(U) Moderate Increase in Violence in 2012

Overall violence is higher this year, with monthly attacks 20 percent higher during the first 8 months of 2012 compared with the last 8 months in 2011. However, attacks remain within the range observed since late 2009, and mass-casualty attacks have spurred only limited public and militant reactions. DIA assesses violence is likely to continue at these moderately elevated levels through the end of 2012, but will not threaten the government’s stability.

We estimate that most of this year’s violence is attributable to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), based on our analysis of Iraqi security incidents and attack claims. AQI has conducted coordinated, mass-casualty attacks in multiple provinces almost monthly, as well as hundreds of smaller-scale IED, small-arms, and rocket attacks. We attribute fewer attacks to Sunni insurgents and criminals. We estimate Shia militant groups, (b)(1), 1.4 (c) account for even fewer attacks, most of which are motivated by animosity among Shia groups and criminal activity. We anticipate that insurgent and militant violence will not decline further in 2012.

AQI averaged nearly 20 vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) and suicide attacks a month in 2010 and 2011, (b)(1), 1.4 (c) AQI in 2012 has averaged 39 VBIED and suicide attacks a month and surged to more than 50 attacks in June and July, the highest monthly totals since March and April 2008. AQI attack claims accounted for about 60 percent of Iraqi violence this year. (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(U) Level of Violence in Iraq From January 2009 Through August 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Elections</th>
<th>U.S. Forces Withdraw from Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Data prior to December 2011 underrepresent attacks on civilians, government officials, and U.S. forces in Iraq because the attacks often occurred outside the purview of U.S. or Iraqi forces. (b)(1), 1.4 (c)
(U) Moderate Increase in Violence in 2012

About 400 Iraqis died each month from June through August in attacks against ISF, government officials, and civilians. This is an increase of about 100 each month from the roughly 300 killed each month between February and May. However, we anticipate Iraq's projected total of violent deaths in 2012 (4,700 violent deaths; violent death rate of 15.1 per 100,000) ranks 27th in the world based on the most recent UN data on worldwide violent deaths. The level of violence and resulting casualties in Iraq have declined almost 80 percent since the height of sectarian warfare in 2006, when Iraq had one of the world's highest totals for violent deaths and the world's highest rate of violent deaths in relation to its population.

(U) The graph below contains the top 35 countries in terms of total numbers of violent deaths, along with violent death rates. Data for deaths as a result of violence were supplied to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime by various regional and national police services, national statistics agencies, public health services, and the World Health Organization. Reporting standards and capacity vary by country, and some countries' data is not comparable to others. Despite these differences, we believe the comparison provides context for understanding the level of Iraqi violence.

(U) Scope Note


How to Read This Chart:

(L) The total number of violent deaths is measured on the left vertical axis.

(L) The number of violent deaths per 100,000 population is depicted on the right vertical axis.

(L) Population figures to determine violent deaths per 1000 population were derived from the most recent census results or official government estimates.

(L) Iraq 2012 projections are depicted in dark green. Iraq 2009 data are depicted in light green.

(U) Syria and Afghanistan 2012 projections are depicted in purple.
Our analysis of attack claims suggests Sunni perceptions of government persecution and concerns about Iraqi subordination to Iran and the United States will sustain low levels of violence. Shia groups are likely to retain small, armed elements to deter and defend against perceived threats from political and militant rivals. We judge that moderate increases in violence will not threaten the Iraqi government’s overall stability. We would expect to see—but are not observing—sustained antigovernment protests, a more aggressive militant posture to counter Sunni threats, and a heavy-handed Iraqi government reaction if violence threatened the government’s stability.

We have observed only limited Shia frustration with Iraqi security forces (ISF) failure to stop AQI attacks. In the past 2 months, two protests in central and southern Iraq against the ISF resulted in dozens of civilian casualties and damage to ISF equipment. However, these events have not spurred similar protests.

Baghdad’s response to AQI attacks—typically a series of raids and arrests—has not been heavy handed or provoked Sunni backlash. Since the 23 July attack that killed more than 100, Baghdad has announced more than 200 terrorism-related arrests. We cannot verify the detainees’ affiliations.