Some Argentine Air Force (ARCAF) NCO's and younger officers are expressing resentment and discontent with the impact of security operations on the normal mission of their service. Additionally, resentment is also being felt from this same group in regard to the apparent dual standards of institutional discipline.
22. DETAILS: 1. (C/NOFORN)

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

...the primacy of security and counter-subversive activities over the normal mission of ARGAF units is having a debilitating effect on operational capability and causing resentment. Counter subversive operations have priority over normal unit tasks and take about one-third of NCO's and officers of all ranks below Comodoro (O-6) away from their jobs. Maintenance capability has been seriously affected, with a concomitant loss in operational capability. This second priority position of the unit's normal mission is causing a morale problem among all grades, according to Source B and C. In addition, as a result of several cases of Montenero infiltrating the ARGAF through the draft system, conscripts are no longer permitted to work in the HQ building, do guard duty at the ARGAF units, or work in any of the principal buildings of the units. The policy has resulted in NCO's being used for guard duty and menial support tasks in the HQ and the units. Source A stated that this practice caused the NCO's at the 1st Air Brigade, El Palomar (26548-6436W) to confront the commander there, and request that junior officers also be assigned to guard duty. The NCO request was granted: young officers, primarily from the professional services (doctors, lawyers, technicians) have been observed on guard duty there.

2. (C/NOFORN) Source B, in referring to several events, such as the bombing of the ARGAF HQ (See IR - ) , the ALUAR case (See IR - ) and the mini-revolt in December 1973, stated that many officers in the middle grades (Major to junior O-6) are dissatisfied with the implied dual standards of institutional discipline. According to Source B, senior Comodoros (O-6) and Brigadiers are not held accountable for their transgressions in the same manner other officers are. As a specific case Source B said that the possible linkage of Brig. SAVIGLIANO's children with subversive groups has not caused his retirement, but in cases of less senior officers, it has. In the case of Brig. PALAZUELOS, whose daughter placed a bomb in his office (See IR - ) , Source B said that information concerning the daughter's possible connection with the Montoneros was presented about a year ago, but nothing was done because of his rank. Brig. CAPELLINI, who lead the unsuccessful mini-revolt against ARGAF leadership in Dec 1975, is still on active duty. This fact, according to Source B and C, demonstrates that a Brigadier can defy his superiors and stay on active duty, while more junior officers have been placed in custody and removed from the service for lesser offenses.

3. (C/NOFORN) Source B then referred to the ongoing GRAIVER and ALUAR cases. He said it is common knowledge in the ARGAF that several active duty Brigadiers are "crooks" (ladrones) and "smugglers" (contrabandistas). When pressed for actual names and criminal acts, Source B explained himself by...
naming those Brigadiers he considered to be honest and above suspicion: i.e. Brig. AGOSTI (CINC), Brig CABRERA (Commander, Personnel Command), and Brig. DAMIANOVICH (Judge Advocate General). The implication was that all other Brigadiers are supposed to have tainted records. Source B then said that most of the younger officers concerned with institutional discipline and professional integrity look to Brig. CABRERA as their leadership example, and future CINC.

COMMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424 hearing rumors on low level resentment/discontent among some sectors of ARGAF for sometime. These are the first substantial accounts of what is bothering the NCO's and the middle grade officers. The ARGAF plays a secondary, supportive role in the armed forces' battle against subversion. Participation is limited to maintaining an aircraft on alert at each unit/base, and providing ground patrols and intelligence operations. In the meantime, the institution's principal mission-aircraft operations-takes a secondary role. The initial threat of subversion justified the diversion of effort, but the GOA success in this area has apparently caused some ARGAF people, particularly those in units, to question whether the primacy of the counter-subversive mission is still valid for the Air Force. Corruption has long been an accepted way of doing business in government and out. The armed forces objective of cleaning out corruption and holding government officials responsible for their actions, as evidenced by the GRAIVER and ALUAR cases, is being taken at face value by many officers in the ARGAF. They feel that institutional discipline should be applied equally to all, to cleanse the ARGAF. ___________ considers the resentment/discontent reported by these sources to be more substantive than normal barracks griping; however, not of a magnitude sufficient to cause an immediate challenge to the incumbent leadership. As the national reorganization process continues and the subversives threat declines through the rest of this year, the ARGAF leadership may, however, sense a limit to its freedom of options in promotions for senior officers and continued support for a massive counter-subversive campaign.