SEC. 1245. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF IRAN.
(a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than January 30 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on the current and future military strategy of Iran.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the security posture of Iran, including at least the following:

(1) A description and assessment of Iranian grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, including—
   (A) The goals of Iran's grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy.

Iran's grand strategy is to become the strongest and most influential Islamic country in the Middle East and to influence world affairs. The theocratic leadership's ultimate ideological goal is to be able to export its theocratic form of government, its version of Shia Islam, and stand up for the "oppressed" according to their religious interpretations of the law.

Iran's security strategy is to deter an attack. For years it has publicly discussed its "20-Million Man Army" and its asymmetric warfare doctrine as deterrents to any would-be invader. Iran has also extended its outreach and support to governments and dissident groups that oppose U.S. interests. Diplomacy, economic leverage, and active sponsorship of terrorist and paramilitary groups are tools Iran uses to drive its aggressive foreign policy. In particular, it uses terrorism to pressure or intimidate other countries and more broadly to serve as a strategic deterrent.

Iran's military strategy is designed to defend against external or "hard" threats from the United States and Israel. Iran's principles of military strategy include deterrence, asymmetrical retaliation, and attrition warfare. Iran can conduct limited offensive operations with its strategic ballistic missile program and improved naval forces.

(2) Trends in Iran's strategy designed to establish Iran as the leading power in the Middle East and to enhance the influence of Iran in other regions of the world; and

According to press statements, Iran's 20 year outlook plan (2005-2025) provides the framework for the policies of the 5 year plan (2010-2015) and seeks to make Iran a "top regional power."

Among other objectives, the 5 year plan seeks to expand bilateral, regional, and international relations, strengthen Iran's ties with friendly states, and enhance Iran's defense and deterrent capabilities.

Iran seeks to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and expanding ties with regional actors while advocating Islamic solidarity. It also seeks to demonstrate to the
world its “resistance” to the West. Iran is attempting to secure political, economic, and security influence in Iraq and Afghanistan while undermining U.S. efforts by supporting political groups, providing developmental and humanitarian assistance, and furnishing lethal aid to Iraqi Shia militants and Afghan insurgents while simultaneously providing weapons, training and money to Lebanese Hizballah, its strategic partner. Iran has also signed economic and security agreements with other nations, particularly in Latin America and Africa.

The Iranian regime uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to clandestinely exert military, political, and economic power to advance Iranian national interests abroad. IRGC-QF global activities include: gathering tactical intelligence; conducting covert diplomacy; providing training, arms, and financial support to surrogate groups and terrorist organizations; and facilitating some of Iran’s provision of humanitarian and economic support to Islamic causes.

Iran provides Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups – notably, HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-GC) – with funding, weapons, and training to oppose Israel and disrupt the Middle East Peace Process. The IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary vehicle for providing materiel and lethal support to Lebanese Hizballah, which Iran views as an essential partner for advancing its regional policy objectives.

(C) Iranian strategy regarding other countries in the region, including other specified countries.

Iran continues to drive a multi-pronged soft power strategy in Iraq, including continued support to select Iraqi surrogate groups. The IRGC-QF Ramazan Corps is responsible for carrying out Iran’s policy in Iraq. To more effectively execute Iran’s policy, the IRGC-QF posts its officers in Iran’s diplomatic missions throughout Iraq, including Iran’s outgoing Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi. The incoming Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Danafar, is also a Qods Force officer.3

Iran continues to provide money, weapons and training to select Iraqi Shia militants and terrorists despite pledges by senior Iranian officials to stop such support. The weapons include:

- Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) with radio-controlled, remote arming and passive infrared detonators
- Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)
- Anti-aircraft weapons
- mortars
- 107 and 122 millimeter rockets
- rocket-propelled grenades and launchers
- explosives
- small arms.4
Iran also offers strategic and operational guidance to militias and terrorist groups to target U.S. Forces in Iraq and undermine U.S. interests. In addition to providing arms and support, IRGC-QF is responsible for training Iraqi insurgents in Iran, sometimes using Lebanese Hizballah instructors. Lebanese Hizballah provides insurgents with the training, tactics and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations and employ sophisticated IEDs. In addition to weapons and support, Iran continues training Shia militants in the use of IEDs, EFPs, and the counter-measures designed to defeat these weapons and the networks that design, build, emplace and fund them draw persistent counter-responses. The flow of new IED technologies and highly creative emplacement and employment methods underscore the enemy's ability to adapt and react quickly and efficiently to CF countermeasures.

Iran continues to actively influence events in Afghanistan through a multi-faceted approach involving support for the Karzai government while covertly supporting various insurgent groups and political opposition groups. Tehran's support for the Government of Afghanistan is reflected in its diplomatic presence as well as numerous Iranian NGOs active in the country. Tehran has also pledged over a billion dollars in aid, but has actually paid only small fraction. Iran has used the threat of repatriating the large Afghan refugee population residing in Iran as a lever to influence the Government of Afghanistan, especially in the harsh winter months. Iranian officials met with President Karzai and his main opponent Abdullah throughout the campaign and worked hard to appear as the consensus maker during the post election period. Tehran has also leveraged long time relationships with numerous officials such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ismail Khan, both of whom lived in Iran for a period of time. Arms caches have been recently uncovered with large amounts of Iranian manufactured weapons, to include 107mm rockets, which we assess IRGC-QF delivered to Afghan militants. While it is difficult to determine the exact time the arms were brought into Afghanistan, their recent manufacture date suggests lethal support is ongoing. Tehran's support to the Taliban is inconsistent with their historic enmity, but fits with Iran’s strategy of backing many groups to ensure that it will have a positive relationship with the eventual leaders.

Iran has been involved in Lebanon since the early days of the Islamic Republic, especially seeking to expand ties with the country's large Shia population. The IRGC played an instrumental role in the establishment of Lebanese Hizballah in 1982 and has continued to be vital to the development of the organization. The IRGC-QF provides financial, weapons, training, and logistical support to Lebanese Hizballah. In turn, Lebanese Hizballah has trained Iraqi insurgents in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon, providing them with the training, tactics and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), incorporating lessons learned from operations in southern Lebanon.

For a discussion of Iranian strategy with the other specified countries see the classified version of this report.

(2) An assessment of the capabilities of Iran's conventional forces, including—
   (A) the size and capabilities of Iran’s conventional forces;
According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which consist of three main components: the regular military (sometimes referred to as the Artesh); the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Pasdaran, and the Law Enforcement Force (LEF). The regular military and IRGC come under the control of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). These forces are responsible for defending Iran's borders and providing for internal security. The LEF is formally subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, and plays a key role in internal security and frontier security.⁶

(U) Ground Forces

Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force (IRIGF) - Estimated personnel strength: 220,000; 4 armored, 6 infantry, 2 commando divisions; several independent armor, infantry, airborne, commando brigades, and artillery groups

IRGC Ground Resistance Forces (IRGCGRF) - Estimated personnel strength: 130,000; 31 Provincial Corps (two in Tehran Province) generally comprised of armor and infantry brigades, and artillery groups.⁷ ⁸ Additionally, each brigade is allocated ten Basij battalions, called Imam Hossein Battalions, which will support the brigade in its combat operations.⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Systems</th>
<th>Estimated Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>1,800 - 1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>1,800 - 1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>2,300 - 2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>5,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Artillery</td>
<td>1,100+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man Portable Air Defense Systems</td>
<td>Numerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tanks Weapons</td>
<td>Numerous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iranian Ground Systems
Naval Forces.

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) - estimated strength: 18,000; 4 naval districts; exact squadron structure unknown, but includes submarine, missile boat, patrol boat and auxiliary units; naval aviation units; naval riflemen and marine commando units

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) – estimated strength: 20,000; exact force structure not known, but includes missile, torpedo and small patrol boat units, several anti-ship coastal defense missile batteries; naval riflemen and commando units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval System</th>
<th>Estimated Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (attack / midget)</td>
<td>3 / 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvette</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided Missile Patrol Boats</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boats / Craft*</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense (Launchers / Missiles)</td>
<td>12 / 100+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mines</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iranian Naval Systems

*In addition, the IRGCN controls hundreds of small patrol boats.

Air Forces

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) - Estimated personnel strength: 52,000; 10 fighter bases, 19 fighter/fighter bomber and trainer squadrons, 1 reconnaissance squadron, 10 transport/tanker squadrons.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force (IRGCAF) - Estimated personnel strength: 5,000; Force structure is unclear; some ground attack, transport trainer units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Estimated Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters / Fighter Bombers</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iranian Aircraft

The IRIAF remains largely dependent on 1970's-vintage U.S. aircraft like the F-4 Phantom II, the F-14A Tomcat, and the F-5E Tiger II. Its most advanced fighter is the MiG-29 Fulcrum, and it has managed to keep a substantial portion of its fleet of U.S.-supplied aircraft flying. While Iran has not procured new aircraft in over 10 years, it has been seeking to meet some of its requirements by developing its own indigenous combat aircraft, most of which are derivatives of U.S.-built F-5A Freedom Fighters and F-5E
Tiger IIIs. One noteworthy project is the twin-tailed Saeqeh (Thunderbolt), of which several examples have apparently been built.10

Iran’s exercises and military literature make it clear that its air planners understand the value of airborne early warning and C4I systems, airborne intelligence, electronic warfare platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and airborne refueling. Where UAVs are concerned, Iran has an active program and two families of reconnaissance, target and lethal UAVs. However, the IRIAF has not been able to progress in other areas. For instance, the IRIAF’s lone airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) platform crashed in September 2009, killing all seven people on board. Iran is also building indigenous precision-guided munitions for the IRIAF, but recent large-scale exercises showed fighters delivering conventional unguided munitions.11

Air Defense

Estimated personnel strength: 12,000; breakout between IRI and IRGC not known; Headquarters and 5 regional air defense sectors; small, but growing number, of surface-air-missile (SAM) sites; numerous anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) sites.

- Major SAM systems include: I-HAWK, CSA-1, SA-5, SA-6, SA-15, FM-80, Rapier
- AAA gun systems include: 100mm, 57mm, 35mm, 23mm guns

In 2009 Iran established a separate air defense force under the command of BG Ahmad Miqani, as a fourth force in the Artesh. The new service consolidates equipment and personnel under a single commander and has authority over both regular and IRGC air defense units. Iranian officials gave a number of reasons for creating an air defense force, including the need to better defend the nuclear sites, improve the maneuverability and capability of the air defense forces, and consolidating information-gathering and air defense forces in a single service. Iran is unlikely to seek to develop a fully integrated nationwide air defense system. Instead, it seems to prefer a point defense strategy, with its strongest defenses located around key strategic centers.12

Tehran continues to invest heavily in advanced air defenses, and the potential acquisition of the Russian SA-20 surface-air-missile system (SAM) remains a major part of its air defense modernization efforts. Iran’s procurement of modern SAMs with automated command, control and communications systems will be a significant upgrade to existing Iranian air defense capabilities and improve its ability to protect senior leadership and key nuclear and industrial facilities. Iran acquired modern TOR-M1 short range surface-to-air missiles in 2007 and has displayed newly acquired and indigenously built radar systems at its Holy Defense Week parade.13

For a thorough discussion of Iranian military capabilities see the classified version of this report.
(B) An analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s conventional forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries;

Iran maintains very sizeable military forces, but they would be relatively ineffective against a well trained, sophisticated military such as that of the United States or its allies. Iran’s forces are sufficient to deter or defend conventional threats from Iran’s weaker neighbors, such as post-war Iraq, the GCC, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, but are lack the air power and logistical ability to project power much beyond Iran’s borders or to confront regional powers such as Turkey or Israel.

For a thorough discussion of Iranian conventional military forces see the classified version of this report.

(C) A description of Iranian military doctrine; and

Iran has historically placed the majority of its conventional force strength to include armor, mechanized infantry, and infantry units close to its borders with Iraq and Turkey. This reflects Iran’s defensive military doctrine, which is designed to slow an invasion and force a diplomatic solution to hostilities. Iranian military training and public statements echo this defensive doctrine of delay and attrition. Iran continues to build its capability to counter more advanced adversaries, including the recent merger of the Basij Resistance Forces (600,000 estimated personnel) with the IRGC ground forces.

For a thorough discussion of Iranian military doctrine see the classified version of this report.

(D) An estimate of the funding provided for each branch of Iran’s conventional forces.

DIA does not have information on how much funding is allocated to each branch of Iran’s military or to special operations forces. According to the 2010 Military Balance, Iran’s total defense spending is about 2.8 percent of GDP —approximately $9.6 billion in FY2008-09. Iran’s defense spending as a share of GDP is relatively low compared to the rest of the region.

(3) An assessment of Iran’s unconventional forces and related activities, including—

(A) The size and capability of Iranian special operations units, including the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force;

Iran established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) in 1990 as an elite unit within the IRGC. Although its operations sometimes appear at odds with the public voice of the Iranian regime, it is not a rogue outfit; it receives direction from the highest levels of government, and its leaders report directly, albeit informally, to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, employing complementary diplomatic and paramilitary strategies.
The IRGC-QF stations operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often building on existing socio-economic ties with the well established Shia Diaspora. At the same time, IRGC-QF engages in paramilitary operations to support extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes. IRGC and IRGC-QF have been behind some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the past 2 decades, including the 1983 and 1984 bombings of the U.S. Embassy and annex in Beirut, the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1994 attack on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and many of the insurgent attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq since 2003. It generally directs and supports the groups that actually execute the attacks, thereby maintaining plausible deniability within the international community.

Support for these extremists takes the form of providing arms, funding, and paramilitary training. In this, IRGC-QF is not constrained by ideology; many of the groups it supports do not share, and sometimes openly oppose, Iranian revolutionary principles, but Iran supports them because they share common interests or enemies.

IRGC-QF maintains operational capabilities around the world. It is well established in the Middle East and North Africa, and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America, particularly Venezuela. As U.S. involvement in conflicts in these regions deepens, contact with the IRGC-QF, directly or through extremist groups it supports, will be more frequent and consequential.¹⁵

Each Provincial Corps in the IRGCGRF possesses a unit, called Saberin, which has limited special operations capabilities. These units rotate to the northwest to perform counter-insurgency against Kurdish PJAK and to the southeast to operate against Jundallah.¹⁶

For a thorough discussion of Iranian unconventional forces see the classified version of this report.

(B) The types and amount of support, including funding, lethal and non-lethal supplies, and training, provided to groups designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations and regional militant groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran or in response to a military attack by another country on Iran;

DIA assesses with high confidence over the last 3 decades, Iran has methodically cultivated a network of sponsored terrorist surrogates capable of conducting effective, plausibly deniable attacks against the United States and Israel.

DIA judges Tehran provides support to terrorist and militant groups to support Iran’s strategic interests in each situation. Elements of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have provided direct support to terrorist groups, assisting in the planning
of terrorist acts or enhancing terrorist group capabilities. Through the IRGC-QF Iran provides material support to terrorist or militant groups such as: HAMAS, Lebanese Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Taliban, and Iraqi Shia groups. In addition to the underlying relationship and Iran’s strategic goals, the operating environment also factors into the type, quality, and quantity of aid provided by Iran to a terrorist or insurgent group.

Iran, through its longstanding relationship with Lebanese Hizballah, maintains a capability to strike Israel directly and threaten Israeli and U.S. interests worldwide. With Iranian support, Lebanese Hizballah has successfully exceeded 2006 Lebanon conflict armament levels. On 4 November, Israel interdicted the merchant vessel FRANCOP, which had 36 containers, 60 tons, of weapons for Hizballah to include 122mm katyushas, 107mm rockets, 106mm antitank shells, hand grenades, light-weapon ammunition. The IRGC-QF operates training camps in Lebanon, training as many as 3,000 or more LH fighters. Additionally, Iran also provides roughly $100-200 million per year in funding to support Hizballah.

Iran provides Kata’ib Hizballah (KH)—an Iraqi Shia terrorist group—and other Iraqi militant groups with weapons and training. Inside Iran, the IRGC-QF or Lebanese Hizballah-led training includes: small arms, reconnaissance, small unit tactics, and communications. Some individuals or groups receive more specialized training in assassinations, kidnappings, or explosives. Iranian materiel assistance and training increased the lethality of roadside Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and improvised rockets, enhancing the capabilities of the supported groups.

Iran’s support to Palestinian groups—including HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command—produced improvements in the groups’ capabilities and increased the threat to Israeli and U.S. interests in the region. Iranian training and material support assisted HAMAS in the development of the Qassam rocket, extending the range to 40km. Iran continues to smuggle weapons, money, and weapons components into Gaza through tunnels in the Philadelphi corridor and may have assisted Gaza-based Palestinian groups in producing rockets whose range may now exceed 40km.

The IRGC-QF provided limited and measured lethal support to select Afghan insurgent and terrorist groups since at least 2006. Iranian supplied 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and mortar rounds have been recovered in Taliban-affiliated cache locations. DIA judges Iranian lethal aid and financial assistance potentially increase these groups’ operational capabilities.

(C) An analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s unconventional forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries in the region; and

Iran’s unconventional forces, to include its paramilitary forces that are trained according to its asymmetric warfare doctrine, would present a formidable force on Iranian territory. These forces would include commando and special forces units, smaller specially trained
teams embedded within the conventional force units, selected Basij forces, and combat patrols of the Law Enforcement Forces. Numbers of personnel could exceed one million personnel.

However, Iran has a limited capability to project force beyond its borders. Attacks on U.S. forces in other countries would likely be limited to surrogates or small numbers of trained personnel disguised as civilians.

For a thorough discussion of Iranian unconventional capabilities see the classified version of this report.

(D) An estimate of the amount of funds spent by Iran to develop and support special operations forces and terrorist groups.

We do not have information on how much funding is allocated to each branch of Iran’s military or to special operations forces. According to the 2010 Military Balance, Iran’s total defense spending is about 2.8 percent of GDP or approximately $9.6 billion in FY2008-09. Iran’s defense spending as a share of GDP is relatively low compared to the rest of the region.

Please see section 3B for estimated Iranian funding to various terrorist groups.

(4) An assessment of Iranian capabilities related to nuclear and missile forces, including—

(A) A summary of nuclear weapons capabilities and developments in the preceding year;

Iran is developing technological capabilities applicable to nuclear weapons. It continues its uranium enrichment and heavy water nuclear reactor activities in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions and also continues to develop ballistic missiles which could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons.

Iran has installed over 8,000 centrifuges at Natanz and accumulated more than enough low enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, if further enriched and processed. For several years it has been constructing an underground enrichment facility near Qom, and has stated it intends to begin enrichment operations there in 2011. Iran has been building this facility in contravention of U.N. resolutions and in violation of its international nuclear safeguards obligations.

Tehran has also refused to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s requests for access to facilities, documents, and personnel as part of its investigation of Iran’s past nuclear weapons-related work. Iran’s nuclear activities and related lack of openness with the international community pose a significant threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East.
Iran has gone to lengths to protect its nuclear infrastructure from physical destruction and has placed an emphasis on a number of factors to include locating facilities in buried, hardened facilities and is attempting to acquire sophisticated air defense systems, like the Russian S300, to be installed at nuclear installations.

(B) A summary of the capabilities of Iran’s ballistic missile forces, including developments in the preceding year, the size of Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces, and the locations of missile launch sites;

Regular Iranian ballistic missile training continues throughout the country. Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles that can range regional adversaries, Israel, and central Europe, including Iranian claims of an extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and a 2,000-km medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ashura. Beyond the steady growth in its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new sub-munition payloads.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile</th>
<th>Deployed</th>
<th>Range (mi)</th>
<th>Propellant Type</th>
<th>Deployment Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tondar</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1st Solid / 2nd Liquid</td>
<td>Road-Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fateh-110</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>120+</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>Road-Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab 1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Road-Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Road-Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Road-Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab 3 Variant</td>
<td>Possibly</td>
<td>1200+</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Road-Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sejil MRBM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1200+</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iranian Ballistic Missiles

With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States by 2015. Iran could also have an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of threatening Europe.

- In late 2008 and early 2009, Iran launched the Safir, a multi-stage space launch vehicle, which indicates progress in some technologies relevant to ICBMs.

For a thorough discussion of Iranian ballistic missiles see the classified version of this report.

(C) A detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries; and
Ballistic Missiles

Iran over the past 2 decades has placed a significant emphasis on developing and fielding ballistic missiles to counter perceived threats from Israel and coalition forces in the Middle East and to project power in the region.

- Iran actively began acquisition and production programs in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War to address its inability to counter Iraqi missile attacks.
- Received assistance from North Korea and China.
- Currently has largest deployed ballistic missile force in the Middle East with approximately 1000 missiles that range from 90-1200 mi.
- Performed four highly publicized exercises (“Noble Prophet”) since 2006 to demonstrate its missile capabilities.

Short-range ballistic missiles provide Tehran with an effective mobile capability to strike coalition forces in the region. Iran continues to improve the survivability of these systems through technological advances, such as solid-propellant and the use of anti-missile defense tactics.

Iran has also developed medium-range ballistic missiles to target Israel and continues to increase the range, lethality, and accuracy of these systems.

- The Shahab 3, based on the North Korean No Dong, can reach all of Israel.
- The Ashura or “Sejil” is an indigenous, two-stage missile that is in development. It uses solid-propellant technology, which reduces the launch preparation time and footprint.

For a thorough discussion of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, see the classified version of this report.

Cruise Missiles

Coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) are an important layer in Iran’s defense of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Iran can attack targeted ships with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) from its own shores, islands, and oil platforms using relatively small mobile launchers.

The C801/802 is Iran’s primary CDM, first imported from China in 1995. The C801/802 is capable of engaging targets at a range of six nautical miles, and has greater accuracy, a lower cruising altitude, and a faster set-up time than the Seersucker missile Iran used during the Iran-Iraq War. The C801/802 allows Iran to target any point within the Strait of Hormuz and much of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Iran has also worked with China to develop shorter range missiles, including the C701, for deployment in narrow geographic environments.
Iran can readily deploy its mobile CDCM launchers anywhere along its coast. These systems have auto control and radar homing guidance systems, and some can target using a remote air link. Mobile CDCMs, combined with multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), coastal artillery, and ballistic missiles, Iran hopes to overwhelm enemy air defenses.  

For a thorough discussion of Iranian cruise missile capabilities, see the classified version of this report.

(D) An estimate of the amount of funding expended by Iran since 2004 on programs to develop a capability to build nuclear weapons or to enhance Iran’s ballistic missile forces.

DIA has no information on Iran’s missile funding nuclear or weapons program budget.
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) IRAN'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's conventional forces"—

(A) means military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran designed to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran's unconventional forces and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise missile forces; and
(B) includes Iran's Army, Iran's Air Force, Iran's Navy, and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, other than the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force.

(2) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces"—

(A) means forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran that carry out missions typically associated with special operations forces; and
(B) includes—
   (i) the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force; and
   (ii) any organization that—
       (I) has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States;
       (II) receives assistance from Iran; and
       (III)
           (aa) is assessed as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out attacks on behalf of Iran; or
           (bb) is assessed as likely to carry out attacks in response to a military attack by another country on Iran.

(3) IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES.—The term "Iran's ballistic missile forces" means those elements of the military forces of Iran that employ ballistic missiles.

(4) IRAN'S CRUISE MISSILE FORCES.—The term "Iran's cruise missile forces" means those elements of the military forces of Iran that employ cruise missiles capable of flights less than 500 kilometers.

(5) SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.—The term "specified countries" means the countries in the same geographic region as Iran, including Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

(d) TERMINATION.—The requirement to submit the report required under subsection (a) shall terminate on December 31, 2014.

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1 OSC [IAP20050816011032 | - | 20050816 | - | (U) Iranian Naval Commander Says Capable of Building Advanced Ships, Missiles | - | - | U | Source is a university student press agency; produces politically moderate reporting with emphasis on student activities; promotes political awareness of seminary and university students; partially government-funded with a student editorial staff; licensed to the government-created University Jihad institution

2 OSC [IAP20090111950070 | - | 20090111 | - | (U) Leader Outlines Policies of 5th Development Plan | - | - | U | Source is Tehran Fars News Agency in English — privately owned online news agency that follows "principle-ists" policies and its activities are in line with the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader

3 Middle East Media Research Institute translation of the 14 Jan 2010 Iraqi Daily al-Zaman.