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13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. SOURCE: AMEMBASSY

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

16. SUMMARY:

(U) This IR forwards a captured Montonero document that outlines terrorist activities in the greater Buenos Aires area for the period July-September 1977.

17. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA (original)
DIA/DS-6A
USCINCSO w/o encl

18. DOWNGRADE AND DECLASSIFIED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

19. N DATES:

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Office
Date: Oct 18, 2018

20. ENCLOSES:

1. Montonero Subversive Document, 1 Cy, 30 pgs

(c)

REQUEST ENCL(S) FROM RDS-4

2. Translation of Excerpt #1 (2N 183-78)

30 pgs. Conf.

21. This IR contains 2 pages.
22. DETAILS: (C) The enclosed document was captured by Argentine Security forces and provided to U.S. Embassy personnel. Although, it is a very poor copy, sufficient information can be gleaned from it to obtain an appreciation of the objectives and operational methods of the Montoneros. The terrorist bulletin was produced by the guerrillas operating in the Federal Capital Zone and reportedly is the first of its kind. The 57 page document consists of four parts and addresses a variety of terrorists activities. Part I, consisting of 25 pages deals with the Montonero Party while the second, (19 pages) outlines activities to be directed at various sectors of the population such as students, unions, etc. The third section (8 pages) discusses Montonero military activity and the last part (14 pages) treats the terrorist's propaganda arm.

COMMENT: (C) The Montonero document provides an insight to terrorist capabilities. It demonstrates, if nothing else, that there are still a few terrorists around and they still think "big." It is doubtful that they will be able to carry out their activities to the extent outlined. The government is keeping pressure on them and will probably continue so long as the guerrillas maintain any capability whatsoever.
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**ENGLISH TITLE OF TRANSLATION**

Area Bulletin of the Montonero Party

**FOREIGN TITLE OF TRANSLATION**

Venceremos Montoneros - Boletin Zonal del Artido Mononero, Federal Capital Area

**AUTHOR(S)**

Unknown

**FOREIGN TITLE OF DOCUMENT** (Complete only if different from title of translation)

Unknown

**PUBLISHER**

Unknown

**DATE AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION**

Unknown

**COMMENTS**

See attached material

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Date: Oct 18, 2018

Confidential

ENCL # 2 (b)(3):10 USC 424
AREA BULLETIN OF THE
MONTONERO PARTY

Federal Capital Area

Official Organ of the Montonero Party in the Federal Capital

AGENDA:

EDITORIAL
QUARTERLY PLAN FOR THE MONTONERO PARTY IN THE AREA
QUARTERLY PLAN FOR THE POLITICAL SECRETARYSHIP IN THE AREA
QUARTERLY PLAN FOR THE MILITARY SECRETARYSHIP IN THE AREA
QUARTERLY PLAN FOR THE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA SECRETARYSHIP IN THE AREA

(ILLEGIBLE) OF THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE

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Date: Oct 18, 2016

(b)(3):10 USC 424
We dedicate this first edition of the Area Bulletin to all those comrades who, with conscience, uprightness, and revolutionary consistency, gave their all for the triumph of the people's struggle, to resist this bloody dictatorship, to build our Montonero Party.

In the names of some of these comrades fallen recently in our area, we remember today the heroic struggle of all our people.

**COMRADES:** 
"NEGRITA" AND "EMILIO", "GALLO", "ANGEL", "QUI- (ILLEGIBLE) OSATINSKY", "MANOLO", "ENRIQUE".

**REMEMBER!**

**ALWAYS UNTIL VICTORY!**

**MONTONEROS TO THE DEATH!**

**LIBERATION**
**OR**
**DEPENDENCY**

**FATHERLAND**
**OR**
**DEATH**

**WE SHALL OVERCOME!**
What is the Area Bulletin and what purpose should it serve?

This Bulletin is the principal instrument for solidary political leadership of the General Secretariat in the Area.

Through this Bulletin the Secretariat imparts the principal directives for the entire force which are the adaptation to the (ILLEGIBLE) of the Montonero Party's power policy.

Through this Bulletin, the Secretariat synthesizes the evaluation (ILLEGIBLE) practice of all party forces, taking as its principal reference the results of that collective practice among the workers and people of the Capital. It also evaluates the directives of the Secretariat in the light of the mass results. Finally, (ILLEGIBLE) evaluation of the overall practices and directives, the Secretariat synthesizes new political directives for action, taking into account the situations which present themselves and the national policies of the Montonero Party.

Through this Bulletin the Secretariat socializes all directives for the group, and not only those intended for the specialized practice of each cadre. It also socializes information referring to mass activity and to production of the Montonero Party, the Peronist Montonero movement, and the Montonero Army.

Through this Bulletin the Secretariat makes known the most critical contributions brought about by the comrades, selecting them as a function of their value in advancing mass action and in building the Montonero Party and the Peronist Montonero Movement as (ILLEGIBLE) of power of the workers and people.

This Bulletin is, then, an instrument for participation by the group, since within it are synthesized the experience of the group in directives for action and the principal contributions of the entire Party force.

1.7 This Bulletin is, in synthesis, the principal area instrument (ILLEGIBLE) political homogenization of the Party with regard to (ILLEGIBLE) action.

2. What this Area Bulletin will contain.

2.1. The Bulletin will contain evaluations of the (ILLEGIBLE) practice and of the directives which governed those practices.

2.2. It will contain the Secretariat's plans of action and of each (ILLEGIBLE) which are the central directives of the Montonero Party in the (ILLEGIBLE).
2.3. It will contain information on mass activity and on (ILLEGIBLE) of the Montonero Party, the Peronist Montonero Movement and the Montonero Army in the Area. This information will come from the (ILLEGIBLE) that each sphere and Secretaryship must develop for knowledge of (ILLEGIBLE) Secretariat. Also from these parties we shall take contributions and (ILLEGIBLE) from comrades or spheres.

3. To whom the Bulletin will be directed and how it will be produced.

3.1. It will be directed towards those comrades in the Groups. These (ILLEGIBLE) thus because although it is primarily addressed to the Party force (ILLEGIBLE) it is in the Groups where a good part of our future cadres (ILLEGIBLE). Furthermore, because in this way the Secretariats will be able to arrive (ILLEGIBLE) with the synthesis of the general directives of the Party (ILLEGIBLE) to the Movement's better cadres, stimulating initiative and autonomy and advancing in their training as future cadres of the Party. In this way we shall also take account of the experience and Party Directives before them in the (ILLEGIBLE).

3.2. The Area Bulletin will be quarterly, following the rhythms of (ILLEGIBLE) and evaluation of what has been produced. There may be special editions (ILLEGIBLE) example the issue which we shall dedicate to disseminate the (ILLEGIBLE) proposal.

The Bulletin will be centrally printed by the (ILLEGIBLE) and Propaganda Secretaryship.

(ILLEGIBLE) limitations of this first edition of the Area Bulletin.

As will be seen, this edition will be rather incomplete with respect to the (ILLEGAL). It will not have mass information nor production and will lack previous (ILLEGIBLE). This is due to the crisis situation (ILLEGIBLE) the Area as the destruction of the former Secretariat.

(ILLEGIBLE) members of this new Secretariat we have preferred, nevertheless, to quickly produce this first issue only with the plans of action to provide an immediate answer to the basic problem: orienting the mass (ILLEGIBLE) of the Montonero Party and the Montonero Army. We believe this justifies not having postponed even for a moment the appearance of this (ILLEGIBLE) or Party political leadership which the Bulletin must be. In the next issue we shall be able to count on the evaluation of what was achieved in (ILLEGIBLE) and with mass and production information. As regards this point of information we wish to stress the importance and (ILLEGIBLE) the importance of the ordered contribution of all comrades so as to be able to measure more objectively, i.e., in mass results, our (ILLEGIBLE) and mistakes and thus be able to adjust more our plans of action to the needs of the workers and people of the Capital.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CAPITAL AREA: FELIPE LARROQUE

LIBERATION OR DEPENDENCY  WE SHALL OVERCOME!
FATHERLAND OR DEATH
LET US TODAY FILL OUR ROLE AS VANGUARD: LET US BUILD
THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE MASSES AND OF THE PERONIST
MONTONERO MOVEMENT

July-September Quarterly Plan for the MP of the Capital Area

I-INTRODUCTION:

The recent deaths and the betrayal of the ex-Secretary General of
the MP in the Area have dealt a hard blow for our (ILLEGIBLE). The
circular produced immediately by those comrades who (ILLEGIBLE)-ly
assumed leadership of the Area bears witness to the (ILLEGIBLE) that
we have had, correctly analyzes the implications of these (ILLEGIBLE)
especially of the betrayal of the ex-Secretary General (ILLEGIBLE)
and points up the first work directives. This is an (ILLEGIBLE)
correct initiative which we must continue and deepen.

Now that the Area Secretariat has been rebuilt, we need to deepen
and develop some of these points and, especially, in reference to the
plan of action for the next quarter. This plan of action must meet
the central problem: to push the mass policy (ILLEGIBLE) the Area
and overcome the root causes in this defeat (ILLEGIBLE) organizational
(ILLEGIBLE) that we have suffered.

What is this root problem which allows (ILLEGIBLE) such a hard
blow? The problem is political: 1- lack of confidence (ILLEGIBLE)
triumph and 2- an entire organizational conception of leadership
(ILLEGIBLE) and party building. We shall analyze this latter point
further on. Let us now take a look at the first.

This involves the loss of confidence that our party can survive
this harsh enemy offensive and advance towards the (ILLEGIBLE) of
all workers and the people. This is not only (ILLEGIBLE) problem
which explains the betrayal of the ex- A.S.G. but rather it is (ILLE-
GIBLE) of an internist view which still predominates to a very large
extent (ILLEGIBLE) practice and thought of Party forces and even of
the (ILLEGIBLE)-pations.

WHEN THE ENEMY IS WEAK IS WHEN WE MUST ADVANCE.
THE IMPORTANT THING IS NOT THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL ACTION BE LARGE
OR IMPORTANT BUT RATHER THAT MANY ACTIONS BE CARRIED OUT.

We continue to analyze the survival possibilities (ILLEGIBLE)
as a function basically of the cadres who make them up and (ILLEGIBLE)
the general process of the masses and of the Party by the losses
(ILLEGIBLE) brought on by the enemy, and although this is necessary
to keep in mind (ILLEGIBLE) provide drastic solutions to the problem
the determining factor even (ILLEGIBLE) these solutions is provided
by the process of transforming the Peronist Movement which is given
in the growing (ILLEGIBLE) resistance. This resistance is qualitatively

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superior to all those known in the history of Peronism and the
P.M.M is (ILLEGIBLE), a synthesis, at the same time that it began
from a (ILLEGIBLE) transformation stage of the P.M.: the stage of
overcoming the (ILLEGIBLE) open (ILLEGIBLE) of Peronism with the
death of Peron and the betrayal of (ILLEGIBLE) Lopez Rega; the
stage of building a new (ILLEGIBLE) leadership of the masses, the
Peronist Montonero Movement.

And this is so because "the P.M.M. is the only political force
in the country that has a mass power policy, which the (ILLEGIBLE)
in the only existing mass action." (directives of the National Political
Secretaryship).

This is why we can say, without any equivocation, (ILLEGIBLE)
at this moment there are a great many more potential cadres for the
(ILLEGIBLE) outside it than within its ranks. And whether they are
cadres of the (ILLEGIBLE) depends on our policy.

Any comrade who has sounded out the status (ILLEGIBLE) knows that
this is rigorously true. And this is not by chance (ILLEGIBLE) iso-
lated facts, but a product of the transformation of Peronism (IL-
LEGIBLE) practice of resistance, this is a product of overcoming (IL-
LEGIBLE) crisis of Peronism within the framework of resistance stra-
 tegy (ILLEGIBLE) and pushed by the M.P. from the military coup on-
ward.

And this is what explains the fact that despite the very harsh
(ILLEGIBLE) that we have received, despite the betrayal of some (IL-
LEGIBLE) cadres within the M.P., there is no Area where they have
deprived us of our will to fight, there the forces of the Party are
not regenerated through the Movement, where our policy of power does
not continue being developed with ever more fullness and depth.

In summary, it is this transformation of the M.P., it is this
stalemat ing and overall deterioration of the enemy offensive across
the field of the people, it is having succeeded in imposing the
popular resistance strategy upon the short war which they wanted to
involve us in, which creates the determining conditions for the sur-
vival of the Party. And it is these conditions which we must take
correct advantage of, and we must guide ourselves through them so as
to find the solutions which reduce the rate of the casualties we
are suffering internally, which allow us to substitute for them and
even grow organizationally.

What is then the basic solution for overcoming the harsh blow
we have received in the Area?

LET US CONSTRUCT THE PERONIST MONTONERO MOVEMENT, A MASS
POLITICAL ORGANISM THROUGH WHICH THE MONTONERO PARTY PUSHES
ITS POLICIES TO ORGANIZE AND LEAD ALL POPULAR STRUGGLES.
It is not a question of our intending in the first place to overcome the political harm caused by the betrayal of the ex-A.S.G. and, prior to that, the betrayal of some other ex-comrades of the Party in the Area, developing a supposed internal ideological consolidation campaign. In the first place, the M.P. must exploit the aforementioned conditions. And this means pushing our mass policy essentially there where the workers are at the forefront of the resistance, developing a correct frontal vindicative policy, consolidating, winning, or generating authentic mass organizations, so as to expand our political space. In concrete terms: to expand and deepen the resistance, launching the P.M.M. in this setting and SPREADING its PROGRAM.

In the wisdom of this policy, which can only be measured through mass representativity, will lie the key to internal consolidation of our forces, to the regeneration of our forces. There, in the autonomy and initiative of the cadres, we shall objectively measure who merits being Party cadres and who does not, whether they are in its ranks today or not. In the mass results of the lineaments established we shall measure the wisdom or error of this leadership.

This is the only revolutionary path for overcoming the political harm caused by the betrayal of the ex-A.S.G. and that of some other ex-comrades. This is the only means of being faithful to the heroic example of so many comrades in the Area who have sacrificed themselves to the death to push this path of popular resistance, along which the certainty of final triumph today sits and becomes clear.

II.-PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE AREA:

Now that the Secretariat has been rebuilt and as a result of the foregoing, the first task which we propose for ourselves is a quarterly plan of action. We are conscious of the fact that this first plan will have many limitations, first because of the break in leadership continuity due to the emergency undergone, and second because of the partial lack of a balance sheet of what has been achieved, learned and assimilated by the entire force, and third but fundamentally, because of the insufficient development of an area war hypothesis which will allow us to concentrate the efforts of all the secretariats in the same direction.

We shall go about overcoming these limitations in the overall practice within the lineaments of this plan and in the evaluation of what has been done and synthesis of a new plan which we shall develop at the end of the quarter.

The central objective of this first plan will be to continue concentrating the effort of the entire Party behind some central political axes, without regard to secretariatship, since each one of them must develop the same and single power policy by distinctive methods (politicians, propagandists, and military personnel), adapting that power policy to the means with which it is developed.
Therefore, these central axes will be the basis on which each Secretary develops his own plan. And the ensemble of these materials plus information on the experience achieved will constitute Area Bulletin No. 1 which should become familiar to the entire party force. In this way each Party cadre will first become familiar with the general plan and that of his secretaryship (so as to gain time in the execution of policies), but then, with the Area Bulletin, will have an overall view of all Party structures in the Area.

Mass situation in the Area and nationally:

In the Area at the present time we lack a true and precise knowledge of the status of the workers in the unions of principal factories. We only have a general and fragmentary view of how resistance is spreading. This is principally a product of the emergency situation we have lived through. But it is also a product, and this is the most important thing, of not having clearly defined what are the most important working sectors for a revolutionary strategy, both in terms of weight in the production structure and their experience in the struggle. This, which in short means sowing the seeds of an Area power hypothesis, will be the next task which the Secretariat must confer about with the contributions of all comrades. We do not intend a scientifically perfect effort but simply to approach a hypothesis in its central axes which will allow us to unite all the efforts of the Party in one direction, with the result of the greatest possible accumulation of power. With experience we shall go about verifying the correctness of this hypothesis, and we shall continue to improve it.

For now, we shall move within the state or service unions where electrical workers, telephone workers, dockers and railway workers are in the forefront, and especially because of the unity and combativeness they have demonstrated, the first-mentioned.

Within the production unions there are mechanics and in second place metallurgists, and some large textile factories and food services.

LET US CONCENTRATE THE ENTIRE STRENGTH OF THE PARTY IN THE AREA BEHIND SOME CENTRAL POLITICAL AXES, WITHOUT REGARD TO SECRETARYSHIP, SINCE EACH ONE OF THEM MUST DEVELOP THE SAME AND SINGLE POWER POLICY THROUGH DISTINCT MEANS (POLITICISTS, PROPAGANDISTS, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL), ADAPTING THAT POWER POLICY TO THE MEANS USED TO DEVELOP IT.
This simple listing brings us to the question of what was the Party's participation in these conflicts. The answer, as we all know, is that it was insufficient, and in some cases nil, which shows us the principal limitation that we must overcome. Furthermore, we cannot forget, while making our prioritization, that the conflicts within many of these unions had not only area importance but national as well. Thus the GM conflict of July-August 1976 was one of the beginnings of the conflict within the mechanics' union at a national level, and furthermore it was one of the most combative conflicts in the union, to the extent that the government had to intercede directly in the plant with the Labor Minister himself. This was the first serious setback for the dictatorship; then, in September, it was the metallurgists, but with a greater degree of dispersal, and finally at the start of this year the electric utility workers checkmated the entire offensive of the dictatorship. On the other hand, textiles and food had a basically area significance.

Therefore, the priority for all Party cadres this quarter, under whatever secretaryship they may be, will be to succeed in getting a foothold in the unions we shall mention below, so as to know the present status of their struggles and be able to define the vindicative policies and more precise union policies, fixing on that base the mass policy of the P.M.M.

Priority, then, goes to the following unions: in service, Light and Power, telephone, dockers workers, and railways; in production: mechanics and metallurgists.

Priorities on other fronts, all secondary with respect to the aforementioned unions, will be: MIP territorial and the JUP and the UES.

Within the national resistance framework, National Internal Bulletin No. 3 gives us an idea, although fragmentary, of how it continues to grow in breadth and depth, despite the news blackout that the enemy has imposed on it. Recently even the newspapers have picked up on conflicts in the most important Rosario tractor factories where important partial conquests were made: in the western area the same is happening in the Winco metallurgical factory, also with positive results; and in the south the Peugeot conflict is flaring up again without yet having come to a resolution. And the list would be endless.

It is also necessary to take into account that all these struggles, in general partially won, have mostly taken a high toll in dismissals, kidnappings and assassinations. Although this has shown itself useless to attempt to brake the rising resistance process, we must keep it in mind so as to reduce its costs and increase the political erosion of the enemy.

THE PEOPLE GIVE NO RESPITE. THE POPULAR RESISTANCE IMPOSES ITS OWN STRATEGY.
Everything points to the fact that this second half of the year will mark an even greater advance in the resistance, both in quality and in quantity. The policy of maintaining salaries rigidly frozen, the definitions which will be produced with the Professional Associations Act, and the contamination of the rationalization process of the state apparatus, point to a sharpening of the social and union situation of the workers.

It is this situation which principally explains the progressive isolation of the military government and the crossing over to the opposition of all national forces, and the contradictions even with the monopoly groups and with sectors of the oligarchy. There is no other explanation for the declaration of the episcopate, of the radicals, the engineers, the union leadership in refusing to go to the OTT, the gray Peronists (Robledo, Luder, Catex, etc.) and the progress of the proposal to create a civic front pushed by the Christian Democrats, and supported by the radicals, socialists, gray Peronism, and the communists.

This is the framework which creates optimum conditions for the P.M.M. to transform itself into a national political reference for the masses, thus opening up the decisive stage in the transformation of the Peronist Movement.

It is for this reason that the basic role of the M.P. has ceased being, at this time, that of bearing on its own shoulders the weight of the resistance tasks (as was happening in the first six months under military dictatorship), and its role has now gone on to be that of pushing autonomous construction of the principal tool for the counteroffensive: THE PERONIST MONTONERO MOVEMENT. Fulfilling its role as a vanguard is today for the Party to place the axis of mass political conviction in the P.M.M. Placing the Party effort by generating it in the most important working sectors in each area, i.e., where the resistance has created the best conditions for its development.

THE BASIC ROLE OF THE MONTONERO PARTY HAS CEASED BEING, AT THIS TIME, THAT OF BEARING ON ITS OWN SHOULDERS THE WEIGHT OF THE RESISTANCE TASKS, AND ITS ROLE HAS NOW GONE ON TO THAT OF PUSHING AUTONOMOUS CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRINCIPAL TOOL FOR THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE: THE PERONIST MONTONERO MOVEMENT.
The enemy's situation:

The enemy's resistance mentioned in the foregoing section demonstrates the failure of his policy of trying to brake it through terror, the failure of his economic policy, not having succeeded in annihilating the M.P. despite the harsh blows received, in short the people's faction having succeeded in imposing its strategy of resistance and erosion, overcoming that of short war which was the only trump card the dictatorship had, mark the state of standstill of the enemy offensive, despite the fact that military pressure is being hardened on the M.P. and the M.E.

These are the facts which explain the worsening in internal contradictions which will be changed into antagonistic contradictions with the generalization of the conflicts and their deepening within the framework of this unsolvable economic crisis.

These contradictions are being accentuated with his internal and international political isolation, and above all because it cannot be avoided that Peronism overcomes its crisis and starts to transform itself and synthesize a new power strategy.

The present force relationship:

It is for this reason that we find ourselves next to the point of detaining the enemy offensive against the people's faction and its subsequent crossover to a counteroffensive (we must remember that the counteroffensive is the final stage in the strategic defensive).

Now, this means that placing the propagandizing of the P.M.M. directives as the central task of the Party is not just another quantitative fact, it is not just to hierarchize the propaganda, it is to begin leading the masses by means of propaganda. And by means of propaganda we will organize the P.M.M in this stage. In other words, the P.M.M. must bear the central weight in leading the masses. Be at the head of the resistance. And the Party will make every effort to actualize this as quickly as possible. Its role is to shorten this transition. When this is achieved, the Party must prudently regulate its activity. Nothing any longer justifies voluntarism, activism.

Today the Party doesn't have to guide anything; the resistance is on an ascending march. Today we have to set up a new objective which will allow it to take a great leap forward as a leadership unit: the P.M.M. To take a step forward today for the Party is to kick off the construction of the P.M.M; to continue placing the center of resistance and mass leadership activity in the Party is not to take that step forward. As it says in the circular produced by the area provisional leadership: "The P.M.M. today fills a fundamental role. The P.M.M. is the political organization of the masses through which the Party pushes its policies to organize and lead all popular struggles." And further

WHEN THE ENEMY IS WEAK IS WHEN WE MUST ADVANCE. THE IMPORTANT THING IS NOT THAT EVERY INDIVIDUAL ACTION BE LARGE AND IMPORTANT BUT THAT THERE BE MANY ACTIONS.
on: "The P.M.M. is going to be our principal organizing weapon; both the Party and the Army will develop within it..." Hence the importance of representativity of the first provisional delegates of the P.M.M. in the area. Only by incorporating ourselves into a representative sample of the best cadres of Peronism will the P.M.M. have its own autonomous life.

Central directives for the entire M.P. in the Area:

1. Diffusion of the P.M.M.

In this quarter we must reach at least 50,000 people with the struggle program of the P.M.M. (the eight p-ints). This means producing at least 100,000 fliers with these eight points and adding to them the adherence and support of the Party and its Groups.

For this purpose the Party will take out a single flier of the eight points with its own adherence and each Group will do the same: the C.G.T in the resistance for the union front, Authentic Peronism Groups in the field, J.P. and M.I.P. Evita Gr., Peronist Town Movement, Peronist University Youth, and U.E.S on the student front.

The Party will produce 40,000 fliers of its own and the Groups will produce the other 60,000. Half of these fliers will be directed to the union front for which purpose the territory will contribute to production and distribution on this front.

Additionally, a minimum of 10,000 complete declarations by the P.M.M. will be produced which will also be 50% directed to the union front.

All secretaryships will be involved in this propagandizing task, utilizing the centralized production of the Press Secretary and stencils which it provides, and the production of each secretaryship.

Within the union front, propagandizing priorities will be ruled by the abovementioned unions as priority ones: service unions: Light and Power, telephone, dock workers and railway workers, and among production unions, Mechanics and Metallurgists.

On the territorial front, priority will be given to the western and souther areas, then the northern and eastern area and finally the student front with priority in the university front.

The Political Secretary will be the one principally charged with clarifying these priorities and organizing their execution. The Military and Press Secretaries will distribute the Party adherence flier (Military 20,000, and Press 20,000) directing them first to the union front.

Furthermore, all secretaryships will push a painting campaign with
the following central slogans: "To resist is to overcome" P.M.M.; "All Peronism in the Peronist Montonero Movement" P.M.M.; "C.G.T. Authentic. C.G.T. in the resistance" P.M.M.; "Firmenich and Bidegain lead the resistance" P.M.M.; "Firmenich, O. Cano, Galimberti, etc. lead the resistance" P.M.M.

2. Diffusion of the C.G.T. in the resistance:

We must push the propagandizing of the C.G.T. in the resistance, its directives for the resistance and its program. This means developing the C.G.T. as a union political reference point within the area to push the development of legal and clandestine mass organizations depending on the union, factory, etc. Let us not think, then, of the C.G.T.A. as an organic officering instrument but rather as a mass leadership instrument on the vindicative and union political plane.

It is really a question of capitalizing on leadership as the central correct idea of the C.G.T.A. which was to have pushed resistance as its strategy, which was embraced by the majority of the working class, beyond the fact that this did not respond to its direct leadership.

LET US CONTINUE FIRING. LET US FORCE THE HAND THAT BEGINS TO WEAKEN.

The central responsibility in this stage will fall to the Political Secretaryship which will be supported by the organizing quality (ILLEGIBLE) textiles and food (ILLEGIBLE) other superstructures (ILLEGIBLE) for the production of a sheet by the C.G.T.A. with directives and information about the resistance. Despite the organizing reality with which it will share, the principal distribution effort will be made in the state and production unions already mentioned as having priority.


During this week a central propaganda task will be carried out along with a secondary militia activity.

The propaganda task will revolve around the installation of little altars with photos of Evita, masses in memorium for Evita and all fallen fighters. The propaganda materials will be the P.M.M. fliers.

The militia activities will be carried out with total autonomy and with the resources that each Group may have or may be able to obtain or manufacture; coordination in resolving these needs between groups or with party structures is totally prohibited.

The objectives of these actions will be: 1. Anti-boss and anti-oligarchy and 2. Antirepressive. The former will have priority. In saying "antiboss" we refer to foreign monopoly employers, their procurators and their institutions and installations. There will be no indiscriminate attacks on movie theaters, nightclubs, communications media, etc.
The propaganda for these actions will be signed as Militia of the P.M.M. and will propagandize the eight points of the P.M.M. The actions will seek the participation of the greatest possible number of comrades (although only a few may participate in each action, in many cases), i.e., mass actions, rather than raising the violence level, thus impeding the participation of many comrades who are not in a position to take it on.

For the future, the Military Secretary will carry out these directives which make up militia strategy and tactics as a way of assuming leadership of all military activity in the Movement. This leadership will not be direct over the militia operations, since it is the responsibility of the Political Secretary and of the Groups not to offer those elements which make up their strategy and their tactics, the logistical and information techniques. This will not be done for the week of July 26 because it is beyond our capabilities.

(ILLEGIBLE)

1. Political Secretaryship

Obviously the diffusion of the P.M.M. on all fronts will be the central task. For this purpose it will name provisional delegates on the various fronts, making this the crux of its representativity. They will remain apart from the various organizational forms with which they carry out their functions, which are: a) to disseminate, reproduce and circulate the directives of the P.M.M. on their fronts. b) to generate their own ways of multiplying this dissemination (roasts, etc.). c) to maintain relations with the national leadership of the P.M.M.

In the second place, it must push development of the C.G.T.R. as the area referent in mass leadership in union policy, doing this especially in the priority unions. The launching of a C.G.T.R. Leaflet will be basic in accomplishing assignment.

The objective we wish to reach during the quarter in the four unions defined as priority within the state unions and production unions is to succeed in getting a foothold in them, establishing relations with representative comrades so as to obtain exact knowledge of the concrete reasons why they are in condition to fight or are already fighting, to know their state of mind, state of conflicts, etc. In this way, for the next quarter we shall be in a position to define and push a vindicative union proposal adjusted to the situation of each union.

For the time being, the general proposals with which we shall undertake this assignment are: 1- maintenance of the Professional Associations Act and union legality, i.e., return of the unions to the workers.
2- Specific salary claims
3- Suppression of the hunger policy of (ILLEGIBLE) de Hoz.
4- Union unity against the dictatorship, leaving aside old confrontations while all efforts are directed at carry out the resistance.

In organizational politics, the central objective is to succeed in pressuring or forming truly representative mass organizations for each factory, plant, etc., making maximum use of every legal chink.

The central assignment methodology will be to find the minimum vindicating and union objectives which mobilize and do not partisanize the struggle, allow us to win union representativity, pressure the internal bureaucratic or vacillating committees, succeed in winning them over or incorporating their best cadres into a truly representative organization.

The priorities set should not make us lose initiative in the face of any major conflict which might arise. In these cases, the comrades of the Party and of the Groups will act with total autonomy.

The territorial front: in addition to contributing to the union front in the P.M.M.'s propagandizing tasks in the search for contacts inside the priority unions, it will have as its own objectives:

1- Building the P.M.M. as mass leader through dissemination of its directives. Designation of delegates.
2- Development of solidarity organizations.
3- Development of mass organizations or insinuation into already existing ones through concrete vindications in each area.

For the M.I.P. the political objectives are identical, and within the vindicative specifics of the front it will form Committees of Tenenats in the Resistance and will try to generate a legal mass organization to carry out denunciations of their situation in all official areas, the press, etc.

We plan the same for the Peronist Town Movement, placing the vindicative core on the development of legal mass organizations to confront the plan for evictions through fire by the military government.

In the P.U.Y we shall push creation of Resistance Centers on the basis of the struggle against the repressive policy of the universities, the legality of the student union organization, the suppression of a reactionary educational policy, and connection with all popular struggles.

For this purpose we shall formulate a broad alliance policy and we shall reduce to a minimum the existing Group forces, transferring them to other fronts, keeping in mind the fact of the mechanical nature of the P.U.Y. policy and the prevailing repressive situation.
In the U.E.S as on all fronts the political core will be the P.M.M., the struggle against repressive policy and the conscription of 18-year-olds.

2. Military Secretaryship:

The central policy of the M.A. is its military operations. The military attack lines will be 60% antiboss and antioligarchic and 40% antirepressive. But furthermore and fundamentally, there will be at least two propaganda operations for each attack carried out.

Of the antiboss and propaganda attacks, 50% will be directed against companies of Light and Power, Telephone, dockworkers and railway workers. The other 50% will be directed towards the foreign monopolistic mechanical and metallurgical firms.

As with all the secretaryships, the comrades of the M.A. will have autonomy for immediately meeting any important conflict which may be produced.

The M.A. must raise the quality of its operations during the quarter. This means: first, increasing the political adjustment of its operations to the overall objectives of the P.M.M. and the Party in the area. That is, concentrate its operations in the established proportions on the objectives defined above. So that this can really be accomplished, it will move forward in defining the union sector or the factory corresponding to each squad. The squads so distributed will try to settle into the area corresponding to these unions or factories, to make political contacts with their workers through propaganda, to obtain all operational information concerning infrastructure, etc., of the assigned area. Squad and factory must be a unit which will crystallize further on when the general political work in the priority spots allows us to incorporate workers into these squads.

Second, raising the quality means consolidating the military objective with propaganda. For this purpose there will be twenty thousand fliers for the P.M.M., 101,000 fliers propagandizing the activities of the M.A. The press solidarity will be consolidated for this.

Third, raising the quality means that it must reconstruct a logistical structure to prevent combat squads, currently reduced to scarce resources, from turning their operations into militia activity. Likewise, it will reconstruct an information structure.

Squad operations will be carried out unhesitatingly with full autonomy. For this purpose armaments will be suitably distributed among them, and the minimum logistical conditions indicated above will be created. For this purpose, each squad must construct its infrastructural rearguard in the Movement through political activity and secondly each soldier and each member of the Party must act indispensible. This rearguard not only will be infrastructural: the squads must obtain there everything that logistics cannot offer for the time being. Likewise, each squad must have an autonomous press production capacity in order to produce the fliers for each operation. The M.P.'s relation with the Movement will therefore be direct. And there it will have to continue carrying on recruitment.

3. Press Secretaryship

The central objective of this secretaryship will be to generate the conditions so that the M.P. and the Groups of the P.M.M. can produce their own press. For this purpose it will combine centralized production with the delivery of stencils and simple production techniques in the groups and squads of the M.A. The general trend must be decentralization of production, reducing centralized production of the materials of the M.P. The greatest difficulty which must be overcome to obtain these results will be guaranteeing distribution through the Movement, and, finally, of geography.

Here the responsibility of the other Secretaryships will be the determining factor.

As regards the quarterly tasks to meet these objectives, it must produce:

1- Sets of stencils for the other Secretaryships of the P.M.M. flier (eight points and adherence of the M.P.), of the complete declaration of the P.M.M., of the Montonero Evitas who may be going out, of News on the Resistance, and leaflets for July the 26th.

2- It will centrally print the greater part of the eight-point fliers, all the complete declarations of the P.M.M.; it will increase the quantity of Montonero Evitas printed in the area according to the plan which has now been set, and the same for the News on the Resistance.

As regards the priority propaganda tasks of the Secretaryship, it will direct them towards unions defined as priorities almost completely. The rest it will direct to the individual propaganda and political action task for the insertion of the M.P. press into the Movement.

As regards distribution, which we have already said is the central problem to be solved during the quarter, it must guarantee that: either distribution is through the Movement's mailboxes, or, in the final instance geographically, or nothing at all should be distributed. We shall not be able to do anything to suppress coordination and avoid exposure of comrades on the street of the Secretaryship does not comply strictly with this directive. Of course neither will there be press distribution through the Movement's mailboxes, or, in the final instance geographically, or nothing at all should be distributed. We shall not be able to do anything to suppress coordination and avoid exposure of comrades on the street of the Secretaryship does not comply strictly with this directive. Of course neither will there be press
in the other Secretaryships if they do not contribute a minimum of these mailboxes.

Party Construction Policy

Let us again take up here a problem pointed out in the introduction to this plan. We said in the introduction: "In summary, it is this transformation of the P.M., it is this stalemating and overall deterioration of the enemy offensive across the field of the people, it is having succeeded in imposing the popular resistance strategy upon the short war which they wanted to involve us in, which creates the determining conditions for the survival of the Party.

AS GENERAL PERON SAID: NO ARMY EVER OVERTHROW A PEOPLE; THEY WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO HUMBLE A PEOPLE FIGHTING FOR THEIR RIGHTS, TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST AGGRESSION.

What we shall attempt to establish is how to make correct use of these conditions which are determining today for the survival of the Montonero Party.

What are the causes explaining the organizational backsliding of the Party? This is the first question we must ask ourselves. On the one hand, the situation imposing the defensive strategy stage upon us, and on the other, our own mistakes. Towards the end of Isabelism and especially at the start of the military dictatorship this stage had placed us in a very difficult situation. The danger of the total offensive unleashed by the Armed Forces, the armed hand of the oligarchy and of imperialism, was not only its military potential but also the fact that this potential was released upon us in the midst of a profound crisis in Peronism.

Beyond our mistakes, which weigh heavily, it was these conditions of this stage which principally explain the organizational backsliding of the Party.

Today the situation is completely different: today it is our own mistakes and no longer the conditions of the stage which explain the fact that we continue backsliding instead of starting to grow organizationally. We already pointed out what these conditions were in the introduction. Let us add just three things:

1- There exists a political space among the people much larger than the one we are occupying.
2- A cadre regeneration process is being produced in the Movement as a fruit of this resistance which is going far beyond the relation the Party wants for the Movement.
3- The areas where most progress was made in modifying radically our entire organizational construction policy for the Party had their losses reduced to minimum levels (Rosario case).
What must we change to radically transform our organizational construction policy?

1- We must deepen the transformation of our leadership methodology. We cannot continue with organizationalist leadership, but rather lead with the press and propaganda as the main instrument. In the Area especially there is much to do in this field.

This plan, the Secretaryships' plans, the P.M.M. directives for mass political leadership, the Montonero Evitas, etc., are concrete steps in this direction.

2- We must deepen the change in party operational rhythms. In the Area, we shall make it three months between each party meeting at all levels. Supervision and review will not only cease being obligatory, but they must be made through reports, tape recordings, etc., but not as a way of summa-izing meetings.

3- We said that the political production unit must be each cadre in the Party. In the army, the unit is the squad or the sub-squad (two comrades). Nevertheless, in contradiction we also maintain the existence of Group Councils, and Group Sub-Councils. In practice we do everything the opposite of what we say. On the one hand there should be the minimal party cell: Official and Candidate, meeting every three months. To carry out the policies according to evaluation and plan formulated in this party meeting, the Council should not exist. The Official should directly lead an Area or Front; even the Second Official should do this, especially on the union front or in priority unions. Each Candidate does the same. There should not be an organizational pyramid through which the Official leads. And the same with the Groups. What we have today in general are true Groups, with exceptions. What we have in general today are three or four comrades through whom the Candidate leads. And this is also a mistake of the same type. Winning political space, spreading ourselves around, etc., means that each cadre we today refer to as Group must directly lead a sector of the neighborhood, or open up another, the same as the head of the Group, or the Candidate. This is exactly the same for union work. When does a Group exist? When there is a mass organization in which our current group members are representative and carry out political work with the best comrades of this mass organization.

THE WAR IS WON WHEN THE ENEMY LOSES THE WILL TO FIGHT, EITHER BECAUSE THE REAL POSITION OF INFERIORITY PREVENTS HIM FROM CONTINUING, OR BECAUSE HE IS CONVINCED HIS DEFEAT IS CERTAIN EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT SO OBJECTIVELY.

Only in this way will Party cadres be political production units; only in this way will they be representative; only in this way will we have P.M.M. Groups, and only in this way will we have an objective thrust for incorporating the most representative cadres of the Movement into the Party and for removing from the Party those who do not know how to win this representivity.
4- Each cadre of the Party who is in the Army or in the Press structure must have a principal function which is the one marked out for him by his specialization, and a secondary one which is to carry out some political task where he lives, works, etc. In this sense, specialization is not absolute for taking advantage of this political task and better develop as insiders the specialized principal task.

Nevertheless, this is not all that we have to change. This is what is already underway in the Party which we must rigorously put into practice. But there are other basic problems which we must resolve and which just recently we have set for ourselves:

1- Overcoming the conception of the Party as an organizational structure and seeing it as an instrument for political leadership.

We are to believe the Party exists when its structures function, when they are related, and the more, the better. And this is not so because it can function perfectly, but to have mistaken policies which lead to nothing. Of course there is always need for minimal functioning. And at this stage of harsh enemy military offensive against us, this internal functioning must be above minimal.

The Party exists when it has centralized leadership and a single power policy. This is the most basic part. And this is true at a national as well as area level.

Understanding this is of fundamental importance in correctly resolving, for example, the emergency situation which presents itself to us in the face of a fall, etc. The main thing is to remain with the masses, pushing this single power policy of the Party, and not stand by the Party seeking first of all organizational reenlistments which generally lead to new falls under these circumstances. Once the main thing is done (to continue producing), then enlistments will be sought slowly and calmly. We must overcome the profoundly mistaken notion that it is more important to remain enlisted in the Party than in the masses we are to lead.

Thus defining the Party by its centralized leadership and by the single power policy clearly defines for us the central internal task of organizational operation: a) homogenizing the force and b) homogenizing it along the general lines of action.

Life for the Party is then only the cell meeting every three months. At this meeting, in order to comply with what has been said, the Party's central materials should be discussed, along with evaluation of the facts and lines for future action. And nothing more. All other secondary problems which present themselves must be resolved through report circulation mechanisms, notes, etc.

2- Inductions policy. Here we must keep in mind two facts. That which we have already referred to, that right now there are more potential cadres outside the Party than within its ranks. And second, in order to change this situation we must radically modify the notion
we have of what is a Party cadre. Whoever has gained a fixed representation in the Movement, participating in acts of resistance, wants to be a Montonero, he must be a Party cadre. For this purpose we must provide ourselves with a specific policy along these lines. The head comrade of the Political Secretaryship will put out a primer which will serve as a discussion tool for the comrades we induct into the Party. We cannot continue handling things with elitist criteria which only favor comrades of petit bourgeois origin and which, even more seriously, do not allow the directing comrades who are generating the Movement at this stage of the resistance to be those who make up the Party.

3- Organizational techniques: Compartmentalization and Communications. We must take a great leap in these and understand that if, up to now, we have neglected them, it has been through immediatism and voluntarism, none of which is at all justified at the present stage. In summary, we must reach a higher clandestine level in our structures. It is not enough that a comrade's house is completely partitioned if he has several daily appointments which expose not only him but the entire structure to which he belongs. We must make it clear that the most vulnerable point we have today is in our communications and connections.

ALL PERONISM IN THE PERONIST MONTONERO MOVEMENT.

Some measures which each sector must redevelop are:
- To suppress all types of meetings with friends and family among comrades.
- Place the family nucleus into the same structure.
- Compartmentalize all comrade and infrastructure data, even the most minimal.
- Houses known by two comrades, aside from the ones in which they live, must be lifted within a period which will set the sector and which must not be greater than one month.
- Effect controls by decompartmentalization lines and not by area. Suppress daily controls of the sectors. Seek other means of liaison giving priority to the Movement's mailboxes.
- Double key system in communications: a comrade knows the way to contact another he wants to see, but not the time at which he will see him, which is known by a third. In summary: two comrades are needed to produce a meeting with a third.
- Communications between comrades of a single sector will be suppressed; only the chief will be able to call them together.
- Another central standard is reducing the number of communications to the minimum; therefore these must be given only once a month. The communication must be through reports and not personal chats. The mailboxes make these communications impersonal.
- Reduce to a minimum travel on the street. Not only for organizational tasks.
- Come to all rendezvous armed. Whatever the rendezvous may be. There must be no exceptions. Anyone without a gun buys a .22. The only exception is rendezvous outside the area.
- Live where we fight.

In summary, autonomy must be the norm for production, and communication must be minimal and must especially guarantee the information points of what has been produced and the mass situation, critical proposals, for leadership information.

Furthermore, the circulation of complementary directives, proposals, critiques, general reports, etc., for the information of subordinates.

To comply with this, the functions of each cadre must be clear along with the minimum organizational conditions he must have.

Functions: Each Party cadre must carry out a legal mass organization task, he must work, he must perform a political and propaganda, a paramilitary (if he is in the M.A. it will be military and priority) task, and a cadre training task to induct them into the Party.

Minimum organizational conditions: He must have access to the Party press with the general directives for each front, with ways of getting the national and area press, have a compartmentalized place to live, have elements for reproduction of the press, pass cassettes and the budget.

Finally, it should be added that all these changes will not come about without a clear political understanding of why they are the means for making use of the unimprovable mass conditions which we are encountering. There are no disciplinary or organizational measures which can guarantee this. At this stage sanctions are imposed by the enemy, and generally at the cost of a life. And only our mistakes can call final victory into doubt....

LIBERATION OR DEPENDENCY

FATHERLAND OR DEATH

WE SHALL OVERCOME!

FELIPE LARROQUE, CAPITAL AREA GENERAL SECRETARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
POLITICAL SECRETARYSHIP — CAPITAL

EMERGENCY PLAN (JULY TO SEPTEMBER, 1977)

This plan and all effort required to carry it forward we dedicate to the memory of our beloved comrade, Juan Carlos Chiocarello, First Montonero Official and head of the Capital Political Secretaryship. With the example of his leadership, we remember all those comrades of the Political Secretaryship who fell heroically.

COMRADE RAUL, REMEMBERED!

FOREVER UNTIL VICTORY!

I. OBJECTIVES:
1.1. PROPAGANDIZE THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVES OF THE P.M.M. AND CONTINUE PUSHING ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA.
1.2. PUSH THE C.G.T. IN THE RESISTANCE AS UNION POLITICAL REFERENT.
1.3. INTENSIFY PROPAGANDA AND TAKE MILITARY ACTIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ANNIVERSARY OF COMRADE EVITA: JULY 26.

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL POLICY AND FRONT POLICY
2.1. Unionwise
2.2. Territorywise
2.3. Studentwise

1.1.1. PROPAGANDIZATION OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVES OF THE P.M.M.
Concretely, this means that all comrades of the Secretaryship must use their efforts in mass political leadership through propaganda.

We must distribute 70,000 fliers on the Launching of the P.M.M. and accompany these with graffiti and wafers.

Of these 70,000 fliers, 10,000 will be signed by the Party and the remaining 60,000 by the Groups.

- Where to distribute them? Where the resistance events took place in the Capital: Light and Power, Railroads, Mechanical, Dock-workers, Metallurgists, and telephones, basically, and wherever a conflict arises.
- How? By hand, taking them into unions and factories, and where we can't do this, inundate the neighboring area with the Convocation and graffiti.

- Who? All comrades, regardless of their level.

- How many? Of the 60,000 for the Groups, the numbers are:

  30,000 fliers: union (J.P., Evita Gr., P.P.A.)
  20,000 " : territorial (M.I.P., M.V.P.)
  10,000 " : student (P.U.Y. and U.E.S.)

Of the Party's 10,000:

  8,000 fliers : territory (territory and union)
  2,000 " : student

Territory comrades will help meet the union quota, printing and distributing 20,000 union fliers. The other 10,000 are to be printed and distributed in the unions.

GRAFFITI: The core is the PERONIST MONTONERO MOVEMENT and the RESISTANCE.
ALL GRAFFITI WILL BE SIGNED BY THE P.M.M.
- "To Resist is to Overcome." P.M.M.
- "All Peronism within the P.M.M." P.M.M.
- "Authentic C.G.T., C.G.T. in the Resistance." P.M.M.
- "Firmenich and Bidegain lead the Resistance." P.M.M.
- "Firmenich and O. Cano lead the Resistance." P.M.M.
- "The Resistance will Overcome." P.M.M.

Rotate all the comrades of the Higher Council together with the Secretary General, comrade Firmenich.

WAFERS: All those baked intended for the P.M.M. and the Resistance.

PROPAGANDIZE THE CONVOCATION OF THE LAUNCHING AND THE 8 POINTS OF THE P.M.M. PROGRAM; THIS IS THE PRINCIPAL TASK FOR CARRYING IT OUT: "ALL PERONISM WITHIN THE P.M.M."

1.1.2. CONTINUE BUILDING THE P.M.M. IN THE CAPITAL.

The objective is to name delegates of the P.M.M. both unionwise and in the territory and studentwise.

The only condition is that these comrades be representative, politically and/or unionwise.

The Movement's organization must be used for distribution of the press and propaganda.
Therefore it is the function of the comrade delegated by the Movement to disseminate and circulate the Launching flier and however many directives reach him from the P.M.M.

Thus, based on his representatitivity he will continue weaving his press web which will be the organizational structure of the P.M.M. for the time being.

Therefore, there is no structure or model for the Movement except as constructed by each comrade based on his representatitivity and knowledge of the Capital Movement, and it will be, for example: by means of roasts, family groups, creation of Basic Units in the Resistance, etc.

1.2. PUSH THE C.G.T. IN THE RESISTANCE AS UNION POLITICAL REFERENT.

The role of the C.G.T. in the Resistance continues to be valid. We must gain that space that we are not taking advantage of and which therefore is being won by the enemy.

The C.G.T. in the Resistance must be a vindicative referent, binding together the popular struggles, as a fundamental aspect of the accumulation of power by the workers.

Our mistake was in abandoning a correct proposal through our own failures in implementation and through limitations it contained.

The essential for the C.G.T. in the Resistance is that it plans the Resistance. And today this way of struggling is carried on by all workers; it has raised up a Program which overall carries it towards the ensemble of the organic structures of the Workers' Movement and has served to unify, although only partially, struggles at a national level.

Other basic objectives are: union legislation and defeat of all antiworker legislation.

As the SPN says in the directives of March, 1977: "Legality is not a declarative banner but rather an objective to be achieved; we must oblige the enemy to grant it, actively participating in the legal organization of the O.M.

"The greater or lesser legality with which the struggle is faced is a product of the concrete possibilities offered by the stage, the objectives pursued, the enemy's policy, and the correlation of forces.

"Both in the vindicative and political struggle, we must pursue legality as the explicit objective, although this may not be possible, and impose legality to the extent that the correlation of forces allows."
In order for the C.G.T., in the Resistance may be a vindicative referent of the ensemble of popular struggles, it must be: (ILLEGIBLE) and fulfill its role of informing and orienting the march of the Resistance in the Capital.

It is the task of the C.G.T. in the Resistance to push the development of the following proposals and political directives:

1- Push the creation of legal and clandestine vindicative organizations depending on whether the conditions are special, factory or place of work. The only requirement is that it be representative of the whole.

2- Orient resistance actions. Using as a core: union legality, the importance of extending the struggles so as to attain concrete support from other factories, from the neighborhood, etc., and above all making these as massive as possible, i.e., carried forward by the greatest possible number of comrades rather than "very heavy" and done by (ILLEGIBLE).

3- Make known the Program of the C.G.T. in the Resistance. That is, deepen it. It must be present at every vindicative political action by the Movement's union forces and especially (ILLEGIBLE) and deepen it by union.


4- REPORT ON THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTS, HOW THEY DEVELOPED, WHAT WAS GAINED, PROPOSALS AND RESULTS. The enemy hides the facts of resistance, tries to make them appear (when he cannot hide them) to be something isolated and unconnected and lies shamelessly concerning the achievements made.

The objective for this quarter is to put out a Capital Resistance Leaflet containing a review of the conflicts, how the enemy behaved, the resistance measures taken, and the results.

5- The slogans for the fliers of every union vindicate organization we participate in, with resolutions:
   a) Salary increase of....
   b) Renunciation of Martinez de Hoz.
   c) Return of the unions and C.G.T. to the workers.

1.3. COMRADE EVITA'S ANNIVERSARY

We shall place the accent on propaganda actions more political than "whorish".

During this week we must operate with autonomy, providing for ourselves; all actions will be taken without any centralized command and without depending on any Secretaryship or Group other than our own.
We shall work on:
Little altars, where P.M.M. fliers and photos of Evita will be left.
Masses for Evita and all those comrades fallen or disappeared.

The objectives for the paramilitary actions will be sought out in:
- the oligarchy
- monopolistic companies
- state companies in conflict
- any union or factory in conflict
- repressive forces

We shall prohibit:
- any indiscriminate objective
- any bourgeois place (movies, restaurants, etc.)
- transport media (busses)
- individual cars (on the street)

This is so because we are trying to leave behind the agitational policy to replace it with mass policy; to carry out many operations with unclear objectives does not succeed in consolidating a mass policy.

This means that instead of burning a bus, the same number of comrades will "take it" and carry out an armed propaganda operation, distributing P.M.M. fliers; instead of placing a pipe bomb in a house whose occupants we do not know, we make a small altar in the neighborhood market where a beloved comrade fell or in any place worked politically by us.

This week we must take a qualitative and quantitative leap in P.M.M. propagandization.

2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL POLICY AND FRONT POLICY

We cannot say that we have policies for a Front, but rather clarify for ourselves the problems experienced on same and the path to resolve them.

Vindicativeness is intimately linked to politics, and every Group must refer its activity to those mass organizations existing on its specific front.

2.1. UNIONWISE

2.1.1. STATE UNIONS:

a) The effort must be dedicated to:
Light and Power, Telephones, Dockworkers, and Railroad workers.
LET US REMEMBER THE MONTONERO EVITA IN HUNDREDS OF SMALL
PROPAGANDA ACTIONS. LET US TAKE A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
LEAP IN PROPAGANDIZATION OF THE PERONIST MONTONERO MOVEMENT.
"PERONISM WILL BE REVOLUTIONARY OR IT WILL BE NOTHING"

-Evita

b) The crux of the quarter will be:
1- Professional Associations and Dispensability Act
2- Self-vindicating axes
3- Attack on the economic policy of Martinez de Hoz.
4- Union unity against the dictatorship. We shall create a
   broad policy with all existing union sectors.

c) Political core: P.M.M.
d) The signature on the fliers should be:
   "C.G.T. in the Resistance" Capital
   "Telephone workers in the Resistance." Adherents of the
   C.G.T. in the Resistance in the Capital, etc.

1.2. PRODUCTION

a) The effort will be on: 1- Mechanics
   2- Metallurgists
b) and c) the same as for state unions

   For comrades in the service unions as well as those in production:

   WHATEVER CONFLICT MAY ARISE, IT MUST BE GIVEN AN ANSWER WITHOUT
   WAITING FOR CONSULTATION

2. TERRITORIAL

   All effort will be for the P.M.M.
   We must push and seek the unity of the (ILLEGIBLE) Movement to
   resist the dictatorship.

   We shall help the union sector not only by making fliers but
   also going over and attending to points that come up. That is,
   in practice (ILLEGIBLE) comrade may be a production unit in relation
   to the Movement and mass organizations.

   Continue denouncing repressive policy and murders (ILLEGIBLE)
   and create in tandem COMMITTEES OR SOLIDARITY GROUPS OF FAMILIES
   OF THE DEAD, PRISONERS, OR MISSING PERSONS.

   Work on the cost of living problem and on any concrete and
   partial vindication which may arise, for example: freeway, (ILLEGIBLE)
   rentals, etc.

2.2. M.I.P.
As with the other fronts, the central policy will be that of the P.M.M.

The creation of the C.I.R. will be pushed and during the quarter we shall try to construct a legal Committee to dounce the situation of tenants to the Municipality.

2.2.2. TOWNS: P.M.M.

We must denounce the incendiary plans of the military. Create neighborhood committees or boards to denounce this incendiary plan for eradication of the towns.

2.3. STUDENTWISE:

2.3.1. P.U.Y.: P.M.M. in the university. Delegate selection. We shall fight for recognition of the Centers. We must push a broad alliance policy.

Propaganda must be given a shove, especially after having lost so many comrades. That we do not now have any Group in any faculty does not mean that we don't have any policy for it. The policy will be recreated only through getting our fliers and proposals in.

We must not forget that the P.U.Y. as a student organization has a recent and known history of defense of student interests, framed within a proposal for National Liberation.

During this quarter we must put out The Program. The comrades must work it up based on the following points:
- End intervention in the university and repeal of the university act.
- Participation of students in the University government.
- Legality for student centers.
- Renunciation of the military in the Education Ministry
- Active support for workers in conflict.

THE ULTIMATE ADDRESSEES OF THE PROPOSALS EMANATING FROM THE P.M.M. ARE THE SPECIFIC MASS ORGANIZATIONS CORRESPONDING TO EACH BRANCH OF SAME, WITHOUT WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF THE PARTY AND THE P.M.M. LACKS REAL EFFICIENCY.
"PIRMENICH AND O. CANO LEAD THE RESISTANCE!!"

2.3.2. U.E.S.:

Their efforts will be in technical and industrial schools.

The policy must have as its core the recession students are suffering.

Another core to be developed is opposition to obligatory conscription of 18-year-olds.
Work with parents so that they will repudiate this manner of turning their sons into obligatory military men at the age of 18.

Do not abandon the work of any task: recreational, cultural, and vindicative as it pertains to the Front.

Liberation or Dependency

Fatherland or Death

We shall overcome!!

June 1977

Capital Political Secretaryship
WORK PLAN OF THE MILITARY SECRETARYSHIP

CAPITAL AREA --

July-September Quarter

1. Present Situation - Brief characterization.

As a consequence of the blows suffered by the Area since the month of March, the military structure of same has been reduced to its combat force.

This force has five squads with a good degree of operational experience (in its leaders and soldiers) but with paralysis in terms of its external production, devoted to defensive tasks.

The central elements showing themselves in this crisis are:
1- Lack of centralized leadership in the Area. 2- General crisis in its organizational policy. 3- Nonexistence of a central and informational logistics.

Point 1 refers to the lack of overall and specific policies by sector for the Area. The second refers to a type of efficientist and activist practice expressed in structures which do not respond to the degree of development in the war. The third refers to the lack of a central logistical policy which lowers the quality of action and tends to turn the Army into a militia force.

As in any crisis, this one has correct and incorrect options for overcoming it. The options presenting themselves to us are: 1. Overcoming our low external production, centralizing resources, replacing quality with quantity, increasing coordination for operational purposes between the squads, forming solid operational teams without respecting the squad structure, seeking resources from the central apparatus and from our mass structure so as to achieve our goals (ILLEGIBLE) harassment of the enemy.

2. The second option consists of defining a policy for the Secretaryship which is suitable for the overall political line of the Party and the general policy for the Area at this stage, and from there readjusting our organizational policy to the problems established (ILLEGIBLE) a central line for extraction of material and human resources, through our political work within the Movement, to develop a politico-organizational and military economy in our Party continuing the deployment and emplacement maneuver in those places which are political priorities. Massively harass the enemy from our permanent structures, reaffirm the role of the leadership organizations and respect the division of labor of our force in combat, logistics and intelligence.

-30-
To adopt the first option would imply falling back into those cyclical mistakes which our Area force falls into in periods of high operational activity and periods of general paralysis and destruction of our force.

To take the second option implies advancing in the construction of the Montonero Army, understanding our role, acting militarily as a function of the mass struggle and leading the armed Resistance, maintaining a level of harassment and constant wear on the enemy.

This is the permanent task which we must carry out, and in the fulfillment of these objectives (immediate, medium-range, and strategic) our work plans must be structured.

2. THE ARMY'S TASK WITHIN THE AREA EMERGENCY PLAN:

The political standard is the need to advance in the construction of the Peronist Montonero Movement on which we shall inscribe our propaganda and agitation tasks along with the other Secretaryships.

Herewith we present the Area Work Plan of the Secretariat.

3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
3.1. Development of squad autonomy.
3.2. Conformation of the Area Staff.
3.3. Logistics
3.4. Information
3.5. Press
3.6. Deployment and emplacement
3.7. Operational line and operational contingents
3.8. Organizational Aspects

MONTONERO ARMS ATTACK THE VIDELA DICTATORSHIP. LET US ATTACK THE ENEMY IN SUPPORT OF THE POPULAR RESISTANCE.

3.1. DEVELOPMENT OF SQUAD AUTONOMY:

This is not just another point in the work plan. It is the point of departure of the plan, and it is one of its primary determining factors.

We are not going to make a theoretical analysis of this point. We recommend to our comrades rereading and rediscussion of the basic documents of the Party for this stage (Document of April from the C.N., doc. of the S.M.N., press materials such as the Federal Star, Montonero Evita, etc.)

As a central element in the construction of the Montonero Army, we understand that it includes three levels:
The first: political clarity as regards the central objectives and initiative in the development of these objectives in each specific sector. And second: having the minimum material means to achieve this (rods, infrastructure, dough, etc.). The third is having sufficient press infrastructure.

These elements will determine the operational actions of the squads. All type of coordination will be prohibited, as well as "loans", reabsorptions into other squads, drawings, etc.

The principal means of extraction of resources has to be the Movement.

Some will be centrally provided for, because of the specific characteristics of our sector.

Our objectives are to recover politico-military initiative, consolidate a Secretaryship leadership team, develop a central information logistics, supply our own press, resolve our organizational situation within the framework of the overall policies for the Area and for our Army.

3.2. CONFORMATION OF THE AREA STAFF:

The fall of our leadership cadres has been one of the elements of our paralysis. The need for the Area Staff refers to the need for having an organization which synthesizes and (ILLEGIBLE) overall policies. We must be done with immediatism and the interposition of functions. The role of the leadership at each level is very specific, and we cannot pass over it. We cannot plan for reconstruction or development from below if we do not guarantee the leadership guiding us.

Therefore we designate those comrades who will make up the Area Staff: 1- Military Secretary, 2- Combat Section Chief, 3- Logistics Section Chief, 4- Information Unit Chief. In turn the two squad chiefs are designated who will take charge of the combat groups, provisionally maintaining their squad leaderships.

In the logistical section, those comrades who will remain as Services chiefs are named.

3.- LOGISTICS:

This is one of the most disjointed sectors in our Army, and the task to be carried out can be redefined as total reconstruction. The deterioration of our logistics has caused many of its functions to be reproduced in the combat squads. This is not bad; it even affects the development of their autonomy. What is bad is the lack of a logistical policy, and this is what must be resolved.
This policy must lead to adequate production for the needs of the squads and must enable them to reproduce.

Once the leadership is defined, our objective is to form three independent services of same. They are: 1- Workshop, 2- Distribution, 3- First aid.

1- Workshop service: This includes two aspects: one is explosives and the other is weaponry (provided by the national logistic structure). Likewise we shall carry out explosives courses and begin the task of decentralized production of same within the squads.

In weaponry, our central policy will pass over to collaborators.

2- Distribution Service: the principal role of this service is to guarantee distribution internally of war materiel, control the division of same and deposits in the squads, and receive materiel from the central structures. This service is essential since it is the sector which can help us in overcoming the organizational coordination snag in which we are enveloped.

LET US USE ALL WEAPONS. THOSE WE CANNOT GET WE SHALL INVENT.

For this purpose the squads will have drop boxes where the materiel will be delivered and picked up.

Failure to comply with this will void the deliveries since we can't even imagine having a kamikaze service running from rendezvous to rendezvous with possibilities for access to the entire structure.

3- Emergency First Aid and Centralized First Aid. Emergency first aid will be covered by each squad according to their possibilities, either with a doctor, nurse, or whatever that they have recruited or pressed into service.

The service will develop a minimal decentralized aparatus which can put on the bandage of party health, and not emergency first aid.

This structure will be able to meet the appearance of a wound (but not in an emergency) if this is strictly necessary.

We must abandon the idea of a central structure with operating room and surgeon and doctor for each squad.

This aspect also refers to the development of autonomy.

3.4. INFORMATION
In this sector the task is also one of total reconstruction.

In this first stage it will have a minimal structure to take care of two items: employers and armed forces. And this latter will attend to enemy forces.

Its central tasks are to collect and systematize information, form an information network, and develop psychological action campaigns against the enemy.

Its central production must be a function of the combat structure and its needs. We propose minimal objectives of information systematization for the communications media of the system, beginning the tasks of listening, psychological action, and archiving.

Increase the structure as we continue growing.

We must discard the idea of an information unit with independent and strategic objectives which do not provide for the needs of the combat force with enormous structures that do not meet the sector's development.

3.5. PRESS:

The need to guarantee autonomy is indispensable.

This includes two levels. The first refers to the central press of the Montonero Army. The second is the autonomous press of the squads. The first has as its function producing central materials: Montonero Evita, News of the Resistance, Manuals, etc. (Federal Star). For this purpose we must have for this quarter a mimeograph machine for each combat group and one in logistics and information.

The second is a more profound task and key to development, and that is that each structure pays for and produces its own press by itself. This is the immediate task. Each squad must have at least one typewriter, stencils, reams of paper and a duplicator, Pascid, (ILLEGIBLE), hectographic paper or whatever, which will allow production of a flier, a communiqué, a leaflet, a report.

This, more than an organizational end, is a political end, since we are incapable of making propaganda if someone doesn't come to give us a packet of same. It will be the leadership's obligation to answer for the compliance with these measures during the month of July.

3.6. DEPLOYMENT AND EMLACEMENT

We shall not go into the development of this central policy of the Montonero Army here.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
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DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices
Date: Oct 18, 2018
Specifically, the bulk of our force will be situated in the southwestern territory, doing political work across this territory in the manufacturing sectors there.

A small part of our combat forces will be located in some popular neighborhoods of politically non-priority territory so as to obtain attack bases near the zones where the enemy places his major bases.

Aside from their territorial emplacement, each squad will have a union or factory from among those considered priority where it will center its efforts, political, operational, and propaganda.

Our reality today tells us that we are not located even in those places. We have to make every possible effort in these three months to achieve advances in this connection.

Information concerning emplacement of each squad shall be kept separate, is reserved, and any horizontal decompartmentalization of these data will be punished.

3.7. OPERATIONAL LINE AND OPERATIONAL CONTINGENTS

Our principal action will be harassment keeping the rifle grenade (G 70/G 40) as the central means to be used.

Our priority objectives will be antiboss; these will cover 60% of our operational quota. Within this percentage, 50% will be aimed at production, mechanical and metallurgical unions, and the other 50% at state unions where conflicts take place, Telephones, Power and Light, Railways, and Dock workers.

Unions in which there is conflict during this stage will become priority in carrying out armed action and propaganda action against them.

The other 40% will be antirepressive operations.

The principal lines are harassment and weapons recovery.

Each combat squad must try to execute two harassment operations per month, keeping to the proportions set above. Each operation must consider the subsequent propaganda forms.

For each harassment operation there should be two propaganda operations aimed at the working sectors already defined as priority.

3.8. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS:

By means of developing a correct mass policy on the part of the Party and a growing broadening of popular space and strategy,
a failure in our organizational policy is produced.

TO CONSOLIDATE AN OBJECTIVE IS TO PROPAGANDIZE IT.
LET US DISSEMINATE OUR ACTIONS THROUGH ALL THE MEANS AT
OUR DISPOSAL.

We must make enormous efforts in changing our leadership
methodology and operation, critical points in our structure.

We refer to the specific elements set forth in the Area Plan
and to the directives already given by this Secretaryship to all
the structures which make it up.

It will be the Leadership's responsibility to demonstrate
by its own actions understanding of the organizational political
change.

LIBERATION OR DEPENDENCY

FATHERLAND OR DEATH

WE SHALL OVERCOME!!

Military Secretary, Capital Area
QUARTERLY PLAN FOR THE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA SECRETARYSHIP IN THE AREA
(JULY-SEPTEMBER)

This should be everywhere:
With spray paint
with chalk
With faith in victory!!

This plan, and all our force to carry it out, we organize under the memory of our beloved comrades Juan Julio Roque, Superior Montonero Official, member of our National Leadership and National First Secretary of the Press, Propaganda and Indoctrination, and of another beloved comrade, the First Official comrade "Jote Koncurat", First Secretary for Press and Propaganda of the Party in our Area.

COMRADES LINO AND JOTE, REMEMBERED!!
MONTONEROS TO THE DEATH
FOREVER UNTIL VICTORY!!

AGENDA:
1. INTRODUCTION
2. OBJECTIVES
3. TASKS
4. RELATIONSHIP OF THE SECRETARYSHIP TO THE WHOLE
5. PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST GUIDE OUR ACTION

1. INTRODUCTION:

The present plan has its foundations and antecedents in: doc. of the C.N. of the month of April, National Circular No. 1 of the Propaganda Secretaryship, Emergency Area Plan and on the experience of the Area Propaganda Secretaryship summarized in the "May Balance Sheet" and in later production up to the present date. Therefore, we shall not here develop the aspects which in said materials are (ILLEGIBLE) both in national central policies and area ones (doc. of April of the C.N. and Area Emergency Plan), as in the (ILLEGIBLE) policy for propaganda (Circular number 1 of the National Propaganda Secretaryship, "May Balance Sheet" of the Area Propaganda Secretaryship (ILLEGIBLE) area Propaganda circulars).
2. OBJECTIVES

For purposes of easier comprehension, we shall divide them into internal and external (to the Party).

1.- External.
   1.1. Develop the P.M.M.
       Disseminate the proposal of the P.M.M., propagandize it; this is how to develop it today. Succeed in making it a referent; for this purpose we must increase massiveness and provide a political perspective. To succeed we must take into account the following:
       a) The political priorities set for the area.
       b) The concepts of: complete and partial utilization of texts, mass distribution.

If we keep these elements in mind, we shall achieve a correct synthesis of quality, quantity, and opportuneness which will allow us to advance the objective we have proposed for ourselves.

1.2. Week of July 26.

Remember Evita and the fallen as examples of struggle, as guides of the Resistance and of the need for unity of Peronism within the Peronist Montonero Party. During this week we shall intensify our central policy for the quarter set forth in the foregoing point, and we shall also carry out propaganda and specific tasks connected with this date.

1.3. Montonero Evita

The construction of the High Council of the P.M.M. as the real and formal leadership of same does not mean that the Party should abandon the direct relationship it has as such with the Movement. Therefore we shall continue reproducing and distributing in the area.

PROPAGANDA FORMS PART OF A POLICY, IS A POLICY. OUR PROPAGANDA NOT ONLY DISSEMINATES A POLICY BUT ALSO DEVELOPS IT. IF OUR POLICY IS NOT A MASS ONE, IF IT DOES NOT ENCOMPASS THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE, THERE IS NO PROPAGANDA WHICH WILL MAKE IT MASS.


Continue with this popular information medium, succeeding in:
   - raising its quality in the sense of providing more information.
   - increase the quantity, taking into account the Movement's reproduction capacity and other quarterly materials.
   - maintain periodicity.

1.5. Dissemination of the C.G.T. in the Resistance.

Push this, achieving propagandization of its directives for the
resistance and its program (this point is developed in the Area Secretariat plan.

1.6. By word of mouth.

2. Internal.

(Keeping in mind the central criteria for party construction set forth in the Area Plan)

2.1. Develop the central apparatus of the Graphic Infrastructure Department (D.I.G.) and of the Department of Distribution, Evaluation and Correspondence (D.E.C.) and their networks within the Movement.

2.2. Synthesize and socialize the propaganda experience in the area; lead the Party press and orient that of the Movement.

2.3. Reproduce and distribute the national and area internal press for the quarter.

2.4. Continue with the training of cadres with the comrades of the Secretaryship.

2.5. Residence changes as a function of insinuation, safety and production.

2.6. Cover the deficits of the central graphic infrastructure.

TASKS

External:

1.1. For the development of the P.M.M.

We shall work principally on two matters:

- Complete convocation; make the original, centrally print and distribute 10,000 copies: 5,000 for the Political S., 400 for the Military S., and 4,600 for the Press and P. S.

- Area flier: with the eight points, signed by the High Council and different texts for the Party and each one of the Groups. Make originals, stencils, and distribute the Party flier in the following quantities:

  Political Sec. -- 30 stencils -- to print 10,000 copies (8,000 territorial, 2,000 student). (The eight thousand printed in the territory must be propagandized in the unions and territory)

  Military Sec. -- 16 stencils -- to print 20,000 copies which must be propagandized in the unions.

  Press and Propaganda Sec. -- 8 stencils -- to print 10,000 copies which must be propagandized in the unions.

That is, with the stencils we are to produce for the whole area, 40,000 copies of the Party flier will be printed decentrally.
Furthermore the Political Sec. will produce 60,000 fliers for Groups: 30,000 c. for unions 20,000 c. for territory 10,000 c. for student

Then we shall reach the quantity of 100,000 copies of the area flier (for the Party and the various Groups) which will be distributed where the events of conflict took place in the Capital: Light and Power, Railways, Mechanics, Dockworkers, Metallurgists, and Telephone basically, and wherever a conflict arises.

As regards our Secretaryship, it is clear then that we have two tasks: a) centralize the press b) propagandize from the Sec.: 5,000 convocations and 10,000 fliers (for the Party) keeping in mind the aforementioned political priorities. We shall work exclusively in the unions; one department will do this on the production unions and another on the service unions.

1.2. For the week of July 26:
   a) Evita Leaflets: make originals and 52 stencils to distribute: 40 to Political Sec.; 8 to Military Sec.; and 4 to Press and Propaganda.

   b) Propaganda activity: each Department will carry out propaganda activities related to this date, taking into account that we must execute this with total autonomy and without any coordination between groups. The only thing centralized will be the stencils.

1.3. To continue with Montonero Evita:
   Given the foregoing tasks of the Political and Military Secs. they will not be able to absorb the decentralized printing and distributing of the Evita. Therefore our Secretaryship must centrally print and distribute the following quantities:
   Evita 18 (August) 10,000 copies (8,000 Political Sec.; 1,000 Military Sec.; and 1000 Press and Propaganda)
   Evita 19 (September) 12,000 copies (9,000 Political Sec.; 1500 Military Sec. and 1500 Press and Propaganda).

   In view of the lack of this material (for example number 18 which was to be out in June and we still haven't received it) the Secretaryship may increase the quantities of the other materials produced centrally depending on the priorities announced (convocation and flier).

1.4. To continue with the News of Area Resistance:
   Just as for the Evita we must print it centrally and distribute it. Furthermore we shall make a backup of twenty stencils so that the Political Sec. can print 10,000 more copies per number.

   WHEN OUR POLICY IS BEING FORMULATED, HALF OUR HEAD SHOULD BE THINKING ABOUT PROPAGANDA, A FOURTH ABOUT PRODUCTION, AND THE OTHER FOURTH ABOUT DISTRIBUTION. FOR OUR PROPAGANDA TO BE MASS IT MUST BE OPPORTUNE.
Printed centrally: July - 8,000 c. (5,000 Political Sec.; 1500 Mil. Sec.; 1500 Press and Propaganda)
August - 9,000 c. (6,000 Pol. Sec.; 1500 Mil. Sec.; 1500 Press and Propaganda).
September - 10,000 c. (7,000 Pol. Sec.; 1500 Mil. Sec.; 1500 Press and Propaganda).
The Political Sec. will produce the "C.G.T.A. Leaflet" with directives and information of the Resistance.

The task along these lines will be:
To develop a propaganda proposal (and produce it) as a function of the fixed political objective to serve as a complement to the C.G.T.A. Leaflet. For purposes of this quarter, we shall have to have defined and carried out this task and the responsibility will be primarily that of the head comrade of the D.E.C. and the Secretaryship of Press and Propaganda. (For example: wafers with the program points and/or a material for purposes of the quarter featuring the Program and information on the struggles of the workers in the Capital during July, August and September).

Naturally, for this task it is indispensable that our correspondents operate, without which it is impossible to carry out any proposal. The head comrade of the D.E.S. will have the task of joining up all the information he receives from the Political Secretaryship.

1.6. Make a new original and twenty stencils of the press communiqué signed by the P.M.M.

2. Internal.
2.1. For development of the central apparatuses of the D.E.S. and the D.I.G. and its networks in the Movement
a) Infrastructure of the D.I.G. (word of mouth)
b) " " D.E.C. (" " )
c) Stencil engraving unit in the D.E.G.

IN ORDER TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF "MASSIFYING" PROPAGANDA WE NEED TO ARRIVE: FROM IT WE AT LEAST PASS ON TO THE MOVEMENT WE WISH TO ORGANIZE. THE INITIAL QUANTITY THAT WE PRODUCE IS IN DIALECTICAL RELATION TO THE MASS WE WISH TO REACH.

d) Reproduction of decentralized tapes and (ILLEGIBLE) from the D.E.C. (of collaborators).
e) Technical development-originals and development popular propaganda methods.
f) Set up in the D.I.G. a planograph and and retake the planograph project (the D.I.G. must make proposals).
q) Succeed in getting all the groups to have equal capacity in producing simple originals - push and orient the propaganda teams of the Movement through: our production of printed matter and stencils and the specific internal press primers and circulars. On finishing the quarter we must have one or two spare bases in the Movement (we shall not review here the pyramid conception of production for propaganda teams and their tasks).

Our Secretaryship, through the D.E.C., has the task of pushing and controlling compliance with the propaganda policy set as a function of the area plan in the party as a whole.

Our function is not to toss about packets but rather to distribute the propaganda necessary for the political objectives which we have set for ourselves in the area. This means that our distribution must advance in specificity, i.e., distribute with greater precision and direction where we want each piece of material to reach. (It is not the same thing to distribute 30 stencils of a flier for the Political Sec. in its entirety without specifications as to distribute these same 30 stencils to the Political Sec. but specifying to what groups should receive how many, and to print what quantity of fliers.

There is a limitation to this:

a) Within the area, we do not have a profound knowledge of the area's union reality.

b) The Secretaryship is only superficially familiar with the press and propaganda capacity of the groups.

c) Recently, in the previous quarter, the Secretaryship began to produce for all.

That is, our Secretaryship, as a leadership structure of the area press and propaganda policy, will orient efforts and will control the press and propaganda tasks carried out by the party as a whole so that these are directed towards seeking the objectives established in the Area General Plan.

PROPAGANDA FOR OUR PARTY AND FOR OUR MOVEMENT MUST BE THERE WHERE THE CONCRETE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING CLASS AND OF THE PEOPLE IS TAKING PLACE. THE STRUGGLE OF OUR PEOPLE, OF THE WORKING CLASS IN PARTICULAR, MUST BE IN THE PROPAGANDA FOR OUR PARTY AND FOR OUR MOVEMENT.

The D.E.C. will begin to distribute to the mailboxes we have today and must concern itself with our achieving and maintaining the number of mailboxes defined as necessary. Each comrade of the D.E.C. will be responsible for defining the specific control and safety mechanisms for each box and providing alternatives. To the extent that we advance in distribution, we shall be able to do this in the tasks of evaluation and correspondence.
2.2. Synthesize and socialize the propaganda experience in the area and socialize the national experience.

For this purpose it is necessary that our correspondence operates. This will only be possible if there exist the drop boxes and if distribution functions.

Through this, we shall be able to produce it for ourselves and for the Groups. The correspondence will be through written papers and not by personal contacts. The Secretaryship will continue developing primers and circulars as the most appropriate means of reaching our comrades, and the most suitable at this stage.

2.3. Reproduce and distribute the internal national and area press.
   I.B. No. 3 National: print and distribute the necessary quantity (July).
   I.B. No. 1 Area: " " " " " " (August).

2.4. Continue cadre training for the comrades of the Secretaryship.
   a) Strengthen the conceptual unity, which to our way of thinking consists of 4 central elements:
      1- Practice tied to the masses (recognizing our double relationship, direct and indirect).
      2- Political discussion, to which we should dedicate a substantial part of our internal party life.
      3- Socialization of information
      4- Participation in decisions
      5- Promote the practice of synthesis of various individual and local practices as a way of contributing to the political synthesis of the various leadership levels.
   b) Ideological consolidation: ideological contents at a strategic defensive stage consist of three aspects:
      1- Political foundation of all resolutions leading to action. Each cadre must know politically why he is performing each one of his tasks. Bureaucratic and verticalist leadership is to be avoided.
      2- Succeed in making all the cadres love the Party; they must feel part of it, know that they are building it, that they are building the people's victory. To love in an integral sense. To participate in decisions, integrate themselves to give life, i.e., break their hearts every day, discuss openly, give solidarity. If all problem areas are not integrated, morale cannot be built.
      3- Succeed in making every Party cadre achieve a transforming experience of reality. Make each cadre a political production unit within the bosom of the people, in permanent relation with the people.
2.4.2. Military Training

1- Security and defense of living areas and headquarters
2- Develop militia tasks to serve in experimenting with popular propaganda methods.
3- Basic military instruction: if the national manual does not arrive, the head comrade of the D.E.C. must concoct a course on the basics of the most common weapons for our force (short, subs, shotgun, FAL) and urban operations (the simplest squad operations).
4- On finishing the quarter, ALL comrades of the Secretaryship must know how to drive automobiles and have taken out registration (legals) and have stolen a provincial registration (clandestines).
5- All comrades of the Secretaryship at the end of the quarter must be able to manufacture a pipe bomb (see the pipe bomb manual we all have) and have placed one pipebomb per group.
6- Since we must construct our Documentation service in the Area, it is the obligation of all comrades to obtain two sets of documentation during the course of the quarter, at least, and any other material useful for the service.

2.5. Residence changes as a function of insinuation, security, and production.

BY WORD OF MOUTH

2.6. Cover the current graphic infrastructure deficits.

We need at least: one stencil engraver, one typewriter, twenty cassette recorders, one trap per house, and one originals reproduction set per house.

IV. PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST GUIDE OUR ACTION AND RELATION OF THE SECRETARYSHIP TO THE WHOLE

1- The area propaganda Secretaryship and its relation to the structure.

This Secretaryship must be tied to the overall structure and to the Movement by two means:

1.1. That of the propaganda Secretaryship, a route which guarantees integration of propaganda to the power policy which the Secretaryship as a whole must implement, synthesizing it with the other Secretariats.

It guarantees adjustment of the national plans to the area plans and a suitable relationship.

Incorporated by means of this into the Secretaryship is the view of how our policy is developing from the propaganda perspective.

The necessary political synthesis of the Propaganda Secretaryship with the other Secretariats is guaranteed, contributing to the resolution of the secondary contradictions which might arise as products of the relationship between different specialized organizational structures.

WE MUST MAKE THE MONTONEROS OVERCOME SIGN LIKE THE FORMER PERON RETURNS SIGN, THUS DEMONSTRATING THAT TO BE PERONIST AND TO BE MONTONERO IS THE SAME THING IN THE CONSCIENCE OF THE MASSES.
1.2. That of the area of distribution. This route guarantees distribution of national and area materials to the overall structure and to the Movement.

Push the formation of Group propaganda teams, both in their technical aspects as well as in the political aspects related to their specific activity. It should be clear that it is not a strategic leadership relationship (to give it a name) but rather a coordination and control tactic.

It is important to stress that it must lead the technical aspects for several reasons:

a) If we set up one route for production and another for distribution, this obliges the comrades of the Groups to duplicate coordination with the Propaganda Secretaryship thereby cutting off the relationship.

b) If the distribution comrade does not lead or orient the technical aspects, neither will he lead the political aspects of his area. And since the comrades do not ask general questions but rather very concrete things, the egenvral must be dealt with later to provide solutions.

Furthermore, this route guarantees concrete data supply for the production of propaganda, both for the Party and for the Movement, to the Secretariat for its political evaluation (through the Secretaryship) as well as to the federal sector through the distribution area of same.

1.3. Probable development of the area: This area is surely the one which will develop most within the Secretaryship, acquiring ever more importance in the policy of same since it is the sector most closely linked with the masses (since it is linked with the Movement) and therefore through which will be received the data orienting production and development of the Secretaryship.

2. Two principles which must guide development of the Secretaryship.

2.1. Keeping the amasses as referent means being linked to them through the Groups of the Peronist Montonero Movement, that its members go out into the streets and speak with the people of our country, know their problems, their aspirations, their claims. Mass propaganda is not achieved by discussing around a table the correct conceptions, but rather putting them into practice and putting them to the test in the bosom of the people.
2.2. We must wage a political struggle and press with production. The Propaganda Secretaryship must wage the internal political struggle to correctly overcome the secondary contradictions within the bosom of the Party, product of the relationship between its specialized structures. It must wage the struggle to lead the Party's propaganda and orient that of the Movement, but it is fundamental that it do this accompanied by a production that demonstrates that our conception is correct.

A Secretaryship which does not produce will not succeed in leading propaganda ever, regardless of how many resolutions the Party passes to that effect.

A correct conception must be tested with correct practice, and the result of this must be good production. If this does not occur, instead of leading the reality, we will be leading the ideas with which reality cannot be transformed.

LIBERATION OR DEPENDENCY

FATHERLAND OR DEATH

WE SHALL OVERCOME!!
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COMRADES:

"The central objective of this first plan will be to concentrate the force of the entire Party behind some central political axes, regardless of Secretaryship, since each one of them must carry out the same and single power policy by various methods (political, propagandistic or military), adapting this power policy to the milieux in which it is developed." These central political axes consist of "expanding and deepening the resistance, launching within this framework the Peronist Montonero Movement and disseminating its program."

1- Dismissal of Minister Martinez de Hoz and change in economic policy in favor of the national and people's interests.

2- Restitution of constitutional rights and guarantees.

3- Rehabilitation without exception of all political parties.

4- Liberation of all political, union, scientific, student, ecclesiastic, professional, military, journalistic, writer and educational prisoners. Elimination of the concentration camps and publication of the complete list of kidnaps, indicating whereabouts and status.

5- Immediate liberation of ex-President Hector J. Campora; of the ex-governor of Santa Cruz, Mr. Jorge Cepernic; of the ex-governor of Mendoza, Alberto Martinez Baca; of the ex-Minister of Education, Jorge Taiana; of union leaders Alberto Piccinini, Mario Aguirre, Arturo Garin, Jorge di Pascuale, Oscar Smith; of the rector of the U. of B.A., Ernesto Villanueva and of the president of the First National Congress of the Authentic Peronist Party, Dr. Antonio Lombardich. This special mention is intended to rescue the integrity and political consequence of these leaders whom the dictatorship has not been able to level any charges at, despite its attempts to confuse them with the traitorous and corrupt leaders.

6- Immediate elimination of repressive procedures which amount to a systematic violation of human rights, as well as trials of those accused of torture, kidnapping, murder and pillage.

7- Restoration of the General Work Confederation, of the unions involved, and of all suppressed labor legislation.

8- Call to general elections to designate national, provincial and municipal authorities, without exceptions, limitations or proscriptions of any type.
EL SIGNIFICADO STRATEGICO DEL ATLANTICO SUR
EL CONTINENTE AFIRICANO
Y EL OCÉANO INDÍGO

ALEXANDER MANINI
GENERAL DE BRIGADA (HS)
DIRECTOR DE LA ESCUELA DE TIRATORIA

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EL SIGNIFICADO ESTRATÉGICO DEL ATLÁNTICO SUR, EL CONTINENTE AFRICANO Y EL OCEANO ÍNDICO

EL PARAÉS ESTRATÉGICO GENERAL

No se puede analizar el significado estratégico del Atlántico Sur en forma aislada, ello forma parte de un contexto del cual no se puede desligar.

Las grandes masas de aguas sirven como media de comunicación entre los diferentes pueblos del mundo y sobre ellas se tranzan vías para el abastecimiento de combustible, recursos minerales y alimentos que constituyen bases vitales para que los pueblos sigan subsistiendo.

Por el dominio del Mediterráneo lucharon en la antigüedad en tres guerras los romanos y los cartagineses. Entón en el mundo, mostrando una ambición de África desde “decimanaest Cartago”, entendiendo que el país que producía esos frutos no podía ser compartido.

Esta situación determina normalmente grandes intereses económicos en países hoy, las competencias se han multiplicado y se ha cambiado el "de lenda" por "la revolución mundial". Se han modificado los métodos y los procedimientos pero no las intenciones, las que continúan más aviesas.

Las estrategias del Mediterráneo y del Índico están estrechamente ligadas con la estrategia del Atlántico Sur. Son estrategias comunes que no pueden ser consideradas como espacios aislados.

La estrategia del Atlántico Sur está relacionada con los conflictos que pueden afectarla, es una prolongación de la problemática del Océano Índico y del Continente Africano. Dejar que los hechos se consuman en el Índico y en el África para pensar en qué es lo que se podría hacer en el Atlántico Sur, es evidentemente una estrategia fallida.

La estrategia del Atlántico Sur forma parte de una totalidad con el Índico y el Pacífico Sur. Tres grandes potencias se disputan el predominio del mundo, una de Occidente -Norteamérica- y dos de Oriente -Rusia y China.

Norteamérica forma parte del mundo Occidental y brama por una supremacía económica; Rusia y China, del bloque Oriental, buscan un predominio diferente; Rusia pretende un hegemonía política y mediante el marxismo y leninismo aspira al control mundial; en cambio China se ve en la revolución ocaso de donde un segundo plano de Norteamérica.

Por su parte Norteamérica, querría aceptar o no, en cobertura estratégica de Occidente, Rusia y China comparten ahora sus aventuras en el África, aunque continúan en pie sus viejas remolinos por los territorios situados en la orilla izquierda del Río Amur (perdida a favor de Rusia en 1945), la zona de Tschibit (perdida en 1960), la zona de Sajalin (perdida a favor de Rusia y Japón en 1955) y la provincia marítima al Este del Amur (perdida en 1975) a esto se agregan la reactivación de las viejas aspiraciones chinas en Asia, en Bahía y Mao, en Mongolia y en Mongolia.

Estas dos grandes potencias viven un constante alerta estratégica.

De las dos potencias orientales, Rusia es la que se ha lanzado después de la segunda guerra Mundial con mayores impetas de conquista sobre el Índico, el Mediterráneo, el Mar del Norte y el Índico, lo que conforma una estrategia anual para neutralizar o dominar continentes.

Rusia ha modernizado el arranque de su política de tal manera que desde hace mucho tiempo mueve por la "liberación nacional de los pueblos" para justificar su estrategia agresiva de penetración.

Lo interesante de su proceso evolutivo es que en la década del setenta Rusia no estaba preparada, al decir el punto de vista de sus maestros en personal técnico para el libre de estos objetivos; pero a partir del año 1975, su estrategia política se ha mostrado mucho más agresiva, como lo demuestra su intromisión en Angola y su intercambio por puentes en Madagascar y en la República Sudaficana.
Así como Rusia es el enemigo principal de China por la cuenta de intereses opuestos, Rusia es la cabeza visible del mundo Oriental, por lo que se transforma así en el enemigo principal para Occidente y para los propios países africanos.

En su concepción una dos estrategias: la Coexistencia Pacífica como Estrategia General que busca una penetración diplomática, una expansión cultural y un intercambio económico; y a la vez emplea como base a la Estrategia sin Tiempo, de Mao y Ho Chi Minh, que tiende mediante la instigación, el terrorismo, los motivos raciales y el miedo maini, a la toma de la mente del hombre a fin de condicionarlo para la revolución mundial. Su elemento de lucha fundamental lo constituye la guerra subversiva y revolucionaria en vigencia en el Asia, al África y América.

La estrategia clásica o convencional se conduce mediante el espacio, el tiempo y la mano, en cambio, en la estrategia sin tiempo se ha matado el rey por el hilo (alian, oportunidad, circunstancial), es lo que se destroza filosóficamente al tiempo y a los factores habituales del espacio de la estrategia convencional, quedando finas, entonces, las bases de una estrategia nueva, distinta, diferente, desconocida, hecha de una gran criminalidad. Es una estrategia sin tiempo, sin espacio, sin frente, sin rostocinal, donde tiene prominencia la batalla política sobre la militar.

Especialmente para Ho Chi Minh, el líder y presidente Vietminh, fallecido el 3 de septiembre de 1962, la esfera del adversario se ha transformado en el más importante objetivo militar, cuya toma se conduciría dentro de una cuarta dimensión.

Por eso, la estrategia sin tiempo se mueve en el tiempo estratégico con una estructura que conduce, con una criminalidad que agobia, con un objetivo que muesguea y con una apariencia que difiere de la clásica o convencional, logrando con ello superar a Occidente en el problema de las tensiones que todavía no ha podido equilibrar.

La escuela de valentía de la estrategia sin tiempo está degradada, pero con razón se llama guerra sucia a la guerra subversiva y revolucionaria.

LA DIRECTIVA DE HAO TSE-TUNG PARA EL DOMINIO MUNDIAL

Desde el año 1953 se le atribuye a Mao Tse-Tung una directiva que dice: “conquistar o neutralizar primero al Asia (lo que nos hará acceder al Océano Índico y al Mar Mediterráneo), luego, África, lo que nos conducirá al Atlántico y hará imposible la defensa de Europa Occidental.

Luego, ver acabar con Europa, con atacar América del Sur. Una vez conquistada la misma, América del Norte caerá en nuestro poder; la amenaza nuclear basta para ello”. A esta directiva China no ha asistido Rusia y sus flotas con un gran ondulante en los nícolas, la que con gran escala se han introducido en el Mar Báltico, Mar Mediterráneo, en el Océano Índico y apuntan a su debido tiempo, con una penetración en el Atlántico Sur.

El comunismo mundial se debate en África por la posesión del continente... en la caída de Angola por la fuerza, la cantidad de gobiernos sinceramente marxistas y la guerra subversiva y revolucionaria descubierta en los distritos petroleros agitados en los diferentes mares, arca, un olvido de convulsión que provocan en estado de guerra en paz y la preparación de adiós a estrategias conjuntas para superar los renacidos estados de crisis.

El mundo africano que tiene 265 millones de habitantes divididos en grandes grupos, y a la vez, reunidos en algo más de 800 tribus constituye un elemento de cultivo muy importante para la subversión.
Distintos grupos sociales han sido utilizados para la revolución; Rusia se apoya en los obreros de fábricas, China en los inmigrantes; Vietnam en los hombres del campo contra los terratenientes; América del Sur en los estudiantes e intelectuales; América del Sur en los estudiantes e intelectuales; en África se apoya en la raza negra, que en mayoría, explotan tonos de los blancos, utilizando como punta de lanza los jóvenes estudiantes.

Lo importante es saber que lo que quiere el enemigo; asi y sólo a cord posible su neutralización.

LAS GUARDIANES TÁCTICAS: CONFLICTIVAS AFRICANAS

No terminaron los sueños de la guerra revolucionaria en el mundo del Asia, como en Vietnam, Camboya y Tailandia, pero, cuando las guerrillas continúan en el continente africano, creando estados conflictivos de tal naturaleza, que sí bien parten todos de una raza común, están desarrollando su lucha con enfrentamientos diferentes.

Por tal razón, los problemas africanos pueden agruparse en tres grandes comunidades estratégicas conflictivas: una comunidad homogénea de intercambios, como la central; y casos conflictivos específicos.

PRIMERA GUARDIANE STRATÉGICA CONFLICTIVA
LIBIA CONTRA EGIPTO: SE BUSCAN A Ques CONSECUENCIAS SUDAN Y CHAD

En el Norte es importante la tiranía; Libia-Egipto-Sudan y Chad.

Anwar Sadat, el presidente egipcio rechaza el proyecto libio de Khamis de unificar ambos países.

Franco el golpe de Estado para dar a conocer el presidente del Sudán, tanto Egipto como este último país han reaccionado estratégicamente con la fórmula de un escudo de defensa conjunto contra un líder del tipo desummisión o invasión.

Libia comienza a recibir, a principios de mes del año 1976, armas soviéticas y técnicas que suponen las necesidades y posibilidades de sus propias fuerzas, 1400 tanques T-62, 3000 vehículos para el transporte, contendores de piezas de artillería de 300 y metralla y eran contados de aparatos Mig 17, 23 y 25. El Mig 25 es el denominado zorro-murciélago, avión metraje cuyo vuelo tres veces la velocidad del sonido a 30.000 metros de altura, y que operan con bases en Derga y es zing para realizar vuelos repentinos sobre Egipto y el Atlántico Norte lo cual indica que desde Sudán, libios ampliar misión de espionaje aéreo en el África. Estos aparatos del tipo Mig han sido provistos con su línea de repuestos para mantener las operaciones a largo plazo que se pudieran desatar.

Libia, está siendo utilizada en el Norte de África como un triángulo para el control del Mediterráneo y poder gravitar así, sobre muchas partes del continente africano.

En territorio Libio hay 5000 obreros y 8000 soviéticos como consejeros militares de las fuerzas armadas. Además, gran número de personal militar estuvo recibiendo entrenamiento para la conducción de tanques, aviones, artillería y mísiles en la Unión Soviética. Este grupo regresaría para formar parte de las operaciones de ataque que asaltaran un puesto fronterizo egipcio.

En el Oeste de Libia se informó que soldados cubanos lucharon junto a los libios, el 19 de Julio de 1977 en el batallón de frente.

Los egipcios respondieron con un contrataque, que tuvo un carácter nácreo punitivo. Según Sadat, en la batalla de frente, una tanque soviética T-64 superaron a los mismos libios, también soviéticas T-62 y T-55, especialmente porque su personal poseía una experiencia sólida de combate.

El seminario Ros el Youssef, señaló que gran número de expertos en botes supervisaron la primera fase de la operación, donde perdieron...
40 tanques, 20 vehículos y 2 aviones, durante el contrataque que realizaron los egipcios el 21 de julio. Las operaciones terminaron con una trocha que Libia aprovechó para convocar sus reservas.

Mientras tanto, jóvenes israelíes y libaneses llegaban en aviones "para defenderse de la agrupación egipcia." El contrataque, hubo más bien un Carlos de reprimenda aérea, ya que la aviación egipcia golpeó varias veces, la primera con 24 aviones y la segunda con 22...sufi, fueron destruidos en Libia aviones soviéticos de primera línea, capaces de atacar en toda su profundidad a Egipto y al Sudán. La revista Octubre, señalaba que habían sido destruidas en tierra en el oasis de Al Kufra.

Libia había recibido de la Unión Soviética 12 aviones Tupolev 22, apodados Ulanes por los occidentales. Se los encontraba en las bases norteamericanas. Eicluss, al Este de Triest.

En la ONU se tiene el pensamiento, que Arabia Saudita, Kuwait y los Emiratos Árabes le dan su garantía económica a Egipto para un rearme, que consistirá en una primera fase de 1.200 millones de dólares para las necesidades más urgentes de Salát, que serán: 170 bombarderos de combate norteamericanos B-5, 50 aviones soviéticos MiG 17 y MiG 21.

De los 175 MiG que Egipto envió últimamente a la Unión Soviética para su reparación, solo habían regresado 60.

Egipto está cambiando de orientación, ahora buscan mantenimiento técnico de Londres, París, Brus y probablemente España, aspiran al "un equilibrio con Israel, esto es, tener una parte de control de las "valvulas de mano" de la guerra y de la paz en Oriente.

Sudán, por su parte, durante la iniciación del conflicto entre Libia y Egipto, ocupó con sus tropas posiciones de ataque en su frontera para frustrar cualquier intento de penetración en las tropas libias y el Coronel Mohamed Elahady, en el caso de que Libia se decidiera invadir a Chad para su frontera sur con Chad.

Por su parte Egipto ha declarado que defenderá a Sudán como si fuera su propio territorio. De este panorama se observa una penetración profunda soviética y cabana en Libia; un cambio de orientación de Egipto y su inclinación a los países del Occidente y en Sudán y Chad que con Egipto tienen un pensamiento de unidad estratégica.

SEGUNDA COMUNIDAD ESTRATÉGICA CONFLICTIVA

ETIOPIA CONTRA SOMALIA

Somalia está reconocido ya como un país de gobierno con tendencia claramente marxista, Etiopía va en camino también de esta tendencia, Roma realiza esfuerzos inauditos para ganar su penetración. No obstante Etiopía lucha en el desierto de Ogaden, tratando de no perder este territorio contra guerrilleros provenientes de Somalia.

Desde el año 1974 la influencia soviética se ha manifestado enormemente en Somalia, donde además amplias facilidades militares en el puerto de Berbera que los soviéticos aprovechan en toda su dimensión.

La seguridad de las empresas soviéticas descansa en el apoyo de la KGB que domina el servicio de seguridad con su red de informantes y a las misiones diplomáticas de Somalia.

Mediante la KGB, y Jean Macad se tiene el control efectivo del país. Extensas y buenos sistemas de comunicación cubren las relaciones informativas del Océano Índico, del Mar Rojo y del Golfo Pérsico.

Así mismo, se contruyeron nuevas plantas para aterrizar y despegue de los aviones TU95, para el reconocimiento lejano.
A la vez, Etiopía tiene un gráfico problema contra las fuerzas de independencia de Eritrea que de continuar con éxito sus operaciones, transformará a Etiopía en un país mediterráneo, por la pérdida de su salida al Mar Rojo.

Etiopía ante los graves problemas políticos que se le presentaban, organizó un ejército de 30.000 campesinos para luchar contra los radio nacionalistas de Eritrea.

En el desierto de Ogaden se busca una base para destruir la unidad de Etiopía y se culpa a los países árabes de apoyar a Somalia.

Somalia ha acuñado a Mengistu Haile Mariam, coronel, y hombre fuerte marxista de Etiopía del norte, de más de 2.000 opositores etíopes en una campaña de terror.

El 16 de agosto de 1977, el gobierno de Suda Burde de Somalia, entregó su apoyo aparentemente a los 8.000 guerrilleros que forman el Frente de Liberación Somali Occidental combatente en el desierto de Ogaden contra uno de sus puntos fortificados más fuertes: Diir Daga. Freightista Etiopía rechaza ayuda técnica y material de Rusia y Cuba, especialmente en tanques T 54 y T 55 (10 de agosto de 1977).

En la primera semana de agosto, Somalia denunció que un ejército de 8.000 extranjeros, incluyendo fuerzas cubanas se encontraba listas para participar en Somalia, para reforzar las destruidas defensas del gobierno Etiopía, de modo que los componentes de la Tercera División de Liberación Guerrillera se encontraban en las playas de Aden Abubu.

Somalia iniciaba tratativas de un acuerdo con Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña.

Es decir, que mientras Etiopía va recibiendo el equipamiento y ayuda de la penetración soviética; por su parte Somalia, donde los soviéticos tienen intereses nacionales en el puerto de Mogadiscio y presencias en su costa septentrional, está recibiendo como contraparte, el reconocimiento y el principio de cumbio de posiciones, por la ayuda norteamericana y de Gran Bretaña, a pesar de los esfuerzos soviéticos para detener la guerra en esta área conflictivas y no perder posiciones en su penetración.

LA COMUNIDAD ESTRATÉGICA HISPANO-AMERICANA EN LA FAJA CENTRAL.

TANZANIA, BURUNDI, ZAIRE, EL CONGO.

Nada ha dicho, Burundi es la ruta hacia el Congo, donde el Congo anigua África entera le seguirá.

Por otra parte Lesin ha expresado: el camino de París para por el Congo.

Este grupo de forma constante una faixa central perfectamente definida en el continente africano, donde China gravita poco a los intereses y la penetración también soviética.

Tanzania, su presidente Julius Nyerere es de carácter socialista, pero no marxista, que se define con el término de 'Swahili de ahoz' Nyerere es colaborador de los movimientos de liberación en el África dentro de apoyo soviético principalmente. Aquí el país monarquía colonial en el continente.

En importancia la influencia China en Tanzania, lo que se transforma en progresivo por sus armamentos, incluso ha pasado más adelante en la toma de posiciones y la ha ayudado con la provisión de armamentos especiales en misiles de tierra aire y otros aviones, a otros, y cada vez con mucha más fuerza la flotilla China.

Esta flota que tiene un característico muy especial, se extiende a través de una línea que comprende dos partes muy importantes, Don el litoral en el Índico y Punta Roja en el Atlántico.

El Sahara juega un papel fundamental para China, especialmente por tomar un país muy rico en industrializó, con importantes recursos. La tendencia de Naijírgo gravita también en Burundi.

En cambio el Congo, tiene más de 200 instructores militares soviéticos y guisa para dicho país más de 250 millones de vuelos para entrenamiento militar. El Congo se ha acercado con Rusia y China y una tendencia marxista definida.
CASOS CONFLICTIVOS ESPECIALES A FAVOR DEL COMUNISMO

UGANDA

Es un caso especial. Tal como, su presidente, sobre las bases del atentado del 18 de junio de 1976, provocó una depuración política donde 250 personas fueron ejecutadas en la población de los aldeanos.

Según fuentes periodísticas, esta supuesta movimiento ha sido detenido por la fuerzas israelíes, Uganda ha recibido el ayuda soviética con aviones MiG 15, 17 y 11. Uganda, no obstante tener delgadas relaciones con las armas de acero, que también armamento chino.

EGIPTIA

Por su montaje de industrias de aluminio y acero. Se encuentra frente a Egipto y gran parte del país, tiene un almacén de materias primas y petróleo. Su territorio a cabo de las desapariciones y artículos soviéticos y de sus aliados los cubanos. Su puerto de Algeciras, tiene comunión con los puertos soviéticos de Hong Kong, Tallin, Hidra, como asimismo con Vostoknov, Novorick y Tangos en el Mar Negro.

GHANA

El 13 de julio de 1977 se produce una rebelión de la clase media, la que comenzó con un manifiesto de acusación por curry, un almacén de alimentos compuesto con el alimento de las universidades.

Las tropas circunlaban por las calles de Accra, mientras la revolución avanzaba sobre el alimento del mercado. El movimiento fracasó, pero poco a evidencia la continuidad de los intereses soviéticos en las fábricas de la Atlántico frente a Ghana, como asimismo en el puerto de Accra.

PUERTO GIMBA

Se caracteriza por su gobierno de tendencia marxista, con un importante puerto de Biyea e interés soviético fábricas en su costa atlántica.

LAS PILAS DEL CASO VERDE

De orientación marxista ayudan a un proceso general coníngulo.

TERCERA CONDICIÓN ESTRATÉGICA CONFLICTIVA

ANGOLA, ZAMBIA Y MALAWI CONCERNA RHODIA Y SUBAFRICA

SUBAFRICA

Objetivos: SUBAFRICA, ZAMBIA BOTSWANA Y MALAWI

Esta tercera condición estratégica en tracción en la más importante, por la amplitud y la transcedencia de sus objetivos en la estrategia del cual se tiende el dominio comunista de la excepcional ruta marítima de Cabo.

ANGOLA

Nueve meses de guerra civil fueron suficientes para transformar a Ango

en un país marxista.

Las operaciones se iniciaron en el mes de julio de 1975 y terminaron en mayo de 1976.

Se enfrentaron las coaliciones conservadoras, más las fuerzas del MPLA que constituyeron el Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola, a que se sumaron como fuerza principal de hecho unos 11.000 cubanos a que se les fueron miles de soldados, tanques y aviones MiG soviéticos en toda su gama de armamento. Esta unión se enfrentaron a un gobierno de coalición formado por UNITA, a ser la Unión Nacional, unos 20.000 hechos que lucían por la independencia de Ango, a los que se le agruparon escasas fuerzas de los aliados procedentes.

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Los cubanos, las fuerzas del MPLA y los angoleños universales operan desde el este de Salr en cuatro columnas de Norte a Sud, teniendo como principales objetivos fundamentalmente los importantes localizaciones de Agost y Moxico cerca del Atlántico y Porto Silva y Luila en el interior del país. En la localidad de Luambo se construyó el comando del gobierno de ocupación.

Desde la línea zamurco-Porto Silva-Luso, las fuerzas marxistas operan en tres columnas, las que se fueron extendiendo hacia los lugares de paso de los ríos Ancône y Lubango, sobre la frontera con Africa del Sur (Sudán). Entre Abril y Mayo de 1976, las columnas avanzaron alrededor de 1,500 hombres por la acción de los guerrilleros Unita. Los soldados fueron sorprendidos en el puesto de Ponte Nair del Congo, Bauravillies, con destino a Cuba.

Revelaciones hechas por Fidel Castro del 27 de Julio de 1977, deslumbraron que en pocos meses de invasión 6,100 técnicos a otros países y que para el año que viene serán elevados a 5,000.

En un discurso de fase común, para comenzar el ataque al cuartel de Monção de Carvalho de Dan, Castro dijo que el 90% de estos técnicos estuvieron acuñados en estilos africanos, principalmente a Angola y Etiopía.

Angola posee esteires de dinamita e importantes intereses geográficos estratégicamente en su costa atlántica; además, el Puerto Luanda tiene conexiones con los puertos soviéticos de Benguela y del Mar Negro. Mantiene futuros proyectos y acuerdos económicos con Angola.

Si bien la Angola los soviéticos y las cubanas presentan un poder efectivo en marcha, también es evidente que China desea poder sobre Angola.

Angola y Mozambique, forman una comunidad estratégica coherente, marxista, a la que se da gran importancia como factor marxista, por hacer prisa en sufriendo, de la resistencia a Rhodesia, y la República del Sudán. Los dos aliados están más importantes, contrario al comunismo, y como objetivo secundarios a Africa del Sur (Sudán), Botswana y Namibia.

La presencia ruso-cubana en Angola queda determinada por un hormética cooperación de obrerismo, dirigida por experimentados oficiales soviéticos, que se comienzan a ejercer cubanos manteniendo por la fuerza la lealtad de dicho país.

De este manera, el Ministerio de Defensa queda controlado por los comunistas soviéticos, mientras que los movimientos cubanos lo hacen con el gobierno del Estado.

Esta situación de predominancia soviético-cubana ha logrado un programa de movilización política e histórica del marxismo y acuerdos de cooperación y paz con la Unión Soviética, fundamentalmente comercial y político.

Además de importantes que los soviéticos y los cubanos tienen, es que las guerrillas del MPLA gobierno de ocupación Unita, del doctor Savimbi están todavía operando intensamente, de tal manera, que han logrado interrupciones del ferrocarril de Zamurco a Luanda.

La expansión soviética en Angola tiende a la formación de una fuerza militar africana, la cual, en parte, es instruida dentro de la cortina de hierro y vuelca de nuevo al territorio africano para ser usada en los movimientos revolucionarios.

ZAMURCO

El presidente Kenyatta Zamurco pidió a los guerrilleros moçambicanos que estén en su país, en el mes de Junio del año 1978, que abriremos un nuevo frente en el Norte de Rhodesia, antes del mes de agosto, comenzando a desplazarse en un plazo de más de 1,000 hombres.

Zamurco constituye el eje del balance entre las presiones de Angola y Mozambique contra Rhodesia, especialmente porque Angula pasea de contratos que arriesga una frontera común.
RHODESIA
Posea un ejército de 5,000 a 5,000 hombres, pero ante las presiones de sus vecinos ordenó una movilización de 50,000, como valla decidida a la presión de los comunistas. Rhodesia cuenta con el apoyo total de Sudáfrica, ya su ideario es ociali.
En el año de 1976, la invasión de Rhodesia atacó en Mozambique, resistencia de guerrilleros que operaban contra su país y invitó seriamente a Granada que adaptara contra esta similitud procedimiento ya que con claridad que estaba dispuesta a extender el guerra si continuaban las provocaciones.
Ian Smith—primer ministro—ante las debilidades de Gran Bretaña decía que Rhodesia no es débil ni se encuentra dividida.
El 5 de junio de 1977, donde Zambian se atacó con cohetes a Rhodesia, de un kilómetro y medio de distancia, contra cuartel militares.
Rhodesia respondió a Zambian con una operación positiva de cuarenta y cinco días, manteniendo hasta 75 kilómetros en dicho territorio para destruir cuatro bases de guerrilleros y poner un pueblo bajo su control. La operación fue apoya desde el aire y se operó sobre: Manetani, Force de línea, Madilo Don y Napal, produciendo 36 bajas.

CONCLUSION
Con una tensión política marcadamente marxista, Mozambique ha tomado como su objetivo principal a Rhodesia y con sus fuerzas del Pátrico, Frente de Liberación de Mozambique, atacaron con cohetes contra militares de Rhodesia.
Consejeros militares soviéticos, cubanos y de Tanganica ayudan a los insurgentes de Mozambique, para derrocar al gobierno de Rhodesia (minoría blancas que controla el país desde hace 11 años).
Se estima que unos 4,000 guerrilleros Rhodesian entrenados en Mozambique que estarían listos para operar en el mes de octubre, cuando cambien las lluvias.
De ellos, unos 1,000 a 1,500 están provistos con armas soviéticas y se habrían infiltrado ya en Rhodesia.

REPÚBLICA DE MOZAMBIQUE
Por su desarrollo, rica y por su privilegiada posición estratégica, con dominio sobre la ruta marítima del Cabo, es viable que este republica constituya el próximo objetivo soviético en el África.
Por lo tanto intentaré hacerlo antes mediante la guerra con fuerzas y revolucionarias.
Como sus fuerzas armadas son fuertes y están bien instruidas, la subversión intentará robar su estructura interna mediante la infiltración y motines militares inspirados por estudiantes negros.
El mes de junio de 1976 se produjeron cuatro días consecutivos de motines en Sofete donde murieron 97 personas y más de 1,000 fueron heridos, inclusive el jefe, que terminaron con turba; en los edificios del gobierno. La revolución surgió en Nguruvale de 1960 en que la policía mató 84 negros; la revolución para causar en Sofete, barrio negro de 1,000,000 de habitantes, en 15 kilómetros de Johannesburgo, cayó sin víctimas.
Los estudiantes negros se negaron a estudiar el idioma "afrikana" que consideran un símbolo de la opresión blanca.
Los motines de estudiantes en siete comunidades negras en la zona de Johannesburgo.
El 1 de agosto de 1977 continuaron los estallidos de violencia en Sofete.
Esta situación estratégica puede complicarse si se sigue el ideario de la Conferencia de Londres, del 8 de junio de 1977, de 50 países de la comunidad británica, donde Gran Bretaña reconocer el apoyo de los Estados Unidos para la transferencia del poder a las mayores negras africanas en Mozambique y Namibia (Africa del Sudoccidente).
Por su parte, la política de los Estados Unidos comenzó a alejarse de la tradicional de apoyo a los gobiernos bimanes, después de varias visitas del Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger, al continente africano durante el año 1975. La nueva actitud de los Estados Unidos en apoyo de los gobiernos mayoritarios no está reformada poderosamente y en forma simbólica por el embajador negro ante las Naciones Unidas, Andrew Young.

**OBJETIVO final DE HUNSAK EN ÁFRICA**

Brezhnev ha expresado claramente su pensamiento que emcorrala la idea de Nkosi con respecto a sus objetivos en el África. En el discurso oficial del jefe dijo: "la solidaridad de la Unión Soviética con las fuerzas antiestadistas y anti-imperialistas de África, es una contribución al fortalecimiento de la paz mundial". Con estas expresiones la Unión Soviética desea apuntar a un rol dentro de los movimientos nacionales africanos, proveyéndoles armas, técnicas necesarias, repuestos y un corrido servicio de inteligencia y control, utilizando también la participación activa de unos de sus satélites más lejanos: Cosa.

Seguir con ligamentos y concretar con posibilidades futuras, consistía en soltar el problema dentro de las estrategias de campes: político, económico, pacifismo y militar.

En el aspecto estratégico se considera que el pensamiento de Mao Tse Tung con respecto al África, de que el camino del Congo pasa por Budhuni, y que entorno al Congo el resto del África acierta; como las palomas de América, de que el camino de Pños pasa por el Congo... Estos pensamientos no se ajustan a la verdad estratéctica, en función estratégica pregona el camino del África de su importancia fundamental, en parte esta meridiana, en la República de Sudán y no en el árbo central del continente.

Por eso, el objetivo es importante cuando tiene transcendencia estratégica, cuando tiene proyección dentro del contexto, cuando gravita su intensidad. La República de Sudán y aporta el control de las líneas marítimas de comunicaciones del Canal, contribuyendo a desaparición los 45 % del comercio mundial, provoca a Occidente el 80 % de sus suministros de petróleo y el 70 % de los materiales estratégicos de la NAC.

La República de Sudán tiene estabilidad política, fírmese en sus gobiernos y un crecimiento económico sin parangon con el continente africano.

Analicemos entonces la importancia de esta república, que en realidad estratégica con Occidente significa un baluarte para la defensa del mundo libre, pero mínimo, recursivo, interesante conocer qué significa su pérdida, si estamos mediante la nación de la guerra subversiva y revolucionaria.

Veamos qué representa la República de Sudán en materia de combustibles no minerales y en sus fuentes de minerales y materias primeras estratégicas para Occidente.

Rigura entre los cinco mayores proveedores del mundo en materia de combustibles no minerales y es la más importante fuente de petróleo y minerales estrategicos que puede contar el mundo occidental. Tiene más del 70 %, del oro del mundo y cuenta con importantes reservas: el 60 % de las diamantes para joyería y digano del 60 % de las reservas de Occidente.

Tiene una fuente de 12.000 millones de toneladas de carbón y 5.000 millones de toneladas de hierro, suministlando el 8 % delas reservas a Occidente de alta calidad.

Tiene el mayor patrimonio de vanadio y una de las áreas de productor mundial. En la producción de crudo se muestra con las 5/3 partes de las reservas mundiales.

El minero creciendo y el minera se encuentra solo en la República de Sudán. En férreos es la mejor productora del mundo.

En cuanto a las riquezas minerales de incluyen bismutos, boro, cobre, cinc, talco, plomo, magnesita, zinc, pirita, sulfuro, cobre, su producción mineral alcanzó en el año 1973 los $165.0 millones de dólares.

Dentro del continente, es la mayor potencia militar por el desarrollo de sus fuerzas armadas y tienen una posición occidental y antagonista definida, como asimismo es notable por su desarrollo económico.
Según el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales de Washington, Sudáfrica ocupa el decimosecond lugar en función de su poderío económico y como nación comercial; y el cuarto lugar en el mundo en recursos minerales no renovables, éstos por debajo de Estados Unidos, Canadá y Rusia. Con alerta seria, con respecto a Australia.

Tiene una reserva asegurada de Urano de unas 276.000 toneladas, que do en muchos países del mundo se está preparando el uso de la energía nuclear. Se estima que el 10% de las reservas mundiales de plomo y uranio se encuentran en el Cabo Occidental. Sobre la costa de Natal, en Índies, en el área de los medios de Richard’s Bay, puerto de Sodwana se descubrieron minerales como el titanio y el circonio; se puede ir grario con la explotación del control del 12% del mercado mundial, de elemento, como es el titanio, de gran importancia para la industria aeronáutica.

El producto bruto nacional de sudáfrica es 3 veces superior al de cualquier país africano, excediendo Nigéria y Egipto en forma aproximada igual a los productos brutos combinados de los otros países de África Oriental, Central y Meridional (Conferencia del Ministerio Adjunto de Información y del Interior de Sudáfrica —Honorables Louis Le Gror —Octubre de 1978).

La ruta del Cabo: El mundo tiene para comerciar con gran diversidad de aguas, cinco puertos de entre el Atlántico y el Pacífico; El Canal de Panamá y el Estrecho de Malásia. Uno para comerciar con el Mediterráneo con el Mar Rojo, el Canal de Suez, otro para el Índico y el Atlántico; El Cabo de Buena Esperanza y dos para las comunicaciones entre el Índico y el Pacífico: El estrecho de Dílen y el Estrecho de Sundra. El momento mundial registra el siguiente porcentaje: El Cabo de Buena Esperanza tiene un 40% del tráfico mundial además el Estrecho de Malásia un 15%; un 20% se desplaza por el Atlántico, vía Canal de Panamá. Por los Estrechos de Malaca y de Sundra, hace el Pacífico se desplaza un 15%; mientras otro 12% lo hace por el S de Australia.

El viaje del Canal de Suez, hace obligatorio el viaje a través del Cabo. Mientras éste, al norte del Canal de Suez entre 4.000 y 5.000 buques por año pasan en él, sobre todo, en los puertos africanos; pero con el tránsito del canal en el año 1967, el tránsito de buques por año se elevó a 24.000 de los cuales unos 12.000 hacían escala en los puertos del S de la África; y otros 12.000 pasaban por el Cabo sin escalar: existiendo un paso de petróleo que significaba unas 50 millones de toneladas por mes, de los cuales un 90% era para los puertos de Europa. Las 1/2 partes del petróleo de Occidente y 1/4 de los alimentos del mundo con transportados en derredor del Cabo de Buena Esperanza. El Golfo Pérsico tiene el 50% de las reservas petroleras del mundo, de los cuales parten un 80% a través del Cabo para Europa, un 50% para Gran Bretaña, un 50% para los Estados Unidos y un 50% para los demás países. Desde el Golfo Pérsico a través del Índico un 60% de petróleo va a Australia y un 90% a la India.

EL OCÉANO ÍNDICO: El Océano Índico constituye una rama de gran muy importante, con muchas rutas de paso perfectamente definidas: El Canal de Suez, el Canal de Malaca y el Estrecho de Sundra más un lugar de paso amplio al Sur de Australia. como alternativa. Tiene conexiones con el Pacífico hacia el Oeste, con el Mediterráneo hacia el Oeste y hacia el Atlántico por el Oeste. En el Medio Oriente y sobre el Golfo Pérsico se encuentran los recorridos petroleros más importantes del mundo, donde un gran tonelaje se vaga sobre este Océano.

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los intereses franceses, incluso y norteamericanos en el Índico son e
trasnochados. Hay una dependencia del dominio de Occidente sobre el Índios
ra indiscutible. En concreto se encuentra ahora el 60% de los capitá
británicos colocados en el subcontinente indio. Los intereses norteamericanos al
los 10.000 millones de dólares. Al retirarse los británicos de sus
los 8000 millones de dólares. Al retirarse los británicos de sus
los trastornos causados por la URSS, que en el caso del Canal de
pero el 8 de junio de 1957 el canal era línea de suspensión de ha
trastornos; guantes orillor eran ocupados por los ingleses e israelíes, lo
producirían durante enteramente, lo que complicaba las cosas, ya que
de la esquina no era entonces permanecer o no al Este del Canal de Suez. no
tenían que en qué extremo sino en qué orilla.
Tanto Japón como Australia dependen del Óceano Índico en sus elementos
alejamientos.
El Arquipélago de los Chagos (Isla Diego Dardo), en el centro mismo
del Índico, un salto oriental; pero Japón no encuentra interés ma
tiva en esta zona, está interrumpiendo la calidad de sus submarinos
icios por encima de la cantidad.
Según fuentes francesas, el portaviones Kiev con aviones Yakovlev 36,
seguro y vertical muy cerca transitado el Indico igual man
que estaba incrementando sus fuerzas con cruceros lanzan misiles.
El portaviones Kiev de 40.000 toneladas pesa un importante equi
de misiles y proyectos antinavegantes, además de aviones a retropro
navegantes. El primero de la clase Kiev y está ya en operación
y otras dos pronto estarán en servicio. Japón proyecta la construcción
de cuatro portaviones de este tipo.
Según la revista Estudios de Conflictos N° 77, del mes de noviembre de
1976, sobre la penetración soviética en el África señalaba el sigui
de despliegue de los flotillas soviéticas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLOTAS ACTIVAS</th>
<th>MAR NEGRO Y | BÁLTICO</th>
<th>ATLÁNTICO</th>
<th>PACIFICO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bares de guerra</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarinos</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Otras publicaciones expresan con toda claridad que Japón tiene en el
Óceano normalmente unas 15 buques de guerra y que en la actualidad d
de mirar diferentes 10 incluyendo los submarinos.
Esta flota del Índico tiene servicio en 49 países, tanto
parte de la flota regional, que es la más importante del mundo, y
sientes en la zona y se utiliza en operaciones submarinas y con
naciones, con satélites.
Algunas unidades de la flota poseen, los barcos con la más desarrollada céd
que se encienden con grupos pequeños en los derrames de Nuev
que y Camarón.
La OTAN, en la distribución aproximada que hace de la flota rusa, y c
entera coincide con el Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y "Jane,
righting ships", señala lo siguiente:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLOTAS ACTIVAS</th>
<th>MAR DEL NORTE</th>
<th>ESTRÉTICO</th>
<th>NEGRO</th>
<th>PACIFICO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarinos nucleares</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarinos convencionales</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portaviones de combate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruceros</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destructoras lanza misiles</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destructoras convencionales</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronaves</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Este acuerdo corresponde a la primavera del año 1970 y no contiene a la Hueso del Indio. Por otra parte, en este aspecto, las flotas del Mar Rojo, junto con su bloqueo en el canal de Suez, han ejercido el tiempo de la Ofrenda para la ruta de los indios para el abandonar posiciones, Francia resul-tó reforzar su dispositivo con dos barcos equipados con misiles tie-rros a tierra para escoltar al puerto helicópteros Jeanne d'Arc, que pue-trutano por el Gobi no Índico.

Francia despliega sus bases en la Isla de la Heleón, comenzada por uni-dades permanentes y unidades rotativas. Durante un tiempo muy largo, el puerto de Djibouti constituyó su base principal. Después de la apertura del Canal de Suez sus unidades fueron sorprendentemente reforzadas.

El presidente Giscard d'Estaing, intenta evitar sorpresas en la zona. Francia dispone en Pakistán de un importante meroce de armamentos, ademáes tienen contactos con Irán, Irak, Arabia Saudita, India, etc.

El control del este occidental depende de la evacuación de las bases británicas al Este del Canal de Suez para poder de NORTEAMÉRICA. Existe un acuerdo entre Washington y Moscú en virtud del cual Diego Garcia, en el archipiélago de los Chagos, se transforma en pleno centro del Indi-co, en un bulvar occidental.

Los soviéticos, después de lograr en el Índico una superioridad numérica en aviones, tiende a partir de ese momento a basar una producción de calidad.

A partir de 1970 Moscú comienza a jugar un papel de potencia transcontin ental. Durante los últimos años presidentes había intervenido en Egipto y participado en una apertura políti cada hacia las Indias.

En 1977 el flamante Gorbatchov declaraba: "la marina soviética se ha convertido en una temible fuerza capaz de operar a la distancia", luego agregaba, "es una fuerza estricta e independiente" y más tarde añadía que "la marina de la flota soviética era desatinar la supremacía de la flota capitalista en todos los mares y océanos del mundo".

Refiriéndose al poder naval de los norteamericanos decía: "Tardar a temprano, los Estados Unidos tendrán que comprar una que no tiene el domini-no de los mares." Esta última expresión queda inclusive demostrada por la agresiva política nacional que se en todos los mares del mundo donde hubiere pocos.

De acuerdo con la opinión de autoridades militares francasas, la Unión Soviética tiene ahora en esta zona la flota más importante. Entre sus buques figuran: Aiden y Khabalin al Mar de Arabia Saudita; Yemen, Herum y Mogadiscio en Somalia; Ymbo y Dakar en la India. China, a su vez, con su central de nación pacífica en Zanzíbar, ejerce su influencia en todo el Este africano y en toda la zona del golfo Persico. Los rivalidad chino-soviéticas son más profundas en el Índico que en otras partes del mundo. China repite sus buques de guerra en Zanzibar.

El poderio naval soviético, apreciada la política del no de los países africanos, que establece específicamente una política sobre no-alineación o con respecto a los bloques, incluyendo para ello dicho principio del Tercer Mundo. 4 El Africa negra identifica al colonialismo, al imperialismo y al racismo con Occidente, y no con Oriente, de manera que en muchos casos, el anticolonialismo ha asumido el carácter de un racismo anti blanco.

Si bien muchos líderes africanos son comunistas, su México está impregna-do con términos sostendidos por este bloque, lo que ayudan bastante al comunitismo. La marina soviética tiene puntos de escolta, además, en Marroco, Utara, War-es-Suáma, Zanzíbar, etc. Tiene maniobras en las islas Seychelles, en Diego García y las Zey expectas. Según referencias estaría construyendo una base militar en Zecm. En el Índico, es prudente señalar el cambio de orientación política entre el Indio y las Indias, donde el 5 de Junio de 1979, el primer ministro marxista, Albert René, derrocó al gobierno de Presidente James Myron.
Rend dijo que fue el pueblo el que derrocó a Franco, porque quiera transformar al país en un esclavo del capitalismo.
El presidente derrocado señaló que todo era el resultado de un bien planificado conspiración anticomunista. El partido de Rend es socialista con una marca tan clara como para ser enterrado. La edad estaba empañada con retratos del Che Guevara, guerrillero argentino muerto en Bolivia en las sierras de San Juanus.
Los Seychelles forman un grupo de islas a más de 1.000 kilómetros al norte de Malgaches, con una superficie de 327 kilómetros cuadrados y una población de 6.000 personas. No tiene fuerzas armadas pero cuenta con un cuerpo policial de unos 500 miembros.

**DISTRIBUCIÓN DE FUERZAS NAVALES CON MISILES, PARA LA ESTRATEGIA MUNDI**

La distribución de fuerzas dada por el Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y Jone’s Fighting Ships para la primavera del año 1970, especialmente en unidades navales con misiles permiten hacer una valoración de relación de fuerzas entre Rusia, Estados Unidos, y Gran Bretaña, que en esa época era la siguiente:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIDADES ACTIVAS</th>
<th>RUSIA</th>
<th>ESTADOS UNIDOS</th>
<th>GRAN BRETAÑA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINOS CON MISILES</strong></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAUCEROS CON MISILES</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DESTRUCTOROS Y FREGATAS CON MISILES</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LANCHAS PATRULLERAS CON MISILES</strong></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Según nuevas publicaciones de Jone’s Fighting Ships (la Prensa, 26 de Agosto de 1977), expresan que la armada soviética posee tres veces más submarinos que la de Estados Unidos y que está equipada con misiles que podrían alcanzar desde sus propias aguas territoriales hasta Hawai o Quito.
Se presenta como una armada poderosa y bien organizada y que, según el ex-suboficial del Servicio de Informaciones Naval Británico, en el prefacio de la publicación para la edición 1977-1978, señala: La continuidad del sueño soviético en "las guerras de liberación nacional" y que si bien los rusos habían incrementado la capacidad de su material en las principales regiones estratégicas marítimas, su debilidad principal residía en el potencial humano; dado que mientras los Estados Unidos tienen marinos profesionales la Unión Soviética tiene conscriptos. Según Jone’s, las fuerzas serían las siguientes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIDADES</th>
<th>UNION SOVIETICA</th>
<th>% DE DOS UNIDOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINOS NUCLEARES</strong></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINOS EN CONSTRUCCION</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31 (16 con motores Diesel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINOS CONCLUIDOS</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINOS EN RESERVA</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Date: Oct 10, 2018
La superficie terrestre tiene una parte emergida y otra cubierta por aguas. La segunda es mucho más extensa que la primera, ya que de los 5 millones de kilómetros cúbicos que constituyen la superficie del ghi 1,49 millones son de tierra firme y 361 millones de agua; sea, que el de la superficie está bajo las aguas.

En todo el hemisferio boreal se llena la mayor parte de la superficie, unos 300 millones de kilómetros cúbicos, formando un vasto mar que se encuentra con las aguas del mar azul. Mientras las masas continentales tienen a agruparse hacia el Norte, en las aguas se forman oceános, que son el Índico, el Atlántico, el Pacífico, el Índico y el Atlántico.

El Océano Atlántico está dividido en tres parte: el Océano Atlántico, el Océano Índico, y el Océano Pacífico. El Océano Índico, que es el más grande de los tres, tiene una superficie de más de 50 millones de kilómetros cuadrados y se extiende desde la costa oriental de América hasta la costa oeste de Asia, comprendiendo la mayor parte del Océano Índico.

El Océano Pacífico, que es el más grande de los tres, tiene una superficie de más de 50 millones de kilómetros cuadrados y se extiende desde la costa oeste de América hasta la costa este de Asia, comprendiendo la mayor parte del Océano Pacífico.

El Océano Atlántico, que es el más pequeño de los tres, tiene una superficie de más de 50 millones de kilómetros cuadrados y se extiende desde la costa oeste de América hasta la costa este de Europa, comprendiendo la mayor parte del Océano Atlántico.

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EL Atlántico Sur tiene importantes áreas geográficas, patrullas en la plataforma submarina argentina y cuantiosos flancos en el continente europeo sin escalamiento.

En el Atlántico Sur, jugará un papel muy importante en el control y seguridad del mar por el Estrecho de Magallanes, el que desempeñará las Isla Malvinas. El hecho de que los Ingléses se hayan apoderado de ellas, le resta unidad a la cohesión estratégica de sus legítimos derechos en el área.

El comunismo, a pesar de su penetración en el mundo, no ha logrado afirmarse ni en Argentina, ni en el Uruguay, ni en el Brasil; su control de grandes partes revolucionarias por ahora lo está ejerciendo en el Africa, francesa con América a raíz de que ha ido mucho más allá de sus posibilidades de conjugar el espíritu físico, el espíritu político y el espíritu del destino.

El problema del Atlántico Sur, dentro de un contexto estratégico tan convulsado, o sea Asia dominada en sus dos terceras partes, Europa en su mayoría, Africa en sus dos terceras partes también... con un Viejo Mediterráneo sur del Norte y el Atlántico donde operan las escuadras asediadas... ante un escenario estratégico donde Rusia se une con su estrategia naval pero consolida las mentes mediante su estrategia con la isla de Siberia... Ademáx, Rusia tiene conexiones en el Atlántico con los puertos de Dakar, en Senegal, de Bissau en Puerto Guiné; de Accra en Ghana; de Lagos, con Nigeria; Punta larvae con el Congo, Lunda en Angola; quiero decir, que siguiendo a su bandera mercante, podría llegar un día bajo cuerda de guerra...

De la formación unión del problema, es evidente que la situación del Atlántico Sur no podrá ser resuelta por los poderes responsables en cada área de América.

También es evidente que esta responsabilidad la tendrá que tomar Norteamérica... porque la situación estratégica nuevas y al ala del Norte no forma directa.

El lnea Tanka en el índice en "ver y esperar", contrapuesto al soviético que dice "Despertar la expansión de las flotas capitanes en todas las áreas y extremos del mundo".

La seguridad del Atlántico Sur, debe comprender el mantenimiento de la libertad de acción en el índice para el mundo libre. Por eso, la situación del Atlántico Sur debe considerarse bajo tres aspectos,

1.- El Occidente mantenga el control del Océano Índico
2.- El Índico bajo un estado de profunda crisis
3.- El Índico bajo el control del comunismo

En el primer caso, se seguirán manteniendo la libertad de acción en el Atlántico Sur.

En el segundo, deberán entrar todo occidente en estado de emergencia, porque la seguridad de los puertos de América es resuelta así. Para la última situación, que tendrá Occidente para comprender el problema estratégico y encontrar una buena solución.

En el tercer caso puede ser posible que se repliegue la política norteamericana de "ver y esperar en el Atlántico Sur", en cuyo caso la interacción entre las dos áreas ya estaría acabada.

LAS ESTRATEGIAS TACTICAS

El comunismo hasta ahora, con una estrategia de paz se guerra está ganando la contienda.

A su estrategia de Consistencia Pacífica y a su estrategia con tiempo útil entre lo cual componen las Distanciones y Disuasión, que no es estrategia, sino cursos de acción políticos para evitar conflictos; pero cada vez que se clavan un conflicto último hay algo para perder y bienfarios, como causa estratégica de Occidente ya ha perdido bastante.

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Date: Oct 12, 2010
EVOLUCIÓN ESTRATÉGICA EN SUDAFRICA

Este informe se basa en la formación de una mayor unidad estratégica, a fin de poder coordinar las precisiones de la política africana; ante una opinión públi- 
ca que va en aumento y que se va desarrollando, está incluido en el estudio de 
este último año, determinada como consecuencia de un estudio a 
las amenazas a corto y largo plazo que afectan en forma directa o in-
directa a la República de África del Sur.

Por lo tanto, se deben estudiar dos tipos de problemas:
1.- Los que afectan la comunidad estratégica conflictuada
2.- Las amenazas que afectan al propio territorio.

LA COMUNIDAD ESTRATÉGICA CONTRAINFLUYENTE

A CORTO PLAZO

1.- Mozambique formará y operará con las guerrillas en su lucha con-
tra Rhodesia, preparando de un modo de poder político hacia las 
mayorías negras, que favorecen a la izquierda.

2.- Zambia, desde sus fronteras anegar la lucha de las guerrillas 
contra Rhodesia.

3.- No se da en apuntar a través de Sudán, una participación activa 
de cuadros para apropiar la esencia del gobierno de Rhodesia.

4.- La guerra revolucionaria y revolucionaria en Sudáfrica y en 
Rhodesia, unión entre estudiantes, motines, enfrentamientos raciales internos, 
eradicación, etc., a fin de facilitar a este último convulsivo la 
participación de los blancos con la lucha común.

Rhodesia será el enemigo principal de Mozambique, Zamar y Angola y 
la que allí se converterá al impacto más fuerte de la guerra subre 
via y revolucionaria.

A probable que también puede ocurrir por si sola la dureza de este 
impacto, pero también se podría ver que podría parte de un ter-
torio ante las acciones de la subversión.

En este último caso, tendría que ser precedida con efectivos militares 
de Sudáfrica para proteger la integridad territorial de Rhodesia; sa-
biendo que estratégicamente y en el fondo, se está desarrollando un 
plan de paramilitar defensivo.

A la subversión no le interesa al tiempo, por tal razón, en el caso 
de resolver el problema en favor de Rhodesia, volverá nuevamente a 
comenzar retirando tropas.

PROBLEMAS QUE AFECTAN AL PROPIO TERRITORIO DE LA REPÚBLICA DE 
SUDAFRICA

A MEDIO PLAZO

La guerra revolucionaria y revolucionaria que proceden primero sobre 
Rhodesia, en un segundo paso gravitará sobre África del Sur y 
Botswana con la intención de estabilizar un campo completo alrededor 
Afric del Sur.

La República de Sudáfrica será entonces entonces a todas las técni-
cas de la subversión y deberá pasar por los siguientes estupas subver-
sivas:

Una etapa la lucha armada, escala de la apertura y la otra es 
revolucionaria, donde todo se acelera desde el punto de vista po-
lítico y embriagante. Así se organiza la infiltración, el terroris-
to y el reorganización.

Esta etapa es clandestina y constituye la primera fase que se denomi-
nara: ORGANIZACIÓN

Una segunda etapa de EXPANSIÓN donde se produce la apertura de la di-
tensión armada en esfuerzo. Lucha armada y así, para disputar 
la poder. En esta etapa se incrementa la infiltración, se originan 
los grupos paralelos, el terrorismo se hace discriminado, se forman 
los sectores, los grupos y los motines racia-
es.

La tercera etapa es la de la INTIMIDACIÓN MÚLICA donde operan ya 
bandas armadas y guerrillas. Se trata de obligar a conformar un asa 
de resistencia para con un mando común de proclamación de su 
mero, a fin de evitar violencia para disputar áreas periféricas o territo-
riales.

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La guerra es la de LA AGONIZACIÓN DE ÁNGELAS donde se crea un ejército regional, un nacionalismo que sirve al terror para consolidar la mayoritaria social. La guerra es la de LA DECISIÓN, la de la crisis revolucionaria, la de la inestabilidad populada generalizada. Se busca la decisión mediante la lucha militar o la lucha política.

La guerra es la de LA TÚNA DEL PODER donde se consolida todas las etapas posteriores y se produce el cambio de sistemas. En estos casos se producen los hechos más singulares, porque mediante la acción subversiva generalizada se ponen todas las bases del sistema en control revolucionario; se eliminan agentes y autoridades; se establece la nueva estructura política jurídica y las fuerzas irregulares se transforman en fuerzas del nuevo orden, en fuerzas regulares de la nación.

La estrategia es la artima de la conducción ejecutada por los niveles más altos en función de los objetivos razonables del país, en los cuales se incluye la seguridad nacional.

Muchas veces, las necesidades nacionales hacen que el propio patrimonio de la economía estratégica, los agentes de resistencia, los sistemas de bases, sean más fuertes que los propios sistemas; en esos casos, no se debe esperar en la ejecución de una guerra preventiva, con todas las infiltraciones y riesgos que ello puede producir; siempre y cuando se opere sobre las bases y no sobre los efectos.

**LA GUERRA FORTIFICADA EN SUDAFRICA**

Se evidencia que la República de Sudáfrica se verá precisada dentro de los límites a realizar una guerra preventiva sobre el principal ajustador de la economía estratégica, conflictuosa y exportadora de recursos, sobre la base de blancos y cubanos: Angola; en este caso, la República de Sudáfrica debería prover los planes estratégicos correspondientes.

Por tales razones, Angola pasa a ser para Sudáfrica el enemigo principal. La causa genera de conflictos.

Por esta guerra preventiva, la República de Sudáfrica debe desarrollar dos estrategias:

1. Mediente la fuerza militar, siguiendo las bases naturales de la guerra clásica.
2. Mediente la estrategia indirecta, continuando los linchamientos de una guerra subversiva y revolucionaria.

Se estima que este último caso será el más fructífero, aunque en tiempo, el más largo.

Queda decretando que la guerra subversiva y revolucionaria y su metodología no es exclusivamente el patrimonio de los comunistas sino una forma nueva de guerra que se ajusta a las necesidades de lucha del más difícil contra el más fuerte, del oprimido contra el opresor, y aquí en Angola se dan todas las condiciones para que la República de Sudáfrica desarrollara en toda su amplitud la guerra, sin tiempo y sin nombre, pero con la única finalidad de terminar con el dominio de los comunistas en dicho área.

Pero esa es la mayor que revestir las bases providas por el movimiento Unita y con toda clase de ayuda, como el fuerte un gobierno propio, y siguiendo las mismas etapas de la guerra subversiva y revolucionaria, eliminar el embrollo de gobierno y la toma de poder. Pero la guerra no es sólo el acto de violencia en cualesquiera de sus naturalezas, sino que necesita de otros elementos que le proveen de base, como ser: lo informativo, plano, como en lo ejecutivo; y de una filosofía que prevé un sentido de vida por el cual deben vivir o morir.
Se une la época de los límites, embriolando el paso de los Thermopilas en el equilibrio de la Teotlinal con uno transformista náyade, acumulando tanto la zona superclitoral austral de los En rara norma de Sócrates. Un cartel ante dos taumaturgos: virgen, el que vino a Escocia, di-lo que los que no se vuelan han muerto por cumplir sus leyes. La guerra absurda y revolucionaria no tiene graduación moral, carente de escala de valores y su ocaso sin respetar las leyes. La lucha actual, pero dentro de una escala de valores, es necesaria para poder sobrevivir a este imanes extrañerizado por el comunismo y que confunde a los países de tal manso, que no saben si viven en paz en un guerra o en una guerra en paz.

CONCLUSIONES

El significado estratégico del Atlántico Su en función de una estrategia conflictuada, tiene su razón de ser en conexión con el Océano Índico y la problemática del continente africano.

Dada la omnipresencia del terror y la aparición sin censura del enemigo, su condición necesitará de medios muy importantes que sólo puede disponer una fuerza potente, como es el país rector del mundo occidental. La disuasión realista para la paz, de Nixon, como estrategia sostenida en el Sudeste Asiático en su lucha contra el comunismo, Primo se retiraron los franceses de Vietnam, los norteamericanos desafiaron.

Los norteamericanos alegaron seriamente de la falta del enemigo, sobre "un ácido de paz" y no de guerra subordinada y revolución en el mundo.

La investición de Kissinger francés en el África; como también francés, los objetivos políticos aliados en la II Guerra Mundial. La guerra es un campo de experimentación, donde se obtiene la experiencia necesaria para no cometer los mismos errores concretos, no obstante, en estrategia es muy difícil lograr experiencia. Los norteamericanos en la guerra han sabido siempre muy bien pero han presentado en varias desviaciones en su estrategia general.

Según Jesús en el Evangelio: "que no se pueda servir a dos amos al mismo tiempo.", Norteamericanos varía su apoyo entre los guarniciones de menorías y las mayorías negras en el África, lo que en ambos esta dos representan el mismo, con la cual se sirve a dos amos: lo mismo sucede con la adquisición de Taiwán y China.

La filosofía de las Tres-Rúas es ya sumamente inexorablemente... Oriente Medio tiene en filosofía y una doctrina: el hombre tiene una misión.

Por lo tanto surge la necesidad:

1.- Que un occidente presente una estrategia, una filosofía y una doctrina que responda a los altos valores espirituales de su cultura; que neutralice el armamento primario en el África y luego realice su posición original.

2.- Que esta estrategia deben ser participes todos los países del mundo libre.

3.- De no adoptar una nueva estrategia, diferente a las distancias y diferencias, no deseas olvidar que Estados Unidos, Europa, Japón y Australia seguirán dependiendo del metálico del Medio Oriente, del Golfo Pérsico, y no hasta tanto no aprueben otras formas como alternativas, este problema no lo podrán superar y el costo de la lucha serán por los comunistas en petróleo, viveros y materiales críticos estratégicos provocará una crisis de suma gravedad.

4.- De observar que ante una estrategia soviética definida, ávida, persistente, guía a disposición de la revolución mundial, no existe una estrategia occidental coherente y del mismo nivel para enfrentarlo, sino que de nuevos conflictos elabora con prisa como repulsión de su propia seguridad en forma independiente...
4. - El control de los grandes almacenes de agua será como consecuencia de una vitoriosa estrategia militar terrestre, y no en
la inversa, como operan Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña en su
concepción general.
En consecuencia será la enanía del África en que promocionará
estrategia indirecta la posibilidad del índico, la caña del Ca-
bo y la gravedad en el Atlántico Sur; de ahí que la estrati-
gea norteamericana en el Índico de "ver y esperar"... ha qued-
dó irremisiblemente atrás.
5. - La heredera de Sudáfrica constituye una oseca de puente que
tiene el Africa, para salvar la cultura Occidental. Es el pi-
voe estratégico que domina el rutas marítima más importante
y transpirente de la actualidad.
6. - El Atlántico Sur sirve de nudo de unión que enlaza los inter-
eses de la Argentina, Uruguay y Brasil con la República de
Sud África, por lo que es importante establecer acuerdos es-
tratégicos que sirvan a esta finalidad.
7. - La política naval soviética que se ha desarrollado en el Med-
terráneo se está repetiendo en el Índico, y con la misma secuen-
cia ha iniciado una apertura en los puertos del África Atlán-
tico.
8. - El objetivo de la guerra diluiré es la paz; el objetivo de la gue-
rra subversiva y revolucionaria es la revolución mundial.
Para concretarlo se necesita la formación de una mentalidad
diferente.
9. - Sudáfrica está considerada como el salón de la justicia
de Occidente; pero la justicia tiene los ojos vendados.
LA SOLIDARIDAD ESTRATÉGICA COMPLEMENTADA
ESTRATEGIA OPERACIONAL A CORTO PLAZO
PRIMERA FASE
SE BUSCA LA CAída DE RHODESIA
DESDE ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE Y ANGOLA.
LA CONJUNTA ESTRATÉGICA CONFLICTUADA

ESTRATEGIA OPERACIONAL A LARGO PLAZO
SEGUNDA FASE

DE LA caída DE RHODESIA, ÁFRICA DEL S.O.
Y BOTSWANA, SE DESCA DEL CORGO DE LA R.S.A.
1. ATACAMIENTO Y CERRO DE LA R.S.A.
2. INCENDIO DE LA SUEJERSON INTERNA EN LA R.S.A.
3. INFILTRACIÓN EMERGENCIAL DE LOS ESTADOS FRONTERIZOS
   Y LUCHA ARMADA.
LA COMUNIDAD DE ACTIVIDAD CONFLICTUADA
LA GUERRA PROVOCATIVA DE LA R.S.A.

A LARGO PLAZO

1. CONTROLAR LA GUERRA SUBVERSIVA Y REVOLUCIONARIA DENTRO DE LA R.S.A.
2. TRASLADAR LA GUERRA SUBVERSIVA Y REVOLUCIONARIA A ANGOLA
3. FORMAR UNA COMUNIDAD ESTRATÉGICA CON AFRICA DEL S.O., RHODESIA Y BOSTWANA A FIN DE CONTROLAR LOS ÚLTIMOS.
4. COORDINAR EL MANDO Y OPERAR CON LA ESTRATEGIA SIN TIEMPO, SIGUIENDO SUS ETAPAS, DENTRO DE ANGOLA.
Atlantic is vital to US

Protestant Baran

An important part of the strategic value of the South Atlantic was that with the 4,600 km range of Russian Delta missiles, the United States could come under attack from submarines based in this ocean.

This was stated by Captain J D Forrester of the US Navy, the strategic studies component in Pretoria yesterday.

Other experts in the region would have to participate in the joint strategy — of the whole West for that would be most effective, he believed, if the war took the form of a defensive and revolutionary struggle of the same kind now used by the communists.

The speaker was General Albert Baran, director of the school of strategy, Bucasia Park.

The occasion was a symposium on the strategic importance of the South Atlantic held by the University of Pretoria's Institute for Strategic Studies.

THEMELISS

Angela was the ideal place for the West to develop a plausible, plausible strategy — the practical strategy of the fact — to put an end to communist rule in the region.

The best way to attain this goal, he said, was to take advantage of the existing structure of the South African government, which should receive every kind of help.

General Baran and the South Atlantic was vital to the interests of South America, Europe and the United States.

West finds it harder to shelter SA war

Protestant Baran

It is becoming increasingly difficult for Western nations to resist pressure by the African states to accept law against South Africa.

This view was expressed yesterday by Professor Ifil, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria.

The speaker noted that the Western nations were wars for all kinds of reasons, including weapons.

Western states had become increasingly dependent on African states for all kinds of reasons, including weapons.

Problems

Set Western policies conning to condemn South African aggression in Africa were likely to be ineffective, he said, unless they were supported by the internal political situation of any other country.

"Pressure is mounting on the African states with their own interests to be preserved. The Western nations should consider the South African situation before taking action against South Africa in the South African conflict."
"Wage war in Angola?"  

USE OWN SUBVERIVE METHODS -- STRATEGIST

This is a letter to the editor in the "Pretoria News" of Pretoria 15/9/77

The letter states that the wages in the mines are too high and that the workers are not sufficiently motivated.

The letter suggests that the government should consider implementing its own subversive methods to increase productivity and efficiency.

The letter also mentions that the workers are not adequately trained and that their safety is not a priority.

The letter concludes by stating that the government should take action to improve the working conditions of the workers.

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SUDÁFRICA

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Sept. 16 de 1977


dilegent expert

WORD OF WAR

with Angola

By New York Times

A little over a year ago South Africa was forced to open its borders to Angola, an event that has been accepted by the regional powers. Now it seems that the South Africans have not been final in that they will continue to stand by their policies.

The conference was attended by the representatives of the South Africans, who were present and agreed that the situation of the country, still in the forefront, is not as it should be. It is a situation which is not the case, but a serious one, and it is therefore necessary that the South Africans act accordingly.

The meeting, which took place in Sal, Angola, was attended by the representatives of the South Africans, who were present and agreed that the situation of the country, still in the forefront, is not as it should be. It is a situation which is not the case, but a serious one, and it is therefore necessary that the South Africans act accordingly.

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Agostinho Neto en Moscú

Preocupación del Kremlin ante los conflictos en el cuerno de África

Por JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY

Moscú, U.S.S.R. — El presidente angoleño Agostinho Neto llegó饥饿 1976, atiende esta tardanza a la capital soviética para confe-
registradora de su presiden-
ficar a los soviéticos en el proyecto de derrota del África.

La prensa soviética dice que la visita de Agostinho Neto en la comi-
unión de los periódicos, uno de los más importantes, que se repite tras las actualizaciones calendarias, sea cuando están puestos en la prensa en los tiempos soviéticos.

Los principales conflictos armados, incluyendo algunos armientos de los países de la región, han ido de los desencuentros que se producen por la debilidad de otras fortalezas existentes.

"Un ejemplo lamentable..." dijo Brezhnev en sus discursos en Moscú y El Cairo que fue el que se produce en lo que se produce en los países africanos.

El líder soviético agregó, "En la actualidad, la más importante, tal como nuestra presencia en la inestabilidad de las fortalezas no se repite universalmente. No hay duda de que se muntan y los conflictos en los países africanos, en este caso, de problemas existentes entre ellos, no se repiten por acuerdos mutuos sobre la base de la buena voluntad".