allocate
forces to the air operation.

The allocation process will start at the VGRK level. This is
necessary, since the command and employment of certain forces is held at
that level. In aviation, a recent reorganization returned certain tactical
and strategic units to the control of the VGRK—in a manner similar to that
employed in WW II—to once again provide the VGRK with uncommitted reserves.
These reserves will be used at the outset of the war but, unlike forces more
firmly committed to specific fronts and axes, they will be employed within
theaters as, and where, most needed. It is anticipated that the attack on
NATO's Central Region by Western TVD forces will comprise the greatest
concentration of forces assembled for any air operation. It is believed
that at least two of the VGRK's five air armies, most (if not all) aviation
of several fronts, Polish and Czech aviation, and possibly elements of
Soviet, and perhaps Polish, Naval Aviation will be allocated to this effort.
In addition, tactical surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, special
operations and air assault forces, and airborne units will become part of
it. All of these forces will form part of a destruction and disruption
process designed and integrated to achieve maximum effect in depth.
Complementing the strike forces, a variety of electronic countermeasure
units assigned to tactical and strategic aviation, fronts, armies, and
the navy will seek to disrupt NATO's C3 and air defense systems, protect Soviet
attacking forces, and provide defense for Warsaw Pact units and
installations.

This massive marshaling of forces—their integration into combined-
arms activities; the selection of their goals, objectives, and targets,
their employment, resupply, sustainability, and ultimately their dissolution
or reallocation—is all part of force allocation and fire support structure
planning processes.

As noted, intelligence plays a significant role in threat
perceptions, weapons improvements, and force allocations. Refinements to
these allocations are made constantly as situations change. Allocations are
made according to plans formulated by a succession of echelon commanders in
response to directives from above. Directives descend from the VGRK to TVD,
front, army, and division. These directives specify objectives, directions
of attack, targets, combat and support units assigned to subordinate units,
and coordinating responsibilities with adjacent organizations. The
directives also specify higher echelon tasking or employment of allocated
forces such as aviation and missiles for use in a TVD or VGRK controlled air
operation.
Subordinate commanders, once tasked, plan the allocation of their forces so as to fulfill directives from above. They are assisted in their plans by Operations Groups (OGs), composed of personnel from superior and lateral commands. These groups operate through the respective Commanders' Chief of Staff and work closely with the formation's Combat Control Center (CCC). The CCC functions much like the US Tactical Operations Center and is at the heart of the Soviet command structure. It is composed of functional representatives from staff and subordinate units who are empowered to make force employment decisions. The CCC is supported by an operations directorate, the rocket troops and artillery CP, the intelligence CP, and the air and air defense CP. Integration and employment of forces takes place at the appropriate level of command. Superior and subordinate CCC representatives come from, and are familiar with, the units involved in battle. CCCs/OGs establish intelligence requirements, prescribe ammunition supply rates, control movement of tactical surface-to-surface missiles and mobile rocket bases, and plan air defense support for air operations. During planning, decisions are made on the desired levels of damage, to include disruption and destruction. The electronic warfare officer plays an important role in this process, as he is responsible for the use of jamming assets as part of the disruption plan. He and other members of the group rely heavily on intelligence for support.

The intelligence system described above will provide peacetime information on opposing forces. As the Soviets prepare for war, they will intensify collection, use agents to provide more current data on NATO forces, and insert special operations forces to obtain real-time data on possible relocation of nuclear assets and portions of the air defense system. This last-minute information will be used to update the target map for use in the air operation attack plan. It could cause last-minute re-targeting of portions of the attack force and might conceivably alter the location or directions of some air penetration corridors.

Air corridors will be used to minimize Pact aviation losses to NATO air defenses. Using SIGINT, ELINT, and whatever other means might be available, planners will seek to establish corridors in those locations which will present the least threat to the attacking force. It is estimated that one to two corridors might be placed opposite each front.

While these preparations take place in the CCCs, aviation units will make last-minute preparations as well. Most flying activities will be discontinued with only necessary training sorties flown. Maintenance crews will repair the maximum number of aircraft possible, armors will assemble and test precision-guided munitions, and rear services personnel will make preparations for possible moves to deployment fields according to the plans made by various CCCs beforehand. Mobilized off-base transportation and construction units will prepare for field delivery of war consumables and for airfield repair. Squadron and regimental navigators will review low-altitude navigational maps and brief pilots on visual reference points. Pilots will receive briefings on their targets, the use of IFP, corridors, altitudes for safe transit over Warsaw Pact territory, and applicable radio frequencies (for navigation to and from home and dispersal airfields). Additionally, they will be given alternate field locations and call signs for emergency or tactical purposes.
Regimental and squadron commanders will work out call signs with those regimental and division officers departing for front or TVD air/air defense command posts, and forward air control posts to be used in later C³ procedures.

If at this time NATO launches an air offensive against the Warsaw Pact and penetrates Pact airspace, planners will exercise the air defense operation plan, marshaling the total force of the air operation and the interceptors and surface-to-air missiles of air defense in a combined effort to stem the NATO air offensive, defend Pact territory, pursue NATO aviation to their home bases, and attack NATO airbases and air defense systems in a manner similar to the one planned for the air operation. (See appendix B for a more detailed discussion of the Warsaw Pact air defense system.) If the air defense operation is successful, the air operation, adjusted to the new situation, will begin.

If NATO does not attack first, the air operation will proceed as planned. Various sources fix the duration of the air operation to a finite number of days. This figure fluctuates from 2 to 5 or more days. Such figures should be used for discussion purposes only, since the achievement of the two primary goals—denial of nuclear assets and air superiority—will determine the length of the air operation. Similarly, attempts are made to fix a single figure for the total number of aircraft to be involved. Again, circumstances in the TVD and in neighboring TVDs, the worldwide situation, the disposition of NATO naval forces, and other factors will determine the exact number of aircraft in the attack on NATO in the Western TVD. There is clearly no shortage of aircraft available for use in this TVD (as appendix A indicates). Figures used by analysts in the past range from the number of aircraft in adjacent groups of forces to the total number of Soviet combat aircraft within range of NATO’s Central Region minus those not judged operationally ready or held in reserve. Using this approach, the spread has ranged from 1,200 to 2,700 aircraft to be employed in a series of mass strikes. The precise number of aircraft used in the Western TVD is not known, however, and planners are expected to allocate available forces in a way most likely to achieve desired goals.

Fire suppression C³ and air defense assets will be integrated with electronic suppression. Tactical surface-to-surface missiles, equipped with improved conventional munition warheads, will be launched against corridor-based HAWK and Nike-Hercules batteries, the air defense C³ system, and NATO fighter and fighter-bomber airfields within range. This attack could be followed at H-hour by the first wave of aircraft consisting probably of fighter-bombers and tactical bombers possibly carrying AS-9/AS-11 antiradiation missiles, rockets, cluster munitions, and bombs. The aircraft will cross the FLOT to attack the air defense system and begin establishing corridors. They will be equipped with self-protection jammers and will be supported by standoff jammer aircraft. Heavy use of chaff is expected throughout the air operation. Supporting Pact fighters will accompany this force and will seek to protect the attackers from NATO fighters. The initial effort could be accompanied or preceded by AS-4 and AS-6 antiradiation missile launches from VGK air army aircraft, such as the BADGER, BLINDER, and BACKFIRE; these launches will be carried out against radiating targets in the E/F and possibly I/J frequency bands from Pact territory. Reconnaissance aircraft will accompany this force to report on damage.
The second wave, consisting of fighter-bombers, tactical bombers, and VGK air army bombers and armed with antiradiation missiles, rockets, bombs, and precision-guided munitions, will follow the first wave to continue the attack on the air defense system and to begin attacking NATO airfields and nuclear storage sites. They also will be protected by self-screening, standoff, and escort jammers. Fighters will provide protection by flying escort missions, establishing protective orbits, and by flying barrier patrols. Reconnaissance aircraft and visual reconnaissance reporting by crews of the returning first wave will provide planners their first inputs on the progress of the air operation. This could be accompanied by radio reports from special operations force personnel and agents providing eyewitness reports on damage and information on dispersing NATO nuclear units. This information likely will be used by GCC personnel to make targeting decisions for the third wave and to fine-tune targeting for still uncommitted units of subsequent mass strikes.

Depending on the success of the first and second waves, the third wave might have to continue defense suppression while pressing the attack on nuclear storage sites, airfields, and C3 nodes not previously engaged. Throughout the initial formation of corridors and beyond, heavy use of chaff is expected, both as a passive countermeasure and as a possible aid to navigation. As corridors are extended through NATO SAM positions, standoff jamming aircraft are expected to enter into the corridors to extend their ECM range. Fighter-bombers, tactical bombers, and VGK air army aircraft will be leaving the corridors to attack their predesignated targets. DIA expects that by this time, several attempts will have been made to engage the US AWACS aircraft. Once corridors reach past the heaviest concentrations of NATO SAMs, flanking engagements of the AWACS by Pact fighters could be expected. Smolensk Air Army BADGER, BLINDER, and BACKFIRE aircraft should be expected to continue standoff launching of air-to-surface missiles against key radiating and nonradiating targets on land and at sea. Alternately, they will enter NATO territory through the established corridors, armed with a mixed load of ASM and bombs or with bombers supported by ASM carriers. FLOGGER, FITTER, and FENCER aircraft, protected by on-board and escort jammers and carrying a mix of bombs, cluster munitions, rockets, and precision-guided munitions, will engage pre-designated point and area targets. If intelligence from reconnaissance agents, and/or special operations forces indicates that nuclear delivery weapons are dispersing to firing positions, a portion of the attacking force, including fighters, would be directed/diverted to locate and engage them. Similarly, if the situation requires, or if plans call for Operational Maneuver Group (OMG), air assault, or airborne operations this early in the campaign (see section C (4) below for a discussion of these forces), a portion of the attacking force, supported by surface-to-surface missiles might be diverted to achieve temporary local air superiority. While these activities continue against the Central Region, Soviet Naval Aviation bombers (BACKFIRE, BADGER, and BLINDER) in the Baltic Fleet Air Force (BALFAF) may execute ASM and conventional bombing missions on NATO naval airfields and naval and maritime ports and mine the approaches to these ports. BALFAF BACKFIREs, and possibly BADGERS, could be tasked to conduct antiship missile strikes against NATO carrier battle groups and amphibious forces operating outside the Baltic. BALFAF FITTERs will support amphibious operations and attack NATO combatants in the Baltic (see section D (4) below for a discussion of naval operations).
(3) While Soviet aircraft will carry the heaviest burden in the attack, Czech fighters and fighter-bombers are expected to engage the air defense system in at least one corridor in the southern portion of the TVD and assist in the search and destruction of dispersing NATO nuclear weapons systems. Polish fighters and fighter-bombers supported by Soviet aviation will engage NATO forces in the northern portion of the TVD.

(6) As mentioned earlier, VCK and TVD planners allocate Warsaw Pact air operation forces to counter the total expected threat by NATO to Pact forces in Europe. Thus, forces would be allocated to the Northwestern and Southwestern TVD in relation to perceived threats. These forces would be employed simultaneously as war in the Western TVD progresses. Shifts in forces directly subordinate to the VCK should be expected to occur in the European theater as the situation requires. An attack against the United Kingdom by theater air forces of the Western TVD could be supported, if necessary, by naval aviation assets in the Baltic or Northern Fleets, and possibly by some elements of the Moscow Air Army of the VCK. Similarly, elements of the Vinnitsa Air Army of the VCK could be diverted from the Southwestern TVD to help in the attack on the Western TVD. Of course, it should be noted that elements of the Smolensk and Moscow Air Armies might be called upon to help naval aviation units in the attack in the Baltic and North Seas.

(7) A variety of reconnaissance systems by now will have presented a partial picture of the progress of the air operation. Unless serious attrition to Pact forces takes place, the second mass attack on the first day will take place as scheduled. TVD and VCK commanders will evaluate aviation forward deployment plans in light of Pact combat losses, damage to their main operating bases and portions of the air logistics system, and the progress of the air operation. They will implement appropriate steps or options to cope with the situation. Skip echelon employment of forces in the air operation will take place if key CCCs are lost to any variety of causes. Likewise, operation of elements of aviation units from dispersal fields, supported by field deployed rear service units, will take place as NATO's aviation takes its toll of Pact aircraft and airfields.

(8) Overall, the air operation is expected to continue until its major objectives are achieved. At that point, assets such as frontal aviation--preempted for use in the air operation--would revert to the front commanders. If projected rates of advance by frontal forces are achieved, airfields and key facilities in the FRG, Belgium, Netherlands, and Denmark will be overrun and most remaining Pact aircraft will be forward based to allow operations into France, Spain, and Portugal (see appendix C for a discussion of forward deployment of aviation resources and underlying assumptions and considerations). The study will now address frontal operations in the Western TVD and discuss in detail the potential employment of these combined arms formations.
C. FRONTAL OPERATIONS

1. Front Planning Considerations

   a. Mission

   Section 3 provides postulated missions and organizations for combat for each first-echelon front in the Western TVD. Characteristic missions for a front include the defeat of enemy forces (NATO army groups and theater reserves) within the zone of operations, neutralization of enemy nuclear systems, disruption of enemy mobilization and reinforcement efforts, and seizure of specified areas deemed politically or militarily vital to the accomplishment of the TVD strategic mission.

   b. Enemy

   Of immediate importance to front forces advancing in the Western TVD are the divisions deployed in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark by Allied Forces Northern Europe, and the corps deployed in central Europe by Allied Forces Central Europe (through its Northern and Central Army Groups). The structure of NATO ground forces in the Western TVD is illustrated in figure 10.

   Development of a Pact maneuver scheme is largely dependent upon the Pact perception of opposing force readiness and capabilities. When possible, breakthroughs are directed against weak defenses and/or gaps in the defensive line, while strong defenses are encircled, isolated, and later defeated in detail. In the Western TVD, the NATO corps sectors vary markedly in readiness and the Pact probably would prefer to direct its main effort against the relatively weak Belgian, Dutch, and British corps sectors (figure 11). The Pact advantage in striking NORTHAG is particularly pronounced if the offensive is to be launched after a brief mobilization period of 2 weeks or less.

   c. Terrain

   Terrain, along with mission and enemy situation, determines the development and prioritization of offensive axes. Terrain considerations are particularly important planning factors at army and division levels. Certain "invincible corridors" which facilitate rapid movement traditionally have been incorporated into NATO defensive planning (figure 12). Large north-south rivers flow through Germany which can halt an attacker until bridging operations are accomplished (especially the Rhine, the Ems, and portions of the Elbe). Areas of marsh along the coastlines of Denmark, Germany, and the Benelux nations can retard movement seriously if an attacking echelon is committed in these areas. Areas of dense forest would not stop a modern mechanized force but can slow an advancing force significantly (e.g., as with the Black Forest and Teutoburger Forest in the FRC and the Ardennes Forest in Belgium). Finally, occupation/reduction of defended urban areas can require a disproportionate dedication of time and attacking troops. Accordingly, Pact forces will attempt to bypass restrictive terrain and achieve strategic objectives by maneuvering on high-speed axes. Terrain considerations within specific fronts are discussed below.
2. Pact Concept of Front Operations

a. Phases of TVD Operations

As addressed throughout this chapter, each of the campaigns for control of air, sea, and territory in the Western TVD can be seen to have distinctive phases. Naval operations in the Danish Straits, for instance, may be seen to progress from a sea denial phase to a sea control phase, while air/air defense operations progress through stages of air parity, local air superiority, and finally, total air superiority. The campaign waged by frontal maneuver forces is similarly defined in phases. The first phase applies unremitting pressure to achieve the immediate strategic political/military goals of the TVD. In the Western TVD, these immediate goals probably are defined as the occupation of the West Germany, Denmark, and the Benelux nations. The second phase of Western TVD operations (if, indeed, a second phase is deemed necessary) could be the continuation of the Pact offensive into France and/or the United Kingdom. Pact forces will attempt, through continuous advanced planning, to shift from phase to phase with minimal interruption to the tempo of the advance. It is probable, however, that executing forces will undergo at least some restructuring before they can pursue their missions in a new phase of operations.

b. Operational Echelonnement and Fronts Involved

(1) General

The land offensive component of theater operations conducted by frontal forces emphasizes rapid, deep operations in conjunction with the deep strikes of theater air and missile operations. Traditionally, the Soviets have employed the concept of echelonnement to conduct these deep operations. Typically, the first echelon penetrates the enemy defense to the depth of the immediate assault objective, after which the second echelon exploits the penetration by driving rapidly through the breach and into the enemy rear area. It is customary for the army commander to dedicate a second-echelon division to the army's main axis of advance, while the front commander typically assigns a second-echelon army to the front main axis. Finally, the TVD may form one or more second-echelon fronts. One potential mission for a second-echelon front is demonstrated in this scenario by the Belorussian Front. The Belorussian Front remains a second-echelon force throughout the first TVD offensive phase, but then becomes the primary strategic grouping for the second TVD offensive phase (the advance into France). Echelonnement thus insures continuity and tempo between offensive phases. Conversely, a second-echelon front or army may be intended for commitment to first-echelon service earlier in the campaign. This is demonstrated in this scenario by the Carpathian Front, which deploys forward early to exploit an axis opened by the forces of the Southwestern Front. Echelonnement thus insures the tempo of the Pact advance by the continuous commitment of fresh forces at preplanned stages of the campaign. Finally, second-echelon forces at any level may be called upon to exploit unexpected opportunities (such as conducting counterattacks and pursuits) or to respond to unexpected contingencies (such as blocking enemy penetrations).
(2) First Operational Echelon

The first operational echelon in the Western TVD consists of Pact forces positioned in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These forces are expected to be formed into three wartime fronts: a Northern Front (Soviet and Polish forces), a Central Front (Group of Soviet Forces, Germany plus GDR forces), and a Southwestern Front (Soviet Central Group of Forces plus Czech forces). The first operational echelon also will include readily deployable units from the USSR (particularly naval, air, and airborne forces) allocated to the Western TVD for specific tasks during the campaign. The first-echelon fronts are expected to be able to reach their immediate objectives (doctrinally at a depth of 300-500 km within 5-7 days) before the second-echelon fronts deploy to their support.

(3) Second Operational Echelon and Reserves

In addition to the three first-echelon fronts listed above, the Soviets are expected to commit fronts to the Western TVD formed from the Soviet Baltic, Carpathian, and Belorussian Military Districts. These fronts will be second-echelon fronts of the TVD or, less typically, reserve fronts of the TVD or the Supreme High Command. In this Western TVD scenario, the Baltic Front will be discussed as a reserve front of the TVD. As such, it will respond to unexpected developments in the TVD, such as a requirement to regenerate forces after a nuclear strike. The reserve front may remain near its deployment area or may move forward in stages not directly linked to the daily progress of the attacking echelons. The Belorussian and Carpathian Fronts, as second-echelon forces, follow preplanned axes and keep pace with the attacking forces.

(4) Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG)

The improvements in firepower, mobility, and protection of ground maneuver formations in the 1970s, the increase in C³ and logistic capabilities, the development in numbers and capabilities of airborne and airmobile forces, and the increase in assets and firepower of army aviation (helicopters), have allowed the Soviets to modify their concepts in recent years. They now plan to maintain and increase the depth and tempo of their operations through the use of operational maneuver groups (OMG). These are task-organized elements of front and army forces (usually a division provides the nucleus for the army OMG, and an army or corps provides the nucleus for the front OMG) that is committed early in the offensive. The OMG is tasked to move through penetrations in the enemy tactical defense and subsequently to conduct raiding and exploitation in the enemy rear in conjunction with air, airborne, and airmobile operations. These operations are intended to disrupt, destroy, or degrade the enemy nuclear, C³, air, and air defense capability; force the enemy to divert forces from the main battle area; and facilitate the continuing rapid advance of echeloned forces. The OMG often resembles a second-echelon force, but is actually quite different in concept and control, as it is committed earlier than the second echelon and, once committed, may not maintain an overland logistic lifeline to its parent formation. The OMG thus depends on a highly mobile, self-contained logistic support structure supplemented by air resupply of critical items. A main axis of advance may employ an OMG, a second echelon, or both.
c. Doctrinal Concepts of Front Operations

(1) Depths and Frontages

A front offensive operation can be carried out to a depth of 600-800 kilometers over a period of 12-15 days. Operational frontages may be as high as 350 kilometers. Maneuver forces of the front advance through the front area of operation on multiple axes. Each axis typically supports one army in first echelon, while an axis of high priority can be weighed by increasing the size of the first-echelon army, by committing on OMC nearby, and/or by dedicating a substantial second-echelon force to that axis. The frontage of the advancing army may vary from 40 to 100 kilometers, depending upon terrain considerations and the enemy threat (which, in turn, will influence how many divisions the army commander chooses to deploy in the army's first echelon). Figure 13 illustrates the echelonment of forces of a Pact army in battle formation.

(2) Front Immediate and Subsequent Objectives

Doctrinally, front immediate objectives usually are accomplished to a depth of 250-350 km within a period of 5-7 days. Front immediate objectives include the neutralization of enemy nuclear systems wherever detected (this is a priority mission of Pact forces at all levels) and the neutralization of NATO army groups and their associated operational reserves within the area of front operations. Achievement of the front immediate objectives is doctrinally an opportune time for the commitment of the front's second-echelon armies. Front subsequent objectives are accomplished to a depth of 600-800 km by day 12-14 of the operation. Front subsequent objectives include the neutralization of enemy reserve forces and mobilization efforts, seizure of significant geographic objectives (such as population and industrial centers), and destruction of any nuclear systems previously undetected.

(3) Army Immediate and Subsequent Objectives

Army immediate objectives usually are accomplished to a depth of 100-150 km over a period of 3-4 days. The army is assigned objectives which penetrate to the enemy operational rear area. In the Western TVD, such objectives would be defined as the penetration of the NATO army group through its deployed divisions to the depth of the army group reserve. Accomplishment of army immediate objectives is doctrinally an opportune time for the commitment of the army's second-echelon divisions. Army subsequent objectives are accomplished at a depth of 250-300 km within a period of 3-4 additional days. Army subsequent objectives exploit the successes already gained and include the destruction of enemy second-echelon and reserve forces within the army area of operation. Accomplishment of the army subsequent objectives usually satisfies the immediate objectives of the parent front. The interrelationship of army and front objectives is illustrated in figure 14.
Concepts of Exploitation

Exploitation is the rapid achievement of major objectives after the enemy main defenses have been breached. At front level, exploitation consists simultaneously of seizing designated geographic objectives and also destroying those major enemy units still capable of operations in the front area, including reserve forces, reinforcements, and bypassed or retreating units in the enemy's main battle area. Offensive priority usually will be dedicated to destruction of enemy forces, provided that geographic objectives still can be seized on schedule. If the front commander determines that destruction of the enemy is of the highest priority, the first-echelon army usually will be directed to pursue and destroy the enemy while second-echelon forces continue the advance. If, on the other hand, seizure of geographic objectives is the higher priority, the first-echelon force probably will continue the advance (detaching a minimal force to maintain contact with the enemy) while second-echelon forces destroy the enemy. To the army commander, "exploitation" usually connotes the annihilation of the enemy, and as a result the army pursues the enemy force unless otherwise directed by the front.

Contemporary Soviet concepts of exploitation assign a key role to the OMG. As described earlier, an OMG is committed early in the operation (as early as D+1 at army level) as a large raiding force deep in the enemy rear. The disruptive actions of the OMG inhibit enemy maneuvers and thus indirectly benefit the advance along formal axes. The OMG also may be given tasks of direct assistance to echeloned forces. For instance, the OMG may be assigned the mission of rapidly advancing to seize river-crossing sites which will be utilized by the slower-moving echeloned forces. Finally, the OMG can be directed, as opportunities permit, to block enemy forces being pursued by the echeloned units.

At both front and army level, exploitation of success is driven by the doctrinal requirement for speed of execution. The front commander achieves momentum by weighting his successful axes, reprioritizing second-echelon and supporting forces as necessary. The front commander further has available nuclear warheads and high-performance aircraft with which to maintain unremitting pressure on the enemy and can call upon
airborne and air assault forces to seize objectives in advance of ground maneuver units. The army commander achieves momentum by prioritizing logistic and fire support in favor of successful divisions and by establishing divisional axes which avoid restrictive terrain (especially urban areas) as much as possible. At both front and army level, exploitation can result in redefinition of multiple successful axes to encircle and destroy enemy units.

During exploitation, pursuit is conducted at army level and below to deny the enemy any opportunity to withdraw to a new defensive line. Frontal pursuit harasses the enemy rear and is characteristic of combined-arms armies. Parallel pursuit requires higher speed than the retreating enemy and is characteristic of tank armies (and the tank divisions of combined-arms armies). Parallel pursuit harasses the enemy flank(s) as well as the enemy rear and may, if completely successful, result in the encirclement and ultimate annihilation of the enemy force. Pact writings stress the importance of strikes by fire support assets (which must, of necessity, be very mobile) in slowing and fragmenting the enemy force during pursuit.

Encirclement is the classic exploitation maneuver. Encirclement on a single axis is possible when the defender is isolated with his back to an impassable obstacle. In the Western TVD, this may occur if defenders in northern FRG are pinned against the North Sea coast. Double envelopment by converging axes may occur in the Central Region, but it requires a high degree of control and superior mobility if defending units, with the advantage of interior lines of support, are to be enveloped. Pact planners believe that encirclement can be enhanced by interdicting the enemy routes of withdrawal (especially through the use of airborne assaults to seize choke points) and by reducing enemy control and mobility through strikes by all available fire support assets. Forces subordinate to different fronts can cooperate in encirclements, although control and support of such an operation would be complex (figure 15).

d. Force Allocation and Echelonment Methodology

(1) General

The three Western TVD first-echelon fronts deploy a total of 16 armies. Observed Pact exercises have differed markedly regarding the allocation of armies per front, the axes to which specific armies are committed, and the echelonnement of forces within each front. This scenario has allocated the armies primarily through exercise patterns and analysis of force ratios required. Armies were echeloned within each front based upon exercises and force readiness levels. Armies were committed to specific axes within each front based upon exercises, doctrine, and enemy/terrain constraints.
(2) **Northern Front**

The Northern Front in this scenario advances along two divergent axes. Neither axis supports commitment of an OMG because the narrow frontages and the numerous water obstacles inhibit rapid independent maneuver. Of the Soviet armies concerned, an army from the Baltic MD is committed to the sealing role on Zealand Island, specifically because its peacetime garrison facilitates the army's deployment. A GSPG army is committed to the southern axis for similar reasons. One Polish army has been allocated as the front reserve.

(3) **Central Front**

The Central Front in this scenario advances on four axes. Since it has been assumed that all the armies are fully mobilized and deployed, the decisive factor in echelonment has been the Pact preference for utilizing tank-heavy forces in the second echelon. A front OMG is positioned for commitment near the northernmost axis since this area offers the greatest chance of exploitable first-echelon success while also providing advantageous terrain for OMG maneuver.

(4) **Southwestern Front**

The Southwestern Front in this scenario advances on two axes, each of which initially supports a first-echelon and second-echelon army. On the northernmost axis, the Soviet CGF army is placed in second echelon initially because it will, upon the commitment of the Carpathian Front, continue along its established axis as the first-echelon force. On the southernmost axis, the 4th Czech Army is placed in the first echelon because it is more operationally ready for deployment than its second echelon counterpart, the 3d Czech Army. Although the Czech Third Army initially follows the axis of the 4th Czech Army, it may in fact be redirected to the northernmost axis as circumstances and opportunities dictate.

(5) **Carpathian Front**

The Carpathian Front, while not a first-echelon front initially, becomes a first-echelon force early in the first offensive phase of the TVD operation. The Carpathian Front, when committed, utilizes the newly subordinated CGF army as its first-echelon force since the CGF army is already positioned on the main axis and can advance accordingly without loss of tempo. The 8th Tank Army, as a tank-heavy force, follows the main axis as a second-echelon force while the 13th Army conducts its advance along the front secondary axis. An OMG is not employed by the Carpathian Front because the Black Forest terrain does not facilitate rapid independent maneuver. The CGF army, however, may form a division-size army OMG if unexpected opportunities present themselves for exploitation.

The following assessment of specific frontal operations in support of Western TVD objectives is supplemented by four appendixes: Appendix B (Warsaw Pact Unified Air Defense System); Appendix C (Postulated
Forward Deployment of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Supporting the Western TVD; Appendix D (Front/Army Fire Support); and Appendix E (Front/Army Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). These appendixes provide additional details for their respective subject areas and should be read in conjunction with the main text below.

3. First-Echelon Front Operations
   a. Northern Front
      (1) Mission
         (U) The mission of the Northern Front in this scenario is as follows:
         -- To advance forces into Denmark via Schleswig-Holstein, neutralize NATO forces within the zone of operations, force Denmark out of the alliance, and seize vital installations from which the Danish Straits can be dominated.
         -- To advance forces through the northern FRG to neutralize NATO forces within the zone of operations, anchor the flank of the Central Front, sever NATO reinforcement/resupply via the German North Sea ports, and seize vital installations in the FRG from which Pact forces can project power into the North Sea and beyond.
      (2) Enemy
         (U) See section C (1) for data on enemy forces.
      (3) Terrain
         (U) Forces advancing through Schleswig-Holstein will experience difficulty along the North Sea coast due to the marshes and peat bogs which characterize the area. The hillier Baltic Sea coastline, while more densely forested, is more amenable to cross-country movement. Road networks in Schleswig-Holstein are generally good. Obstacles in Schleswig-Holstein include the Kiel Canal and many small rivers. These obstacles typically run east-west, so lateral movement off the main axis (to seize major objectives or to encircle enemy forces) is facilitated. The terrain generally improves in Denmark's Jutland Peninsula, although again the North Sea coastline is marshy until the Esbjerg-Kolding line is passed. Although Denmark is generally more suitable to cross-country movement than Schleswig-Holstein, the road networks are less extensive.
         (U) Forces advancing through the North German Plain encounter generally favorable terrain, although the Elbe, Weser, and Ems Rivers probably will require major bridging operations. As in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, the attacker will find that obstacles hinder forward movement but facilitate lateral movement of forces split from the axis of advance. The North Sea coastline in the Bremen/Oldenburg area is marshy and unsuitable as a westward axis. Road networks in the area are excellent.
Forces advancing into the northern Netherlands encounter generally unfavorable terrain due to many ditches, waterways, peat bogs, and marshes in the area. Destruction of the dikes could flood the coastal region to a depth of 1 to 20 feet. Major highways which could be exploited by an attacker are more sparse in the northern area than in the coastal and southern sections of the Netherlands.

(4) **Troops Available**

A troop list of major elements of the Northern Front, task-organized for combat, is shown in Appendix A.

(5) **Concept of the Operation** (figure 16)

(a) **Immediate Objectives**—Northern Axis

The Northern Front advances on two divergent axes. The northernmost axis, composed in this scenario of the Polish Pomeranian Army, advances through Schleswig-Holstein, crosses the Kiel Canal, and advances into Denmark to the Esbjerg-Kolding line. This task should be attainable by D+6. Attainment of the Esbjerg-Kolding line is an opportune time for the commitment of the army's second echelon, since subsequent operations will be characterized by freer maneuver space and greater opportunity for airborne/amphibious operations in conjunction with the overland assault. During the initial period of operations, the attacking force is constrained to a frontage of less than 60 km and accordingly can place no more than two divisions on line. The division along the Baltic coastline, having more favorable terrain, probably will execute the main thrust while the division on the North Sea coastline conducts a supporting attack. The major cities of Hamburg, Luebeck, and Kiel are bypassed by first-echelon divisions and encircled by second-echelon divisions of the first-echelon army. Actual penetration, occupation, and pacification of these cities will be accomplished by forces of the second operational echelon. During the initial offensive phase, in a related action off the overland axis, an airborne assault is launched on D+1 against Danish forces on Bornholm Island by the Polish 6th Airborne Division in conjunction with an amphibious landing carried out by the Polish 7th Sealing Division.

(b) **Immediate Objectives**—Southern Axis

The Soviet 2d Guards Tank Army (GTA) is the first-echelon force on the southermost axis. The 2d GTA attacks across the North German Plain to the Ems River, which it should reach by D+7. The advancing force must cross several rivers large enough to require bridging (notably the Elbe, the Leine/Aller, and the Weser) as well as a number of lesser rivers. The advancing army probably will be constrained to placement of no more than two divisions on line at river-crossing areas, although the terrain otherwise permits at least three divisions to be placed on line. As on the northernmost axis, urban areas will be bypassed and encircled by first-echelon forces and subsequently reduced or occupied by successive echelons. Significant areas in this category are the southern approaches to Hamburg and the cities of Bremen, Bremerhaven, Oldenburg, and Wilhelmshaven.
In this scenario the 2d GTA, in first echelon, is tasked to secure bridgeheads across the Ems River which the second-echelon army will utilize when committed to combat.

(c) Subsequent Objectives—Northern Axis

The bulk of the Pomeranian Army continues the advance northward through the Jutland Peninsula, which now widens sufficiently to permit deployment of three divisions on line. A relatively small force of one or two divisions (depending upon the enemy situation) is detached to occupy Fyn Island and neutralize any remaining Danish forces. Also during this phase an amphibious assault is conducted by the Soviet Naval Infantry Brigade to establish a beachhead on Koge Beach of Zealand Island. Supporting parachute assaults are conducted by the front air assault brigade on Roskilde and Vaerlose Airfields. The beachhead is subsequently enlarged by the follow-on Soviet 3d GMRD to incorporate the port city of Koge, which permits the landing of three divisions of the Soviet 11th Guards Army. The 11th Guards Army then becomes the responsible unit for the occupation of Zealand Island, including the city of Copenhagen, while the Pomeranian Army concurrently completes the conquest of the Jutland Peninsula and Fyn Island.

(d) Subsequent Objectives—Southern Axis

The second-echelon army (in this scenario the Polish Silesian Army) crosses the Ems River utilizing the bridgeheads previously established by the 2d GTA. The 2d Guards Tank Army continues the main assault into the northern Netherlands, advancing via Nordhorn, Apeldoorn, and Utrecht. The Silesian Army advances to the northwest and conducts a supporting attack to the North Sea coastline to the areas of Leeuwarden and Groningen. The 2d GTA's advance, upon reaching the Utrecht area, divides into division-size elements to establish Soviet control over Rotterdam, Amsterdam and the coastline from the Waal River to the Ijsselmeer.

(e) Front Reserve

The Polish Warsaw Army is designated the reserve army of the Northern Front in the scenario. It will deploy behind the second echelon to the vicinity of Hamburg, from which its missions are to conduct population control and rear area security in northern FRG, defeat counterattacks along the coast, and reinforce either front axis if necessary.
targets, provides prestrike surveillance and poststrike damage assessment, and aggressively seeks out mobile targets such as deployed LANCE units. This process is discussed in Appendix E.

The initial priority of Northern Front fire support will be to facilitate and complement the TVD offensive air operation (discussed in detail in section B). To this end, most front fixed-wing air assets are coopted outright by the TVD for the duration of the air operation. The aviation resources which remain under front control benefit from the local air superiority achieved by the air operation as they strike targets designated by the front commander. While front and TVD aviation strike targets deep into NATO territory, artillery and missile units of Polish and Soviet forces conduct strikes against the few targets within range. SCUD brigades provide the longest "reach" of surface-to-surface systems in the Northern Front. These weapons, with a range of 300 kilometers, can reach the operational depth of opposing NATO army corps and even some nuclear priority targets (such as some of the SAM sites and key airfields in northern FRC). Some SCUD missiles are expected to be used with improved conventional munitions (ICM) during the air operation.

A possible forward deployment scheme for fixed-wing aviation units within the Northern Front—and associated assumptions and considerations—can be found in Appendix C. Fixed-wing aviation fire support is generally directly subordinate to the front, which allocates sorties to its armies (Appendix D). The unusual divergent axes of advance in the Northern Front, however, probably will result in a de facto dedication of specific aviation units to specific axes (and, by implication, to the first-echelon armies on those axes). It is unlikely, though, that fixed-wing regiments will be assigned formally to specific army-level formations, even though their cooperation will be very close.

Air operations in support of the northernmost axis are characterized by the frequent interaction of front and naval aviation against maritime and coastal targets. Aviation support to this axis must be particularly responsive during the amphibious/airborne assaults on Bornholm Island (D+1) and Zeoland Island (D+8), during which the northern axis temporarily will receive priority in allocation of air assets. Support to the southernmost axis is a more straightforward undertaking in support of maneuver forces in that it involves less interplay with naval or strategic aviation. The southern axis of the Northern Front usually receives priority in allocation of front fixed-wing sorties due to the higher regional enemy air threat, the larger number of critical targets, and the higher offensive priority of the maneuver axis.

Artillery operations during the offense stress support to first-echelon armies. The Northern Front in this scenario will dedicate most of the Polish 1st artillery brigade to support the Polish Pomeranian Army on the northernmost axis while the Soviet 149th Artillery Division supports the Soviet 2d GTA (first-echelon army on the southernmost axis). Both these armies, in turn, doctrinally dedicate some nondivisional artillery to support first-echelon divisions and retain the remaining nondivisional artillery under centralized control as an Army Artillery
Group. The 91st Polish Antitank Regiment is attached to the 2d GTA, which probably will utilize this regiment as the nucleus of its army antitank reserve. These units will be subordinated when second-echelon and first-echelon armies exchange roles. Thus, the Polish Silesian Army (on the southern axis) eventually can gain the Soviet 149th Guards Artillery Division, the 91st Polish Antitank Regiment, and a Soviet attack helicopter regiment.

b. Central Front

(1) Mission

The mission of the Central Front in this scenario is as follows:

-- To advance forces through the central FRG and into the Benelux nations south of the Maas River, neutralizing major NATO formations within the front area of operations and preventing NATO mobilization/reinforcement in those areas.

-- To force the Benelux nations out of the NATO alliance.

-- To deny NATO the use of major ports and airfields within the area of operations, thus interdicting NATO's lifeline to the continental US.

-- To position forces along the French border in order to continue the advance if directed to do so.

(2) Enemy

(U) See section C (1) for data on enemy forces.

(3) Terrain

The Central Front attacks in a zone 350 kilometers wide, which accords it more opportunities for maneuver than the narrowly confined Northern Front. Terrain in central FRG is generally favorable to maneuvering forces, particularly once attacking forces have penetrated past the constricting Harz Mountains, Hessian Hills, and Odenwald near the West FRG/GDR border. The Weser, Main, and Neckar Rivers are obstacles within specific axes, while the Rhine poses a significant obstacle across the width of the entire front. In some areas, the defense is favored by hilly and/or heavily wooded terrain, but such areas are unconnected and can be bypassed as more successful axes are exploited elsewhere. The Ruhr region is heavily urbanized and would be bypassed on a wide berth by first-echelon forces. The Frankfurt area is also heavily urbanized, but is less extensive. Advancing forces can occupy important objectives (especially airfields) in the Frankfurt outskirts while narrowly bypassing the environs of the city. Road networks in the central FRG are excellent and facilitate east-west movement.
 Forces advancing into the Netherlands experience unfavorable terrain for maneuver. Like their counterparts of the Northern Front, forces of the Central Front advancing in the Netherlands probably will encounter widespread flooding which will confine the advance to the road networks. Forces advancing into Belgium encounter favorable terrain in the central part of the country, although forces entering Belgium south of the Sambre River will be slowed by the thick vegetation and sparse road networks of the Ardennes.

(4) Troops Available

A troop list of major elements of the Central Front, task-organized for combat, is shown in Appendix A.

(5) Concept of the Operation (figure 18)

(a) Immediate Objectives--Northern Axis

The Central Front advances in this scenario on four axes, of which the northernmost is the most heavily weighted. In this scenario, the northern axis supports the Soviet 3d Shock Army in first echelon. The 3d Shock Army crosses the GDR/FRG border north and south of Helmstedt, bypasses Braunschweig, and on D+1 crosses the Leine River near Sarsted and the Innerste River near Hildesheim. The Leine River is crossed on D+2 and the Weser River is crossed near Hameln on D+3. Crossing the Weser accomplishes the 3d Shock Army's immediate assault objectives. Since the Weser is a significant obstacle, the crossing will be accomplished on multiple sites and supported by the 3d Shock Army's organic air assault battalion. The advance reaches Halle by D+4 and forward elements reach the Ems River by early D+5. The 3d Shock Army seizes crossing sites over the Ems River between Muenster and Wiedenbruck, thereby accomplishing front immediate objectives on this axis. The 3d Shock Army has adequate maneuver space within its area of operations to place three divisions on line with one division remaining as the army's second-echelon force.

(b) Commitment of the Front OMG

The Central Front OMG, built around the 20th Guards Army, is positioned for commitment when the 3d Shock Army achieves its penetration of the NATO defenses. Once committed in the wake of the 3d Shock Army, the OMG is not obligated to follow a specific axis, but rather moves rapidly to seize bridgeheads across the Rhine River which subsequently will be used by the slower-moving main forces. The operations of the OMG in this scenario are of direct benefit to the 3d Shock Army, but are carried out in the general interest of the front commander.

(c) Immediate Objectives--EGA Axis

The 3d EGA in this scenario conducts a secondary attack through the Goettingen Corridor north of Kassel. The 3d EGA strikes the boundary between FRC III Corps (CENTAG) and Belgian I Corps (NORTHAC), with priority of effort dedicated to encircling and destroying the defending
NATO forces. The 3d EGA advances to Goettingen by D+1, to Warburg by D+3, and to Dortmund by D+7. The subsequent mission of the 3d EGA is to occupy and control the industrial region of the Ruhr. Movement in this area (Duesseldorf/Wuppertal/Solingen/Cologne) is complicated by extensive urbanization. However, the 3d EGA will attempt to reach the Rhine River north of Cologne by D+10 in order to keep pace with neighboring Soviet armies.

(d) Immediate Objectives—Central Axis

The central axis is used by the Soviet 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) in first echelon to deliver an attack designed to engage and neutralize the US V Corps. The 1st GTA crosses the GDR/FRG border near Eisenach/Bad Salzungen and advances to the Haune River near Fulda/Bad Hersfeld. Subsequent movement along this secondary axis will depend upon the relative successes achieved elsewhere in the front. By wheeling to the north, the 1st GTA could encircle the FRG III Corps and thus support the northernmost axis. By wheeling to the south, the 1st GTA could encircle the US VII Corps and thus support the southernmost axis. By continuing the advance directly westward, the 1st GTA could continue its own success against the US V Corps, threaten Frankfurt and/or Bonn, and seize crossing sites on the Rhine River between Bonn and Mainz. This scenario will commit the 1st GTA on such a westward axis. The 1st GTA advances via Alsfeld to the Giessen area by D+4, from which, depending upon the enemy situation, it may be directed to send strong forces directly south to threaten Frankfurt and/or to seize bridgeheads near Mainz. Attainment of the Giessen area satisfies the immediate objectives of the 1st GTA. The advance continues via Wetzlar and Limburg to the Rhine River near Koblenz, which is reached by D+8/9. Attainment of the Rhine River satisfies the front immediate objective on this axis. Preparation for the assault crossing of the Rhine will require reconnaissance, repositioning and resubordination of assault and supporting forces, and forward displacement of ammunition, bridging equipment, and similar materiel.

(e) Immediate Objectives—Southern Axis

The southern axis is used by the Soviet 8th Guards Army (GA) to neutralize major elements of the US VII Corps. The 8th GA crosses the West FRG/GDR border near Meiningen and advances via Schweinfurt to cross the Main River near Wuerzburg. Crossing the Main River accomplishes the 8th GA's immediate assault objective. The 8th GA subsequently advances to cross the Tauber River south of Wertheim and continues the advance to cross the Neckar River near Ebersbach by D+6. The attacking force is constrained initially to a frontage of two divisions but can expand its frontage after crossing the Main River. During this phase of operations major enemy forces (of the US VII Corps and/or US V Corps and forward-deployed French forces) may, as opportunities present themselves, become targets of encirclement by converging forces split from the central and southern axes.
(f) Subsequent Objectives—Northern Axis

The East German Army (EGA) (from MD V; henceforth referred to as the 5th EGA), which had initially been a second-echelon force, enters first-echelon service upon crossing the Ems River. It assumes control of two tank divisions from the 3d Shock Army as it does so. The 5th EGA crosses the Ems River between Muenster and Wiedenbruck on D+5/6 and subsequently crosses the Dortmund/Ems Canal between Muenster and Datteln by D+7. By D+9, the 5th EGA is positioned to cross the Rhine River at multiple sites between Rees and Wesel. The Rhine River crossings (conducted on D+10 throughout the Front) are major bridging operations and will require concentration of assault and supporting forces during the preparatory phase, an intensified air defense effort to protect these concentrations, preliminary air assaults (parachute and heliborne) to seize key terrain on the hostile side, and intensified air and fire support during consolidation of the airheads and bridgeheads. To sustain momentum after crossing, the 5th EGA will attempt to advance from its Rhine bridgeheads to the Maas River by D+11. The Maas River, while not as formidable as the Rhine, must also be bridged, and this operation will be conducted on multiple sites between Gennepe and Venlo on D+12. The Maas River is the last significant natural obstacle to be negotiated on this axis. The subsequent advance enters the Netherlands to neutralize NATO forces in the s'Hertogenbosch—Eindhoven—Tilburg region, and by D+15 crosses the Netherlands/Belgium border. The first-echelon force for the advance into Belgium is the 28th Army of the Belorussian Front (resubordinated to the Central Front during this phase of the TVD operation). The remainder of the Belorussian Front, as a TVD second echelon, advances several days behind the Central Front. The 28th Army advances from the border to Herentals (from which point a second-echelon division is deployed to occupy the port of Antwerp) by D+16 and enters the Brussels area by D+18. Brussels is bypassed for later occupation by succeeding echelons while the first echelon concludes its advance by occupying assault positions which will be used by the full Belorussian Front for the later invasion of France.

(g) Subsequent Objectives—Central Axis

The Rhine River crossing on the central axis is accomplished on D+10 to coincide with the crossings of the northern and southern axes. The executing force on the central axis is the Soviet NGF Army, which had initially been a second-echelon force. As it enters first-echelon service, the NGF Army's two tank divisions are augmented by at least one division from the 1st GTA and most of the 1st GTA's nondivisional fire support. The NGF Army advances directly through the Rhineland-Palatinate region to reach the FRG/Belgium/Luxembourg border by D+12. The subsequent advance into Belgium (south of the Sambre River) is concluded by D+15 and establishes assault positions for the subsequent invasion of France to be conducted by the Belorussian Front.
(h) Subsequent Objectives—Southern Axis

After crossing the Neckar River, the 8th Guards Army advances to the Rhine River via Speyer by D+9. The Rhine is crossed at multiple sites on D+10. The 8th GA subsequently advances to Kaiserslautern, which it reaches by D+12. This phase of the advance permits the occupation of Pirmasens Depot and other logistic bases important to NATO. The final phase of the advance is conducted as forces transit the Saar Region to eliminate any French troops remaining in the FRG. Saarbrucken is reached by D+15. Subsequent activities center around the establishment of assault positions for the continuance of the advance into France of the Carpathian Front.

(i) Subsequent Operations—EGA Axis

The 3d EGA does not cross the Rhine River on D+10 as do the other armies of the Central Front; instead, it continues its consolidation and pacification of the Ruhr district. The 3d EGA becomes the primary headquarters responsible for rear area control in the central FRG, with priority of effort being protection of overland LOCs sustaining Pact forces as the advance continues beyond the Rhine.

(j) Fire Support

Subordination and allocation of nondivisional fire support assets is reflected in the task organization noted above. Priority targets which can be identified in peacetime are shown in figure 19. The Central Front area of operation contains more critical targets and incorporates the highest-priority axes of advance, and accordingly is allocated more fire support assets than the other fronts within the Western TVD.

As in the Northern Front, the initial task of Central Front fire support is to facilitate and complement the air offensive operation. The longest-range surface-to-surface system for this purpose within the Central Front is the SCUD missile. The SCUD systems will, however, largely be withheld until the nuclear threshold is crossed. Some SCUD units will participate in the air operation using improved conventional munitions (ICM) warheads.

Airstrikes are especially important during the initial days of the offensive while artillery systems are largely out of range of NATO targets. Initially, ground-attack fixed-wing support will be limited as the TVD air operation continues to coopt front sorties, so the close air support function will primarily devolve upon attack helicopters. While helicopters must operate in a high-threat environment due to local antiaircraft weapons, they benefit from the disruption of NATO counterair and air defense efforts caused by the air offensive operation.
The GSFG, which provides the peacetime nucleus from which the Central Front is formed, is relatively deficient in nondenisonal artillery, having only one, the 34th Gun Artillery Division. This relative deficiency can be addressed by rededicating all or part of the 3d Guards artillery division (CAD) from the Belorussian Front to the Central Front. The multiple rocket launcher brigade, the antitank brigade, and self-propelled howitzer units from the Belorussian 3d Guard's Artillery Division would be especially useful to the Central Front and probably will be deployed as rapidly as transportation networks permit. The remainder of the 3d Guards Artillery Division remains under control of the Belorussian Front and deploys forward with its second-echelon parent unit. The regiments of these two artillery divisions are allocated by the Central Front to support the first-echelon 3d Shock Army (which, as the force conducting the main attack, is most heavily augmented), the 1st GTA, and the 8th GA. These armies in turn allocate appropriate nondenisonal artillery assets to their first-echelon divisions and retain the remainder under central control as Army Artillery Groups.

Fire support in the Central Front usually will be characterized by progressive displacement of supporting units to insure both continuous coverage and continuous replenishment of expended ordnance. This pattern will be broken on several occasions when the tempo of the advance is altered. These occasions include the crossings of the Rhine River and the commitment to combat of second-echelon formations. During these periods fire support units intensify their strikes to deny the enemy any respite as maneuver forces prepare to continue the offensive. This requires supporting aviation to fly more sorties, supporting artillery to position farther forward and in mass, and all assets to expend much more ordnance. Since these operations involve multiple armies within the front, fire planning is orchestrated by the front to a degree greater than during periods of rapid maneuver.

c. Southwestern Front

(1) Mission

The mission of the Southwestern Front in this scenario is as follows:

-- To advance into the southern FRG, neutralizing major NATO formations within the front area of operations and preventing NATO mobilization/reinforcement within the area.

-- To establish lines of communication and assault positions which will facilitate the commitment of the Carpathian Front during the first week of combat operations.

-- To establish Pact control over the FRG borders with Switzerland and Austria.
2. Enemy

(U) See section C (1) for data on enemy forces.

3. Terrain

(T) Terrain generally favors maneuver forces, particularly after the attacking force has negotiated the hilly and heavily wooded Czechoslovakia/FRG border area. In some areas, such as Franconia, movement may be slowed locally by hilly terrain, but such areas are circumvented easily. Terrain in the South German Plain region, which covers most of the operating area, is particularly advantageous for rapid maneuver. Urban areas, such as Munich and its environs, are less extensive than those in the Central and Northern Fronts, and river obstacles are generally fewer and smaller than in other front areas.

4. Troops Available

(T) A troop list of major elements of the Southwestern Front, tasked-organized for combat, is provided in appendix A.

5. Concept of the Operation

(a) Immediate Objectives—Northern Axis

(S) The initial advance on the northernmost axis is conducted by the 1st Czech Army in first echelon. The 1st Czech Army crosses the Czechoslovakia/FRG German border via Cheb and via Rozvadov and penetrates to Marktredwitz/Weiden by D+1 and to the Regnitz/Main/Danube Canal near Nuernberg by D+5. During this phase, the leading echelon is constrained by the terrain to a frontage of two divisions. As opportunities present themselves, major units of the FRG II Corps may be encircled by Czech forces splitting southward off the main axis. The 1st Czech Army achieves its immediate assault objectives by reaching the Altmuehl River via Ansbach on D+6/7. At this point the Soviet CGF Army, until now a second-echelon force of the Southwestern Front, deploys on line and takes over the westward axis developed by the 1st Czech Army. In subsequent operations, the 1st Czech Army will redirect its advance to the south.

(b) Immediate Objectives—Southern Axis

(T) The initial advance on the southernmost axis is conducted by the 4th Czech Army in first echelon. The 4th Czech Army crosses the Czechoslovakia/FRG border via Fuerth-im-Wald and by D+2 advances to the Danube River near Regensburg. During this phase, the 4th Czech Army may exploit opportunities to encircle elements of the FRG II Corps by splitting forces to the north (trapping NATO units between the Danube and the Czech border). Movement is constrained in the Fuerth-im-Wald area to a maximum frontage of two divisions, but frontages expand after the crossing of the Danube. The 4th Czech Army accomplishes its immediate assault objectives by reaching Landshut by D+5. From Landshut, the 4th Czech Army can continue its advance to the south and bypass Munich, or attack Munich via multiple avenues, or divert forces to the west to exploit successes on the northern axis.
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(c) Subsequent Objectives—Northern Axis

The 1st Czech Army, after relinquishing its previous (westward) axis to the CGF Army (now subordinated to the Carpathian Front), redirects its advance southward. During the period D+8/9/10, the 1st Czech Army advances to the Danube River via Donauwoerth-Inglstadt, thus clearing the operational rear of the Carpathian Front and encircling NATO units remaining in central Bavaria. The Danube River is crossed on D+11, and by D+12 the 1st Czech Army reaches Augsburg. One division is split from the army's axis at this point to occupy the western outskirts of Munich. Meanwhile the main body of the 1st Czech Army continues its advance up the Lech River valley to the FRG/Austrian border near Fuessen, neutralizing remaining NATO forces in the process. NATO forces attempting to withdraw through Swabia toward France are pursued and destroyed as a matter of high priority. The Czech forces should reach Fuessen by D+16.

(d) Subsequent Operations—Southern Axis

The 4th Czech Army is joined in the sector by two Czech tank divisions from the Eastern Military District. These are mated with one MRD from the 1st Czech Army to form a new entity, the 3rd Czech Army. The 3rd Czech Army advances from Landshut to enter Munich from the north (via Freising) and from the east (via Markt Schwaben). The 4th Czech Army, meanwhile, continues the advance southward to Bad Toelz, neutralizing remaining NATO forces which may attempt to establish defensive positions in the Bavarian Alps.

Major nondivisional fire support assets in the front include SCUD brigades. The Czech 7th Artillery Division is also subordinate to the front. The only attack helicopter regiment is subordinate to the Soviet CGF army. This deficiency is remedied by reassignment of a Soviet attack helicopter regiment from the Carpathian MD to temporary control of the Southwestern Front. Fire support assets of the Southwestern Front are limited compared to the Central Front but sufficient for the Southwestern Front's assigned mission. An immediate source of augmentation is the Carpathian MD/Front, which will in any case be committed to first-echelon service alongside the Southwestern Front on/about D+6. The Carpathian MD/Front can accordingly, if necessary, predeploy selected assets of its two 26th and 31st Artillery Divisions and its High-Power Artillery Brigade. These units will return to the control of the Carpathian Front when the Carpathian units are committed.
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Fixed-wing aviation support to the Southwestern Front, like artillery allocation, reflects the lower priority of the region. The Czech air force and peacetime CGF air forces provide the nucleus for the air forces of the Southwestern Front. These are augmented by units resubordinated from the air forces of the Carpathian MD/Front. A projected forward deployment plan for fixed-wing units within the Southwestern Front is shown in appendix C. These Soviet air units will be returned to control of the Carpathian Front when the Carpathian forces are committed on D+6, but by this time the NATO counterair threat may have been reduced to the extent that Czech Air Force assets remaining under Southwestern Front control could be adequate for the support task.

The 1st Czech Army is the first-echelon army on the main axis and accordingly receives priority of support. Most of the Soviet supporting units will be utilized on this northernmost axis, since they will ultimately continue on this axis under Carpathian Front control. The 4th Czech Army, advancing on the lower-priority southermost axis, is supported exclusively by Czech units. At D+6, when the Southwestern Front loses the CGF army and the Soviet supporting units, the 1st Czech Army may need augmentation by additional Czech fire support, but this decision will be driven by the assessed capability of NATO forces remaining in this area.

4. Second-Echelon Front Operation

a. Carpathian Front

(1) Mission

The mission of the Carpathian Front in this scenario is as follows:

-- Initially (D-day through D+5) to serve as a second-echelon front of the TVD and, as such, prepare to deploy as directed by the TVD commander to exploit successes of the first-echelon fronts and/or to block enemy counteroffensives.

-- Subsequently (D+6 and after) to enter first-echelon service, advancing in sector to neutralize major NATO units and prevent enemy mobilization and reinforcement efforts within the area of operations.

-- To occupy attack positions on the FRG/French border from Karlsruhe to Switzerland and continue the advance into France on order.

(2) Enemy

(U) See section C (1) for data on enemy forces.
(3) Terrain

The Carpathian Front conducts combat operations primarily in the Baden-Wuerttemberg area. Although an advance would be slow in the Black Forest area which covers much of the region, the Carpathian Front can achieve its objectives by advancing along the Kralchau Gap and the Rhine Valley Corridor and thus largely bypass the most restrictive terrain. A secondary axis advances along the Neckar Valley to neutralize enemy forces in the Stuttgart area. Although terrain constraints will make this advance slower than the main axis, the secondary axis is less time-critical and accordingly can achieve its objectives despite terrain constrictions.

(4) Troops Available

A troop list of major elements of the Carpathian Front, task-organized for combat, is provided in appendix A.

(5) Concept of Operations

(a) Immediate Objectives—Main Axis

The main effort of the Carpathian Front, conducted in this scenario by the CGF Army in first echelon, crosses the Altmuehl River at D+8 and advances to the Kocher River (via Schwaebsch Hall) by D+10 and the Neckar River (via Marbach) by D+11. Seizure of Neckar River crossing sites fulfills the immediate assault objectives of the CGF Army. At this point the advance can cross the Neckar to continue the advance westward and/or advance southwest along the Neckar Valley into the Stuttgart area.

(b) Subsequent Objectives—Main Axis

The main effort, now conducted by the 8th Tank Army in first echelon, crosses the Neckar River on D+12 and advances to cross the Nagold River (via Pforzheim) by D+14. From this point the advance follows the Rhine River to occupy assault positions along the FRG/French border. However, if necessary, the advance could continue due west from Pforzheim to enter France without pause. In this scenario, the 8th Tank Army remains on the FRG side of the Rhine, taking Baden-Baden by D+15, Offenburg by D+16, and reaching the Swiss border by D+18. This axis, in addition to securing assault positions for the advance into France, encircles any French and other NATO forces in Baden-Wuerttemberg which otherwise may attempt to retreat into France.

(c) Supporting Axis

The 13th Army advances along the Neckar Valley on D+12 to neutralize NATO forces in the Stuttgart area. The 13th Army reaches Stuttgart by D+15 and subsequently advances through Boeblingen (D+16), Rottenburg (D+17), and Rottweil (D+18), thereby securing the flank and rear of the main assault force.

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(d) Fire Support

Subordination and allocation of fire support assets of the Carpathian Front is reflected in the task organization noted earlier. When the Carpathian Front is committed to first-echelon service on/about D+6 it recovers many of its supporting units previously "loaned" to the Southwestern Front. Among these are an attack helicopter regiment and assets of two artillery divisions and a high-power artillery brigade. Further, the Carpathian Front recovers all its fixed-wing air assets on commitment.

The CGF army, already in place on the main axis, receives priority of support until D+12, when it is replaced in first echelon by the 8th Tank Army. The 13th Army, conducting a supporting attack through the Neckar Valley, receives nondivisional artillery augmentation. The main and secondary axes are relatively close together so that long-range fire support (missile and fixed-wing aviation) can support either axis without rebasing.

b. Belorussian Front

(1) Mission

The Belorussian Front is a second-echelon front of the Western TVD. The mission of the Belorussian Front is as follows:

To advance behind the first-echelon fronts, prepared as directed to commit all or part of subordinate forces to the exploitation of Pact success or the blocking of NATO counteroffensives.

When committed, to become the main attacking force for the advance into France (with the Carpathian Front supporting through an attack into southern France, while the Belorussian Front advances into central and northern France).

(2) Enemy

(U) See section C (1) for data on enemy forces.

(3) Terrain

Natural obstacles should not hinder the movement of the Belorussian Front, since as a second-echelon force it will benefit from the bridging and construction operations that had been carried out by preceding units. The primary constraint to movement would be any areas of heavy nuclear radiation and/or chemical contamination, but these would have been identified and can be bypassed.
(4) **Troops Available**

A troop list of major elements of the Belorussian Front is shown in appendix A. Between the major phases of the TVD operation (i.e., after the occupation of the FRG/Benelux but before the invasion of France) there will be a major restructuring of TVD forces, during which the Belorussian Front will receive combat and supporting units formerly subordinate to the now-depleted Central and Northern Fronts.

(5) **Concept of Operations**

In accordance with Soviet planning procedure, the second TVD phase is not planned in detail prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Rather, the staff of the Belorussian Front conducts its detailed planning during, not before, the advance of first-echelon formations through the FRG. Prewar planning consists primarily of logistic planning to support the movement of the force to its assembly areas in western Poland and the eastern GDR.

Prior to its commitment as a first-echelon force, the Belorussian Front must move to concentration areas near the border with Belgium, Luxembourg, the FRG, and France, a movement of approximately 800 kilometers. The movement will be controlled carefully so that the logistic support and rear services of first-echelon forces are not disrupted. The movement is conducted in combined fashion by rail and road, using organic wheeled and tracked vehicles and supporting tank transporters.

By about D+15 through D+20 the forces of the first-echelon fronts will be securing strategic objectives near the French border and the Belorussian Front forces will begin to arrive in assembly areas in Belgium and the western FRG. Although the Soviets strive to maintain an uninterrupted tempo in the offense, there will be an unavoidable pause as forces are restructured and resubordinated, and during this pause the TVD may attempt to maintain the tempo of operations by conducting airborne and amphibious operations. It can be anticipated that one or more armies formerly subordinate to the Central Front will be resubordinated to the Belorussian Front for the advance into France, and the Belorussian Front also will receive almost all the aviation formerly subordinate to the Central Front and a large proportion of its nondivisional artillery assets as well. The Central Front, now greatly reduced in size, becomes a second-echelon front of the Western TVD.

A potential variation in the role of the Belorussian Front is possible if the Central Front forces remain relatively undepleted and combat-capable upon reaching their strategic objectives. In this variant, the Central Front armies remain in first-echelon service (under Belorussian Front control) while the newly arrived Belorussian armies follow in the second echelon. It is more likely, however, that most Central Front armies will be so depleted that they will have to be taken out of first-echelon service for a period of personnel rest and replacement and refitting of equipment (see section F below for a discussion of force reconstitution approaches).