19 November 1965

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Summary 273-65

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INDONESIA: Military leaders are more confident
that they can survive without Sukarno,
if it comes to that.

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NOTE:
Egyptian Activities in Yemen

Egyptian troops are apparently assembling in the Hodeida area for the withdrawals from Yemen which are to begin on 23 November under the Jidda agreement. UAR strength has not been materially reduced since August and is still carried at 53,000 to 58,000. Continued proroyalist dissidence northwest of Sana does not seem to be affecting Cairo's determination to abide by the pact.

A 7 November UAR message indicates some concern over Soviet approaches to the Yemeni military. It reported on a scheduled meeting between the Soviet Military Attache and Yemeni Chief of Staff Baider in which Soviet aid to Yemen after the Egyptians pulled out was reportedly to be discussed and noted that Baider was "avoiding" experts from the UAR. (TOP SECRET TRINE)

Cuban Exile Attack May Be Imminent

A Cuban exile claimed on 16 November that the Second National Front of the Escambray (SFNE) was planning a raid on the coast of Cuba "within 72 hours." This report is supported somewhat by another source who says that the SFNE intended to carry out attacks against Cuba as soon as the negotiations covering voluntary emigration to the US were completed.

Exile groups planning attacks on Cuba to protest the emigration program could include SFNE, Alpha 66, and the People's Revolutionary Movement. The 14 November raid in the Havana area has probably stimulated these organizations to step up their preparations. Cuban security forces were, however, almost certainly placed on an increased state of alert after the 14 November attack. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
European Meeting of Communists Affirms Hard Line in Venezuela

Venezuelan Communist leaders decided to continue antigovernment violence at a conference held in Rome from 4 to 9 November. German Laiaret, representative of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) in Havana, chaired the meetings, which were also attended by a delegate of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left and members of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and by Italian, Cuban, and Colombian Communists.

The conference decided that Venezuelan Communists in other Latin American countries and possibly those in Europe would be ordered home and that urban terrorism was to be stepped up and the collection of funds intensified. Laiaret offered to provide some funds in the near future, probably from Cuba. At an FALN meeting in Rome two days earlier, an Albanian contribution of $50,000 was announced; this presumably represents Chinese Communist funding.

The holding of these conferences in Rome indicates that the Italian Communist Party is still the primary sponsor of FALN and PCV activity in Venezuela, and the attendance of delegates from other nations and pledges of funds attest to the continuing involvement of the international Communist movement in the FALN insurgency. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEEM)

Guerrilla Atrocities Arouse Venezuelans

Guerrilla atrocities in western Venezuela have aroused strong revulsion and may damage the Communist cause.

A district official in Falcon State was kidnapped and killed on 15 November, and a peasant official was put to death that day in Lara State. President Leoni decried the murders as "treacherous, cowardly, monstrous crimes," and a peasant organization has offered to support the government in retaliatory action.

These brutal acts were intended to keep alive the image of guerrilla power even in the face of recent government successes. Such outrages, however, have the effect of alienating the peasants and arousing the populace in general. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEEM)
Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces

Party First Secretary Brezhnev will become Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces only in the event of war, according to a high-ranking Ministry of Defense officer. The officer told the US Army Attaché in Moscow recently that Defense Minister Marshal Malinovskiy is the commander in chief of all the military forces but that if war came, Brezhnev would form a Stavka (Supreme Command).

Brezhnev reportedly informed Danish Premier Krag in October that he was Chairman of the Defense Council. This latest report, however, makes it clear that the position of Supreme Commander is separate and apart from the Defense Council, a body of high-level Party, government, and military officials which has existed since before World War II to provide a forum for discussion and decision on major issues of military policy. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Language and The Warsaw Pact

Language difficulties persist within the Warsaw Pact despite strenuous efforts to overcome them during the past several years.

The Polish Military Attaché in Moscow recently told the US Army Attaché there that a multinational headquarters had controlled the last Pact exercise (OCTOBER STORM) but admitted that language was a problem -- this despite bragging by Gen Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces, that differing languages were no problem in the combined war game.

Intercepted conversations during the exercise clearly revealed that operations were complicated by language. On one occasion, misunderstandings among Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German operators forced a switch to English. Russian normally serves as the common language for the Pact organization, and numerous communications changes designed to facilitate interworking among the various national forces have been effected in recent years. The problems encountered in OCTOBER STORM could lead to an intensification of combined communications training. (SECRET SAVIN)
Status of Soviet Venus Probes

The two Soviet probes continue on their three and a half month journeys toward Venus. Signals intercepted on 16 November from the 2,113-pound VENIK 3 tend to substantiate the TASS statement that its scientific equipment differs slightly from that of VENIK 2 -- about 2,120 pounds -- launched four days earlier.

These probes are some 700 pounds heavier than VENIK 1, the first Soviet spacecraft to achieve a planetary trajectory. Their weight is similar to that of ZOND 3, a 2,200-pound craft which photographed the hidden side of the moon in July and which is now in a heliocentric orbit. The Soviets claim they modified ZOND 3's trajectory some two months after launch, altering its velocity by about 164 feet per second. They might make a similar adjustment in the trajectories of the Venus probes.

Radar tracking data suggest that VENIK 3 will pass the planet at some 100,000 nautical miles or less on 28 February without a mid-course correction. A velocity correction of only 11 feet per second, if applied the day following launch, could have reduced this to less than 9,000 nautical miles. VENIK 2 has a much poorer trajectory; its six million nautical mile miss distance may be too large to correct adequately. There is no firm evidence, however, that either trajectory has yet been adjusted.

Early Soviet Venus and Mars probes usually failed in parking orbit, but two previous probes toward each planet did inject on transfer orbits only to suffer communications failures en route. Nine of the USSR's 15 planetary attempts to date have been aimed at Venus (see chart overleaf). (TOP SECRET TRINE)
SOVIET PLANETARY PROBES

MARS PROBES
"WINDOW" OPENS EVERY 23½ MONTHS

COMMUNICATION FAILURE
NOW EN ROUTE
AT INJECTION
AT LAUNCH


MISSION SUCCESS
0
PARTIAL SUCCESS
2
FAILURE
4
TOTAL
6

VENUS PROBES
"WINDOW" OPENS EVERY 19 MONTHS

COMMUNICATION FAILURE
NOW EN ROUTE
AT INJECTION
AT LAUNCH


MISSION SUCCESS
0
PARTIAL SUCCESS
2
COMMUNICATION FAILURE
NOW EN ROUTE
AT INJECTION
AT LAUNCH


MISSION SUCCESS
0
PARTIAL SUCCESS
2
TOTAL
9
Planned French Earth Satellite Attempt

French preparations to orbit an earth satellite from Hammaguir, Algeria, are nearly complete, and a launch attempt appears imminent; it may occur between 20 and 24 November. Scheduling the first launch next week would allow time for a second before the presidential election on 5 December in case the first one fails. Instructions have been sent to a French official in Algeria to have the press team remain at the launch site should a second be required.

The first satellite (A-1) will carry an 88-pound payload sponsored by the Ministry of Defense. Power for its instrumentation and telemetry systems will be provided by batteries having a life of about two weeks. Plans are for the orbit to have an apogee of 1,350 nautical miles and a perigee of 268 nautical miles. The intended inclination is believed to be between 30 and 35 degrees. The booster to be used is the French three-stage DIAMANT system. (SECRET SAVIN)

Guinea Cracks Down on Foreign Diplomats

Guinea's President Toure is evidently exploiting the alleged conspiracy against his government to tighten his hold on the country.

Foreign Minister Beavogui told foreign diplomats in Conakry on 17 November that the government had decided to limit their activities because of the role the French and other Embassies had played in the recent plot. He said that specific regulations would be issued soon but that in the meantime all business with the government should be conducted through his Ministry and Embassy personnel should avoid contacts with other ministries and the public.

Toure has implied several times during the past few days that some high-level government officials were under investigation. Most members of the diplomatic corps think that he is paving the way for sweeping changes and that individuals to be purged will be those known to be pro-French. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Dominicans Question Legal Status of IAPF Personnel

Dominican moderates are questioning the legality of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).

The daily El Caribe has recently devoted much attention to the status of the Brazilian soldier who killed a Dominican civilian on 30 October. The paper objects to the fact that IAPF regulations enabled the commander to deny a Dominican judge's request that the accused be delivered to his custody. El Caribe has claimed that the IAPF has no mandate from the 10th OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) to exempt its personnel from Dominican jurisdiction.

The senior member of the ad hoc OAS Committee in the Dominican Republic comments that it and OAS Secretary General Mora approved the IAPF regulations on immunity at a time when no government existed and that immunity can now be formally established only through the consent of the provisional government. An attempt has been made to work out a confidential accord with Garcia Godoy, whose precarious political position prevents an open agreement, but so far he has not dealt with the matter.

Former Dominican rebel foreign minister Jottin Cury will head a private delegation going to Rio de Janeiro to present the OAS conference with a document opposing a permanent IAPF and proposing the revision of the MFM resolution on the present IAPF. A rightist delegation will also present a petition in Rio requesting that Garcia Godoy be directed to clean out leftists and Communists.

The relatively small number who participated in a Communist-led march on the national palace on 17 November points up the widening split between Communists and non-Communists in the "constitutionalist" camp. Juan Bosch's political party and the Social Christians both refused to join it. Bosch is being increasingly criticized by Communists for his failure to cooperate with them. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Congo Developments

Relations between the Congolese and Belgians have suffered another setback, although the latest one doesn't seem too serious at present.

President Kasavubu took the Belgian Chargé to task on 16 November for the attempts by some of his compatriots to aid former Premier Tshombe. The President had apparently just learned that they had assigned a bodyguard of mercenaries to Tshombe. He was particularly irritated that the men involved, including the Belgian Army officer who commanded the European mercenary unit, had been sent home; he felt that the government should have been free to punish them for intruding into its affairs.

Kasavubu gave the Chargé a long lecture on the place of foreigners and hinted that the Belgians were trying to run the country. He said he was reaching the point where he would rather sacrifice efficiency, which the loss of a few foreign advisers in high places in government would entail, rather than postpone the day when the Congolese would have to run their own affairs. Kasavubu said, however, that he wanted Belgian technical assistance to continue and that Brussels should have no fears about the validity of agreements reached when Tshombe was in power.

The Belgians will have even more trouble with the Congolese if the efforts of some of Tshombe's friends to drive a wedge between Kasavubu and Army Commander Lt Gen Mobutu come to light. According to a radiotelephone conversation, Tshombe's supporters in Leopoldville and Brussels believe that he must have Mobutu's backing to win the power struggle and that a means must be found to convince Mobutu he too is threatened by those in power. Rumors going the rounds in Leopoldville have it that Kasavubu wants to place officers in the upper levels of the army who are primarily loyal to him and not to Mobutu and that he is planning steps in this direction. Whether started by Tshombe's friends or not, the tale certainly suits their purpose. (SECRET LARUM NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
French-Israeli Missile Test Program Is Delayed

The test program of the MD-620 short-range ballistic missile France is developing for Israel is encountering further delays, according to a reliable source.

The fourth and final test of the first stage was scheduled for September on the Ile du Lavant range but was canceled because of technical difficulties; the problems had not been solved by mid-October. Until this test is conducted, none of the 20 planned two-stage tests can begin.

The two-stage configuration will be fired on a trajectory that will pass off Corsica. In order to prevent compromise of the program, the French do not plan to announce closures for the new impact area.

The MD-620 is a two-stage solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile with a design range of 270 nautical miles. It is being developed under a contract negotiated in 1963. Delivery of the 25 missiles ordered is not expected to start before 1967-1968. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

Schroeder's Visit to the UK

West German Foreign Minister Schroeder arrived in London on 18 November for talks with British Foreign Secretary Stewart.

Schroeder denies recent charges by pro-French factions in Germany that he plans to propose a German-British treaty similar to that between Bonn and Paris. He says, however, that he expects to implement plans originally made by Adenauer to have periodic meetings with the British.

Schroeder does not intend to bring up nuclear sharing by NATO members but will wait for the British to broach this subject. He believes Germany's position is clear -- it wants to participate in some type of NATO nuclear force. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

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ISRAEL: Forces are being maintained in the Latrun area which would be ready to act rapidly if a clash developed there. Troops, including armor, and being assembled in the Beersheba region for an exercise at the end of the month. Their gathering increases the Israelis' capability to take prompt action in the Latrun region. (CONFIDENTIAL)

TURKEY: Although Cyprus is quiet, Turkish capability to launch air attacks on the island with little or no warning has again been highlighted by the status of F-104G aircraft at Murted Airfield near Ankara. Eight F-104s have been on alert at the field; two of them have SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles, and the others, bombs, napalm, and three-inch rockets. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

ECUADOR: The 9th Infantry Division at Loja in the south advised an unidentified headquarters on 13 November that Peruvian detachments along the border had been reinforced. Recent indications that the Ecuadorans might stir up a border incident in connection with the OAS meeting in Rio de Janeiro may have prompted the Peruvians to take precautionary defensive measures. (SECRET SAVIN)

CHILE: President Frei has declared the key copper mining areas, plagued by a 23-day strike, zones of emergency under military supervision. The government has not taken over the mines or ordered the miners back to work, but it may do so soon. Eight carabineros were reportedly injured on 17 November in a clash with Socialist- and Communist-led workers at the large Chuquicamata mine in the north. Chile's Christian Democratic government has generally been reluctant to intervene in strikes, but the militancy of the union officials and the loss of important revenues apparently forced its hand. The miners won the support yesterday of 50,000 iron, nitrate and coal workers who said they would go on a 48-hour sympathy strike today. They reportedly decided to join the strike despite government warnings that drastic measures would be taken against them. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
BRITISH GUIANA: Prime Minister Forbes Burnham may visit the US soon to request military assistance for the "Guyana" defense force which will take over security responsibilities when independence is achieved. The Constitutional Conference in London will probably close on 19 November after which Burnham plans to spend two days in New York on UN business. Another trip to the US is scheduled for early December when he may request patrol boats for the coast guard. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

EAST AFRICA: Tanzania President Nyerere has told the press that regional leaders agreed in Nairobi on 15 November to provide assistance to Zambia and to the Africans in Rhodesia. He said they also discussed ways the Africans could achieve independence rather than how to help the UK reestablish its authority. The Rhodesian rebellion was directed against the British, and obviously "we cannot be expected to help the British regain their colonial authority." (UNCLASSIFIED)

USSR/RHODESIA: In its extensive propaganda on Rhodesia, the USSR is stressing its "full solidarity" with the Zimbabwe people and declaring its readiness to cooperate with African countries in giving them utmost support. There is nothing in the statements, however, to indicate that Moscow is prepared to take any action on its own or make commitments except in conformity with decisions of the UN or of African states. The Somali Ambassador in Moscow says most African diplomats are convinced that the Soviets are only interested in getting propaganda mileage out of the Rhodesian affair and cannot be counted on for real assistance. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

MOROCCO/CUBA: Rabat still wants to break diplomatic relations with Havana. Foreign Minister Benhima has stressed, however, that his country must find an alternate source for its 1966-1967 sugar requirements before making the break. He appealed again on 16 November for US assistance in this matter. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) (Continued)
ALGERIA: The UAR has agreed to accept Algerian students in its military colleges. According to an intercepted message, the request for training was made on 9 November, some weeks after courses had started. The Algerian Armed Forces had turned down an Egyptian offer of 15 September to train 100 students because the government was expanding its own Cherchel Military College. The Cherchel facilities presumably proved inadequate to handle the number of students involved. (TOP SECRET TRINE)

FRANCE/USSR: France will receive without charge a Soviet telecommunications antenna for use with MOLNIYA communications satellites, according to a high-level source. The antenna will probably be installed at a site in Brittany originally proposed by the Soviets. Several proposals for collaborating in the transmission of color TV via MOLNIYA-type satellites have been discussed, but this is the first indication that a decision has been reached. Another evidence of cooperation is the French offer to permit the Soviets to use their launch facility in French Guiana when it is completed. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

ITALY: The Council of Ministers on 17 November approved a bill reorganizing the Defense Ministry and creating a Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new law increases the authority of the Defense Chief of Staff, reduces the number of Secretaries General from three to one and of Directorates General from 30 to 19, and raises the number of the Central Offices from three to five. The Minister of Defense Cabinet, the Secretary General of Defense Office, and the Central Offices are to be organized by 1 January and the Directorates General before 31 Dec 67. (CONFIDENTIAL)
NOTES

CYPRUS: The government of Cyprus apparently has implemented a recently reported plan to induct technically qualified men, including those over draft age, for SA-2 missile training. Two specific instances of qualified individuals being notified that they had been drafted for missile training at a special camp in Egypt have been reported. SA-2 missile-associated equipment is known to be in Cyprus, but it is not believed that any missiles have yet been delivered to the island from the UAR. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
FAR EAST/ASIA SECTION
Developments in South Vietnam

Military

The high level of Viet Cong activity and expanding friendly search-and-destroy operations continue to account for the sharp tempo of the fighting in Vietnam.

A Viet Cong force of from 300 to 500 attacked a battalion of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (US) on 18 November about one mile north of the Chu Pong Mountain in southwestern Pleiku Province as Operation SILVER BAYONET continued. Preliminary reports indicated that contact was maintained for over six hours and that 303 Viet Cong were killed. US losses were 60 killed and 41 wounded. At last report, all elements were engaged in light contact with the largest action involving an attack by a Viet Cong platoon.

Four South Vietnamese Army battalions were heli-lifted into an area eight nautical miles northwest of the US positions on 18 November, and all forces received sporadic sniper fire during the night. Latest confirmed US casualties as of 0600H 19 November are 171 killed, 268 wounded, and four missing in action. Eight South Vietnamese have been wounded. Aircraft losses include one A-1E/SKYRAIDER and one helicopter destroyed, and two helicopters and one C-47 damaged. VC/PAVN losses total 1,186 killed (body count) and 19 captured. In addition, 324 weapons have been captured and between 300 and 400 weapons destroyed.

The Communists are obviously determined to maintain control over southwestern Pleiku, long the site of a major Communist headquarters and base area and an infiltration point for large forces and supplies. The Communists have reportedly ordered reinforcements from other regions to launch a counteroffensive to reestablish control over lines of communication and "divide the country."

(Continued)
The action at Hiep Duc District Headquarters in Quang Tin Province, which began on 16 November, is still under way. A Viet Cong force estimated to be 500 strong still controls the headquarters, but two South Vietnamese Army battalions are moving toward the battle area. An estimated Viet Cong battalion-size attack on another government outpost in Quang Tin Province on 17 November inflicted losses on the defending Popular Force platoon of 15 killed and eight wounded. The South Vietnamese reaction force did not arrive until after the enemy had withdrawn. Insurgent casualties are not known.

In a series of separate actions in Binh Duong Province, two Viet Cong have been killed, 26 suspects detained, and a base camp and dispensary uncovered. In addition, one company of the 1st Infantry Division (US) engaged an unknown number of Viet Cong who were firing small arms from a network of tunnels about 12 miles northeast of Saigon. Enemy losses are not known; US casualties were "light."

An estimated Viet Cong battalion on 16 November overran the forward outpost of the Binh Thanh Thon Special Forces Camp, Kien Tuong Province, which was defended by one Civilian Irregular Defense Group company. A reaction force later reoccupied the post; 11 defenders had been killed and 17 wounded, and 30 are missing. Enemy casualties were not reported.

An estimated Viet Cong force of two battalions was reportedly involved in the attack on Tan Hiep Airfield, Long An Province, which began on 17 November. A five-battalion South Vietnamese Army relief force supported by armed helicopters is pursuing the guerrillas. Viet Cong losses now total 91 killed and four captured. Latest friendly casualties are 32 killed and 89 wounded.

(Continued)
Communist forces have lost 110 killed and two captured along with a quantity of arms and ammunition in Chuong Thien Province as a result of a multibattalion South Vietnamese Army search-and-destroy operation about 30 miles southwest of Can Tho. This operation is continuing.

Two Viet Cong companies attacked a South Vietnamese Marine company on 19 November in Gia Dinh Province, five miles southwest of Saigon. In the resulting encounter, the friendly forces lost six KIA, 11 WIA, and five MIA. Viet Cong casualties are unknown, however, three individual weapons and one crew-served weapon were captured.

Phase II of Operation BLUE MARLIN, a joint multibattalion US and South Vietnamese Army search-and-destroy operation about 12 miles north of Chu Lai Base, was terminated on 18 November with no significant US contact. Final results include two friendly KIA and one WIA, with Viet Cong losses listed as 24 killed, two wounded, 16 captured and 21 suspects detained. In addition, 21 individual weapons were captured.

Phase III of a South Vietnamese Army operation initiated on 6 November in Thua Thien Province continues. Friendly losses to date are eight KIA, 36 WIA, and one captured. Viet Cong losses are listed as 38 KIA, 11 captured, nine suspects detained, and 19 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon captured.

In Chuong Thien Province about 100 miles southwest of Saigon, Operation DAN CHI 182 was terminated on 18 November with the following results: friendly casualties -- nine KIA, 39 WIA (includes one US); Viet Cong casualties -- 50 KIA (body count), two captured and three suspects detained. In addition, 16 individual weapons, one crew-served weapon, 3,570 assorted rounds of ammunition, 16 mines, and 120 grenades were captured.

(Continued)
At 2030H on 18 November, a USAF A-1E/SKYRAIDER operating under the control of one ground and one airborne forward air controller, dropped two 100-pound bombs in close proximity to a 1st Cavalry Division position west of Plei Me. Latest casualty report indicates three US killed and four injured.

According to South Vietnamese intelligence sources, a "Plan 9-A" covering Viet Cong strategy during the latter part of 1965, was discussed during a meeting of the Viet Cong Provincial Committee in the delta region in late September. The plan envisaged a combination of "guerrilla and mobile warfare," and continuing disruption of lines of communication. The major battlefield, according to the plan, would be in the central highlands, and in other areas the Viet Cong were to rely largely on guerrilla tactics. The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam was said to have called on each province to furnish one battalion to reinforce the troops in the central highlands area, and allegedly called for guerrilla tactics to continue against outposts, towns, cities, and enemy infantry. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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Political

Premier Ky on 17 November formally inaugurated a major land-reform program in Tay Ninh Province; 700,000 acres of state-owned land are to be distributed to about 180,000 farmers. A crowd of 2,000 to 3,000 attended the ceremony as did US Ambassador Lodge, Deputy Premier Co, and various members of the diplomatic corps.

(Continued)
According to a Capital Military District staff officer, Prime Minister Ky instructed 1st Corps Commander Gen Nguyen Chanh Thi on 12 November to close the Hue student newspaper Minh Vien Hue. Ky said he wanted the paper closed because of its anti-American and neutralist line rather than because of its attacks on himself. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Estimate of Viet Cong Courses of Action

The US Embassy in Saigon has forwarded an "Estimate of Viet Cong Situation," drafted by the mission intelligence committee and concurred in by COMUSMACV.

The estimate is highlighted by a discussion of various courses of action the Viet Cong may adopt in South Vietnam. These alternatives and Embassy comments on them follow:

1. Major escalation in order to seek an early military decision.

2. Continuation of their strategy of augmenting their capabilities for the gradual transition to conventional warfare.

3. Reversion to smaller-scale insurgency.

4. A negotiated settlement.

Although the first course of action offers prospects for quick success, it carries with it the risk of triggering a massive US response.

The second may be viewed by the Communists as carrying less risk of provoking any new major escalation by the US. This course is in accordance with Communist China's and North Vietnam's doctrinal concepts of "liberation wars," and any deviation from it would be difficult for them to rationalize to their adherents. Both Hanoi and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam had stated that their major aim for this year was to build up Viet Cong capabilities to achieve a strategic balance of forces as a prelude to the general counteroffensive. There is evidence that they concluded this summer that this goal was still attainable despite the increase in US and allied strength and that they have undertaken new measures to restore the balance.

The Communists may calculate that this alternative combined with extensive terrorism -- a course

(Continued)
which proved successful against the French --
offers the best prospects for wearing down the
will and determination of the US to continue the
war. If their buildup permits them to regain the
initiative and momentum on the battlefield that
they enjoyed earlier this year, they may feel that
the impact of this on South Vietnamese Army and
civilian morale will cause a return of political
instability that could prove decisive for the out-
come of the war.

The third alternative would entail serious
risks to Viet Cong morale and lead to a substantial
increase in defections that could reach disastrous
proportions.

The fourth alternative offers mixed blessings
to the Communists. The Viet Cong would first
negotiate to gain time to build up their strength
and undermine ours, and then to gain a satisfactory
settlement. Doctrinally, negotiations would be a
feasible alternative if their outcome assured the
attainment of ultimate Communist goals, which are
unchanged. If the Communists' position became so
weak through the failure of other alternatives
that a favorable settlement were not feasible,
they might prefer allowing the insurgency to
wither away rather than to embark on fruitless talks.
In any event, they are unlikely to seek negotiations
until they are convinced that victory through other
means is impossible.

Current indications point to the second alter-
native -- continuation of the buildup of Viet Cong
capabilities for conventional operations. These
indications include: (1) Evidence of the infil-
tration of additional military units from North
Vietnam; (2) the buildup of main-force units at
the expense of village guerrilla elements; (3)
captured documents which state that Viet Cong
goals for 1965 remain unchanged; (4) continued
confidence and determination to press the war as
reflected in statements from Hanoi and the
Liberation Front; (5) completion of a motorable
supply route through Laos; (6) resumption of
large-scale attacks despite losses suffered in

(Continued)
previous actions; (7) the marked increase in Viet Cong activity since early October; (8) continued development of North Vietnam's air defense capabilities, with Chinese and Soviet support, to reduce the effectiveness of US air strikes and enhance the ability of the DRV to survive them; and (9) the continuing fragility of the South Vietnamese Government and its vulnerability to Viet Cong pressures. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Another SAM Site in North Vietnam

Another SA-2/GUIDELINE missile site -- number 45 -- has recently been detected in North Vietnam, about 10 nautical miles south-southeast of Hanoi. According to detailed analysis of 10 November high-altitude photographs, it has six launch positions, a central guidance area, and one probable revetted missile-hold position and is link-configured. No missiles or associated equipment were observed.

The new site is located less than one-half mile from Site 10 and near Sites 1 and 15. The reason for this overlap in coverage is not known. (SECRET)

More New SAM Sites in North Vietnam

Preliminary field analysis of high-altitude reconnaissance photography of 18 November revealed two new possible SAM sites in North Vietnam.

The first SAM site is located approximately 29 nautical miles northwest of Hanoi, in the vicinity of Sites 44 and 7. The first site consists of six occupied revetted launch positions, an occupied revetted central guidance position, one missile in an unrevetted hold area, one possible missile in an unrevetted hold area, and one probable missile on a transporter on a road leading into the site. Three possible missiles were also reported 200 yards east-northeast of the site -- two in a possible maintenance area and one on a transporter. If confirmed by detailed photo analysis, this site will become number 46.

The second site, located approximately 12 nautical miles northeast of Haiphong, appears to be in the early stages of construction. A road pattern with wide turns indicates an irregular circular pattern, and a serviceable secondary road serves the site. Two launch positions and the central guidance revetment appear to be in the early stages of construction. All positions are unoccupied, and no missile-associated equipment was noted. If confirmed, this site will become number 47. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #41

TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKED

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
Air Strikes Against North Vietnam, 18-19 November

United States Air Force and Navy aircraft struck three fixed targets and conducted armed reconnaissance along North Vietnamese lines of communication during the period 18-19 November.

Seven South Vietnamese Air Force aircraft struck the Dong Thanh Warehouse Area on 18 November. Smoke and dust precluded accurate damage assessment to the target, however, pilots estimate 70 per cent damage to the target.

Four USN aircraft struck the Bai Thong Army Barracks Northeast, located approximately 20 nautical miles northeast of Thanh Hoa, on 18 November while on armed reconnaissance. One secondary explosion was noted and 13 buildings were destroyed.

Two USN aircraft struck the Qui Vinh Railroad Bridge, located approximately 30 nautical miles south of Thanh Hoa, on 18 November while on armed reconnaissance. The bridge was damaged and is unserviceable.

Forty USAF planes conducted armed reconnaissance on 18 November destroying an automatic weapons site and damaging seven barracks and one building. Three roads and two bridge approaches were cratered. A road and a truck park were seeded and a rail line was cut approximately 70 nautical miles northwest of Hanoi on the Hanoi-Lao Cay rail line.

Eighty-one USN aircraft conducted armed reconnaissance on 18 November destroying four bridges, nine barges, two trucks and one building. Two bridges, four barges, five trucks, and one pier were damaged. Eight roads, five bridge approaches, and a ferry approach were cratered.

Sixteen USN aircraft conducted armed reconnaissance on 19 November destroying 13 trucks and two barges.

One USAF F-105 was shot down by ground fire approximately 25 nautical miles southwest of Vinh on 18 November. The pilot was recovered and is in excellent condition. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Status of Soviet and East European Shipping to North Vietnam

Two East European and three Soviet merchant ships are in or near port at Haiphong. Four Soviet and two Polish ships are en route to North Vietnam, and four Soviet and five East European merchantmen are scheduled for future voyages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF SHIP</th>
<th>FLAG</th>
<th>GRT</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Port</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzerzhinsk</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>8,229</td>
<td>TK1/</td>
<td>Arr Haiphong 17 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S. Rakovsky</td>
<td>Bulg</td>
<td>8,556</td>
<td>CGI/</td>
<td>Etta Cam Pha 15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalewel</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>7,817</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Etta Haiphong 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk (LH)</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>10,107</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Haiphong 19 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salsk</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Haiphong 19 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>En Route</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakurainai</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>11,081</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Indonesia 19 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kochanowski</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>8,231</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Suez Canal 15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenin斯基 Pioner</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>12,285</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Singapore 19 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marian Buczak</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>7,053</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Dep Aden 4 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostrogzhsk (LH)</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>11,067</td>
<td>CG</td>
<td>South China Sea 19 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poti</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>8,229</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Dep Black Sea 14 Nov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Abbreviations: CG-Cargo; LH-Large Hatch; TK-Tanker

(SECRET)

19 Nov 65 DIA Intelligence Summary Page F-11
Weekly Estimate of Jet Combat Aircraft in Southern China and North Vietnam

There was no change in the estimated jet combat aircraft order of battle in southern China and North Vietnam last week. (SECRET)

Demonstrations Considered Against North Vietnamese Embassy in Laos

According to a reliable source, members of the Lao National Police, the National Documentation Center, and officers of the 5th Military Zone, were considering staging a peaceful demonstration against the North Vietnamese Embassy in Vientiane on 19 November. On 17 November, the newspaper Sieng Mahason urged the population to demonstrate because of direct North Vietnamese involvement in military attacks in the Thakhek area. Premier Souvanna Phouma does not approve of the idea, and stated that these moves with international repercussions should be left up to him as long as he was running the government. He further commented that he personally could see no value in a demonstration. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
Indonesian Situation

Indonesian military leaders are evidently gaining confidence in their ability to combat President Sukarno and to survive politically without having to use him as a crutch.

Sukarno's resistance to the Army's anti-Communist line seems to be provoking Gen Nasution into considering drastic measures. The President's reported determination to preserve a PKI influence in a single political party has led Nasution's advisers to urge holding him under virtual house arrest unless he agrees to proclaim a national emergency. An alternative suggested by Nasution's associates is Sukarno's assassination. Nasution's position seems to have improved in the past month to such an extent that he may now be able to afford the political price of deposing Sukarno. Military criticism of the President is said to have been much more outspoken recently.

Sukarno has reportedly been pressing the Army for permission to visit Jogjakarta so that he could "address the people," but he might be intending to establish contact with fugitive PKI leader D. N. Aidit. To avoid a direct refusal, military authorities have advised that such a trip is unsafe. The most intense Army actions against the PKI have been in the Jogjakarta area. According to an intercepted message, a platoon of airborne troops has been parachuted onto the slopes of Mt Merapi, a PKI stronghold north of Jogjakarta where Aidit has supposedly taken refuge.

(Continued)
A nine-member ministerial committee has reported to Sukarno on the economic situation and has promised a maximum effort to provide the population with extra goods during the year-end holidays. The committee explained that established trade relations with Communist China, the USSR, western countries, Japan, and other nations would continue.

(TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Singapore's Plans for Defense Forces

Singapore plans extensive changes in its defense forces in the next few months, and British Foreign Secretary Stewart may go there early in 1966 to negotiate a defense treaty.

The primary objective of the changes in the Singapore forces is to eliminate their Malaysian personnel, and the Minister of Defense says that this must be accomplished by next March. Authorities in Kuala Lumpur reportedly do not object to having all the Malaysians removed from the two infantry battalions -- one-third of one battalion and two-thirds of the other. The withdrawals are expected to begin when the Singapore battalion in Sabah returns in February.

The government is also concerned by the lack of a Singapore command element over these military units, which when at home bases are controlled by a Malaysian brigade headquarters. Singapore apparently intends to have this brigade element withdrawn.

The authorities evidently foresee no problems in bringing the two infantry battalions to full strength after which they will consider raising a third one. Plans call for recruiting at least 3,000 men for three territorial battalions for guard and security duties. Formation of a battalion-size police unit for internal security is also being considered.

Singapore cannot afford an air force and navy, and the authorities are said to rely "largely on friends," presumably the British, to insure external security.

(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Indian-Pakistani Situation

Clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces have become lighter and less frequent, and there seems to be some progress toward negotiations for withdrawal.

Both sides have reacted favorably to UN Secretary General Thant's new proposal that a Chilean or Argentine general rather than Brazilian Brig Gen Sarmento be appointed UN representative in withdrawal talks. India blackballed Sarmento when it charged Brazil with being partial to Pakistan. The availability of a Chilean brigadier general with service on the Kashmir cease-fire line is being investigated while U Thant awaits a formal Pakistani reply to the proposal -- India has agreed to accept a representative from either country.

More Indonesian naval units have reportedly arrived at Karachi for what may be a combined exercise with the Pakistani Navy. Two KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats may be on board a Pakistani freighter which just arrived from Djakarta. Two Indonesian W-class submarines and a navy troop-cargo ship had reached Karachi earlier this month.

An Indonesian message of 16 November referred to providing arms and ammunition to Pakistan. The materiel was in storage but had been "earmarked" for the Pakistanis. Other intercepts have reflected persistent attempts by Pakistan to obtain such supplies from various Moslem countries.

A recent Pakistani arms procurement delegation to Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium and the UK reportedly obtained a sizable amount of 120-mm mortar and possibly 40-mm cannon ammunition from a French firm. The Pakistanis apparently avoided government contact and negotiated only with weapons dealers in their quest, which was also for F-86 and F-104 jet fighters. Bonn had forewarned West German dealers not to deliver weapons to areas of tension; they reportedly did not meet the Pakistani requests. (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
### Special Pakistani Civil Air Flights to Communist China (September and October)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Itinerary</th>
<th>Passengers and Mission</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 September</td>
<td>2 PH-1000 F-27 and 1 Lockheed Super Constellation</td>
<td>Chittagong to Kunming, return to East Pakistan on 24 September, the day after the ceasefire was effective.</td>
<td>Thirty-four PIA crew members. Flights probably to provide a safe haven in China during September hostilities.</td>
<td>The regular weekly PIA flight from Karachi to Canton and Shanghai via Bangkok was suspended on 9 September because of India’s cancellation of open flight rights. Schedules flown to China were rescheduled on 29 September through Citrus AU bringing India; they end in Canton. The additional expense of flying via Colombo has brought a temporary halt to service to Shanghai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11 September</td>
<td>FIA DOING 720B</td>
<td>Karachi-Pekin-Canton-Djakarta, round trip via northern Himalayan route.</td>
<td>Fifteen-member Pakistani delegation led by FIA director and former air force chief Asghar Khan. Mission probably went to Indonesia to deliver military aid and to China to request assistance against India.</td>
<td>Neither China nor Indonesia is known to have provided Pakistan with aircraft, arms, or other military materiel during the fighting in September. Indonesia may have planned to donate some aid in mid-September when Djakarta requested and was granted permission for military aircraft to transit that country en route to Pakistan. First round trip coincides with Peking's 16 September ultimatum that India withdraw within three days unless termination of Chinese side of the Sino-Indian border or a cease-fire was observed. Second flight coincides with Peking's extension of its ultimatum on 19 September. Chinese officials may have been alerted to the fact that Pakistan was seriously considering accepting a UN-sponsored cease-fire resolution and decided to lessen pressure along the Sino-Indian border. Third trip made after Peking retracted its ultimatum on 22 September and the Indian-Pakistani cease-fire became effective on the 23rd. Pakistan probably utilized its future political tactics on Kamar and discussed other aspects of the cease-fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15, 19, and 23 September</td>
<td>FIA DOING 720B</td>
<td>Karachi to Canton, three round trips via northern Himalayan route.</td>
<td>Passengers unknown. Mission possibly involved consultations relating to the Chinese threat against India along the Himalayan frontier.</td>
<td>Parshuram later told the Indian ambassador in Karachi that 23 flights had met the following: (1) an offer of a temporary base supply of “munitions”, (2) the showing of late-model medium-range and MiG jet fighter factories, and (3) exploratory talks on building a tank factory in Pakistan. The frequency of flights within a short time suggests that Pakistan quietly accepted Peking’s offer of military supplies. The Chinese “missions” may have been composed of ammunition, small arms or both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>FIA DOING 720B</td>
<td>Karachi to Pekin via northern Himalayan route, returned to Karachi on 11 October</td>
<td>Pakistani delegation led by commerce minister and presidential defence advisor Ghulam Farooq and Asghar Khan, defense talks in addition to advanced mission of representing Pakistan at 1 October Chinese celebration.</td>
<td>“Missions” later told the Indian ambassador in Karachi that 23 flights had met the following: (1) an offer of a temporary base supply of “munitions”, (2) the showing of late-model medium-range and MiG jet fighter factories, and (3) exploratory talks on building a tank factory in Pakistan. The frequency of flights within a short time suggests that Pakistan quietly accepted Peking’s offer of military supplies. The Chinese “missions” may have been composed of ammunition, small arms or both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-12 October</td>
<td>FIA DOING 720B</td>
<td>Peshawar to Canton, round trip via northern Himalayan route. Two aircraft made a total of seven flights during the week.</td>
<td>Passengers unknown. Chindori military cargo believed to have been transported to Pakistan.</td>
<td>“Missions” later told the Indian ambassador in Karachi that 23 flights had met the following: (1) an offer of a temporary base supply of “munitions”, (2) the showing of late-model medium-range and MiG jet fighter factories, and (3) exploratory talks on building a tank factory in Pakistan. The frequency of flights within a short time suggests that Pakistan quietly accepted Peking’s offer of military supplies. The Chinese “missions” may have been composed of ammunition, small arms or both.</td>
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**Pakistan International Airlines**
SUPPLEMENT

PAKISTANI FLIGHTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI CONFLICT

At least some of the special Pakistani civil air flights to China in September and October -- during and immediately after the Kashmir conflict -- were probably associated with military cooperation against India, the donation of token amounts of Chinese munitions, and the provision of a safe haven for certain aircraft.

A Pakistani delegation secretly visited Peiping in search of military assistance in early September, and special missions during the middle of the month may have been connected with consultations about military measures against India, especially along the Himalayan frontier. Another delegation went to Peiping at the end of September as part of the intensive search for materiel that began immediately after the cease fire. According to intercepted messages, this group investigated Chinese tank and MIG fighter production facilities as potential sources of supply and obtained an offer of a limited amount of free "munitions." The final series of covert flights during a one-week period in early October may have transported Chinese military cargo -- ammunition or small arms -- to Pakistan.

Regularly scheduled civil air flights to Canton were resumed on 29 September.

Peiping is probably unable or unwilling to provide Pakistan with enough materiel to replenish its stocks immediately, but Pakistan may make limited purchases in China soon. Pakistan would prefer military self-sufficiency; in lieu of that, however, it will avoid putting all its "eggs in one basket" -- the US -- as it does now by procuring large quantities of Chinese hardware (see map overleaf). (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM)