SUBJ: THIS IS IN
1. ARGENTINA (AR)
2. (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) INSURGENCIES - COLOMBIAN ARMY CONCERN OVER MOUNTING
6VERSION
4. N/A
5. 7710 - 7711
6. 771116
7. 771019 - 771021, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA
8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. 

CONFIDENTIAL 00110001
15. DIRECT NO - NO FORN TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT TO HOST GOVT.
16. SUMMARY: (C/NOFORN) COLOMBIAN ARMY COMMANDER EXPRESSED CONCERN AND FRUSTRATION OVER COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS REFUSAL TO PERMIT ARMED FORCES TO REACT TO SUBVERSIVE THREAT IN A STRONG, DECISIVE MANNER. MEMBERS OF COLOMBIAN ARMY DELEGATION FELT THAT THEIR SUBVERSION PROBLEM WAS GETTING WORSE.

22. DETAILS: 1. (C/NOFORN) EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE STEADILY WORSENING PROBLEM OF SUBVERSION IN COLOMBIA, HE FELT THAT THE SECURITY FORCES MUST ACT FORCEFULLY AND DECISIVELY TO ELIMINATE THE SUBVERSIVES BEFORE THEY GET ANY STRONGER. ALTHOUGH THE ARMED FORCES ARE PREPARED TO ACT, THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT LET THEM TAKE THE STRONG MEASURE NEEDED. HE FEARS THAT THIS WEAK GOVERNMENT RESPONSE WILL INHANCE THE IMAGE OF THE SUBVERSIVES AND WILL CAUSE MUCH MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE.

2. (C/NOFORN) EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY SITUATION IN COLOMBIA. HE POINTED OUT THAT COLOMBIA WAS ENTERING A PERIOD OF SUBVERSION SIMILAR TO THAT FROM WHICH ARGENTINA IS NOW EMERGING. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS AND THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE THE STRONG MEASURES NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE PEACE AND TO AVOID A RETURN TO THE VIOLENCE WHICH PREVAILED IN THE LATE 50'S AND EARLY 60'S.

3. (C/NOFORN) ALTHOUGH THE DETAILS OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMY PARTY'S ITINERARY IN ARGENTINA ARE UNKNOWN AMONG THE PLACES WHICH THE GROUP VISITED WERE THE 1 CORPS HQ IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE MILITARY INSTITUTES COMMAND IN CAMPO DE MAYO. BOTH OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE COMMANDED BY HARD LINE GENERALS WHO HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERSUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS.

COMMENT: (C/NOFORN) HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN VERY OPEN AND SINCERE IN HIS CONVERSATIONS.
SATIONS, HIS CONCERN AND FRUSTRATION OVER THE CONSTRAINTS
PLACE ON THE ARMED FORCES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA IS
PROBABLY GENUINE SINCE IT HAS EXPRESSED IN A VERY OBJECTIVE
MANNER AND AMONG OLD FRIENDS, Sec 3.3(b)(1) HEARD NO DIRECT MENTION
OF POSSIBLE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN GOC BY MEMBERS OF GENERAL
SARMIENTO'S DELEGATION, ALL SEEMED TO AGREE THAT MORE FORCEFUL
ACTION WAS NECESSARY AND THAT THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE GIVEN
A GREATER DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IN COMBATTING SUBVERSION. IT IS
A GOOD BET THAT THE BRIEFINGS WHICH THE PARTY RECEIVED FROM
HARD LINE ARGENTINE GENERALS SUAREZ MASON AND RIVEROS REIN
FORCED THE COLOMBIAN OFFICER'S NOTIONS THAT MORE FORCE, AND
LESS RESTRAINT, IS NEEDED IF THEY ARE TO AVOID A SERIOUS
SUBVERSION PROBLEM IN COLOMBIA. THIS MSG COORD W/EMBASSY.