Soviet Readiness in the Western Theater and its Impact on Operations (U)

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SOVIET READINESS IN THE
WESTERN THEATER AND ITS IMPACT
ON OPERATIONS (U)

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PREFACE

(5) This study is a follow-on to a recent U.S. Intelligence Community assessment of Soviet ground force readiness. It examines recent developments in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD) ground forces to determine their effect on the Soviets' ability to initiate and conduct offensive operations in the NATO Central Region. The Soviets' capability to generate forces to meet the commitment schedule of their doctrine for the use of echeloned forces is the primary focus of the study.

(U) Allied recipients of this study are encouraged to forward comments or questions through servicing US authorities to the Defense Intelligence Agency the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-6111
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SUMMARY

(5) Soviet offensive doctrine in the Western Theater encompassing the NATO Central Region is centered around having an immediately available force element that can insure the Warsaw Pact's ability to seize and maintain the initiative. This equates to the highly ready groups of Soviet forces deployed in the forward area and selected non-Soviet elements. A large additional element is maintained at varying readiness levels to insure the continuous commitment of fresh forces to combat at preplanned times and places after D-day in accordance with the Soviet doctrine for the use of echeloned forces. Additional forces have to be available as reserves.

(5) A force of 75-90 divisions is required to meet Soviet planning factors for use of echeloned forces for operations in the Western Theater. Sixty-three to 74 of these should be mobilized, trained, moved, and be in or arriving in forward concentration areas on D-day. This insures timely and orderly commitment to combat in the first phase of theater operations to seize objectives along the French-German border and North Sea coast. An additional force of 12-16 divisions has to be made ready in forward concentration areas by about D+8 in order to be available for the second phase of operations into France.

(5) In the Western Theater, consisting of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts (MDs), there are 104 Warsaw Pact divisions.* Three airborne and 1 sea-landing division will be employed for specialized airborne and amphibious operations, and 17 will be most likely used as reserves. The remaining 83 are available for use as first- or second-echelon divisions and are sufficient in number to meet the assessed requirements to carry out offensive operations. However, to meet doctrinal norms, forward area forces must be reinforced from the western MDs of the USSR prior to D-day.

(5) In a rapid attack scenario the Soviets can prepare the forces required for an offensive into Central Europe after about 2 weeks of preparation prior to D-day, including time for not-ready force elements to conduct a short period of refresher training. If the Soviets opt to train all of their forces to Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), levels of proficiency, approximately a month of preparation is required prior to D-day. However, such extended preparations will be conducted in a phased, sequenced, and heavily concealed fashion, possibly employing exercise cover, in an environment of gradually accelerating tensions.

(5) In recent years the Warsaw Pact has been engaged in an extensive force development program that has involved the expansion, modernization, and reorganization of the theater forces and the introduction of improved training practices and innovative operational concepts and combat organizations. This has been done to insure the Pact's ability to implement its theater strategy of deeply echeloned forces advancing to deep objectives. This program has been accomplished in the face of unfavorable

* Including one new-type army corps counted as a division in this study.
demographic trends. This apparently has caused the Pact to man ready forward forces at levels somewhat below wartime authorization and to continue to maintain the majority of western MD divisions at cadre level, even though many are being equipped with the latest equipment. These peacetime manning problems have only a minor impact on the previously assessed rate at which the Pact can generate its forces. Pact ground forces in the Western TVD thus present an increasingly formidable threat to NATO in terms of numbers, capability, and readiness.
1. INTRODUCTION

This study examines the impact of recent assessments of the readiness posture of Warsaw Pact ground maneuver forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD) on their ability to conduct operations against the NATO Central Region and Denmark. The basic Soviet concepts for operations against the NATO Central Region, including force generation and organization for combat, will be examined along with the readiness of Pact ground forces in the theater. The study assesses the Pact's ability to generate the forces required by their strategy and will postulate timelines required to generate those forces given a variety of assumptions of post-mobilization training.

The Soviets have traditionally viewed the Western TVD as the decisive arena of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The theater encompasses the NATO Central Region, Schleswig-Holstein, and Denmark as well as the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts (MDs) of the USSR. In Soviet eyes, it contains the greatest concentration of potential enemy military, industrial, and economic resources of any peripheral land theater. The Pact views NATO as having uneven military capabilities. While many of NATO's forces are viewed as relatively weak, some components, such as US and FRG corps and US aviation, are assessed as very powerful forces. Their planners perceive that NATO forces are improving their capabilities by both expanding forces and equipment levels and by acquiring new, technologically advanced weapons systems. These include new tanks such as the US M-1 and the German Leopard-II; improved tactical aviation represented by the F-15, F-16, and Tornado, new artillery, missile, and air defense systems; and new combat helicopters and antitank weapons.

Pact planners also view NATO as developing innovative tactical doctrines such as the US Army AirLand Battle and the SHAPE Follow-on Forces Attack concepts, which capitalize on enhancements in mobility, command and control, and firepower. These involve, in their eyes, increased maneuver, NATO development of concepts for offensive operations, and a growing threat to the stability of the rear area.

Moreover, Pact planners also ascribe to NATO an excellent capability to alert, mobilize, and deploy its in-theater forces and are also well aware of NATO's plans to introduce additional well-equipped ground and air forces into the theater, primarily from the US. They believe that, given 2 to 3 weeks of preparation time, NATO can develop a formidable warfighting capability.

While such assessments are in part self-serving, worst-case analyses on Pact planners' part, they do reflect an extremely cautious and conservative approach to military planning. They also are the result of Pact planners' mirror imaging of their own rapid force generation plans. They fuel historically and ideologically driven perceptions that a powerful potential enemy such as NATO may seriously consider a surprise attack on the USSR. Therefore, Pact planners assess that they must deploy numerous well-equipped forces in the theater maintained at a readiness that permits rapid
assumption of a wartime posture. They must continually innovate in tactical doctrine and organizational concepts in order to effectively counter growing enemy capabilities.

2. STRATEGIC DETERMINANTS OF PACT READINESS

(3) In planning for a possible war in Europe, the Soviets recognize that seizure of the initiative and rapid offensive operations by combined-arms forces to objectives in the depth of the theater are the key to victory. Three elements of their strategy drive their approach to the deployment and readiness of their forces:

--- Pact forces must be able to engage in initial operations under emergency conditions, without prior mobilization of reservists.

--- In order to maintain the momentum of the theater offensive, fresh forces must be available for commitment at preplanned times and places. Therefore, forces are echeloned, allowing for continuous commitment over time at a greater depth.

--- Large reserves must be available to replace anticipated high losses, particularly if a war is fought at the nuclear level, and to deal with other unexpected events.

(U) The requirement to maintain immediately available forces derives ultimately from Soviet determination not to repeat the experiences of the initial period of World War II, when the surprise German attack of 22 June 1941 inflicted huge losses and destruction on the USSR. Soviet official analysis of the cause of the disaster focuses on the fact that Soviet strategy of the time assumed that a small covering force would be able to halt an attack while main forces were mobilized and deployed. The Soviet Command calculated that 2 weeks would be required for the western border MDS to prepare their forces for war. Before beginning offensive operations, the Soviets would have to reinforce the western MDS with forces from the interior. According to Soviet analysis, in the spring of 1941 the Soviets recognized that events were leading to war and began preparation measures. Approximately 800,000 reservists were called up. Twenty-eight divisions in the USSR interior were ordered to move to the west, and second-echelon and reserve divisions in the western MDS were tasked to begin forward movement. Nevertheless, even with that warning and preparation, there was insufficient time to mobilize and deploy their forces. The German attack found Soviet forces poorly prepared and deployed, and it thus inflicted a crushing defeat on them.

(U) The official Soviet analysis of these events ignores many factors which, in Western interpretation, caused the disaster. Soviet authors stress that the lesson learned from this experience is that forces sufficient to blunt a surprise enemy attack and begin offensive operations must be available without going through a lengthy period of mobilization, preparations, and movement. One Soviet analyst has summarized this conclusion, as follows:
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At the same time, the combat experience teaches us that before the start of war, we must possess forces and resources in a state of combat readiness which would ensure repulsion of a surprise attack without additional mass mobilization, without major regroupings, and without the need for reorganizing troops in the initial period of war. Several versions of contingency plans, prepared beforehand, for repelling aggression and conducting the first operations would be necessary as well.*

The Soviets believe that the high readiness and combat capabilities of NATO forces (in their perception) makes this principle just as valid today as it was in 1941.

This does not mean that all Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces have to be maintained in a state of readiness that allows immediate transition to battle. The Soviet concept of the use of echeloned forces to conduct a theater operation requires a large force structure. However, its units can be maintained at varying levels of readiness. Under the echelonnement concept, the momentum of the advance is insured, in part, by the continuous commitment of fresh forces to the operation at preplanned times and locations. Below is a sample schedule derived from Soviet doctrine for the commitment of echeloned forces for battle over the course of a typical theater operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Time of Commitment</th>
<th>Depth of Commitment (beyond D-day FLOT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Echelon Divisions of 1st Echelon Army</td>
<td>D-day</td>
<td>FLOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Operational Maneuver Group (OMG)</td>
<td>D+1</td>
<td>30-50 kilometers (km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Echelon Divisions of 1st Echelon Army</td>
<td>D+2-3</td>
<td>100-150 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front OMG</td>
<td>D+2-3</td>
<td>100-150 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Echelon Divisions of 2d Echelon Army</td>
<td>D+5-6</td>
<td>250-350 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Divisions of 2d Echelon Front</td>
<td>D+10-20</td>
<td>400-600 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to readiness, this concept does not demand that the force generation process make all forces ready on D-day. Rather, the process must insure that forces are available at the time and place required by the operations plan. In addition, the Soviets also believe that forces committed over the course of a theater campaign can be at an increasingly

lesser level of combat potential measured in terms of equipment capabilities and training. They assess that on D-day the best equipped and trained forces of each side will face each other, and as the campaign progresses, these forces will be attrited or destroyed, and both sides will be employing newly mobilized, less well-trained and equipped forces. In addition, if the Soviets are winning, the combat tasks accomplished by forces committed later in the campaign will become increasingly simple. First-echelon forces typically will have to break through prepared defenses, conduct meeting engagements with enemy armored units, and repulse attacks by late model aircraft. Divisions committed later will have to pursue defeated enemy forces, occupy territory, and mop up scattered pockets of enemy resistance.

The Soviets also believe that future wars will demand large reserves of manpower and equipment and that victory will go to the side that can most quickly mobilize those reserves. They expect to sustain enormous losses, especially in a nuclear war. Therefore, the Soviets plan to establish very large reserves at theater and Supreme High Command levels whose principal wartime function will be to serve as replacements for divisions destroyed in the first echelon. Strategic reserves will be located primarily in the depth of the theater and, therefore, beyond the range of most tactical nuclear systems. Thus, in a theater nuclear exchange, they will suffer fewer losses than first-echelon forces and will be a prime source of replacements. Replacements primarily will be in the form of divisions and other units that will be brought forward to reconstitute the first-echelon front and army structure.

3. READINESS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE WESTERN TVD

Readiness of a military force is a measure of its ability to carry out its mission. It is measured in terms of numbers and types of equipment, manpower, training, leadership and morale, command and control, etc. The readiness of Warsaw Pact ground forces has been the object of extensive research and analysis by the US Intelligence Community. Results have been published in several studies including the following: Interagency Intelligence Memorandum The Readiness of Soviet Ground Forces (U), NI IIM 82-10012/D (SECRET); and Defense Intelligence Report, The Soviet Force Generation Process (U), Volumes I and II, DDB-1100-352-82 (SECRET/UNCLASS).

To summarize, these studies indicate that the Warsaw Pact divides its forces into two broad readiness categories: "ready" and "not-ready."

"Ready" units are the most highly manned and the best equipped and trained, and at least are minimally prepared for combat operations with little or no mobilization. "Not-ready" units require extensive mobilization and would not be available for immediate combat operations. While the necessary reservists can be mobilized quickly, the Pact reserve system does not immediately convert "not-ready" units into cohesive fighting units. Instead, "not-ready" units must train, subsequent to mobilization, if they are to perform proficiently in a mid- to high-intensity combat environment.

Within these broad categories the Pact actually maintains their forces at one of six levels of readiness. These are described in table 1. In table 2 are listed the ground maneuver divisions (including a new-type army corps which is counted as a division in this study) of the Western TVD in accordance with these readiness levels. Figure 1 portrays these
divisions broken out according to the "ready" or "not-ready" status and located on a stylized representation of the theater.

Figure 1. (U) Peacetime Status Warsaw Pact Divisions — Western TVD.

Table 1

Readiness of Warsaw Pact Divisions (U)

"Ready" Divisions

Full-Strength Ready
-- Peacetime equipment and manpower authorization are essentially equal to wartime authorizations.
-- Full training program includes annual regiment and division field training exercises (FTR).
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Table 1 (Continued)

--- All authorized equipment and more than 95 percent of authorized manpower assigned.
--- Modern equipment.

**Reduced-Strength Ready I**
--- Peacetime equipment authorizations are essentially equal to wartime authorizations.
--- Peacetime manpower authorizations are less than 95 percent and some personnel augmentation is planned prior to commitment to combat. Normally manned between 70 and 85 percent.
--- Full training program.
--- Modern equipment.

**Reduced-Strength Ready II**
--- Peacetime equipment authorizations are essentially equal to wartime authorizations.
--- Peacetime manning does not equal wartime authorizations and considerable personnel augmentation is planned prior to commitment to combat. Some regiments and/or battalions of the divisions are in a cadre status. Normally they are manned between 55 and 70 percent.
--- Modified full training program. (Cadre subunits do not participate in FTXs)
--- Mostly modern equipment.

"Not-Ready" Divisions

**High-Strength Cadre**
--- Peacetime equipment authorizations normally are not equal to wartime authorizations.
--- Normally manned between 25 and 40 percent.
--- Troop training—generally not above battalion level.
--- Generally older equipment, although many in the Western TVD have the latest Soviet equipment.

**Low-Strength Cadre**
--- Peacetime equipment authorizations (e.g., trucks and APCs) are not equal to wartime authorizations.
--- Peacetime manning is less than 25 percent of wartime authorizations.
--- Troop training—generally not above company level.
--- Generally older equipment, although many in the Western TVD have the latest Soviet equipment.

**Mobilization Base (inactive)**
--- No permanently assigned staff in peacetime.
--- No regular training program.
--- Substantial equipment shortfalls.
--- Equipment configured in unit sets.
(17) This force structure conforms to the three underlying rules regarding manning and deployment described above. The large number of ready divisions in the groups of forces and NSWP armies satisfies the requirement that a large force be available for use in initial operations in an emergency situation without preliminary mobilization (although if time is available, it is virtually certain that the reduced-strength ready divisions will be brought up to full strength). Second, the large number of ready divisions in the theater also provides for divisions to be committed as second-echelon and operational maneuver group elements at preplanned times in the early stages of a theater conflict. Less-ready divisions and/or those located farther to the rear could be planned for employment later in the conflict. Third, the sheer size of the theater force, which is attained, in part, by maintaining large numbers of divisions at very low readiness levels, assures that a large reserve can be made available.

(18) Nondivisional units are essential to the conduct of a theater campaign and their readiness is an essential element of theater readiness. These are also maintained as "ready" or "not-ready" units. Analysis has also revealed that they are actually maintained as full- and reduced-strength ready, high- and low-strength cadre, or mobilization base units. In assigning peacetime manning levels, tact planners appear to consider both planned time of wartime commitment and skill levels required by the units. Nondivisional units in the groups of forces are maintained as "ready" units, reflecting plans for their early employment. In other areas, units that require complex specialized skills such as missile units generally are manned as "ready" units. Nondivisional units that do not meet these two criteria are maintained as "not-ready".
a. Recent Developments in Readiness in the Western Theater

Since the 1970s the Warsaw Pact has conducted an aggressive program to enhance the various components of readiness. Improvements include equipment modernization and numerical growth, force reorganization and expansion, upgrading of command and control capabilities, enhancement of logistic support, and improvements in training. These developments are supplemented by innovations in operational concepts and combat organizations. The Soviet goal is to insure their ability to seize deep objectives in a short theater campaign characterized by rapid maneuver, combined-arms operations, and massive fire support. A significantly better trained and organized force with improved firepower, mobility, command and control, sustainability, and operational concepts is emerging. The more important improvements in ground force capabilities are summarized below.

(1) Equipment

Equipment available to Pact forces in the Western TVD is being expanded in absolute numbers, while the inventory is being modernized through the introduction of new models. Examples of new equipment include the T-64, 72, and 80 tank replacing the older T-54/55 and T-62. Towed artillery systems are being replaced with newer self-propelled systems including the 2S1 122-mm system and the 2S3 and 2S5 155-mm systems. The 155-mm systems are capable of nuclear as well as conventional fires. The SS-21, 12 (Mod-2), and 23 short-range ballistic missile systems are being introduced or are about to be introduced replacing older FROG, SCALEBOARD, and SCUD systems. These new systems have increased range, accuracy, and improved conventional munitions capability. Air defense is being enhanced by the substitution of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems for older gun systems. In some Soviet units, older SAMs, including the SA-6 and SA-9, are being replaced by newer generation SA-8, 11, and 13 systems. Mi-24/HIND and Mi-8/HIP helicopters are proliferating in the force, improving both aerial fire support and air assault capabilities. In regard to the expansion of absolute numbers, table 3 illustrates the growth for selected items of equipment.

Table 3
Numbers of Major Weapons Systems in the Western TVD (U)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)
(2) Reorganization and Expansion

The modernization and increase in numbers of equipment have been accomplished via a reorganization and expansion of the theater force structure. The most striking change has been the reorganization and expansion of Soviet divisions. The change to the Soviet division structure involves the addition of a howitzer battalion (18 122-mm howitzers) to tank regiments in tank divisions, and the expansion of the motorized rifle company of tank regiments in tank divisions to a full battalion. Also, the reconnaissance battalions of both tank and motorized rifle divisions are receiving six medium tanks; and helicopter detachments are expanding to squadron size with the addition of HIND attack helicopters. Additional BMPs are being added to motorized rifle battalions to carry crew-served weapons. The expanded infantry assets of the motorized rifle regiment of tank divisions has been consolidated into two battalions.

Force reorganization and expansion has also affected non-divisional units. Army-level artillery units in the groups of forces are expanding from 54-gun regiments to 96-gun brigades by the addition of an artillery battalion and the expansion of all batteries from six to eight guns. In addition, Czechoslovakia has been forming, since the late 1970s, the NSWP countries' only artillery division. The sixth Soviet artillery division in the theater started forming in 1984 in the Belorussian MD.

Air assault assets have also grown significantly in the theater. Five air assault brigades have been deployed in the theater, one each in the three western MDs as well as in the GSPG and CCF. In addition, air assault battalions have been identified in four of the five GSPG armies, and in the Belorussian and Carpathian MDs. The addition of these forces must be balanced against the loss of one of the theater's four airborne divisions, the 103 Guards, located in the Belorussian MD, which was assigned to duty in Afghanistan in 1979.

The increase in numbers of helicopters in the theater is being reflected in an expanding aviation force structure. Ready divisions are being assigned helicopter squadrons in place of detachments. Tank and combined-arms armies are being assigned aviation units and staffs, including an attack helicopter regiment. In all there are now 14 attack and 9 transport helicopter regiments in the theater.

Command and control is being improved by the construction of hardened command posts, the establishment of extensive landline communications systems, and the acquisition of modern signal equipment, including communications satellite and tropospheric scatter systems. Improved high-frequency, very-high-frequency, and ultrahigh-frequency (HF, VHF, and UHF) radio and radio-relay equipment is also being acquired. Automated command and control systems are being developed and deployed.

(3) Training and Doctrine Developments

The Soviets are further improving the combat potential of their forces by a far-reaching change in the conscript assignment and training system. Previously, the Soviets called up new conscripts to
replace those whose terms of service had expired in April and October. During that period approximately 25 percent of the personnel in Soviet forces were rotated. That troop rotation initiated a 6-month training period in which training commenced with basic training for the new conscripts and progressed through individual to unit training and exercises. At the completion of the period, every unit rotated its personnel and the process was repeated in the next period.

The Soviets have modified this practice by consolidating all new conscripts in one company/battery of each tank, motorized rifle, and artillery battalion. That company is not subject to another troop rotation for at least 18 months, and the soldiers serve together for their entire period of service. The company's training program then lasts 18, not 6, months. Instead of having to repeat three similar training periods, each of which starts with basic training, the companies are able to build on their experience and conduct more advanced combined-arms training and exercises. Now, following troop rotation time, a typical tank or motorized rifle battalion contains a "junior" company whose soldiers are in their first 6-month period of service, an "intermediate" company with troops in the 6th-12th month of service, and a "senior" company with troops in the 12th-24th month of service.

The result of this change is that at the end of a a 6-month training period, when the "junior" companies have been through one training period, a much more cohesive and better trained Soviet force has been created. Combat readiness has been significantly increased. GDR forces have also adopted this system.

These developments in the organization, proficiency, and combat potential of the force have been complemented by innovations in the operational concepts and combat organizations that the Soviets plan to employ in a future war. These innovations have been designed both to take advantage of growing Warsaw Pact capabilities and to counter projected developments in NATO strategy, operational concepts, and weaponry.

These innovations have included experimenting with traditional methods of providing fire support. A significant innovation involves the integration of all types of target destruction or suppression assets (airstrikes, rockets and artillery, air defense, jamming, etc.) into an integrated and coordinated fire support plan. When planning for operations, such a plan is drawn up by a small staff to insure the most effective support of the operation.

The Soviets are paying close attention to destruction of NATO deep-strike assets. They are especially concerned with the problem of suppressing long-range systems that could interfere with the movement forward of second-echelon and other follow-on forces. They have introduced a new phase of fire support—fire support of movement forward—to the traditional fire support that accompanies the commitment of a division to combat. This phase is designed to destroy NATO's deep-attack systems that could interfere with the movement forward and introduction to combat of follow-on forces. They also appear to be experimenting with deep-strike systems similar to the US Assault Breaker system by teaming SS-21, SCUD, and multiple rocket launchers with improved reconnaissance and automated C³ systems.
The Soviets are also introducing a new element into the combat formation of fronts and armies. This new element, called an operational maneuver group (OMG), is a revival of the World War II mobile group. It is designed to be introduced into NATO's rear area early in an operation by passing through a penetration of forward defenses made by the first echelon. It will then conduct raids and exploitation in the enemy rear. By attacking command and control facilities, nuclear weapons and delivery systems, airfields, transportation facilities, etc., the OMG will disrupt the stability of the NATO rear and facilitate the introduction of the second echelon. The OMG is normally a heavily reinforced division at army level and a corps or army at front level. The use of the OMG in Soviet plans contributes to the acceleration of the collapse of NATO defenses, the assurance of a high rate of advance to deep objectives, the neutralization of NATO's theater nuclear capability, and the achievement of a swift victory. Recently, the Soviets have started expanding divisions to corps-size units patterned after World War II tank and mechanized corps. So far, two of these new corps have been formed. They appear to be well suited for OMG operations and are distinguished by the following points:

-- Maneuver elements are called brigades. The corps has three to five of these that are composed of composite battalions with both tank and BMP companies.

-- Other major units in corps include two multiple rocket launcher battalions, an air assault brigade/regiment, a helicopter squadron, an artillery regiment, and a materiel support regiment.

-- Command and control is enhanced through assignment of a security and service battalion, a tropospheric scatter battalion, and communications satellite equipment.

One of these corps is located in the Western TVD, at Minsk in the Belorussian MD. The other is deployed in the Transbaikal MD. (In the calculations in the remainder of this study the Minsk Corps will be counted as a division.)

(4) Sustainability

(b)(1)(2)(4)(c)

Organizational restructuring has enhanced the logistic support of Pact forces. Recent changes are designed to enhance mobility, responsiveness, flexibility, and survivability of critical logistic resources in the face of increasing materiel requirements. New materiel support units have been created. Materiel support brigades subordinate to fronts and armies, and materiel support battalions and companies subordinate to divisions and regiments are charged with the supply of ammunition, POL,
spare parts, and other consumable supply items to combat elements. These units are composed of large motor transport assets, mobile supply stocks, and a variety of servicing and support elements. In contrast to past practices in which transport, supply, and servicing responsibilities were fragmented, most resupply operations now are placed under individual materiel support unit commanders, who can provide materiel resources more quickly and effectively to combat units. Rear front bases continue to exist under this concept, but the former army mobile bases, forward front bases, and aviation supply bases are being replaced by materiel support brigades.

These force enhancements have involved primarily Soviet forces in the theater, both in the groups of forces and in the western MDs. The NSWP component is modernizing at a slower rate. Even though they are acquiring new equipment, such as T-72 tanks, BMPs, SA-5 SAMs, etc., their relative capabilities are diminishing when measured against both their Soviet allies and many of their expected NATO adversaries. They present an anomaly in that they are manned predominantly at "ready" levels. This insures their ability to attain a high proficiency by conducting a vigorous training program in peacetime and to rapidly assume a wartime status. However, their equipment is more similar to the Soviet "not-ready" model. For example, these forces are still equipped primarily with T-54/55 tanks. Most divisional air defense is provided by 57-mm guns, and artillery is mostly older towed systems.

An unusual and contrasting pattern of readiness is evident in the Soviet western MDs. The readiness status of many of those forces has a pattern contrary to what is normally observed in Pact forces. The vast majority of western MD divisions (30 of 38) are manned at a "not-ready" status. However, many of these "not-ready" divisions, as well as the "ready" divisions, are exceedingly well equipped, particularly with tanks. In fact, there is a marked differentiation between those divisions and the rest. The divisions are arbitrarily referred to as "modernized" and "not-modernized." The "modernized" tank and motorized rifle divisions include 7 reduced-strength ready (including the Minsk Corps) and 16 cadre (1 additional cadre division is in the process of modernizing). They are characterized as follows:

-- Modern tanks. All are equipped with T-64, 72, or T-80 types. This is the factor employed to determine if a division should be considered as "modernized."

-- Motorized rifle units equipped primarily with infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). These divisions are equipped primarily with BMPs, with fewer numbers of BTR-60s and 70s.

-- Division air defense missiles. SA-6, -8, or -11 SAM systems are assigned to all the reduced-strength ready divisions and to eight of the "modernized" cadre divisions.

-- Modern artillery. Towed systems still predominate throughout the western MDs; however, self-propelled artillery has been identified in six reduced-strength ready and four "modernized" cadre divisions. These divisions also have the more modern towed guns such as the 122-mm howitzer D-30.
In contrast, the following characterizes the 14 "not-modernized" divisions:

-- Older tanks. All are equipped with the T-54, 55, or 62.

-- Primarily APC equipped. Although most divisions have some BMPs, these divisions are equipped primarily with BTR-60s and some 152 APCs.

-- Air defense gun systems. The division air defense weapon in all of these division is the 57-mm S-60 antiaircraft gun.

-- Older Artillery. None of these divisions has modern SP artillery. Their inventories contain large numbers of World War II-vintage weapons such as the 122-mm howitzer (M-1938).
This modernization program is driven by the vital role that at least some of the western MD forces will perform in Western TVD operations. Faced with growing NATO capabilities and deteriorating relative capabilities of their NSWP allies, the Soviets apparently are placing increasing reliance on western MD forces to sustain deep-theater operations. Accordingly, these are being provided with the most modern equipment. However, serious demographic problems within the USSR induce the Soviets to continue to man most of these forces at a cadre level. Apparently, the Soviets have a high confidence in their ability to mobilize rapidly, prepare, and forward deploy these forces so they can participate in early theater operations.

The groups of forces present a mixed pattern of modernization. Three GSPG armies, the 2d Guards Tank, the 3d Shock, and the 20th Guards, constitute the standard of the most modernized of Pact forces. They are equipped with modern tanks, artillery, air defense systems etc. The 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies of GSPG as well as the NCF and CGF have lagged somewhat behind those three armies. The T-62 tank still predominates in these forces, although T-64, T-72, and T-80 types are being introduced. SP artillery is also being introduced at a somewhat slower rate.

The Pact forces in Hungary and the Kiev MD present a similar pattern of readiness. These forces, usually associated with the Southwest TVD, may be employed in the Western TVD under some contingencies. In Hungary, the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SGF) with four divisions is manned, trained, and equipped in a fashion similar to the other Soviet groups of forces. The Hungarian Army with six divisions, while it is upgrading its capabilities, maintains a pattern of readiness similar to the NSWP countries of the Western TVD.

The Kiev MD repeats, in some respects, the pattern observed in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs. The 15 maneuver divisions in the district are all categorized as "not-ready" (8 high-strength and 3 low-strength cadre, and 4 mobilization bases). Eight of these divisions are equipped with T-64 tanks and thus exhibit the principal characteristic of the "modernized" divisions of the western MDs. However, APC/IFV, artillery, and air defense weapons are far below the standards of those "modernized" divisions. The divisions of one army in the Kiev MD, the 5th Guards Tank Army, are all equipped with the T-64 (except for mobilization bases located in the army area).

b. Readiness Problems

These enhancements have not been achieved without cost. The force expansion and reorganization have driven up the number of personnel required to man the force. The expansion along with significant growth of Soviet forces outside of the theater is being accomplished in the face of unfavorable demographic trends. The labor forces in all four of the Pact countries in the Western TVD are projected to increase slowly and to have some periods of net losses in the remainder of the century. They are all currently limited or will be in the next few years in the numbers of males
reaching the age of 18. (See appendix A for details of the demographic situation in the Pact nations.) This has driven the Pact to economize in the use of manpower.

(3) In the Western TVD peacetime ground force manpower has grown from 1,195,000 in 1979 to 1,304,488 in 1984, an increase of 9 percent. However, the force structure is growing at a faster pace, leaving a large gap between wartime (fully mobilized) and peacetime authorized manpower. The manpower shortfall has manifested itself most notably in Soviet forces in the forward area. It is assessed that the Soviets no longer maintain their divisions in the groups of forces in a full-strength ready status.

(3) The divisions there are now manned at reduced-strength ready I status. Tank divisions have 90 percent of their wartime-authorized personnel, and motorized rifle divisions have 85 percent. These shortfalls appear to be primarily in specialties requiring little specialized training. Vacant positions predominate in motorized rifle and artillery units where riflemen and ammunition bearers account for most of the missing personnel. Other units requiring highly skilled and specialized personnel, such as tank, missile, or signal units, are kept at or near full strength. Thus, these divisions are able to carry out critical skill and combined-arms training in peacetime. The missing personnel can be mobilized rapidly and integrated into their units when preparing for war.

(3) These divisions still fulfill the Soviet doctrinal requirement of being able to enter combat without preliminary mobilization in an emergency. The manpower shortfalls, while they reduce a division's combat potential somewhat, are not great enough to affect its basic ability to fight. Nevertheless, if at all possible, these divisions plan for and practice to conduct mobilization of missing personnel prior to going to war. Sources of filler personnel include the three following categories:

-- Soviet civilian reservists resident in the forward area who are employed by the groups of forces in peacetime.

-- Soldiers assigned to the groups of forces who in peacetime serve in nonessential housekeeping, administrative, or recreational assignments. It is known that several nonessential units in the groups will be disbanded in wartime and their personnel assigned to combat formations.

-- Soldiers brought from the Western USSR. These may be newly mobilized reservists or active-duty personnel transferred from other assignments.

(3) In all, DIA estimates that it will now take 2 to 3 days to fully mobilize and prepare the Soviet divisions in the forward area.

(3) A second cost of the force development program concerns the use of consolidated conscript rotation and phased training. While the innovation produces a better trained force on the whole, it has a drawback in that during most of the training cycle most tank, artillery, and motorized rifle battalions have a company, the "junior" company, that cannot
be considered combat capable. Only toward the end of its initial 6-month training period can this company be considered as attaining the minimal standard of proficiency and cohesion for commitment to offensive combat. As was the case with manpower, this does not mean that the division cannot fight in an emergency situation. It can man 70 percent of its weapons systems with trained crews. This appears to be the Soviet minimal standard of readiness for combat.

Thus, the cost of their force improvements for the Soviets is a reduced capability, while still meeting minimal standards, to effectively respond in an emergency situation such as an unexpected NATO resort to war. In Soviet eyes, this represents a calculated risk. It reflects their confidence that they will either control the timing of events in a crisis or that a period of warning prior to a war will be available. If time is available, the Soviets can take numerous steps to reduce the manpower and training problems. Given a minimal time to prepare the force, a better trained, organized, and equipped force than in the mid-1970s confronts NATO.

To deal with the manpower shortfall in the groups of forces the Soviets can do any of the following:

-- In a prolonged period of crisis or tension they could be made up by assigning additional conscripts to bring the groups of forces to full wartime manning. This may be done during a normal troop rotation.

-- The required personnel can be mobilized or transferred as described above in a concealed manner over a prolonged period of time.

-- The required personnel can be rapidly mobilized or transferred in the context of a general mobilization for war. In the first two alternatives, there is a low probability that the activity will be detected in a timely manner. In the third, this activity will be one small element of an avalanche of activities associated with general mobilization.

The Soviets can remedy the training problem by delaying or canceling the discharge of troops whose term of service is expiring and keep them on active duty. This retains the high unit proficiency attained at the end of the training cycle and avoids the problem of replacing fully trained "senior" companies with untrained "junior" ones. The USSR Law on Universal Military Service empowers the Minister of Defense to retain troops on active duty for 2 months past their scheduled discharge dates. In addition, Warsaw Pact mobilization plans are known to include provisions for canceling or delaying scheduled discharges. Furthermore, if planning to attack, the Soviets can begin hostilities at the end of the training period, when proficiency is at its highest.
c. Mobilization Requirements

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

4. FORCE GENERATION CAPABILITY AND REQUIREMENTS

The combat potential of the theater forces is realized as they go through the force generation process. It is through this process that units are mobilized, trained, prepared, deployed, and enter combat. The steps of the process have been described in the recent Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IAM), The Readiness of Soviet Ground Forces (U), NI IAM 82-10012/D (SECRET), which will be summarized. In analyzing the force generation process, this study derived timelines to mobilize Soviet divisions; that is, bring them to wartime authorized manning and equipment levels, disperse from garrison, and erect a wartime command and control system. These are shown in table 6.
Table 6

Soviet Division Mobilization Timelines (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Division</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-Strength Ready</td>
<td>1.5-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced-Strength Ready I</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced-Strength Ready II</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>3.5-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>4.5-6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Base</td>
<td>7-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The memorandum then examined timelines for postmobilization training. It documented the difference in proficiency between the six kinds of Soviet divisions in terms of mission proficiency scores and derived timelines for divisions in the five lower categories to attain the proficiency of full-strength ready divisions. A GSFG division (which at the time of the analysis was assessed to be full-strength ready) was used as a standard against which to evaluate other divisions. Three standards of proficiency were derived from analysis of a GSFG division over the course of the training cycle. Timelines for divisions at lower manning levels to attain these standards were then derived. The three standards were:

-- Minimum proficiency: The lowest level of training proficiency, which occurs at troop rotation. It was assessed that, given a choice, the Soviets would prefer not to commit divisions at this point, but would do so in a situation in which they did not have control of time and events.

-- Minimum standard for commitment to offensive operations: This occurs about 3 months into the training cycle, after conscripts have completed basic training and company- and battalion-level training is well underway. At this point, it was assessed that divisions have achieved sufficient cohesion and proficiency for commitment to offensive combat in a mid- to high-intensity combat environment.

-- Maximum proficiency: This is attained at the end of each training cycle, when all required training has been completed.

These levels in terms of mission proficiency scores equaled 67, 85, and 100 percent, respectively. Timelines for Soviet divisions to mobilize and attain these levels are shown in table 7. In examining time to attain minimum proficiency for offensive operations, the distinct break between the three types of "ready" divisions and the three types of "not-ready" divisions should be noted. The analysis suggested that the Soviets intend to commit their "ready" divisions to combat with little or no additional training, while, if time were available, the "not-ready" divisions would train.
### Table 7

Cumulative Force Availability Time Estimates for Soviet Divisions (Days) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Type</th>
<th>Alert, Dispersal, and Mobilization</th>
<th>Minimum GSPC Proficiency*</th>
<th>Minimum Offensive Operations*</th>
<th>Maximum Proficiency*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-Strength Ready</td>
<td>1.5-2.5</td>
<td>1.5-2.5</td>
<td>1.5-2.5</td>
<td>1.5-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced-Strength Ready I</td>
<td>2.0-3.0</td>
<td>2.0-3.0</td>
<td>2.0-3.0</td>
<td>6.5-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced-Strength Ready II</td>
<td>3.0-4.0</td>
<td>3.0-4.0</td>
<td>7.0-9.0</td>
<td>30.0-42.0**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>3.5-5.0</td>
<td>12.5-22.0</td>
<td>23.0-35.0</td>
<td>34.5-48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>4.5-6.5</td>
<td>15.0-25.5</td>
<td>23.0-36.0</td>
<td>40.0-53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Base</td>
<td>7.0-9.0</td>
<td>20.0-30.5</td>
<td>29.0-41.5</td>
<td>40.0-53.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes time for alert, dispersal, and mobilization.
** Divisions with cadre regiments and battalions.
*** Divisions with cadre battalions only.

This analysis should not be interpreted as a judgment that the Soviets would, in reality, train their forces according to the timelines developed. The IIM simply quantified differences in proficiency and combat potential among Soviet forces and laid out the tradeoff a Soviet planner has to make. It stated that the Soviets have to choose between two basic options described below:

-- The Soviets could commit their forces as soon as they had been alerted and mobilized. Should they opt for this approach, they would have to accept a degradation in the combat potential of the mobilized force due to the low peacetime training levels of a large portion of the force.

-- Alternatively, the Soviets could allow varying amounts of time following alert and mobilization to more fully prepare and train their forces. This would extend overall preparation time but would enhance the total forces' combat potential.

Continuing research and analysis has led to two additional basic conclusions. First, extensive analysis of non-Soviet readiness indicates that the Poles, Czechoslovaks, and East Germans maintain their forces according to the same readiness patterns as the Soviets with one major exception. That exception is Polish cadre divisions that conduct much more intensive and effective training for their reservists than the normal Warsaw Pact pattern. Therefore, those cadre divisions attain significantly higher levels of mission proficiency on mobilization and have reduced timelines for attaining the three standards of proficiency described above. (See table 8.) This accelerated force generation capability is driven apparently by the planned early commitment of Polish forces in Pact theater strategy.
Table 8
Polish and Soviet Cadre Division Force Generation Capability Compared (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Division</th>
<th>Mission Proficiency on Mobilization</th>
<th>Days Required to Attain Minimum Proficiency for Offensive Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polish High-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>12-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet High-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Low-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>15-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Low-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>24-36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second conclusion derives from knowledge gained of actual Soviet mobilization plans. A number of Pact emigrees, who had access to their unit's mobilization plans while serving in cadre units, report that those plans do include time for training. However, that time is extremely short and appears to be primarily individual refresher training. Analysis accomplished in the readiness IIM indicated that such training could last 4 to 5 days and would boost the mission proficiency of units as shown in table 9.

Table 9
Proficiency Gain From Individual Refresher Training (IRT) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Division</th>
<th>Proficiency on Mobilization</th>
<th>Proficiency on Completion of IRT</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-Strength Ready</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced-Strength Ready I</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced-Strength Ready II</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Strength Cadre</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Base</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This relatively short period of training provides a high "payoff" while insuring a fast force generation rate. It possibly is sufficient to prepare "not-ready" Pact divisions for the relatively less-demanding tasks they may be required to accomplish in a later period in a war.
a. Force Generation Requirements

Analyses of Pact force generation capability in various theaters have traditionally taken the form of how long it takes to generate the total forces deployed in that theater. This analysis will modify that basic approach by examining the time it takes to generate the force required to carry out Soviet operational concepts. This analysis is thus a two-step process. First, the number of forces required to carry out planned operations must be calculated. Then, the time required to generate those forces must be derived. To accomplish the first step, the study will examine projected Soviet operations in the Western TVD and determine a generalized schedule at which divisions are to be committed.

In a theater campaign in the Western TVD, Pact operations fall into two phases. In the first phase, three to four first-echelon fronts are committed to seize immediate strategic objectives generally along the North Sea coast and Danish Straits. These front objectives are be attained in 12-15 days. According to Soviet doctrine, each front is to seize immediate operational objectives located at a depth of 250-350 kilometers by D+6. The fronts then commit their second-echelon armies to insure the seizure of subsequent (and final) objectives located 600-800 kilometers in depth (these constitute the immediate theater strategic objectives). The first-echelon fronts that initiate this first phase of theater operations are formed primarily from highly ready, forward-based Pact forces and usually include the following:

-- The Northern Front is composed primarily of Polish forces, and its headquarters is drawn from the Polish Ministry of Defense. It is deployed in wartime to the northern GDR and attacks into the northern FRG, Netherlands, and Denmark area. It is also tasked to seize the Danish Straits in conjunction with airborne and amphibious operations.

-- The Central Front is formed from GSGF, NGF, and GDR forces, with its headquarters drawn from the GSGF Headquarters. This front will conduct the main theater attack across the central FRG and into Belgium, the southern Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

-- The Czech Front is composed of Czechoslovak forces, and its headquarters is drawn from the Czechoslovak Western MD Headquarters. The Soviet CGF, organized as an army, is also assigned. The front's mission is to attack from Czechoslovakia into the southern FRG and secure objectives on the FRG-Swiss-Austrian border.

In addition, Soviet plans appear to provide for the early commitment of at least one additional front from the theater second echelon in this first phase. Normally a Carpathian Front formed from Carpathian MD forces is committed at D+5-10 in southern Germany, normally between the Central and Czech Fronts. This early commitment of the Carpathian Front should not be understood as a massed movement of Carpathian MD forces into battle. Rather, it takes the form of a reorganization of the theater
first-echelon forces operating in that sector, usually the GGF and/or the GSFG 8th Guards Armies, are subordinated to the Carpathian Front. The front then commits a Carpathian MD army to combat as a front second-echelon army. In effect, the commitment of the Carpathian Front is a method of transferring control of the main axis in southern Germany from a Czechoslovak-commanded to a Soviet front and introducing one, possibly two, additional armies to combat on that axis.

In addition, a Danube Front is formed from Hungarian-based Pact forces including the Soviet SGF and the Hungarian Army. It is usually assessed as belonging to the Southwest TVD, but under some contingencies may attack through Austria via the Danube Valley into southern FRG. This front may be reinforced by forces from the Carpathian MD.

Recent information indicates that the Soviets may be reevaluating this longstanding theater organization for combat. They appear to be experimenting with introducing fronts from the western MDs into the theater first echelon on or prior to D-day. These fronts, while being headed by a commander and staff provided by the headquarters of the western MDs, would incorporate significant forces from the forward area, both Soviet and NSWP, as well as western MD forces. One, possibly both, NSWP-commanded fronts would not be employed in the first echelon on D-day. While this experimentation is undoubtedly motivated in part by the declining relative capabilities of the NSWP forces, when measured both against NATO and the Soviets, it should not be thought of as a replacement of NSWP forces. This reorganization is assessed to have two objectives:

-- Reorganize the force structure of the theater first echelon to bring all forces attacking on D-day under direct Soviet control.

-- Reinforce the theater first echelon with selected "modernized" western MD forces to insure that attacking Pact forces have a favorable force ratio/correlation of forces on D-day.

An alternate first-echelon front structure that may be emerging might consist of the following:

-- A Belorussian or Baltic Front operates in the former Polish Northern Front sector. It includes one to two Polish armies, one to two Belorussian or Baltic armies, and possibly some GDR and GSFG forces.

-- A Central Front is composed of GSFG, NGF, and GDR forces and may be reinforced from the Belorussian MD.

-- A Carpathian Front is deployed in the Czechoslovak-GDR border area. It incorporates the GSFG 8th Guards Army and/or the Soviet GGF as well as Carpathian MD armies.

-- A Czech Front is composed of Czechoslovak forces and possibly the CCF.
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(5) In a second phase of theater operations, Pact forces execute offensive operations through France to secure subsequent strategic objectives located in Brittany, the Bay of Biscay, the Pyrenees, and the Mediterranean. This operation will probably be initiated by three to four first-echelon fronts that normally include the following:

- A Belorussian and/or Baltic Front is deployed forward to the Belgium-Luxembourg area and most likely is heavily reinforced with former Central and Northern Front forces. It attacks into northern France toward Paris and the Breton Peninsula.

- The Central Front, after extensive replacement and reorganization, attacks from the Luxembourg-Karlsruhe area into central France.

- The Carpathian Front attacks from the Karlsruhe-Freiburg area through Alsace toward the Rhone Valley and thence toward the Mediterranean.

- Additional second-echelon fronts will most likely be committed to the operation after it has begun.

(5) A required commitment rate for these fronts has been determined in the following fashion:

- First-echelon divisions of the first-echelon armies are committed on D-day. The number required was determined by dividing the total frontage by 20 kilometers, the average width of a zone in which a division operates.

- Selected first-echelon armies commit division-size operational maneuver groups (OMGs) on D+1, usually at a depth of about 50 kilometers beyond the D-day forward line of own troops (FLOT).

- On D+2-3 first-echelon armies commit their second-echelon divisions to combat at a depth of about 100-150 kilometers. The numbers of these divisions are assessed as one-quarter to one-third of the number of first-echelon divisions.

- Selected fronts commit an army- or corps-size OMG to combat at D+2-3.

- Fronts begin to commit the divisions of their second-echelon armies to combat on D+5-6 at a depth of 250 to 350 kilometers. The number of divisions in these armies is equal to one-third to one-quarter the number of divisions in the first-echelon armies.

(5) When the front is deployed for combat, first-echelon divisions are deployed in departure areas located within 40-60 kilometers from the FLOT. First-echelon army second-echelon divisions are in concentration.

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24
areas 60-180 kilometers behind the FLOT. Divisions of the second-echelon army are in concentration areas 150-250 kilometers behind the FLOT. OMG concentration areas are probably somewhat forward of the second echelon they will precede.

If deployed forward prior to D-day, Belorussian forces and the Baltic MD's 11th Guards Army are located in concentration areas in western Poland and in the Poland-GDR border area approximately 300-400 kilometers behind the East-West German border. Carpathian forces are in southern Poland and central Czechoslovakia approximately 300 kilometers from the Czechoslovak-FRG border.

The process of committing these second-echelon formations is complex and time consuming. It consists of preparations in the concentration area including command and control planning and structuring, equipment maintenance, resupply, rest and feeding of troops, engineer activities, etc. It is followed by a long-distance march to departure areas located about 20-80 kilometers from the planned area of commitment. In the departure areas, final preparations, including additional maintenance, command and control, rest and feeding, engineer, resupply etc., have to be accomplished, after which the lead units are moved out and committed to battle.

DIA has recently analyzed this process extensively and has determined the following timelines to accomplish the activities required to commit second-echelon elements to combat. These measure the time from when the formation is given a warning order for commitment until its first unit is committed to battle:

--- Second-echelon divisions of first-echelon armies - 48-60 hours (2-2.5 days) (planned commitment time is D+2-3).

--- Second-echelon armies - 103-177 hours (4.5-5 days) (planned commitment time is D+5-6).

DIA thus assesses that to insure orderly and timely commitment, all front second-echelon elements should be in, or arriving at, their concentration areas on D-day. This means that required mobilization, training, and movement of these elements from their garrisons to concentration areas must be accomplished prior to D-day. It is further assessed that approximately 7 days are needed for a second-echelon front to conduct the final preparations and deployments necessary to move their forces from their concentration to forward departure areas and to commit the first new forces to battle.

Reserves are also vital for insuring the success of Pact operations by providing replacements and responding to other unplanned contingencies. In this analysis it is assessed that the mobilization-base divisions are used as reserves that are assigned at army, front, and supreme high command levels. In addition, it is assessed that the Baltic Front is initially a reserve front. The forces in the MD, with the exception the 11th Guards Army with four divisions, which is garrisoned in the southern part of the MD and is planned for early commitment, are assigned to that front. In addition, airborne and sea-landing (marine) divisions are not
used as echeloned forces as described here. Those, along with divisions
planned for use as reserves, are excluded from the number of divisions that
can be employed in first- or second-echelon roles. Therefore, 83 active
tank and motorized rifle divisions of a total theater force of 104 divisions
can be planned for employment in first- or second-echelon roles. (See table
10.)

Table 10

Numbers of Divisions in Assessed Roles (U)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

Appendix B shows the calculation of the numbers of divisions
required and time they have to be available to carry out Pact strategy for
each front. Two conclusions are evident from this analysis:

-- The Warsaw Pact has sufficient forces in the theater to
implement their strategy for the use of echeloned forces—at
least through the beginning of operations into France,
indicating that the Pact has sized the force to
carry out its doctrine.

-- There are insufficient forces in the forward area (GDR,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia) for the Pact to meet its
doctrinal requirements to seize immediate strategic
objectives along the French border and North Sea coast.

The most important area of shortfall
is the Central Front sector.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)
b. Capability To Meet Requirements

The second major part of the analysis, also shown in appendix B, related the force requirements to the theater force generation capability. DIA examined how long it would take the Soviets to generate the forces to meet the requirements. Using backward planning, DIA was able to determine the latest time that forces would have to commence preparations if they were to enter battle at the required place and time.
Four force generation options were examined, two involving rapid and two extended preparations. These were:

-- Mobilization and movement to concentration areas with no postmobilization training being conducted.

-- Mobilization, movement, and 4 days of individual refresher training. Only units whose proficiency falls below the minimum for offensive operations on mobilization (generally "not-ready" and reduced-strength ready II units) conduct such training.

-- Mobilization, movement, and training to the level judged equal to the GSFG minimum proficiency.

-- Mobilization, movement, and training to proficiency judged to be a minimum for commitment to offensive operations in a mid- to high-intensity combat environment.

These options are referred to as options A, B, C, and D, respectively.

Tables 12-15 show the time required to make the required number of divisions available at the proper place and time in order for the Pact to implement its planning for the use of echeloned forces. The tables also indicate when division preparations have to begin in each major theater component. These also indicate when forces in each theater have to start preparing in order to meet the commitment schedule. Major conclusions evident from this analysis are shown below.

-- The Soviets probably view option B quite favorably if they believe circumstances require them to initiate a quick attack. This provides them an opportunity to conduct a short period of training, which provides a large increase in proficiency without a major slowdown in the force generation rate. Under option B, movement can be conducted in a more planned and orderly manner.
No matter what the training option chosen, the forces that take the longest to prepare, and hence would have to begin preparations earliest, are selected cadre divisions in the Polish Warsaw, the Czechoslovak Eastern, and the USSR western MDs. The "modernized" cadre divisions would be the first to prepare in the western MDs. Monitoring of those forces rather than the highly ready groups of forces provides the best opportunities for gaining early warning of Pact preparations for attack.

Figure 2. (U) Division buildup rates in Western TVD.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

The Soviets have long envisioned that the decisive campaign in a Pact–NATO confrontation will take place in the Western Theater. The Soviets have planned the size and readiness of the large, well-equipped force to support their planning for offensive operations in the Central Region. They perceive many NATO forces as powerful, highly ready, modernizing, and well supplied with nuclear weapons. They assess that to conduct an offensive against NATO requires them to seize the initiative, to sustain the momentum of the advance through the continuous commitment of echeloned forces, and to have available large reserves. These requirements drive them to maintain the groups of forces and selected NSWP forces in a high readiness state so that they can enter war quickly and commence offensive operations. This insures Pact control of the initiative even in an emergency situation. Additional forces are maintained at varying but sufficient readiness levels to insure their entrance into combat as second-echelon divisions at preplanned times and places after D-day. Additional forces are available as reserves.

In recent years the Western Theater ground forces have exhibited a remarkable force development program highlighted by reorganization to increase combined-arms capabilities, equipment expansion and modernization, training improvements, enhancement of command and control capabilities, and development of innovative operational concepts and combat organizations. The goal is to insure the Soviets' ability to seize deep-theater objectives in rapid, combined-arms operations.

The analysis indicates that of 104 ground maneuver divisions in the Western TVD, 83 are probably available for use as first- or second-echelon divisions with preplanned missions for commitment. The remaining divisions are airborne or sea-landing divisions that are planned for specialized operations or are reserves. The 83 divisions are sufficient to meet Soviet requirements for echeloned forces, which is calculated to be 75-90 divisions. However, to seize immediate strategic objectives along the French border/North Sea coast, forward area forces will have to be reinforced from the western MDs. In a well-prepared attack, these reinforcements, should be in, or arriving in, the forward area on D-day.

To make the required forces available, it is assessed that approximately 2 weeks of preparations are required before hostilities. This preparation period includes time for a short period of refresher training. If the Soviets choose to train all of their forces to GSFG levels of proficiency, approximately a month of preparations prior to D-day is required. However, such extended preparations would probably take place in a period of gradually increasing tension and most likely would be accomplished in a phased, sequential, heavily concealed fashion. Exercise cover will probably be employed for some of those preparations.

DIA intends to continue and refine this analysis. Related studies now ongoing on Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces in the Western TVD are bearing out the DIA judgment that forward area forces are insufficient to accomplish immediate theater strategic objectives and hence early reinforcement from the western MDs is required.
(U) The annual population growth rates in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR range from 0 percent for the GDR to 0.3 percent for Czechoslovakia, to 0.9 percent for both the USSR and Poland. (For comparison, the annual growth rate of the USA is currently 0.9 percent.)

(U) Trends in the adult male labor force available both for military service and for employment in the civilian economy were examined by determining the difference between the 18-year-old males entering the labor force and those departing the force through retirement or death. These trends are shown in graphs as figures 3-6. All four countries are currently limited or will be in the next few years in the number of males reaching the age of 18.

(U) The Soviet Union has 68,860,000 males in the 15-49 military age group, 54,760,000 of whom are considered fit for military duty. Under current laws, males register for military duty when they are 17, but are not drafted until they reach 18 years of age. As indicated in figure 3, the Soviet Union is facing two periods when manpower will not be as abundant as in the past: 1987-89 and 1997-98. During the first period, the number of
male departures in the labor force created by retirements and mortality will exceed the number of 18-year-olds entering the labor force by about 130,000. During the second period, the number of vacancies and 18-year-olds will be about even, with few 18-year-olds available for military or economic expansion. In view of the large requirement for draftees needed to maintain the current 5.2-million-man military force size, the USSR will need to consider various manpower saving measures if it hopes to pass through these periods without major impacts on the military or the economy.

East Germany has 4,337,000 males in the 15-49 military age group, of whom 3,480,000 are considered to be fit for military duty. Beginning in 1991, male vacancies created by death or retirement will outnumber 18-year-olds available to replace them. Demographic factors may improve after the year 2000 (Figure 4).

Figure 4. (U) Demographic trends: GDR.
There are 9,293,000 males in Poland in the 15-49 military age group, of whom 7,384,000 are considered fit for military duty. Beginning in 1988, Poland will face three periods of net manpower deficits when there will be no 18-year-olds available for military or economic expansion. Demographic factors will begin improving by 1999, as indicated in figure 5.

Figure 5. (U) Demographic trends: Poland.
In Czechoslovakia males in the 15-49 age group number 3,785,000, of whom 2,900,000 are considered fit for military duty. As with the other three nations under study, Czechoslovakia is limited in the number of 18-year-old males available for military or economic expansion after vacancies have been filled. Figure 6 indicates that a net manpower deficit will occur in the labor force during the period 1985-93. Beginning in 1992, the total number of males reaching 18 years of age will begin exceeding deaths and retirements.

*UNCLASSIFIED*

![Figure 6](Image)

**Figure 6. (U) Demographic trends: Czechoslovakia.**