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(b)(3):10 USC 424
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SUMMARY: IRAQ SURVEY GROUP'S CBW TEAM PARTICIPATED IN A MEETING WITH IRAQ NATIONAL MONITORING DIRECTORATE CBW EXPERTS TO DISCUSS AL MUTHANNA AND AN NIBA'I SITES. TOPICS OF CONCERN INCLUDED DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS AND MATERIALS AT THESE SITES.


2. AL MUTHANA. THE SECURITY OF THE CRUCIFORM BUNKERS AND DESTRUCTION OF THE TANK CONTAINING ONE TON OF HYDROGEN FLUORIDE WERE DISCUSSED. THE CONTENTS OF THE BUNKERS WERE ARTILLERY SHELLS FILLED WITH MUSTARD, SOME LEAKING; EMPTY SHELLS; SODIUM AND POTASSIUM CYANIDE SALTS; REMNANTS OF THE MUSTARD INCINERATOR USED TO DESTROY MUSTARD; AND EMPTY 1,000 KG CONTAINERS WITH RESIDUE OF MUSTARD AND NERVE AGENTS. ISG REQUESTED THAT NMD PREPARE A
COST

PROPOSAL FOR SECURING THE CRUCIFORM BUNKERS. THE PROPOSAL SHOULD INCLUDE TWO BARB WIRE FENCES, WITH LIGHTS, LIVING QUARTERS TO SUPPORT A PLATOON OF SOLDIERS (30); INCLUDING HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, AN ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, WATER, AND POWER.

WATER AND POWER WOULD MOST LIKELY UTILIZE ON-SITE GENERATORS. A GUARD POST ON TOP OF THE CRUCIFORM BUNKERS WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD VIEW IN ALL DIRECTIONS. THE GUARDS, WHETHER MILITARY OR CONTRACT, MUST BE VERY RELIABLE PEOPLE, AND GIVEN AUTHORITY TO USE DEADLY FORCE. ANOTHER OPTION PRESENTED WAS USING THE US ARMY TO SEAL THE BUNKERS, BUT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REMEDIATE THEM IN THE FUTURE IF THIS ROUTE WAS CHOSEN.

THAT THE HF TANK WILL BE DESTROYED. THAT BECAUSE OF VALVE DAMAGE, NO INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN IRAQ WOULD WANT IT. THE TANK WILL BE EXCAVATED AND LIFTED OUT OF THE PIT. THE PIT WILL BE FILLED WITH LIME, A SMALL EXPLOSIVE CHARGE PLACED ON THE TANK, THE TANK LOWERED INTO THE PIT, ADDITIONAL LIME ADDED, AND THE CHARGE DETONATED. THE TANK WILL BE BACKFILLED. NMD WAS INVITED TO SEND AN OBSERVER. FINALLY, ISG SUGGESTED MUTHANA, SINCE IT IS UNSUITABLE FOR CIVILIAN USE BECAUSE OF CONTAMINATION, AND WOULD MAKE A GOOD MILITARY TRAINING AREA.

NMD REPORTED THE MUSTARD IRAQ PRODUCED WAS NEVER DISTILLED. ITS PURITY WAS BETWEEN 80 TO 90%. IRAQI MUSTARD WAS A STABLE AGENT WITH ONLY ABOUT 5% DEGRADATION PER YEAR, AND COULD STILL BE ABOUT 60% VIABLE TODAY. THE BULK AGENT WAS RELATIVELY PRISTINE. THE SAME QUALITY MUSTARD WAS USED IN ALL IRAQI MUNITIONS.

WAS AMAZED WITH UNMOVIC’S RESULT OF 94% PURITY DURING SAMPLING OF SOME REMAINING SHELLS IN 2003. NMD QUESTIONED THE SAMPLING PROCESS AND ASKED IF UNMOVIC HAD SHAKEN THE SHELLS. NMD BELIEVED THE SHELLS SAMPLED IN 2003 OBTAINED 2.5 LITER OF POLYMERIZED POLYMER, 1 LITER OF GOOD AGENT (FILL FOR 155 MM ROUND IS 3.5 L). BELIEVED THE HIGH PURITY COULD BE AN ARTIFACT OF SAMPLING, USING A SMALL HOSE.
TO ONLY SUCK UP LIQUID, AND LEAVING ANY LARGE PARTICLES (POLYMERIZED MUSTARD) BEHIND. THEREFORE, AS THE MUSTARD IMPURITIES POLYMERIZE OUT OF SOLUTION, THE CONCENTRATION OF MUSTARD IN THE UNPOLYMERIZED PORTION COULD ACTUALLY INCREASES.

4. Fate of 550 Mustard Rounds. NMD provided the following information on the "missing" mustard rounds. After the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq declared 13,000 155 mm mustard filled artillery rounds. All the rounds were to be collected at Muthanna for verification and destruction. Artillery rounds from Nasariyah were taken directly to Muthana for destruction. Rounds from Al Okada exactly needed to be clarified) first went to Kirkuk. From there, the convoy was attacked by rebels (1991) and one truck captured. The rebels set fire to the trailer and munitions and abandoned them a few kilometers from the ambush site. The Republican Guard became involved and decided to cover the burnt munitions and trailer with sand to protect them from looters. In 1997, site was excavated in the presence of UNSCOM and no munitions were found. An area one kilometer on each side of the suspected burial site was surveyed for the "missing" trailer and contents. The 550 mustard rounds were declared "missing" at that time. However in 1992, at Muthanna, the Iraqis and an UNSCOM inspector noticed several hundred burnt rounds. These rounds were destroyed with the other mustard rounds. NMD believes the stolen rounds were recovered a month after being buried and transported to Muthanna, where they were destroyed with the remaining round. Somehow these rounds were never tallied with the munitions already located at Muthanna. This is how the clerical error started. Iraq lost accountability and did not realize that the burned rounds found at Muthanna were the ones from the stolen trailer.

5. AN NIBA'1 AND ANTHRAX MASS BALANCE. AN NMD PERSONNEL WAS

6. (U) AN NIBA'I AND ANTHRAX MASS BALANCE. AN NMD PERSONNEL WAS PRESENT DURING THE DESTRUCTION OF ANTHRAX MATERIAL AT A LOCATION CALLED AN NIBA'I (NFI). THE ANTHRAX CAME FROM THE AL HUSAYN WARHEADS IN 1991 AND WAS TREATED WITH PERMANGANATE AND FORMALIN. THE NUMBER OF ANTHRAX WARHEADS WAS BETWEEN 5 AND 15; IRAQ DID NOT KEEP GOOD RECORDS AND COULD NOT VERIFY HOW MANY WARHEADS WERE FILLED WITH ANTHRAX. THAT THE TWO ONE CUBIC METER TANKS FILLED WITH
INACTIVATED ANTHRAX (TREATED WITH PERMANGANATE AND FORMALIN) WERE DESTROYED AT AL AZIZIYAH. THE ANTHRAX WAS TO BE USED TO FILL THE DROP TANKS IRAQ MODIFIED FOR A SPRAY DELIVERY SYSTEM. THE SPRAY TANKS WERE NEVER FILLED. THEY BELIEVE THE ANTHRAX PRODUCTION RECORDS FOR 1989 WERE NOT COMPLETE. HOWEVER, NMD ALSO QUESTIONED UNSCOM AND UNMOVIC MEDIA CALCULATIONS SAYING IRAQ WAS NOT GIVEN CREDIT FOR ENOUGH PARTIAL FILLED CONTAINERS OF MEDIA.

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**COMMENTS:**

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