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Military Intelligence Summary, Volume IV, Part I Africa South of the Sahara (Southern and Central Africa) (U)

Defense Research Reference Series



Defense Intelligence Agency

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Part I
March 1989

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Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume IV, Part I, Africa South of the Sahara (Southern and Central Africa) (U)

Defense Research Reference Series

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by the Middle East/Africa Division,
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency

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PREFACE

(U) The Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), published in eight volumes, is a synopsis of military intelligence worldwide. Intended to serve as a ready reference, the MIS presents a compilation of intelligence on those forces that contribute to the military security of each country, and on the political and economic factors affecting the country's military capability. Published annually, the MIS serves to update information in other DIA publications.

(U) Given the growth of the MIS, Volume IV has been subdivided into three parts: Part I — Southern and Central Africa, Part II — West Africa, and Part III — East Africa. This subdivision should improve the timeliness of publication and ease of reference for the consumer.

(U) Information summarized in the MIS is available in detail in numerous DIA publications. A list of related publications, both completed and scheduled, is published in the *Register of Intelligence Publications* (DDB-2600-37-series) and in the *Defense Intelligence Production Schedule* (DVP-2600-35-series). The *Intelligence User's Guide* (DDM-2600-397-series) explains how to obtain finished intelligence products and services from DIA.

(U) Specific publications that may be of particular interest and have been produced since the last edition of this MIS in March 1985 are as follows: *Comparative Military Strengths: Sub-Saharan Africa* (U), DDB-2600-1852B-85, November 1985; *Foreign Military Assistance, Volume VI — Africa South of the Sahara* (U), DDB-1940-1A-85, Volume VI, December 1985; *Air Order of Battle, Volume IV — Africa South of the Sahara* (U), DDB-1300-104-85, June 1985; Naval Order of Battle, Volume IV — Africa South of the Sahara (U), DDB-1200-104-84, November 1984; and *Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa* (U), DDB-2300-5-84, May 1984.

(U) Questions and comments concerning *MIS Volume IV, — Part I,* should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: [redacted] Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: [redacted] in accordance with DIA Manual 59-1, *Intelligence Dissemination/Reference Services.*


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Burundi
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Angola
Malawi
Zambia
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Namibia
Botswana
South Africa
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Swaziland
Lesotho
South Africa
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ANGOLA

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ANGOLA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President, and President of the MPLA-Labor Party: Jose Eduardo *dos Santos*

Prime Minister: Pedro De Castro *Van-Dunem* ("Loy")

Minister of External Affairs: Afonso Domingos Pedro *Van Dunem* ("Mbinda")

Minister of Defense: Col-Gen Pedro Maria *Tonha* ("Pedale")

Minister of Interior: Lt-Gen Manuel Alexandre Duarte *Rodrigues* ("Kito")

Acting Minister of State Security: Fernando Piedade *dos Santos* ("Nando")

b. Type and Stability of Government

~~(C)~~ The People's Republic of Angola (RPA) is considered by its leaders to be a Marxist state; however, the Government is in only the earliest stages of development along Marxist lines. The RPA was established on 11 November 1975, at the end of Portuguese rule, by one of three contending Angolan insurgent groups, the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In December 1977, the MPLA's first Party Congress was held, transforming the MPLA into the MPLA-Labor Party and giving the party a stronger role in the Government and in the military and security forces. President dos Santos was elected by the MPLA in September 1979 to replace Agostinho Neto, who died in Moscow that month while under medical care. Dos Santos was confirmed in the position by a vote of the MPLA's Extraordinary Party Congress in December 1980. His position has progressively strengthened, from his election initially as a compromise choice, to his reelection, along with a supportive Politburo and Central Committee, at the December 1985 Second Party Congress.

~~(C)~~ The MPLA is the sole legal party in Angola, but party leadership is severely factionalized and these divisions have undermined the stability of the regime. Even the late President Neto, who held a leadership role in MPLA affairs for more than a decade, was not always capable of maintaining complete control of his party. Neto balanced pressures — as dos Santos now also does — from a hardline pro-Soviet element, MPLA moderates, and black militants. The moderates want to limit Communist influence in the country and the black militants resent the influence of whites, mulattoes, and urban intellectuals in the top levels of the party and government. A hard-line pro-Soviet group also contends for greater power. Because of their numbers, the militants and their supporters pose a serious threat to the stability of the regime; the pro-Soviets are also strong, deriving their support from the large Soviet Bloc presence in-country. Other points of contention among the factions are reconciliation with rival nationalist groups and relations with the West. President dos Santos still does not have the wide acceptance that Neto did, and, despite his growing strength, his freedom to act remains circumscribed by continuing struggles among these and other factions. The relative influence of the various factions waxes and wanes. The MPLA's present power base includes the Kimbundu tribe, which has traditionally supported the MPLA; large segments of the urban population; and the substantial number of Cuban personnel in the country.

~~(S)~~ The stability of the country also is jeopardized by widespread internal conflict (see 1.c.).

c. Internal Threat

~~(S)~~ In the aftermath of the MPLA's 1975 pre-independence seizure of the central government from a hastily formed coalition of insurgent groups, the MPLA has been seeking to consolidate its control over the country. In areas it controls, the MPLA rules with dictatorial power; however, a guerrilla war is being waged by Dr. Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Since the early 1980s, UNITA has greatly expanded its size, capabilities, and scope of operations. Despite a series of government and Cuban military offensives over the years, the insurgents control most of Cuando Cubango and Moxico provinces and have been able to prevent reopening of the Benguela Railroad, and now operate routinely as far north as Uige and Lunda Norte. During the 1987 dry season offensive, government forces attacked UNITA-controlled territory with renewed determination but were routed decisively. The likelihood of similar government offensives creates a dilemma for UNITA — whether to oppose directly such drives into its territory or withdraw and revert to purely guerrilla tactics.

~~(S)~~ UNITA is by far the largest and best organized opposition movement, and receives the core of its support from Angola's largest tribe, the 3 million Ovimbundu. The movement has 64,000 men under arms, of which about 21,000 are semiconventional troops and about 43,000 operate as guerrillas in small-unit formations. Past external support received through Zaire was all but eliminated following the late 1978 rapprochement between the MPLA government and Mobutu. It has increased again in recent years but probably consists primarily of a Zairian safehaven for UNITA troops and a transshipment point for supplies. UNITA also receives vital assistance from South Africa including tailored ground and air support, arms and equipment, logistic and medical support, intelligence, training, and liaison. UNITA also receives some support from Western and pro-Western countries which is funneled through Zaire and South African-controlled Namibia. Most of UNITA's arms, however, are believed to come from captured stocks. The movement's military successes and its conciliatory policies are enabling it to move beyond both its redoubt in the sparsely populated southeast and the Ovimbundu central highlands to areas with other ethnic bases. UNITA hopes to force the MPLA to share power by driving Cuba to withdraw its troops from Angola.

~~(S)~~ Two other insurgent groups were formerly active in the Bakongo-populated northwest, but they have been reduced in recent years to minor security problems. One, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), formerly fought for the secession of that oil-rich exclave, but chronic leadership disputes have rendered it impotent. There are indications the MPLA is seeking to negotiate an end to hostilities with at least one FLEC faction. FLEC may be able to call on 200-300 guerrillas, but their activities are sporadic and uncoordinated. The other Bakongo insurgent group, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), had been a major contender for power during the colonial period but by independence it had been defeated by the Cuban-backed MPLA. Its absentee leader, Holden Roberto, was ousted in 1980; by 1984 it had lost nearly all its ability to oppose the regime, and since then much of its leadership has been coopted by the MPLA. Zaire no longer backs either group. Latent animosity toward the MPLA among former FLEC and FNLA supporters is very likely the explanation for UNITA's ability to expand into both these groups' base areas.

d. External Threat

~~(S)~~ The MPLA views South Africa as the major threat to Angolan sovereignty and

sees the UNITA insurgency largely as an extension of the South African threat. Pretoria has a history of intervention in Angola. In August 1975, a few hundred South African troops first entered Angola, securing the Cunene River Dam and Power Station (a former joint Portuguese-South African project) located several miles inside the country. Later, an expeditionary force of some 2,000 South African troops fought successfully against the MPLA in central Angola in support of UNITA and the FLNA. These troops were pulled back to within 50 km of the southern border with Namibia in January 1976, but at the same time South African reinforcements were sent to this area. South African forces near the border reached 10,000-15,000 troops, including up to 5,000 on the Angolan side. The last of those South African soldiers withdrew from southern Angola, including the dam and power station, at the end of March 1976. South Africa now maintains about 10,000 troops in the northern area of Namibia as a counter to guerrilla activity from across the border. In May 1978, South African forces first struck three South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) camps in Angolan territory. Since then, South Africa has routinely made air and artillery strikes, reconnaissance flights, and limited ground attacks against SWAPO base areas and support facilities as well as six subsequent major cross-border raids. Following the last of these raids — Operation Askari, which concluded in January 1984 — the South Africans occupied a wedge of Angolan territory along the Namibian border, withdrawing only in April 1985. Pretoria's counterguerrilla strategy encompasses much of southern Angola, and at times it is difficult to determine whether its cross-border operations are against SWAPO or in support of UNITA. In 1979 South Africa for the first time struck what were apparently purely Angolan targets although such targets are generally avoided. South Africa in 1985 and 1987 conducted airstrikes against Angolan units engaged in a major offensive against UNITA.

(S) Neighboring Zaire for many years was the chief backer of the MPLA's oldest rival — the FNLA — and a supporter of UNITA and FLEC as well. Despite this, a reconciliation agreement normalizing relations between Angola and Zaire was concluded in February 1976. The agreement was designed to allay each state's fear of destabilization efforts by the other and to promote the reopening of the strategic Benguela Railroad, which provided Angola large amounts of foreign exchange. The line, which is even more vital to both Zaire and Zambia, traverses Angola, which also is in position to control the mouth of the Zaire River, Zaire's outlet to the sea. The agreement with Kinshasa proved ineffective, however, and several thousand ex-Katangan Gendarmes opposed to Zairian President Mobutu invaded Zaire in March 1977. The invasion was sponsored by Angola and probably supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union; some 2,000 of the Katangans and followers secured a measure of control over the western portion of Zaire's vital Shaba Province until Mobutu, with Morocco's assistance, was able to regain control of the area. A May 1978 invasion, also backed by Angola and Cuba, further antagonized Zaire. Since a second rapprochement with Kinshasa was effected in July 1978, some of the ex-Katangans (who now call themselves the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo — FLNC) have been dispersed away from the Zaire border while others from time to time have again assisted — or even joined — the FAPLA. Also as part of the rapprochement, Kinshasa placed effective restrictions on FNLA, UNITA, and FLEC. As a result, Zaire ceased to pose an immediate threat to Angola. In the intervening 9 years, however, the FLNC has become demoralized and disorganized, while UNITA has acquired renewed Zairian support. Hence, Zaire once again looms as a potential threat to the MPLA but Luanda in turn makes veiled threats to unleash the FLNC. However, Angola's military potential is now much greater than that of Zaire because of Soviet weaponry received, the presence of Cuban troops, and expansion of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA). Another neighbor, Zambia, backed UNITA during the civil war.

Lusaka now maintains good relations with the RPA, but may continue low-level contacts with UNITA.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S)~~ Since the MPLA owes its original takeover and continued existence to Soviet and Cuban support, it is heavily influenced by those countries. The late President Neto himself joined the youth wing of the Portuguese Communist Party when he was a student in Lisbon and several years later joined the MPLA, which had been formed in 1956 by Angolan nationalists and members of the Angolan Communist Party. During the 1960s and 1970s, the MPLA followed the Moscow party line more closely than did any other African liberation movement. In October 1976, Angola signed both a friendship treaty, including a military agreement, and a separate party-to-party agreement with the Soviet Union. The treaty, even stronger than the 1974 USSR-Somalia treaty, puts the MPLA on record as rejecting African socialism in favor of the scientific socialism of Marx and Lenin. Angola also has signed friendship agreements with Cuba, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, North Korea, Romania, and possibly Poland. Angola strongly supports the Soviet Bloc and Cuba in international forums, and in 1980 was one of three Sub-Saharan states to vote against a UN condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the December 1977 party congress, the MPLA was transformed into the MPLA-Labor Party, officially described as a "vanguard working class party pursuing Marxist-Leninist ideology." The first task given to the party's central committee was directing an immediate purge of ideological dissidents. Nevertheless, the exact nature of Angolan Marxism is unclear; moreover, the cleavages pointed out in paragraph 1.b. contribute to some diversity among Angolan leaders on this issue. The Angolan Armed Forces are particularly susceptible to Communist influence because of the forces' poor capabilities on their own and the fact that most equipment in the inventory is of Soviet Bloc origin. Top leadership in the Armed Forces is disproportionately non-black (although the number of non-blacks is small) and therefore especially dependent on foreign backing to stay in power. Enlisted personnel, who are generally black, resent as excessive the influence of white foreign Communist military advisers, who are seen partly as guarantors of white and mulatto dominance in Angola.

f. Economic Factors

~~(C)~~ Angola's agriculturally based economy is augmented by extraction (chiefly oil and diamonds) and light industry. Angola imports at least 50 percent of its food needs. Other leading imports are machinery, electrical equipment, iron, steel, metals, and vehicles. Major exports are oil, diamonds, and coffee. Major trading partners are Cuba, the USSR, Portugal, and the US. The 1986 estimate for GNP was $3.0 billion — $390 per capita. Angola's real gross domestic product (GDP) has probably declined every year since 1978, and there is no indication that trend will be reversed in the near future. Oil production continued to climb in 1986-87, and oil prices have stabilized. However, Angola still needs to meet debt arrears from last year when oil prices plunged. The inflation rate in Angola is estimated at 25 percent per year. Foreign debt at the beginning of 1986 was $3.9 billion, requiring 16.4 percent of export earnings for repayment.

~~(S/NF)~~ Angola does not have the capability to produce military materiel except possibly the most basic quartermaster items. Since 1975, the USSR has been the major supplier of military equipment. The USSR has delivered fighter and transport aircraft, helicopters, landing ships, patrol craft, tanks, APCs, ADA, a wide variety of SAMs, ammunition, and support equipment valued at over $6.4 billion. Romania has supplied trainer aircraft and helicopters, while East Germany has sent thousands of trucks. Deliveries of military

equipment from Free World countries have been less than 3 percent, by dollar value, of those from Communist states.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S)~~ The RPA's dependence on Moscow and Havana (particularly on the 46,000 Cuban military personnel and 6,000 Cuban civilians) and its current relations with neighboring states are an outgrowth of the MPLA's turbulent recent past. In January 1975, Portugal brought all three major Angolan nationalist factions (MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA) together in a transitional government under the terms of the Alvor Agreement, which established 11 November 1975 as the date of Angolan independence. Before Independence Day, scattered fighting broke out among the nationalist factions, and in March 1975 the Soviet Union and Cuba began their buildup of military aid for the MPLA. This buildup showed an unprecedented willingness on the part of the Soviets to support militarily a government takeover by a Marxist faction in Africa. Cuban advisers began to arrive in large numbers in September, the MPLA became more aggressive, and fighting escalated in the following months, technically becoming a civil war at independence. Thousands of Cuban troops were injected into the fighting for the MPLA, while smaller numbers of South African and Zairian troops supported the other two factions. The FNLA and UNITA, already in an alliance of convenience, formed a rival government to the Luanda-based RPA. International pressure and the weight of Soviet and Cuban assistance forced a South African pullback and the eventual collapse of the regular FNLA and UNITA forces. By the end of February 1976, the civil war was over, with UNITA, FNLA, and FLEC waging guerrilla warfare in the southeast, northwest, and Cabinda, respectively. Based on scanty evidence, it is estimated that Cuba has suffered 10,000 casualties, including perhaps 2,000 dead, since entering Angola. Several thousand others have died as a result of accidents or disease.

~~(S)~~ During the civil war, the following additional states sent at least token military contingents to the aid of the MPLA: Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Mozambique, Congo, and Somalia. The MPLA also received strong political support from Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda. Although the Organization of African Unity deadlocked in 1976 on recognition of the RPA, all member states now recognize it as the legitimate government of Angola.

~~(S)~~ As one of the Frontline States, Angola supported liberation movements aimed at white-ruled Rhodesia and provided training camps for the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which lost the struggle for control of Zimbabwe to a rival. Angola supports even more vigorously SWAPO, which has both training and staging bases in Angola and seeks to take control of Namibia from the white-dominated government there. Nevertheless, Angola also backs a UN-supervised solution for the Namibia problem. Angola also supports the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, a liberation group opposed to white rule there, and the anti-Mobutu FLNC, both of which also have training bases in Angola.

(U) Angola is a member of the UN, the OAU, the Nonaligned Movement, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and other international organizations.

h. (U) Key US Officials

None. The US has not recognized the RPA.

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. ~~(C)~~ Key Military Officials

Armed Forces: Commander in Chief, MPLA, President Jose Eduardo *dos Santos*

Minister of Defense, Col-Gen Pedro Maria *Tonha* ("Pedale")

Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Antonio dos Santos *Franca* ("N'dalu")

Vice Minister of Defense and Political Commissar of the Armed Forces: Lt Gen Francisco Magalhaes *Paiva* ("Nvunda")

Vice Minister of Defense and Deputy Chief of Staff: Maj Gen Roberto *Leal* ("Monteiro")

Chief of Intelligence Directorate: Maj Mario Placido Cirilo *de Sa* ("Ita")

Army: Commander, probably same as Armed Forces Chief of General Staff

Navy: Commander, Maj Gen Antonio Jose *de Carvalho* ("Toka")

Air Force and Air Defense: Commander, Lt Col Alberto *Carreia* ("Neto")

Militia: Commander, Lt Col Paiva Domingos *da Silva* ("Mussuca")

b. Position of the Armed Forces

~~(C)~~ The Armed Forces of the RPA are called the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). Both headquarters and general staff are in Luanda, where they are strongly advised by Cuban and Soviet military personnel. Military personnel often fill important civilian positions such as government minister, provincial governor, party official, diplomatic negotiator, and adviser to the President. Elections at the December 1985 Second Party Congress resulted in a military-dominated politburo. The FAPLA consists of an army large by African standards, smaller naval and air forces, and a militia force. The military was once generally respected by the populace in areas that were traditionally pro-MPLA, but that attitude seems to have declined in inverse proportion to UNITA successes. Elsewhere it is tolerated by the civilian populace. Military service is unpopular and avoided. Many of the Army's troops are very young, poorly trained and disciplined, and uneducated. Reports of dissension over racial issues and of poor relations with Cubans are common. The country's poor economic situation has resulted in severe shortages of food and other supplies in at least some areas, with attendant morale and discipline problems in the FAPLA.

~~(C)~~ Although overall command relationships are not well known, the constitution published in early 1978 states that the President of the MPLA-Labor Party (rather than the President of the RPA, although both positions currently are held by the same man) is the commander in chief of the FAPLA. He exercises control through the Minister of Defense and military region commanders. Informal avenues of influence (tribal, regional, linguistic, generational, ideological, educational, and others) exist outside the formal structure and are very important. Control of Cuban troops in Angola is probably exercised outside the Angolan military structure with possible nominal subordination. There is also a Soviet-led combined command of Angolans, Cubans, Soviets, and possibly East Germans.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(C)~~ At independence on 11 November 1975, the FAPLA was essentially a guerrilla force fighting a conventional-style war. Since then, there has been an extensive training program designed to turn the FAPLA into a modern conventional armed force, although ironically it now finds itself waging a counterinsurgency effort. Apparently progress has been slow in the conventional training area, since most sophisticated equipment is still manned by Cubans. Some specialized units have been created, but acquisition of a significant counterinsurgency capability is a more distant prospect. FAPLA has increased its force structure appreciably in recent years, much of the increase apparently accomplished by converting militia troops

into regulars — a practice also evident in the Soviet-advised Ethiopian Army. Since 1983 there has been an upsurge in Soviet equipment deliveries, particularly in the air and air defense areas. This is apparently part of a strategy to make greater use of airpower to discourage South African intervention and to improve reconnaissance, mobility, and tactical air support to carry the war to UNITA-controlled regions in the south and east.

~~(C)~~ The 1987 FAPLA offensive against UNITA showed continued heavy dependence on Cubans and Soviets in order to accomplish an unprecedented logistic buildup prior to the commencement of operations in Moxico and Cuando Cubango Provinces. This involvement will continue and may increase in the future. In accordance with the 1976 friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, advanced equipment will continue to be delivered to Angola. Angola originally claimed that Cuban forces were in the country to defend against South Africa and that these forces would begin to leave if South African raids ceased. In fact, however, Cuban forces are also necessary to prop up the MPLA regime and to assist in combating insurgencies; it is likely, therefore, that Cuba will continue to station large numbers of troops in Angola for the foreseeable future, even if independence comes peacefully to Namibia and South African raids cease. Angola's more recent statements acknowledge this, insisting that Cuban troops will not withdraw until South African-backed destabilization efforts cease; since Angola attributes all UNITA success to South African support, Angola has a convenient justification for retaining Cuban troops indefinitely. Were Angola's Soviet Bloc and Cuban patrons to leave, the FAPLA's limited capabilities, dissension among its personnel, and the Government's narrow regional and ideological bases of support probably would cause the FAPLA to quickly (i.e., within a year) lose control of all but a few areas.

~~(C)~~ The missions of the Armed Forces are inferred to be keeping the MPLA regime in power, defending the national territory, and combating the internal threat posed by insurgent groups.

d. ~~(C/NF)~~ Military Budget: $587 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1983 (25 percent of central government budget), the last year for which information is available. No service allocation is available.

e. (U) Population

7,950,000 estimated as of July 1987 (includes Cabinda)

Males (ages 15-49): 1,933,000; physically fit, 972,000

Ethnic divisions: Africans — 94 percent; Europeans — 5 percent; mestizos — 1 percent

Literacy: 20 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To maintain the regime securely in power, defend the national territory, and combat insurgency.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ Even without the assistance of Cuban forces currently in-country, the Army would be capable of blunting an attack launched by any of Angola's neighbors except South Africa. However, it could not maintain the integrity of the country's borders and could not prevent infiltration. Counterinsurgency capabilities would be poor; the Army would have little

offensive capability despite its impressive list of equipment. Moreover, disunity in the Army probably would sap even these capabilities rapidly.

~~(S)~~ With the help of Cuban forces now in Angola, the picture changes considerably. In this case, the combined forces could repel an attack from any of Angola's black neighbors and blunt an attack from South African forces in Namibia. These forces still would not be capable of preventing infiltration or eliminating insurgency. The Cuban-backed FAPLA forces would be capable of limited offensive operations (i.e., shallow penetrations) against the poorly defended frontiers of Zaire or Zambia. But they would be incapable of successful offensive operations against South African forces in Namibia. Army capabilities are expected to continue to improve gradually as a result of the extensive training program underway since independence and the growing combat experience of officers and NCOs.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ An estimated 70,000 indigenous regular Army troops. In addition, there are about 46,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, of whom about 21,000-25,000 may be ground force personnel organized into brigade-type units performing garrison duty, thereby freeing FAPLA for counterinsurgency operations. (The remainder of the Cubans are advisers and air defense personnel.) There are also estimated to be several thousand former Katangan Gendarmes (who now call themselves National Front for the Liberation of the Congo — FLNC) exiled from Zaire, many of whom are aiding the Angolan regime against UNITA. An estimated 3,500 SWAPO personnel also assist the FAPLA in operations against UNITA.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The Army is under the direct centralized command of the FAPLA General Staff in Luanda. There are 10 military regions (MRs) for the command and control of Army units. These are based upon the same MRs established by the MPLA during its years of insurgency against Portugal, although the boundaries seem to have changed somewhat from time to time and some have been split into two. When the civil war was in progress, the Army was organized into fronts rather than MRs, as some of the latter were wholly or partially occupied by the enemy. The first MR, in northwestern Angola, is headquartered in Uige; the second, in Cabinda; the third, in eastern Angola, is headquartered in Luena; the fourth (central Angola), in Huambo; and the fifth (southwestern Angola), in Lubango. MR 6 (southeastern Angola) is headquartered in Menongue, MR 7 (the central coast) in Benguela, MR 8 HQ in Luanda, MR 9 in Malange, and MR 10 (the northeast) in Saurimo.

~~(S)~~ These regional control elements are thought to be the equivalent of division headquarters, but they are static command centers probably responsible for the day-to-day support of units within each region, not field-deployable headquarters. Regional military councils, of which the military region commanders are members, have been established in the six regions most affected by the UNITA insurgency. These councils are designed to address political and economic problems as well as security issues and to mobilize all resources — not just military ones — in meeting security threats. The councils are subordinate to the President and the Armed Forces commander but are not believed to have operational authority over military region commanders.

(b) Ground Combat Units

~~(S/NF)~~ The largest organizational combat unit is the brigade. The brigade is also the principal maneuver element in the Army, while tactical engagements usually occur at battalion or lower level. There are about 80 infantry brigades and a tank brigade. A few

of the infantry brigades may be specialized, such as air assault, but virtually all-function as light infantry. Progress has apparently been made in recent years in mechanizing some infantry brigades. Infantry brigades vary in size, but most contain 3-5 infantry battalions of about 400 men each. These brigades are often supported by artillery and less frequently by armored units. Artillery battalions or batteries attached to infantry brigades probably contain a wide variety of weapons ranging from 122-mm howitzers to mortars. The chief tactical armored unit is the tank company with a TOE of 10 tanks. Tenuous evidence indicates an infantry brigade may have an authorized strength of about 1,700, but actual strength may average only 700 men. The organization of support units is unknown. Air defense units are part of the Air Force.

(c) Army Aviation Units

~~(S)~~ None. All aircraft are operated by the Air Force, including light spotter aircraft and helicopters.

(d) Deployment

~~(S/NF)~~ All Army units except an apparent battalion stationed in Sao Tome are deployed in Angola, including the Cabinda exclave. Main concentrations are in the Luanda area, in Cabinda, in the central highlands, and in the east and the southeast where most operations against UNITA are conducted. At any one time, perhaps as many as 800 Cubans from Angola may be in neighboring Congo, either in transit to or from Angola, for rest and relaxation in Congo, or deployed in Congo while assisting in maintaining security in Cabinda. These personnel are included in the 46,000 or more Cuban military personnel believed to be in Angola; however, they are not counted as assisting the Congolese Armed Forces. Moreover, the Cubans in Angola serve as a pool from which troops can be drawn for the Mozambican conflict, if necessary; or for service elsewhere in Africa.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ The Army is well equipped by African standards. There is a conglomeration of light weapons and equipment — some inherited from the Portuguese, some acquired during the years of insurgency, but most of it more recently obtained from the USSR and Eastern Europe. Heavy infantry weapons are in abundant supply and include 12.7-mm heavy machineguns, 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, and 82-mm and 107-mm recoilless rifles. Over the past few years the USSR has delivered an impressive list of armor, artillery, and air defense artillery. The following is a consolidated listing of major items of combat equipment delivered by foreign suppliers:

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Mortars:	120-mm heavy	UR	40
	82-mm	UR	500
	81-mm	NI	50
	60-mm	NI	100
Rkt Lchrs (RL) and Rcl Rifles (RCLR):	122-mm RL, BM-21	UR	90
	240-mm RL, BM-24	UR	40
	40-mm AT RL, RPG-7	UR	575
	40-mm AT RL, RPG-2	UR	1,000

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
	107-mm RCLR, B-11	UR	60
	82-mm RCLR, B-10	UR	700
Artillery:	122-mm gun and/or how	UR	200
	152-mm howitzer	UR	40
	130-mm fld gun, M-46	UR	70
	100-mm fld gun, M-1955	UR, CU	50
	85-mm gun	UR	40
	76-mm gun, ZIS-3, M-1942	UR	270
Armor:	Tank, mdm, T-62	UR	20
	Tank, mdm, T-54/55,	UR, PL, CU	460
	Tank, mdm, T-34, 85-mm	UR, YO, CU	100
	Tank, lt amph, PT-76	UR	30
	APC, BTR-60P	UR	100
	APC, BTR-40, -50, -152	UR, CU	100
	IFV, amph, BMP	UR	55
	ARC, BRDM-2	UR	75
	ARC, U/I	UR	210
Air Defense:	57-mm, 85-mm, 100-mm	UR	12
	57-mm ADA, S-60	UR	80
	37-mm ADA, M1939	UR	190
	23-mm ADA, ZSU-23-4	UR	68
	23-mm ADA, ZU-23-2	UR	200
	14.5-mm, ZPU-1, -2, -4	UR	180
	SAM, SA-7/GRAIL	UR	100
	SAM, SA-2/GUIDELINE	UR	42
	SAM, SA-3/GOA	UR	51
	SAM, SA-6/GAINFUL	UR	20
	SAM, SA-8/GECKO	UR	16
	SAM, SA-9/GASKIN	UR	52
	SAM, SA-13/GOPHER	UR	40

(6) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The Soviet- and Cuban-advised reorganization of the Army's logistic system that began after the Portuguese departure in 1975 and the accompanying infusion of large amounts of military material resulted in significantly enhanced support capabilities. The logistic system functions fairly effectively; however, it is dependent upon foreign sources for virtually all military supplies and relies heavily on Cuban military personnel for its operation. Logistic facilities and equipment themselves are adequate to support current levels of military operations. A wide and effective variety of support equipment, transport vehicles, and communications gear has been provided to Angola by the Soviet Union and its allies, particularly East Germany. Although loss of equipment during South African incursions and in operations against UNITA has been substantial, available stock remains adequate and replacement of materiel continues at a steady rate.

~~(S)~~ Centralized control of supply and logistic functions has resulted in relatively efficient resource allocation. Most units in rear areas are adequately supplied; breakdowns in the distribution cycle occur primarily in areas where adverse security conditions prevail and

lines of communication are frequently interdicted, where units are engaged in combat operations, or in support of isolated outposts. Food and noncombat materiel seem to be in shortest supply. Maintenance of equipment is presumed fair to good, with most major service being performed by Cuban or Soviet Bloc technicians. Although technical training of indigenous personnel is conducted, maintenance of most equipment and sophisticated systems remains dependent on foreign assistance. Given the current level of internal security problems and threat from South Africa, large-scale foreign assistance will continue to be required to maintain adequate support capabilities.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ Angolan males between the ages of 18 and probably 30 are subject to 3 years of military service. In an emergency, 15- to 17-year-olds may also be required to serve. Service beyond 3 years is allegedly voluntary. The term of service for officers is unknown. Volunteers come mainly from urban or Kimbundu tribal areas — longtime sources of MPLA support. Most FAPLA troops are probably conscripts, however. Theoretically, military callups take place twice a year, based on rolls kept of birthdates. Enrollment compliance is so rare, however, that conscription cannot be done by name. Instead, FAPLA simply requires all males of a given age to report for induction. Evasion and even flight are so widespread that FAPLA commonly impresses all youths who appear to be the required age. This probably occurs year-round and chiefly in urban areas where roundups are easiest to conduct. Conscription has cut into economic production because almost all of the small number of technically trained young males are inducted. No more than 5 percent of the annual intake may be granted deferments or exemptions, even for medical reasons. Recruits are assembled in holding camps, under poor conditions, until they are transported en masse to basic training sites. Desertions are common, beginning at the Recruiting and Mobilization Centers. To combat this, personnel may be assigned to areas populated with unfamiliar ethnic groups. Adequacy of pay and other benefits is not known, but morale is generally poor. Material incentives (e.g., wristwatches) are used. Women may join FAPLA but are not subject to conscription.

(8) Training

~~(S)~~ The overall quality of training is poor to fair, but is improving. Most troops receive some basic training; the amount varies, with much of it very rudimentary. The low educational level of personnel impedes successful training. Efforts are being made to improve the quality of training programs, and the Cubans and other foreign advisers play a prominent role in this effort. Training now is concentrated in three main areas: officer training (much of which is being conducted abroad), training in the employment of heavy weapons and other modern equipment, and technical training. Attempts are probably being made to provide combined arms training, and to emphasize maneuver warfare. Political indoctrination probably consumes a large percentage of training time.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(C)~~ Males are subject to callup for reserve duty from the time they complete active duty until age 50, but it is not known whether a reserve organization actually exists. It is likely that the militia is considered a reserve force. The civil war showed that tens of thousands of Angolans can be mobilized in a relatively short time, but lack of training would seriously affect their usefulness.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

(U) To patrol the coast, defend the ports from seaborne attack, and transport men and materiel.

(2) Capabilities and Limitations

~~(S)~~ The People's Navy of Angola *(Marinha de Guerra Popular de Angola — MGPA)* is a force of marginal significance. It has a minor patrol capability (mainly on the northern coast near Luanda), can conduct occasional escort operations in coastal waters, and is capable of providing some important sealift support to the ground forces. During pre-independence fighting among Angola's insurgent groups, landing craft were used as mobile fire platforms for rockets and other Army weapons. The Navy's limited capability to conduct operations, and even to keep its ships operational, is directly dependent on the presence of foreign seamen and advisers serving with the Navy and on materiel from abroad. Except for perhaps a small number of whites and mulattoes who previously served in the Portuguese Navy, the Angolan Navy has no personnel with naval experience dating before 1975.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ Estimated at 1,500, not including foreign advisers. This total could include some former members of the Portuguese colonial forces who may or may not have Angolan citizenship.

(4) Ship and Aircraft Strength

(a) ~~(S/NF)~~ *Ships*

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
LSM (mdm amph aslt landing ship POLNOCNY Class)	3			
PTG (missile attack boat, OSA II Class)	4			2
PT (torpedo boat, SHERSHEN Class)				5
PC (patrol craft, Argos Class)	5			
PB (patrol boat)				11
LCU (util landing craft, Alfange Class)				1
LCU (util landing craft)				3
LCM (mdm landing craft)	5			
LCP (personnel landing craft)	4			
AK (cargo ship)	4			1
Total: 48	25			23

(b) Aircraft

~~(S)~~ None. MiG-21 aircraft of the Angolan Air Force based in Luanda fly occasional patrol missions over the coastal waters.

(5) Organization and Deployment

~~(S)~~ The commander of the Navy is collocated with and subordinate to the FAPLA headquarters in Luanda. The main base is located at the former Portuguese naval facilities

in Luanda harbor. Several islands near Luanda are used for naval training, and some islands reportedly have coastal artillery batteries, which probably are under naval command. Naval units are also based at Lobito and Namibe. Marine units may have been organized, and Navy units are apparently deployed along some inland waterways, at least in Cuando Cubango Province and along the Zaire River.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Ex-Portuguese Navy vessels are probably in fair-to-poor condition. Five coastal transport vessels (600 to 900 DWT) were acquired from local civilian shipping companies during the war; at least two of these were also former Portuguese Navy. The most modern patrol boats are six OSA II PTGs, as well as five 137-ft Argos PCs, each armed with two 40-mm guns. Four of the latter reportedly are being equipped with new electronic and communications systems by Soviet naval technicians. The other eleven patrol boats are smaller, and some are believed to be in poor condition. Two are 69-ft Jupiter Class boats, each with two 20-mm guns, and five are 68-ft Bellatrix Class, each with a single 20-mm gun. Many of the 14 landing craft are inoperable. The 187-ft Alfange Class LCU is in heavy use, however. Three unidentified LCUs, two POLUCHAT PBs, six OSA II PTGs, five SHERSHEN PTs, and three POLNOCNY LSMs have been supplied by the USSR.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ Built by the Portuguese in the early 1960s, the Luanda Port Facilities and Naval Base are the largest and most important port and naval facility in the country and have one of the best deep water harbors on the west Africa coast. This expanding base provides shore support activities for naval combatants and billeting for personnel. The importance of the port is expanding, due to a recognition of Luanda's potential strategic value, which is reflected by a large Soviet and Cuban presence together with facility expansion and increasing military activity.

~~(S)~~ The Luanda maritime complex handles breakbulk, roll-on/roll-off containers, grain, ore, cement, and petroleum products. The port also serves as a Soviet replenishment, refueling, and repair facility. It is also the major disembarkation point for Cuban troops entering Angola.

~~(S)~~ Small repair yards at Luanda, Lobito, and Soyo routinely overhaul small combatants on end-haul marine railways. The maintenance of ships and facilities is largely dependent on Soviet and Cuban technicians. An 8,500-ton Soviet floating drydock and repair facility routinely repairs Soviet 2,600-ton factory trawlers and could be pressed into service support for combatants as large as a KRESTA Class cruiser.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ There is a critical shortage of trained personnel; most of those recruited have come from the Luanda area. After independence in November 1975, when the Angolan Navy was formed, an effort was made to recruit former members of the Portuguese Navy. Terms of service for Navy personnel are probably similar to those described in paragraph 3.a.(7).

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ It is difficult to judge the quality of training in the Navy, but it probably is improving. In 1976, a small Portuguese Navy team was in Luanda, probably advising the MGPA, but since its departure all foreign naval advisers, instructors, and technicians probably have been Soviets and Cubans. An unknown number of Angolans have been sent to the USSR and Cuba for naval officer training. In the Luanda area, training in naval gunnery and

coastal artillery reportedly is being conducted under the direction of Soviets and Cubans. A large amount of training time is wasted on political indoctrination, which is believed to be ineffective.

~~(S)~~ Some members were trained during the period of transition to independence (January-November 1975) by the Portuguese Navy to be part of an integrated MPLA-UNITA-FNLA force. Because of the Portuguese Navy's clandestine support of the MPLA, however, most of those trained were members of that faction.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(C)~~ The existence of a reserve and mobilization system for personnel is unknown, but males are theoretically subject to callup for reserve duty from the time they complete active duty until age 50. There are in Angola 14 merchant ships of 1,000 GRT or over which could be mobilized for military use. These include 12 general cargo ships, 1 bulk carrier, and 1 POL tanker.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(U) To provide logistic and tactical support to the ground forces and to protect Angolan airspace.

(2) Capabilities and Limitations

~~(S/NF)~~ The Angolan People's Air Force and Air Defense (FAPA/DAA), with the assistance of Cuban personnel and a Soviet An-12/CUB squadron in Angola, is capable of providing limited support to surface forces, including reconnaissance and transport. Air defense, ground attack, and search and rescue capabilities are less well developed. The Air Force is capable of defending against air attacks and of helping to blunt ground incursions from any of Luanda's neighbors except South Africa. An air defense system, including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and radars, has been installed primarily in the southern sectors and should improve Angolan capabilities against South Africa in the long term, but the system is reportedly not yet fully integrated. The Air Force also poses a potential threat of air attack to neighboring countries other than South African-controlled Namibia. Its combat capability is built around MiG-21/FISHBEDs, MiG-23/FLOGGERs, Su-22/FITTERs, and Mi-25/HINDs, as well as SA-2, -3, -6, -7, -8, -9, and -13 SAMs. The Air Force is heavily dependent on foreign sources for operational aircrews, training and maintenance personnel, aircraft, repair parts, and general supplies.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ Estimated at 2,500. There are also Cuban air force and air defense personnel aiding the FAPA/DAA. Pilot totals are estimated very roughly at 260 Cubans and 110 Angolans. There may also be pilots from Portugal or perhaps other countries. The Soviet advisory mission includes personnel assisting the Air Force as instructors (including instructor pilots), mechanics, advisers, and perhaps staff.

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 250 (115 jet, 52 turboprop, 9 prop, 74 turbine helicopter)

In operational units: 250
(115 fighters: 95 all-weather, 7 ground attack, 13 fighter-trainer;
45 transports;
16 reconnaissance;

74 helicopters: 30 medium, 17 light, 27 attack)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The commander of the Air Force is responsible to the FAPLA general headquarters in Luanda. The main operating base in the north is located at the former Portuguese Air Force (PAF) base adjacent to Luanda's international airport; the major airbase in the south is at Lubango. Other important airbases are at Huambo, Lobito, Luena, Malange, Menongue, Namibe, and Cuito Cuanavale. Unit organization is unknown; a postulated organization is shown below. Some reports imply there may be dual chains of command — Cuban and Angolan. Aircraft are probably permanently based at the locations mentioned above, but it is routine for them to be based temporarily at forward airfields or other airbases where fuel and/or support facilities are less adequate. SAM defenses are located primarily along the Namibe-Menongue rail line and at a few urban areas farther north; e.g., Luanda, Huambo, and Malange.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Summary of Postulated Units

Unit	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
1 Trainer Sqdn	MiG-23, IAR-823	13	Negage/Lubango
1 FITTER Sqdn	Su-22	7	Namibe
3 FLOGGER Sqdns	MiG-23	50	Luanda/Lubango/ Menongue
3 FISHBED Sqdns	MiG-21	45	Lubango/Menongue/ Namibe
2 HIND Sqdns	Mi-25, Mi-35	27	Luanda/Huambo
3 Transport/Utility Sqdns	An-26, An-2, CASA-212, F-27, DO-27, BN-2, Fan Jet Falcon	45	Luanda
2 HIP Sqdns	Mi-8	30	Luanda/Huambo
1 Light Helicopter	Alouette III, SA-330	17	Luanda
2 Recon Sqdns	C-172, PC-7, Fiat G91	16	Luanda

There is also a Soviet An-12/CUB detachment of about 12 aircraft in-country assisting the Soviet advisory group and the Angolan Armed Forces with air transport.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ The equipment inventory includes some old ex-PAF aircraft but is composed primarily of Soviet-provided fighters, helicopters, and transports; transports acquired from the civil airline; and some light aircraft purchased in Western Europe and others taken away from private owners in Angola. Some old inoperable aircraft abandoned by the PAF in Angola have not been added to the Air Force inventory (e.g., PV-2 Harpoon bombers and F-84 fighters). Besides MiGs and Soviet-supplied helicopters, other aircraft that have been used in combat are Fiat G91 jet ground attack aircraft, and Alouette III helicopters. Soviet-provided equipment is in good condition; other aircraft vary widely in material condition. SAMs also probably are kept in good repair, since missile defense remains largely in the hands of Cubans.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The Air Force logistics system is entirely dependent on foreign personnel to operate effectively. The Cubans are in charge of Luanda Airfield and are chiefly responsible for logistic support. Soviet technicians assemble Soviet supplied aircraft and, along with Cubans, work on airfield construction, facility improvements, and communications. Maintenance of MiG, An-26, and Mi-8 military aircraft at Luanda is performed by Soviet personnel. Soviet-made helicopters are maintained jointly by Soviet and Cuban ground crews. About 25 percent of the MiGs at Luanda are normally grounded for maintenance. Western-made aircraft in the Angolan Air Force are maintained primarily by Angolan Airlines (TAAG). However, some major overhauls have been done in Portugal. French-manufactured Alouette III helicopters have been maintained by former Portuguese Air Force personnel working for the FAPA. Twelve Soviet An-12 aircraft operate out of Luanda, providing logistic support to Soviet advisers and FAPLA units throughout Angola.

(8) Personnel Recruitment and Retention

~~(S)~~ Shortages of all types of personnel exist; recruitment practices and terms of service are probably similar to those described in paragraph 3.a.(7). During the colonial period, the Portuguese Air Force (and Navy) recruited few if any black Angolans — unlike the Army, which recruited large numbers. As a result, it is difficult to find any blacks with air force experience dating before 1975. Thus, it is likely that some white former members of the PAF have been recruited for the Angolan Air Force.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ Few details are available on training; however, there is considerable activity both in-country and abroad. Angolan pilots have been training in the Soviet Union since mid-1975, and some may be trained in Cuba. The Cubans are very active in training air force personnel in-country in a variety of skills. Pilot training schools have been established at N'gage and Lobito, where Portuguese Communist mercenaries who are PAF reservists may have replaced the former Romanian instructors. The number of Angolan aircrews probably has increased along with the growth in the inventory. The proficiency level of Angolan crews is reportedly very low, however.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(U) No organized reserve is known, and the Air Force is small enough and new enough that, in any case, few former Air Force personnel would be available for mobilization or to form a reserve. Virtually all of the country's civil aircraft, facilities, and indigenous civil aviation personnel would be available to the Government in a national emergency. Without foreign assistance, however, use of the aircraft would be restricted by a shortage of qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel.

(U) The total number of licensed pilots of major transport aircraft and other civil aviation personnel in Angola is not known. Approximately 24 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kg currently are registered, owned, and operated in Angola: 1 707-320B, 5 707-320C, 3 An-26/CURL, 4 737-200, 1 737-200C, 2 L-100/L-382 Hercules, 1 F-27-400 Friendship, 3 F-27-600 Friendship, 1 F-27-500 Friendship, and 3 Yak-40/CODLING.

(U) With the exception of one F-27-500 Friendship, all of the above aircraft are in the fleet of Angola's national flag carrier, TAAG, which is wholly government owned. The F-27-500 is operated by Sonangol, Angola's state-owned oil company. The F-27-400 Maritime provides coastal surveillance and SAR duties rather than normal commercial service. This aircraft is reportedly operated by TAAG, but may be part of the Air Force inventory. Transport

aircraft of the Angolan Air Force carry civil registration markings and some may operate occasionally for TAAG. Likewise, TAAG aircraft routinely provide important transportation support to FAPLA.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Militia

(S) The militia (People's Defense Organization — ODP) was formed during the civil war as an auxiliary to the FAPLA and was of some value during the 1975 streetfighting in Luanda. The bulk of its original members were youths between 12 and 20 years old with virtually no military training. That ragtag, undisciplined unit had little military capability. Following independence, the militia was augmented with adults and was organized apparently on a local basis. It has chiefly rear area guard functions (including performing these functions along the Benguela Railroad), and thereby frees FAPLA personnel for offensive counterinsurgency operations. Militia personnel have suffered increasingly numerous casualties at the hands of UNITA, partly as a result of assisting the Army in counterinsurgency operations. The militia formerly comprised about 30,000 armed personnel, but it is believed that up to 20,000 of these may have been incorporated into the Army in the last 2 years. Thus, current militia strength is believed to be about 10,000 but may, in fact, be much higher. Some uncorroborated reports have placed the size of the force as high as 100,000. The militia is probably more important to the government's counterinsurgency effort than any other paramilitary force. Little is known about its equipment and training, but the militia is probably equipped with a variety of small arms, mainly of Soviet manufacture.

(2) Border Guard

(C) The Angolan Border Guard Service *(Tropa Guarda Fronteira Angolana — TGFA)* surveils Angola's inland and possibly maritime borders and would be expected to deter aggression until regular forces could arrive. In the early years after independence, Cubans may have had border patrol functions; the TGFA may have been established as late as 1977 or 1978. Some training is provided by Cubans in Angola and in Cuba; training in Angola is evidently decentralized, as schools have been noted in Ompanda, Saurimo, Negage, and Caota. TGFA Chief of Staff is Capt Manuel Domingos. Personnel strength is estimated very roughly at up to 6,000. The organization and other details of the TGFA are unknown.

(3) Police

(S/NF) The People's Police Corps of Angola (CPPA) may number 8,000; some are former members of the Portuguese paramilitary services and were well trained in internal security functions. Under the Portuguese, the paramilitary police were organized into companies that could be employed quickly when the shift from normal police to military functions was required. In contrast to the Army, CPPA personnel — at least at independence — were older, better educated, and more experienced. The CPPA is subordinate to the Minister of Interior. In 1981, the Minister of Interior fired the CPPA National Director and took the job himself, presumably temporarily. Whether a full-time replacement has been named is still not known. The Deputy Director appointed at the same time was Capt Fernando Torres Vaz de Conceicao. There is a Police Training School in Luanda; police have also received training in Cuba and Nigeria.

e. (S/NF) Total Military Personnel Strength

(1) Indigenous Forces

Army	70,000
Navy	1,500
Air Force and Air Defense	2,500
Militia	10,000+
Border Guard	6,000
Police	8,000
Total	**98,000+**

(2) Foreign Forces

Cuban	46,000
FLNC	7,500
SWAPO	3,500
ANC	1,200
Total	**58,200**

f. Foreign Military Presence

(1) Cuban Expeditionary Force

~~(S/NF)~~ Cuban military personnel began to arrive in Angola in sizable numbers in September 1975, although some arrived as early as March. The Cubans appear to have been formed into units only after their arrival in Angola. By the end of the year, these forces had increased considerably and were heavily involved in the fighting, both as advisers to the MPLA and as separate combat units. In the late 1970s, however, they increasingly took on the function of garrisoning major towns, leaving combat operations more and more to FAPLA. They function under a Cuban high command, which is probably controlled outside the FAPLA command structure with nominal subordination. Cuban military personnel now number 46,000; also present are 6,000 Cuban civilians. Over half the soldiers are troops organized under brigade-size headquarters deployed chiefly in Luanda, in the central highlands, and along the southern rail line. The Cubans are also assisting the Angolan People's Air Force and Air Defense flying maintaining aircraft (particularly MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-22, Mi-8, and -24, and An-26) and operating part of Angola's air defense system. The remainder of the 37,500 are advisers, instructors, technicians, and staff at all levels of the FAPLA, including the Navy, and probably with some of the insurgent groups — such as SWAPO — being provided assistance by Luanda.

(2) Former Katangan Gendarmes (National Front for the Liberation of the Congo — FLNC)

~~(S)~~ Gendarmes from Zaire's former Katanga province exiled themselves in eastern Angola more than 20 years ago after Katanga's abortive secession attempt. The Katangans were employed by Portugal during its counterinsurgency campaigns and later sided with the MPLA in the civil war. These troops were well trained and experienced, and in the civil war proved to be the best African troops under FAPLA command. They are equipped with infantry weapons. In March 1977, some 2,000 of these Katangans and their followers invaded Zaire's economically vital Shaba Province and secured a measure of control over the western portion of the province until Zaire, with Moroccan assistance, was able to regain control of the area. In May 1978, they invaded Shaba once again and retreated to Angola only as

French and Belgian forces arrived. After the late 1978 rapprochement with Zaire, Angola dispersed most of the FLNC away from the Zaire border. They now number several thousand men; perhaps some 2,000 of them have been aiding FAPLA either as individual soldiers or as a separate force under the FAPLA headquarters and reportedly operating against UNITA.

(3) South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

~~(S)~~ The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has training and staging bases in Angola and SWAPO's semiconventional arm, numbering some 3,500, participates from time to time in operations against UNITA. Elements of SWAPO are probably reluctant to do so, however, at least partly because of ethnic ties between the two groups, and continued SWAPO participation in these operations is uncertain. SWAPO combatants are collocated in many cases with FAPLA and Cuban units.

(4) African National Congress (ANC)

~~(C)~~ The African National Congress (ANC) has several training bases in Angola. In return for Angolan support, an ANC unit was, in the past, required to aid FAPLA's counterinsurgency effort in the north, but it is not known if this support is continuing.

(5) ~~(S/NF)~~ Others

Soviet Advisers: 1,200 (in advisory, training, and technical capacities supporting the Armed Forces at all levels).

East German Advisers: Approximately 1,000 (assisting police and intelligence services and possibly the Army).

North Korean Advisers: Approximately 1,500-3,000.

~~(S)~~ Perhaps three dozen Portuguese citizens, acting on their own behalf, are assisting the FAPLA, particularly in the area of counterinsurgency warfare training. North Korean and Vietnamese military personnel have been reported, but not confirmed, in Angola. Others of Portuguese descent who are Angolan citizens are included in FAPLA strength totals. No official Portuguese military advisers are present.

ANGOLA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Benguela Military Region HQ	1150CA0065	90100	12-36-00E	013-22-30E
Cabinda Military Region HQ	1027-00668	91030	05-38-00S	012-12-00E
Cuito Cuanavale Airfield	1151-08028	80080	15-10-02S	019-10-04E
Huambo Airfield	1151-08002	80081	12-48-20S	015-45-26E
Huambo Military Region HQ	1151-00091	91030	12-48-07S	015-43-16E
Lobito Airfield	1150-08001	80103	12-22-11S	013-32-23E
Lobito Port Fac	1150-00001	95141	12-20-40S	013-33-01E
Lobito Shipyard	1150-00109	67130	12-16-02S	013-34-12E
Luanda Airfield	1057-08001	80081	08-51-11S	013-14-10E
Luanda HQ Joint Commands	1057-00033	91011	08-48-18S	013-13-37E
Luanda Military Region HQ	1057CA0029	90110	08-54-44S	013-09-43E
Luanda Port Fac and Naval Base	1057-00001	95141	08-47-00S	013-14-20E
Lubango Airfield	1150-08011	80081	14-55-28S	013-34-36E
Lubango Military Region HQ	1150-00036	91030	14-55-00S	013-30-00E
Luena Airfield	1056-08001	80081	11-46-06S	019-53-52E
Luena Military Region HQ	1056-00018	91030	11-47-00S	019-52-00E
Malange Airfield	1057-08002	80080	09-31-25S	016-18-57E
Malange Military Region HQ	1057-00247	91140	09-30-40S	016-20-10E
Menongue East Airfield	1151-08818	80080	14-38-15S	017-43-32E
Menongue Military Region HQ	1151-00186	91030	14-39-00S	017-43-00E
Namibe Port Facility	1150-00006	47420	15-11-34S	012-08-07E
Namibe Airfield	1150-08831	80065	15-15-33S	012-08-54E
Negage Airfield	1027-08045	80091	07-45-13S	015-17-31E
Saurimo Military Region HQ	1056-00059	91140	09-39-00S	020-24-00E
Soyo Port Fac and Navy Base	1027-00398	47510	06-07-18S	012-21-55E
Uige Military Region HQ	1027-00651	91030	07-37-00S	015-30-00E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

BOTSWANA

1. ~~(C)~~ **Political-Military Situation:** An independent parliamentary republic and member of the Commonwealth, Botswana is one of the few African countries where democracy is more than an ideal. Formerly the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland, Botswana became an independent state in 1966. Sir Sereste Khama was President until his death in 1980, when he was succeeded by Vice President Quett K. J. Masire. Both Khama and Masire were founding members of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has held a majority in the National Assembly since 1966. Botswana has followed policies emphasizing political stability, democracy, economic development, and nonmilitary involvement in the liberation of southern Africa.

~~(S)~~ Masire has repeatedly expressed concern at the political ambitions of the late President's son, Brigadier Ian Khama. Khama and his followers believe that he is the rightful successor to the Presidency. However, his positions as Deputy Defense Force Commander and Paramount Chief of the Bamangwato tribe restrict his political career. By BDP statute he must resign the Paramountcy 5 years before running for office. The Botswana Defense Force (BDF) Commander, Major General Merafhe, sees Khama as a potentially destabilizing influence on the government, especially if he should gain the support of the younger officers of the BDF. Merafhe hopes that, by retaining older officers in the force and postponing his own retirement, he will be able to check the political ambitions of Khama and ensure that the Army remains a stabilizing factor in domestic affairs.

~~(C)~~ Botswana is a sparsely populated, semiarid, landlocked country approximately the size of France surrounded by South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It is heavily dependent upon economic links with South Africa. Seventy-five percent of the country's imports and 100 percent of its bulk exports pass through South Africa, and 20,000 Botswana work in mines there. Botswana's economy is based chiefly on diamond exports and beef production. Despite 6 years of serious drought, the country has achieved rapid economic growth and impressive foreign exchange reserves, mainly through the sale of diamonds. Botswana is a member of the United Nations (UN); the Organization of African Unity (OAU); and a customs union with South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland; and is associated with the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Lome Convention. Botswana is also active within the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an organization of southern African states seeking to lessen their economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa.

~~(S)~~ In spite of Botswana's position as a member of the Frontline States (the others are Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), it maintains generally proper relations with South Africa, though under strained conditions. Officially, the Government of Botswana refuses to permit anti-South African insurgent groups, such as the Africa National Congress (ANC), to operate from bases in its territory. However, the RSA remains dissatisfied with Gaborone's efforts to discourage ANC operations originating from Botswana. For this reason and in response to ANC attacks inside South Africa, the South African Defense Force (SADF) launched strikes against ANC targets in Botswana in June 1985 and May 1986. The SADF may have also been responsible for explosions which killed several Botswana in January and April 1987.

~~(C)~~ Botswana's Dukwe Camp is a sanctuary for approximately 4,200 refugees, of whom 3,800 are Zimbabweans, the rest coming chiefly from Angola, South Africa, and Namibia.

The majority of refugees in Botswana are required to stay at Dukwe though nearly 1,000 others live in other parts of the country. Botswana must contend with the social burden of the refugees as well as maintaining good relations with the neighboring states from which they come. The latter aspect has been especially difficult in Gaborone's relationship with Zimbabwe, as Zimbabwean anti-government dissidents have occasionally used Dukwe Camp as a refuge and possibly a base of operations. In 1985, the situation became very tense when Harare threatened to take unilateral action against suspected guerillas in the camp. Since that time, Botswana has managed to diffuse the situation by cooperating in the extradition from Dukwe to Zimbabwe of persons identified as non-refugees by Harare. This has, however, created concern among international and American officials that some legitimate refugees may be repatriated to Zimbabwe against their will, casting a bad light on Botswana's otherwise outstanding human rights record.

~~(S)~~ By the mid-1970s, the Government of Botswana recognized that its 350-man Police Mobile Unit (PMU) was not capable of maintaining the integrity of its borders against insurgents, Rhodesian security forces, or the SADF. A decision was made to establish a defense force with greater capabilities to control refugees within Botswana and to prevent border incursions. In 1977, the Botswana Defense Force was established using the PMU as a nucleus. Both the commander and deputy commander were former members of the PMU, but only the deputy, Brigadier Ian Khama, had any military training. Since 1977, the BDF has grown rapidly from 500 men to approximately 4,300. However, it still has a very limited ability to defend against external threats and cannot wholly prevent insurgent operations in its territory. Defense matters are handled by the Cabinet; there is no defense ministry or department.

~~(S)~~ The BDF sees itself primarily as a deterrent force to cross-border operations from neighboring states, particularly South Africa, but recognizes its current limitations against the much larger military forces of Zimbabwe or South Africa.

2. (U) Key Officials:

President: Quett K.J. *Masire*

Vice President: Peter *Mmusi*

Minister of External Affairs: G.K.T. *Chiepe*

Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration: Ponatshego *Kedikilwe*

Botswana Defense Force Commander: Lt Gen Mompati *Merafhe*

Deputy Botswana Defense Force Commander: Maj Gen Ian *Khama*

Air Wing Commander: A. S. *Joshi* (Indian Air Force Officer)

Chief of Intelligence: Colonel Lewis *Fisher*

Commissioner of Police: Simon *Hirschfeld*

3. (U) Military Budget: $26.9 million originally budgeted for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1988. The defense budget represents 3.8 percent of the Central Government Budget. Dollar values converted at an exchange rate of 1.67 pulas equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 1,149,141 as of July 1987

Males (ages 15-49): 215,000 physically fit: 113,000; 13,000 reach military age (18) annually

Ethnic divisions: 95 percent Tswana, 4 percent Bushmen, 1 percent European

Literacy: About 24 percent in English; about 35 percent in Tswana; less than 1 percent secondary school graduates

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ **Army:** Personnel Strength: 4,300

Reserve: None

Major Units: Five infantry companies with a personnel strength of approximately 350 each (2 at Mogaditshane, 2 at Francistown, and 1 at Selebi Phikwe); an armored car company with a strength of about 300; and, a support unit commanding 200-man mortar, antitank, air defense and artillery units. The main base is located at Mogoditshane, 5 miles from Gaborone. Officer training abroad has been done mostly in the UK and Zambia, but the BDF has also established its own officer training program in-country. Some BDF members have received signals, supply, ordnance, and infantry training in India and the United States. Five Soviet advisers arrived in-country during late 1981 to assist with the delivery of Soviet armored vehicles. They departed in October 1982.

Major Equipment: Rifles (Belgian FN, British AR-18, Chinese AK-47 Galil, Uzi submachineguns); machineguns; 6 British 105-mm light artillery pieces; 60-mm and 81-mm mortars; RPG-2 and RPG-7 antitank weapons; 84-mm Carl Gustav recoilless guns; 20-mm antiaircraft guns; 6 Javelin SAM launchers with 40 missiles; 10 Milan anti-tank missile launchers with 40 missiles; 35 Shorland armored cars; 36 V-150 Cadillac-Gage Commando APCs; militarized Land Rovers; 7-ton 4 x 4 Bedford trucks. In late August 1981, the BDF took delivery of a variety of equipment purchased from the Soviet Union. Included in the delivery were 30 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, 3 BTR-40 and 3 BRDM-2 and 12 SA-7 launchers with 64 SA-7/GRAIL surface-to-air missiles.

6. **(U) Navy:** None

7. ~~(C)~~ **Air Force:** The BDF Air Wing was formed in June 1977, and in the following month training began under the auspices of an ex-Royal Air Force pilot. The Air Wing has a total personnel strength of approximately 200. Its aircraft inventory consists of six BN2A-21 Defenders, two Short Skyvans, six Bulldog SA-3-120 armed trainers, and two Cessna 152A Aerobat aircraft. In 1985, Botswana purchased two Aerospatiale AS-350 Ecureuil helicopters, and in 1986 purchased a single NBO-105 helicopter from Indonesia. Recently, Botswana purchased three British Strikemasters which arrived in April 1988. Six more are slated to follow in 1988-89. The Bulldogs and Defenders are configured to carry light rockets and machinegun pods. Cargo capacity is limited by long distances between operational airfields and troop garrisons as well as high temperatures throughout most of the year. Some 19 Botswana pilots, including Deputy Commander Khama, several British expatriates, and 4 Indian personnel, are available. The British and Indian personnel also serve as instructors in flying and maintenance procedures but are not allowed to participate in actual combat. The Air Wing's primary missions are border patrol and reconnaissance, with secondary missions of ground attack and resupply. Current air operations consist primarily of pilot qualification and local transportation flights. The main operating base is located at the international airport in Gaborone. Plans call for a forward base at Francistown with three squadrons, a maintenance unit, and a training unit. Basic training will be conducted at Francistown utilizing the Bulldogs.

8. ~~(C)~~ **Paramilitary:**

Police: The paramilitary arm of the police, the 350-man Police Mobile Unit (PMU), was phased out in 1977; it became the basis for the new army. The police force retained no paramilitary capability at that time but has since established a Special Support Group (SSG) which undertakes duties outside day-to-day police work. A paramilitary role is being planned for the police force, which could then assist the BDF in controlling refugees and in patrolling the border areas. The police have a strength of about 1,000. They are not normally armed, except for those performing Presidential protection duties. A stock of .303 rifles and .45-cal pistols is kept for contingency purposes. The force is well trained and administered and performs its functions of ensuring public safety and order competently. In the event of hostilities, the police would serve as a reserve unit in support of BDF operations. Despite BDF origins in the Police Force, relations between the two are strained. Some British expatriates serve in the Police Force.

9. **(U) Key US Officials:**

Chief of Mission: (Gaborone) Ambassador Natale H. Bellocchi

(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ~~(S/NF)~~ **Foreign Military Presence:**

India: 44 advisers to the BDF. Indians are on permanent assignment to the BDF, are incorporated into normal operations of the organization, and occupy key maintenance and training positions.

UK: The UK Military Assistance Officer of the Ministry of Defense prepared the basic planning document for the BDF. The British sent an 8-man team from their Special Air Service to Botswana in 1987 to provide training in counterterrorism. A 3-man military training team is scheduled to arrive in July 1988. It will probably concentrate on basic small-unit tactics and drill and ceremony. A small number of British expatriates also assist the BDF on a private contract basis.

BOTSWANA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Francistown Afld	1275-08016	80091	21-09-36S	027-28-57E
Francistown Mil Barracks Area and Company HQ	1275CA0014	91170	21-09-23S	027-30-32E
Gaborone Airfield	1300-08038	80091	24-39-15S	025-56-30E
Gaborone National Army HQ, and Company HQ	1300-88022	91110	24-39-25S	025-56-45E
Mogoditshane Military Camp	1300DA0012	91170	24-36-37S	025-51-57E
Selebi/Phikwe Military Insta	1275DA0007	90110	21-54-58S	027-51-00E
Seretse Khama Barracks and Company HQ	1300-01131	91170	24-45-00S	025-55-00E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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BURUNDI

1. ~~(C)~~ **Political-Military Situation:** Burundi became independent, on 1 July 1962, as a traditional monarchy. It became a republic on 28 November 1966 after a military coup led by CPT Michel Micombero, who was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by LTC Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, who established the Second Republic. Bagaza ruled until 3 September 1987 when he was removed in a coup organized by army noncommissioned officers and led by MAJ Pierre Buyoya. Although the result of discontent within the military, the coup was facilitated by the country's deteriorating economic condition and Bagaza's violations of human rights as well as his attacks against the church.

~~(S)~~ Buyoya faces many problems. He depends heavily on the military to keep him in power, but the continued support of the NCOs, who placed him in power, is not certain. Due to budgetary constraints, Buyoya was unable to increase military salaries as much as he had promised, which has caused discontent among the NCOs. In addition, Buyoya's more liberal attitude towards the church and improving the situation of the majority of the Hutus is causing discontent among the ruling Tutsis. It is uncertain at this time whether or not Buyoya will be able to balance these competing demands and remain in power.

~~(C)~~ A continuing theme in Burundi's political situation is the tension between the ruling, but minority, Tutsis, and the majority Hutus. The Tutsis make up only 14 percent of the population, whereas the Hutus comprise 85 percent. Perceiving a threat to their states, the Tutsis killed an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Hutus in 1972. Since then, Hutu participation in the military and government has been limited, although government policy is to improve this imbalance. There is however, significant opposition to this among the Tutsis who perceive the Hutus as a threat because of their sheer numbers. This attitude makes reconciliation difficult.

~~(C)~~ Relations with Rwanda and Tanzania under Bagaza were correct except for occasional tension over Hutu refugees and customs matters; this situation has continued under Buyoya. Relations with Zaire were more tense but this situation has improved significantly under Buyoya.

~~(C)~~ The Burundi military is well trained and capable of maintaining domestic order and resisting an invasion from Rwanda. If invaded by Tanzania or Zaire, however, the army would probably be overwhelmed.

~~(C)~~ Burundi is a one-party state. Uprona, the official party, uses leftist rhetoric but is not communist. It has, however, maintained links with several communist parties. There are currently more that 400 Burundians studying in the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc states. Burundi has diplomatic relations with five communist countries (PRC, Cuba, North Korea, Romania, and the Soviet Union). The PRC provides the largest amount of economic aid. It is not yet clear if these ties will continue under Buyoya. Communist countries have been proceeding cautiously; there are indications that Buyoya will attempt to distance Burundi from communist support.

(U) Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor nation at an early stage of economic development. It is predominantly an agricultural society with only a few basic industries. all other consumer items are imported, mostly from Europe, and local prices are high due to transportation costs. Parastatals are heavily involved in the economy, contributing to economic inefficiency. Coffee exports account for about 90 percent of foreign exchange

earnings each year, with cotton and tea accounting for another 8 percent. Until recently, Burundi was one of the few African countries that was self-sufficient in food production. However, the susceptibility of the food supply to climatic aberrations was demonstrated in late 1984 when 9,000 tons of US emergency food aid was required. Burundi's gross domestic product in 1983 was about $1.1 billion, or $247 per capita.

~~(C)~~ Periodic summit meetings are held with Rwanda and Zaire to consider matters of common interest; in 1976 the three established the Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries (CEPGL), which includes mutual security provisions, and have signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Moreover, Burundi joined Rwanda and Tanzania in 1977 to establish the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, to which Uganda adhered in 1981. After Belgium's withdrawal of its military advisers in January 1974, Burundi turned to other Free World countries and to communist states for military assistance and materiel. The USSR and Libya have been major suppliers of army equipment including APC's, field artillery, trucks, radars, ammunition, and small arms. France has supplied armored cars and infantry weapons. Aerospace materiel is acquired mainly from the Free World and includes helicopters from France and utility aircraft from Italy. Military deliveries from the Free World and from communist states over the last 8 years have been roughly equal in value.

2. (U) Key Officials (all Tutsi):

President of the Republic, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Defense: MAJ Pierre *Buyoya*

Prime Minister: None

Minister of External Relations and International Cooperation: Cyprien *Mbonimpa*

Minister of the Interior: LTC Aloys *Kadoyi*

Army Air Section Commander: UNK

Administrator-General of the Surete and Chief of Military Intelligence: LTC Gervais *Ndikumagenge*

Inspector of Gendarmerie: LTC Athanse *Nziyumuira*

Secretary General in the Ministry of Defense: LTC Jean Baptiste *Mbonyingingo*

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ Military Budget: $36.6 million proposed for fiscal year ending 31 December 1987; this is 19.1 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available but this figure includes the Gendarmerie. Dollar values converted from Burundi francs at the exchange rate of 123.5 francs equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 4,788,000 estimated as of June 1985. Males (ages 15-49): 1,091,000; physically fit, 567,000.

Ethnic divisions: Africans, more than 99 percent; non-Africans include about 3,000 Europeans and 2,000 South Asians.

Literacy: About 25 percent, chiefly in Kirundi, but some in French and Kiswahili.

5. ~~(C/NF)~~ Army:

Personnel Strength: Approximately 10,000, most are Tutsi. Officer/enlisted breakdown not available, but all officers are believed to be Tutsi. Training in Somalia is believed to have

ended; 200 received infantry training in Libya between 1978 and 1981 but few are being sent there now due to dissatisfaction with the training received; about 30 officers and NCOs receive unspecified training in France annually, and another 20 are trained annually in the USSR. Reserve: After one year of active duty, veterans are subject for 20 years to emergency recall and annual training periods of 60-75 days. Major Units: Six battalions (three infantry, one parachute, one commando, one training), six independent infantry companies, two armored squadrons, and various support units. Each infantry battalion probably has 750-900 men. An air defense battalion is being formed with Soviet assistance. There are major deficiencies in logistics. Major Equipment: 23 BRDM amphibious armored reconnaissance vehicles, 12 AML-60 armored cars, 12 D-30 122-mm howitzers, 70-80 antiaircraft guns, 15 75-mm recoilless rifles, 120-mm mortars, 18 82-mm mortars, 4 3-inch mortars. Soviet equipment is gradually replacing aging Belgian materiel.

6. ~~(C)~~ **Navy:** None; however, the army has a maritime company. Three high-speed Greek-built Lambro 44 patrol boats acquired from Greece in December 1974 give Burundi the potential of patrolling the northern end of Lake Tanganyika. It is unlikely that all three boats are operational at once. The maritime company also has a diesel barge used to transport military supplies along the lake Tanganyika coast. One report indicates the patrol boats are operated by civilians.

7. ~~(C)~~ **Air Force:** None; however, a small air section (70 men) is included in the army and provides liaison services to the armed forces. French advisers contribute significantly to the maintenance and operation of Burundi's four Alouette III helicopters, three Cessna 150s, three C-47s, three SIAI-Marchetti SF 260s, and possibly a Co-27. Burundians are receiving flight, maintenance, and operations training in Greece and Libya. In the past, 15 pilots were trained in the Soviet Union and 20 in Somalia. The air section reportedly has 50 qualified pilots (30 fixed-wing and 20 rotary-wing), but most are scattered as infantry officers throughout the army.

(U) Burundi has one civil transport aircraft over 9,000 kilograms gross weight (Aerospatiale SE-210 III Caravelle), operated by Air Burundi. There are approximately 12 licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Burundi. This aircraft would be available to the government in the event of a war or national emergency.

8. ~~(S/NF)~~ **Gendarmerie/Paramilitary:** The Gendarmerie is responsible for nearly all regular police duties, including traffic control and operation of Burundi's only firefighting unit, which is at Bujumbura airport. Following its subordination to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff in 1967, military incompetents and those of suspect loyalty were consigned increasingly to the Gendarmerie. In its early years, the Gendarmerie was more heavily Hutu than the army and, therefore, suffered greater losses in the purge of Hutu personnel which followed the 1972 Hutu uprising. The current strength is probably about 1,000 although the authorized strength is 1,189. No breakdown by grade or ethnic group is available. The force is organized territorially, with six military districts (several provinces are combined to make up a district). The military district commander controls all Gendarmerie units in the district. Districts, in turn, are divided into a countrywide total of 18 *arrondissements*, each with at least one gendarme brigade assigned to it (A brigade consists of about 30 men). There are also a number of separate brigades responsible for frontier security, bringing the total number of brigades to 37. The Gendarmerie lacks mobility and is poorly trained. It therefore lacks a combat capability, but is adequate for the maintenance of internal security. The Gendarmerie has received communications equipment and considerable training from France.

9. (U) Key US Officials:

Chief of Mission: Ambassador James Phillips

(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign Military Presence:

French military advisers: 20, including army officers, and air force personnel with the Burundi airline and the Gendarmerie.

Soviet army technicians: 17, training Burundians to operate amphibious armored reconnaissance vehicles; and air defense advisers. An additional 11 Soviet professors teach at the Burundi military academy.

Egyptian military advisers: 2, assisting the army.

LESOTHO

1. ~~(C)~~ **Political-Military Situation:** One of the world's poorest countries, Lesotho is an economic and geographic captive of South Africa. Its economy — revenues, imports, exports, and employment of 120,000-150,000 Basotho migrant workers — is heavily dependent on South Africa. While Lesotho considers itself a nonaligned nation, it maintains close relations with the West, but diplomatic relations have, since 1983, been established with a number of East bloc countries, particularly the USSR, Cuba, North Korea, the PRC, and Yugoslavia. It is a member of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). Nominally a constitutional monarchy now under King Moshoeshoe II, Lesotho was dominated by the conservative Basutoland National Party (BNP), led by Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, from independence in 1966 until the January 1986 coup. When it appeared Jonathan would be voted out of office, he maintained his power by suspending the constitution, suppressing the opposition, and canceling the September 1985 elections. General dissatisfaction with Jonathan's autocratic rule and his slide toward the East bloc, coupled with a 3-week economic blockage by the South African Government (SAG), led to the military coup that toppled the Prime Minister's regime. The Parliament and all political activity in Lesotho have been suspended by the military government headed by Maj Gen Justinus Lekhanya, Chairman of the Military Council. Maj Gen Lekhanya had been thrust into a leadership role in the coup by the true driving force, Colonels Joshua Letsie and Thaabe Letsie. The Letsie brothers believed Lekhanya was the only one who could control the Army, the instrument of the coup. The Letsies along with King Moshoeshoe II are the domimant forces in the current government, although Lekhanya is accorded genuine respect and the military council generally operates in a collegial fashion.

~~(S)~~ Internal opposition to the Jonathan regime came from the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The BCP was the first political party in Lesotho and appeared to have won the 1970 election before the counting of ballots was halted by the Jonathan government. Since that time, the BCP has operated from exile. In December 1979, the BCP announced the formation of a military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), to pursue an armed insurgency against the Jonathan regime. LLA guerrillas, supported by South Africa and Transkei, mounted an increasingly costly series of terrorist attacks during 1982 and 1983 to protest the exclusion of the BCP from political power. Following a joint South Africa-Lesotho security conference in November 1983, attacks by the LLA dramatically dropped off when both South Africa and Transkei took steps to control LLA operations in their territories. After the December 1982 South Africa raid against ANC targets in Maseru, the Government of Lesotho (GOL) promised to control African National Congress (ANC) activities. There is some evidence that over the last 4 years Lesotho has expelled or repatriated large numbers of South African refugees, some of whom were ANC members identified as particularly objectionable by South Africa. South Africa, on the other hand, lifted an embargo on much-needed arms shipments in late 1984, ceased the intermittent border closures, stopped delays in payments from the Southern Africa Customs Union and on the Highland Water Project. By responding to South African security demands, the Jonathan regime appeared to join Mozambique and Angola in reaching a modus vivendi with South Africa, although steadfastly refusing to sign any kind of treaty with it. This policy of "good neighborliness" between the two countries continued in spite of accusations that, on the one hand, the GOL still harbored and supported ANC and Pan African Congress (PAC) operatives and, on

the other hand, the South African Government trained and supported LLA insurgents who conducted sporadic attacks in Lesotho. This fragile peaceful coexistence was threatened in late December 1985 when South Africa, accusing Lesotho of harboring ANC operatives, conducted a raid against ANC members in Maseru, and imposed a virtual blockade on the country, which resulted in the ouster of Prime Minister Jonathan some 3 weeks later. Despite a broad amnesty granted by the new military government under which 265 former LLA members have returned to Lesotho, BCP leader Ntsu Mokhele refuses to return until he is given a top position in the government. It is not yet clear whether the LLA will stop its terrorist attacks on prominent Basotho citizens and their families, although none have occurred recently. The November 1986 murder of two former Cabinet members has not yet been solved, although it has been theorized that the new government saw them as obstacles to political reconciliation.

~~(C)~~ The economy of Lesotho relies heavily on South African support. More than half of the working adult male population is employed in South African mines, and thousands more work on farms or factories in South Africa. The remittances sent back to Lesotho by migrant workers in South Africa finance 79 percent of Lesotho's imports and constitute 50 percent of gross national product. South Africa also supplies 99 percent of the electricity consumed in Lesotho, markets the main agricultural crops, and transports virtually all of Basotho exports. Its economic dependence on South Africa also leaves Lesotho vulnerable to effects of sanctions on South Africa.

~~(C)~~ The Army, formerly known as the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF), was established as a separate entity from the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) on 1 April 1978. It was formally declared an army in August 1979. The LPF was renamed after the January 1986 coup, and is now known as the Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF). Transformation of the police paramilitary unit into the LPF was stimulated by a revival of insurgent activity by followers of Ntsu Mokhele and his Basutoland Congress Party and the subsequent need for a better equipped force. Also, the move had roots in internal power politics, probably in the Prime Minister's desire to offset the armed potential invested until then solely in the police. Both remained under the control of Chief Jonathan in his role as Minister of Defense and Internal Security. A coordinating staff in the office of the Prime Minister coordinated police and army matters. The Army commander, police commissioner, and head of the Special Branch all enjoyed equal rank. During the January 1986 coup, Major General Lekhanya, Commander of the LPF, emerged as the leader of the newly formed Military Council. He and other members of the council, particulary Colonel Joshua Letsie and Colonel Thaabe Letsie, have now removed themselves from the routine operations of the military, and a new Army commander, Brig Gen Benedict Lerotholi, has been appointed. The Army's mission is to defend the borders, provide internal security, and support the LMP. Its modest headquarters, which includes a weapons storage and maintenance facility, is located in Maseru (BE 1398-00724; CAT 91010; COORD 29-19-00S 027-29-00E). Without improved training, equipment, and leadership, the RLDF will remain a marginally capable force. In the absence of a serious LLA terrorist threat, however, its shortcomings will not be as apparent.

2. (U) Key Officials:

King and Head of State: *Moshoeshoe II*

Chairman of the Military Council and Minister of Defense and Internal Security: Maj Gen Justinus M. *Lekhanya*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Lengolo *Monyake*

Member of the Military Council: Col Joshua Sekhobe *Letsie*

Member of the Military Council: Col Thaabe Solomon *Letsie*

Commander, Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF): Brig Gen Benedict *Lerotholi*

Commander, Air Wing (RLDF): Wing Cdr Ernest *Mokete*

3. (U) Other Important Personalities: Ntsu *Mokhehle*, leader of the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)

4. (U) Military Budget: $55.9 million for fiscal year ending 30 March 1985; this is 21.6 percent of the proposed central government budget. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 1.215 maloti equals $1.00.

5. (U) Population: 1,666,012 as of 1988

Males (ages 15-49): 353,000; 189,000 physically fit

Ethnic divisions: 99.7 percent Sotho; 1,600 Europeans; 800 Asians

Literacy: 40 percent

6. ~~(S)~~ Army:

Personnel Strength: 2,000 estimated. (A small number of women serve in the RLDF in medical and clerical fields.)

Major Units: seven companies, one "recce" (special forces) platoon, and one support company containing various combat support elements such as signal, engineer, medical, supply, and transportation. HQ elements are located both at the RLDF barracks at Maseru and at Makoanyane Barrack near Maseru. Companies and platoons are normally deployed at locations throughout the country, rotating from the barracks at Maseru.

Major Equipment: Rifles (R-1s of South African manufacture and Israeli Galil assault rifles); light machineguns (RPD, RPK and M-60s from Taiwan); 81-mm mortars (Taiwan); 2-inch mortars; Shorland armored cars, various Land Rover and jeep-type vehicles; Bedford 3-ton riot trucks; and seven or eight French-made armored cars. Additionally, Lesotho is reported to have received a large shipment of weapons and equipment from Communist countries, to include small arms and ammunition, radios, and 11 North Korean light Kaengsaeng 4 x 4s. Lesotho is known to be seeking additional arms and equipment. West Germany has provided some aircraft and heavy-duty all-terrain vehicles. Israel is reported to have sold 10 light armored vehicles (RAM V-1) in 1987.

7. (U) Navy: None

8. ~~(C)~~ Air Force: The Air Wing of the RLDF has two Short SC-7 Skyvan STOL utility aircraft; one Beech Baron 58 short-range transport; one Bell 37G, one MBB-KHI BK-117 and two MBB BO-105 utility helicopters; and three Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters. Operational helicopters are used in border patrol and for the delivery of a quick-reaction force. One of the three Bell 412 helicopters and one of the MBB 105s have been registered with the Department of Commerical Aviation in anticipation of a lucrative flying contract in support of the Highland Water Project. Reporting indicates a low operational rate because of a lack of spare parts. Eight pilots have received training in West Germany, and seven of the pilots are being trained to bring them up to commercial standards but are experiencing difficulty in achieving acceptable proficiency. The Air Wing has approximately 10 foreign contract personnel who supply support/maintenance. At present, the entire Air Wing is based at Moshoeshoe I (formerly Leabua Jonathan Airport) (BE 1389-08022; CAT 80106; 29-18-05S

027-30-20E); but a new military airstrip is under construction at the Mantseho training facility (location not yet determined).

9. ~~(C)~~ **Paramilitary:** The Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) has been upgraded to a paramilitary unit. Estimated strength of the LMP is about 1,000. No further information on the LMP is available.

10. (U) Key US Officials:

Chief of Mission: (Maseru) Ambassador Robert Smalley

(b)(3):10 USC 424

11. (U) Foreign Military Presence:

Republic of China: One training adviser and three civil engineers advising on civil action construction projects.

Federal Republic of Germany: 10 West German contract personnel provide maintenance for helicopters and Dornier aircraft.

United Kingdom: Three military advisers. One LTC and two Captains instruct basic infantry courses.

LESOTHO

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Maseru Base/Nat HQ	1398-00724	91010	29-19-00S	027-29-00E
Menkhoaneng Base/Bn HQ	1398-00726	91170	28-55-00S	028-13-00E
Moshoeshoe Airport	1389-08022	80106	29-18-05S	027-30-20E
Quithing Base/Bn HQ	1398-00727	91170	30-24-00S	027-43-00E

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MALAWI

1. ~~(C)~~ Political-Military Situation: Malawi became an independent member of the British Commonwealth on 6 July 1964, following almost 75 years of British colonial administration. Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, leader of the independence movement, was named in the constitution as the first President. Dr. Banda heads the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which is the only legal political party in Malawi. Two years after independence, Malawi became a republic on 6 July 1966. The constitution provides that the President of Malawi be selected every 5 years by officials of the MCP and tribal chiefs; however, by a unanimous resolution of the MCP, Banda was acclaimed President for Life in 1970. The National Assembly is a single-chamber legislative body with 96 elected members. According to the constitution, all legislative power is vested in the Parliament. However, such power has never been realized because of President Banda's predominance; a position based on control of the governmental structure and leadership of the MCP.

~~(C)~~ Malawi experienced nearly 20 years of improving economic conditions, relative to other black-ruled African countries. It is a landlocked country with virtually no natural resources. Its only assets are fertile soil and adequate rainfall with a climate favorable to crop production. From independence in 1964 through 1979, real GDP grew at an average rate of 5.5 percent per year. Since the mid-1970s however, the country has experienced mounting balance of payments problems and an interruption in economic growth, due to such factors as escalation in import prices of fuel and capital goods, cyclical swings in the prices of agricultural exports (tea, tobacco, and sugar), and interruptions in traditional rail routes to the Indian Ocean resulting in higher costs of transport. With assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the government has embarked on an ambitious structural adjustment program aimed at restoring economic growth and achieving a sustainable balance of payments position. Economic growth has declined, however, with GDP decreasing 2.8 percent and 2.6 percent in 1985 and 1986, respectively. Despite the strides made since independence, Malawi remains one of the world's least developed and poorest countries. Per capita GDP in 1986 measured only $205, reflecting the absence of any appreciable mineral or manufacturing base in the economy. Malawi is heavily dependent upon South Africa for both investment and trade. South Africans make up a large percentage of the tourists who visit Malawi and when petroleum supplies from Mozambique were interrupted in 1980, South Africa airlifted petroleum products to Malawi. Malawi also exports and imports via Mozambique's rail and port systems, precariously balancing its economy between these two southern African foes.

~~(S)~~ Ninety-year old President Banda, enjoys the affection and loyalty of the people. Although there are no indications that the people, the army, or the police will not remain loyal to him, the President is extremely wary of threats to his position and authority. This was reflected in May 1983, when three prominent cabinet ministers with large constituencies, and a member of parliament died in an auto accident. Reports suggested that they may have been murdered by the police. In 1985, anticorruption purges took place beginning with the ouster of civil service chief John Ngwiri, who held one of the most powerful positions in the country. The departure of Ngwiri represents a shakeup in the power structure and the succession line-up in Malawi. President Banda tolerates no opposition, and anyone emerging as a political threat risks imprisonment or financial ruin.

(S) President Banda's health appears to be deteriorating. Reporting suggests that the

transition of leadership in Malawi is slowly underway, even though Banda remains in power. His closest advisers are exerting increasing influence and making decisions for him, most notably in the foreign policy arena. For example, President Banda was unaware of Malawi's abstention on the United Nations Grenada resolution. Until recently, no one other than the President would attempt to take a position on foreign policy issues. Whoever succeeds Banda will likely continue many of his basic policies, while trying to bring Malawi back into the mainstream of African thinking. African acceptance of Malawi under Banda's rule has been cautious due to his maverick style and decisions, such as maintaining diplomatic relations with South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan. However, despite occasional reports concerning the President's deteriorating health, he has continued to be the major power in Malawi. Banda's demise or incapacitation could create a leadership vacuum. The Malawi Constitution provides for a Presidential Council of three MCP members to rule the country in the event of Banda's death until a new president can be elected by the MCP. Reliable sources have reported, however, that the council will have five members, three from the MCP plus the Chief of Police and Commander of the Army. In such a situation, there might be a power struggle between the army, the young pioneers, and police. Although the army, under its present commander, is expected to uphold the constitutional process.

~~(C)~~ President Banda judges external matters strictly on the way they affect Malawi. He is a staunch anti-communist (there is no communist diplomatic mission in Malawi; however, in 1982 Malawi gave nonresident accreditation to the North Korean Ambassador to Lusaka) and is pro-Israeli. In an effort to maintain a policy of contact and dialogue with neighboring countries, President Banda takes an official stand of no aid nor sanctuary for insurgent groups although it is widely believed and that covert aid reaches the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) through Malawi. Malawi continues to enjoy close ties with the United Kingdom, benefiting from aid for social and economic development projects. In addition to being a member of the Commonwealth, Malawi is a member of the OAU, the UN, and the Southern African Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC).

~~(S)~~ Although there are known dissidents inside and outside the country, there does not appear to be an immediate threat to the political stability of Malawi. These dissidents are few in number, weak in capability, and currently without a major benefactor. The major opposition groups outside Malawi are the Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA), the Congress of the Second Republic (CSR), and the Malawi Freedom Movement (MAFREMO). Past meetings of leaders of these groups held to discuss unification of the disparate anti-Banda movements ended in failure. In late December 1981, the Malawi Security Forces announced the capture of MAFREMO leader Orton Chirwa when he attempted to reenter Malawi to lead an anti-Banda coup. The capture of Chirwa and subsequent trial for treason by the traditional court system has probably not crushed the long-term ambitions of the other elements of the dissident community nor has it slackened their interest in coming to power in a post-Banda Malawi.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), although not directly engaging in activities against landlocked Malawi, has caused major economic problems in the country by sabotaging the important Mozambique rail link leading from Malawi to the Indian Ocean ports of Beira and Nacala. As a result, Malawi has had difficulty exporting its major cash crop (tobacco) and importing fertilizer and necessary consumer items, and has been flooded with up to 600,000 Mozambican war refugees.

~~(C)~~ In March 1987, the Malawi Army sent 800 troops to assist the Mozambique Army in protecting the Nacala railway from attacks by RENAMO. Despite The $136,000 per month cost of the operation and personal risk to the Malawi troops, the economic situation in Malawi makes the opening of the Nacala imperative. At present, Malawi has secured

the track along the 150-km corridor east to Malema, although work to rehabilitate the remainder of the line is on hold. The commander of the armed forces has stated that their intervention into Mozambique is "economic"; therefore, they are ordered to stay within a 5-km limit of the line and not to pursue RENAMO into the bush. The operation has had limited success, yet RENAMO still manages to periodically dismantle small segments of the track and damage locomotives, rendering the route inoperable for short periods.

~~(C)~~ Malawi and Mozambique share over 1,000 miles of border. In October 1984, the presidents of Malawi and Mozambique met for the first time resulting in the signing of numerous cooperation agreements including one on border security. Refugees, including RENAMO and Mozambican soldiers, have frequently crossed over into Malawi since 1984; the refugee population exceeded 600,000 by mid-1988. The issue of forced repatriation has been discussed with Mozambique, however, Mozambique is not yet prepared to resettle refugees in such large numbers. In the meantime, many refugees are suffering from malnutrition and lack of clothing and water. The government of Malawi appears to be helping in every way possible, but its basic services are simply overburdened.

~~(S)~~ As a result of the insurgency affecting Mozambique, the Malawi Army, fearing that it may face similar problems, has included counterinsurgency operations in its training program. In September 1982, the Army conducted the first in a series of field training exercises involving an insurgency scenario. There are indications that the CSR, MAFREMO, and LESOMA have received promises of Soviet, Cuban, and/or Libyan support, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) may have trained members of the CSR. Although there is very little support within the country for these insurgency organizations, the military is preparing for the contingency.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Armed Forces are the direct responsibility of the President, who personally handles all defense matters. In the event of external aggression, the Malawi Army Commander has been designated by the Life President as responsible for all command decisions, while the other services are to perform such functions as the Army Commander directs. Internal problems are the primary responsibility of the Inspector General of Police. The President has three advisory boards to assist him with the formulation of defense policy; they include the Operational Committee, the Army Council, and the National Intelligence Committee (NIC), the latter being the most important. The NIC comprises the Army Commander, Inspector General of Police, Chief of the Police Special Branch, Secretary of the President and Cabinet, and Secretary General of the Malawi Congress Party.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Malawi Army has the mission to defend the country and to maintain order. Although one of the better trained and disciplined armies in the region, it is smaller and not as well equipped as those of neighboring states. It would be unable to defend Malawi in the unlikely event of a major incursion by Tanzania or Zimbabwe but is competent to deal with most other threats. The Malawi Army has gained extensive experience in Mozambique and its recent performance indicates that it has profited from its experience. Although it has demonstrated the ability to engage and defeat RENAMO forces attacking the Nacala line, it does not have sufficient numbers, equipment, or economic resources to permanently secure it.

2. ~~(C)~~ Key Officials:

President and Minister of External Affairs (also responsible for defense functions): Dr. Hastings Kamuzu *Banda*

Minister without Portfolio and Secretary-General Malawi Congress Party: Robson *Chirwa*

Army: Commander, General Melvin *Khanga*

Deputy Commander: Lt General Issac *Yohane*

Director of Operations; Chief of Staff: (Acting) Col. I.E. *Kayoyo* (while General Bruce Y. *Manyozo* is attending the US Army War College until 1988)

Director of Training: Maj General Wilfred John *Mponela*

Director of Military Intelligence: Brig Blaise *Funsani*

Ground Commander in Mozambique: Lt Col H.M. *Kadzeya*

Army Naval Detachment Lt Col Maynard *Gondwe*

Army Air Wing Commander: Col Greven *Masamba*

Police: Inspector General, Elliot Funuel *Mbedza* Commander Mobile Force, Faison George *Kadya*

3. (U) Military Budget: $20.3 million (including police) for fiscal year ending 31 March 1987; this is 5.6 percent of the central government budget, and 2.8 percent of the GDP. Dollar values converted from Malawi Kwacha at an exchange rate of 1.96 kwacha equals $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 7,056,000 as of July 1985

Males (ages 15-49): 1,511,000; physically fit, 767,000 as of 1 July 1987

Ethnic divisions: Over 99 percent African, less than 1 percent European and Asian

Literacy: 25 percent of population

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ Army:

Personnel Strength: 6,800

Major Units: The major units of the Malawi Army are three light infantry battalions. Each battalion has an authorized strength of 1,150 men, with a large headquarters company and five rifle companies. In addition to the three light infantry battalions, there is an air wing (see Air Force) and a support battalion. The support battalion consists of a 105-mm artillery battery, a reconnaissance troop, an air defense detachment, and a naval detachment (see Navy). A paratrooper wing and airborne school were formed in 1981 with instructors trained in West Germany and most recently the United States. In addition, the Malawi Army Commander is interested in forming a special forces company, a combat engineer company, and one additional 105-mm artillery battery. In June 1983, a six-man detachment from the Paratrooper Wing went to West Germany to participate in training by the US Army Special Forces Detachment in Europe. It is hoped that this organization will greatly enhance the Malawi Army's ability to meet real and potential threats to the government. Past South African military assistance has been on a case-by-case basis only, as with the training associated with the delivery of the Eland armored cars in 1985. There is also a military college that is probably one of the finest, most efficiently organized and operated military training schools in Sub-Saharan Africa. The college conducts recruit training, numerous enlisted courses, officer cadet courses, platoon leaders course, company commanders' course, communication courses, NCO courses, a catering course, and a staff officers' course. The military college has responsibility for training not only the Army but also the militia.

Major Equipment: Major items in the Malawi Army inventory are mainly of British origin and include 22 Fox armored cars, 14 Ferret Mk-II scout cars, 4 Eland armored cars, 9/105-mm

guns, at least 8 81-mm mortars, and 52 7.62-mm light machineguns. The acquisition of the 105-mm light guns gives the Malawi Army its first artillery capability. Additional equipment includes a mortar-locating radar and 14 Blowpipe SAM launchers with 80 usable missiles as of 1986.

6. ~~(S)~~ **Navy:** The Malawi Army Naval Detachment has 4 patrol craft (of which 3 are operational), with approximately 60 combat trained and 42 support personnel stationed at Monkey Bay on Lake Malawi. Two patrol boats were acquired from the Portuguese, one 35-foot landing craft is of unknown origin, and the most recent acquisition was a 65-foot patrol boat from France. The sale of another French patrol boat is in the works, but no arrival date has been specified. The Naval Detachment also maintains the President's boat, a small fiberglass coupe, and one additional fiberglass boat. In 1982, the detachment purchased six inflatable assault boats with twin 50-hp Mercury outboard engines. The detachment has received some training and maintenance support from South Africa. The detachment also has two trained scuba divers and limited amounts of scuba equipment. The Naval Detachment conducts limited patrols on Lake Malawi, an area of increasing interest because of potential gas and oil deposits under the lake. In the past, Lake Malawi has been the cause of territorial disputes between Tanzania and Malawi. Malawi shares the lake with Mozambique, but does not recognize a Tanzanian territorial claim to any part of the lake. Due to its low priority, the Naval Detachment lacks operational equipment, training, and maintenance funds to operate or repair patrol boats. Even with the recent addition of the 65-foot patrol craft from France, the unit will have only a limited capability to patrol Lake Malawi.

7. ~~(S)~~ **Air Force:** The Malawi Army Air Wing (MAAW) has one fixed-wing squadron and one helicopter squadron. The MAAW has the capability to transport a small contingent of troops, perform a limited visual reconnaissance role, and provide some VIP transport. The fixed-wing squadron has four Dornier-28 Skyservant utility aircraft for troop transport, 2 DO-228 light transports, and one HS-125 VIP transport. In addition, West Germany is expected to deliver up to four DO-228 light transport aircraft to the Air Wing in 1988. Pilots receive basic training for the Dornier aircraft in West Germany. Most recently, the US provided training for this squadron in Phoenix, Arizona. The helicopter squadron is equipped with four French helicopters, two SA-330 Pumas, two AS-350 Ecureuils, and one SA-360 Dauphin acquired in 1985. Currently there are 13 rotary-wing pilots in the MAAW. French and West German technicians are assigned to the Air Wing and are essential to the proper maintenance of the aircraft.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Military Aid:** Malawi receives no military assistance from communist countries. Since 1975, $59.8 million worth of equipment has been sent to Malawi. The United Kingdom has delivered $24.1 million of this including armored cars, transport aircraft, and 105-mm guns. France is second with $16.8 million in deliveries including helicopters, transports, and one patrol boat. Third is West Germany with $15.4 million in deliveries including fixed wing aircraft, trucks, and ammunition.

8. ~~(C)~~ **Paramilitary:**

a. Police Mobile Force

Personnel Strength: 460

Units: 4 companies (13 platoons total)

Major Equipment: Eight Shorland armored cars, one Britten-Norman Defender (BN-2A)

light transport aircraft, one Cessna 185 utility aircraft, and one Short Skyvan 3M STOL light transport. The force is used for a variety of special missions including riot control, counterinsurgency, and reaction force type operations. It receives marksmanship training from the Malawi Army Rifle Team.

b. Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP)

Personnel Strength: Estimated at 600 with military training.

Units: Organization unknown. The MYP was established in 1963 as an organization to spearhead economic development, particularly agriculture. It long has been suspected of having a paramilitary element. The MYP maintains an air detachment as well as a Presidential Guard of about 100. MYP training, however, incorporates heavy doses of military discipline and indoctrination in citizenship. The program continues to process approximately 3,000 youths each year. Altogether about 60,000 youths have been trained at 23 bases throughout the country. The role of the MYP was reduced in 1981 after former head of the MYP Guanda Chakuamba Phiri was arrested and put on trial for gross breach of party discipline. Phiri's crime appears to have been the accumulation of too much power. It is unlikely that Phiri accumulated this power to pose a threat to the Life President. Rather, he was probably preparing for the power struggle that is expected to follow Banda's death. Since the Malawi Army has taken over the naval detachment and now has its own air wing, the military significance of the MYP in relation to the police and Army has been reduced.

9. (U) Key US Officials (Lilongwe):

Chief of Mission: Charge D Affaire Dennis Jeit

(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ~~(C)~~ Foreign Military Presence:

Federal Republic of Germany: Four advisers with MAAW fixed-wing squadron.

France: One Army captain, two civilian technicians with the helicopter squadron.

South Africa: One communications specialist is assigned to the Army. A five-man team assist the Army in the maintenance and operations of their Eland armored cars.

MALAWI

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Lilongwe Intl	1154-08012	80111	13-57-54S	033-41-49E
Monkey Bay Port Facility	1154-00031	95140	14-04-21S	034-55-23E
Mvera Mission Army Barracks	1154-00287	90110	13-44-00S	034-08-00E
Mzuzu Army Barracks	1054-00056	90110	11-27-20S	034-02-08E
Salima	1154-08013	80111	13-45-33S	034-35-03E
Zomba	1154-08008	80106	15-23-01S	035-23-23E
Zomba Army Cobbe Barracks	1154-00001	90110	15-23-20S	035-18-20E

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MOZAMBIQUE

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MOZAMBIQUE

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President of Mozambique and of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), and Commander in Chief of the Mozambican Armed Forces: Joaquim Alberto *Chissano*

Prime Minister and Minister of Planning: Mario da Graca *Machungo*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Manuel *Mocumbi*

Minister of National Defense: Gen Alberto Joaquim *Chipande*

Minister of the Interior: Col Manuel Jose *Antonio*

Minister of Transport and Communications: Armando Emilio *Guebuza*

Minister of Security: Maj General Mariano de Arauo *Matsinhe*

Chief of the General Staff and Vice Minister of Defense: Lt Gen Antonio Hama *Thai*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) The constitution adopted after the Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique in 1975 established the country as a People's Republic with only one officially recognized party, the Marxist-oriented Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). The head of FRELIMO is also the head of state. Under the Constitution, ultimate power rests with the People's Assembly, which was formed in December 1977. The Assembly is composed of the Central and Executive Committees of FRELIMO, the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), the provincial governors, representatives of the Armed Forces, FRELIMO cadre, and representatives of other mass organizations chosen by the Central Committee from each province.

~~(C)~~ At the time of independence, Samora Moises Machel was the President of FRELIMO and thus became the President of the Republic as well as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Despite the theoretical power of the People's Assembly, President Machel exercised complete control over the government and the Armed Forces until the time of his death in October 1986. President Joaquim Chissano has chosen to follow his predecessor's policies but has left the running of the Armed Forces to military leaders. Decisions are made by the President in consultation with an ad hoc group of three to six FRELIMO confidants.

~~(S)~~ When FRELIMO took over the government, most, but not all of the country was under its control. As a result, Machel concluded that it was necessary to build a national organization, overcome regional and ethnic rivalries, revitalize the economy, and set the country on a socialist course including offering support to neighboring "revolutionary" movements such as the ANC and anti-Rhodesian insurgents. Government control over all aspects of national life gradually intensified, particularly in urban areas and those rural parts of Mozambique where FRELIMO did not operate or draw support during the war against the Portuguese. Machel then incorporated the experience of the Soviet, Chinese, and Tanzanian political and economic systems into his rule; the Mozambique experiment failed and the economy collapsed. Radical external policies led to Rhodesian — and later South

African — support to anti-FRELIMO, RENAMO insurgents. The economy has subsequently been partially propped up by Western aid.

~~(S)~~ The major consequence of Machel's internal and external policy failures has been a postindependence breakdown of FRELIMO control, matched by a corresponding increase in control of the countryside by the insurgent National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (RENAMO). Espousing an ostensibly democratic, pro-West political ideology, RENAMO is composed of a diverse segment of Mozambican society unified by its dislike of FRELIMO government policies. Though limited mostly to the rural areas and at one time largely dependent on South Africa for military aid, RENAMO has emerged as a largely autonomous avowedly nationalist insurgency that threatens Mozambique's economic and social stability. A series of negotiations between Mozambique and South Africa during late 1983 and early 1984 culminated in the signing of a nonaggression pact in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord, as the agreement is called, pledged the two countries to cease all military support of antigovernment dissident groups. Specifically, South Africa agreed to stop providing aid to RENAMO, including external bases, training, weapons, and other logistic and operational support, while Mozambique agreed to terminate the same kind of support for the African National Congress (ANC). Neither side has fully complied with the agreement; however, their respective levels of support are now minimal in comparison with before. Both governments continue to find the accord useful.

~~(S)~~ RENAMO's slowness in developing a political and administrative infrastructure has been a hindrance to its goal of replacing the FRELIMO government or forcing it to share power. Until recently, Afonso Dhalakama, leader of RENAMO, had apparently chosen to ignore political organization in favor of military operations until he seized power. Insurgent military successes in the field have aggravated differences between various factions within FRELIMO over the best strategy for dealing with RENAMO. Through 1985, a major obstacle to Machel's efforts to rescue the economy was the intensification, despite the cutoff of official South African assistance, of RENAMO guerrilla activity directed against the country's economic infrastructure. While the insurgents do not yet have the military wherewithal to seize power, they may be able eventually to force President Chissano to the bargaining table. However, it is unclear whether Chrissano could gain overwhelming FRELIMO backing for negotiating at this time.

~~(S/NF)~~ A shrewd politician and skillful bargainer, President Joaquim Chissano is a master at building consensus before he makes a critical decision. President Chissano currently overtly supports the military hard line against RENAMO, and shares their suspicions about South Africa. Nevertheless, conditions being right, he is viewed as more likely to negotiate with enemies of the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique (GPRM) than was the late Samora Machel. However, near-term prospects (1988-89) for negotiations appear slim.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ The RENAMO insurgency is the major threat to the FRELIMO government. There are no known prospects for a coup d'etat. The GPRM for a time was threatened with a possible coup in 1986. Senior officer veterans of the "armed struggle," who blamed President Samora Machel for the country's many problems, met clandestinely to plot a military takeover of the government. Machel's failure to share power — instead creating a personality cult — and the steadily deteriorating security situation were only a few of the motives of coup plotters who planned to assassinate him. Following Samora Machel's accidental death in an airplane crash in October 1986, the adhesive that bound the

right-leaning plotters soon evaporated. They instead enthusiastically supported Chissano as Machel's successor during the period of political maneuvering for the Presidency.

~~(S)~~ The RENAMO insurgency has grown steadily since 1982 in both size and capability. Current RENAMO strength is estimated to be 22,000 full-time armed guerrillas reinforced by unknown thousands of supporters. Operating in units of up to 200-300, RENAMO regularly conducts military operations in all of Mozambique's provinces. Largely confining itself to rural areas, RENAMO conducts raids and sabotage operations within several kilometers of the major cities of Nampula, Nacala, and Maputo, the capital. Its military strategy has focused on attacking the economic infrastructure of Mozambique, particularly collective activities, and appears aimed at aggravating already endemic weaknesses in Mozambique's political and economic systems in order to force the FRELIMO government to accept a negotiated settlement. An underdeveloped political strategy, a reputation for committing atrocities, and a history of South African sponsorship, however, have severely limited the organization in widening it's base of support. These factors, more than the efforts of the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM), have been key in preventing RENAMO from becoming a viable alternative to the FRELIMO government.

~~(S)~~ To cope with RENAMO, in 1982 Machel altered both Mozambique's international political strategy and its domestic military strategy. In the military field, Machel decentralized command and control of the FAM to better allow local commanders to conduct counterinsurgency operations. On the international political front, Machel opened Mozambique to the non-Soviet world for the first time since independence. Particular emphasis went to securing economic aid from the US, the European Economic Community (EEC), Scandinavia, and Japan to shore up the crumbling economy. Other states approached for both economic and military aid have included the PRC, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Brazil, France, Italy, the UK, and the Netherlands. As noted earlier, Mozambique engaged South Africa in negotiations to stop its support of RENAMO in return for an end to anti-South African guerrilla operations out of Mozambique. The FRELIMO government has moved away from the Soviets in an attempt to diversify and supplement military assistance. The Mozambican economy will continue to require considerable Western aid in order to have any chance of survival. At the same time, the FAM must achieve positive results in its attempts to contain RENAMO. Should FRELIMO's military position become untenable, Chissano may be forced to strengthen his relationship with the Soviets, who remain his primary source of military support.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The Chissano regime continues to follow Machel's hard line toward RENAMO. RENAMO retains the initiative and poses a serious threat to government control over large rural areas of the country. FRELIMO's military position has shown little tangible improvement during the 6 years since RENAMO intensified its war effort. While small amounts of arms, ammunition, and communications equipment are supplied from abroad, RENAMO becomes increasingly more self-sufficient each year by capturing weapons and supplies from the FAM. Although RENAMO's logistics situation lacks many essential items, it is adequate to support a relatively high level of activity. Pre-Nkomati, South African-supplied caches are presumed to be exhausted. Since 1986 there has been no hard evidence that South Africa is supplying RENAMO insurgents. RENAMO needs to achieve dramatic military and political successes against the government if it wants to seize power or cause the FRELIMO government to enter into negotiations. The seizing of a provincial capital, even temporarily, or the beginning of violent urban guerrilla warfare would indicate that RENAMO has added a new dimension to its combat capability. Increasing pressure on the FRELIMO government by attacking garrisons and villages close to Maputo is another way RENAMO can improve its leverage.

d. External Threat

~~(S)~~ With the Zimbabwe settlement in April 1980, the only external threat perceived by the Government of Mozambique came from the Republic of South Africa. Machel continued his support for the liberation of South Africa from white rule, as he did in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and as a result he faced South African retaliation. The South African raids into Maputo and its suburbs against African National Congress (ANC) offices and facilities in January 1981, May and October 1983, and May 1987 illustrate the inability of the FAM to protect Mozambique from South African forces. While the aim of the South African raids has been to coerce the FRELIMO government into discontinuing support to the ANC, the GPRM has stubbornly continued to condone the low level presence of ANC spokesmen and political activity.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Until the March 1984 Nkomati Accord, South Africa threatened Mozambique indirectly by providing military training, equipment, and advisory personnel to RENAMO, which permitted its rapid growth. Because of the cutoff of official South African aid following the signing of the accord, RENAMO's effectiveness was expected to be greatly lessened. The cutoff has not reduced RENAMO's activity but has limited its capability to conduct commando type raids requiring specialized equipment and training. With the Nkomati Accord recently renewed, Mozambique's formal relationship with South Africa has improved. While conventional attacks by South Africa on Mozambican targets are extremely unlikely, South Africa probably would not hesitate to conduct covert raids directed at ANC safehouses. Some elements in the Mozambican Government continually accuse South Africa of assisting RENAMO. Although South Africa has denied these accusations, the problem has not been completely resolved and relations between the two countries remain delicate. South Africa retains the capability of reestablishing its close relationship with RENAMO should the Nkomati Accord break down. A low level of South African aid to RENAMO probably continues with Pretoria able to reinstitute more extensive support at any time.

~~(S)~~ Maputo enjoys fair-to-good relations with its other regional neighbors. Relations with Malawi did deteriorate to an all time low just prior to Machel's death, but have since improved dramatically. Malawi is currently cooperating fully with the Government of Mozambique (GOM) and has a 1,500-man Malawian security force defending the Nayuchi-Malema section of the Nacala rail line.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S)~~ Chissano, like Machel, is a self-proclaimed Marxist. However, when dealing with the West, he claims he is a nationalist with socialist leanings. Similar to Machel before him, Chissano sides with the Soviet Union on most international questions. The number of Soviet Bloc advisers in Mozambique is the third highest in Africa, following Ethiopia and Angola. It would be incorrect, however, to view Chissano as a Soviet puppet. He has maintained Machel's policy of not giving the Soviets the basing rights that they have sought. There is, however, a pro-Soviet faction within the Mozambican Government led by Marcelino Dos Santos, which prefers expanded Soviet influence.

~~(S)~~ With regard to economic aid and recognition of Mozambique as a socialist nation, the USSR has not been forthcoming. However, the Soviet Bloc is Mozambique's main supplier of military equipment and exerts a strong influence over the FAM through the large number of Soviet and Cuban advisers in-country. Dissatisfaction with the condescending attitude of the advisers and the poor quality of Soviet-provided equipment and training has led to heated debates between Soviet military advisers and FAM generals. Despite mutual dislike,

both sides are pragmatic enough to realize the necessity of continuing the marriage of convenience.

~~(S)~~ Relations between Mozambique and its Soviet benefactors deteriorated sharply in 1983 and early 1984, and then plummeted further in 1986 when President Machel died in a Soviet Iluyshin airliner piloted by a disoriented, inebriated Soviet crew. GPRM and FAM dissatisfaction with the Soviets came at a time when FRELIMO could least afford a rift. President Machel had planned the most ambitious offensive to date to deter RENAMO advances and prevent the insurgents from overrunning the provincial capital of Quelimane. There was no turning back; failure to launch the offensive, which required massive Soviet assistance, would have been disastrous. Moscow's delivery of large quantities of weapons in 1985, training of Special Forces, and massive airlift support significantly contributed to the offensive's limited success. Since then the GPRM has recognized that it has little hope of obtaining extensive foreign military assistance from other than the East Bloc and Cuba. This has resulted in an improvement in relations between Mozambique and its Communist allies. The FRELIMO government fully recognizes that without Soviet military assistance it cannot survive. This dependence gives the Soviets tremendous leverage and insures that the GPRM, in spite of its "nonaligned rhetoric," will remain a cooperative Marxist country. Despite massive Soviet military assistance, RENAMO continues to make incremental gains against the Mozambican Government. From the Soviets' point of view, Machel's negotiations and resulting security accord with South Africa betrayed the Marxist-Leninist and antiapartheid movements in southern Africa. A particularly bitter pill for Moscow to swallow was Machel's termination of active support for the Soviet-sponsored ANC. Probably to insure Mozambique's future military dependence upon the USSR, Moscow continued to deliver large quantities of weapons to Mozambique at a somewhat accelerated pace in 1985 and continued steadily through 1986 and 1987. However, the weapons reportedly have not been of the type, quantity, or quality desired by Mozambique, and have done little to improve the battlefield situation.

~~(S)~~ In 1986 the Soviets engaged in intensive resupply activity in preparation for a January 1987 offensive. In 1987 in addition to routine ammunition and fuel resupply, the Soviets began upgrading the FAM's radar network and establishing an integrated national air defense system; 13 new T-55 tanks were also delivered.

f. Economic Factors

(U) Mozambique's economy has been plagued by widespread economic mismanagement, intermittent drought, and 10 years of guerrilla warfare. As a result, the economy contracted an average of 8.5 percent annually during 1981-85. External foreign debt more than doubled since 1984 to an estimated $3 billion in 1986. Total exports, consisting mostly of shrimp, cashew nuts, sugar, cotton, and copra, plunged from $285 million in 1981 to only $80 million in 1985. In 1986-87, Maputo implemented an economic reform program, including an IMF agreement, debt rescheduling, and World Bank loans. The reform program has shown initial success, producing the first positive economic growth of this decade in 1986. Prospects for continued economic recovery, however, still are severely limited by the RENAMO insurgency.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S)~~ Mozambique is a member of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM); and has been denied full membership in the Soviet-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). In the past, the Mozambican Government has supported the Soviet Union and Cuba on almost all international issues. In 1977,

Mozambique signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Most recently, in 1985 Mozambique signed two economic cooperation agreements with CEMA. Despite its pro-Soviet position, Mozambique continues to deny the Soviets and their allies base rights in Mozambique, although Soviet naval vessels do make periodic port calls at Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. Mozambique is also one of the Front Line States (the others are Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), and maintains especially good relations with both Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, in 1987 friction developed between the Armed Forces of Mozambique and Zimbabwe as well as between the Armed Forces of Tanzania and Mozambique. Mozambique and Zimbabwe have signed a Defense Protocol that forms the basis of Zimbabwe's current military assistance to Maputo. At the request of the GPRM, there are 5,000 (the number varies depending upon the type of operations being conducted) Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) troops deployed inside Mozambique. These forces not only provide security for Zimbabwe's vital lines of communication to the sea against attacks by RENAMO, but also conduct offensive operations against the RENAMO insurgents. Zimbabwe also trains Mozambican troops in their own country and in Zimbabwe. Former President Nyerere of Tanzania allowed FRELIMO to operate from Tanzania during its struggle against Portuguese rule, and sent troops to assist the Machel government in defending Mozambique after independence. The Tanzanian combat troops remained in Mozambique for nearly 4 years before being withdrawn in late 1980 only to be redeployed to Quelimane Province in early 1987. The Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) currently has 2,500-3,000 combat troops in Mozambique.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Mozambique has no military equipment production capability. Military equipment is supplied mainly by Communist countries, led by the USSR, with shipments valued at over $1 billion since independence. This is about two-thirds of the total value of all deliveries. Other significant suppliers are East Germany and Hungary. Free World suppliers provided material valued at only $14 million during the same period. Major items provided by the USSR have included jet fighters, transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol boats, tanks, APCs, field artillery, mortars, ADA, small arms, ammunition, trucks, and communications equipment. In 1983, the Soviet Union stepped up deliveries to Mozambique. Deliveries included T-55 tanks, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, and MiG-21 fighters, which were part of a 1979 agreement. Total value of these deliveries was about $240 million. The quantity of material delivered in 1984 decreased somewhat, but included relatively sophisticated items such as Mi-24 helicopters and MiG-21 fighters. However, Soviet arms deliveries to Mozambique were again accelerated in 1985 and included additional Mi-24 helicopters, PT-76 light tanks, BTR-60 APCs, BM-21 rocket launchers, various field artillery pieces, SO-1 patrol boats, YEVGENA Class inshore minesweepers, and SA-3 missile systems.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ A number of foreign military missions now operate inside Mozambique, with Cuba maintaining the largest mission, followed by the Soviet Union. Additionally, there are some Czechoslovakian, Tanzanian, PRC, and North Korean military personnel working with the FAM. Western military missions are small, normally attaches only. Since 1986, the US, Italy, and Portugal have had resident attaches living in Maputo.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Maputo): Ambassador Melissa Foelsch Wells

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Commander in Chief: Major General Joaquin Alberto *Chissano*

Minister of National Defense: General of the Army Alberto Joaquim *Chipande*

Chief of General Staff and Vice MOD, Mozambican Armed Forces: Lieutenant General Antonio *Hama Thai*

Political-Military Commissar: Major General Eduardo da Silva *Nihia*

Commander, Mozambican Army: Lieutenant General Tobias *Dai*

Chief, Operations Directorate: Major General Salvador *Mutumuke*

Chief, Reconnaissance Directorate: Brigadier Jose Ajape *Hussene*

Inspector General, Mozambican Armed Forces: Brigadier Matias *Juma*

Commander, Mozambican Air Force and Air Defense Forces: Colonel Joao Bernardo *Honwana*

Commander, Mozambican Navy: Captain Manuel Gimo *Caetano*

Commander, Border Guard Forces: Major General Domingos *Fondo*

b. Position of Armed Forces

~~(C)~~ The Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM), also known as the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM), consist of the Ground Forces (Army and Border Guard), the Militia, Naval Command, and Air and Air Defense Force. The 45,000- to 50,000-man Ground Forces predominate over the fledgling 700-man Navy and the 1,000-man Air Force. The Ground Forces are supplemented by over 22,000 militia personnel who are serving on active duty. The FAM evolved from the military arm of FRELIMO, which had waged a guerrilla war with the Portuguese for 9 years prior to 1974. The strengthening, development, and reorganization of the FAM have had high priority with both the Machel and Chissano regimes.

~~(S)~~ Since independence, the FAM leadership has played an important role in national-level policy formulation. Military officers completely control the defense structure, view themselves as the military arm of FRELIMO, and generally belong to the moderate faction of the party. Because of the constant security threats faced by Mozambique since independence, first Rhodesian cross-border raids and now the National Resistence of Mozambique (RENAMO) insurgency, the military has consistently been able to claim a major portion of scarce national resources and has been the predominant player, behind Machel and Chissano, in national councils.

~~(S)~~ Beginning in 1982, to cope with the RENAMO threat, a military commander was appointed for each province and district within the country and counterintelligence officers were assigned down to village level. In many cases, particularly in areas where RENAMO was highly active, the local military commander also assumed all civil responsibilities. Regardless of who is formally in control at the local level, however, the military has first priority for regional resources. This has not endeared the military to the general public.

~~(S)~~ Machel was his own de facto Minister of Defense (MOD), and had plans to command a major offensive against RENAMO at the time of his death. Chissano had the solid backing of the military to replace Machel. The new president, unlike Machel, has left the details

of fighting the war to the military. MOD Chipande, with the concurrence of President Chissano, has pressed forward with gradual changes for FAM. In June 1987, many older veterans were forced to retire and were replaced with younger, brighter officers. Also an Army Chief position was created and a standardized rank and promotion system instituted. These and other reforms thus far have not had the impact necessary to revitalize the trouble-ridden FAM.

(U) The mission of the FAM remains to defend the national borders, conduct counterinsurgency operations, and maintain internal security.

~~(S)~~ The chain of command for the FAM runs from the President, who is Commander in Chief of the Forces, to the Minister of Defense, to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, to the Regional and Provincial Commanders. Because of the appointment of Regional and Provincial Commanders, the role of the Service Commanders has been reduced mainly to administrative and logistics matters.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The FAM continues to perceive the South African Defense Force, SADF, as its only external threat. Encouraged and assisted by the Soviet Union, FRELIMO leaders in 1975 began organizing and equipping a conventional force to counter this threat. Upon completion of the conversion from guerrilla force to conventional force, the FAM remained incapable of defending itself not only from South Africa but also from the growing internal threat posed by RENAMO. FAM has been slow and largely unsuccessful in developing a viable counterinsurgency force capable of thwarting the rapidly expanding RENAMO insurgency.

~~(S/NF)~~ In 1983, the FAM placed an increased priority on the development of units tailored to fight the guerrilla insurgents. A number of "special" counterinsurgency units were formed and committed to the battlefield. During 1984 and 1985, large numbers of militia personnel were mobilized to man many newly formed provincial military command battalions. Normally responsible only for local security, these independent battalions have often been placed under the operational control of the regular Ground Forces brigades for offensive operations. The FAM was better able to support these units through improved intelligence collection and analysis. Despite some limited battlefield successes in late 1983 and early 1984, a major offensive conducted by a 10,000-man Zimbabwe National Army task force in the central part of the country between July and October 1985, and a massive FAM offensive in the first half of 1987, the FAM remained unable to turn the tide of the war decisively in favor of the government. RENAMO's areas of operation have continued to expand and now include frequent cross-border incursions into Zimbabwe. Severe personnel, logistic, and command and control shortcomings have largely prevented the FAM from exploiting occasional improvements in the tactical situation.

~~(S/NF)~~ During 1978, the Soviets began developing an air force to complement the ground force structure. Between 1978 and 1981, a small number of helicopters, transport aircraft, and ground-attack jet fighters and trainers were provided to Mozambique by the Soviet Union and East Germany. During 1983 and early 1984, the capabilities of the Air Force were significantly upgraded with the deliveries of sophisticated aircraft including MiG-21/FISHBED jet fighters, An-26/CURL transports, Mi-8/HIP transport helicopters, and Mi-24/HIND attack helicopters. Most training for the Air Force has been conducted in Eastern Europe and the USSR. However, Soviet advisers provide some pilot training and on-the-ground technical support inside Mozambique. The Soviets apparently plan to continue

expanding this force. Progress is, however, quite slow due to a lack of trained Mozambican pilots and maintenance personnel.

d. Military Budget

(U) $74 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1987; 34.6 percent of the total central government budget. Dollar values converted at an exchange rate of 400 meticais equal $1.00.

e. (U) Population

13,776,000 as of 1 July 1985 Males (ages 15-49): 3,030,000; 1,791,000 fit for military service Ethnic divisions: 99 percent African, less than 1 percent European and Asian Literacy (1983): 20 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Ground Forces

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the national borders, conduct counterinsurgency operations, and maintain internal security.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Ground Forces are incapable of defending Mozambique from the primary external threat, South Africa, and have not had success in conducting counterinsurgency operations against RENAMO. Any outbreaks of internal violence would certainly be labeled as subversion provoked by South African agents and would probably be ruthlessly suppressed by the national security apparatus (SNASP). Military garrisons, including the Tank Brigade located in suburban Matola, could also be used as a backup.

~~(S)~~ Perhaps the only strength of the Ground Forces is its growing level of practical experience. Its principal weaknesses are manpower shortfalls; persistent logistics failures; an ineffective command and control structure; the lack of a coherent counterinsurgency strategy; high desertion rates; an unwillingness to fight; and instances of infiltration by RENAMO.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ Estimated 45,000 to 50,000 on hand, out of an authorized strength of 79,000. (Officer/NCO, enlisted breakdown not known.)

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The chain of command for the Ground Forces runs from the President, Commander in Chief, through the Minister of Defense, and then the FAM Chief of Staff to the regional and the provincial military commanders. The service commanders exercise formal command of their major subordinate units, but in actuality are mainly concerned with administrative, personnel, and logistic matters. Operational control of the various brigades and independent battalions of the Ground Forces is normally exercised by the provincial military commander. Implementation of FAM's modernization program is beginning to produce a few tangible results, such as more competent leadership in the field. FAM now has two Soviet-trained, combat-ready paratroop battalions and two North Korean-trained combat-ready commando battalions. These units were credited with several successful surprise attacks on RENAMO

during the offensive. Plans are for three more battalions if FAM can convince an ally to provide the necessary helicopter support. Despite these improvements, command and control and logistic weaknesses continue to hamper FAM's war efforts.

(b) ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ *Ground Combat Units*

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average Actual
1st Motorized Infantry Brigade	2,525	1,800
2d Motorized Infantry Brigade	1,092	1,000
3d Motorized Infantry Brigade	2,096	1,200
4th Motorized Infantry Brigade	2,027	1,200
5th Motorized Infantry Brigade	2,525	1,500
6th Tank Brigade	2,512	2,000
7th Motorized Infantry Brigade	2,096	1,200
8th Motorized Infantry Brigade	1,771	1,000
4 Border Guard Brigades	1,500 each	1,000 each
1 Artillery Regiment	600	400
2 Commando Battalions	615 each	550
2 Paratroop Battalions	500 each	450
120 Provincial Military Battalions	240 each	1,204 each
7 Artillery Battalions	200 each	140 each

(c) Deployment

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ In the northern four provinces — Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Zambezia — the Ground Forces are lightly deployed. The 4th Border Guard Brigade and the 7th Motorized Infantry Brigade are both based in Niassa Province, but provide smaller elements to support defense operations in the other three northern provinces. The 9th Motorized Infantry Brigade is based in Cabo Delgado Province. To the west, the 4th Motorized Infantry Brigade and 3d Border Guard Brigade are based in Tete Province. In central Mozambique, the 5th Motorized Infantry Brigade is based in Sofala Province while the 3d Motorized Infantry Brigade and 1st Border Guard Brigade are responsible for Manica Province. Moving south, the 2d and 8th Motorized Infantry Brigades, along with the 2d Border Guard Brigade, are based in Gaza Province but also operate in Inhambane Province. A special Soviet-trained counterinsurgency brigade is also based at Nacala, but may operate throughout the country. In vital Maputo Province, the 1st Motorized Infantry Brigade and the 6th Tank Brigade provide security for the capital.

~~(S)~~ The FAM is equipped with a full spectrum of weapon systems that compare favorably with the conventional inventories of its neighbors, even South Africa. Since independence, the USSR and its East European allies have been Mozambique's main suppliers of equipment. Additionally, North Korea, the PRC, Yugoslavia, Libya, India, France, the Netherlands, and Tanzania have provided small quantities of equipment. Over the past 2 years, Mozambique has approached almost all west European countries, as well as the US, for military assistance in an attempt to diversify its sources of supply and lessen its dependence on the Soviet Union. It has had only limited success. Constant operations against RENAMO keep Ground Force stocks of operationally ready equipment at low levels, and shortages of ammunition are frequently reported.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ In addition to the major items of equipment detailed below, the FAM is

equipped with a full variety of Soviet-style infantry weapons including 7.62-mm light machineguns; submachineguns; 7.62-mm assault rifles; RPG-2 and -7 antitank rocket launchers; 9-mm pistols; and 12.7-mm and 14.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns:

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Mortars:	160-mm, towed, model 1943	UR	Unk
	120-mm, towed, NFI	UR	6
	82-mm, M-1937	UR	218
	82-mm, Type 53	CH	400
	60-mm, M 57	YO	93
	60-mm, Type 63	CH	600
Antitank	AT-3/4 SAGGER	UR	Unk
Weapons:	Rkt lchr (RL) and Rcl Rifle		
	240-mm rkt lchr, 12 rd, BM-24	UR	6
	122-mm rkt lchr, 40 rd,	UR	40
(RCLR):	BM-21		
	107-mm rkt lchr	CH	10
	82-mm rcl rfl, B-10	UR	Unk
Artillery:	76-mm fld gun, ZIS-3, M1942	BU,HU	98
	85-mm fld gun, D-44	UR	168
	105-mm how, M18/40	CZ	55
	122-mm how, M1938, M-30	UR	24
	122-mm how, D-30	UR	82
	122-mm fld gun, D-74	CH	43
	130-mm fld gun, M-46	UR	32
	152-mm, M1943 D-1	UR	24
ADA:[1]	Msl lchr, SA-2	UR	18
	Msl lchr, SA-3, 4-rail	UR	21
	Msl lchr SA-7	UR	137
	14.5-mm ZPU-1	UR,GC	215
	14.5-mm ZPU-2 twin	UR,GC	20
	14.5-mm ZPU-4 quad mount	UR,GC	10
	23-mm ZU-23, twin	CZ	120
	30-mm AA gun, towed, NFI	GC	3
	37-mm M1939,	BU,CH,HU,UR	150
	57-mm S-60	HU,UR	149
	57-mm SP, ZSU-57-2	GC,UR	30
	85-mm, towed, KS-12	CH,CZ	72
Armor:	Tank, T-54/55, mdm	GC,UR	177
	Tank, Type 59, mdm	CH	6
	Tank, T-34, mdm	GC,HU,UR	260
	Tank, PT-76, lt	UR	50
	BMP, AIFV	UR	50
	BTR-152 APC	UR	215
	BTR-60 PB APC	UR	121
	Truck, NFI	RO,CH,UR	125
	Tank transporter	CZ,UR	6

[1] ~~(C)~~ The distribution and control of air defense equipment between the Army and Air/Air Defense Force is unknown. The SA-2/3 batteries are controlled by Air/Air Defense Forces.

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Other:	GSP amph ferry	UR	28
	PTS amph trnspt	GC,UR	32
	TMM scissors bridge	UR	4
	Armored landing bridges	UR	5
	WAZ 452 ambulances	UR	5
	OT-810 APC	CZ	15
	ARV BRDM-2	UR	88
	ARV/APC, UI	UR,HU, KN/FR	120
Motor Transports:	7/8-3.4-ton truck	GC,HU,UR	615
	3.5-7.5-ton truck	GC,UR	506
	Over 7.5-ton truck	CZ,UR	52
	Msl Transporter Truck	UR	100

(6) Logistics

~~(C)~~ The Ground Forces have severely limited abilities to plan and carry out the movement of their forces and the maintenance of their equipment.

~~(C)~~ Since 1975, Mozambique's internal lines of communication and international transportation corridors to Malawi and Zimbabwe have been in a state of chaos, severely limiting movement within and through the country.

~~(C)~~ Lack of maintenance, extensive war damage, and the ongoing RENAMO insurgency have crippled Mozambique's transportation infrastructure and placed a heavy burden on the country and its allies who depend on it for access to the Indian Ocean ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala.

~~(C)~~ Mozambique's ground forces have a severely limited capability to maintain and move their equipment. Combat units fighting RENAMO frequently run short of food, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies due to a lack of transportation assets and adequate lines of communication.

~~(C)~~ Mozambique's international transportation corridors from Beira and Nacala to Zimbabwe and Malawi are running far below capacity due to the insurgency and are kept open only at considerable economic, military, and political cost.

~~(C)~~ The Beira Corridor, a road, railway, and oil pipeline to Zimbabwe, is constantly subject to RENAMO interdiction and is guarded by Zimbabwe National Army and Mozambican troops, placing a crippling burden on both countries' economies. Similarly the Nacala Corridor, a single rail line to Malawi, is also frequently attacked by RENAMO and is kept open only by a Malawi and Mozambican Army presence. In both cases RENAMO has Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, and to a lesser degree Tanzania, at a disadvantage. Neither the Beira and Nacala Corridors nor the economies of Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique will attain full potential until hostilities cease and the transportation links in and through Mozambique are secured and rehabilitated. Because of the hazardous ground LOCs, scarce airlift assets are often relied upon to resupply provincial capitals.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ All Mozambicans 18 years old or older are required to register for the National Recruitment and Induction System. Callups generally occur twice a year to fill the levy

set by the FAM Department of Personnel and the Ministry of Defense. Those inducted are required to serve 2 years. Because of war and poor administrative procedures, it is not uncommon for a 2-year draftee to serve 8 years. Women are not obligated to register, but they may do so. In spite of the draft, most FAM units are not at full strength. Units have experienced problems with poor morale and desertion, especially with the new inductees. In 1985, the draft was expanded to fill shortfalls in the Ground Forces and militia and to increase the size of these forces. Impressment to meet manpower shortfalls is an accepted practice. The government not only has enacted additional callups during the year, but also has extended the draft to all those under 30 years of age and to all those holding professional skills in short supply in the Army (e.g., doctors, engineers), even if they are over 30 years of age. It is also believed that the insurgency is making recruitment more difficult as RENAMO spreads its influence over more of the population. The insurgents are disseminating propaganda against the FRELIMO regime in the countryside that discourages compliance with induction processes and encourages desertion. For career soldiers there are few incentives to leave the military, as they do not have the skills for civilian employment commensurate with the status and privileges the FAM enjoys in Mozambican society.

~~(S)~~ Qualified government and party civilians, especially those 4,000-5,000 who served with the FPLM before independence, often serve as political commissars and in communications and logistics assignments.

(8) Training

~~(S)~~ Basic and most advanced military training, to include officer candidate training, is conducted at several camps throughout Mozambique. Instruction is provided not only by Mozambican instructors, but also by Soviet, Cuban, North Korean, and Tanzanian advisers. Although some advanced training is provided in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Eastern Europe, the trend is toward in-country training. However, several hundred personnel are undergoing training in neighboring Tanzania and Zimbabwe. At Nyanga, Zimbabwe, the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) provides a 12-week training course for Mozambican junior officers. From an initial complement of 60 in 1986, the number of students increased to 120 in 1987 and is expected to increase to 240 in 1988. The quality of officer candidates sent by FAM to be trained by the BMATT is low. Defense Systems Limited (DSL) a private-sector group made up of ex-SAS soldiers, is also training Mozambican troops to provide security on the Nacala Railway. DSL has trained approximately 100 troops thus far and will be training more. FAM and Soviet training is very poor while UK training is highly regarded.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ The Ground Forces are supplemented by a militia force of undetermined strength that was revitalized in 1982 at Machel's direction. A large number of personnel have undergone basic infantry training during the last 3 years. As many as 22,000 are probably serving in provincial infantry battalions which have been activated on a virtually full-time basis (see section 3.d., Paramilitary Forces). Other unknown thousands of militia personnel are inactive and not affiliated with any organized militia battalions. However, Ground Forces commanders, due to personnel shortages, often impress the militia into their units for local operations. While the militia has proven to be generally ineffective, it does provide the FAM a manpower pool to draw from. In order to provide more protection against RENAMO insurgents, weapons have been given to some of the citizenry. There is only minimal training in military subjects for such personnel, however, and their utility is suspect. Militia at

village level frequently abuse fellow villagers, and have been of little or no value as a deterrent to RENAMO.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C)~~ Mobilization plans are not available, but they are probably dependent upon a rapidly expandable militia force. While thousands of personnel could be mobilized within several months, many more months of training and additional logistic support, which is currently unavailable to the FAM, would be necessary before the personnel could be organized into capable combat units. Given the tremendous problems with regular forces and existing militia forces further mobilization with any degree of effectiveness is next to impossible.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ The mission of the Navy is to patrol Lake Malawi, Mozambican territorial waters, and the country's harbors.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The capabilities of the Navy to carry out its mission are marginal. The service has too few ships and personnel to be able to effectively monitor Mozambique's long coastline, extensive territorial waters, and major ports. The Navy has marines *(fuzileiros)* but they have not yet been fully trained.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ Estimated at 700 men. The breakdown between officers and enlisted men is unknown.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Ship Strength

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
PB (Patrol Boat)	15	2	0	5
LCM (Medium Landing Craft)	0	0	0	3
YTM (Yard & Service Craft)	2	0	0	0
MSI (Inshore Minesweeper)	2	0	0	0
Total: 29	**19**	**2**	**0**	**8**

(5) Organization and Deployment

~~(C)~~ Mozambique maintains two naval contingents, one on Lake Malawi and the other on the Indian Ocean. Ports used by the Navy include Metangula (Lake Malawi), and Maputo, Beira, Nacala, and Pemba (all on the Indian Ocean).

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Three Jupiter and two Bellatrix Class patrol boats were turned over to Mozambique by the Portuguese in 1975 along with three medium landing craft, and are inoperable. Five Soviet-supplied ZHUK and two unidentified patrol craft from the Netherlands were delivered during 1979 and 1980 and should be in good condition, although the Navy may lack qualified personnel to man these craft. In 1985, Mozambique received two SO-1 patrol boats and two YEVGENYA Class inshore minesweepers from the Soviet Union. Additional Soviet craft may be on order. Also during 1985, India reportedly delivered 10 unidentified small patrol boats.

(7) Logistics

~~(C)~~ The ability of the Navy to maintain its equipment is questionable. It continues to receive foreign assistance and will do so until Mozambican personnel can be fully trained.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Mozambique has two repair facilities where significant hull and related shop maintenance can be performed on the Navy's patrol craft. The first, at Beira, is an aging drydock, which has a lift capacity of 5,000 tons and could accommodate any of the Navy's vessels. The second, at Maputo, is a floating drydock, which has a lift capacity of 4,500 tons and was delivered by the Soviets in 1981 primarily to support the Mozambican and Soviet fishing fleets. However, it could also be used by Mozambican Navy units for repairs and maintenance.

(8) Training

~~(C)~~ There is a small NCO training school at Pemba in Cabo Delgado Province. For the most part Mozambican NCOs and officers are trained in the USSR or East Germany. Soviet technicians and naval personnel also train, advise, and assist the Navy.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(C)~~ There appear to be no reserves or mobilization in the Navy.

~~(C)~~ The Mozambican Merchant Marine consists of nine ships of 1,000 GRT or over. Of these, seven would have limited military support potential. All but one of these vessels are breakbulk ships with total deadweight tonnages (lift capacity) of 23,300 tons of cargo and ranging in age from 8 to 37 years. The remaining ship is a dredger.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(U) The Air Force's mission is to provide air defense for the country and tactical support for the Ground Forces.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The Air Force has a limited air defense capability. The SA-3/SA-2 forces provide Mozambique its only significant air defense capability. A shortage of transport aircraft and helicopters and a general shortage of qualified pilots severely limit the ability of the Air Force to perform its ground support role. A shortage of modern aircraft and qualified pilots is expected to continue over the next several years; surrogate pilots will be required if the Air Force is to remain fully operational. The Air Force is currently in deplorable condition and is not capable of defending the country or giving adequate tactical support to the land forces. During the January 1987 offensive Soviet transport aircraft supplemented the Mozambican lift capabilities.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ Estimated at 1,000; no breakdown of officer/enlisted personnel available. At least 60 pilots have received training in the Soviet Union.

(4) ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 140 (fixed-wing: 82 jet, 10 turboprop, 10 prop; helicopters: 38 turbine)

In operational units: 140
(79 fighters: all weather
8 transports: 8 short-range
15 trainers: 7 jet, 8 prop
24 helicopters: 22 medium lift support,
16 attack)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The Air Force is organized into eight squadrons. This includes four fighter squadrons, a fixed-wing transport squadron, a transport helicopter squadron, an attack helicopter squadron, and a training squadron. Fighter aircraft are periodically assigned to Tete and Maputo in support of tactical operations. Both Mozambicans and Soviets pilot combat and transport aircraft.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Air defense is the responsibility of the Air Force and has a high priority because of Mozambique's perceived threat from South Africa and its belief that RENAMO insurgents are supplied by airdrops from South African aircraft. In 1987, the Soviets began upgrading the country's radar and air defense network. The plan is to establish four air defense centers, each to be manned by a regiment or brigade of air defense troops under the command and control of the Air Force. The centers will be located in Maputo, Beira, Tete, and Nacala. Each center will be an integrated system linking radars, antiaircraft guns, SAMs, interceptor aircraft, and operational control centers.

(b) ~~*(S/NF/WN)*~~ *Summary of Units*

Unit	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
1 Transport Sqdn	An-26/CURL	7	Maputo
	CASA-212	1	
4 Fighter Sqdns	MiG-21/FISHBED	48	Nacala
	MiG-17/FRESCO	31	Beira (with detachment at Maputo)
1 Training Sqdn	MiG-21/MONGOL	2	
	MiG-15/MIDGET	8	
	Yak-18 MAX	8	Maputo
1 Transport Helicopter Sqdn	Mi-8/HIP	22	Beira
1 Attack Helicopter Sqdn	Mi-24/HIND	16	Maputo

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ All of the equipment in the Air Force inventory has been supplied by the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic since 1978. Technicians for this equipment were trained in the Soviet Union, and the overall status of maintenance is poor. It is believed that fewer than 20 MiG-17/FRESCOs are still operational. Some of the MiG-21s are still in storage and have not yet been assembled. As of October 1987, only 6 MiG-21 FISHBEDs out of 48 based at Nacala were reported to be operational. The reasons for the low operationally ready rate are lack of spare parts and poor maintenance. Poor quality and limited availability of aviation gas have also been a problem.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The ability of the Air Force to provide transport within the country and to maintain its equipment is poor. The Mozambican Air Force is dependent upon the USSR for replacement parts and fuel. On occasion logistic support to the Air Force has been withheld or delayed by the USSR for political reasons.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(C)~~ Officer retention is good; NCO and enlisted retention has been a problem. In fact, desertion among all ranks is a serious problem.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ Flight training and technical training have been provided by the Soviet Union, both in the USSR and by Soviet advisers in Mozambique.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(C)~~ Other than a few Mozambican Airline (LAM) pilots, there are few reserves available. A small number of trained Mozambican technicians could possibly be mobilized in an emergency.

~~(C)~~ Approximately five civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Mozambique:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)	**Owner/Operator**
1 Il-62 Classic	LAM (see below)
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30	LAM
2 Total	
Medium-Range Transport Aircraft (1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)	
2 Boeing 737-200	LAM
1 Boeing 737-200C	LAM
3 Total	

(U) LAM (Linhas Aereas de Mocambique), Mozambique's domestic and international flag carrier, is government owned and operated. All of the above aircraft carry civil registration markings.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Mozambique is not known. LAM employs approximately 32 pilots.

~~(C)~~ Virtually all of Mozambique's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized for military use in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Without considerable foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft.

d. Paramilitary Forces

~~(C)~~ As many as 30,000 militia personnel have been mobilized to serve in at least 100 provincial military command battalions. These territorially based infantry battalions provide primarily local security. Normally directly subordinate to the Provincial Military Commander, they are often under the operational control of a Regular Army or Border

Guard brigade. With the increase of insurgent hostilities, nearly all of these personnel are serving as full-time soldiers.

e. ~~(S)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Ground Forces	45,000-50,000 (estimated)
Navy	700
Air Force	1,000
Militia	22,000 (estimated)
Total	**73,700 (estimated on hand, 124,200 authorized)**

f. ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Foreign Military Presence

(1) Foreign Military In-Country

Soviet: 800 (instructors/technicians/advisers)

Cuban: 900 (military instructors and advisers/security assistance; figure includes 200-250 intelligence personnel)

East German: 200-250 intelligence/internal security personnel

Czechoslovakian: 50+

Hungarian: 75

Romanian: Unk

North Korean: 90-110

Tanzanian: 2,500-3,000[1]

Zimbabwean: 7,500[1]

Zambian: 50+

Malawian: 600-800[1]

(2) Mozambican Military Presence Abroad

Soviet Union: 100

Bulgaria: Unk

Cuba: 75

German Democratic Republic: 100

Hungary: Unk

People's Republic of China: 45

Tanzania: 500-600

Portugal: 5

United Kingdom: 2

Zimbabwe: 120

[1] (U) Combat troops.

MOZAMBIQUE

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Beira Airfield	1176-08023	80081	19-47-45S	034-54-32E
Beira Army Brigade HQ and Bks Area	1176-00063	91140	19-49-20S	034-53-30E
Boane Brigade HQ	1299-00006	90110	26-01-50S	032-19-10E
Chiduachine Brigade HQ and Bks Area	1299CN0578	91140	24-47-00S	033-28-30E
Chimoio Brigade and Battalion HQ Area	1176-00843	91140	19-02-20S	033-25-30E
Cuamba Brigade HQ Area	1154-00280	91140	14-49-05S	036-32-45E
Lichinga Military Post	1154-00108	91140	13-16-30S	035-14-56E
Maputo Ground Forces HQ	1299-00007	90110	25-57-25S	032-35-40E
Maputo Naval HQ and Training Facilities	1299-00076	96100	25-58-42S	032-34-32E
Massingir Military Installation	1276-00110	91140	23-51-00S	032-04-00E
Matola Military Camp	1299CA0021	91140	25-50-27S	032-25-07E
Metangula Naval Base	1154-00276	95140	12-43-00S	034-49-00E
Nacala Port Facilities	1155-08009	47420	14-32-12S	040-40-16E
Pemba Port Facility	1155-00008	47420	12-58-02S	040-29-20E
Sao Jorge Do Limpopo Military Installation	1276CA0004	91140	22-44-17S	032-02-59E
Tete Brigade HQ	1176-00343	91140	16-09-45S	033-35-43E
Vanchilavalavo Military Camp	1299CA0022	91140	24-28-49S	032-46-11E
Vila Montepuez Bde HQ	1155CA0001	91140	13-07-40S	039-00-20E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

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NAMIBIA

1. ~~(C)~~ Political-Military Situation: Namibia (South-West Africa) — a territory about the size of the UK and France combined — is not yet independent. It has little intrinsic value but does receive considerable attention from parties searching for an internationally acceptable independence formula. It is also important as a buffer between Angola and South Africa. South Africa occupied the German territory of South-West Africa during World War I and in 1920 received a mandate from the League of Nations. In 1945 the UN claimed to have inherited the League's authority, and in 1946 refused to allow South Africa to annex the territory. However, South Africa refused to recognize any trusteeship arrangement with the UN. As a result, each party pursued a different course of action with regard to Namibia.

(U) The legal conflict over the status of Namibia has continued for 37 years. In 1950, the International Court of Justice ruled that Namibia had an international status, and that the UN was capable of supervising the mandate but that South Africa did not have to agree to a UN trusteeship for the territory. The UN in 1966 formally terminated South Africa's mandate and in 1967 established a UN Council for Namibia to administer the territory. The UN Security Council declared South Africa's administration of Namibia illegal in 1970, and the International Court of Justice supported that opinion in 1971. Numerous resolutions have been passed by the UN in an effort to force South Africa out of Namibia, but with no effect.

~~(C/NF)~~ While negotiating over Namibia's future with the Contact Group (US, UK, France, Germany, and Canada), the Frontline States, and the United Nations, South Africa has concurrently been sponsoring various schemes leading to a unilateral, "internal settlement." The latest of these schemes is the Multi-Party Conference (MPC), formed in 1983 after the failure of both the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)-controlled government installed in 1978, and the South African-sponsored State Council formed in 1980. The MPC plan to form a "government of national unity" (Transitional Government of National Unity — TGNU — or simply TG,) was formally endorsed in the South African Parliament by State President P.W. Botha in April 1985, and the MPC was seated in June 1985. This "interim" government comprises a National Assembly of 62 members, a cabinet of 8 with 8 deputies, and a constitutional council of 16 members. This council was scheduled to sit for a maximum of 18 months to draw up an "independence constitution." The new constitution was handed to the MPC in November 1986. The chairmanship of the cabinet was to rotate every 3 months among its members, however, there is no evidence that this has in fact taken place. Although the MPC is not recognized by the UN, its members are forging ahead in hopes of reaching a compromise solution to the Namibian independence problem that will be acceptable to the Namibian people and to the UN. Chances of success are very limited as the Ovambos, the majority tribe, are not represented in the government. The MPC has only limited legislative powers at this point, and its decisions are subject to approval by the South Africa-appointed Administrator General. South Africa retains control of Namibia's defense, foreign relations, and internal security.

~~(C)~~ An end to the six-year drought and a revival of demand for Namibian exports of diamonds, copper, and other minerals, account for 62 percent of the territory's gross domestic product, are the major reasons for modest improvement in the Namibian economy in 1986. Economic growth is expected to grow by one percent in real terms, the first positive growth rate since the late 1970s.

~~(S/NF)~~ The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) has waged a guerrilla war against South African rule of Namibia since 1966. At present, the SWAPO military component, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), numbers about 6,000-8,000. Unable to operate routinely and establish permanent bases inside Namibia, SWAPO's efforts have been limited to rainy season incursions (March-April) aimed at the white farming areas south of Ovamboland. It is estimated that SWAPO within Namibia never numbers more than 100-600 guerrillas.

~~(S/NF)~~ Since the mid-1970s, South Africa has had to devote a relatively large number of South African Defense Force (SADF) troops to the SWAPO insurgency. In 1973, the SADF took responsibility for border security from the South African Police (SAP), and in 1974 a special military area was established along the border. Since then, the region, called the Border Operational Area (BOA), has been subdivided into sectors. The SADF has constructed a number of military bases in the BOA from which it conducts routine border and counterinsurgency (COIN) patrols, hot-pursuit raids into Angola and occasionally Zambia, and supporting airstrikes and reconnaissance. In late 1986 and 1987, the SADF conducted a number of preemptive strikes against SWAPO targets in southern Angola. Despite the independence negotiations, the SADF has continued to improve its facilities and increase the number of small bases in the BOA. While the SADF has not been able to eliminate the SWAPO insurgency, it has managed through major and hot-pursuit cross-border raids to achieve short-term advantages and to halt its growth.

(S/NF) Since the 1975 Angolan war, the SADF has conducted six major strikes into southern Angola. Although many smaller reactive or hot-pursuit operations took place during the intervening time, the major raids were all highly successful and, with few exceptions, strikingly similar. Each raid took advantage of favorable weather conditions, excellent intelligence, and an improving military infrastructure inside Namibia. At first the military goals were modest, having been chosen to lessen the potential for conflict with Cuban-Soviet-Angolan military forces. Although each raid could have hampered Namibian negotiations among SWAPO, South Africa, the Frontline States, and the Western Contact Group, the SAG apparently decided that the risk was justified by the outcome — reduction of the SWAPO military threat. However, no less important is the Namibian role as a South African base of operations in support of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)'s struggle against the Soviet-Cuban backed Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). Namibian based SADFs launched major strikes to stop the 1985 and 1987 FAPLA offensives against UNITA Forces in south eastern Angola, and is likely to repeat similar operations whenever the SAG perceives the need.

~~(C)~~ Casualty figures since 1984 have declined and may indicate a wavering in SWAPO's determination to infiltrate into Namibia:

	SADF/SAP[1]	SWAPO	Ratio
1978	30	800	1:27
1979	31	1,000+	1:33
1980	87	1,106	1:13
1981	54	1,100	1:20
1982	77	1,268	1:16
1983	90	918	1:10
1984	26	584	1:21
1985	31	599	1:19
1986	34	645	1:19
1987	73	745	1:10

~~(C)~~ Figures for SADF/SAP represent combat losses only, not deaths due to "other causes" and "accidents."

~~(C)~~ Following Operation Protea in 1981, SADF maintained forces in southern Angola on a semipermanent basis to head off SWAPO incursions into northern Namibia, eventually occupying an area that extended some 100 km into Angola and came to be known as the "Area in Question" (AIQ). Early in 1984 in Lusaka, South Africa agreed in principle to a phased withdrawal of all its forces from southern Angola. The disengagement process led to the formation of an Angolan-South African Joint Military Commission (JMC). The South African withdrawal proceeded fairly rapidly as far south as the town of Ngiva, some 35 kilometers north of the Namibian border. Blaming the Angolan forces' inability to control SWAPO elements in the area, the South African Government delayed complete withdrawal from Angola until April 1985.

~~(C/NF)~~ Despite the almost total withdrawal of SADF from Angola, the negotiating process between Angola and South Africa relative to independence in Namibia has been further stalled by a number of further or subsequent South African incursions into Angola; basic disagreement on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) from Angola; and South African rejection of the UN position that SWAPO is the sole legitimate representation of the Namibian people. South Africa will continue to maintain sizable military forces in northern Namibia but is in the process of shifting the bulk of the fighting to the South-West African Territory Force (SWATF).

~~(C)~~ SWATF was established in 1980. The force has been designed to augment the SADF and to form the nucleus of an armed force for a future independent Namibia. By law, the SWATF falls under the authority of the Administrator General (AG) for Namibia, who is appointed by the South African Government. All operational matters are carefully controlled from SADF Headquarters in Pretoria. In fact, because the SADF tightly controls funds, equipment, weapons, training, and engineering assistance, the effect of the authority of the AG is minimal on day-to-day SWATF matters. Commander SWATF (a seconded South African general) commands separate South African Army (SAA) units deployed in Namibia as well as Namibian military forces. There is no unified command structure in Namibia.

(U) In September 1980, the Namibian National Assembly passed a motion requiring national military service for all racial groups. Previously only white males were subject to conscription into the SADF. The law took effect on 1 January 1981 and applied to men ages 16 to 25. National servicemen serve for 2 years and then are assigned to a reserve unit with an obligation for 30-day camps, usually on a yearly basis for 8 years. In November 1980, selective notification of conscription began; however, no one from the northern areas of Kaokoland, Ovambo, Kavango, or Caprivi was included. Although the SADF has said that this was because no reserve units exist in the region into which to funnel the servicemen after two years' active duty, the more important reason was that the authorities did not wish to precipitate movement of young men across the border to swell the ranks of SWAPO. Although large numbers of nonwhite volunteers for the various SWATF ethnic units obviate the need for wide scale conscription, a compulsory and controversial registration drive was conducted in late 1984 for all men in Namibia between the ages of 17 and 54. SWATF authorities insisted that registration did not mean automatic conscription, but less than positive results led to a temporary halt in the registration process.

~~(C/NF)~~ The ample numbers of black and colored volunteers is probably due to the SWATF pay scale, which is the same as the South African Army's and therefore much better than these men normally could expect in civilian life. The 2 SAI Bn Gp in Walvis Bay trains 3,000 Namibians per year for service in SWATF mixed battalions and reserve forces, advanced training takes place at the unit level, and junior leader training is given at the South West African Military School in Okahandja.

~~(S/NF)~~ A separate command has been formed for Walvis Bay. This command includes the 1,500 SADF troops stationed in Walvis Bay and is called the Walvis Bay Territorial Command (WBTC). This administrative rearrangement furthers South Africa's claim that Walvis Bay, due to a different historical route of acquisition, is not part of Namibia. However, SADF, SWATF, and WBTC remain closely associated; for instance, SWATF conscripts are being trained at a WBTC facility.

2. (U) Key Officials:

Administrator-General (appointed by South Africa): Mr. Louis *Pienaar*

Commanding Officer South-West Africa Territory Force: Maj Gen Willie C. *Meyer*

South-West Africa Territory Force, Second in Command: Brig Gert *Nel*

South-West Africa Territory Force, Chief of Staff for Operations: Col J.T. *Louw*

South-West Africa Police Commissioner: Lt Gen A. *Gouws*

Chief of Security Police: COL Johan *van de Merwe*

South-West Africa Territory Force, Chief of Staff, Intelligence,: Col J.J. H. *Bissehoff*

South-West Africa Security Police, Divisional Commander: Brig Sarel *Strydom*

Members of the 8-man Transitional Multi-Party Conference (MPC) Cabinet:

Chairman and Minister of Transportation: David *Bezuidenhout* (Coloured Labor Party)

Minister of Finance: Dirk *Mudge* (Republican Party)

Minister of Manpower and National Health and Welfare: Moses *Katjiuongua* (South West Africa National Union (SWANU)

Minister of Information and Justice: Jariretundu *Kozonguizi* (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance)

Minister of Mining and Commerce: Andreas *Shipanga* (SWAPO Democrats)

Minister of Local Authorities and Civic Affairs: Hans *Diergaardt* (Rehoboth Free Democratic Party)

Minister of National Education: Andrew *Matjila* (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance)

Minister of Agriculture: Eden *van Zijl* (National Party)

Other important personalities:

National Party of SWA: Kosie *Pretorius*

Christian Democratic Action (CDA): Peter *Kalangula*

Coloured Labor Party: Barney *Barnes*

National Independence Party: Charlie *Hartung* and Otilie *Abrahams*

Caprivi African National Union: Mishake *Muyongo*

National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO): Kuaima *Riruako*

3. (U) Military Budget: $64 million for fiscal year ending March 1986; this is 7 percent of the proposed central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 2.22 rands equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 1,301,598 as of 1988

Males (ages 15-49): 281,000 physically fit, 167,000.

Ethnic divisions: 85.6 percent black, 7.5 percent white, 6.9 percent mixed about half the blacks are Ovambo.

Literacy: 100 percent white, 16 percent nonwhite.

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ Army: In an effort to "Namibianize" the war, the ratio of SADF/SWATF personnel deployed along the border with Angola has been changed significantly in recent years; Namibian personnel now make up over 61 percent of the security forces involved in controlling the movement of SWAPO insurgents. SWATF is playing an increasingly important role in cross-border operations into Angola. During Operation Askari in January 1984, Namibian units were major participants. Clearly the SAG is trying to shift a greater burden of the fighting in Angola and Namibia to SWATF despite its limited capabilities. Even with increasing numbers of volunteers, SWATF remains heavily dependent on the SADF for all levels of military assistance, from uniforms, to weapons, to leadership. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the SWATF to survive if negotiations were to result in a SWAPO-ruled independent Namibia. On the other hand, if the MPC solution becomes acceptable to all Namibians and to the UN, the SWATF, with significant South African assistance, will become the nucleus of an independent Namibian armed force.

Personnel Strength: Some 18,000-21,000 troops on active duty serve in Namibia of which 10,000-12,000 are SWATF and about 9,000 are SADF. In addition, there are 1,500 SADF permanently stationed in Walvis Bay.

Reserve: Namibia now has its own reserve program separate from that of the SADF. The old Citizen Force (firstline reserve) is now called the Reaction Force. There are an estimated 2,500 white Namibian males in Reaction Force units. These forces have both a conventional and a COIN mission. The old Commando Force (home defense reserve) has been renamed the Area Force. Between 2,000 and 5,500 white Namibian males and 500 nonwhite Namibians belong to Area Force units. Like his SADF counterpart, a SWATF soldier serves two years of national service, and then serves until the age of 40 in the Reaction Force. This annual commitment is 30 days, which is always spent "on the border." He then transfers into the Area Force until age 55.

Major Units: South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF): 10 light infantry battalions (est strength 900-1,000 each); one reserve brigade, three battalions, Reaction Force; one field artillery battalion; two armored car battalions; one airborne battalion; one signal battalion (est strength 200); one Specialist Unit (employs dogs, horses, motorcycles); six-seven company-size combat service support units designed to support active duty SWATF.

South African Defense Force (SADF): one infantry battalion group (mech) (est strength 1,500); one field artillery battalion; one armored car battalion; five (est) separate cos; one-two cos reconnaissance commando (special forces); one to two cos paratroops; unknown number of equestrian, motorcycle, and canine units; one irregular unit (32 battalion) consisting of ex-FNLA, UNITA supporters, and Portuguese Angolans (est strength 1,500).

South-West Africa Northern Logistics Command: Located at Grootfontein and Windhoek, est strength 5,000 (included in the 31,000 manpower strength listed above).

Major Equipment: Namibian light infantry units equipped with rifles (R-1 and R-4), mortars, and rocket launchers. SADF has at its disposal: mortars; FA (the G-5 155-mm gun and G-6 self-propelled 155-mm gun); Eland armored cars; Ratel IFV; indigenous light armored vehicle (Buffels); Oliphant tanks.

6. ~~(C)~~ Navy: There is no navy separate from the SADF. Several harbor patrol craft

(Namacurra Class PSB) are probably present. Occasionally, a South African Navy (SAN) ship deploys to Walvis Bay. Formation of a naval component to SWATF was discussed and rejected. Company strength elements of SAN marines are being rotated into the BOA for 3-month tours in order to gain counterinsurgency experience.

7. ~~(C)~~ **Air Force:** The 1st South-West Africa Squadron is the only air element of the SWATF. Formerly the 112th Commando Squadron of the South African Air Force (SAAF), it consists of civilian pilots holding reserve commissions in the SWATF who make their own aircraft and ground support crews available for military missions. Headquartered at Eros Airfield outside Windhoek, the Squadron is organized into four flights and operates in close coordination with the Western Air Command (WAC), which controls all military air operations in Namibia. Squadron personnel rotate on a weekly standby roster and are subject to frequent callup. Most operations are staged out of Eros and consist of providing aerial reconnaissance, communication, and personnel transport support to the SWATF and SAA elements operating in Namibia. SAAF aircraft are detached from South Africa for temporary assignment to the WAC. Impala close-air support, light utility aircraft, and Puma and Alouette helicopters are used extensively in support of SADF operations in Namibia.

(U) Four civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are believed to be registered, owned, and operated in Namibia:

Medium-Range Transport Aircraft (1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)

2 McDonnell Douglas C-47/DC-3 SKYTRAIN

Short-Range Transport Aircraft (less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)

2 Convair 580

(U) These aircraft are operated by Namib Air, which is a subsidiary of Safmarine, South Africa's national shipping line. One of the Convair 580s is believed to be leased from a South African mining company. Namib Air recently purchased two short-range Beechcraft B1900 commuter aircraft and also operates a number of Piper and Cessna light aircraft. All aircraft in Namibia are registered in South Africa.

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Namibia is not known. Namib Air reportedly employs about 18 pilots.

~~(C)~~ Virtually all of Namibia's civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized by the Administrator General of the territory, or by the South African Government, in the event of war or comparable state of emergency affecting Namibia.

8. Paramilitary:

~~(C)~~ Prior to September 1980, police services in Namibia were provided by some 1,700 to 1,900 South African Police (SAP). As of 1 September 1980, an independent police force was created for South-West Africa. The strength total of the new force and the remaining SAP elements probably remains about the same. It has its own budget and all the traditional national police functions except for security (special branch) and intelligence, which remain under the control of the South African Government. Until such time as the training cycle can provide police personnel of local origin, many members of the new force will be seconded from SAP. Routine police services are performed from 52 stations throughout the territory. The Administrator General of Namibia assumed Command and Control of SAP elements in Namibia in May 1985.

~~(C)~~ In addition to regular police, a program to develop ethnic police units for northern Namibia has been underway since 1978. A 3-month version of the usual 5 1/2-month SAP

training course has been conducted at various locations in the north. Training consists of drill, tactical formation, COIN operations, and marksmanship. Some 2,500 ethnic policemen have completed the training, are assigned to duty in their home areas, and are said to make up a "Special Force." The Special Force is also known as the Home Guard.

(C) The Southwest Africa Police's Counterinsurgency unit previously known as Operation K-Koevoet (Crowbar), formerly a paramilitary section of SAP — now also under the Administrator General, continues to rotate in and out several companies deployed to the BOA. This unit continues to play an important role in counterinsurgency operations in Namibia. The counterinsurgency police unit, has a strength of 2,000 including 200 white South Africans. This force, recruited mostly from the Ovambo and Kavango peoples of northern Namibia, has evolved into the primary counterinsurgency force inside Namibia. Rarely deployed outside the territorial limits, the special COIN police unit has the highest kill ratio among SADF/SWATF/SAP elements. Over 80 percent of all SWAPO guerrillas killed in Namibia are credited to the COIN police units.

9. (U) Key US Officials: There is currently no permanent US official representation in Namibia. The US Liaison office closed in February 1985, but it may reopen if negotiations between South Africa and Angola are resumed.

10. (U) Foreign Military Presence: None

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NAMIBIA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Eros Afld	1273-08004	80091	22-36-40S	017-05-05E
Grootfontein	1178-09998	70220	19-34-20S	018-06-15E
Grootfontein Afld	1178-08001	80081	19-36-08S	018-07-33E
Grootfontein Ord Depot	1178-00011	92020	19-34-00S	018-06-00E
Mpacha Afld	1177-08067	80082	17-38-03S	024-10-50E
Okahandja SWATF Mil Sch Osona Bse	1273-09999	90130	21-59-00S	016-50-00E
Ondangwa Afld	1179-08002	80063	17-52-42S	015-57-00E
Rundu Afld	1179-08005	80092	17-57-00S	019-43-00E
Walvisbaai	1273-09994	70220	22-57-00S	014-29-55E
Windhoek HQ SW Africa Ter Force	1273-00003	90110	22-35-36S	017-05-24E

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RWANDA

1. (U) Political-Military Situation: Rwanda gained independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962, and for 11 years was governed by a civilian regime. On 5 July 1973, however, members of the Rwandan Army *(Armee Rwandaise)* led by Defense Minister Colonel Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew the government of Gregoire Kayibanda, abolished the discredited National Assembly, and established the Second Republic. Habyarimana then ruled by decree, but with the intention to expand popular political participation and to return to constitutional rule. On 23 July 1975, he announced the formation of the *Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour Le Developpement* (MRND) as a grassroots political organization aimed at promoting peace, unity, and national development. Under the direction of the MRND, Rwandans adopted a new constitution by referendum on 17 December 1978, and then elected Major General Habyarimana President on 24 December 1978. Pursuant to the constitution, legislative elections were held in December 1981 to establish the *Conseil National De Developpement,* which shares law-making authority with the President. Running unopposed, the President was reelected in December 1983, for another five-year term.

(U) Habyarimana's government policy has sought to redress regional and ethnic grievances, end corruption, and stimulate economic development of the country's population, which is growing at a rapid rate. The moderate ethnic policies of the government have considerably reduced tension between the 85 percent Hutu majority and the 14 percent, formerly dominant, Tutsi minority. The most concerted challenge to the government occurred in April 1980, when State Security Chief Major Theoniste Lizinde and a number of other military and civilian officials and business people were arrested and charged with a plot to seize power and eliminate President Habyarimana. They were subsequently tried and many were found guilty in the fall of 1981. Lizinde and one other person involved were given death sentences, which were commuted in 1982. There do not appear to be serious internal threats to the sovereignty of Habyarimana or to the Hutu preponderance. Though dormant ethnic hostility may remain between the Tutsis and Hutus, it is unlikely that there will be large-scale civil disturbances between the two ethnic groups in the foreseeable future.

(U) Rwanda's external relations with neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire have steadily improved in recent years despite lingering Rwandan concern about the intentions of Tutsis who have fled Hutu domination to neighboring countries. Rwanda is wary of Burundi's Tutsi-led government and army but works actively to reduce tension with Bujumbura. Fairly close relations between Libyan leader Qadhafi and deposed Burundi president Bagaza occasionally gave Kigali cause for concern, but there are indications relations will improve with Buyoya now in power in Burundi. Relations with Uganda, through which most Rwandan trade passes, were strained by Ugandan internal conflict in recent years, and by Uganda's expulsion of Rwandans. As a result of concern over Uganda's actions, Rwanda has sought to lessen its dependence on transportation routes that run through Uganda: coffee is entirely exported through Tanzania to Mombasa, Kenya and it hopes to route all exports this way eventually. Relations with Tanzania have also improved since the end of Tanzania's 1979-81 war with Uganda, which cut Rwanda's supply line. Regional cooperation has grown since September 1976 when Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire established the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL), which includes mutual security provisions. Moreover, Rwanda joined Burundi and Tanzania in 1977 to establish the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, to which

Uganda adhered in 1981. Rwanda is a member of the United Nations (UN), Organization of Africa Unity, (OAU), Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and other international organizations.

~~(C)~~ Rwanda's relations with communist states are reserved. The Government of Rwanda (GOR) is interested in pragmatic development rather than ideology in its dealings with communist countries. With the exception of China, which has provided technical and some military assistance, and to a lesser degree North Korea, Rwanda has been disappointed with the small amount of economic assistance provided by communist states. The Soviet Union's primary contribution has been the 75 academic scholarships provided in 1984-85. North Korea provided organizational assistance to the MRND as well as economic and limited military aid, but aroused suspicion because of its doctrinaire approach. The small contingent of North Korean advisers was asked to leave in 1982. Rwanda has established relations with Cuba, which exercises no evident influence.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Rwandan Army can maintain internal security and probably resist an attack from Burundi. It could not, however, cope with an invasion from its more powerful neighbors. The Army and a separate Gendarmerie make up the Rwandan Armed Forces (*Forces Armees Rwandaises*, FAR). High morale and training compensate for the FAR's shortage of resources. Rwanda has no military equipment production capability. Since independence, military assistance from abroad has totaled about $43 million. The principal suppliers are Belgium, the PRC, and Libya. Military support from Belgium, the traditional supplier, has been in the form of infantry and Gendarmerie training, advisers, and infantry weapons and equipment, while Libya has supplied APCs, trucks, infantry training in Libya, and a helicopter. The PRC has supplied primarily field artillery, ADA, and small arms. Assistance to Rwanda is mostly grant aid rather than sales. The French have trained the paracommando battalions and the air company.

(U) Rwanda is among the poorest countries in the world and is the most densely populated country in sub-Saharan Africa, with approximately 500 people per square mile. Over 93 percent of the country's 6.3 million people are subsistence farmers. Coffee accounts for around 75 percent of its export earnings. Tin ore, processed tin, and tea are its other major exports. The US accounts for 50 percent of Rwandan coffee sales. Bananas, cassava, beans, potatoes, sorghum, and peanuts are the main food crops. Shortages of natural resources, capital, and skilled labor, as well as transportation difficulties, complicate domestic production, which is limited to selected consumer goods. Rwanda's per capita GDP in 1984 was estimated to be $257 and has nearly a four percent growth rate.

2. ~~(C)~~ Key Officials:

President, Commander in Chief, Minister of National Defense, Chief of Staff of the Army and of the Gendarmerie, and President of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND): Maj Gen Juvenal *Habyarimana*

Secretary General, MRND: Bonaventure *Habimana*

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Francois *Ngarukiyintwali*

Minister of Interior: Thomas *Habanabakize*

Chef de Cabinet, Ministry of Defense (Defacto Minister): Lt Col Leonidas *Rusatira*

Deputy Chief of Staff, Army: Lt Col Laurent *Serubuga*

Commander, Aviation Company: Maj Sebastien *Ntahobali*

Deputy Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie: Lt Col Pierre Celestin *Rwagafilita*

Chief, Central Information Service (Secret Police): Joseph *Habiyambere*

Chief, Intelligence (G-2): Maj Emmanuel *Mugabo*

3. ~~(C)~~ **Military Budget:** $42.7 million for fiscal year 1987; 12 percent of the central government budget. No service allocation is available. Exchange rate used is 78.61 Rwandan francs equals $1.00.

4. **(U) Population:** 6,246,000 estimated as of June 1985

Males (ages 15-49): 1,386,000; physically fit, 702,000

Ethnic divisions: 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, 1 percent Twa (Pygmoid)

Literacy: 37 percent, primarily in French or Kinyarwanda

5. ~~(C)~~ **Army:**

Personnel Strength: Approximately 5,250 (210 officers, 35 WO, 5,005 EM). Officers from northern Rwanda dominate the armed forces. Quality of training is generally good. Rwandans have been trained in Zaire, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and North Korea. About 400 paracommandos have been trained in Libya, but Rwandans were very unhappy with the quality of the training. Rwanda was also dissatisfied with the North Korean effort. Three years of officer training is provided at Kigali; NCOs are trained at Butare. Basic and infantry training is at Gako. Following basic training, every recruit completes a 3-month commando training course at Bigogwe. Weapons specialization and other advanced training is acquired abroad, especially in Belgium. Experienced Western observers have commented on Rwandan soldiers' professionalism and on their work ethic. Equipment appears to be well maintained and compounds are generally neat. Additionally, the Rwandan military is involved in a number of successful civic action programs.

Reserve: An unknown number of reservists reportedly serve under the direct control of the 10 Rwandan prefectures and are expected to operate the communications system being installed by the West German military mission. There also may be an honorary reserve system.

Major Units: Two infantry battalions, 1 paracommando battalion, 1 airborne battalion, 10 prefectural light infantry companies, 1 recon company, 1 ADA battery, 2 engr companies, 1 aviation company, and a logistic support base (4 cos).

Major Equipment: 27 armored cars (including 12 French AML-245s), 4 57-mm recoilless rifles, 2 37-mm guns, 79 2-inch mortars, 5 3-inch mortars, 1 60-mm mortar, and 3 81-mm mortars. Rwanda received from North Korea in 1979 about 50 artillery pieces — twin 37-mm AA guns (probably M1939) and 4-barrel guns (probably ZPU-4 14.5-mm AA machineguns).

6. **(U) Navy:** None. A maritime section of the Army at Gisenyi operates two power boats armed with machineguns; however, the operational status of the boats is uncertain.

7. **(U) Air Force:** None. The Army, however, has an aviation company with 16 aircraft (2 DHC-6 Twin Otter Short-Range STOL transports, 1 SE210 Caravelle, 2 NORD 2501 Noratlas medium-range transport, 3 BN-2 Defender utility/light transports, 4 SA-341 Gazelle light utility helicopters, 3 Alouette III light transport helicopters and 1 SA-360 Dauphin medium support helicopter); and 150 personnel. The aircraft are operated and maintained by Rwandan personnel. There are a few Rwandan pilots.

(U) Rwanda has one civil transport aircraft over 9,000 kilograms gross weight (Boeing-707-328C) operated by Air Rwanda. This aircraft would be available to the government in the event of a war or national emergency. There are approximately 24 licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Rwanda.

8. ~~(C/NF)~~ **Paramilitary:** Personnel Strength: reportedly 1,500 (officer/enlisted breakdown not available). There are 10 Gendarmerie companies corresponding to the 10 administrative divisions. The National Police were merged with the Army (then known as the National Guard) in June 1973 by the previous regime; about 40 percent of the personnel were released from duty at that time. In December 1973, a National Gendarmerie was authorized, but it did not come into effective existence until some time after October 1974. While the National Police had received advisory assistance from Belgium and later the FRG, the Gendarmerie has been assisted by France since the arrival of the first two French advisers in late 1975. The present French team teaches at the Rwandan Gendarmerie NCO Academy *(Ecole de Gendarme)* and at the Rwandan Military Academy *(Ecole Superieur Militaire)*, where Gendarme officers are trained. The team also gives instruction in auto repair, communications, and police techniques.

9. (U) Key US Officials:

Chief of Mission (Kigali): Charge D Affaires Tan De Wilde

(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ~~(C/NF)~~ Foreign Military Presence:

Belgian military advisers: Approximately 20 (includes Army commando, aviation, and medical personnel)

French Army, Air Force and Gendarmerie advisers: 20

West German communications team: 7

RWANDA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Bigogwe Commando School	0933-00368	90130	01-30-15S	029-30-15E
Butare Military Barracks	0933-00123	90110	02-35-44S	029-43-40E
Butare Military Barracks	0933-00123	90130	02-35-44S	029-43-40E
Gako Barracks Area	0933CA0005	90110	02-13-19S	030-10-17E
Gako Barracks Area	0933CA0005	90120	02-13-19S	030-10-17E
Gisenyi Mil Area	0933-00360	91170	01-42-00S	029-15-00E
Kigali Acady Ecole Militaire Superieur	0933-00366	90130	01-58-00S	030-11-00E
Kigali Army Barracks Konombe	0933-00251	90110	01-58-00S	030-11-00E
Kigali Army Barracks Kanombe	0933-00251	91160	01-58-00S	030-11-00E
Kigali Army Barracks Kanombe	0933-00251	91170	01-58-00S	030-11-00E

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SOUTH AFRICA

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SOUTH AFRICA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Civilian Officials

State President: Pieter Willem *Botha*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Roelof F. "Pik" *Botha*

Minister of Law and Order: Adrian J. *Vlok*

Minister of Defense: Gen Magnus A. De M. *Malan*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) South Africa has been an independent republic since 1961, when a constitution was drafted, the Union of South Africa was abolished, and ties with the British were severed. For over 20 years, the Republic of South Africa was ruled by an all-white Parliament. A new constitution, the result of 10 years of preparation, was adopted in Parliament in September 1983 and sanctioned in public polls in September 1984. The new constitution was adopted after a lengthy and tumultuous campaign fraught with boycotts by Indian and coloured segments of the population dissatisfied with the continued lack of direct representation of the black majority in Parliament.

(U) The constitution combines the offices of State President and Prime Minister and gives the State President potentially authoritarian powers. The Senate was eliminated and replaced by the "President's Council," a group of approximately 60 members drawn from Parliament or appointed by the State President. Parliament consists of three houses, namely, a House of Assembly (white), a House of Representatives (coloured), and a House of Parliament (Indian).

~~(C)~~ Perceived by South African nonwhites as a ploy to enlist coloured and Indian support for resisting sharing power with blacks, the constitution was rejected by a large number of members of these ethnic groups as well as by the international community in general, including the United Nations. Despite internal and external pressures there is little evidence that the government will be willing to share political power with the black community in the near future.

~~(C)~~ As reaffirmed by the May 1987 all-white election returns, the National Party (NP) has the overwhelming following of the (white) electorate. The Conservative Party (CP), which was formed in March 1981 by NP members upset by proposed constitutional reforms presented by the NP leadership promoting coloured and Indian participation in the government, gained strength and influence during the last elections. White reaction to the South African Government's (SAG's) proposed reform program and to the way it has handled the current unrest has significantly increased CP membership, attracting mostly far-right members of the NP who feel threatened by what they see as a departure from traditional Afrikaner dominance. The Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), an extreme rightwing party, won its first parliamentary seat in byelections on 30 October 1985. Although it is not a threat to the National Party, its gains are indicative of some movement toward the far right by the white blue-collar electorate (despite the fact that the HNP lost its seat in the May elections). The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), more liberal, also had gained in membership in recent years, and had acquired both national and international stature promoting reform

on behalf of the black population and advocating a dialogue with the African National Congress (ANC). However, the May elections significantly damaged the PFP's national standing. The CP has replaced the PFP as the official opposition. The New Republic Party, another liberal party, has lost much of its strength, and is close to disappearing from the political scene. The most contentious and sweeping NP policy is apartheid, or separate development, which seeks to perpetuate white dominance of the political process in all of South Africa with the exception of a number of relatively small, scattered areas (totaling about 13 percent of South Africa's land area) designated as "homelands." Four homelands — Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei — have been granted independence (see separate MIS sections that appear after South Africa). Kangwane and Swazi homelands may become independent within a few years although both have refused independence. Gazankulu, Lebowa, Suid-Ndebele, and Basotho Qwa-Qwa are further from independence. This devolution of power is not recognized by the international community. Some homeland leaders (for example, Chief Buthelezi of Kwazulu) are opposed to the independence scheme. In fact, a union of Kwazulu and the State of Natal has been proposed in an experimental plan for power sharing devised by leaders in both entities. Initial response by the SAG was negative, but the Indaba, the conclave of blacks from Kwazulu and whites from Natal, is expected to resume its deliberations in the near future.

~~(C)~~ Despite the virtual state of siege existing in a number of areas affected by the state of emergency (SOE) imposed as a result of lingering violence in black townships across South Africa, increasing dissatisfaction with the government among blacks, coloureds, and Asians, as well as condemnation by the world community, the government remains in control of the country. Since late 1978, when P. W. Botha assumed the mantle of Prime Minister in the wake of financial scandal, he has advocated changes in racial policies to gain the cooperation of all population groups in an attempt to prevent internal unrest while perpetuating white control and quieting external critics. Many issues have been addressed: political rights and economic position of urban blacks, the reapportionment of land to the homelands, security laws, and citizenship for black South Africans. Some progress has been achieved, most notably with the repeal of the Mixed Marriage Act, abolition of pass laws, desegregation of many public accommodations, approval of black trade unions, and creation of houses of Parliament for Asians and coloureds. While these changes are regarded as quite fast and progressive by Afrikaners, they have not satisfied nonwhite demands. Botha's plans are often vague, and he has on occasion pulled back, indicating that despite his bold, risk-taking approach, he has to exercise judiciousness in finding a path between the conservatives and the nonwhite population. His recognition of the need for reform has had the effect of raising blacks' expectations, and often gives an impression of indecisiveness that infuriates friends and foes alike. In part, Botha's strategy reflects the Defense Establishment's belief that steps must be taken to prevent the growth of a major threat from within the country. Nevertheless, the overall situation is expected to worsen in coming years. Specific problems such as raised black consciousness and expectations, urban violence and sabotage, white backlash, increased support for insurgency in South Africa proper, and a depressed South African economy will not abate in the foreseeable future, but probably will not seriously endanger the government's stability at least until national elections for Botha's successor in 1989, should he decide to step down.

c. Internal Threat

(U) The Soweto riots of June 1976 and disturbances since that time, such as school boycotts and strikes, had already demonstrated the breadth of deep-rooted dissatisfaction within the black community when a new wave of violence gripped South Africa in the latter part of 1984. Born partly of economic and political frustration, the violence soon spread

to most of the country's urban black townships in a confrontation between increasingly politicized black youths and representatives of the SAG. Fanned by a number of legal and banned organizations, the unrest reached such wide proportions that State President P. W. Botha felt it necessary to declare an SOE in and around the urban centers of Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth in July 1985. The SOE was extended to all of South Africa in June 1986. The violence, which by the end of 1986 had resulted in over 3,000 deaths, was confined primarily to the limits of the townships. Some spillover did occur, most notably in the Indian community around Durban, and to some extent in white areas around Cape Town and Johannesburg. Alarmed by the extensive media coverage of the unrest and the resulting bad press for the government, the SAG moved to severely curtail news reporting starting in late 1985.

~~(S)~~ African nationalist organizations, antiapartheid movements, strikes by black workers, and the growing opposition of a number of white intellectuals and others also can be considered part of the internal threat. Political developments in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia (South-West Africa) have served to raise the level of economic, social, and political expectations among South African blacks. While township violence has become endemic, urban terrorism is still sporadic in South Africa. Two anti-South African Government groups, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), operate from exile. The ANC is adept at staging terrorist attacks within South Africa, in spite of South Africa's efforts to deny ANC members bases in neighboring countries by means of cross-border raids, or pacts, accords, and agreements. After a slowdown in 1983 and 1984 there were 136 attacks in South Africa in 1985, the highest number since 1976. The eventual goal of these groups is to wage guerrilla warfare against the white government to gain political control of South Africa by forcing an end to apartheid, and to obtain black majority rule. The ANC has been trying to take advantage of the current unrest in the townships, to mobilize the black population against the SAG and its representatives. (See DIA Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa (U), DDB-2300-5-87, August 1987, (S).) It is clear that the insurgents, especially those belonging to the ANC, are becoming more aggressive. The police, the military, and the economic infrastructure are increasingly targeted. The 20 May 1983 ANC bombing of the South African Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria represents the most dramatic and significant act of sabotage to date. These externally based insurgent movements are receiving assistance from a variety of sources in their efforts against the Republic. Isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, and other outbreaks of disorder do not at this time constitute a significant threat to South Africa. Although a significant jump in the number of terrorist attacks occurred in 1985 through 1987 (1985:136, 1986:198, and 1987 (through November):195), against an average of 45 in the three previous years; most attacks were directed at security forces members.

~~(S)~~ Although there is no active insurgency in South Africa at present, Tanzania does provide a haven for anti-South African forces, while Zimbabwe treats the problem with more circumspection. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland pursue very cautious policies toward South African insurgents but are not able to completely control the activity of those groups. As a result of the 19 March 1984 Nkomati Accord, Mozambique apparently has greatly reduced support for the ANC and has denied it the use of bases from which to launch attacks on South African targets. Angola still provides a haven for most South African and Nambian insurgents, and turns a blind eye to continued SWAPO incursions into northern Namibia.

~~(C)~~ White, ultraright extremist groups such as the Wit Commando, the Wit Hand, and the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB) (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) are strongly opposed to any form of integration and, while not having caused extensive damage yet, they

are a potential problem for the government. In fact, members of the AWB disrupted National Party meetings on several occasions. The government's shift to the right neutralized the AWB, at least temporarily. Additionally, a number of incidents of vigilantism have taken place in reaction to black unrest spillovers outside the townships.

d. External Threat

~~(S)~~ At the present time, there is no significant external threat to South Africa. The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), with its 6,000 to 8,500 guerrillas, operates out of bases in Angola against South African control of Namibia. Its minelaying activities consist predominantly of sabotage, ambushes, minelaying, assassinations, mortar bombardment, and intimidation and kidnaping of the populace. Perhaps 100 to 600 SWAPO guerrillas are present in northern Namibia at any one time. South Africa responds with preemptive or retaliatory cross-border military strikes following the Israeli and Rhodesian models.

~~(S)~~ South African emphasis on building up military forces, materiel stockpiles, domestic arms production, border defenses, and overall capabilities stems from the anticipated external threat of widespread active insurgent opposition with worldwide support. As the physical and political buffers against black Africa have eroded, South Africa has attempted to encourage the emergence of moderate neighboring regimes, but has also enhanced its conventional warfare capabilities. South Africa has attempted to preserve some regional leverage and reduce potential external threats through intervention into Angola, past cooperation in efforts to peacefully resolve Namibian independence, and efforts to improve relations with Mozambique.

~~(S)~~ South Africa fears the threat posed by the Cuban presence in Angola. The establishment of new military bases in the north and east Transvaal indicates marked South African concern for the potential threat from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In the worst-case situation, South Africa envisions a Cuban presence and a Soviet-backed Marxist government in Namibia, something the political leadership has indicated it will not accept. South Africa is pessimistic about events in Zimbabwe and afraid that an unfriendly Zimbabwe will offer safehavens, training, and staging bases to anti-South African groups. Continuing international condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies has entrenched the whites' perception that a lonely battle to preserve their way of life lies ahead.

e. Economic Factors

~~(C)~~ South Africa's economy is gradually continuing to improve. In 1985, the gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at $50.2 billion; per capita income was $1,825 (converted at an exchange rate of 2.23 rands per $1.00). Although early forecasts predicted GDP to expand by 3-4 percent in 1986, the actual growth rate was approximately 1-2 percent. However, in spite of sanctions, it is believed that South Africa's GDP further improved in 1987 as a result of a growing current account surplus, a higher gold price, a gradual return of business confidence, and the recovery of the rand. Inflation in South Africa was expected to remain at 15-18 percent for 1987.

~~(C)~~ South Africa's favorable renegotiation of its foreign debt in March 1987 provided a further boost to economic confidence. The agreement allows Pretoria to extend the current debt payment standstill until June 1990. South Africa will repay $1.4 billion of the $13 billion under the standstill agreement during the next 3 years. In addition, South Africa will continue to repay $10 billion in medium-term debt outside of the standstill.

~~(C)~~ Although the prospects for the South African economy are good in the short run, the damage to the economy from internal unrest, sanctions, divestment, and reduced access

to machinery and equipment will begin to show in the longer term. The fact remains that until there is greater confidence in South Africa's political future, the economy is unlikely to perform at its potential.

~~(C)~~ The Republic ranks first in world reserves of platinum group metals (82 percent), chromite (68 percent), gold (52 percent), and vanadium (49 percent). It ranks second in world reserves of industrial diamonds (7 percent) and manganese (41 percent).

~~(C)~~ In world production of minerals, the Republic ranks first in chromium (35 percent), gold (57 percent), and vanadium (32 percent). South Africa and the USSR each produce about 48 percent of the world output of platinum group metals. South Africa ranks second in production of manganese (20 percent) and is third in asbestos (5 percent), industrial diamonds (14 percent), and antimony (15 percent). It is also the third-largest Free World producer of uranium (13 percent). Adding significance to the above statistics are the highly sophisticated ore extraction, transportation, export, and management capabilities of the Republic.

~~(S)~~ South Africa is also actively engaged in nuclear research. A uranium enrichment pilot plant has been built and successfully operated at Valindaba. Although plans for a commercial-scale plant that would enable South Africa to export uranium in an enriched form have been postponed, the pilot plant is being expanded. While supposedly designed to produce low-enriched uranium for power reactor fuel, the Valindaba facilities are believed capable of producing highly enriched uranium. This capability could have far-reaching political as well as economic ramifications, especially in light of the discovery of a purported nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert in July 1977 and a probable nuclear test in the South Atlantic-Indian Ocean area on 22 September 1979. South Africa is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but is a party to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

~~(S)~~ South Africa has the capability to produce almost all of its required ground force equipment and can meet some of its naval and aerospace needs. Ground force production facilities produce the Ratel series infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and Eland armored cars, 155-mm field guns, 127-mm rocket launchers, 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, grenade launchers, 7.62-mm and 5.56-mm machineguns and rifles, 9-mm submachineguns, and pistols and related ammunition. They also produce a series of anti-landmine vehicles, troop carriers, and gun-tractors. Truck production is approximately 100,000 vehicles annually.

~~(S)~~ Prior to the arms embargo, agreements were concluded for production of two aircraft under license: the Impala MK II trainer/ground-attack aircraft and the Kudu light transport. In the past, the South Africans assembled the high-performance French Mirage F-1, also under license. An indigenously designed air-to-air missile, the V-3B Kukri, entered production in late 1980 or early 1981. In July 1986, the South African Air Force (SAAF) unveiled a locally produced advanced jet fighter, the Cheetah, which is based on a modified Mirage III airframe. The Cheetah was scheduled to be in an operational squadron by January 1988.

~~(S)~~ The current production of naval vessels consists primarily of the Minister Class guided missile boats, based on Israeli Reshef design, and a few auxiliary and patrol boats. The launching of SAS *Drakensberg* in April 1986 and its commissioning in the fall of 1987 were heralded as an important step toward the establishment of a naval shipbuilding capability. It is believed that South Africa could produce or assemble combatants up to frigate size, but would require outside technical and materiel assistance. Submarines could be produced but only at great expense and with considerable assistance from a submarine-producing country.

~~(S)~~ Despite the stimulation provided by the voluntary arms embargo enacted in 1963 and the mandatory arms embargo enacted in 1977 that are driving South Africa's policy of military self-sufficiency, most sophisticated weapons technology and component parts and some spare parts and ammunition still must be obtained abroad. The arms embargo has not succeeded in isolating South Africa from foreign military materiel sources, but it has increased the difficulty and cost of procuring foreign arms.

f. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S)~~ South Africa has no publicly acknowledged alliances; however, there has been known military cooperation with Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Taiwan, and Israel. In 1975, the UK Labor government terminated the Simonstown Agreement, which allowed for British use of the Simonstown naval facilities. South Africa is not known to receive military aid from any country, but it retains a military assistance agreement with Malawi. South Africa also has training agreements with Taiwan, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay, but these agreements may be jeopardized by mounting criticism of apartheid, in general, and pressure caused by the report concerning illegal sales of arms to South Africa tendered to Congress as a result of the "Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986." Israel, in particular, has moved to publicly distance itself from South Africa.

~~(S)~~ South Africa maintains a tenuous miltary supply relationship with France. Although French spares continue to arrive, albeit not from official sources, the South African Government is genuinely concerned about France's theoretical ability to leave the country with a lack of spare parts for the French equipment already purchased and on hand. Defense cooperation with Israel is thought to be considerable, particularly in arms production and sales. In addition, Israel is thought to have a sizable training team in South Africa, and several quasi-military personnel are attached to the Israeli Embassy.

~~(S)~~ The mandatory United Nations arms embargo theoretically cuts South Africa off from all outside sources of military materiel; it has, in fact, had a mixed impact. France canceled the sale of two submarines and two light frigates. On the other hand, Israel did not abrogate existing contracts for Reshef patrol boats. Most Western nations appear to be enforcing the embargo, and though the South Africans do not like it, they expected the boycott and had taken steps to improve their self-sufficiency in arms production. They also undoubtedly maintain contacts with private arms dealers. While several Western countries have cut back their contacts with the South African military establishment, a growing list of Third World customers are interested in weapons and equipment manufactured in South Africa, as well as Soviet Bloc materiel captured in Angola.

~~(S)~~ South Africa's isolation from changes elsewhere in Africa has ended. In April 1974, when Portugal dismantled its centuries-old African empire, South Africa and Rhodesia suddenly were exposed to the danger of being the last two exclusively white governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. The advent of black majority rule in Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980 leaves the white South African Government, and the territory of Namibia which it controls, completely alone. South Africa's future depends more than ever on its continental relations and its willingness to compromise with black African states, a process that is difficult because of its internal policies, and one that must be undertaken only from a position of strength from the SAG's perspective. Pretoria has declared officially that it is willing to cooperate fully with black governments in Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, but has warned them repeatedly against harboring South African insurgents. The SAG has, in fact, taken action against insurgents in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, and Lesotho. While the formal proposal for a "Constellation of States" as put forward by then Prime Minister P. W. Botha is no longer discussed, an atmosphere

of strained cooperation in the areas of economics and collective security does exist in the region. Swaziland, Mozambique, and Angola have signed accords and agreements to ensure mutual security with South Africa. Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho have refused to sign such agreements, but officially make efforts to curb insurgent activity from their territory. South Africa, for its part, completed a phased withdrawal of its troops in southern Angola, and stopped openly supporting RENAMO in Mozambique (although it recognized subsequently that it was supporting UNITA). Nevertheless, South Africa reserves the right to pursue insurgents into neighboring countries and to conduct preemptive stikes as it has demonstrated on several occasions.

g. (U) Key US Officials (Pretoria)

Chief of Mission: Ambassador Edward J. Perkins

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Air Attache: Vacant

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. Key Military/Police Officials

(1) (U) Key Military Officials:

Defense Force:

Chief of the South African Defense Force: Gen Johannes J. ("Jannie") *Geldenhuys*

Chief of Defense Staff: Lt Gen Ian *Gleeson*

Chief of Staff, Intelligence: VAdm Andries ("Dries") *Putter*

Chief of Staff, Operations: Lt Gen J.B.P. *Van Loggerenberg*

Army:

Chief of the Army: Lt Gen Andreas J. *Liebenberg*

Deputy Chief of the Army: Maj Gen D.R. *Marais*

Chief of Army Staff, Operations: Maj Gen J.J. *Bosschof*

Officer Commanding, SADF Forces, South-West Africa Command: Maj Gen Willie C. *Meyer*

Navy:

Chief of the Navy: VAdm Glen *Syndercombe*

Chief of Navy Staff, Operations: RAdm James *Sleigh*

Air Force:

Chief of the Air Force: Lt Gen Denis J. *Earp*

Chief of the Air Force Staff: Maj Gen Andries J.S. *van der Lith*

Chief of Air Staff, Operations: Maj Gen James *Kriel*

Police:

Commissioner: Gen Hendrik Gideon ("Hennie") *de Witt*

Chief of Counter-Insurgency/Riot Police: Maj Gen Albertus *Wandrag*

(2) (U) Other Important Personalities:

Nelson *Mandela*, de facto leader of the African National Congress (ANC) (imprisoned)

Oliver *Tambo*, President of the ANC; ANC is banned in South Africa; Tambo is in exile

Alfred *Nzo*, Secretary General of the ANC

Joe *Modise*, Commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe, military wing of ANC

Johnson *Mlambo*, Head of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)

Gatsha *Buthelezi*, Chief Minister, Kwazulu homeland; President, Inkatha political organization; Chairman, South African Black Alliance (SABA)

Archbishop Desmond *Tutu*, General Secretary, South African Council of Churches

Dr. Alan *Boesak*, President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches

Dr. Andries *Treurnicht*, Conservative Party leader

Jan P. de *Lange*, Head of the Broederbond

(3) (U) Military Attache Accredited to the United States:

Defense and Military Attache: Col Oliver William *Holmes*, SAAF

Military and Naval Attache: Col Frederick *Rindel*, SAA

b. Position of Armed Forces

~~(C)~~ The South African Defense Force (SADF) is composed of four services — Army, Navy, Air Force, and Medical Service — each headed by a three-star service chief. About 700 officers and NCOs serve at the multiservice SADF headquarters. The SADF's British-type dual-structured staff system has been supplanted by a general/specific staff system modeled along French/US lines. Each of the five major headquarters (SADF and the four services) is organized into five major staff sections, which are numbered 1 through 5 in the sequence of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and finance. In the SADF HQ, the South African Navy (SAN) HQ, and generally throughout the SADF structure, the staff operations chief is the de facto second-in-command and can act for the commander when necessary. The only two known exceptions to this rule are the South African Medical Service (SAMS) HQ, in which the Chief of Medical Staff, Logistics, is the de facto number two, and the Army HQ, in which the position of Deputy Chief of the Army was created effective 1 September 1982. The Defense College and the Military Academy are under staff supervision of the Chief of Staff, Personnel.

~~(C)~~ The SADF, particularly the Navy, has in the past been generally pro-US or pro-UK, but this atmosphere has eroded in view of US and UK policies toward South African issues. Most of the SADF are suspicious of these nations because of their support of the UN arms embargo. English-speaking personnel make up about 50 percent of the Air Force, 40 percent of the Navy, and less than 20 percent of the Army. Almost all of the most important positions are held by Afrikaners. Military personnel are generally highly regarded by their fellow citizens, enjoy a favorable social status, are loyal, support the policies of the Government, and are strongly anti-Communist. Nevertheless, their authoritarian role in quelling unrest since 1984 has damaged their image in the eyes of the black population.

~~(C)~~ Most SADF personnel are white South Africans; however, because of increasing manpower demands in both the military and civilian sectors, increased use of nonwhites

on a voluntary basis in the SADF is taking place. All official bars to racial integration and upward mobility in the military service have been removed from SADF and South African Government (SAG) directives. The SAG has agreed in principle to compulsory military service for coloured and Indian personnel; major impediments to implementing this act are said to be facilities and funding. Coloured, Indian, and black contributions to the SADF effort have been small despite undertakings such as the use of coloured and black troops in a combat role in Namibia. Viewed in the South African context, however, much progress has been made toward racial integration in the SADF. The SADF is well ahead of South African society in general in lowering racial barriers on the job. Under the leadership of Gen Magnus Malan, formerly SADF Chief and now Minister of Defense, pressure will continue to be applied in the political domain to equalize pay and allowances.

~~(C)~~ Following are current SADF nonwhite strength figures:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
Blacks	3,000	0	100	3,100
Coloureds	10,200	800	500	11,500
Indians	0	450	50	500
Total	**13,200**	**1,250**	**650**	**15,100**

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The armed forces are capable of conducting counterinsurgency and conventional operations within the Republic and to a lesser degree in neighboring states. Weaknesses are the diminished logistic and support capabilities caused by the arms embargo and the inability of the industrial base to support an all-out military effort along the breadth of the northern border. Emphasis continues to be placed on improving the quality of training and increasing the military equipment inventory. Despite repeated assertions that it is 95 percent self-sufficient in arms production, South Africa is concerned about the obsolescence and inadequacy of its military equipment inventory, its uncertain sources for arms, and its isolation from Western military establishments.

~~(S/NF/NC)~~ In an effort to insure arms supplies and to promote its own arms industry, South Africa formed the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) in 1968. Originally the controlling agency for existing armaments plants, ARMSCOR is now tasked to procure weapons, ammunition, and technology based on the needs of the SADF. ARMSCOR's duties today cover the entire process of weapons production from research through manufacture, servicing, and repair, as well as procurement from private concerns. ARMSCOR, although government funded, functions as a private corporation that employs over 25,000 people. It relies on its own subsidiary weapons factories to produce weapons for the SADF. However, it does not hesitate to acquire arms by tasking private South African industry to meet the needs of the SADF. To this end, it is now estimated that over 100,000 people are employed in the South African arms industry. ARMSCOR is often tasked to obtain weapons and technology in the open international arms market or covertly from sensitive sources. In addition to promoting arms production, ARMSCOR is now actively involved in covertly seeking markets for South African-produced weapon systems, and has achieved some success in this area, notably with the 155-mm G5 gun-howitzer, although actual sales or barter agreements have been shrouded in secrecy.

d. (U) Military Budget: $2.34 billion for fiscal year ending 31 March 1987; this is 13.9 percent of the central government budget. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 2.25 rands equals $1.00. Defense expenditures for 1986-87 represent a 19.2 percent increase over 1985-86 defense spending.

e. (U) Population: 34,313,356 as of July 1987; (includes Bophuthatswana 1,750,165; Transkei 2,832,345; Venda 434,395; and Ciskei 982,982)

Males (ages 15-49)[1] : 8,490,000; physically fit, 5,182,000

Ethnic divisions[1]: 69.9 percent black, 17.8 percent white, 9.4 percent colored, 2.9 percent Indian

Literacy: Almost all white population literate; government estimates 50 percent of nonwhites literate.

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ To defend the national borders, conduct counterinsurgency operations, and support the police in maintaining internal security.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The South African Army (SAA) is capable of defending the country against any probable aggressor, including any group of black African states. The force is capable of conducting counterinsurgency and conventional operations in the Republic and, to a lesser degree, in neighboring states. A coordinated attack all along the country's northern borders would strain the Army's capabilities, but would not destroy its ability to resist successfully.

~~(S)~~ The Army is a modern military force and is superior in overall combat capability to any other army in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its major strength is in the relatively high quality of its professional soldiers, who provide excellent training and leadership for the force. Its main weaknesses are a shortage of skilled personnel in the Permanent Force (PF), its reliance on reserves and national servicemen to fulfill the bulk of its missions, and a shortage of sophisticated equipment. The lack of combat experience has been rectified to a degree by the 1975 and later incursions into Angola and constant operational border duty since. The Army is defense oriented but could mount a limited-duration multibrigade operation with full logistic and air support outside its territory. The two-division conventional force concept under the control of SAA HQ has improved the Army's capability to deploy troops for combat, as demonstrated during Exercise THUNDER CHARIOT in September 1984. The formation of subordinate division and brigade headquarters facilitates the mobilization of a conventional combat force of a corps size constituted from the reserves at short notice. Exercise GOLDEN EAGLE 1-87 showed that the SADF is developing a capability to coordinate the operational activities of its three combat services.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ The SAA is composed of Permanent Force (PF) personnel who are career soldiers, Citizen Force (CF) personnel on active duty who serve 2 years as conscripts (national servicemen), and any other reserves called up. CF personnel who have completed 2 years of national service have a 12-year reserve commitment. Volunteers who have completed all national service requirements are assigned to service in conventional force units or in the Commandos.

~~(C)~~ The active duty strength of the SAA is 84,500, out of which 28,000 are PF. Between the CF (a ready reserve force) and the Army Commandos (home guard reserve forces that

[1] (U) These figures include the Homelands' population total.

contain volunteers as well as men completing their reserve commitment), the SAA has a 250,000-man reserve pool that can be activated within about 30 days.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The South African Army is organized into three groups of forces: conventional forces, counterinsurgency (COIN) forces, and infrastructure forces.

~~(C)~~ The SAA's conventional forces consist of one infantry division, one armored division, and one airborne infantry brigade (minus). Each is directly subordinate to SAA HQ. The bulk of the personnel assigned to these units are CF reservists, but some PF members are also assigned.

~~(S/NF)~~ COIN units are subordinate to the 10 South African Army Territory Commands into which South Africa proper is divided. They are Western Province, Northern Cape, Eastern Province, Natal, Far North, Eastern Transvaal, Witwatersrand, Northern Transvaal, Northwestern, and Orange Free State Territory Commands. In addition, a Walvis Bay Territory Command (WBTC) is sometimes mentioned but probably exists in name only. (For information on the South-West Africa Territory Command, see the section on Namibia.) COIN units consist largely of local home defense forces called commandos. They are manned by members of the Army Commandos. Their primary mission is to defend the home area and to guard key installations and facilities. There are also COIN infantry battalions manned mainly by CF personnel not on active duty. PF administrative and support units, manned by PF and CF personnel subordinate to the local territory command, support the various COIN units. Together these units (300 of at least company size) furnish the SAA's COIN combat capability.

~~(C)~~ Infrastructure forces are part of, and draw their name from, the SAA's infrastructure, which consists of the SAA HQ, the training establishment, logistics command, separate engineer and signal units, and the chief of the Army's Reserve Force (operational active army combat units). Infrastructure units are manned by PF personnel and second-year draftees.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength Per Unit Authorized	Average Actual
Infrastructure Forces (Active duty army consisting of PF personnel and CF personnel on active duty)		
8 Inf Bns (white)	Unk	2,000-3,500[1]
8 Ethnic Inf Bns (6 black and 2 coloured)	Unk	200- 600
4 Reconnaissance/Special Forces Cos	Unk	100
1 Airborne Bn	864	560
2 Armor Bns	Unk	750
2 Artillery Bns	Unk	1,400
1 Air Defense Bn	Unk	900
1 Engineer Bn	Unk	800

[1] ~~(C)~~ The basic active duty SAA infantry battalion from the training establishment has a strength of 750 men; however, these units serve as training cadre to the semiannual intake of National Servicemen. As a result, these units may have as many as 2,000-3,500 men in various stages of training at any one time. Normally a battalion has elements operating simultaneously in the Border Operation Area (BOA) and training at the battalion home base. The basic infantry company has about 100 men and a squad has 10 men. Infantry companies are either mechanized (Ratel IFV) or motorized (Hippo or Buffel light armored indigenous APC).

Major Tactical Units	Strength Per Unit Authorized	Average Actual
Conventional Forces (Ready Reserve consisting of CF personnel not on active duty)		
2 Division HQ (1 infantry, 1 armor)	Unk	Unk
7 Brigade HQ	Unk	Unk
46 Infantry Bns (estimated)	Unk	Unk
1 Reconnaissance/Special Forces Co	Unk	Unk
12 Armored Bns (10 armored car, 2 tank)	Unk	Unk
8 Artillery Bns	Unk	Unk
6 Air Defense Bns	Unk	Unk
2 Engineer Bns	Unk	Unk
2 Airborne Bns	Unk	Unk
Counterinsurgency Forces (Army Commandos consisting of CF personnel not on active duty and volunteers)	Unk	125,000
30-35 Commando Group Headquarters; about 180-200 light infantry units (range in size from company to reinforced battalion)	Unk	Unk

(c) Deployment

~~(S)~~ In-country: 73,000 (all training establishment units except those listed below).

~~(S)~~ Namibia: Some 9,000[2] active duty South African military are regularly deployed in Namibia and 1,500 in Walvis Bay.[3]

~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign: The SADF provides some limited Army advisory assistance to Malawi. Assistance to the Angolan insurgent group, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), continues. SADF assistance to the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) has reportedly stopped since early in 1984, although some contact has been kept, which is in technical violation of the Nkomati Accord. The SADF, on occasion, has launched cross-border raids against SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia and against the ANC in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ The Army has excellent domestically produced small arms and infantry support weapons, and adequate and improving communications equipment, transport and command vehicles, and miscellaneous service items. Defense planners are working actively on replacing the Army's older heavy equipment, and attempts are being made to acquire a new family of field artillery pieces, heavy mortars, AT weapons, infantry-operated AD weapons, and armor. The Ratel, a South African-produced infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), has been produced in sufficient numbers to enable the SAA to fully equip several infantry battalions. South Africa also produces an armored car called the Eland, which is the local version of

[2] ~~(S)~~ Order of battle and SADF strengths in Namibia change as troops continually rotate in and out for duty and as operational requirements change.

[3] (U) See separate section on Namibia for details.

the Panhard AML-245, and a series of light armored landmine-resistant personnel vehicles (essentially modified truck and auto chassis), called Hippo, Leopard, Rhino, Kudu, and Buffel. Some 350 Ratels and Elands have even been sold to Morocco. The Buffel has become the standard vehicle in the SAA motorized battalion and plays an important combat support role in the BOA. In 1979, the SADF announced development of a field gun, the 155-mm G-5, and the R-4, an assault rifle based on the Israeli Galil. The G-5 has seen distribution in South Africa, and has been observed in Namibia. It is believed that approximately 100 G-5s have been sold to Iraq. In 1982 ARMSCOR announced the development of a prototype self-propelled version of the G-5, called the G-6. The G-6 is destined to replace the G-5 within SADF inventories, and has been observed with units in the BOA. A 127-mm multiple rocket launcher is also produced by South Africa. This indigenous weapon system was based on and designed to outdistance the Soviet BM-21 122-mm rocket launcher that gave the South Africans trouble during the 1975 Angolan war.

~~(S)~~ A variety of general transport vehicles, some of commercial design, are acquired from local sources. They are generally designated SAMIL, for South African military vehicle. Four-passenger "minijeeps" of Australian manufacture probably have been obtained. Light weapons are of modern Belgian and Israeli design. Some equipment, such as Oerlikon ADA and wire-guided AT missiles, has been obtained abroad. Equipment in use is maintained in excellent condition. One of the training establishment force's chief functions is to maintain equipment stocks.

~~(S)~~ During Operations PROTEA and ASKARI, the SADF captured several thousand tons of SWAPO and Angolan military equipment. Some of this equipment has been incorporated into the South African inventory. Of particular note are 57 Soviet antiaircraft weapons that have been refurbished and deployed with the SAA. Reporting also indicates that South African infantry units are issuing captured antitank weapons like the RPG-7.

~~(S)~~ Older heavy equipment such as post-World War II materiel (British and some US) is placed in storage when deactivated, and is believed to be in good to excellent condition. Some key items, such as the Centurion tanks, have been rebuilt in-country. Major armor and artillery items of equipment are listed below.

(U) See also DDB-1921-5-81, *Foreign Army Materiel Production: Africa South of the Sahara* (U) , February 1981 (S) , and DDB-1920-224-86, *Worldwide Military Production* (U) March 1986.

(b) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment (Estimated)

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Infantry Weapons:[1]	60-mm mortar	FR	Unk
	81-mm mortar	FR	2,000+
	81-mm mortar	SF	2,000+
	2-in mortar	UK	125
	3-in mortar	UK	423
	4.2-in mortar	UK	15
	3.5-in rocket launcher	UK	Unk
	RPG-7[2]	UR	Unk
	Entac AT missile	FR	Unk
	SS-11 AT missile	FR	Unk

[1] ~~(S/NF)~~ The SAA also may be in possession of the M-79 grenade launcher (at least one has been observed in-country) and the STRIM 89-mm AT rocket launcher.
[2] ~~(S/NF)~~ Captured in Angola.

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Artillery:	G-6, 155-mm gun SP	SF	Unk
	G-5, 155-mm gun	SF	285
	25-pounder, SP, Sexton	UK	57
	25-pounder, how	UK	115
	5.5-in gun	UK	53
	127-mm MRL	SF	150+
Air Defense Artillery:	35-mm ADA, Oerlikon	SZ	60
	20-mm ADA, HSS	FR	20
	40-mm ADA, Bofors	IT	40
	40-mm ADA, Bofors	UK	24 (200 in storage)
	35-mm ADA	SF	225 estimated
	14.5-mm ADA, KPU-1[2]	UR	24
	23-mm ADA, ZU-23[2]	UR	13
	20-mm ADA, M55[2]	YU	13
	SA-7[2]	UR	200+
	35-mm ADA, Oerlikon	SZ	78
Armor:	Tank, Centurion, Mk III/IV/3	UK/JO/IN/SF	225
	Armored car, Eland[4]	FR, SF	1,800+
	(w/90-mm gun)		1,200
	(w/60-mm gun mortar)		600
	IFV, Ratel[5]	SF	1,400+
	Universal carrier, trk	UK	200
	Recovery and special purpose vehicles	UK, US	13
	Light armored personnel carriers (e.g., Hippo, Rhino, Kudu, Buffel)	SF	1,000+
	Tank Transporters	US	198

[2] ~~(S/NF)~~ Captured in Angola.
[3] ~~(S)~~ Centurions equipped with the 83.4-mm gun have been refitted with 105-mm guns and diesel engines. Once upgraded they are called the Oliphant (Elephant) tank.
[4] (C) The Ferret scout cars and Saracen APCs, most were transferred either to duty with police or to mothball war reserve storage. Some revamped Saracens have been reintroduced in the active inventory. A limited number of Ferret Scout cars remain with the 44 Para Brigade.
[5] (U) Includes an unknown number of Ratels modified with the addition of 90-mm guns or 81-mm mortars.

(6) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The Army is experiencing some minor difficulty in maintaining the standing force. The Army has some 40 depots and subshops devoted to supply and maintenance. The capacity of these facilities appears to be adequate. Although the voluntary arms embargo instituted in 1963 made materiel acquisition troublesome, the mandatory arms embargo established by the UN on 1 November 1977 has magnified South African procurement difficulties. The arms embargo will have a long-range debilitating impact that will be especially evident in the defense budget, and in the increased obsolescence of high-tech equipment.

~~(S)~~ Self-sufficiency in Army equipment has increased significantly in the past decade and a half; however, heavy and sophisticated items and some components and weapons technology

still must be imported. ARMSCOR directs numerous companies producing Army materiel; these include firms producing arms and ammunition, vehicles, heavy engineer equipment, electronics, and quartermaster supplies.

~~(S)~~ The 1975 Angolan involvement pointed up shortcomings in ammunition production and reserve stocks. For example, there was a shortage of artillery ammunition (25-pounder and 5.5-inch). It was not manufactured locally and had to be purchased in Western Europe. At present, South Africa manufactures almost all of the ammunition required by the SAA.

~~(S)~~ About 1,800 Eland armored cars (based on the French Panhard AML) have been built locally, as have some 1,400 or more Ratels. In early 1975, it was announced that South Africa would build tanks; however, it appears that older tanks like the Centurion have been purchased abroad and are being refurbished and upgraded locally. Principal modifications include 105-mm guns, diesel engines, and improved optics and fire control systems. Although South Africa does possess the technological capability to produce a modern tank, the cost of such a project is thought to be prohibitive for the tight defense budget.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ Medically fit white males (18-26) are chosen by the National Service System for compulsory service. Conscripted personnel are assigned to the Army, Navy, or Air Force by selection boards composed of PF officers. In addition, a small number (about 500) are assigned to the paramilitary police. Under the present system, National Servicemen are required to begin 2 years of active duty in early January or early July. Following 2 years of active duty, they are assigned to a CF or Commando unit; they are called up for eight additional annual training periods not to exceed a total of 720 days' reserve duty during the 12-year active reserve service. National Service can be avoided by enlistment in the South African Police, the Harbors and Railway Police, or the Prison Service; however, the enlistment must have been accomplished before callup for National Service occurs. Six-month deferments may be obtained if the individual is enrolled in a college or university. The annual callup, distributed semiannually, provides 33,000-44,000 conscripts. Most of these go to the Army; the remainder go to the Air Force (3,800) and Navy (1,200). Voluntary enlistments for the PF are for a minimum of 3 years. Over 8,000 coloureds currently serve in the SAA. Most serve in the South African Cape Corps (SACC). In March 1986, a second infantry battalion was added to the SACC, and a Citizen Force (CF) regiment was also created. The Cape Corps School was reportedly closed to make room for the newly created units, and training is now performed in other SADF schools. The SACC also includes the Maintenance Unit, which is one of two PF maintenance units in the SAA. Some coloureds serve away from their parent units in white units, in technical specialties such as those mentioned above. Coloured units and individual soldiers have served with distinction in the BOA.

~~(C)~~ Blacks were introduced to the SAA in January 1974 after General Malan called for a black training center in November 1973. The 21 Battalion is located south of Johannesburg at Lenz. More than 2,000 black volunteers have passed through 21 Battalion; its present strength is over 600 men. There are black NCOs and a few black officers, but the unit is white led. Originally the unit was intended for a support mission, but it has served successfully in a combat capacity in the BOA.

~~(C)~~ Although 21 Battalion is actually a training school and not an operational unit, it does deploy company-size units of graduates for combat operations in the BOA. Following their deployment to the BOA, black soldiers are assigned an area of specialization and enter short courses to qualify as clerks, cooks, drivers, etc. A small number are selected for a longer period of additional training to qualify as instructors. Eventually, all are assigned

either to ethnic battalions or to the staff of 21 Battalion. In addition to preparing black soldiers for service in the SAA, 21 Battalion also trains men to become noncommissioned officers in the black "Homeland" armies. 21 Battalion has also started training black commissioned officers; the first two were commissioned in 1985. Qualified recruits from Bophuthatswana, Venda, Transkei, and Ciskei also have been accepted for training.

~~(C)~~ During 1979-80, the SADF formed five new black ethnic battalions, or regional units as the SADF calls them, in addition to 21 Battalon (multi-ethnic). 121 Battalion, essentially Zulu in makeup and home-based at Jozini in northern Natal, has participated in counterinsurgency operations in northern Natal and has sent at least one company to Namibia for duty. A Kwandabelle unit, 115 Battalion, is located in the Transvaal. The other ethnic units, all located in the Northern Transvaal Command, are 111 Battalion (Swazi), and 113 Battalion (Shangaan). 112 Battalion has become the primary force of the nascent Venda National Force (VNF) and is no longer considered part of the SAA. These units are trained to operate in the countryside near their camps but all will probably send elements to the border to enhance their training. The government began the regional program to prepare for a possible rise in insurgency in rural areas. The black units are viewed as a stabilizing factor and a way for blacks to participate in their own defense. A sixth black ethnic unit, 116 Battalion, made up mostly of northern Sothos, was formally established in the first part of 1986. Located north of Messina, the battalion is charged with control of the border with Zimbabwe.

~~(C)~~ Blacks can join the SAA Training Establishment Force for an indefinite term of service and may resign by giving 1 month's notice. While enlistment and promotion standards are to be equal with those of whites, the generally lower educational level of blacks may work as an impediment to advancement. Recruitment has not been a problem because SAA service offers job security, a good wage, family benefits, and the prestige of a uniform. When an individual black soldier's homeland becomes independent, he has the choice of serving with the homeland force or remaining with the SADF.

(8) Training

~~(S)~~ The overall quality of training enables the Army to fulfill its mission. Training at all levels is vigorous, intense, and heavily emphasized. The Army successfully handles the training of about 25,000-40,000 conscripts annually and also supports the training of reserve units despite the shortage of PF cadre. Conscripts receive a period of basic and advanced training that includes the acquisition of a skill. After about 8 months they are considered combat ready and serve a 3- to 5-month period of operational border security duty in Namibia or in Northern Transvaal.

~~(S)~~ Training is oriented toward both counterinsurgency and conventional operations in border areas. Unit training is satisfactory, but the SADF is working toward improvement of combined-arms training. In the past, the Army has conducted several brigade-size exercises to improve command and control, coordination, and logistic support at that level. The Army Battle School near Sishen is used regularly for the annual training of conventional force units. A two-division exercise (THUNDER CHARIOT) was successfully conducted there in September 1984. THUNDER CHARIOT was the first two-division exercise conducted in South Africa. It demonstrated the excellent transportation capability of the SADF as well as the ability to coordinate the activities of a large force in conventional warfare. Usually, 11 months out of the year, at least one battalion (regiment) is training there. Army Commandos periodically train as light infantry at the Daniel Thereon Combat School near Kimberley. A new series of exercises, GOLDEN EAGLE, was evolved from THUNDER

CHAROT. GOLDEN EAGLE 1-87 was the first exercise in which elements of all three combat services were involved.

(9) Reserves

~~(S)~~ South Africa relies on an extensive reserve system. Its personnel components are summarized below.

(a) Conventional Force

~~(S)~~ The Conventional Force is a firstline reserve that is composed of personnel who have completed their active service obligation and have been posted to CF units (conscripts are assigned either to a Conventional Force or a Commando unit upon completion of their 2-year active-duty obligation). These units are called up for annual training periods of a minimum of 30 days each; they serve either in the BOA in Namibia or in black townships in South Africa. Current estimated conventional force strength is about 125,000. There are about 75 battalion-size combat units and an equal number of support units of company size or larger. Combat units are organized into seven brigades and two divisions that are subordinate to HQ, SAA.

(b) Army Commandos

~~(S)~~ The Army Commandos are organized into about 300 light infantry units termed "Commandos." The Commandos have been an all-white force but now are being encouraged to recruit blacks, coloureds, and Indians. Several Commando units have been successful in recruiting black and coloured members, but the practice is not widespread. Women volunteers serve in a noncombatant capacity. In the past, units received training in counterinsurgency warfare and were not expected to operate for sustained periods in the field. However, recent changes in training emphasis and an improved personnel assignment policy have enhanced the operational capability of the Commandos. It is clear that much of the burden of conducting COIN operations will fall to the Commandos in the future. Commandos will be increasingly tasked to provide security for sensitive installations such as powerplants, bridges, utility installations, and government buildings. The territory commands (TC) will become increasingly active in providing medical, communications, and transportation support for subordinate Commandos. In the past, Commandos were dependent on civilian facilities for support.

(10) Women's Army Corps

~~(S)~~ The SAA has over 3,000 women volunteers in noncombatant-type duties including civil defense, communications, nursing, driving, and clerical duties. Recently, the role of women in the SADF has been expanded. Career fields open to women are in the Personnel Services Corps, Signal Corps, Catering Corps, Ordnance Service Corps, Finance Corps, Intelligence Corps, Military Police, and the Engineering Corps. Basic training for Permanent Force women has been moved from the Women's Army College at George to the Personnel Services School at Voortrekkerhoogte. This move will permit an increased number of Citizen Force women volunteers to be trained at George and is indicative of the increased role women are playing in the SAA.

(11) Mobilization

~~(S)~~ Specific mobilization plans are not known. However, if a serious threat to the country's security should develop, COIN and Conventional Force units would be mobilized along with the paramilitary South African Police, which would come under the jurisdiction of the SADF. Without outside logistic support, full mobilization capacity is estimated as follows:

	Personnel	Corps	Div (Inf/ Armd)	Bde (Inf/Armd/ Mtzd)	Bn	Commando units
M-day	70-75,000	0	0	0	15	50
M+15	150,000	0	2	7	45	150
M+30	300,000	0	2	10	82	200
M+90	375,000	0	2	12	85	200
M+180	400,000	1	3	14	90	200

~~(S)~~ Full mobilization would be avoided if at all possible because of the skilled (white) manpower shortage it would create. Mobilized forces could not be maintained for any extended period without severe countrywide economic repercussions. In 1976, the Defense Act was revised to increase the period of liability for continuous service, short of full mobilization, to 4 months (from 2 previously). This increased mobilization enhanced flexibility in situations short of an all-out emergency, thereby making it feasible to call up selected reserve units to combat a limited threat.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ The missions of the South African Navy (SAN) are to defend the nation against seaborne attack, to protect against infiltration from the sea, to provide harbor security for all South African port installations, to survey and maintain the lines of communication around the Cape of Good Hope, and to police the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). When directed by the Chief of the Navy (CNavy), the SAN has the mission of conducting submarine, mine warfare, and offensive small craft operations, and special warfare operations in support of the SADF. The SAN also is tasked with conducting hydrographic operations. Surveillance of the Cape Sea Route is a joint responsibility with the South African Air Force Southern Air Command (SAC).

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The Navy is incapable of protecting the nation from attack by a modern naval force, and in itself would be only a minor factor in a general war. Nevertheless, the SAN is one of the more effective naval forces in Africa. It is capable of limited escort, patrol, and minesweeping operations in local waters. The Navy's antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are deficient, but it continues to train and maintain a limited ASW capability. The submarine force has a limited attack capability. The degradation of ASW capability is due primarily to a loss of ASW platforms, experienced personnel, realistic training exercises, and state-of-the-art techniques and systems. Development of a harbor defense capability continues. The Navy is able to undertake limited sea search and rescue.

~~(S)~~ Despite these limitations, the Navy is working toward improving its capabilities, with emphasis on coastal defense. South Africa claims 12 nautical miles (NM) as territorial waters and a 200-NM exclusive fishing zone. The addition of guided missile patrol combatants (PGGs) to the inventory has increased coastal patrol potency, but many additional PGGs will be needed before the entire 2,881-km[4] coast can be adequately covered. To carry out the new harbor defense role, the SAN has established marine units.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ SAN personnel strength is approximately 6,800; about 3,600 (525 officers) are Perma-

[4] (U) The Namibian coast is an additional 1,489 kilometers.

nent Force personnel and 1,500 are Citizen Force conscripts performing National Service. (In addition, 800 coloured and 450 Indian SADF personnel are assigned Navy duties, and some 450 women are in the South African Women's Naval Service (SWANS).

(4) Ships and Aircraft Strength

(a) ~~(C)~~ Ships

Type	Op	Nonop	In Reserve	Status Unknown
SS (Submarine)	2	1		
FF (Frigate)		1		
PGG (Patrol Guided Missile Combatant)	6		3	
PC (Patrol Craft)[1]	2			3
PSB (Harbor Patrol Boat)	30+			
PBR (River/Roadstead Patrol Boat)	1			
MSC (Coastal Minesweeper)[1]	3		1	2
MHC (Coastal Minehunter)	1		1	
AGS (Hydrographic Survey Ship)	1	1		
AG (Misc Auxiliary)	1			1
APB (Barracks Ship)				1
AVR (Rescue Vessel)	5			
YAG (Service Craft)	1			
YPT (Torpedo Retriever)	1			
YTB (Large Harbor Tug)	2			
YTM (Medium Harbor Tug)	1			
YTL (Small Harbor Tug)	1			
YXT (Training Craft)	1			
Total: 74	**59**	**3**	**5**	**7**

[1] ~~(C)~~ One MSC and one PC are assigned to CF units.

(b) Aircraft

~~(S)~~ The SAN has no organic aircraft and depends upon the South African Air Force's Southern Air Command (SAC) for support. Five units stationed in the vicinity of Cape Town at Yesterplaat and D.F. Malan Airfields provide the bulk of SAC assets devoted to maritime roles. Wasp HAS-1 helicopters perform ASW duties from the President Class frigate. Piaggio 166 light transports routinely perform short-range and coastal surveillance duties. The SAAF's only long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, the Shackleton MR-3, was phased out in November 1984 after 28 years of service. The loss of this aircraft, which had the ability to carry torpedoes, depth charges, bombs, and sonobouys, severely limits the SAAF's maritime capabilities. C-47 Dakotas have now been assigned to perform limited reconnaissance duties. C-130s, C-47, and civilian L-100s carry out search and rescue missions. The Air Force also has a squadron of Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft, but it is inadequately trained for naval support operations.

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) Command Relationships

~~(C)~~ Subject to the direction of the Chief of the SADF, responsibility for naval operations

is vested in the CNAVY. The CNAVY, his immediate staff, and the staff planning elements are located in Pretoria. Operational planning and control is vested in the Commander Naval Operations (COMNAVOP), located at Joint Maritime Operations Center (JMOC), Silvermine. The Naval Operations Command and the South African Air Force South Air Command (SAC) are headquartered at the JMOC. Naval and air maritime operations are controlled from the facility. The naval and air staffs exercise control over its assets. The JMOC is the communications center for all maritime surveillance and operations. Joint maritime operations are conducted out of the Maritime Defense Headquarters (MHQ) located near Westlake, a suburb of Cape Town. Satellite centers of the MHQ are located at SAS[5] Bluff, in Durban, and in Walvis Bay.

(b) Naval Headquarters Organization

~~(C)~~ Naval Headquarters, Pretoria, is divided into five functional areas: Chief of Naval Staff Personnel, Chief of Naval Staff Intelligence, Chief of Naval Staff Operations, Chief of Naval Staff Logistics, and Chief of Naval Staff Finance.

(c) Organization of the Navy

~~(C)~~ The SAN is organized into six separate commands, including three functional commands (Naval Operations Command, Naval Training Command, Naval Logistics Command) and three area commands (Naval Command Natal, Naval Command Cape, and Naval Command Walvis Bay). Since the SAN has the mission to fight on land as well as at sea, separate command and control structures for conventional and unconventional war have been established.

~~(C)~~ Naval Operations Command is responsible directly to CNAVY for the conduct of conventional naval operations within the Republic's maritime areas of strategic and tactical interests. COMNAVOP has operational command over all surface and subsurface forces, maritime operations, and exercises of the SAN. Forces are organized administratively under COMNAVOP into the 10th Frigate Squadron, the 147th Minesweeping Squadron, Strike Craft Flotilla, and a search and rescue (SAR) unit.

~~(C)~~ The SAN command structure is undergoing a major restructuring that started in 1986. The SAN's six commands are being combined into two large area commands, Western Naval Command headquartered in Simonstown and Eastern Naval Command headquartered in Durban. The seaward dividing line between the two areas is on longitude 02329E, just east of the coastal town of Knysna. The reorganization, scheduled to be completed by mid-1988, is being implemented in order to utilize the Navy's limited resources more effectively. These commands are responsible directly to CNAVY for conduct of landward counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, protection of harbors and national key points, and coordination of planning or action regarding COIN operations. The port naval commands, which are located at major ports or can be activated as required, and which have responsibility for port and harbor security, are also subordinate to the area naval command.

~~(C)~~ Coinciding with the SAN's redefined mission, which directs Navy attention away from security of the Cape Sea Route to protection of South African territorial waters, the Marines were reestablished and charged with the land and seaward defense of all ports. The South African marines are not a separate corps but are an integral part of the Navy. Marines are subordinate to either the regional naval command or the installation they are charged to guard. A company-strength element of the South African Marines is continuously deployed in northern Namibia for duty in the border operational area.

[5] (U) Traditionally, South African naval stations, as well as South African ships and some units, are called SAS (South African Ship).

(d) Deployment

~~(C)~~ The preponderance of naval forces are located at SAS Simonstown in Cape Province. The naval base located there now has been expanded to the limit of its capacity. Because of this condition and the fact that the major threat to South Africa is perceived currently as coming from its northern neighbors, the SAN now is dispersing its forces to the areas of major concern. SAS Salisbury Island in Durban Harbor was reoccupied by the Navy in 1976 and is being renovated from a dormant World War II naval base to an active naval base challenging Simonstown in importance since becoming home port of the Strike Craft Flotilla. Approximately half of the strike craft are being redeployed to Simonstown. An advance naval operations center at Richards Bay has been established. On the west coast, the SAN has bases at Saldanha Bay and Walvis Bay. Associated with Saldanha Bay is the SAR facility named SAS Flamingo. The Submarine Flotilla, the 10th Frigate Squadron, and the 147th Minesweeping Squadron are all home-ported in Simonstown. The Strike Craft Flotilla (SAS Skorpion) is located at SAS Salisbury Island, Durban Harbor. The Marines, organized into harbor protection units, are assigned to the major ports. A contingent of marines assigned along the Zambezi River in the Caprivi Strip provide compound and convoy security, and conduct patrols on the river.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ All major shipbuilding for the Navy is done at Sandock-Auotral Shipyards in Durban. The facilities are capable of building two Minister Class patrol boats at a time and could produce two vessels a year. South Africa launched its first large naval ship, the SAS *Drakensberg*, in April 1986. The *Drakensberg* was commissioned in October 1987 following sea trials in mid-1987.

~~(S)~~ Larger combat ships are primarily of British origin while most smaller vessels, particularly patrol craft, are built in South Africa. Most are maintained in good material condition. Vessels normally in reserve are in good condition but are stripped of armament, which is stored at Simonstown. The SAN's principal combatants are one frigate (FF) acquired new from the UK in the early 1960s, three Daphne Class submarines (SSs) acquired from France in the early 1970s, and nine Reshef Class (called Minister Class by the SAN) patrol guided-missile combatants (PGGs). Patrol and mine warfare ships are used in rotating service. The SAN's second frigate, SAS Steyn, is reportedly being reactivated. The modernization program, which includes new guns, missiles, and communications equipment, will enhance the Navy's limited ASW capabilities.

~~(S)~~ The SAN dockyard has modified the frigate to carry helicopters. Two coastal minesweepers (MSCs) have been converted to coastal gunboats, and work has commenced on at least one of four more scheduled for this conversion. The dockyard also has converted two minesweepers into minehunters (MHCs).

~~(S)~~ The SAN has nine operational Minister Class patrol boats. Three were built in Israel, and South Africa has built at least four under license from Israel. These vessels are armed with surface-to-surface missiles called the Skorpion, probably a modified version of the Gabriel (possibly the Gabriel II).

~~(C)~~ The locally built harbor defense launch (PSB), a 9-meter catamaran called the Namacurra Class, was unveiled in early 1979. Thirty have been completed to date.

~~(S)~~ The SAN has embarked upon a plan to begin construction of corvettes, which will probably be initiated by 1990. South Africa's shipbuilding industry could satisfy the SAN's needs in the following areas: completion of the Reshef program; minigunboats for harbor defense; a resupply and replenishment ship; and institution of a corvette-building

program. The SAN has been studying the feasibility of developing a submarine construction capability. However, due to the financial pressures facing the SAN, new projects such as corvette and submarine construction have been put on hold (although the sale of submarine plans to South Africa by a private concern in West Germany raises the question of the government's immediate intentions).

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The SAN has two repair facilities: the primary facility at the Simonstown Navy Base and the newer but smaller facility at Salisbury Island, Durban. The Simonstown facility consists of a drydock capable of handling the SAN's largest combatant, a synchrolift for patrol or strike craft, and ample berthing for repairs afloat. The Salisbury Island Naval Facility has a recently finished synchrolift, built especially for the maintenance of the Navy's Minister Class strike craft. South Africa also has two large government-owned drydocks in Cape Town and Durban that can be used for repair or modification of the SAN ships. The Navy has experienced occasional shortages of repair parts and equipment, even though South Africa is virtually self-sufficient in such items.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(C)~~ The Navy continues to experience personnel shortages. Although recent restructuring of salary policies and the recession in South Africa have improved retention of trained personnel, the SAN will continue to have problems in manning its many technical billets. To a limited degree, the SAN is expanding its use of nonwhites, especially in technical fields, which has helped relieve the strain. The Navy was the first force to use nonwhites with the recruitment of coloureds in 1965. Indians were introduced into the SAN in 1974. Several naval vessels have mixed crews. Coloured and Indian midshipmen have been taken into the Naval College at Gordons Bay, and there are a few Indian commissioned officers. Women also are being recruited on a larger scale. The South African Women's Naval Service (SWANS) augments shore-based male personnel. A 1986 attempt to integrate coloured, Indian, and white women's training failed after a few weeks. For details on conscription and terms of service, see sec. 3.a.(7). For details on use of nonwhite personnel, see sec. 3.a.(7) and sec. 3.d.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ Training in the SAN in some areas is adequate. However, in most areas poor training techniques, lack of training aids, shortage of qualified instructors, and lack of regular training exercises continue to retard the training effort. Early in 1978, a separate command was established under the Chief of the Navy to administer all basic and initial technical training. As late as 1976, SAN officers were attending courses at most levels in the United Kingdom and France. The SAN maintains an exchange program at the junior officer level with Chile. Israel may be providing training on the Reshef patrol boats, but this has not been confirmed. Additionally, Argentine, Israeli, and Taiwanese officers have attended the South African Naval Staff College. SAN officers attend regular joint staff courses and staff courses of other services in the SADF.

(a) Training Facilities

(U) Seven training facilities, the Naval Staff College, the Naval College, the South African Military Academy, SAS Simonsburg, SAS Wingfield, SAS Saldanha, and the Action Operations Center Bluff, provide a full range of naval training opportunities (see DDB-1200-SF-85, NAFIS-South Africa for details).

(b) Exercises

~~(C)~~ The SAN conducts regular training and firing exercises. The SAN also occasionally conducts long-distance patrol and SIGINT-gathering exercises with the Minister Class patrol boats through the Mozambique Channel. In November 1981, four SAN vessels, two frigates, a tanker, and a strike craft completed an 18-day, 6,000-kilometer training patrol of the southern Indian Ocean. The task force left Durban, passed by Reunion and the Comoro Islands on its way around Madagascar, turned south again near Dar es Salaam, and returned along the Mozambique coast. Although such an operation clearly taxed the capability of the SAN, the exercise once again pointed out South Africa's determination to demonstrate periodically its ability to project naval power in the region, despite turning away from a blue-water concept. In the past, the SAN has conducted ASW, submarine warfare, and minesweeping exercises. The last known SAN exercise that tested ASW capabilities took place with a seven-vessel task force off the Cape Peninsula in March 1984. However, because of personnel and logistic constraints, these exercises are believed to be carried on less frequently now.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(C)~~ The Navy Citizen Force (CF) reserve numbers about 11,000. These men serve in "paper units" and are assigned to seven reserve training centers located in Cape Town, Simonstown, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London, Johannesburg, and Pretoria. One seaward defense boat (PC) has been transferred to the Pretoria and Johannesburg units for training, maintenance, and manning, which are conducted in Simonstown. This should improve inland CF effectiveness. A minesweeper that was converted to a patrol boat also has been assigned to a CF unit. Reserve effectiveness would be severely limited by the lack of depth in training. Only a few hundred personnel receive brief periods of shipboard training each year. The principal focus of the port CF units is on harbor defense, harbor security, salvage, and mine countermeasures. The Johannesburg CF unit mans the command and control facility at Walvis Bay.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C)~~ All reservists could be mobilized within 30 days. They probably would be assigned to reserve training centers, to other shore establishments, and to vessels in reserve status. Their combat efficiency and overall capability would be marginal because of inadequate training. By law, the assets of the country can be mobilized in a national emergency and can be used as the President sees fit. This action could include all vessels owned by the South African Merchant Marine that fly the South African flag. National service can be satisfied by signing on in the South African Merchant Marine and attending the Merchant Marine Academy Louis Botha in Cape Town. All of the commercial companies' assets that serve tankers in South African ports and waters can be nationalized in the event of a national emergency. This includes helicopters and aircraft services as well.

~~(C)~~ The South African Merchant Marine fleet consists of 42 ships of over 1,000 gross registered tons. Seventeen of these ships, with a total deadweight tonnage (lift capacity) of 578,000 tons of cargo, have a military support potential. These ships include four breakbulk, nine container, one RO/RO, and three drybulk carries, and have an average age of 10 years. Even though South Africa is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa with a shipbuilding industry, only 2 of these 17 ships were fabricated in country. The remainder of the country's ships are auxiliary vessels such as passenger ships, research vessels, dredges, and fish factory ships.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ The missions of the South African Air Force (SAAF) are: supporting the Army and police in maintaining internal security, providing air transport and tactical air support to the South African Defense Force, assisting the Navy in protecting sea approaches, and providing air defense for South Africa and Namibia.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Air Force is capable of providing air support, both tactical and logistic, to the country's internal security forces. The force also would be effective in a defensive role, including air defense intercept and maritime sorties. The SAAF is one of the most powerful air forces in Africa and could defeat any likely aggressor (i.e., any African state); however, it could not guarantee the country's airspace over the long term if opposed by a major power. The SAAF is capable of short-duration offensive operations in nearby countries and could be employed successfully in a counterinsurgency role. The SAAF has a basic electronic countermeasures (ECM) capability. Its strengths are quality personnel, high standards, and a nucleus of relatively modern well-maintained aircraft and numerous second-line aircraft equipped for counterinsurgency duties. The SAAF's chief weaknesses are its reliance on overseas petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) sources; limited availability of aircraft and parts (because of the arms embargo); a shortage of personnel, including pilots, for certain types of aircraft; and the inexperience of younger airmen.

(3) Personnel

~~(S)~~ Overall personnel strength of the SAAF is currently 11,300; about 6,500 are Permanent Force personnel. This includes an estimated 1,100 pilots, 180 pilot trainees, and an estimated 500 other aircrew personnel. Another 4,200 are National Servicemen. It is estimated that there are 150 female personnel, 300 coloureds, 50 Asians, and 100 blacks also serving as volunteers with the SAAF.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 916 (fixed-wing: 376 jet, 23 turboprop, 320 prop; helicopter:[6] 197)

In operational units: 785

179 fighters: 34 all-weather fighter; 118 ground attack; 27 reconnaissance, bomber.

12 photo reconnaissance

54 transports: 21 medium-range; 13 personnel transporters; 20 short-range.

2 airborne refueling

24 maritime patrol

298 trainers: 252 fighter/ground attack, 3 bombers, 15 transports, 28 helicopters

60 utility

154 helicopters: 65 medium, 80 light, 9 maritime (ASW)

2 test range support

In storage: 131

[6] ~~(S)~~ A few helicopters are on rotating loan to the police but are operated by SAAF personnel.

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ Since the beginning of 1980, the SAAF has undergone a major reorganization. This effort has changed the service from a functionally organized force to a more flexible, regionally oriented entity. Specifically, the system allows for the newly established regional commander to organize fighter, transport, helicopter, and light aircraft forces under his command to better meet the local threat.

~~(S)~~ Recognizing the shortcomings inherent in the old system, the Air Force reorganized to better deal with the rapid pace of modern conflict. Under the original setup, the service was functionally structured and consisted of the following major organizations: Strike Command, which controlled all fighter, bomber, and air defense forces; Transportation Command; and Maritime Air Command, which controlled all naval support aircraft. Although squadrons of different commands were often based together, they remained under the control of their functional chain of command. Thus, to conduct combined air operations, particularly in support of the regionally based Army units, Air Force Headquarters became involved because it was the only echelon authorized to task-reorganize the various commands for short-term missions.

~~(S)~~ Under its new system, the SAAF is organized into three regional commands and four functional commands under Air Force Headquarters. Operational control is exercised by the Air Force Command Post (AFCP), which is collocated with headquarters in Pretoria. The three regional commands control all aircraft based within their boundaries. These are the Main Threat Area Command (MTA), which is responsible for the northern half of the country; the Southern Air Command (SAC), which is responsible for the southern half of the country and the adjacent coastline; and the Western Air Command (WAC), which is responsible for Namibia. The MTA is located with the AFCP in Pretoria and has 19 subordinate squadrons (6 of the squadrons are reserve units); SAC is headquartered at Silvermine, near Cape Town, and has 8 subordinate squadrons (2 are reserve units); and the WAC is located at Windhoek in Namibia and commands aircraft assigned from its sister commands. During 1985, the SAAF merged and disbanded several of its Impala ground attack squadrons as a cost-saving measure. In addition, two pilot training squadrons were removed from Training Command, given an operational role, and placed under regional commands.

~~(S)~~ The AFCP is in charge of overall planning for the Air Force. It delegates authority and responsibility for tactical operations to the SAC and WAC. Since the AFCP and MTA are commanded by the same individual, the AFCP directs all operations in the MTA area. The regional commanders can further delegate command of tactical operations to their airbase commanders, squadron commanders, or forward air control posts established for a particular operation. Under this system, the former administrative and support-oriented airbase commander has now become an integral part of the chain of command, a role some SAAF personnel find difficult to understand and accept.

~~(S)~~ Training Command, which manages most service training, and the Air Logistics Command, which oversees a nationwide system of Air Force depots, remain from the previous organization. Two new functionally organized commands have also been established to support the regional headquarters. The Airspace Control Command, headquartered at Swartkop Airbase in Pretoria, controls all early warning radar units, the 250th Air Defense (surface-to-air missile) Group, and the Air Defense School. The Tactical Support Command, headquartered at Snake Valley Airbase in Pretoria, controls a number of small units that support tactical operations in the field. These include six reserve tactical airfield support

units, two forward air control posts, three tactical ground-controlled intercept units, and a mobile photographic interpretation unit.

~~(S)~~ SAAF aircraft are deployed formally to some 12 airfields in South Africa; the main airbases are located at Pietersburg, Pretoria, and Hoedspruit; other important bases are near Cape Town. SAAF operations in Namibia are conducted from airfields at Rundu, Grootfontein, Mpacha, and Ondangwa. Over the past few years, the SAAF has been gradually upgrading and expanding its military airfields throughout the border area opposite Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Also, construction of a major SAAF base, the Louis Trichardt AFB, began in 1983 in the northeastern Transvaal and was dedicated in the fall of 1987. The Trichardt airbase was expected to be operational by January 1988. In addition to the new airfield and the upgrading of existing facilities, South Africa has begun to open a series of combination roads and airstrips in remote border areas. The strengthening and widening of a part of an ordinary road will cost a fraction of what it would cost to build a full-fledged runway. The conversion of national roads to aircraft runways will allow for added mobility needed in counterinsurgency operations.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Summary of Units

Units	Aircraft		Principal Base
	Type	Total	
Main Threat Area Command (MTA)			
1 all-weather ftr sqdn	Mirage III-CZ	16	Hoedspruit AFB
	Mirage III-BZ	3	
	Mirage III-RZ	4	
	Mirage III-RZ	3	
1 air defense ftr sqdn	Mirage III-EZ	Unk	
	Mirage F-1CZ	13	Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria
1 gnd spt atk sqdn	Mirage F-1AZ	31	Hoedspruit AFB
1 light bmbr sqdn	Canberra B(I)	5	Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria
	Canberra T-4	3	
4 atk sqdns	Buccaneer S-2	5	Waterkloof AFB, Pretori
	Aermacchi MB326M/K	44	J.B.M. Hertzog Afl (Bloemsprite AFB)
	Aermacchi MB326K/M	23	Lanebaanweg Air Force Station
	Aermacchi MB326K/M	31	Lanseria AFB, Pretoria
1 VIP trnsp sqdn	HS-125	4	Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria
	Viscount	1	
	Merlin IVA	6	
	Falcon-50	1	
1 mdm trnsp sqdn	C-130	7	Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria
	C-160	9	
1 light trnsp sqdn	C-47 Dakota	13	Swartkop AFB, Pretoria
	C-54	4	
4 heli sqdns (light, mdm)	Alouette III	46	Louis Botha Afld, Durban
	Puma	35	
	Super Frelon	7	Swartkop AFB, Pretoria; Hoedspruit AFB

Units	Aircraft		
	Type	Total	Principal Base
2 utility sqdns	C-4M Kudu	24	Lanseria AFB Pretoria
	AM3C Bosbok	16	Potchefstrom AFS
1 advanced flying school (fighter)	Mirage III-DZ	3	Pietersburg AFB, Pietersburg
	Mirage III-EZ	16	
	Mirage III-D2Z	9	
	Cheetah	20	
	Aermacchi MB326K	27	
	Aermacchi MB326M	19	
1 multiengine flying school (transport)	C-47 Dakota	12	J.B.M. Hertzog Afld (Bloemspruit AFS)
1 helicopter flying school	Alouette III	24	J.B.M. Hertzog Afld (Bloemspruit AFS)
	Alouette II	4	
Airspace Control Command			Devon/Slurry
4 permanent radar sites			(Mafikeng)/Villa Nora (Ellisras)/Mariepskop
3 mobile radar sqdns			Pietersburg AFB, Pietersburg
1 AD Group[1]	Cactus/Crotale SAM	24	Waterkloof AFB, Pretoria
	Tigercat SAM[2]	36	
Southern Air Command (SAC) 1 atk sqdn	Aermacchi MB326M	23	Langebaanweg AFB
1 light recon sqdn	Piaggio 166	18	D.F. Malan Afld, Cape Town
1 ASW heli sqdn	Wasp HAS-1	9	Ysterplaat AFB, Cape Town
	Alouette III	Unk	Cape Town
1 mixed heli sqdn (mdm)	Super Frelon	7	Ysterplaat AFB, Cape Town
	Puma	16	Verwoerd
1 light heli sqdn	Alouette III	34	H.F. Verwoerd Afld Port Elizabeth AFS
1 light trnsp sqdn	C-47 Dakota	12	Ysterplaat AFB, Cape Town
1 advanced flying school (maritime, reconnaissance, transport)	Uses aircraft from other SAC Airbases		Ysterplaat AFB, Cape Tow
1 basic jet flying school	Aermacchi MB326M	55	Langebaanweg AFB
Training Command 1 primary fly sch	T-6 Harvard	108	Dunnottar FTS, vic Johannesburg
1 light aviation sch	Cessna 185	21	Potchefstrom Afld, Potchefstrom

[1] ~~(S)~~ One battery has three acquisition units and six to nine firing units. South Africa has three batteries of equipment; two batteries are believed to be operationally deployed.
[2] ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ In the first operational sighting of the Tigercat since it was acquired, 11 launchers and 11 guidance trailers were identified at Ondangwa AFS in August 1982.

Units	Aircraft - Type	Total	Principal Base
Air Navigation sch Air Commandos 12 recon/utility sqdns	C-47 Dakota Various privately owned light aircraft	3	Langebaanweg AFB Bethal/ Potchefstroom/Vereenig-ing/ J.B.M. Hertzog/Durban (Virginia)/Ben Schoeman/ Kimberley/Vorth/D.F. Malan/ Knysna/Victoria West/Lanseria

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Almost half of the SAAF's aircraft are of UK, US, and Canadian origin; the majority are aging second-line machines. Modern aircraft are predominantly French and Italian types, many produced in South Africa. The French have provided helicopters, jet fighters, and transports; the Italians jet trainers, ground attack, and transport/utility aircraft.

~~(S)~~ The SAAF acquisition program has been severely limited by the arms embargo. If it were not restricted, the SAAF would be in the market to replace aging items in its inventory, such as long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, transports, and follow-on fighters. To overcome the impact of the embargo, the SAAF has adopted the dual strategy of developing a domestic military aircraft industry while covertly acquiring those items that cannot be indigenously produced. Large sums of money have been and continue to be expended in order to develop and produce military aircraft, armaments, and spare parts. Covert acquisition efforts have also been somewhat successful over the past few years, particularly in securing spare parts, helicopters, and light transport aircraft. Indications are that the SAAF will continue this dual strategy in the years ahead.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The Air Force has two mobile SAM systems in its inventory, the Cactus/Crotale and the Tigercat. SAAF has three batteries of French-made Cactus/Crotale missiles, with of total of about 24 launcher vehicles. Two batteries are believed to be operational. One battery is located at Waterkloof and has experienced technical difficulties; the other was deployed to Rundu Airfield, Namibia, in August 1987. In 1976, 36 British-built Tigercat mobile launchers were purchased from Jordan along with all the ancillary equipment. In the first operational sighting of the Tigercat since it was acquired, 22 launchers and 11 guidance trailers were identified at Ondangwa AFS in August 1982. It appears that, overall, the Air Force SAM units maintain a low degree of readiness. Judging from the annual exercise conducted by the units, it would take 1-2 days for either system to be set up to conduct operations.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ Aircraft maintenance is good, although there are some problems in retaining qualified aircraft mechanics for first- and second-echelon maintenance. All third-echelon (depot) maintenance is handled by regional depots, which are supported by Atlas Aircraft. The Atlas Aircraft plant at Kempton Park near Johannesburg can overhaul any of the diverse aircraft in the inventory. In some cases, however, the unavailability of parts causes problems. Currently, the SAAF is moving to a centralized maintenance concept where second-echelon (major) maintenance will be consolidated into a base-level effort for all flying squadrons at a base. The new maintenance concept is viewed as a cost-saving measure and a way to improve maintenance efficiency. The SAAF is dependent on foreign sources for some repair parts and all crude oil supplies. A strategic reserve of crude oil is maintained in abandoned mine shafts; stocks of processed fuel are adequate for at least 30 days of sustained operations.

Tactical airfield units can be deployed to operational airfields anywhere in the Republic or in Namibia for aircraft servicing duties.

~~(S)~~ SAFAIR, a partially government-owned cargo airline, operates 12 L-100 (C-130E) aircraft. About 20 percent of its operations are official LOGAIR; i.e., logistic contracts for the SADF. There is close cooperation between SAFAIR and the SAAF, and the actual percentage of LOGAIR missions is probably much higher.

~~(S)~~ South Africa has a small but growing aircraft industry. The Government-owned Atlas Aircraft Company, a subsidiary of ARMSCOR, supports military and some light civilian aircraft needs. MB-326 aircraft built by Atlas are produced under a license awarded by Aermacchi of Italy in 1964. In August 1983, ARMSCOR ended its series production of the MB-326 jet aircraft. Since production began, over 200 MB-326 M/K models (called the Impala MK I/II by South Africa) are believed to have been completed. The majority of these aircraft were built mainly from South African-manufactured components. Impala MK-I began using the updated Viper 540 engine. Atlas Aircraft will now switch emphasis to production of spare parts for the Impala and upgrading existing SAAF aircraft. Atlas has produced two types of single-engine light utility type aircraft with Aermacchi help. The 40 AM3C Bosbok assembled at Atlas are in the SAAF inventory. The C-4M Kudu is a hybrid of the AL-60 and the AM3C and was developed by Atlas and Aermacchi to meet SAAF requirements. Total production of the C-4M Kudu may exceed 60; about 40 are estimated to be in SAAF units. Currently, only the C-4M communications/utility aircraft is in production in South Africa. There is, however, an advanced fighter development program underway designed to produce a replacement for the Mirage F-1. In July 1986, the SAAF received its first Cheetah aircraft. The Cheetah is an extensively modified Mirage III, powered by the ATOR AK-SO engine. Currently, there are about 20 Cheetahs in SAAF units. In February 1986, ARMSCOR unveiled a prototype combat helicopter called the XHA1. For several years a research and development priority has been placed on developing a helicopter gunship. The indigenous manufacture of a combat helicopter represents a significant breakthrough for ARMSCOR and the SAAF. It will also alleviate the high cost of purchasing spare parts for the SAAF's aging helicopter fleet through third parties.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ South Africa provided considerable financial support for French development of the Crotale mobile SAM system, known as the Cactus in South Africa. The Cactus was scheduled for licensed production in country, but SADF dissatisfaction with the system's performance has clouded its future. Thus far, problems have included unreliability, limited operational flexibility, and the need to have French technicians onhand to keep the Cactus operational. Over the past few years, the ARMSCOR missile production subsidiary, Kentron, has developed an AAM derived from the US Sidewinder. The missile, known as the Kukri (formerly referred to as the Whiplash), has been extensively modified to improve stability and maneuverability. The Kukri system incorporates an integral sight that is superimposed on the visor of the pilot's helmet, thus allowing the pilot to initially guide the missile by looking at the target. The Kukri AAM probably entered series production in 1980 or early 1981. It is assembled by hand at a rate of 1 per working day, or about 250 annually. Currently, Kentron has other missiles and drones under development.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ Over the past few years, the SAAF has found it increasingly difficult to recruit the quality personnel it needs to sustain operations. This is particularly true for the technical officer and pilot and navigator career fields. The SAAF estimates it will need about 800 applicants for flight training each year over the next 4 years. Pilot trainees must be volunteer high school graduates with passing marks in mathematics, English, and

Afrikaans, who are between 17 and 25, unmarried, and willing to accept a 10-year service obligation. Pay raises and a well-orchestrated recruiting campaign brought in a sufficient number of volunteers in recent years, but the lure of high-paying civilian technical jobs will continue to drain the SAAF of some of its best people. For details on conscription and terms of service of National Service personnel, see sec. 3.a.(7).

~~(S)~~ As a partial response to its personnel shortfalls, the SAAF introduced a revised pay system in 1980 which applies only to navigators and pilots. The intent was to make the military flying career competitive with the pilot programs of civilian airlines. In addition, the SAAF liberalized its personnel policies in mid-1974 by commissioning two women 2d lieutenants and assigning three females as stewardesses aboard SAAF VIP aircraft. In early 1976, the Air Force stated that it intends to use women as pilots for certain noncombat roles. Squadron No. 114 Air Commando has been formed with only women pilots. The Air Force received its first nonwhite volunteers in 1977. Coloureds, Asians, and blacks now serve the SAAF in such positions as firefighters, cooks, supply clerks, drivers, and apprentice mechanics and in security enlisted billets. Also, in December 1981, six coloureds began officer training courses, three of them in the pilot field; the present status of these individuals is unknown. Additionally, the SAAF says pilot training is open to all races as long as the individual can meet the qualifications.

~~(C)~~ An increase of nonwhite recruits in the skilled and operational positions in the SAAF will probably be slow in coming. It is the one force in the SADF that has a backlog of white applications for enlistment and a need for manpower with highly technical skills. As a result, the SAAF will move slowest in absorbing nonwhites.

(9) Training

~~(C)~~ Individual and unit training is of high caliber, approaching US standards. All pilots now begin training with 130 hours in T-6 Harvard prop aircraft. Then the students go directly to specialty flying training. Selected pilots receive 117 hours' transition training to jets; others are assigned to helicopter school, some to light aviation, and others to transports. The program produces over 100 new pilots a year.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Tactical training emphasizes support to ground forces, and the SAAF participates in most Army exercises. SAAF pilots excel in individual skills (i.e., bombing, strafing, aerobatics) and are rated as among the best in the world. There has been some difficulty in fully qualifying F-1AZ pilots. Air-to-ground coordination is apparently a serious problem that the SADF is working to correct. An additional problem area is a lack of training in low-level combat tactics which are needed to meet the modern SAM and AAA threat in Angola and Namibia.

~~(S)~~ Training experience includes participation in the paratroop exercises, night bombing practice, joint SAN/SAAF ASW exercises, and a naval gunfire control exercise. Operational experience has been gained in support of SADF requirements in Namibia and Angola, including ground attack, paratroop delivery, aerial reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and logistic support, and in support of South Africa's antarctic research program.

~~(S)~~ In addition to the 6 flying schools listed in section 3. c. (5), there are four other major air force training schools under the Training Command. These include the SAAF College (officer courses, advanced course, and staff courses) at Voortrekkerhoogte, Pretoria; the Survival School at Hoedspruit AFB; and the School of Technical Training at Lyttelton. The Airspace Control Command controls the Air Defense School (radar and SAM operations) at Waterkloof AFB.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ Currently, it is estimated that the SAAF has a total of 30,000 CF and Commando personnel. However, probably no more than 10,000 of these, including some 4,000 aircrew, have received sufficient training to constitute an effective reserve. The rest of the CF spend an occasional short period with the regular force or are assigned to a CF reserve squadron. Reserve units are kept at strength by transfers from the PF (i.e., regular Air Force) and by personnel completing their service with the PF.

~~(S)~~ There are also 12 Air Commando units, composed of privately owned light aircraft, directly controlled by the Air Force. Air Commandos are responsible to the regional commands and are capable of performing reconnaissance, air resupply, and search and rescue missions, and of providing general support to the defense force or police in an emergency. They probably also have a minor armed reconnaissance capability. Air Commandos have a 10-day encampment annually during which their training is supported by the regular Air Force. They also participate in SADF joint exercises.

~~(S)~~ Beginning in 1980, a new type of Air Force organization was formed, the Tactical Airfield Unit (TAU). There are now six of these units under the Tactical Support Command, wholly composed of CF personnel. Each is a self-contained mobile unit with the mission of supporting field-deployed SAAF units. TAU tasks include air traffic control, security, firefighting, movement control, medical support, billeting, and communications support. It appears that these units frequently exercise in South Africa proper, but have not as yet been deployed to Namibia. In August 1985, the SAAF exercised its TAU by deploying to a contingency airfield. Reports indicated that the unit performed its mission quite well.

(b) Mobilization

~~(S)~~ Reservists could mobilize quickly. They probably would be assigned to designated airfields within the country, but lack of equipment and facilities would preclude complete use except for the minority who are already assigned to units. Those personnel with much regular force experience would be assigned to regular duties.

(c) Civil Aviation

1. Aircraft

(U) Approximately 85 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in South Africa:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)	**Owner/Operator**
4 Boeing 747-244B	South African Airways (SAA)
2 Boeing 747-244M	SAA
2 Boeing 747-344	SAA
6 Boeing 747SP	SAA
2 Boeing 707-300C	SAFAIR Freighters
2 McDonnell Douglas DC-8	AFRO Air
18 Total	
Medium-Range Transport Aircraft (1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)	
4 Airbus Industrie A-300B2 Airbus	SAA
4 Airbus Industrie A-300B4 Airbus	SAA

1 Airbus Industrie A-300C4 Airbus	SAA
19 Boeing 737-244	SAA
3 BAe HS-748-2A	Air Cape (1), BOP Air (1), Transkei Airways (1)
15 Lockheed L-100/L-382G Hercules	SAFAIR Freighter
1 Lockheed L-100-20 Hercules	SAFAIR Freighters
12 Douglas C-47/DC-3 Dakota	Air Cape (1), Government (1), COMAIR (1), United Air Services (3), Various others (6)
1 Vickers 761D Viscount	United Air Services
60 Total	

Short-Range Transport Aircraft (less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)

4 Fokker F-27-200 Friendship	COMAIR
2 DeHaviland Canada DHC-8 Dash Eights	Magnum Airlines
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-4	National Air Cargo
7 Total	

(U) The Airbuses, most of the Boeing aircraft, and all of the HS-748s constitute the fleet of South African Airways (SAA). SAA has converted one of its older Boeing 737s to a VIP configuration for use by the State President and other government officials. SAA reportedly has ordered an additional A-300C4 Airbus and retained an option on a third A-300 B4.

(U) The government-operated DC-3 Skytrain is registered to the Directorate of Civil Aviation (DCA). The operating condition of some of the older DC-3s is uncertain.

(U) One of the three HS-748s is operated by Transkei Airways. One of the DC-3s is operated in Namibia by Namib Air.

(U) Afro Air is a new freight airline operating from Bophuthatswana. It plans passenger services in the near future.

(U) Magnum Airlines, a domestic carrier, recently began operation with two new short-range De Havilland Canada DHC-8 Dash Eights which were delivered in 1986.

(U) The Lockheed Hercules aircraft are operated by SAFAIR Freighters. SAFAIR is seeking to increase utilization of its fleet by expanding into the international air cargo market. Several of SAFAIR Freighters' Hercules aircraft have been leased to foreign carriers, and two of its remaining aircraft sometimes operate cargo flights for SAA. SAFAIR may register its aircraft in Botswana, Lesotho, or Swaziland to avoid the stigma of South African registration and more easily obtain international clearances.

2. Pilots

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in South Africa is approximately 800. SAA reportedly employs as many as 500 pilots.

3. Mobilization and Potential

~~(C)~~ Virtually all South African civil aircraft and indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized for military or other government use in the event of war or national emergency. By law, the South African Defence Force (SADF) may seize any civil aircraft, even if no national emergency has been declared. Most South African Airways personnel are

former SADF members, and most transport pilots throughout the country are ex-military, many of whom maintain Citizen Force commissions. SAFAIR Freighters, in particular, has accumulated considerable experience in hauling military cargo for the SADF under a charter contract.

d. Paramilitary Forces

(1) South African Police (SAP)

(U) See also DIA, DDB-2420-10-85, *South African Police* (U) , May 1985 (S).

(a) Mission

~~(S)~~ To maintain internal security, conduct counterterrorist activity, patrol hostile borders, and provide a ready force for deployment against insurgent elements.

(b) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The SAP is well trained and equipped to perform its routine internal security mission, but had to rely on support from the military forces to deal with widespread unrest in 1984 and 1985. It also could provide rear area security during hostilities. The deployment of paramilitary companies to Rhodesia in the late 1960s and early 1970s for counterinsurgency duties provided field training and operational experience, and served to improve the capability of the SAP to cope with an insurgent environment. Counterinsurgency capabilities continue to be exercised in Namibia, the northern Transvaal, and northern Natal.

(c) Strength

~~(S)~~ About 60 percent of the 56,000+ force consists of nonwhite members. (About 14 percent of the 930-man officer corps is nonwhite: 8 percent black, 2 percent Indian, and 4 percent coloured.) The exclusively paramilitary element is composed of about 3,000 SAP specially trained for their military role; some nonwhites are now included among these specially trained troops. SAP reserves total 22,000. Any ex-policemen can be called to serve up to 30 days annually. Service is from 1 to 2 years, including an initial 6-month training period.

~~(C)~~ The SAP was understrength by some 8,000 enlisted men at the end of 1980. A major problem in recruitment and retention has been low police pay. The number of whites in the force is expected to continue to decrease while overall strength is expected to reach 96,300 over the next 10 years.

~~(C)~~ SAP strength in Namibia is estimated to be 1,700-1,900. About 1,000 of the total serve in the Border Operation Area. Control of security forces in Namibia was assumed by the Administrator General in May 1985.

(d) Organization

~~(S)~~ The SAP is organized along military lines and is divided into 19 geographic divisions covering the entire country, including Namibia. Specially trained personnel are organized into about 25 mobile police companies. In early 1973, nonwhite SAP were assigned to border patrol in Namibia with the mobile companies for the first time. The SAP conducted the counterinsurgency effort in Namibia from the mid-1960s until 1973, when the SAA took on that responsibility. In late 1978, mobile police companies were noted supporting the counterinsurgency campaign.

~~(C/NF)~~ A Special Guard Unit was established in 1984 to provide security for government buildings and important people. Initially numbering 1,000, the Special Guard Unit is to

be expanded to 10,000 over a 5-year period. In October 1984, then Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange indicated that he was prepared to authorize the establishment of local police forces by the black township councils. Subsequently, in 1985 municipal police units were created in 32 townships. By September 1986, 6,000 council policemen had assumed duties in black townships, and an additional 10,000 were being recruited and trained. Although the Municipal Police are not part of the SAP, they were declared "peace officers" in January 1986 and acquired certain powers normally vested only in members of the SAP.

~~(S/NF)~~ In September 1986, the SAG announced the formation of a 1,000-man "Special Constable" unit for duty in the townships. The unit strength is projected to reach 6,000. By August 1987, the strength level was reported at 4,000. Recruits of the unit are given a 3-week training course, are issued a weapon, and are then considered ready for duty in the township.

~~(C/NF)~~ The merger of the South African Railways Police with the SAP took place in October 1986, adding 7,000 to the force. However, since many Railways Policemen had already been working with the SAP, this move added little to its capabilities.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ SAP members are equipped with modern small arms including the South African-made R-1 rifle, over 4,000 motor vehicles, indigenous light armored vehicles, 80 Saracen armored personnel carriers, Alouette helicopters (on loan from the Air Force and flown by Air Force personnel), and a number of light utility aircraft. Equipment is generally well maintained; the Army is thought to provide training in the use and care of military-type weapons. Mobile companies are equipped as light infantry and are specially equipped to operate in rural areas. The SAP is generally ill equipped and ill trained to handle urban unrest. Some new equipment such as helicopters and water-cannons were added to the inventory, but with little impact on police capabilities.

(f) Employment in Township Unrest

~~(C)~~ Never considered a benign force, the SAP came under strong criticism for its heavyhandedness in handling unrest in black townships in 1984 and 1985, and was accused of provoking violent incidents on numerous occasions, the most notable of which was the "Langa Massacre," which left 19 blacks dead in March 1985. Since October 1984, the SAF has been supported by SADF on a routine basis in joint operations to quell the unrest. In addition to assisting the SAP in the townships, SADF took over some of its border control duties in August 1985, thereby releasing 6,000 SAP members for township duties.

(g) ~~*(C)*~~ *Strength of Police Organizations*

Special Guard SAP	56,000+
Municipal Police	1,000+
Special Constables	4,000
Total	**61,000+**

Cadet Corps

~~(S)~~ In addition to the South African Police, which is capable of a substantial contribution to the country's combat strength, there is a Cadet Corps composed of high school student volunteers who could be mobilized in the event of a national emergency to perform certain rear area military functions. There are an estimated 100,000 active Cadet Corps members.

Similarly, veterans' groups maintain strong military identification and could provide an immediate source of personnel to perform paramilitary activities.

e. ~~(S)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength[1]

Army	84,500
Navy	6,800
Air Force	11,300
Total	**102,600**
Cape Corps (serve with SAA, SAN, SAAF)[2]	5,000+
Indian Corps (serve with SAN, SAAF)[2]	470
Blacks (serve with SAA and SAAF)[2]	1,800

[1] ~~(S)~~ Includes PF cadre and active duty conscripts. Strengths are estimates. Nonwhite strengths are listed separately. The forces of the Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei "homelands" are not included, nor are those of the South-West African Territory Force (see separate sections).
[2] (U) Not included in total.

f. ~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign Military Presence

Israel: Israeli advisers and technicians are thought to be present in South Africa working with the Army, Navy, and ARMSCOR.

g. ~~(S/NF)~~ Military Presence Abroad

An unknown number of South African military personnel are assigned to Israel, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Chile. In addition, there were recently student officers in training in Taiwan and Spain. SADF presence in Malawi includes a four-man team upgrading the naval detachment located at Monkey Bay, Malawi.

(Reverse Blank)

SOUTH AFRICA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Ben Schoeman	1421-08002	80091	33-02-07S	027-49-35E
Bethal Airfield	1300-08035	80112	26-28-25S	029-28-00E
Devon Aw Radar Fac	1300CA0076	85100	26-21-40S	028-48-50E
DF Malan Airfield	1422-08021	80062	33-57-53S	018-36-08E
Dunnottar Airfield	1300-08015	80111	26-21-18S	028-28-18E
East London Port Fac	1421-00005	87400	33-01-27S	027-54-20E
Eros Airfield	1273-08004	80091	22-36-40S	017-05-05E
George SA Army Women College	1422CA0041	90130	33-59-04S	022-34-30E
Gordons Bay Nav Coll Cape Province	1422-00512	95520	34-10-00S	018-52-00E
Grootfontein (WA)	1178-08001	80081	19-36-08S	018-07-33E
Hoedspruit AFS	1299-08863	80053	24-21-50S	031-03-35E
J.B.M. Hertzog Afld Bloemspruit AFS	1397-08005	80060	29-05-32S	026-18-10E
Jozini Army Camp	1299-00245	90140	27-26-00S	032-04-00E
Kalahari Desert Sus U/G Nuc Test Site	1301CA0001	40130	27-47-06S	021-30-27E
Knysna Airfield	1422-08800	80130	34-02-30S	023-03-25E
Langebaanweg Afld	1422-08009	80064	32-58-00S	018-09-37E
Lanseria Airfield	1300-08904	80080	25-55-55S	027-55-23E
Louis Botha Airfield	1398-08013	80081	29-58-25S	030-56-50E
Lyttleton	1300-09935	70220	25-50-00S	028-12-30E
Mosselbaai Port Facilities	1422-00016	47400	34-10-50S	022-09-02E
Pietersburg Airfield	1275-08001	80053	23-50-52S	029-27-28E
Port Elizabeth E Prov Commando HQ	1421-00027	91031	33-58-50S	025-37-41E
Potchefstrom Afld	1300-08019	80111	26-40-05S	027-04-57E
Richards Bay Port	1398-00576	47400	28-48-00S	032-03-30E
Saldanha Port Fac	1422-00017	47400	33-01-20S	017-56-51E
Salisbury Island	1398CA0023	95141	29-52-55S	031-02-05E
Silvermine	1422-00513	95150	34-11-30S	018-26-30E
Sishen Mil Tng Area A Bks	1379CA0036	90120	28-02-00S	023-06-50E
Snake Valley AB	1300-08033	80071	25-48-35S	028-09-56E
Swartkop Airfield	1300-08033	80071	25-48-35S	028-09-56E
Valindaba Uranium Enriching Plant	1300-00912	60200	25-47-58S	027-56-17E
HF Verwoerd Airfield (Port Elizabeth)	1421-08008	80071	33-59-10S	025-36-50E
Victoria West Afld	1397-08013	80105	31-24-15S	023-09-15E
Villa Nora	1275-09954	70220	23-34-30S	028-05-40E
Voortrekkerhoogte Mil Cmd Tng Sch	1300-00705	72121	25-47-00S	028-09-00E
Walvis Bay Port Facilities	1273-00001	95140	22-57-10S	014-30-00E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

Appendix (Continued)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Waterkloof	1300-08030	80053	25-49-49S	028-13-25E
Westlake Maritime Defense HQ	1422-00513	89400	34-05-15S	018-26-35E
Wingfield	1422-00644	91160	33-54-00S	018-31-00E
Ysterplatt Airfield	1422-08003	80071	33-54-02S	018-29-55E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

BOPHUTHATSWANA

1. ~~(C)~~ **Political-Military Situation:** The seven widely scattered parcels of land in north-central South Africa reserved for the Tswana ethnic group, and called Bophuthatswana, were declared independent by the South African Government on 6 December 1977. This action, creating the second of four independent homelands, was another step in the attempt to implement South Africa's separate development program. Mineral wealth, including one of the world's largest platinum mines (approximately 56 percent of South African production), and some industrialization give this homeland a better economic outlook than the others. In addition, the heavily South African financed construction effort, principally in Mafikeng (BE 1300-09933; CAT 70220; COORD 25-51-40S 025-38-30E) and Mmabatho (COORD 25-48-00S 025-32-00E), as well as an Israeli-promoted large-scale capital-intensive agricultural development program in southeastern Bophuthatswana, contribute to a potential economic viability not enjoyed by other homelands. In September 1980, the town of Mafikeng was incorporated into the independent homeland and renamed Mafikeng. The consolidation of Bophuthatswana's six scattered parts and the citizenship of Tswanas living in South Africa remain as contentious issues between the two governments. A parliamentary democracy headed by an executive president, the independent homeland is recognized by no government other than South Africa, although a number of foreign investors deal directly with the government of Bophuthatswana. In an apparent bid to force recognition from Botswana, the government of Bophuthatswana started to require visas for Botswana train crews traveling through the homeland.

(U) With independence, an embryonic defense force designated the Bophuthatswana National Guard (BNG) was established under the aegis of the South African Defense Force. In December 1979, the National Guard was proclaimed a Defense Force by Minister of Defense Hennie Riekert. Located near the new capital of Mmabatho (near Mafikeng), the Defense Force occupies a military base newly constructed by the South African Government. The mission of the Defense Force is to defend Bophuthatswana, to prevent insurgent infiltration through its territory, and to provide civic action assistance to other government departments. All personnel are volunteers; because of good pay the government has seen no need to institute a callup system. There are a number of Tswana officers; the highest rank held has been major. Each soldier completes a 14-week basic course and then chooses to go on to either combat or technical training. Combat training focuses on counterinsurgency. Those who choose technical training may become motor mechanics, builders, electricians, chefs, storekeepers, or clerks. Candidates for officer training are selected after the specialized training course has been completed.

~~(C)~~ The Bophuthatswana Defense Force is the most capable military unit in any of the homelands. The force can carry out ceremonial duties and could contain very limited, localized civil disturbances. It increasingly operates along the border with Botswana. Bophuthatswana is not known to have any serious internal problems, but a police station in the town of Mabopane (COORD 25-25-00S 028-06-00E) was attacked by members of the African National Congress (ANC) in September 1981. Continuing infiltration of anti-South African guerrillas through Botswana and Bophuthatswana along their common border is likely to continue to be a major concern, and was in fact the object of an alleged confrontation between them in February 1985. Future development of the force will be tightly controlled by the South African Government. The Defense Force commander has

called for improving the force's mobility and counterinsurgency capabilities — probably in response to South African requests that the homeland forces be used for such operations.

2. (U) Key Officials:

Executive President: Kgosi Lucas Manyane *Mangope*

Minister of Defense: Brig Hennie *Riekert* (South African, retired)

Defense Force Commander: Brig H. S. (Jack) *Turner* (Seconded South African Army officer)

Director of Intelligence: Richard *Knowlls* (former Rhodesian police officer)

Chief of Security: Richard *Mosiane*

3. (U) Military Budget: $8.3 million for fiscal year ending March 1986; this is 1.8 percent of the total budget. Dollar value converted an exchange rate of 2.22 rands equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 750,165 estimated as of July 1987

Males (ages 15-49): 308,102; 159,600 physically fit

Ethnic Divisions: 67.9 percent Tswana and 32.1 percent Non-Tswana (7.4 percent North Sotho, 6.3 percent Shangaan, 3.2 percent South Ndebele, 3.1 percent Xhosa, 3.0 South Sotho, 3.0 percent Zulu, 1.1 percent Swazi, 0.6 percent Venda, 4.4 percent other)

Literacy: Not available

5. ~~(C)~~ Army:

Personnel Strength: Estimated 600

Combat Units: One infantry battalion at Molopo, probably consisting of three or four other companies, and two company infantry groups at Mankwe Base and Gopane Base. respectively and a special forces unit. The combat units are supported by a maintenance unit, a technical service unit, and a military school.

Major Equipment: Rifles (provided by South Africa), general purpose trucks, wheeled armored personnel carriers

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (C) Air Force: The Air Component created in 1981 was redesignated "Air Wing" in 1982. It consists of three light helicopters and approximately six light utility fixed-wing aircraft.

8. (U) Paramilitary: The Bophuthatswana National Security Unit, operating under the country's Defense Force, was established to relieve police and other security officers. Estimated strength: 200.

9. (U) Key US Officials: None; considered by the US Government an administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa.

10. ~~(C)~~ Foreign Military Presence: A number of South African Defense Force commissioned and noncommissioned officers are seconded to the Defense Force. There are some reports of Israeli advisers assisting the Defense Force, but this is unconfirmed. A total of 41 paratroopers received their wings in April 1986 after training with 1 Parachute Battalion, in Bloemfontein, South Africa.

CISKEI

1. ~~(C)~~ **Political-Military Situation:** On 4 December 1981, Ciskei became the fourth South African homeland to be granted independence. Located south of the Transkei and the city of East London on the Indian Ocean, Ciskei is, along with Transkei, one of two Xhosa homelands. No foreign governments recognize the independence of the South African homelands because they view Pretoria's homelands policy as an attempt to maintain white sovereignty over black enclaves and deprive blacks of South African citizenship. The Ciskei Government of President Lennox Sebe was established in the town of Bisho, just outside the white city of King William's Town, which was to have been the capital of the new country until white protests forced a last-minute change. The boundaries of Ciskei have been gerrymandered to exclude almost all white areas. Pre-independence negotiations between the Sebe government and Pretoria left about 90 percent of all disputed lands under South African control. The new homeland has no resource base to provide employment for the 2.1 million Ciskei Xhosa, of whom fully two-thirds live outside Ciskei. Both industrial areas and viable agricultural lands remain under white control.

~~(C)~~ In April 1985, the Government of Ciskei announced a sweeping tax reform to attract South African and foreign investors through advantageous tax breaks. The initial response was overwhelming, and the plan seems to have been at least partially successful — to the dismay of South African businessmen who see Ciskei's operation as unfair competition. The impact of the reform cannot yet be fully assessed, but it appears that foreign firms want to register their businesses in Ciskei for tax purposes, but are not willing to relocate physical assets.

~~(C)~~ Even though security laws in Ciskei are considered even more stringent than those in the Republic of South Africa, opposition to the authoritarian rule of President Sebe continues to grow. Sebe survived attempted coups in 1983 and 1984 by two of his brothers: General Charles Sebe, former Commander of the Ciskei Security Forces, freed from prison by gunmen in October 1986, and Namba Sebe, former Transportation Minister, who has since taken refuge in neighboring Transkei, and is thus adding fuel to the tense situation between the two homelands. The security of Ciskei was further shaken in January 1985 when President Sebe had a heart attack, followed in March by coronary bypass surgery and again in February 1987, when troops from the Transkei led by white mercenaries attempted to overthrow the government and to kill President Sebe.

~~(C)~~ The Xhosa are the largest ethnic group in South Africa and have longstanding connections to the banned African National Congress (ANC), an anti-South African insurgent organization. Nelson Mandela, imprisoned Chairman of the ANC, is a Xhosa and the Xhosa language is reportedly used among the ANC community in exile. The fear in Pretoria is that the homelands, and especially Transkei and Ciskei, could harbor ANC insurgents.

~~(C)~~ To maintain internal security, the Sebe government created a combined police, security, paramilitary, and defense force for Ciskei in February 1981. This force was trained by the South African Police and Defense Forces, but an incident involving the death of two Ciskeian soldiers resulted in the eviction of the South African Commander of the Ciskei Defense Force and of two of his aides in January 1985, and was closely followed by the removal of all SADF seconded personnel. The size of the Ciskei Security Forces is undetermined, but probably consists of 300 police and over 400 Defense Force personnel.

The capabilities of the new national force, primarily evolved from 141 battalion (SADF), are not believed to be significant but may allow the authorities to control localized civil disturbances.

2. (U) Key Officials:

President: Chief Lennox Leslie Wongama *Sebe*

Minister of Defense: Chief D. N. *Mavuso*

Foreign Minister: B.N. *Pityi*

Commander Ciskei Defense Force: Lt Gen I.N. *Mlandu*

Deputy Commander Ciskei Security Forces: Commandant O.J. *Gqozo*

Commissioner of Police: Lt Gen Edwin *Kutta*

Chief of Security Police: Brig Zebuion *Makuzeni*

3. (U) Military Budget: $4.1 million for fiscal year ending March 1986; this is 1.5 percent of the total budget. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 2.22 rands equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 982,982 estimated as of July 1987

Males (ages 15-19): 153,000; 90,000 physically fit

Ethnic divisions: Unknown, majority of population is Xhosa, estimated less than 1 percent European.

Literacy: Unknown, probably very low for blacks, high for whites.

5. ~~(C)~~ Army: Personnel Strength: 400 (estimated)

Combat Units: One light infantry battalion, 31 members served in the operational area in Namibia for a period of 2 months in 1984; one counter-terrorist squad; one airborne company.

Major Equipment: Rifles (provided by South Africa).

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (U) Air Force: Two Skyvan troop carrier aircraft, one MBB BO-105, one MBB-BK 177A-1, and one British-built Islander. Six Mooney TXI were purchased by Israel for delivery to Ciskei, but their current status is unknown. Some Ciskeians were sent to Israel for training as pilots and mechanics, although the Government of Ciskei denied they were trained to fly military aircraft.

8. (U) Paramilitary: None; however, the Ciskei Security Forces are essentially paramilitary.

9. (U) Key US Officials: None; considered by the US Government as an administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa.

10. ~~(C)~~ Foreign Military Presence: Limited reporting suggests that some South Africans may be assisting the security forces. Other reporting indicates that recent aircraft additions to the Ciskei Air Force may have been accompanied by some in-country Israeli advisory efforts.

TRANSKEI

1. ~~(C)~~ **Political-Military Situation:** The first South African homeland, Transkei, was granted independence on 26 October 1976, but it has not been recognized by any other government or any international organization. It remains heavily dependent on South Africa for administrative and economic support. The Transkei consists of three noncontiguous segments of territory located between Lesotho and the Indian Ocean, south of Durban. It is one of two Xhosa homelands; the Ciskei is the other. Transkei is beset with problems that include: need for national development, internal dissidence, potential assassination attempts, a border dispute with Lesotho, bickering with Cisker reluctance of other countries to recognize its sovereignty, and unrest similar to that in South Africa. The Government has dealt repressively with the opposition, arresting opposition leaders or forcing them into exile. Current unrest resulted in the banning of three political organizations in October 1984, and in the imposition of a state of emergency in July 1985. Curfews and police harassment are still a daily fare.

~~(C)~~ On 24 September 1987, preceeded by reports of widespread corruption within the highest levels of the Transkei government, the Transkei Defense Force (TDF) under General Bantu Holomisa forced the resignations of eight cabinet ministers followed by that of Prime Minister Chief George Matanzima. Although the South African government was careful to distance itself from the internal crisis in Transkei, it clearly supported the change in leadership. Within two weeks of the mass resignations the National Congress of the ruling Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP), in a surprise move, elected Miss Stella Sigcau, the former Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, as the Prime Minister. The new PM — just prior to her appointment — indicated her political orientation when she stated that when the time came Transkei should be reabsorbed into South Africa under a Federal system of government. However, within three months, on 30 December the TDF, under General Holomisa, once again seized power overthrowing the Sigcau administration. This time, however, Holomisa suspended the constitution and formed a military council to rule the country. Sigcau, as Matanzima before her, had been tied to corruption which subsequently led to the Holomisa coup. The general has said he does not want to retain control of the government and will return civilian rule once all corrupt bureaucrats have been purged from the system.

~~(C)~~ Relations with South Africa have followed an irregular course. In 1978, Transkei broke diplomatic relations with Pretoria in an apparent bid for international recognition. To demonstrate its resolve, Transkei abrogated a nonaggression treaty with South Africa, denied overflight by aircraft from that country, and made overtures toward banned South African opposition groups. However, since international recognition has not been forthcoming, and Transkei still depends on South Africa for some two-thirds of its national budget and on the South Africa Defense Force (SADF) for its protection, diplomatic relations have been normalized. Then President Matanzima, however, rejected President Botha's 11 September 1985 announcement in which he stated that residents of black homelands may also retain South African citizenship.

(U) Relations with the other Xhosa homeland, the Ciskei, are not good. Transkei does not recognize the "pseudoindependence" of Xhosaland. Although the Ciskei has urged economic, scientific, social, and industrial cooperation with the Transkei, Mantanzima had steadfastly refused. Allegations that W. M. Xaba, former Ciskei Vice-President, and Namba Sebe, Ciskei

President Lennox Sebe's brother, now exiled in Transkei, were planning to overthrow the Ciskei government aggravated the dispute. The situation was further aggravated when General Charles Sehe, brother of the Ciskei president, jailed in Ciskei for coup plotting, was freed by three white gunmen allegedly tied to the government of Transkei. It culminated in a February 1987 attack on the residence of the Ciskiran President by troops from Transkei led by expatriates. Escalation was tentatively ended when Transkei, Ciskei, and the South African government signed a security pact in Cape Town on 10 April 1987.

~~(S/NF)~~ The army, the Transkei Defense Force (TDF), consists of both Permanent Force (Regular Army) and Citizen Force (reserve) members. At this time, the Permanent Force is in the process of being expanded and made more capable of fulfilling its mission, protection of Transkei's territory from internal and external threats. Until recently, the TDF, under the Command of Lt Col Ronald Reid-Daly, former commander of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, likely played an active role in supporting insurgency against the Government of Lesotho. It is clear that much of the infiltration into Lesotho by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) originated in territory controlled by the TDF, but it is not clear to what extent Reid-Daly and the TDF were influenced or controlled by South Africa. At any rate, Reid Daly and all (20 to 50) white advisors were expelled from Transkei in April 1987. At the same time, Major General Zondeva Mtirara, who had assumed command of the armed forces in 1986, tendered his resignation. During the recent period of estranged relations between South Africa and the Transkei, plans existed for the formation of 9 Citizen Force units with a mobilization potential of 800 men. Only two such units, however, are known to have received military training. Plans for the formation of a Transkei Navy were reportedly motivated by the suspicious activities of unidentified naval craft off Transkei's coast. These plans resulted only in the training of a small number of frogmen by two reportedly former Selous Scouts until their departure from Transkei.

2. (U) Key Officials:

President: Paramount Chief Tutor Nyangé Lizwe Vulindlela *Ndamase*

Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Police:

Chairman of the Military Council: Major-General Bantu *Holomisa*

Military Council Members: LTC Craig Mfotshoyi *Duli*

LTC Paul *Tobia*

Brigadier Elzear Rodney Goba *Keswa*

Major Vakutshiwo Petros *Makhalali*

Defense Force Commander: Brigadier T. T. *Matanzima*

Chief of Staff: Colonel M. M. *Ndeleni*

Commissioner of Police: Rev B. N. *Dlamini*

3. (U) Military Budget: $9.2 million for fiscal year ending March 1986; thish is 1.8 percent of the total budget. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 2.22 rands equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 2,832,345 estimated as of July 1987

Males (ages 15-49): 551,000; 330,000 physically fit

Ethnic divisions: 98.9 percent blacks, 0.6 percent white, 0.5 percent colored (mulatto); Africans belong to Xhosa ethnic group

Literacy: High for whites and coloreds; low for blacks

5. (U) Army:

Personnel Strength: 1,000 (estimated)

Major Units: One infantry battalion, One special forces regiment (company size)

Major Equipment: Equipped with South African rifles, limited infantry support weapons, Land Rovers, and trucks. The TDF is probably in the market for additional items such as mortars, rocket launchers, antitank weapons, and perhaps even armored vehicles. The TDF conducted its first exercise, CROCODILE TEARS II in May 1984. Plans were made to expand the Army by 750 troops in 1986, and to create a second, battalion to be based in Butterworth, Southern Transkei. It is not yet clear if these plans are going to be implemented.

6. (U) Navy:

Personnel Strength: 23 (estimated)

Major Units: None

Major Equipment: None. Attempts have been made to acquire patrol craft from unidentified sources.

7. (U) Air Force: None. South African Air Force (SAAF) supports TDF in training as well as air operations. The planned establishment of an air force wing was announced in May 1986. It has not yet come into being.

8. (U) Paramilitary: Transkei Police Force. Total strength of police force is unknown.

9. (U) Key US Officials: None; considered by the US Government an administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa.

10. ~~(C)~~ Foreign Military Presence: An unknown number of SADF personnel were seconded to the TDF. Former Col Mtirara and another Transkeian recently completed the prestigious Management and Staff course at the SA Army College at Voortrekkerhoogte, and Transkeian police trainees are known to be attending the South African Police Training College at Hammanskaal (BE 1300CA0092; CAT 90110; COORD 25-24-00S 028-16-02E). It is likely that some South African Police have also been seconded to Transkei police forces. TDF officers and noncommissioned officer candidates are trained at the SADF 21 Bn near Lenz (BE 1300-00684; CAT 91160; COORD 26-19-00S 027-49-00E). The status of relations between South Africa and Transkei after the expulsion of white advisers is still unclear.

VENDA

1. ~~(C)~~ Political-Military Situation: Venda, about half the size of Connecticut and strategically located near the borders of Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the northern Transvaal, is a two-part homeland for the Venda-speaking people. It was declared independent by South Africa on 13 September 1979. Venda was the third independent homeland created and is recognized by no government other than South Africa. Venda is the smallest, poorest, and most isolated of the four independent homelands. Although Venda is largely supported by financial aid from the South African Government (SAG), there has been little accomplished to advance the economic or social well being of Vendans. Venda has some agricultural potential, but the lack of available investment in equipment and training of local farmers has retarded agricultural development. There is little mineral wealth in Venda although there are some coal deposits with potential for exploitation. Lack of both infrastructure and access to export harbor facilities will continue to delay development. Venda lacks any industrial development and has few transportation or communication links with South Africa.

~~(C)~~ The Government of Venda under "Life State President" Mphephu has become increasingly repressive. Twice rejected by the voters, Mphephu has remained in power by shrewdly manipulating the traditional chiefs and by judicious use of the small security forces. The July 1984 elections were again contested by the Venda Independence People's Party (VIP), the opposition party, but the ruling party captured all seats in the Venda parliament and a one-party state was declared in late 1985. Dissident elements have been detained. A number of detentions and incidents of torture have been reported. Much publicized deaths in detention of foes of the Mphephu regime have embarrassed the Government. There is some evidence that Mphephu was shaken by the international reaction to detentions and prison deaths. However, it is clear that Mphephu and the increasingly influential General Malaudzi will continue to use the small Venda security forces to control, and in some cases eliminate, opposition to the regime.

(U) A combination of military, police force, and prison service, the Venda National Force (VNF) is responsible for preserving internal security, maintaining law and order, controlling traffic, and performing detention services. The commander of the VNF is a former South African police member who will eventually hold the rank of lieutenant general. Other Vendans serving in the South African Prison Service and the Transvaal Traffic Department were allowed to transfer to the VNF, while new recruits were also sought. South African assistance will be required for some years and is probably covered by agreements with South Africa, such as a nonaggression pact, signed at the time of independence.

(U) The VNF is composed of three branches. A Law and Order Branch is responsible for preventing crime and protecting citizens. Under the purview of this branch are a mobile unit, a traffic unit, the prison service, and probably the counterinsurgency unit. The security branch and the management services branch constitute the remaining elements of the force.

~~(C)~~ In September 1983, Venda announced the creation of a separate Venda Defense Force (VDF). Probably formed from both the counterinsurgency unit of the VNF and former elements of South African Army (SAA) 112 Battalion (a 300 to 500-man force of ethnic Vendans) which had been transferred to Venda in September 1981. The VDF will likely patrol the northern and eastern borders of the country as well as the buffer zones between Venda and the neighboring states of Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The creation of the VDF probably

relegates the VNF to roles most often associated with police. South Africa will continue to train and equip the 112 Battalion. Based on an offer made by President Mphephu in March 1983, Venda military units on occasion have served in Namibia under the operational command of the SAA The VDF Manenu Battalion (the former 112 BN) is now commanded by a seconded SAA officer.

2. (U) Key Officials:

President and Commander in Chief: Paramount Chief Patrick R. *Mphephu*

Vice President: Khosi *Madzivhandila*

Commander Venda National Force: General Tshikhakhisa R. *Malaudzi*

Commander Venda Defence Force: Lt Col G.J. *Cloete* (seconded from the SAA)

3. (U) Military Budget: $4.5 million for fiscal year ending March 1986; this is 3.7 percent of the total budget. Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 2.22 rands equal $1.00.

4. (U) Population: 434,395 estimated as of July 1987 Males (ages 15-49): 84,000; 44,600 physically fit Ethnic division: 90 percent VhaVenda, 7 percent Shangaan, and 3 percent Pedi Literacy: Not available

5. ~~(C)~~ Army: Personnel Strength: 300-500 Major Units: Former SAA 112 Battalion Major Equipment: Small arms provided by South Africa

6. (U) Navy: None

7. (U) Air Force: 1 Alouette III and 1 B.K. 117. Aircraft are piloted by South African personnel.

8. (U) Paramilitary: The VDF is a 600-man paramilitary organization, which is evolving into a national police force with some counterinsurgency capability.

9. (U) Key US Officials: None; considered by the US Government an administrative subunit of the Republic of South Africa.

10. ~~(C)~~ Foreign Military Presence: Some South African Police and South African Defense Force personnel are seconded to the VDF. All officers and most NCOs in the VDF are seconded from SAA. However, Venda junior leader candidates are regularly trained in South Africa, and it is likely that the leadership positions in the battalion will be increasingly filled by Vendans.

SWAZILAND

1. (U) Political-Military Situation: King Sobhuza II, the Lion of Swaziland, was the world's longest reigning monarch and the dominant political figure in Swaziland for 61 years. In 1900, following the Swazi tradition, Sobhuza had been named King by a family council at the age of one. The country was ruled by a regency until Sobhuza assumed the throne in 1921. Independence from the British came in 1968. In April 1973, the King abolished the Constitution and Parliament and affirmed his personal rule. He ruled through a cabinet appointed by him and retained the right to override bills passed by Parliament. Parliament was reopened in January 1979 with some members chosen through indirect election and others nominated by the King.

~~(S)~~ In August 1982, after the death of King Sobhuza II, a power struggle took place within the royal house. There were clashes betweeen proponents of modernization, led by the Prime Minister, Prince Mabandla, and the Queen Regent, and traditionalists, centered in the Liqoqo, the Council of State led by Prince Mfanasibili. In 1983, in a bloodless coup, Prince Soziza deposed Queen Regent Dzeliwe Shongwe, and appointed a new Queen Regent, Ntombi Thwala.

~~(S)~~ In September 1985, the new Queen Regent, supported by the Prime Minister and the majority of the Royal Council, removed Prince Mafanasibili and Dr. George Msibi from the Liqoqo. Police Commissioner Simelane, who had close ties to Mafanasibili, was also removed. Prince Mafanasibili had exercised his authority in a heavyhanded manner, which led to dissension in the Royal Family. As a result of this most recent government reshuffle, Crown Prince Mkhosetive was enthroned in April 1986, and took the name King Mswati III. The decision to install the Prince prior to his 21st birthday was probably made in order to block any comeback attempt by Mafanasibili and some of his supporters who still occupied ministerial positions.

~~(C)~~ Shortly after his accession, King Mswati III undertook to consolidate his power by dissolving the Liqoqo, and making sweeping changes in the government. The King replaced Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini with a former Police Commissioner, Sotsha Dlamini, and appointed several of his relatives to the Cabinet and other positions of power in the government.

~~(C)~~ Swaziland is a member of the Commonwealth, the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). In international affairs, it takes a conservative and anti-Communist stance. Although there is no external threat directed against Swaziland, its territorial integrity is occasionally violated when insurgent or counterinsurgent operations spill over from South Africa and Mozambique. Two such raids took place, in June and December 1986, respectively.

~~(S)~~ South Africa and Mozambique surround this landlocked country, and Swaziland attempts to maintain correct relations with both. In this regard, Swaziland is especially sensitive to refugee and South African insurgent group activities within its boundaries, and has begun patrolling its borders in problem areas. Until early 1984, the African National Congress (ANC), a South African insurgent group, was allowed in Swaziland; however, it was not permitted to conduct military operations and was closely watched by the police. In an effort to curb insurgent activity in its territory, the Swazi Government established

a central processing center to handle South African refugees in order to increase Swazi control over the activities of the refugees and lessen the likelihood of South African incursions. The 16 March 1984 signing of the Nkomati Accord, a nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, caused a large number of ANC guerrillas to flee the latter country and seek sanctuary and safehouses in Swaziland. Previously, ANC activities in Swaziland had been severely restricted due to close cooperation between the Swazi and South African intelligence services and police forces. On 31 March 1984, the Swazi and South African Governments publicly revealed the existence of a 2-year-old security agreement between the two countries that provided for cooperation in countering insurgent activities. This announcement was followed in early April by the expulsion of a number of ANC refugees and guerrillas by the Swazi Government. After a Swazi police officer was killed while trying to arrest several ANC activists, Swazi police and military forces intensified their efforts to rid Swaziland of ANC personnel and conducted several raids against the ANC during which two of the guerrillas were killed. Increased military and police cooperation with South Africa and harsh anti-ANC policies by the Swazi Government resulted in a nearly total ANC withdrawal from Swaziland in 1986. The South Africans conducted a number of small-scale cross-border raids into Swaziland against ANC targets. A December 1986 raid in which two Swiss citizens were kidnapped and two Swazis killed, drew criticism from the Swazi Government itself, and proved to be an embarrassment to the South African Government. However, in 1987 South Africa continued cross-border operations resulting in the deaths of at least six ANC operatives and the abduction of several more. Talks have been held between the two governments concerning the transfer of the South African homeland, Kanewane, to Swazi sovereignty. South Africa has also sought to increase Swazi vigilance against ANC border violations by holding out the possibility of territorial concessions.

~~(C)~~ Sanctions against South Africa and the fear of additional sanctions have accelerated the rate of investment in Swaziland as an alternative to South Africa. Real econommic growth in 1986 is estimated at approximately 9-10 percent. Factors enabling this growth include a 35 percent increase in sugar production, a relatively stable exchange rate in 1986, lower interest rates, and substantial new investment. Such growth is probably not sustainable in 1987. Drought has again plagued the country, and although investor interest in Swaziland remains high, the current round of investments has depleted the supply of readily available factory sites and housing.

~~(S)~~ The official name of the Army is the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force (SDF). The SDF was formed as a volunteer force in 1973. Initially its purpose was to offset the police and as a tool for the monarchy to wield power against the populace should the need arise. After 30 months of training and a growing perception of an increased threat from the then new FRELIMO government in Mozambique, the Royal Swaziland Defense Force was formally established on 25 November 1975. The force is responsible through the Minister of Defense to the King.

~~(C)~~ The mission of the Army is to protect the monarchy and citizens from unrest and terrorism, and to guard the borders to prevent infiltration by the African National Congress (ANC) and other dissidents. Army leadership is provided by middle-aged Swazis who served in noncombatant status in the British Army during World War II, and the typical volunteer is a barely literate rural youth. The Army has no military capabilities beyond its own borders; however, the force is capable of playing a key role in controlling any threat to the monarchy.

2. (U) **Key Government Officials:**

Head of State: King: *Mswati* III (previously known as Prince Mkhosetive)

Queen Mother: Ntombi Thwala

Prime Minister: Prince Sotsh *Dlamini*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: George *Mamba*

Minister of Defense and Youth: Vacant

3. (U) **Key Military Officials:**

Royal Swaziland Defense Force (SDF): Commander, Brig Gen Fonono *Dube*

Deputy Commander: Col Ndambi David *Dlamini*

Military Intelligence, Chief: Lt Col Samketi Z. *Dlamini*

Police: Commissioner, Sandile *Mdziniso*

4. ~~(C)~~ **Military Budget:** 17.6 million for fiscal year ending March 1989; this is 9.7 percent of the central government budget. No service allocations are available. Dollar values converted at an exchange rate of 2.04 emalangeni equals $1.00.

5. (U) **Population:** 735,302 as of 1988

Males (age 15-49): 151,000; physically fit: 87,000

Ethnic divisions: 96 percent African, 3 percent European, 1 percent mulatto

Literacy: 65 percent

6. ~~(C)~~ **Army:**

Personnel Strength: 2,600 men Reserve: None

Major Units: The Umbutfo SDF is organized into a 438-man Royal Guard unit; four regular infantry units called battalions; one training battalion; one mortar platoon; one parachute platoon; and an Air Wing. There are no current authorized strength tables. A platoon can consist of 20 to 50 men. Consequently battalion strengths and structures vary. The infantry battalions are all assigned to remote areas away from population centers and normally have half of their platoons on border duty and half in reserve (though most of the reserve group are generally on leave). Most training is conducted under the auspices of the British Army team in-country, but some training is conducted abroad in the UK, South Africa, and Kenya. The parachute platoon was trained at Bloemfontein, South Africa.

Major Equipment: Assorted 7.62-mm rifles and machineguns (mainly FN); AR-18 5.56-mm rifles; machine pistols; six 81-mm, fifteen 60-mm, and six 120-mm mortars; eighteen 84-mm Carl Gustav antitank weapons; four 105-mm pack howitzers (for ceremonial functions); and three Shoreland armored cars. Transport includes 3/4-ton Land Rovers and a variety of 4-ton and 7-ton West German cargo trucks. Most weapons were supplied by Great Britain.

7. (U) **Navy:** None.

8. ~~(S)~~ **Air Force:** The Air Wing of the SDF is based at Matsapa Airfield and equipped with two IAI-201 Arava light STOL transports. These aircraft are leased from Israel. One has no armaments and is used to support the civil government. The other has ordnance racks and a pilot's lateral gunsight. Israel has reportedly agreed to sell Swaziland machinegun ammunition and rocket launchers for the two Arava aircraft. Four pilots and seven

maintenance personnel have been trained in Israel. South African instructors are training Air Wing personnel in subjects such as air operations and aircraft maintenance. Currently, three South African trained pilots are instrument rated. In November 1986, eight pilots were being trained by a South African contractor but only four were expected to graduate. The contractor provided two instructor pilots, two mechanics, and an aircraft.

9. Paramilitary Police:

~~(C)~~ The Royal Swaziland Police Force has a strength of about 1,600 men organized into 4 territorial districts. This figure includes a police mobile unit of about 135 men that functions as a quick-reaction force for paramilitary police operations. In addition, the police provide a mobile reserve of three platoons with the responsibility of guarding royal residences and members of royalty in transit.

10. (U) Key US Officials:

Chief of Mission: (Mbabane) Ambassador Harvey F. Nelson, Jr.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

11. ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military Presence:

United Kingdom: 3-man Army team (one major and two warrant officers).

Republic of South Africa: A six-man South African Defense Force training team is providing SDF personnel training in weapons and vehicle repair and maintenance, training, intelligence, and anti-infiltration techniques. South Africa also provides personnel to assist in the operation of the aircraft in the Air Wing.

SWAZILAND

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Majimba Mil Bse Bn HQ Barracks	1299-00325	91160	26-12-00S	031-20-00E
Manzini National Army HQ	1299-00258	91010	26-29-00S	031-22-00E
Matsapa Airfield Northwest	1299-08910	80111	26-27-23S	031-13-44E
Mbabane Ministry of Defense, Royal Court of Swaziland	1299-00259	89300	26-31-00S	031-17-00E
Mliba Trng Bse, BN HQ and Barracks	1299-00254	91160	26-15-00S	031-35-00E
Nsoko Mil Bse, Bn HQ and Barracks	1299-00257	91160	27-02-00S	031-57-00E
Siteki Mil Bse, Bn HQ and Barracks	1299-00255	91160	26-27-00S	031-57-00E

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ZAIRE

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ZAIRE

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Marshal *Mobutu* Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga

Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security: Lt Gen *Likulia* Bolongo

First State Commissioner: (Prime Minister) *Kengo* Wa Dondo

State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation: *Nguz* a Karl-i-Bond

Special Presidential Adviser on National Security: *Nkema* Liloo

b. Type and Stability of Government

~~(C)~~ The Republic of Zaire (formerly the Democratic Republic of the Congo) has been independent since June 1960. With military backing, then Lt Gen Mobutu assumed the Presidency in November 1965 and continues to rule essentially by decree and astute manipulation of key political and military figures who accede to his desires. The parliamentary and presidential election in 1970 unanimously approved the Mobutu regime and the single political party, the Movement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), of which all citizens are considered members. Constitutional amendments adopted in 1974 officially subordinated the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government to the MPR. Under this structure, the president of the MPR automatically became President of the Republic. Mobutu, as President Founder, is exempt from most of the checks placed on the presidency by the constitution. President Mobutu, running unopposed, was reelected in August 1984 for a third 7-year term.

~~(C)~~ From 1965 to 1974, President Mobutu provided Zaire a degree of stability that contrasted strongly with the chaos that followed independence. Economic difficulties since 1974 and government insensitivity to social priorities have, at times, contributed to popular discontent with the regime. Zaire continues to experience economic problems provoked by low export prices for minerals, inflation, poor management, and a high debt burden. The economic crisis, though currently somewhat assuaged by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, remains exacerbated by widespread corruption and a decaying infrastructure. Living standards have deteriorated throughout the country since independence, and periodic outbursts of social discontent have occurred. Shaba I (1977) and Shaba II (1978) presented the greatest threat to the stability of the Mobutu regime. These invasions by ex-Katangan gendarmes were repelled only with foreign assistance. While these and other minor disturbances most notably the rebel raids on the eastern Shaba town of Moba in 1984 and 1985 were suppressed, discontent lingers throughout Zaire.

~~(C)~~ Dissident leaders abroad have attempted unsuccessfully to galvanize international condemnation of President Mobutu's policies. Others, most prominently Nguz Karl I Bond, have returned to Zaire under one of President Mobutu's occasional amnesties. As late as 1984, Nguz, a former state commissioner for foreign affairs, was calling for a Shaba III or a Kinshasa I to destroy Mobutu's government. Nguz is currently serving as Zaire's Ambassador to the US.

~~(C)~~ Mobutu's political dexterity is evidenced by his ability periodically to convince Western states that earnest reforms in Zaire are underway. Amnesties for exiles and internal dissidents are presented to the international community as evidence of political moderation and tolerance. In 1985, 13 former members of the Zairian legislature were imprisoned by Mobutu after they coauthored a letter of complaint against the government and established a rival political party, the Union for Democratic and Social Progress (UDPS). After spending a year in jail, they were given amnesty by Mobutu on the proviso that they stay out of politics. Recently, several UDPS members have been brought into the government with the reported understanding that some form of political opposition would be permitted. It appears, however, that Mobutu intends to attempt to coopt them by incorporating them into the MPR.

~~(C)~~ Besides reports of opposition movements abroad led by individuals such as Nathaneal Mbumba, former leader of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), and now head of the Coalition for National Unity (CUN); Laurent Kabila, leader of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), and Antoine Kibungu,leader of the Congolese Liberation Party (PLC), there have been reports that Libya is sponsoring dissident activities with various types of support. Qadhafi has made no secret of his hatred for President Mobutu, because of his close ties to the west and the US, and there are persistent fears he may attempt to have Mobutu assassinated. With heightened political opposition and stagnant economic conditions, Mobutu has become increasingly nervous and accusatory towards any domestic or international element that he perceives to be a threat to the stability of his government.

~~(C)~~ In the last several years, Mobutu has both strengthened his position domestically (despite minor flurries of social discontent) and projected an enhanced regional image. He has established himself as a bulwark against Libyan adventurism in Chad, by providing Zairian troops and supplies when needed since 1983. Through this and other initiatives, Mobutu has reaffirmed his commitment to back Western interests in Africa and in return has succeeded in getting his country's major foreign backers — Belgium, France, Israel, United States, West Germany, the People's Republic of China, and Egypt — to help improve the capabilities of the Zairian Armed Forces.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ Among the numerous dissident organizations opposed to the current regime, only a handful are considered worthy of attention. These are the FLNC, the PRP, the PLC. Mobutu's present concerns with these organizations are that their activities could embarrass him, either in Zaire or among his Western supporters. Thus far, Mobutu has been able to limit the activities of the opposition in Zaire through a very effective internal security service, the Agency for National Documentation (AND).

~~(S/NF)~~ In March 1977 and May 1978, the FLNC, founded by ex-Katangan gendarmes who had fled into Angola and Zambia during the 1960s, invaded Shaba Province in an attempt to destabilize the Mobutu regime. The invasions did not galvanize opposition in the province, but did illuminate the discontent that for years had festered there. It was the presence of an inter-African force (IAF) of about 2,500 troops from Morocco, Senegal, Togo, Gabon, and Ivory Coast (from the summer of 1978 through the fall of 1979) that inhibited organized opposition and prevented FAZ depredations that otherwise could have provoked violent popular reactions. The FLNC continues to exist in Angola and Zambia. Since the FLNC no longer claims secessionist goals, but rather complete overthrow of the Mobutu regime, it continues to pose some threat.

~~(S/NF)~~ The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) operates in eastern Zaire from bases in Tanzania and is a less significant threat than the FLNC. This group gained notoriety in 1975

by kidnaping three US students from a research station in Tanzania. While PRP plans to disrupt the government periodically surface, such as the Moba raids in 1984 and 1985, their strength appears to have eroded somewhat. While the possibility of low-level insurgent activity near Lake Tanganyika continues, it is probably not enough to pose a threat to government forces in 1988.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Congolese Liberation Party (PLC) has recently moved its base of operations from Tanzania to Uganda. It is supported by Libya and its operations consist of small-scale attacks on isolated villages and units in the Ruwenzori Massif, on the Zaire Uganda border. Although unable to effectively control or occupy Zairian territory, the PLC has forced Zaire to deploy units in the region and has complicated relations between Zaire and Uganda.

d. External Threat

~~(S/NF)~~ President Mobutu characterizes the external threat as a "Red Belt" of Radical states (Congo, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, and Sudan and until recently, Burundi), surrounding Zaire and supported by the Soviet Union and Libya. At present, he is concerned primarily with supposed support for dissidents by these countries. Mobutu's concerns are exacerbated by the large Cuban presence in Angola and Congo, and possible Cuban presence in Burundi, as well as the Soviet presence in Angola, Congo, Burundi and Zambia. Above all, Mobutu is worried about Libyan designs on Sub-Saharan Africa, especially through assistance to Zairian dissident groups. Only Angola poses a substantive threat of major military attack. Rapprochement with Angola has reduced this threat, although reports of FLNC training inside Angola and invasion threats recur as possible retaliation for UNITA support in Zaire. Consequently, mutual suspicion between Kinshasa and Luanda persists. The FLNC has reportedly decided to launch small-scale terrorist type operations in the future as opposed to the conventional attacks of 1977 and 1978. However, there have been no cross-border FLNC operations in recent years. Mobutu's continued efforts to maintain correct relations with Angola, Congo, and Zambia in particular have held Zaire's external threat at bay. Nevertheless, he is not hesitant to address all of these potential trouble spots when seeking to reinforce his frequent bids for additional western materiel and financial support.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S)~~ Despite the appearance of at least one tract in mid-1980 with the letterhead *Parti Communist Zairois*, there is no known effective communist party in Zaire. The influence of foreign communist states was negligible until 1973, when in order to diversify sources of economic and military assistance and reduce dependency on the west, Mobutu made overtures to the PRC. The PRC established relations with Zaire in early 1973 and has provided agricultural and medical advisers, military training, and equipment (ships, artillery, and tanks) for the FAZ. As a result of the Shaba invasions, the Chinese again provided ships, artillery, tanks and naval and armor advisers to support Mobutu against their Soviet and Cuban rivals in Angola and Congo.

~~(S)~~ In March 1979, a PRC team arrived to train a commando brigade at Kisangani. By the end of 1984 this training had been completed but the Chinese remain as advisers. Chinese are also at Boma (to repair and maintain the Shanghai patrol boats), at Mbanza Ngungu (to repair the armored vehicles) and at Kisangani with the 41st Brigade.

~~(S)~~ North Korean military assistance began in early 1975 and included equipment and training for a Zairian army division, but by April 1976, the North Korean training mission had become suspect of instilling Zairian troops with communist ideology and was asked

to leave Zaire. It became evident in 1975, that events in Angola had dampened Mobutu's enthusiasm for communist aid, and his attention returned to Western sources.

~~(S)~~ Relations with the Soviet Union were correct though distant until the March 1977 Angola-sponsored invasion by the FLNC. Mobutu accused Cuba and the Soviet Union of supporting this invasion as well as the one in 1978. Relations with the USSR and Cuba have since normalized. Despite recent overtures on the part of the Soviet Union, meaningful negotiations on economic issues appear to be stalled.

f. Economic Factors

~~(S)~~ Zaire is one of the largest and most populous countries in Africa. It is endowed with abundant mineral resources (copper, cobalt, diamonds, and gold) and has no shortage of arable land. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Zaire experienced steadily declining terms of trade as the price of its principal export, copper, tumbled. This drastic decline in real export prices, coupled with lax government management, resulted in mounting balance of payments and government deficits, high inflation, and the accumulation of a massive external debt burden (50 percent of government revenue). In an attempt to reverse this trend, the Government of Zaire (GOZ), implemented a stabilization program in collaboration with the IMF and World Bank in January 1983. This program succeeded in reducing government deficits, improving management in both the government and parastatals (particularly in mining and transportation), and establishing foreign exchange rates by supply and demand. These measures were designed to establish the basis for renewed growth, reduce inflation, and provide a return to balance of payments equilibrium. The situation in Zaire continued to worsen in 1986, however, and new requirements were placed on the GOZ in order for it to receive IMF assistance. Debt rescheduling allocated 30 percent of the Zairian budget towards debt repayment. The zaire continues to float and has further depreciated (118 Zaires equal $1 as of June 1987, compared to 55 zaires equal $1 in June 1986.) Inflation is predicted to exceed 40 percent in 1987.

~~(S/NF)~~ Zaire does not produce military equipment other than some quartermaster items and uniforms. Zaire has procured most of its military equipment from Western sources, principally France and the US, and to a lesser extent, Belgium, Israel, and Italy since 1974, Zaire has also received military aid from North Korea and China. The major supplier of military equipment has been France, with equipment deliveries valued at $244.9 million or 45 percent of all assistance provided to Zaire. French equipment includes fighter-trainer and transport aircraft, helicopters, river patrol boats, APCs, mortars, small arms, and radios. About half of this was delivered prior to 1976. Following France is Belgium, with deliveries valued at $73.1 million; China $66.7 million; Italy $62.6 million; W. Germany $27.4 million; Israel $22.9 million; and Egypt $8.1 million. The PRC has made a significant contribution to Zaire by providing an $8 million grant aid package that included small arms, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, and instructional materials in support of their training program at Kisangani, repair of Shanghai patrol boats, and repair of T-59 and T-62 tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade. Equipment shipments from the PRC in 1982 included spare parts for motor gunboats, tanks, recoilless rifles, field artillery, ADA, small arms, and trucks. Aircraft have come mainly from Canada, France, and Italy and include jet fighters, transports, helicopters, and trainer aircraft.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(S/NF)~~ Zaire is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and a regular participant in Third World forums such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). Zaire also belongs to a number of regional organizations, including the Conference of Nilotic States (UNDUGU), the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), and the

tripartite conference of Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire. Mobutu has also attempted to play a key role as spokesperson and mediator for the West with the Front Line States (FLS).

~~(S/NF)~~ Both before and after Angola's independence, Mobutu supported insurgent groups in Angola, particularly the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave Cabinda (FLEC), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In turn, Angolan leaders, first Dr. Neto then Jose Eduardo dos Santos, used the Angolan-based FLNC in their campaign against UNITA. In 1978, however, a rapprochement was effected between the two states and tensions were reduced. Relations continued to improve under the new Angolan regime of dos Santos, and formal diplomatic relations were established in 1980. Zaire continues, however, to have border problems with Angola, who has allowed the FLNC to establish base camps and training sites close to the border with Zaire. Additionally, the Angolan army frequently has crossed the border into Zaire, usually on the heels of UNITA, and has been involved in overflights of various kinds. While the relationship between Angola and Zaire remains correct, it continues to show periodic signs of strain. Angola has raised questions concerning aid to UNITA through Kamina Air Base, and continues to monitor Kamina as a potential staging area for Western powers. It will likely take several years of patient negotiations between the three countries to settle their differences.

~~(S/NF)~~ Zaire's military alignment is affected also by the fact that it has received technical military assistance from several Western countries the ground forces from Belgium, France, Israel, Egypt, West Germany, and the US; the air forces from France, Italy, and the US; and communications and transportation from the US and West Germany. The departure of the North Korean military mission from Zaire in 1976 placed the PRC as the sole communist military supporter of Zaire.

h. (U) Key US Officials (all located in Kinshasa)

Chief of Mission: Ambassador William C. Harrop

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2. MILITARY,GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Minister of State for National Defense and Territorial Security: Gen *Singa* Boyenge Mosambay

Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security: Lt Gen *Likulia* Bolongo

Armed Forces:

Chief of Staff: ADM (4 Stars) *Lomponda* Wa Botende

Deputy Chief of Staff: Maj Gen *Dikuta* Ebilanga Kaming

Army:

Chief of Staff: Lt Gen *Somao* Gbode Mabele

Deputy Chief of Staff: Col *Engona* Kamba

Navy:

Chief of Staff: Capt *Liwanga* Mata Nyamunyobo

Deputy Chief of Staff: CDR *Uzele* Torachi

Air Force:

Chief of Staff: Lt Gen *Kikunda* Ombala

Deputy Chief of Staff: Col *Mongengo* Mangbongo

Military Regions:

First Military Region Commander: Brig Gen *Bakambala* Hekpyowali

Second Military Region Commander: Col *Engona* Kamba

Third Military Region Commander: Brig Gen *Mulumba* a Mbote

Fourth Military Region Commander: Brig Gen *Mosala* Mondjia Ndongo

Fifth Military Region Commander: Brig Gen *Bosange* Bompese Bakol

Sixth Military Region Commander: Col *Lebuabanga* Kanayi

Seventh Military Region Commander: Col *Ipoma* Bansheli

Eighth Military Region Commander: Brig Gen *Shabani* Boole

Military Intelligence and Action Service (SARM): Director, Brig Gen *Mahele* Lieko Bokungo

National Gendarmerie: Chief of Staff, Brig Gen *Manzembe* Ma Ebanga

Presidential Division (DSP): Chief of Staff, Brig Gen *Nzimbi* Ngbale Kongo WaBasa

Civil Guard: President General, *Baramoto* Kpama Kata

Civil Guard: Secretary-General: LTC *Ngimbe*

b. Position of the Armed Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ The President controls the Zairian Armed Forces (*Forces Armies Zairoises* — FAZ) through the Department of National Defense and Territorial Security. The FAZ includes five services (Army, Navy, Air Force, National Gendarmerie Civil Guard and the Logistics Corps). The Gendarmerie is the largest service, but the Army, by virtue of its resources, is the predominant force. Additionally, a nascent Civil Guard when fully formed will assume certain responsibilities for border control and for countering drug trafficking.

~~(S/NF)~~ Because of ongoing reorganizations, ideological reorientations, personnel flux, and the disastrous performance of the Army in the Angolan conflict and the Shaba invasions, the attitudes, loyalty, and overall competence of the military are uncertain. Since independence, there have been pockets of dissatisfaction within the military. Causes of discontent have included low and sporadic pay, lack of promotions, tribal favoritism, lack of equipment, insufficient food, and poor equipment acquisition and management policies. Mobutu has, however, been able to keep a lid on expressions of this discontent through the use of assignment policies that deny senior commanders the opportunity to form an independent power base. Additionally, Mobutu is supreme commander of the FAZ and all authority, both in theory and practice, originates with him. This, coupled with the traditional Zairian respect for authority, as well as the legitimacy enjoyed by Mobutu, contributes to ensuring that the military, as an institution, remains loyal.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The capabilities of the FAZ will continue to be hindered by weak leadership, low and irregular pay, lack of discipline, the low educational level of its members, a shortage of skilled technicians, tribal favoritism, unpopularity with civilians, heavy reliance on foreign assistance for materiel and training, and a poor logistic support capability. The personnel strength in the Army has begun to increase slightly with the formation of the 32d Airborne Brigade, the 22d Brigade, and new recruitment for the Special Presidential Division. Current Armed Forces strength is estimated to be approximately 53,000; authorized strength is estimated at 95,000. Navy strength and Air Force strength have remained essentially static for the last several years.

~~(S/NF)~~ The upgrading of communications and transport capabilities and the development of quick-reaction forces, such as the 31st and 32d Airborne Brigades and the Special Presidential Division (DSP), have been priority items in the Zairian military expansion program. The influence of foreign advisers at select Zairian army units has had some beneficial effect on the capabilities and discipline of these units. Military exercises such as Mbote '87 have indicated that some noticeable improvements in the FAZ have been made, although they continue to be hindered by a poor logistics system, poor communications, and weak indigenous leadership. Without direct foreign military advisory assistance, the logistics system doesn't operate effectively. Cohesiveness and interoperability of the FAZ in general is unlikely to occur unless significant political, social, and economic changes occur. Since these changes are not likely to take place in the near future, Zaire will continue to be plagued with territorial security problems along most of its frontiers.

~~(S/NF)~~ Significant military developments have occurred the last five years. In April 1982, the Israeli Military Mission officially opened. The DSP recruited 800 personnel, and the Israelis provided basic and advanced training. The DSP is today the finest military unit in Zaire and arguably one of the most professional in Africa. During the past two years, the Israelis have trained over 5,000 men for the DSP. In the DSP, the Presidential Security battalion serves as innermost security to President Mobutu, while three other battalions (with two additional battalions planned for 1988 under a new reorganization) will represent total presidential security. In early 1984, Israeli instructors began the reorganization of the Shaba-based Kamanyola Division. Though funding has been insufficient to train all three of the division's brigades, the 14th Brigade was successfully equipped and trained in 1985. In 1987, the Israelis completed training of the independent 22d Brigade, and the French completed training of the first battalion of the 32d Airborne Brigade; both units are to be stationed at Kamina.

~~(S/NF)~~ Perhaps as important as any military event in the recent past was the appointment of Lt Gen Likulia Bolongo as the current Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security. Likulia is highly respected and his appointment is a departure from President Mobutu's usual practice of cronyism.

d. ~~(C)~~ Military Budget: Last military budget figures reported were for FY 1986. For that year,defense expenditures were $41.97 million. This figure is based on the relatively stable exchange rate at that time (55 zaires equal $1).

e. (U) Population: 34.52 million (1986 World Bank) Ethnic divisions: Between 200 and 250 African ethnic groups, the majority (80 percent) are Bantu speaking; the four largest tribes (Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and Mangbetu-Azande) make up about 45 percent of the population.

Literacy: General adult literacy estimated at 55 percent, literacy in French at 15 percent.

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ Territorial defense and internal security of Zaire and the 35-mile coastline.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The Zairian Army is capable of limited defensive operations against unsupported small-scale attacks by neighboring African armies, poorly trained and equipped insurgent groups, and demonstrators. Without substantial foreign advisory and logistic assistance, the army would be hard pressed to sustain operations for longer than 3-5 days against a multi-battalion force.

~~(S/NF)~~ Three of the Army's major weaknesses are lack of communications capabilities, lack of transport for its units, and an inability to support units after deployment. Continuing weaknesses include poor leadership, low or infrequent pay, lack of discipline, low education levels, shortages of skilled technicians, tribal favoritism, unpopularity with civilians, and corruption. Temporary weaknesses include organizational confusion engendered by a drawn-out reorganization program and a confused and fluctuating military assistance program. The Army relies heavily on outside assistance for materiel and training.

~~(C)~~ Priorities for improving the capabilities of the army include upgrading communications and transportation assets and developing quick-reaction forces that can be airlifted to any area in Zaire. The presence of foreign advisers in selected units continues to have a beneficial impact on the capabilities and discipline of those units.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ The current strength of army is estimated to be 22,350.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ Army headquarters is composed of a Chief of General Staff, a general staff, special staff directories, and support units. The Chief of Staff is responsible to the Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security, and to the Supreme Commander. Subordinate to Army headquarters are three military regions. The first Military Region is headquartered at Lubumbashi and encompasses the administrative regions of Shaba, Kasai-Occidental, Kasai-Oriental, and Kivu. The second Military Region is headquartered at Kinshasa and controls the administrative regions of Kinshasa, Bas-Zaire, and Bandundu. The third Military Region has its headquarters at Kisangani and controls the administrative regions of Equateur and Haut-Zaire.

~~(S/NF)~~ The army has been involved in a recruitment drive since the summer of 1985. However, most recruiting has been done on an ad hoc basis to form new units. Existing units continue to lose personnel due to desertions, retirements, and deaths. Because of this, the recruitment has not produced a net gain towards the goal of 100,000 men set by Mobutu.

~~(C)~~ The army deployed outside Zaire in 1981 as a part of the OAU's peacekeeping forces in Chad. The battalion deployed was marked by desertions and low morale, caused by poor logistic support, but managed to accomplish its goal of buttressing N'djamena against possible attacks. Zairian troops which deployed to Chad again in 1983 and 1984 suffered from inadequate food supplies and medical provisions.

(b) ~~*(S/NF)*~~ *Ground Units*

Major Tactical Units (est)	Strength per Unit Authorized	Actual
1 Infantry Division (3 brigades)	10,000 (est)	4,100
3 Infantry Brigades		
13th (3 battalions)	2,611	1,625
21st (3 battalions)	2,611	1,725
22d (3 battalions)	2,611	2,500
2 Airborne Brigades		
31st (3 combat battalions)	4,200 (est)	3,800
32d (1 battalion)	1,000 (est)	900
1 Armored Brigade (3 battalions: 1 tank, 1 artillery, 1 mechanized infantry)	2,500	1,300
1 Commando Brigade (3 infantry battalions)	3,400	1,200
1 Special Division (1 para bde, 1 presidential bde and 1 army rgt)	7,000	5,200

(c) Deployment

~~(S/NF)~~ The Army Headquarters and logistics base, the 31st Airborne Brigade, and the DSP are located in Kinshasa. The 1st Armored Brigade is located at Mbanza-Ngungu, approximately 100 miles southwest from the capital. The Kamanyola Division has its operational headquarters in Kolwezi and tactical responsibility for the area from Kolwezi to Kananga to Tshikapa. The 21st Infantry Brigade is headquartered at Lubumbashi and has responsibility for southeastern Shaba. The 13th Infantry Brigade is headquartered in Kalemie and has tactical responsibility along Lake Tanganyika. The newly formed 22d Brigade is headquartered at Kamina as is the newly formed 32d Airborne Brigade.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S/NF)~~ Zaire has acquired its military equipment from the US, Egypt, Italy, West Germany, France, Israel, the UK, Belgium, North Korea, and the PRC. Belgium has furnished infantry weapons, trucks, armored cars, and ammunition. The US has provided communications equipment, parachutes, transports and trainer aircraft, vehicles, and some small arms and ammunition. Egypt has supplied some artillery equipment. France has supplied armored cars, ENTAC AT missiles, Mirage aircraft, and helicopters. Israel, which concentrated its efforts in the field of airborne equipment and some quartermaster items in the early 1970s, has provided some infantry items to the DSP. In 1983 and 1984, Israel delivered domestically produced weapons as well as some captured from PLO terrorists. Israel agreed to grant Zaire $3 million of Israeli-produced military goods on the proviso that Zaire purchase a sizeable amount of Israeli equipment at a later date. Equipment was used to outfit the DSP and to upgrade the Kamanyola Division. Further diversifying the already motley assortment of equipment in the inventory, Zaire took delivery in 1975 of both North Korean and PRC infantry equipment, tanks, and artillery.

~~(S/NF)~~ Maintenance of equipment is poor. Because of the difficulty in obtaining spare

parts in the interior of the country, the deadline rate for some units is as high as 100 percent, and 50-75 percent is not uncommon. Given the shortage of skilled technicians, the introduction of foreign-supplied equipment has only further complicated equipment maintenance by aggravating spare parts supply and distribution problems.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Armor:	Mdm tk, Type 59	PRC	24
	Lt tk, Type 62	PRC	73
	Armd car, Panhard	FR	271
	APC, M-113	US	12
Artillery:	130-mm gun	KN	18
	122-mm gun	KN	12
	122-mm how	KN	24
	106-mm gun	KN	6
	85-mm gun	KN	29
	122-mm rkt lchr	KN	12
	107-mm rkt lchr	KN	22
	83-mm rkt lchr	BE,UK	150
	40-mm rkt lchr, Type 1956	PRC	145
Air Defense Artillery:	37-mm AD gun, Twin, Type 1956	PRC	40
	20-mm AD gun, Twin	PRC	24
	20-mm AD gun, Bofors and Oerlikon	BE	20
	14.5-mm AD hvy MG, Quad ZPU-4	KN	23
	12.7-mm AD MG, Type 1954	PRC	30
Antitank Weapons:	ATGM, SNAPPER (Mtd on UAZ-69)	KN	18
	ATGM, ENTAC	FR	Unk
	106-mm Rclr	BE	16
	83-mm Blindecide	BE	Unk
	82-mm Rclr	KN	27
	75-mm Rclr	BE	100
	75-mm Rclr	CH	42
Infantry Weapons:	Mortar, 120-mm	CH	36
	4.2-in mortar	BE,FR,US	9
	2-in mortar	UK	Unk
	82-mm mortar	KN	54
	81-mm mortar	BE,FR,US	Unk
	60-mm mortar	BE,FR,US	298
	60-mm mortar, Type 1963	CH	36
	52-mm mortar	Unk	25
	Flmthr, Ptbl, Type 1965	CH	20
	MG, HB, .50 Cal	BE	8
	MG, .30 Cal	Unk	Unk
	MG, 7.62-mm, Type 1956	CH	1,000
	SMG, .45 Thompson	US	187
	SMG, 9-mm, Uzi	IS	804

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	Country of Origin	Total Inventory
SMG, 9-mm, Sten	UK	10
SMG, 9-mm, Vigneron	BE	825
RFL, 7.62-mm, Type 1956	CH	2,500
RFL, 7.62-mm (NATO),FN	BE	11,165
RFL, 5.56-mm, Ma-a16	US	5,500
RFL, 5.5-mm Galil	IS	600
Pstl, 9-mm	BE,FR	Unk
Pstl, .45 Colt	US	Unk
Pstl, 9-mm Type 59	CH	3,000
Pstl, 7.62-mm	CH,KN	200
Pstl, .38 Cal, Smith & Wesson	US	200

(6) Logistics

~~(S/NF)~~ Support for the FAZ is the responsibility of the Corps Logistique (CORLOG), which is headquartered in Kinshasa. CORLOG Headquarters is considered to be a hierarchical equivalent of the other service headquarters. The logistic organization is based on Belgian doctrine with some US influence. Subordinate to CORLOG Headquarters in Kinshasa is a Logistic Group consisting of a materiel battalion, a maintenance battalion, a supply battalion, a transportation battalion, and an ordnance battalion. Territorial depots with organic support companies exist at Kamina, Kisangani,and Kitona. These depots were to be augmented by six forward logistic bases but there is currently only one deployed at Lumbumbashi. The remaining depots are incapable of providing any logistic service support.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Belgians maintained a large presence in CORLOG until early 1986 when they withdrew in favor of concentrating on instruction; CORLOG has since deteriorated to the point that it has been called a "disaster" by one Western military source.

~~(S/NF)~~ The most recently established element of CORLOG is the Logistic School in Kinshasa, opened in the fall of 1982. Staffed by 5 Belgians, it conducts basic-level training for officers; advanced training is obtained overseas. The future of FAZ logistics system appears dim; its problems are numerous, and as long as the system remains in Zairian hands it is not likely to improve.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ A major portion of the army is deployed in the Shaba region along the southern boundary with Angola and Zambia. The second major concentration of army units is located in the western portion of the country, in and around the Kinshasa area, while the fewest army units are located in the northeastern and northwestern regions of Zaire. Surface lines of communication are not well suited for movement and supply of these military forces. The road network is sparse and undeveloped, consisting predominantly of unsurfaced roads and trails in fair to poor condition. To supplement the inadequate highway system, the combined waterway-rail system is used, but this mode of transport is slow and cumbersome. Coupled with other logistic factors such as the adverse effects of the seasonal rains, the difficult terrain, and the limited areas where cross-country movement could be used as an alternative to route movement, logistic support in Zaire is inadequate.

~~(C)~~ Other logistic factors considered detrimental to sound planning of military operations in Zaire include inadequate communication capabilities, improper maintenance procedures, and shortage of skilled personnel. Together, they portray an unacceptable supply and distribution system. Although maintenance facilities, where they exist, are generally well-equipped, maintenance is hindered by shortage of spare parts and skilled personnel,

corruption, apathetic management, and scarcity of funds. Excessive deadline rates persist for all types of military equipment. To compensate for the shortage of transportation assets, operational equipment is not properly used. Overloading of vehicles is common, and principles of preventive maintenance are neither understood, nor practiced. Chronic shortages of POL exacerbate the transportation problems and cause the drawing down of strategic stocks of fuel normally reserved for military operations when internal security is threatened.

~~(C)~~ Because of Zaire's large land area and sparse road and rail networks, air transport is critical to logistic operations. However, the air transport capability is inadequate due to high cost and extremely poor operational readiness rates of Zairian transport aircraft. Consequently, Belgium has routinely augmented air transport operations with its C-130s in order to avoid a total collapse of the distribution system. Foreign advisers and materiel assistance remain indispensable for maintaining even the current low level of support capabilities.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(C)~~ Recruitment for the army in the past has been by voluntary enlistment; however, personnel policies have become increasingly arbitrary. The President has the power to conscript personnel. Soldiers are enlisted for an initial term of 4 years at the end of which they may be discharged or may reenlist for successive 3-year terms.

(8) Training

~~(S/NF/NC/WN)~~ Zairian military schools are operated under the supervision of the Defense Department's Directorate of Organization and Instruction (for the Senior Military Training Center (Groupment Des Ecoles Superieurs Militaires, GESM)), and Army Headquarters (for all other schools). Officer training for all forces is provided largely in-country by the GESM (Belgian commanders and Belgian and Zairian instructors), which is composed of four elements: the Command and Staff College (ECEM), Kinshasa; the Officers' Academy (EFO), Kananga; and the Military Language Institute (IMLA), Kinshasa (English training with American funds), and the School for Administrative officers (EAOA). The Command and Staff College and the Officers' Academy were ordered closed by Mobutu in September 1987 in the aftermath of a scandal involving Belgian complicity in a private arms deal with the Chief of Staff of the Army.

~~(C)~~ The Army operates 13 technical schools. The Basic Training Center (CIR), Infantry and Artillery Training Center (CEKI), and Officer Candidate School (CFCO) are located at Kitona. The Airborne Training Center (CETA), Logistics School (ELOG), Music School (EMUS), Physical and Sports School (EPS), and the Administration School (EAOA) are located at Kinshasa. The Commando Training Center (CECDO) is located at Kota-Koli. The Armor and Artillery Training Center (EFATBL) is at Mbanza Ngungu. An Administrative Services School (EADMIN) and a Communications School (ETRANS) are located at Kananga. The Engineering School (EGN) is at Likasi.

~~(S/NF)~~ North Korean advisers helped to train the Kamanyola Division in 1974, but were expelled in 1976. In the 1977 Shaba invasion aftermath, the French agreed to provide advisers for the training of a parachute brigade and to act as helicopter instructor pilots and maintenance advisers in Kinshasa. They have since trained the three battalions and a support and services company of the 31st Brigade, as well as the 1st battalion of the 32d Brigade. The Belgians have retrained the 21st Infantry Brigade and still serve as instructors with the unit. Several PRC instructors train soldiers at the 41st Brigade at Kisangani. Training of the DSP is exclusively in the hands of several Israeli advisers. The instructors

have completed one Brigade's (the 14th) training in the over all upgrade of the Kamanyola Division, and recently completed training of the 22d Brigade deployed to Kamina.

~~(C)~~ During the last ten years, soldiers from Congo, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Burundi have received military training in Zaire. Additionally, three battalions of Chadian soldiers have trained in commando operations at the Belgian-run center at Kota-Koli. In September 1987, President Habre once again requested training assistance, this time for his presidential guard. Mobutu, who is striving to enhance his image as a regional player sees the offer of military training as another means of increasing his prestige.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(C)~~ In January 1974, Zaire announced the creation of a reserve cadre of officers and NCOs. No activity, however, has ever been observed in connection with the reserve since its creation. Its existence is highly doubtful.

b. Navy

(1) Mission

~~(S/NF)~~ Surveillance and defense of territorial waters; protection of maritime traffic and fishing fleets; search, rescue, and assistance for foreign ships and aircraft; and assistance to the National Gendarmerie and Customs in repression of smuggling and clandestine entry into the country.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S/NF)~~ The Navy is unable to carry out its mission throughout its area of responsibility. Careless operation and maintenance of boats, equipment, and armaments; failure to obtain supplies; and long, inefficient lines of communication are the basic causes for this situation. Despite this, the Zairian Navy continues to make serious efforts to upgrade its operational status by seeking increased foreign military assistance.

(3) ~~(S/NF)~~ Personnel Strength: 1,150 (breakdown not available)

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ Ship Strength:

Type	Op	Nonop
PC (coastal escort) (PRC SHANGHAI II)	6	0
PB (patrol boats) (US Swift 65 ft)	3	1
PBR (patrol boats) (FR Vedette Arcors)	11	0
Total:	**20**	**1**

(5) Organization and Deployment

~~(S/NF)~~ During the July 1974 reorganization of the Armed Forces, the Navy emerged as a separate and equal branch with its own Chief of Staff, headquartered in Kinshasa. The Navy Chief of Staff is responsible to the Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security and to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Navy is organized into three regions, which deal with coast, river, and lake duties. The 1st Region (lake), the oldest operational unit, is headquartered at Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika, has approximately 350 personnel (30 officers, 320 EM), and is assigned

the 4 Swift patrol boats. This unit patrols the lake, attempts to control smuggling, and engages in joint operations with air and ground forces against rebels in Secteur Tanganyika. Headquartered at Kinshasa, the 2d Region (river) has some 450 personnel, who man guard posts along the Zaire River to detect smuggling into the Congo, and who have begun to conduct very limited river patrols. The PBRs are deployed in the Zaire River at Kinshasa. The 3d Region (Coast) headquarters at Banana is manned by some 250 personnel. The PCs are deployed to Banana. Boats assigned to ocean and river units cannot interchange with each other.

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S/NF)~~ Four of the Chinese-made Shanghai IIs, 3 of the US-made 65-foot Swift ships and all 11 Vedette Arcors are currently operational.

(7) Logistics

~~(S/NF)~~ A shortage of spare parts has caused occasional curtailment of operations. The force depends upon local suppliers for fuel, but maintains a small reserve for use during temporary shortages. The Navy is completely dependent upon foreign sources for equipment and spare parts. US repair teams attempt to repair Swift ships on a periodic basis, but these boats are so poorly maintained between visits that they often fall into disrepair within months or even weeks. The PRC has sent spare parts and repair teams and has recently completed a major overhaul of the Shanghais. The Chinese maintain close control over the supply system for these boats.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Repair of Zairian Navy ships stationed at Banana is accomplished at the 1,800-ton dry dock and shops at Boma. Repair facilities are also available for patrol craft at Kalemie where they are hoisted onto the quay for hull repair. Yards at Kinshasa are adequate to support riverine forces. The large size of the country and lack of waterborne connectivity between the various operational regions of the Navy make logistics interface extremely difficult.

(8) Personnel Recruitment and Retention

~~(S/NF)~~ Navy personnel are volunteers. Most have previous military experience and were selected from the Army for naval training and duty. Plans for future recruitment are unknown.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ Some 131 personnel have been trained in naval operations in the US; some 60 have received training in the PRC. Naval training is ongoing at Banana; formation of a technical school at Kalemie has been planned for some time but has yet to be realized.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

~~(S/NF)~~ Retiring Navy officers and NCOs probably are included in the FAZ reserve cadre. (see 3.a.(9).) Mobilization potential is unknown. Civil maritime resources probably can be mobilized in the event of a national emergency and include eight cargo ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 77,400 GRT, 117,443 DWT.

(11) Merchant Marine

~~(C)~~ The Zairian Merchant Marine Fleet consists of 12 ships of over 1,000 gross registered tons. Ships include breakbulk carriers with a combined dead weight tonnage (lift capacity) of 90,200 tons of cargo. Also included are one passenger ship, one fish factory trawler, and four dredges. All the breakbulk ships were built in West Germany in the 1970s.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ The mission of the Zairian Air Force (FAZA) is to cooperate with the other Zairian services in the defense of national territory against external and internal attacks. Specific tasks include fighter support of ground forces, airlift support, and reconnaissance.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The Zairian Air Force has no strategic nor air defense capability but can provide close-air-support for the Army. None of the FAZA pilots are combat ready by US standards; they fly proficiency missions but seldom conduct gunnery or bombing practice. The FAZA has been capable of performing its support tasks with the technical and logistic assistance of foreign military and/or private contract organizations. Its primary weakness lies in a severe shortage of both operable aircraft and flight-trained personnel as well as the virtual absence of an indigenous technical and logistic base. Most of the actual flying is done by European expatriates. The FAZA can perform limited liaison, reconnaissance, and search and rescue; currently, however, it suffers from lack of fuel, poor maintenance, and lack of qualified Zairian pilots. Despite these shortcomings, FAZA pilots have performed adequately on occasion. In June 1985, three Aermacchi pilots strafed and sank several small boats carrying rebels across Lake Tanganyika, then returned safely to base.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ The strength of the Air Force is approximately 2,000. Available aircrew personnel are broken down as follows: C-130 (17 pilots, 14 copilots); MB-326GB (23 pilots); Mirage 5M (2 pilots); Cessna 310 and 150 (36 pilots); helicopter (19 pilots); flight engineers (54); navigators (27); and loadmasters (4).

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 49 (fixed-wing: 15 jet, 7 turboprop, 17 prop; 10 helicopters)

In operational units: 49 (15 fighters, 7 transport, 17 liaison, 10 helicopters)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(C)~~ The Air Force is headed by a Chief of Staff who reports to the Chief of the General Staff and to the State Secretary for National Defense and Territorial Security. The FAZA is organized into a headquarters and three commands: the Central Operations Command (COC), the Air Force Schools Command (CEFA), and the Logistics Command. The FAZA is further divided into three operational regions. The 1st Aerial Region encompassing western Zaire (Kinshasa); the 2d encompassing southwestern Zaire (Kamina); and, the 3d encompasses northeastern Zaire (Kisangani). There is no FAZA infrastructure supporting these aerial regions. The COC consists of the 11th (Macchi MB-326GB) and the 12th (Mirage 5M) Squadrons, the 21st logistical and transport Squadron (Lockheed C-130), and the 31st Helicopter Squadron. Most elements of the COC operate out of N'Djili Airfield, Kinshasa; the helicopters operate out of N'Dolo Airfield, Kinshasa. The CEFA comprises the Kamina Base flying and technical training schools, and the helicopter school at N'Dolo Airfield. The third command is composed of the technical and depot groups with its headquarters at N'Dolo Airfield. Elements of these groups are distributed throughout Zaire.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Summary of Units:

Unit	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
1 Fighter SQ	Mirage 5M/DM	8	Kinshasa/NDjili
1 Fighter SQ	MB-326B	6	Kinshasa/NDjili
1 Tactical/trans SQ	C-130H	5	Kinshasa/NDjili
	DHC-5	2	
	Cessna 150, 310	17	
1 heli SQ	Super Puma, Puma Alouette III, Gazelle	10	Kinshasa/NDolo

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ All aircraft are maintained at N'Dolo Airport, N'Djili Airport, or Kamina Base. Originally formed as an expatriate contract organization called SODEMAZ *(Societe d'Operation et Maintenance des Aeriennes Zairoises)*, the maintenance unit at N'Djili Airport has been subsumed into FAZA and comes under the direction of the Air Force Chief of Staff. It still employs expatriates (5 flight crew members, 3 C-130 and 2 Macchi MB-326GB, and approximately 20 logistic/maintenance/administrative personnel). The capabilities of the organization have diminished under Zairian direction and with the loss of some non-Zairian staff. Maintenance efforts keep about 50-75 percent of the aircraft in operational status, although recent crashes and accidents probably can be attributed to pilot error and flight crew inadequacy rather than poor maintenance. Six Lockheed technical representatives help maintain the C-130s.

(7) Logistics

~~(C)~~ The Air Force is totally dependent on foreign assistance for its equipment and its maintenance and service sectors are dominated by foreign contractors. Despite foreign involvement, the Air Force logistic system is in a severe state of disarray. Misappropriation of funds, corrupt administration, shortage of aviation fuel, and scarcity of spare parts result in excessively poor operational readiness rates for military aircraft. Additionally, airfields and related support facilities are in a constant state of disrepair; operational status and fuel availability are uncertain from day to day. Without foreign assistance, maintenance, and supply systems would rapidly break down.

~~(C)~~ The Lockheed and Cessna companies provide spare parts and overhaul on a contract basis for C-130 and Cessna aircraft. Aviation fuel is obtained from Petro Zaire in Kinshasa, and is often scarce. Outside of Kinshasa, fuel stocks are controlled by Air Zaire. Aircraft maintenance is performed at N'Djili Airfield or Kamina Base. Deadline rates of 50 per cent are common. Problems are caused by lack of funds, failure to release funds for parts, and internal administration procedures.

(8) Personnel Recruitment and Retention

~~(C)~~ All Air Force personnel are volunteers. The Air Force is able to attract personnel initially through the promise of acquiring desirable mechanical skills. However, low pay scales coupled with sporadic pay have given rise to widespread theft of fuel, tools, and spare parts by FAZA personnel from Zairian Air Force facilities. Even though the number of volunteers is sufficient, problems arise in finding qualified recruits. Competition with civil airline companies for qualified personnel has caused retention problems for the Zairian Air Force.

(9) Training

~~(S/NF)~~ Zairian pilots are currently trained in the United States and France. Small numbers of navigators and loadmasters also receive US training. Both the helicopter training program, which began in February 1977, and the Mirage training program are under the direct supervision of the French Military Assistance Group. A French team of three officers and five enlisted men assist with the in-country training program for FAZA Mirage pilots. Another team of one officer, three enlisted men, and one aerospace technician assist the 31st Helicopter Squadron in its training program.

~~(S)~~ An upgraded training program for Mirage pilots is held at Kinshasa/N'Djili Airbase, while the FAZA helicopter training program is held at Kinshasa/N'Dolo Airbase. Low educational levels and lack of mechanical experience contribute to a student-pilot attrition rate of 50-75 percent. It is estimated that when the undergraduate pilot training school is established, there will be a period of high accident rates, high student failures, and poorly-trained graduates.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

(U) There is no FAZA reserve organization at the present time.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C)~~ Virtually all of Zaire's indigenous civilian aviation personnel and aircraft operated by Air Zaire and SCIBE could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. The Zairian Armed Forces have relied heavily in the past on Air Zaire aircraft for troop deployments and logistic support. In a national emergency, the availability of the numerous aircraft operated by private companies would be subject to circumstances. Without considerable foreign assistance, a lack of fully qualified, indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of mobilized equipment, especially if prolonged or high intensity air transport operations were required.

(c) Civil Aviation

(1) Aircraft

(U) Approximately 42 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Zaire:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)	**Owner/Operator**
1 Boeing 707-300	Private carrier
2 Boeing 707-300C	Private carrier
1 Boeing 707-320	Private carrier
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-50	Private carrier
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-54F	Private carrier
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-55F	Private carrier
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63AF	Air Zaire
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30	Air Zaire
9 Total	
Medium-Range Transport Aircraft (1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)	
4 Aerospatiale SE-210 CARAVELLE	Private carrier

1 Boeing 727-300	Private carrier
2 Boeing 737-200C	Air Zaire
5 Bristol 175 BRITTANIA	Private carrier
4 Hawker Siddeley HS-121 TRIDENT 3B	Private carrier
2 Lockheed L-100 HERCULES	Private carrier
2 McDonnell Douglas DC-3 SKYTRAIN	Private carrier
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-4 SKYMASTER	Private carrier
5 Vickers VC-2 VISCOUNT	Private carrier
26 Total	

Short-Range Transport Aircraft (less than 1,200 NM or 2,200 km)

2 Fokker F-27 400M FRIENDSHIP	Private carrier
3 Fokker F-27-500 FRIENDSHIP	Private carrier
2 Fokker Fa-a27-600 FRIENDSHIP	Air Zaire
7 Total	

(U) Numerous private charter carriers, mining companies, and other private business firms operate major transport aircraft, as well as light aircraft, in Zaire. "Private carriers," above refers to companies offering passenger, cargo, or other air services for revenue.

(U) The operating condition of some of the older equipment, particularly the SKYTRAINs and SKYMASTERs, is doubtful.

(2) Pilots

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Zaire is not known. Air Zaire reportedly employs over 130 pilots.

d. National Gendarmerie

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ The National Gendarmerie (GN) performs civilian police functions and is responsible for internal security. In the event of hostilities, the GN will be responsible for first-line defense until the Army can be brought into position.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ Since its inception in the late 1970s, the GN has been plagued with a host of problems. While the capabilities of the GN may be marginally better than those of some other African states, the Gendarmerie is essentially incompetent to deal with any but very minor military disturbances. Most of the Gendarmes are inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and distrusted by the civilian population. The GN has alienated the vast majority of the population in all areas in which it serves by the harassment which it frequently practices. As the first line of defense against military incursions or insurgent attacks, the Gendarmerie would be incapable of effectively halting an attacking force.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ Effective strength of the National Gendarmerie is estimated at 24,000, although the official published strength is 49,970.

(4) Organization and Deployment

~~(C)~~ In July 1972, the decision was made to merge the seven Gendarmerie battalions of the Army with the National Police to form the National Gendarmerie. Among the factors

leading to this move were the delicate political situation, reorganization of the Armed Forces, personalities of some military leaders, and volatile military-civilian relations.

~~(C/NF)~~ The July 1977 reorganization of the Armed Forces made the National Gendarmerie coequal with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The National Gendarmerie is headed by its own Chief of Staff who is responsible to the Chief of the General Staff and The Secretary for National Defense and Territorial Security. The mobile and territorial battalions are commanded by their GN Chief of Staff for policy and administrative matters but are under the command of the Army when they are deployed. The GN battalions are deployed relatively evenly throughout Zaire. The nine administrative regions of Zaire correspond to nine National Gendarmerie Military Districts with headquarters in each of the regional capitals.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

~~(C)~~ The National Gendarmerie is armed with small arms, primarily 7.62-mm Belgian FN or outdated rifles. Frequently, Gendarmerie units are without ammunition or supplies. Although the mobile battalions are authorized trucks and other vehicles with which to deploy into the rural areas, most of the vehicles are inoperative or poorly maintained. The GN has in the past commandeered civilian vehicles and trucks in order to deploy and will probably continue this practice.

(6) Logistics

~~(C)~~ Although the GN is the largest of the ground force units in Zaire, the Army is the most powerful by virtue of its control of resources. As a result, Gendarmerie battalions are usually among the last to be equipped or resupplied. Most of the equipment it receives is outdated and without sufficient repair parts.

(7) Training

~~(C)~~ The National Gendarmerie is responsible for three Gendarme schools: the main school is located at Matete; instructional centers are located at Kapalata and Kasapa.

e. Civil Guard

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ The Civil Guard was activated by President Mobutu in May 1987 to eliminate the militarism associated with the Gendarmerie, by establishing an essentially civilian police force. Its mission is to perform civilian police functions and to ensure internal security, control border crossings and respond to terrorist activities.

(2) Capability

~~(C/NF)~~ It is too early to assess the capability of the Civil Guard. Deployment of the first units began in 1987 and is far from complete. It does not appear, however, that the guard will become an effective organization in the near future.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ As of August 1987, the guard consisted of 2,016 uniformed personnel and 63 civilians. It is limited in size by presidential degree to 50,000 personnel, but has a projected end strength of 15,000.

(4) Organization and Deployment

~~(C/NF)~~ The guard suffers from a severe equipment shortage. Currently, equipment consists of five Land Rover trucks, a handful of French and German made PRC-77 type

radios and a few, used individual weapons. All guards receive locally made uniforms. Zaire has contracted to buy rifles and jeeps from Egypt. This contract, however, has yet to be approved by president Mobutu.

(5) Training

~~(C)~~ The Civil Guard is trained by separate Egyptian and West German advisory groups; the Egyptian team consists of twenty-six personnel and the West German consists of six. Training is conducted at Maluku.

f. ~~(C)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	22,350
Navy	1,150
Air Force	2,000
National Gendarmerie	24,000
Civil Guard	2,016
CORLOG	1,200
Total	**52,716**

g. ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military Presence

Belgium:	66-with Logistics Corps, Military Schools, Army
France:	105-with the Air Force and Army
West Germany:	6-Training Civil Guard
PRC:	43-with Commando Brigade and as Technicians
Israel:	11-training the DSP and the 22d Bde
Egypt:	26-Training Civil Guard

ZAIRE

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Banana Naval Base A HQ	1027-95120	95120	05-59-10S	012-23-40E
Dilolo Inf Bn HQ A Bks	1056-00063	90113	10-42-00S	022-20-00E
Kalemie Military District HQ A Bks	1030-00002	90110	05-57-05S	029-11-25E
Kamina Base Afld	1055-08014	80060	08-38-38S	025-15-00E
Kananga Military Academy	1028-00026	90130	05-55-35S	022-27-00E
Kasaji Barracks A Brigade HQ	1056-00061	91070	10-22-00S	023-27-00E
Kinshasa Airborne BDE HQ	1027-0561	90160	04-10-30S	015-19-00E
Kinshasa Logistics HQ	1027-00555	92000	04-20-26S	015-17-39E
Kinshasa Military Training Center	1027-00560	90120	04-21-05S	015-14-25E
Kinshasa Nat 1 Army HQ	1027-00075	91011	40-18-08S	04-18-50E
Kinshasa Parachute Training Center	1027-00562	80081	04-23-05S	015-18-00E
Kinshasa/N Djili Airfield	1027-08041	80081	04-23-05S	015-26-42E
Kinshasa/N Dolo Airfield	1027-08018	80105	04-19-30S	015-19-35E
Kinshasa SP Be Div Bks Camp Tshatshi	1027-00148	91140	04-19-43S	015-14-15E
Kisangani MR Bde Bn HQ A/Bks	9080-00024	91140	00-31-00N	025-11-00E
Kitona Base Afld	1027-0844	80060	05-55-01S	12-26-50E
Kitona Hq Instruction Center Ceki	1027-00567	91030	05-58-00S	012-28-00E
Kolwezi HQ and Army Barracks	1055-00176	91060	10-43-00S	025-28-00E
Kota-Koli	0813-08802	80071	04-09-29N	021-45-02E
Lumbumbashi Bde HQ	1055-00255	91070	11-40-10S	027-28-05E
Matadi	1027-00706	95000	05-49-00S	013-27-00E
Mbanza Ngungu Armor Arty School	1027-00568	90130	05-15-00S	014-52-00E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

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ZAMBIA

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ZAMBIA

1. GOVERNMENT

a. (U) Key Government Officials

President: Doctor Kenneth D. *Kaunda*

Secretary General of the United National Independence Party (UNIP): Alexander Grey *Zulu*

Prime Minister: Kebby *Musokotwane*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Luke *Mwanashiku*

Minister of Defense: General Malimba *Masheke*

Minister of Home Affairs: Paul *Malukutila*

Secretary of State for Defense and Security: Alex K. *Shapi*

b. Type and Stability of Government

(U) Zambia is a one-party constitutional republic. The August 1973 constitution made the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Zambia's sole political organization. UNIP's Central Committee is the supreme policymaking body of the nation. Implementation of its policies is the domain of the President and his cabinet. Legislative powers are vested in Parliament, which is composed of the President and a National Assembly. All UNIP and government institutions are, however, dominated by President Kaunda, who is head of state, head of the government, head of UNIP, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Kaunda appoints Central Committee members and members of the judiciary, selects his cabinet from among the National Assembly, and has veto power over all legislation. According to the constitution, the President and his cabinet cannot be subjected to a vote of no confidence by the National Assembly.

(U) The present government came into being after the October 1983 presidential elections. President Kaunda was sworn in for a fifth 5-year term after an overwhelming victory, receiving 93 percent of the national vote cast on the basis of approve/disapprove of the UNIP candidate. Every 5 years, before the national elections, UNIP's General Conference meets to elect the President of the Party, who then automatically becomes the sole candidate for President of the Republic. The Central Committee at the same time selects three UNIP candidates for each National Assembly seat — who then compete for election to Parliament in their home districts. The next series of party and general elections will be held during October-November 1988.

~~(C)~~ UNIP is a mass-type political party, incorporating representatives from all segments of Zambian society. The Zambian political elite remains, however, largely divided along regional lines within the Party. Four groupings dominate UNIP's Central Committee: Northern, Luapula, and Copperbelt Province representatives (Bemba-speaking); Eastern Province representatives (Nyanja-speaking); Southern Province representatives (Tonga-speaking); and representatives from Western Province (Lozi-speaking). These blocs are locked in an almost institutionalized struggle for their regional share of diminishing government resources and services. Their scramble to secure a larger slice of a progressively smaller pie

forms the backdrop for the conduct of national politics. Kaunda is the cement that binds the country's disparate elements together.

c. Internal Threat

~~(C)~~ Zambia's worsening economic situation has resulted in rising domestic discontent. Riots in Copperbelt Province in December 1986 — brought about by increased food prices — had to be quelled by the Army. The government's promises that its new economic program will improve living conditions, and the likely failure of the program to do so, will only serve to intensify the people's frustration.

~~(C)~~ Economic decline has also politicized Zambia's relatively powerful and well-organized labor unions. Labor has become increasingly critical of Kaunda's economic policies. In 1985, mineworkers staged illegal wildcat strikes protesting poor pay and lack of benefits. As Kaunda continues his efforts to rein in labor, further conflict can be expected. A general strike would severely disrupt the economy and could result in violent confrontations with government security forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ While Kaunda has, so far, been able to maintain the loyalty of the 17,000-man armed forces, they represent the greatest potential challenge to his rule. However, Kaunda keeps a close eye on developments in the military via his relatively capable intelligence service. In the past, Kaunda has diffused potential problems by reshuffling the military leadership, and providing salary increases and new equipment, and can be expected to take similar action in the future.

d. External Threat

~~(S)~~ The greatest external threat to Zambia's stability is created by the ongoing wars in neighboring Angola and Mozambique. These conflicts occasionally spill into Zambian territory, as combatants venture across the border either in pursuit of enemy units or in search of refuge and supplies. These intrusions do not directly threaten the government in Lusaka. However, they are a source of embarrassment and paranoia, pointing out the Zambian Army's inability to protect the country's borders. Furthermore, the situations in Angola and Mozambique have resulted in a regular flow of refugees from those countries into Zambia, increasing the burden on Zambia's already overloaded infrastructure. These refugees also create a difficult political situation for the Zambian government in the areas where the are settled. Local Zambians resent the provision of food and shelter to the refugees at a time when they themselves are suffering.

~~(S)~~ The Government feels threatened, as well, by South African operations against the personnel and facilities of the African National Congress located in Zambia. While these operations are not directed against Zambia itself, they often result in the deaths of a few of its citizens. The inability of the military to prevent them is a source of popular frustration with both the Government and armed forces.

e. Communist Influence

~~(S)~~ Zambia has no communist party; however, there is a small number of pro-Soviet Marxists within UNIP. These individuals have been successful in gaining some strategic party and government posts that have enabled them to inject a strong dose of Marxist ideology into Zambia's cultural and economic institutions. Their position has been enhanced by UNIP fears over growing societal unrest driven by the failing economy. UNIP's reaction has been to seek ways to increase party control over all aspects of Zambian life. UNIP's Marxist minority facilitated a major political opening to the East in the mid-1970s. The party has sent hundreds of members of all ranks to East European and Soviet political

training institutions over the past decade. Some returning graduates of these courses have been placed in party positions ranging from the ward chairman level to provincial governor. They represent an opportunity for both party Marxists and their foreign allies to extend their influence within Zambia. However, the majority of UNIP's leaders do not appear particularly interested in the substance of Marxist ideology and show no sign of changing their attitude in the near term.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Communist states view Zambia as a nation worth cultivating due to its central location in Southern Africa, its wealth of natural resources, and the influence of its President with other African nations, particularly on issues concerning South Africa and Namibia. Zambia's nonaligned philosophy led to early political, military, and economic ties with Yugoslavia, Romania, and China that continue on a somewhat limited scale. However, the security threat posed by the increasing level of conflict in southern Africa during the mid-1970s led Zambia to open ties with other East European states and the Soviet Union. The expansion of these relationships has been carefully cultivated by the Soviets and the East Europeans, particularly the East Germans. A major arms agreement — valued at over $190 million for MiG-21s, Mi-8 helicopters, spare parts, and ground equipment — was concluded in 1979 between Zambia and the USSR. The East Germans made sizable grants of military equipment in 1980 and have a liaison relationship with the Zambian Intelligence and Security Service (ZISS). Increasing Zambian interest in Marxist social models led Lusaka to conclude cultural, media, educational, and limited economic agreements and protocols with the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Zambia's wide range of agreements with Communist states has led to the presence of numerous civilian and military advisers in-country, including Soviets, Chinese, North Koreans, Romanians, and Yugoslavs. Despite the high degree of Communist involvement, Zambia's positions on international issues have remained generally nonaligned. Furthermore, Zambian ardor for closer ties with the Soviet Bloc states has diminished as the level of economic aid provided has failed to meet expectations, and as the quality of military aid has proved disappointing.

f. Economic Factors

(U) Zambia is in a deep economic crisis demonstrated by a severe lack of foreign exchange, and mounting debt and debt service obligations. Zambia's primary foreign exchange-generating industry, copper mining, is plagued by high costs, falling reserves, and a declining market. Zambia's landlocked position and heavy dependence on a single commodity have made it economically vulnerable. Dependence on copper for over 90 percent of export earnings, heavy importation of consumer goods, statistic economic policies and rapid urbanization have all inhibited growth. Moreover, Zambia did not take advantage of high copper earnings in prior years to develop other productive sectors.

~~(C)~~ Due in large part to an IMF economic reform program, the Zambian economy grew 1.5 percent in real terms in 1985 and an additional .5 percent in 1986, reversing a trend of negative growth since 1980. However, because of the fear of political repercussions stemming from austere reform measures, Kaunda decided to break with the IMF in early May 1987 and to implement Zambia's own economic program. Zambia's new recovery plan reverts to greater government control of the economy, which will stifle growth and investment.

g. Military and Political Alignment

(U) Zambia follows a policy of nonalignment in its foreign affairs and has taken a leading role in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). It has no formal military alliances; however, it does have an informal association with the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe) in opposing the white minority regime in South

Africa. Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Zambia provided a four-person element for the OAU peacekeeping effort in Chad in 1981 and 1982.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Zambia has shown a willingness to accept military assistance from virtually any country. Until the mid-1970s, it was mainly dependent on the UK for such support, although countries as diverse as Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iraq, Italy, and Sweden have also provided assistance. The PRC, the USSR, and Yugoslavia began providing military assistance in 1971. However, since 1979, the USSR has become Zambia's largest supplier of armaments. Soviet equipment includes MiG-21 fighters, transports, helicopters, tanks, APCs, field artillery, mortars, SAM missiles, ADA, and small arms. At one time, earnings from copper and cobalt provided financing for arms purchases, but Zambia's failing economy has caused the country to fall behind in payments for armaments.

~~(S)~~ The USSR maintains a military training mission, with about 70 Soviet advisors, in Zambia. Zambian military personnel have received military training abroad from a variety of countries including Canada, the PRC, East Germany, India, Ireland, Pakistan, Tanzania, the UK, and the USSR.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Lusaka): Ambassador Paul J. Hare

Defense Attache: None

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. (U) Key Military Officials

Army:

Commander: Lieutenant General Gary *Kalenge*

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff: Major General Francis *Sibamba*

Air Force:

Commander: Lieutenant General Hananiah *Lungu*

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff: Major General Herbert *Simutowe*

Zambian National Service: Brig General T. *Fara*

Inspector General of Police: Herbert *Mapili*

b. Position of Armed Forces

~~(S)~~ The Zambian National Defense Force (ZNDF) is composed of an Army, Air Force, and reserve forces. Major Army units include five regular and three reserve infantry battalions,one commando battalion, one artillery regiment, and one armored regiment. The Army, with a strength of about 14,000, overshadows the Air Force, which includes approximately 1,800 men. The mission of the ZNDF is to provide internal defense and border security throughout Zambia.

~~(S)~~ Under the ZNDF reorganization of 1980, all military, paramilitary, and security services were placed under the control of the Secretary of State for Defense and Security. The Ministry of Defense is outside the military chain of command and serves as an administrative adjunct to the Secretary of Defense and Security for dealing with military

administrative and logistic problems. Tactical command and control is exercised by three brigade headquarters elements in the Army and by the Zambian Air Force Headquarters.

~~(S)~~ The military has remained basically uninvolved in national politics and has fully carried out President Kaunda's directives in the past. While they are no doubt frustrated with the economic situation and its impact on military capabilities, senior military officers apparently see no reasonable alternative to Kaunda's leadership and do not seem inclined to assume the mantle of power for themselves. In crisis situations the army leadership seems prepared to follow the President. Most officers and enlisted men would support the army hierarchy.

~~(S)~~ The military is, on the whole, a very conservative and Western-oriented organization. The reaction of many senior military personnel to the 1979 Zambian-Soviet Arms Agreement, and the continued presence of Soviet military advisers, has been negative. The political impact upon the military of training in Soviet and East German military schools has not been significant. Since 1984, there has been an overall reduction in foreign military training in Zambia and overseas due to the poor state of the Zambian economy and belt-tightening measures in the ZNDF.

~~(S/NF)~~ Kaunda regularly reshuffles the military high command to prevent a possible concentration of power outside his hands. Furthermore, he requires all new military recruits to be UNIP members, and has established a political commissar training program to create a core of UNIP political officers to indoctrinate the troops. The general public views the military as a second-rate organization, barely capable of defending the nation.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The influx of Soviet equipment from 1979 to 1981 did little to improve Zambian military capabilities, and they have continued to decline steadily since that time. Poor maintenance, shortage of spare parts, insufficient training, and testy relations between Zambians and their Soviet advisers all contribute to the ZNDF's marginal effectiveness.

~~(S)~~ The most significant problems of the Armed Forces are shortages of qualified personnel, poor morale among officers and enlisted men, and a general lack of discipline. Ethnic and factional discontent, especially among the Bemba-speaking northern peoples, has had an impact within the military and has prompted government actions to limit Bemba and northern influence within the forces.

d. ~~(S)~~ Military Budget: $324 million for fiscal year ending 31 December 1982 or 21 percent of central government budget (more recent data is unavailable). Specific service allocations are unknown.

e. (U) Population: 7,281,738 as of July 1987

Males (ages 15-49): 1,500,000; physically fit, 786,000

Ethnic divisions: 98.7 percent Africans, 1.1 percent Europeans, 0.2 percent other

Literacy: 54 percent

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

(U) To defend the national territory from outside attack and assist the police in maintaining internal security and public order.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Zambian Army is a defensive force with no capability to conduct significant offensive operations beyond its borders. The Army could probably successfully engage a slow-moving force from Malawi, Mozambique, or Zaire. However, the army would be ineffective in interdicting rapid, short-term border incursions from these states due to logistic and transport problems. The army would be incapable of effectively defending Zambia from border incursions or more general attacks from Zimbabwe, Angola or South Africa. In conjunction with the police, the Army can maintain internal security. Overall, the Army's capabilities are marginal even by African standards.

(3) Personnel Strength

(U) Approximately 14,000 officers and men.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The bulk of the Army's strength is assigned to three infantry brigades. Engineer, signal, supply, medical, and maintenance support units are an integral part of each infantry battalion. Additionally, the Army is supported by field artillery batteries, company-size armored units, and antiaircraft artillery batteries. These units are composed of regular troops and may be augmented by the activation of various reserve forces.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Ground Combat Units

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average Actual
3 brigade headquarters	Unk	200
5 infantry battalions	850	850
1 armored regiment	Unk	700
1 artillery regiment	Unk	900
1 commando battalion	Unk	800
1 engineer regiment	Unk	600
2 signal squadrons	Unk	200
2 transport squadrons	Unk	200
3 ordnance and supply companies	Unk	200
1 medical service company	Unk	200

(c) Deployment

~~(S)~~ All units are deployed in-country. The 1st Brigade is headquartered in Lusaka, the 2d Brigade in Kabwe, and the 3d Brigade in Ndola. Every 6 months elements of a brigade rotate into Zambia's Western Province and conduct security operations along the Angolan, Namibian, and Botswanan borders. Army units from Ndola have been deployed to the Zaire border to assist police in curbing cross-border banditry and the rising crime wave in the Copperbelt Region.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ Most basic infantry weapons in use are from the USSR, PRC, or Yugoslavia. This group includes 7.62-mm rifles and machineguns; 60-mm and 82-mm mortars; 14.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns; and RPG-7 rocket launchers. Chinese, Yugoslav, and Soviet-supplied

artillery predominates in the force, as does Soviet-and Chinese-supplied armor. Over the past few years, the military has made the transition from Western-supplied transportation vehicles to a wide variety of Soviet and East European manufactured vehicles. Most major pieces of equipment in the inventory are not available for use because of poor maintenance, no replacement parts, or lack of qualified operators. The Army has no known war reserve stocks, though the large amount of nonoperational equipment in the inventory would be available for cannibalization.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Artillery:	130-mm gun	UR, PRC	13+
	122-mm howitzer	UR, GDR	24
	105-mm cannon	YO	10
	105-mm howitzer	It	8
	76-mm field gun	YO, UR, GDR	50
	122-mm Bm-21 rocket lchr	UR	55
Air Defense:	23-mm, SP, ZSU-23-4	UR	14
	85-mm ADA	CH, UR	24
	57-mm ADA	UR	55
	40-mm ADA	UK	8
	37-mm ADA	CH, YO	41
	20-mm ADA	YO, EG, UK	60+
	SAM-7 lchr	IR	32+
	T-59 tank	CH	20
	T-54 tank	UR	10
	T-34 tank	UR	4
	PT-76 amphibious tank	UR	31
	BRDM-1/2 recon vehicle	UR	88
	BTR-60 APC	UR	13
	Ferret Scoutcars	UK	28
Mortars:	120-mm mortar	EG	14
	82-mm mortar	CH	24
	81-mm mortar	UK, FR	54
	60-mm mortar	CH, UK	61
	2-in mortar	UK	74
AT and Rcl Weapons:	84-mm recoilless rifle	SW	40
	75-mm recoilless rifle	CH	12
	57-mm antitank gun	EG	14
Motor Transport:	7/8-3.4-ton truck	UR	168
	3.5-7.5-ton truck	GC, RO, UR, FN, IZ	900+
	over 7.5-ton truck	UR	31
	10-ton Bedford trk	UK	21
	Truck (type unk)	EG	200+

(6) Logistics

~~(S)~~ Zambia's Army suffers from a lack of standardization of equipment that impairs its combat capability and makes maintenance extremely difficult. Foreign technicians are hired on a contract basis to provide maintenance support. Zambian indigenous

maintenance support is practically nil. Armaments are usually nonoperational because of poor maintenance. Army workshops are responsible for all maintenance that cannot be accomplished at the organic level.

~~(C)~~ The Army has been responsible since 1974 for the management of the Mechanical Service Branch (MSB) of the Ministry of Defense. The MSB provides depot-level support to all military vehicles. The increasing down time and the continuing poor condition of the vehicles have contributed to the MSB's bad reputation.

~~(C)~~ The transportation system in Zambia is far from adequate to support military movement. The rail system is the prime mover, but poor maintenance coupled with single tracking and a lack of alternate routes restricts movement. The highway system is hampered by a large percentage of unimproved roads. In the rainy season (November-March), both road movement and rail movement are impeded by hillslides in mountainous areas and washouts at bridges, ferries, and fords. With all of these problems, the Army is unable to move or resupply its units for all but the most limited operations.

(7) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ The Zambian Army is a volunteer force. Recruits are mainly drawn from those finishing their tour with the Zambian National Service (ZNS). Prospective enlisted personnel must be single, 18-25 years old, and have a junior high school education. Prospective officers must have at least a high school diploma. Recruitment drives are carried out once a year. While the Army apparently has been able to recruit enough personnel to fill its strength requirements, it is generally unable to recruit Zambia's best and brightest. In Zambia, a trained technician or college-educated person can usually secure better wages and working conditions from the mining corporations.

(8) Training

~~(S)~~ Basic training is conducted at the Army Training Center in Kabwe. This training is essentially the same for officer and enlisted personnel: 14 weeks of basic military skills. Advanced individual training is conducted at the unit level. Advanced officer and NCO courses are available at the Training Center and at four NCO schools located around the country. The quality of unit training depends upon the unit commander, but is generally poor.

(9) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ The Zambian Army reserve structure consists of two organizations: reserve infantry battalions and the Home Guard.

~~(S)~~ The manpower of the three reserve infantry battalions consists of approximately 3,000 officers and men who have received regular military training or have previous military experience. While poorly equipped, these units have performed moderately well the few times in the past when they were called upon to augment regular forces.

~~(S)~~ The Home Guard is a small organization centered in urban areas. It consists of 800-1,000 local volunteers who may or may not have formal military training. Usually organized into company-size units, the Home Guard is largely unequipped and undertrained. Since its creation in 1971, the Home Guard has been called to active duty once, in late 1979, during the height of the Rhodesian war. The callup went very poorly and the volunteers were rapidly demobilized. In early 1983, President Kaunda announced intentions to expand

the Home Guard with an emphasis on aiding ZNP and Army units in patrolling the border areas. To date no such expansion has been observed.

(b) Mobilization

(U) All members of the reserve battalions and the Home Guard are subject to mobilization on order of the President, acting as Commander in Chief. Additionally, the President has the power to recall all former Army personnel if he deems it necessary.

b. Navy

(U) The Zambian National Defense Force does not have a naval branch of any type; however, the Police Force does have a marine section with a strength of 32 men who operate a variety of launches and small motor boats. The major activity of the Marine Section is antismuggling patrols on Lakes Tanganyika, Mweru, and Kariba.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

(C) To protect Zambian airspace; maintain a tactical strike force; conduct reconnaissance; and provide airlift mobility for the military, police, and executive elements of the Government.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Zambian Air Force (ZAF) is capable of performing only part of its mission. The ZAF is capable of airlifting one or two Army companies, providing VIP transport, and flying reconnaissance in border areas under fair weather conditions. Its poor maintenance record, however, leaves many aircraft grounded. The Air Force lacks the training and equipment to provide effective air defense or close air support, or to conduct successful offensive operations. There are insufficient qualified pilots for most types of aircraft in the inventory. Soviet training of ground crews is ongoing, but the force still depends on foreign maintenance personnel to maintain its peacetime level of operations.

~~(S)~~ ZAF expansion, which continued at a brisk pace in the 1970s, has halted while the ZAF attempts to train its personnel and integrate the influx of Soviet equipment into its inventory. The ZAF is numerically one of the larger black African air forces, but its modest combat capabilities compare unfavorably with those of neighboring South Africa and Zimbabwe, and with the Soviet/Cuban-supported Angolan Air Force.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(S)~~ Estimated strength is approximately 1,800 (about 250 officers and officer cadets). An unknown number of pilots and pilot trainees are in various phases of flight training.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 157 (59 jet, 57 prop, 41 helicopter)

In operational units: 92 (27 fighters, 21 fixed-wing transports, 25 fixed-wing utility, 19 helicopters)

Trainers: 65 (43 fixed-wing, 22 helicopters)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(C)~~ An air wing was formed in 1964 with four C-47s and two Pembroke aircraft, with the

missions of providing transportation and air reconnaissance support to the ground force. The air wing was renamed the Zambia Air Force upon independence in October that same year. The Air Force continued to grow, and by 1981 it had reached its present size of eight squadrons: three combat, three transport, and two training. Air Force Headquarters is located in the capital, Lusaka. The ZAF occasionally disperses its aircraft throughout the country when it perceives a threat of attack.

(b) ~~(S)~~ *Summary of Units*

Units	Type	Total	Principal Bases
3 Trnsp Sqdns:	DHC-5 Buffalo	6	Lusaka
	HS-748	1	Lusaka
	DHC-4 Caribou	3	Lusaka
	C-54 Skymaster	2	Lusaka
	DO-28 Skyservant	7	Lusaka
	Yak-40/CODLING	2	Lusaka
	AB-205A Helicopter	3	Lusaka
	AB-206 Helicopter	3	Lusaka
	AB-47G Helicopter	2	Lusaka
	AB-212 Helicopter	2	Lusaka
	HIP (Mi-8) Helicopter	11	Lusaka
3 Fighter Sqdns:	FISHBED (MiG-21)	11	Lusaka
	FARMER (F-6)	15	Mumbwa
	FRESCO (FT-5)	2	Mumbwa
	SOKO-GALEB/JASTREB	12	Mbala
2 Flight Training Sqdns:	Aermacchi MB-326	18	Mumbwa
	Siai-Marchetti SF-260	8	Mumbwa
	Saab 91	19	Mumbwa
	Yak-18/MAX	5	Mumbwa
	DHC-2 Beaver	6	Mumbwa
	AB-47G Helicopter	20	Mumbwa
SAM Unit:	SA-3 GOA Ichr	12	Lusaka

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Older transport and utility aircraft were acquired from the UK and Canada. Trainers were acquired from the USSR, PRC, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Jet fighters were acquired from the PRC and USSR, utility/light transport aircraft from West Germany and the USSR, and helicopters from Italy and the USSR. Many aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and radars are often or always inoperative. In most cases, even basic maintenance of these systems requires the assistance of foreign technicians, for which adequate funds have become difficult or impossible to come by.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ During 1983 and 1985, the ZAF field deployed elements of its SA-3 missile squadron, with associated radar and communications equipment, and the 15th MiG-21 Squadron in an effort to integrate its air defense network. The deployment exercise was plagued with a series of communications breakdowns and problems with Soviet supplies and the radar equipment. The less than desirable results have caused a strain in relations between the Soviet advisers and ZAF personnel. The situation has also eroded Zambian confidence in the capabilities of the Soviet-supplied equipment.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ ZAF fuel stocks and other essential supplies at all bases are inadequate for sustained operations, though aircraft ordnance is probably sufficient. Each airbase has its own supply depot. Foreign contract and advisory personnel assist the ZAF in routine maintenance.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ The ZAF is composed of native Zambian volunteers and a small number of foreign contract personnel. Competition with private industry for quality recruits is intense. The Air Force tries to recruit junior college and college graduates to fill technician and officer positions, respectively. However, persons with this type of training are in high demand by the mining corporations. For other airmen, the Air Force requires a junior high school education.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Morale within the ZAF has declined over the last few years. Officers and enlisted men alike have turned to theft of ZAF property to compensate for their low salaries. Grievances, especially among the enlisted ranks, include late payment of salaries, housing problems and poor benefits. Because most ZAF personnel feel they are not receiving sufficient compensation for their efforts, the quality of their work has also suffered.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ Basic and advanced flight training is conducted within Zambia at Mbala and Mumbwa Air Force Bases. Specialized training on new aircraft is conducted out of country.

~~(S)~~ The Saab-91 is used for all basic pilot training. The ZAF has conducted jet combat training with the Galeb-Jastreb at Mbala since 1972. Conversion to Soviet and Soviet-type fixed-wing aircraft is accomplished on FT-5 FRESCO (MiG-17) aircraft. Both fighter and trainer jets have been observed at various airfields around the country, apparently conducting navigation and orientation training flights, and a live-fire range has been established south of Mumbwa Air Base. Helicopter training is conducted on the AB-47G.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(C)~~ The ZAF currently has no reserves. An Air Force auxiliary was included in the National Service Act of 1971, but has yet to be formed.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C)~~ All former members of the ZAF are subject to recall by the President in the event of a national emergency.

d. Civil Aviation

(1) Aircraft

(U) Approximately nine civil transport aircraft, with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms, currently are registered, owned, and operated in Zambia:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)	**Owner/Operator**
4 Boeing 707-320C	Zambia Airways
1 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30	Zambia Airways
5 Total	

Medium-Range Transport Aircraft
(1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)

1 Boeing 737-200	Zambia Airways
1 British Aerospace HS-125-1B	Safari Air Services
2 British Aerospace HS-748-2A	Zambia Airways
4 Total	

(U) Zambia Airways is wholly Government owned, and operates on an international and regional network. Safari Air Services is a private company which conducts an executive service together with tour flights.

(2) Pilots

(U) The total number of licensed civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Zambia is not known. Zambia Airways employs approximately 100 pilots, of whom over 20 reportedly are Zambian.

(3) Mobilization Potential

~~(C)~~ Virtually all of Zambia's indigenous civilian aviation personnel and the civil transport aircraft operated by Zambia Airways could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency. Without foreign assistance, however, a lack of fully qualified indigenous flight and maintenance personnel would prevent maximum effective use of the mobilized aircraft.

e. Paramilitary Forces

~~(S)~~ President Kaunda began to doubt the reliability and loyalty of his military forces following the October 1980 coup attempt. At the urging of former Secretary of State for Defense and Security Zulu, President Kaunda has upgraded the status and equipment of Zambia's paramilitary forces in an apparent effort to balance the armed power of the military.

(1) Presidential Guard

(a) Mission

~~(C)~~ The unit's mission is to insure the safety of President Kaunda by providing for his personal security and the security of his residences, particularly the State House in Lusaka.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ Organized in 1981, the Presidential Guard unit was trained by a North Korean military team. Present capabilities are unknown.

(c) Strength

~~(C)~~ Unknown

(d) Organization

~~(C)~~ Unknown

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ Unknown

(2) Police Mobile Force Battalion

(a) Mission

(U) To provide an internal security force and to reinforce the military forces and police in an emergency.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ Mobile elements are trained in rudimentary police and infantry skills, riot control, and counterinsurgency warfare. They are capable of coping with small-scale riots and tribal conflicts, but have only minor combat capabilities. Problem areas have been leadership, training, and equipment.

(c) Strength

~~(C)~~ Approximately 700

(d) Organization

~~(C)~~ The Police Mobile Force Battalion is subordinate to the Zambian National Police Force Headquarters. Battalion personnel are recruited from the regular police. The unit has 16 platoons organized into 4 companies. Battalion headquarters is at Kanifson, near Kitwe. Platoons work in conjunction with Army, police, and Zambian Intelligence and Security Service (ZISS) elements.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Materiel is adequate for general duties, but is insufficient for sustained combat. Armament includes MK-3 .303 rifles, West German G-3 7.62-mm assault rifles; Sterling 9-mm submachineguns; Bren Mk-3 machineguns, some shotguns, riot guns, and tear gas; shields and batons; and a few 60-mm and 81-mm mortars. Land Rovers are assigned for transport. Maintenance of equipment is poor.

(3) Police Paramilitary Battalion

(a) Mission

(U) To guard vital installations throughout Zambia and to provide a force to assist in the maintenance of law and order, particularly along the borders.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ Little is known of the capabilities of this particular unit. The basic and ongoing training of paramilitary personnel appears to be much more like that of infantry than of police. A major deficiency of the unit is that it has no organic transportation assets and must draw on the inefficient Lusaka police motorpool for support. Thus, it is unlikely that the unit can provide effective border patrol. During 1981, the unit successfully blocked a demonstration by University of Zambia students directed against the US Embassy.

(c) Strength

~~(C)~~ Approximately 700

(d) Organization

~~(C)~~ Headquartered at Lilayi, near Lusaka, the Police Paramilitary Battalion has four operational companies. Each of the companies has 4 operational platoons, each consisting of 40 men, which are designed to function as separate units.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Armament includes West German HK 7.62-mm rifles, HK 11 light machineguns, Sten 9-mm submachineguns, Browning 9-mm pistols, 12 20-mm Oerlikon cannons, and 81-mm mortars, and an unknown quantity of Soviet small arms.

(4) Zambian National Police (ZNP)

(a) Mission

(U) The mission of the ZNP is to preserve the peace, prevent and detect crime, and apprehend criminals throughout the Republic.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The ZNP has become increasingly ineffective over the past few years. The police are ill-trained, badly equipped, corrupt, poorly led, and suffer from internal tribal rivalries. Criminal activity is a severe problem in Zambia's urban areas. The reported crime rate in the country has risen over 800 percent since 1979.

(c) Strength

(U) The ZNP has an authorized strength of near 12,000, but is known to be considerably understrength.

(d) Organization

(U) The ZNP is headquartered in Lusaka and divided into nine police divisions based on Zambia's eight provinces and Lusaka, plus four special divisions: the Mobile Unit; the Paramilitary Battalion (see 3.e.(3) above); the Police Training School; and the 140-man Railroad Police formed in 1975 to provide security for the TANZAM Railroad. In addition, there is a Zambian Police Reserve with a strength of around 1,600, concentrated in the main population areas.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ ZNP officers are authorized to carry weapons in the performance of their duties, though use of force is fairly restricted. In the past, UK-supplied pistols and rifles have been the norm. Lack of operational vehicles is a major shortcoming of the ZNP.

(5) Zambian National Service (ZNS)

(a) Mission

(U) The ultimate mission of the ZNS is to prepare Zambia's future leaders — its youth — to serve the nation. This mission is accomplished by conducting training in leadership; UNIP political ideology; basic military skills; and developmental skills, with particular emphasis on agricultural subjects. After a state of emergency has been declared by the President, he may order the ZNS, or any part thereof, to serve with the defense forces.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The ZNS is capable of routine security duties, but its combat capability is negligible. Since 1982, ZNS cadre personnel have received training in Tanzania, the PRC, and East Germany in a variety of skills, including paramilitary training techniques. North Korean military and East German civilian advisers act as instructors at ZNS camps.

(c) Strength

(U) An undetermined number of men and women form a permanent ZNS cadre. Approxi-

mately 15,000 to 20,000 individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 are actively participating in ZNS training at any one time.

(d) Organization

~~(C)~~ The ZNS was removed from the defense force structure and placed under the Ministry of Youth and Sports in 1981. This shift was made in reaction to widespread public criticism over the poor conditions in ZNS camps. The ZNS operates 12 training centers around the nation. Permanent cadre are seconded from the Army or recruited from among individuals completing their ZNS training. All male Zambians who have completed a junior high school education must serve a 20-month tour in the ZNS, though this time need not be served consecutively. Female junior high school graduates are also technically required to serve, but the only ZNS camp for females was closed in 1981. Other young persons of at least 14 years of age may enlist for tours of varying lengths.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ The force is equipped primarily with small arms provided by the PRC, mainly Type 56 carbines, and perhaps some machineguns. Maintenance is generally poor.

f. ~~(S)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	14,000
Air Force	1,800
Paramilitary	1,400+
Total	**17,200+**

g. ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military Presence

Soviet Union:	70+ military advisers	(Providing maintenance and training for Soviet aircraft and air defense systems)
North Korea:	20+ Army advisers	(Providing training to the Army, ZNS, and paramilitary personnel.)

ZAMBIA

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Chipata Mil Instl	1153CA0007	91160	13-32-43S	032-35-17E
Kabwe Army Bks A HQ Chindwin	1153-00128	91140	14-23-25S	028-29-00E
Kitwe	1153-09995	70210	12-49-40S	028-12-23E
Lilaya Police Bks	1153CA0024	90110	15-31-20S	028-18-00E
Lusaka Army HQ Arakan Bks	1153-00016	91140	15-26-25S	028-19-10E
Lusaka Internatl Airfield	1153-08807	80060	15-19-45S	028-27-10E
Lusaka Min Def HQ	1153-00343	89300	15-25-10S	028-18-40E
Mufulira Army Bks A Stor Area Taungup	1153-00133	91150	12-33-55S	028-15-30E
Mumbwa Airfield	1153-08867	80050	15-04-00S	027-11-00E
Mbala Airfield	1054-08000	80050	08-51-25S	031-19-58E
Ndola Army Bks A HQ Kalewa North Rise	1153-00049	90110	12-56-35S	028-38-00E
Ndola Mil HQ A Bks Tug Argon	1153-00011	91140	13-05-20S	028-45-23E
Kaoma Army Bks A HQ Mankoya	1152CA0001	91160	14-49-375	024-48-50E

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ZIMBABWE

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ZIMBABWE

1. GOVERNMENT

a. ~~(C)~~ Key Government Officials

President and Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief: Mr. Robert *Mugabe*

Prime Minister and Minister of Defense: Mr. Enos *Nkala*

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Nathan *Shaimuyarira*

Minister of Home Affairs: Moven *Mahachi*

Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development: Bernard *Chidzero*

Director General, Central Intelligence Organization (internal security/counterintelligence/foreign intelligence): Elias *Mutewera*

b. Type and Stability of Government

~~(C)~~ The former British Colony of Southern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980, following a 14-year insurgency campaign to achieve black majority rule. The Lancaster House Accords, which established the guidelines for independence, mandated several key aspects of the new Zimbabwean Constitution. Among these was a requirement that the form of government be a British-style parliamentary democracy. Also, 20 of the 100 seats in the House and 10 of 40 in the Senate were reserved for representatives of the white minority population. Until 1987, a unanimous vote by Parliament was required to approve a change in these guidelines. Thereafter, however, such changes required only a two-thirds majority in Parliament. In September 1987, the reserved seats and separate voters' roll for whites were abolished, and the vacated seats were filled by an electoral college composed of the remaining members. A number of whites, some previous officeholders, were elected. In November, Parliament passed another amendment, this one abolishing the office of Prime Minister and creating an Executive Presidency, to which former Prime Minister Mugabe was elected the following month.

~~(C)~~ Zimbabwe's government has been dominated by Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) since independence. ZANU-PF is composed primarily of persons from the Shona ethnic group, who make up 70 percent of the population, and was one of two key black nationalist parties in Zimbabwe who fought the war for independence. The other was Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), whose members came almost exclusively from the Matabele (Ndebele) ethnic group, which accounts for about 15 percent of the population. In the March 1980 elections following independence, ZANU-PF won a parliamentary majority of 57 seats, while ZAPU won only 20. Though political and military rivals during the independence struggle, ZANU-PF and ZAPU formed a coalition government after the elections in a spirit of national reconciliation. This coalition probably prevented a postindependence civil war by allowing both parties to better monitor each other's activities, to jointly supervise the creation of a new national military composed of ZANU-PF, ZAPU, and former Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) personnel, and to share the spoils of government patronage.

~~(C)~~ By January 1981, the coalition government between ZANU and ZAPU had fallen apart, and Prime Minister Mugabe moved to discredit his political rivals. Mugabe achieved

some success in his efforts: the white political community was split, with half of the white representatives in the House breaking away from the Republican Front Party (RF) of preindependence Prime Minister Ian Smith and striking out as independents, and Nkomo was reduced from the important position of Minister of Home Affairs to the largely irrelevant position of Minister Without Portfolio. In January 1982, Nkomo and two other ZAPU Ministers were dismissed from the Cabinet and three important members of ZAPU (including the Deputy Commander of the Army) were arrested after large illegal arms caches were uncovered on property owned by ZAPU.

~~(C)~~ Between early 1983 and 1985, the political situation between ZANU and ZAPU continued to degenerate. The increasingly ascendent radical faction within ZANU apparently succeeded in convincing Mugabe that growing ZAPU dissidence must be destroyed. In response, Mugabe ordered the military to "crush" the ZAPU dissidents. In the forefront of the initial military effort was the North Korean-trained, all-ZANU 5 Brigade, which, during early and mid-1983, and again in early 1984, conducted a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation against the Ndebele populace in Matabeleland. This campaign set the stage for violent, popularly supported ethnic conflict. The 5 Brigade has since been retrained by the British and its commanders have been replaced.

~~(C)~~ In July 1985, the GOZ held its first general elections since independence. The formal election campaign, which opened with the registration of candidates 1 month before elections, and the elections themselves were largely free and fair. When the election ended, ZANU-PF had enlarged its existing parliamentary majority by winning 64 of the 80 seats reserved under the 1980 Lancaster House Agreement for representatives of the black electorate. Furthermore, ZAPU captured none of the seats previously reserved for whites in the September 1987 elections.

~~(C)~~ The creation of the Executive Presidency, combined with ZANU-PF's overwhelming political majority, has established a de facto one-party state in Zimbabwe. Mugabe is in the process of formalizing the arrangement by merging the two parties under the ZANU (now referred to as "New ZANU") banner, on the basis of a unity agreement signed in January 1988. ZAPU has nearly ceased to exist as a separate entity, but a number of its members, including Nkomo have been appointed to high level positions in the Government. Also, former ZAPU personnel will probably continue to dominate provincial politics in Southern and Western Zimbabwe, due to their long-standing affiliation with the Ndebele people who live there.

c. Internal Threat

~~(S)~~ Responding to political friction between ZANU and ZAPU, approximately 5,000 of the 18,000 ZAPU guerrillas who were incorporated into a new national military following independence deserted from 1981-1985. About 600-1,000 became engaged in armed dissidence against the government, focused chiefly in Zimbabwe's Matabeleland provinces. Generally operating in small groups of less than 10 men, the dissidents struck at local government institutions, such as schools, agricultural centers, and villages, and engaged in small-scale banditry and terrorism. Between late 1982 and early 1984, and again in 1987 a number of prominent white farmers, the backbone of Matabeleland's commercial agriculture industry, were ambushed and murdered. The dissidents regularly brutalized and murdered Ndebele men, women, and children for suspected collaboration with government security forces. Lack of internal and external support, desertions, and military and police pressure from the government resulted in a steady dwindling of dissident strength, and by 1987 no more than a few hundred remained active. A 1988 government sponsored amnesty program, following on the heels of the ZANU-ZAPU unity agreement, appears to have convinced nearly all of

them to lay down their arms and come in from the bush. However, should the unity process fail, it is probable that low level dissident activity would return to Matabeleland.

d. External Threat

~~(S)~~ Zimbabwe faces two key external military threats. The most immediate threat is posed by the activities of the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). Since 1982, the Zimbabwean Army has deployed troops (currently about 5,000) to Mozambique in order to protect vital transportation routes to the Indian Ocean and Malawi from RENAMO attacks. RENAMO has retaliated by crossing the border to attack villages and economic targets in eastern Zimbabwe. While RENAMO does not pose a serious threat to the government in Harare, its ability to operate successfully into Zimbabwe has made apparent the limitations of an already overtaxed Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).

~~(C)~~ A less immediate threat, but one just as important in the eyes of the government, is the South African military. In May 1986, the South African Defense Force (SADF) displayed its ability to effectively perform limited operations within Zimbabwe's borders, successfully conducting a small-scale commando raid against a suspected ANC safehouse in Harare. For the time being, it appears that South African military operations will remain limited to South African insurgents and their facilities in neighboring states. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Mugabe and others in the Government view the SADF not only as a threat to the ANC and PAC, but also as a potential tool for South African reprisals against Zimbabwe itself. For this reason, Mugabe is trying to acquire the capability to defend against a conventional military threat from South Africa, in addition to the insurgent threats in Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

e. Communist Influence

~~(C)~~ No Communist party exists in Zimbabwe, and it is unlikely that such an organization will develop in the near future. Though Mugabe and the left wing of ZANU-PF are self-proclaimed Marxists, their government has allowed for the existence of private property and competition in the economic sphere, and has generally been responsive, though not enthusiastically, to commercial interests.

~~(C/NF)~~ Because of past Soviet, East German, and Cuban support for ZAPU, Mugabe has been cautious in developing a relationship with these states. He demanded a Soviet renouncement of ZAPU ties prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations on 18 February 1981. However, there was visit by a high-ranking Zimbabwean military delegation to Moscow in early August 1985 which was followed later that month by a brief unofficial stopover and discussions by Mugabe. In December 1985, Mugabe made his first official trip to Moscow. Since then, several military delegations have traveled between the two nations, and a non-binding agreement was signed for the purchase of air defense weapons, to include MiG-29 aircraft. However, the negotiations have reportedly been hampered by ZANU's underlying suspicion of the Soviets and Zimbabwean economic constraints. Zimbabwe has gradually expanded ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), having purchased a squadron of PRC Fishbed/F-7 aircraft. Negotiations for additional Chinese air defense systems are ongoing. Zimbabwe has also maintained ties with North Korea, although military influence has decreased in recent years.

f. Economic Factors

(U) The Zimbabwean economy contracted by about 3 percent in 1987, due primarily to an acute foreign exchange crisis and severe drought. High military expenditures, particularly the costs associated with deployment in Mozambique, have added to the problem. Zimbabwe's foreign debt tripled between 1980 and 1986, and debt service payments

increased from less than 1 percent in 1980 to an approximately 32 percent in 1987. Inflation returned to double figures in 1986 and is likely to remain high in 1987. Unemployment, officially estimated at 12.5 percent in 1984, is now near 18 percent and is forecast to reach 25 percent by the early 1990s. Furthermore, landlocked Zimbabwe's economy will continue to be vulnerable to potential trade and transportation problems arising from instability in neighboring states.

g. Military and Political Alignment

~~(C)~~ Zimbabwe generally follows a policy of nonalignment in its foreign policy, and since gaining independence has taken a leading role in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), for which Prime Minister Mugabe currently serves as chairman. Zimbabwe is a member of the Front Line States Defense and Security Committee, and has signed a defense protocol with Mozambique under which the two countries have agreed to "support" each other in the face of South African military attacks or subversion.

~~(C)~~ Zimbabwe's foreign policy focuses regionally on contributing to change in southern Africa by playing an active role as a member of the Front Line States, which champions majority rule for Namibia and South Africa, and as a member of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which seeks to develop a degree of regional economic independence from South Africa.

~~(S)~~ Prior to independence, the worldwide arms embargo against the then–Rhodesian Government precluded close military associations with any country but South Africa. Over the past 7 years, however, Zimbabwe has moved to upgrade its largely obsolete arms inventory undertaking major agreements with the UK, China, Brazil, Italy, and France. In 1982, it accepted a major grant of a variety of armor and artillery equipment from North Korea. In 1984, North Korea delivered 20 M1973 armored personnel carriers. During 1983, Zimbabwe signed two agreements with Italy, one for 17 SF-260 turboprop aircraft worth $8,500,000 and the other for two AB-412 helicopters worth $4 million; an agreement for the purchase of 10 more Italian-manufactured Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters was concluded in August 1985 (delivery was completed in 1987). China provided Zimbabwe, on a grant basis, a variety of equipment including armored personnel carriers, artillery, and antiaircraft weapons in 1980, and 36 Type 59 tanks in 1983. In 1986/1987, Zimbabwe purchased 12 Chinese F-7 jet fighters. Brazil delivered 90 Cascavel armored cars in mid-1984, and another 40 in 1986. Most recently, in 1987, agreement was reached with France for the purchase of Alouette III helicopters, along with refurbishment of those still in the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) inventory. Currently, Zimbabwe is discussing the purchase of air defense equipment and aircraft with number of countries including the United Kingdom, PRC, and the Soviet Union.

~~(S)~~ Since independence, a British military advisory team has been present in Zimbabwe. Initially involved in forming a new national military, it now focuses on improving the quality of the military school system. To maintain Zimbabwe's nonaligned bona fides, in 1981 Mugabe accepted North Korean military assistance. From November 1981 until July 1982, a North Korean military training team formed, equipped, and trained the 5 Brigade at Inyanga. Most of this team departed Zimbabwe in July when the training was completed. However, a second similar team arrived in September of 1982 to provide training for the newly formed Presidential Guard Brigade and the People's Militia. Most of these North Korean advisers departed Zimbabwe by mid-1983. Smaller North Korean training teams worked with the People's Militia and armored units in 1984 and 1985. A small People's Republic of China military team was in the country in 1984 and provided field artillery and tank gunnery training and advised the Presidential Guard Brigade. Forty-two Pakistani

Air Force pilots, pilot instructors, and maintenance technicians were assigned to the Air Force of Zimbabwe in 1983 to fill some of the vacancies left by departing white Rhodesian Air Force personnel and British Air Force advisers. Most have since completed their tours and departed and only eight remain today. Over 40 Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) personnel are still assigned to signals and maintenance units within the ZNA.

~~(C)~~ Zimbabwe has also sent hundreds of personnel abroad for military training since independence. Countries which have hosted Zimbabwean trainees include Bulgaria, Cuba, Canada, China, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Libya, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, the UK, the US, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. Training in the United States began in 1982 for Zimbabwe Air Force personnel and in 1983 for Zimbabwe National Army members.

h. (U) Key US Officials

Chief of Mission (Harare): Ambassador James W. Rawlings

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2. MILITARY, GENERAL

a. ~~(C)~~ Key Military Officials

Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA):

Commander: Lt General Solomon *Mujuru* (former name-Rex Nhongo)

Chief of Staff G Branch (Operations): Maj Gen Sheba *Gava*

Chief of Staff A Branch (Administration and Personnel): Brigadier B. *Mabenge*

Chief of Staff Q Branch (Logistics): Maj Gen J.B. *Maseko*

Commander, 1 Bde: Brigadier P.W. *Zimondi*

Commander, 2 Bde: Brigadier Ambrose *Mutinhiri*

Commander, 3 Bde: Colonel M. *Mzheri*

Commander, 4 Bde: Brigadier P. *Sibanda*

Commander, 5 Bde: Colonel Eddie *Mashingaidze*

Commander, 6 Bde: Brigadier Agrippa *Mutambara*

Commander, Presidential Guard Brigade: Brigadier F. *Muchemwa*

Commander, 1 Parachute Group: Colonel A.B. *Mwaketa*

Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ):

Commander: Air Marshal Josiah *Tungamirai*

b. Position of Armed Forces

~~(S)~~ The Zimbabwean military is composed of an Army, Air Force, and reserve force. The ZNA, with a strength of about 44,000, overshadows the 2,500-man AFZ.

~~(S)~~ The Zimbabwean military chain of command extends from the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief, through the Minister of Defense, to the commanders of the Army and Air Force. The Service commanders exercise command of major subordinate units. The Permanent Secretary for Defense monitors the defense portfolio on a day-to-day basis.

Additionally, there is a Defense Council, composed of the commanders of the ZNA and AFZ, which meets monthly with the Ministry of Defense to discuss defense policy. Within the military structure, there is a Commander's Council composed of the commanders, deputy commanders, and chiefs of staff of the ZNA and AFZ, which meets every 2 weeks to discuss service and interservice problems.

~~(C)~~ The Armed Forces have traditionally avoided involvement in national politics and the AFZ and ZNA appear to be loyal to the Government and prepared to carry out Government directives. Members of the armed forces who previously served in the old Rhodesian military are conservative in their outlook, anti-Communist, and pro-US. Members of ZANU and ZAPU profess a radical political outlook, but tend to lack a commitment to Marxist principles and an understanding of Marxist philosophy. ZAPU personnel tend to admire the Soviets, East Germans, and Cubans, from whom they received military training and equipment when they were a fledgling guerrilla army. ZANU personnel distrust the supporters of their rival organization, ZAPU, and are sympathetic to the Bulgarians, Chinese, Romanians, Yugoslavs, and North Koreans for their past support of ZANU. Neither ZAPU nor ZANU personnel appear to have any strong positive or negative feelings regarding the US.

~~(C)~~ The mission of the Zimbabwe military is to protect the national territory, maintain internal security, and conduct limited external operations in support of national interests.

c. Military Trends and Capabilities

~~(C)~~ Despite force development problems, the Zimbabwe military is capable of defending the nation against any neighboring country with the exception of South Africa. The military can successfully conduct joint conventional or counterinsurgency operations throughout Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent in neighboring Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana.

~~(C)~~ The most significant military trend in post-independence Zimbabwe has been the increase in the size and diversity of the force's commitments. Since its creation in 1980-81, with the integration of the Rhodesian Defense Force (RDF) and ZANU and ZAPU guerrilla forces, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) have been called upon to defend the nation against an expanding number of internal and external threats. Today, the ZNA and AFZ are heavily committed to the defense of key routes in Mozambique, while at the same time being called upon to control internal dissidence, defend against RENAMO forays into eastern Zimbabwe, and protect the country from South African incursions. The military remains at least marginally capable of performing the first three missions, though not the last, but is clearly being overtaxed. The resulting degradation in equipment, supplies, and frequency of training is undermining the capability of the force at present, and will have an impact well into the next decade.

d. ~~(C)~~ Military Budget: $433.80 million for fiscal year ending 30 June 1988; 18.6 percent of the central government budget (dollar values converted from Zimbabwean dollars at the exchange rate of Z$1.66 equal US $1.00.)

e. (U) Population: 9,371,972 as of July 1987

Males (ages 15-49): 1,876,000; physically fit, 1,157,000

Ethnic Divisions: African — 96 percent; European — 3 percent; colored (mixed blood) and Asiatics — 1 percent

Literacy: 45-55 percent overall; nearly 100 percent among Europeans

3. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

a. Army

(1) Mission

~~(C)~~ To protect the national territory, to maintain internal security, and conduct limited external operations in support of national interests.

(2) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) is capable of defending the nation against any neighboring countries with the exception of South Africa. The Army can conduct conventional or counterinsurgency operations within Zimbabwe, and to a limited extent in neighboring Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana.

~~(C)~~ However, the effectiveness of the Army is limited by a shortage of close air support and transport aircraft. Since many of the Air Force aircraft have reached the end of their operational lives and must be replaced with new aircraft, the Army's capability for both training exercises and actual counterinsurgency operations has been severely diminished. Army operations are also hampered by a lack of ground transport and communication assets needed for effective deployment and direction of units.

~~(C)~~ Another weakness of the ZNA has been the lack of cohesiveness and esprit de corps among the three factions integrated to form the new Army. The spillover of ethnic and political conflicts into unit garrisons resulted in the breakup of many of the newly integrated units. Most of the ex-ZIPRA combatants and white RSF personnel have left the Army, leaving it staffed largely with former ZANLA and black RSF soldiers. The exodus of white officers and NCOs has resulted in a shortage of mid-level managers and technicians. However, this problem has not affected the Army as adversely as the Air Force.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ Authorized active duty strength is about 45,000. Actual strength is about 44,000.

(4) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The Army's combat force consists of 8 regular infantry brigades and 8 specialized independent units. Each infantry brigade controls three infantry battalions and has organic engineer, signal, intelligence, maintenance, finance, medical, and military police units. The brigades are responsible for areas within the country and for security along given sections of Zimbabwe's borders. The 1 Brigade HQ is in Bulawayo as is that of 6 Brigade; 2 Brigade HQ is in Harare, 3 Brigade HQ in Mutare, 4 Brigade HQ in Masvingo, and 5 Brigade is in Guinea Fowl. The eight independent units are the Presidential Guard Brigade (three infantry battalions); one each commando, horse-mounted infantry, and mechanized infantry battalion; an armored regiment; a field artillery regiment; an air defense artillery regiment; and a parachute group (two parachute battalions and a Special Air Services Squadron). Recent information suggests that the field and air defense artillery regiments will be consolidated during 1988.

(b) ~~(S)~~ *Ground Combat Units*

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit	
	Authorized	Average/Actual
6 Brigade Headquarters	136	160
1 Presidential Guard Brigade Headquarters	Unk	160

Major Tactical Units	Strength per Unit Authorized	Average/Actual
1 Parachute Group Headquarters	Unk	50-100
1 Air Defense Artillery Regiment	Unk	940
1 Armored Regiment	Unk	1,500
1 Artillery Regiment	Unk	750
18 Infantry Battalions	1,024	900-950
2 Parachute Battalions	Unk	350-400
1 Commando Battalion	1,012	825
1 Mounted Infantry Battalion (Grey's Scouts)	550	625
3 Presidential Guard Battalions	Unk	900-950
1 Mechanized Battalion	Unk	750

(c) Deployment

~~(S)~~ Infantry units are deployed throughout the country within brigade areas of responsibility. However, battalions from a brigade may be placed under the operational control of another brigade, the Army headquarters, or a special task force or joint operations command when conducting operations beyond the parent brigade's normal scope or area of responsibility. Other combat units, such as the parachute group, armored regiment, and the specialized infantry units, tend to be based in the capital city of Harare and deployed as needed. Additionally, district commands exist in Bulawayo and Harare to administer combat, combat support, service support, and reserve units that support the Army as a whole.

(5) Weapons and Equipment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ The equipment in the ZNA inventory is somewhat obsolete by Western standards. Large amounts of modern armaments manufactured in a variety of Communist states (which were previously in guerrilla hands) were integrated into Army stocks during the force integration process. The North Koreans provided a major infusion of armor, artillery, and small arms in 1981. In 1983, the People's Republic of China provided tanks, APCs, field artillery, and air defense weapons. Delivery of 90 Cascavel armored cars from Brazil was made in mid-1984 and 40 more were delivered in 1986. It is likely that the Zimbabwean Army will continue to seek new equipment and replacement parts from both Western and Eastern Bloc suppliers.

~~(C)~~ The old Rhodesian Army converted numerous trucks of various sizes into lightly armored, mine-resistant transport vehicles by replacing the bodies of the vehicles. This practice has been continued by the ZNA, and these vehicles, which bear names such as Kudu, Tusker, Rhino, Puma, Hippo, Cougar, Leopard, and Crocodile, still constitute a major form of troop transport.

(b) ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ Ground Weapons and Equipment

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
Armor:	Tank, T-55	PL, UR, KN	8
	Tank, Type 69-2 (T-55 equivalent)	KN	10
	Tank, Type 59	PRC	30

		Country of Origin	Total Inventory
	Tank, T-34	UR	7
	APC, BTR-152	UR	16
	APC, MI973	KN	16
	APC, Type 63/531	PRC	8
	APC, Crocodile	ZI	170-200
	ARC, BRDM-11	UR	5
	Armored car, Cascavel	BR	90
Artillery:	57-mm antitank gun, Type 55	KN, PRC	29+
	130-mm field gun, Type 59	PRC	Unk
	122-mm howitzer, Type 54	KN, PRC	12
	122-mm gun, Type 60	KN	4
	5.5-inch gun	UK	8
	88-mm (25-lb) field gun	UK	40+
	76-mm antitank gun	YU, KN, UR	34
Air Defense Artillery:	37-mm air defense gun	YU, UR, CH	35
	20-mm AAMG	Unk	45
	14.5-mm AAMG (ZPU-1, 2, 4)	KN, UR, CH, YO	36
	SA-7 missiles	Unk	30
Mortars:	120-mm mortar	YU, KN	6
	82-mm mortar	KN	35
	81-mm mortar	UK, SF	104
	60-mm mortar	GE	30
	60-mm mortar	ZI	1,500+
Rkt Lchrs and Rcl Rifles (RCLR):	107-mm multiple rocket launcher Type 63	KN	18
	88-mm rocket launcher	Unk	123
	40-mm rocket launcher	KN	164
	106-mm RCLR	USA	6
	82-mm RCLR, B-10	YO, KN	35
	75-mm RCLR, Type 56	PRC	29
Motor Trnsprt:	1/4-ton Land Rover truck	UK	Unk
	Haflander jeep truck	AU	30
	2.5-ton truck	KN	103
	3-ton Bedford truck	UK	1,500
	4.35-ton truck	KN	4
	5-ton Mercedes truck	SF	50
	K-61 tracked amphibious vehicles	KN	4
	GSP ferry vehicle	UR	4

(6) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(C)~~ The Zimbabwean Government abolished conscription at independence. With the exception of the formation of the new 6 Brigade, Army recruitment has been limited to equipment technicians in order to give former guerrilla personnel priority placement.

~~(S)~~ Retention of white officers and skilled technicians is a problem for the Army. Many are naturally reluctant to serve with their former opponents. Efforts to retain these personnel have centered around appeals to their esprit de corps and military professionalism, but have

been largely unsuccessful. Nearly all of the white personnel present at independence have left the Army.

~~(S)~~ Fortunately for the ZNA, the majority of black NCOs and enlisted personnel carried over from the old force have elected to remain in service. These personnel have proven an invaluable, albeit limited, source for the developing ZNA as training cadres, a professional NCO corps, and a source of skilled junior officer personnel.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ At present, the ZNA's logistics system remains marginally capable of moving and supporting units inside Zimbabwe and to a lesser degree on external operations. The loss of most of the service's white technicians, however, has left the future of the ZNA logistics system in a questionable state. Vehicle maintenance facilities are understaffed and backlogged. Former guerrilla technicians are generally unfamiliar with Western-style equipment and maintenance techniques, though, as part of the British military assistance program, training was provided to these individuals.

~~(S)~~ The old Rhodesian Army always worked from minimum supply and ammunition stock levels as a result of the UN arms embargo against the Rhodesian Government, which was lifted at independence. Explosions at the Inkomo Ammunition Depot in July 1981 destroyed over 60 percent of the Army's preindependence ammunition stocks and caused the military to begin using former guerrilla arms and ammunition as the mainstay of the operational inventory. Since 1983, Zimbabwe has concluded a number of agreements for the purchase of small arms, mortar, and artillery ammunition from both Western and Eastern Bloc suppliers.

~~(C)~~ Although the ZNA is capable of moving and supporting units inside Zimbabwe, the logistics system is very vulnerable. As a landlocked country, Zimbabwe is highly dependent on its transportation network, its railways in particular. In general, the railway system is well developed although it suffers from a chronic shortage of motive power and poor maintenance. It is heavily dependent on the good will of South Africa, and this relationship always remains tense. The highway system, originally developed as a feeder to the railway, has well-constructed principal routes. However, the existence of bottlenecks and the lack of alternate routes limits large-scale military movement. Movement is also hampered by rough terrain and seasonal flood damage.

(8) Training

~~(C)~~ As part of the integration process, a British military training team conducted a program to convert former guerrillas into regular soldiers. The program was designed to produce battalion-size infantry units. The training cycle was 8 weeks long and divided into officer, NCO, and enlisted sections. The class standing of a person at the end of the training session determined his position in the new unit so that the number one graduate of the officer section became the battalion commander. One British officer and NCO stayed with each unit after training to continue conventional military instruction at the unit's garrison location. This program was completed in November 1981. During 1982, the British continued providing battalion-level advisers to conduct unit training. They also began a program to upgrade the quality and curriculum at the ZNA's numerous military schools. Today the British instructors are concentrated at the Staff College, Military Academy, and Battalion Battle School. The Staff College, located at King George VI Barracks in Harare, is the site of the Intermediate Staff Course, which prepares officers for staff appointments in the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel. The Junior Staff Course, which began in 1984, prepares junior officers for staff appointments. The Foundation Course, Company Commander Course, and Battle Group Commanders Course are taught at the Zimbabwe Military Academy at Gweru.

The first Battalion Battle School Course began at Inyanga in September 1983. Since that time, all of the ZNA's infantry battalions, except those of the new 6 Brigade, have rotated through the school at least once. The Battalion Battle School has proved very effective in upgrading the overall combat capabilities of the ZNA, though individual unit capabilities vary widely.

(9) Reserves

(U) In late 1982, the Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM) was formed to replace the old, white-dominated Rhodesian Territorial Army, which had been allowed to degenerate since independence, as the reserve component of the ZNA. The basic regulations of the Territorial Army Act were adopted to govern the new militia force. The first increment of 750 militia cadre and soldiers were trained at the Paradise Camp training center near Bindura. The first militia unit was established in Gokwe District, which borders Matabeleland North, in early 1983. Training of militia personnel has continued since that time.

(a) Mission

(U) To serve as a reserve for the ZNA and police by providing local area security, reinforce the ZNA and police in antidissident operations, and gather intelligence on antigovernment dissidents.

(b) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ The Militia has a limited capability to reinforce the ZNA on both internal and external operations, conduct border patrols, and provide guard forces at strategic locations. However, Militia personnel are inadequately trained and lack discipline. Furthermore, Militia support for ZNA operations is complicated by the fact that Militia units are not in the Army chain of command or subject to Army disciplinary procedures.

(c) Personnel Strength

(U) The present strength of the People's Militia is estimated at about 4,500. About 1,000 are permanent cadre; the rest serve for 6-month periods as required. Early increments of militia trainees were trained by the North Koreans. Numbering about 1,000, these personnel now serve as commanders, administrators, and instructors at 11 militia training camps located throughout the country. Officers from the ZNA are seconded to the People's Militia to fill some of these positions as well.

(d) Organization

(U) The People's Militia is organized around eight brigade headquarters, each of which is located in one of Zimbabwe's eight provinces. The brigade headquarters are under the operational and administrative control of the local ZNA commander. However, they are ultimately responsible to, and under the authority of, the Minister of Home Affairs. When fully organized, the brigades are slated to control a total of 55 battalions, corresponding to each one of Zimbabwe's administrative districts.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ The Militia is equipped with 7.62-mm assault rifles and machineguns, 12-gauge shotguns, grenade launchers, and mortars.

b. Navy

~~(S)~~ Zimbabwe does not have a navy. However, the Zimbabwe National Army Corps of Engineers operates a patrol boat squadron on Lake Kariba. Approximately 50 soldiers

operate a number of small patrol boats and a large landing craft on the lake. Their mission is to support Army amphibious operations and to assist the police in antismuggling patrols.

c. Air Force

(1) Mission

~~(S)~~ To defend Zimbabwe's airspace; to support the Army and police in maintaining internal security; to assist the Army during external operations; and to support the civil government for selected nonmilitary purposes.

(2) Capabilities

~~(S)~~ Unlike the ZNA, the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) did not undergo a large-scale restructuring after independence. Retaining most of its ex-RSF personnel, the AFZ maintained a significant combat capability until mid-1982, when a sabotage incident at the AFZ's main operating base destroyed a major portion of the AFZ's combat aircraft. A number of ZANU radicals, who looked upon the Air Force as the last bastion of white supremacy in the military, seized upon the incident as an opportunity to break this perceived white dominance. At their instigation, some apparently innocent senior white Air Force officers were arrested and tortured in connection with the sabotage. These officers were tried and acquitted of all the sabotage charges. However, they were detained again immediately after their acquittals. Although the officers were eventually released by the government, their treatment had an adverse effect on Air Force morale and readiness. In response to this and to frustration with the lack of promotion opportunities for white officers, there have been a large number of resignations of whites from the AFZ.

~~(S)~~ At present, the AFZ retains a marginal operational capability. Aircraft are heavily involved in supporting ZNA operations against RENAMO in neighboring Mozambique. Reporting suggests, however, that the AFZ will continue to experience a large number of resignations. The situation was exacerbated in early 1984 when the last Royal Air Force advisers departed Zimbabwe. The arrival of 42 seconded Pakistani Air Force personnel in late 1983 was intended to fill some of the vacancies left by the departing British and white Rhodesian personnel. However, all but a few have now left. The loss of an operational Air Force would heavily cost Mugabe during any future internal or external challenge. Despite personnel shortfalls, the Air Force is not likely to collapse, although it will probably continue to operate at a low level of efficiency.

(3) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ The total authorized personnel strength of the AFZ is 2,564. Actual flying strength is approximately 1,500, and personnel levels in the flying squadrons are probably 30 percent to 50 percent below what is authorized. There are over 120 aircraft in the inventory, but only about 40 pilots. Only black pilots are being trained to fly the new F-7. The actual strength of the AFZ Regiment responsible for air base defense is believed to be 1,000 to 1,100.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Aircraft Strength

Total: 125 (fixed-wing: 83 — 31 jet, 12 turboprop, 40 prop; helicopters: 42)

In operational units: 125
(14 fighters
5 bombers
6 light strike
18 transports

26 trainers
14 utility
42 helicopters)

(5) Organization and Deployment

(a) General

~~(S)~~ AFZ Headquarters at Harare is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and the Air Force commander is subordinate to the Defense Minister. Two permanent air stations are located at New Sarum (near Harare) and Gweru/Thornhill with subordinate flying, technical, and administrative wings. Tactical elements are organized into eight squadrons. Additionally, there is an Air Force Regiment headquartered at Fylde Air Station (near Centenary), which controls two infantry physical security squadrons and two air defense artillery squadrons. They are assigned in support of the permanent air stations.

(b) ~~(S)~~ *Summary of Units*

Units	Aircraft Type	Total	Principal Base
1 Ground Attack Squadron:			
	Hawker Hunter GA-9	10	Gweru/Thornhill
	Hawker Hunter T-80	1	
2 Fighter/Training Squadrons:			
	Hawk T-1	7	Gweru/Thornhill
	Marchetti SF-260	20	
1 Air Defense Squadron:			
	F-7 Fishbed (4 operational)	8	Gweru/Thornhill
	F-5 Fresco	2	
1 Transport Squadron:			
	C-47	14	Harare/New Sarum
	Islander	6	
	Casa C-212	6	
1 Light Support/COIN Squadron:			
	Cessna F337 (Lynx)	9	Gweru/Thornhill
2 Helicopter Support Squadrons:			
	Alouette III (11 operational)	27	Harare/New Sarum
	Bell-205 (2 operational)	8	
	Bell-412	11	
2 Physical Security Squadrons:			Harare/New Sarum Gweru/Thornhill
2 Antiaircraft Artillery Squadrons:			Harare/New Sarum Gweru/Thornhill

(6) Status of Equipment

~~(S)~~ Most aircraft are of British origin; newer aircraft are primarily French, Italian, and Spanish. During the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period between 1965 and 1980, Rhodesia obtained a variety of aircraft from several different countries to include Alouette III utility helicopters from France and South Africa, AL-60 fixed-wing utility aircraft from Italy, and a number of Cessna 337s and Agusta-Bell 205 helicopters from Israeli and European sources. In 1981, the Zimbabwe Air Force purchased five rebuilt

Hawker Hunter aircraft from Kenya and two rebuilt Canberra bombers from the UK. In 1982, Zimbabwe took receipt of eight Hawk fighter/trainer jet aircraft from the UK.

~~(S)~~ By late 1982, the UDI-era aircraft fleet was aging. Most of the Canberra bombers and Agusta-Bell 205 helicopters were grounded. The AL-60 Conestoga utility aircraft were no longer serviceable. To make matters worse, six Hunter fighter-bombers and one Hawk trainer were destroyed in a sabotage attack on Gweru/Thornhill Base in July 1982. In 1985, at least four helicopters were destroyed in crashes, three of them while on operations in Mozambique. The AFZ also lost a C-47 and a C-212 in Mozambique in 1986-87.

~~(S)~~ Zimbabwe has made some progress in replenishing its dwindling Air Force fleet. In 1983, the Air Force received six Casa C-212 transport aircraft from Spain. In 1987, Italy completed delivery of 12 Agusta Bell 412 utility helicopters. In October 1983, Zimbabwe signed a contract with the UK for five used Hawker Hunter aircraft to replace those destroyed in the sabotage attack. These aircraft were delivered in mid-1984. Zimbabwe has also purchased 12 F-7 fighter aircraft from the People's Republic of China which were delivered in 1986 and 1987.

(7) Logistics

~~(S)~~ The AFZ has had difficulty maintaining its operational effectiveness because of the continuing loss of skilled technical personnel. This trend will probably persist through the end of this decade as personnel resignations continue. Although aircraft maintenance personnel are fairly skilled at conducting actual repairs, they are relatively unskilled in trouble-shooting maintenance problems.

(8) Personnel Procurement and Retention

~~(S)~~ The AFZ receives a sufficient number of volunteers, but it has had difficulty recruiting personnel with the potential to become fully qualified pilots. Most personnel serve a 4-year term of active duty. In addition, technically skilled civilian personnel are contracted. A civilian firm, Airwork Zimbabwe Ltd, carries out most servicing but foreign exchange shortage limits spare parts and technician pay.

(9) Training

~~(S)~~ Until 1984, AFZ training programs were of high standard, and the force retained a capability to train its own pilot and technical personnel. However, this situation has changed somewhat during the last few years due to personnel resignations and an overwhelming operational commitment in Mozambique. Additionally, pilots returning from training in the Eastern Bloc proved unqualified to fly ZNA aircraft and had to be retrained. Training by PRC instructors on the new F-7s is proceeding slowly, and is being hampered by a generally poor relationship between the instructors and AFZ personnel.

(10) Reserves and Mobilization

(a) Reserves

~~(S)~~ The Volunteer Reserve is organized into ground servicing squadrons. Units are trained and equipped for specific tasks, and some are responsible for helping maintain forward airfields. Members join for a minimum of 3 years and receive training in regular courses during evenings and weekends. The Volunteer Reserve is designed to augment the logistic capabilities of the force when air operations are increased during emergencies. Present strength is estimated to be 200-300.

(b) Mobilization

~~(C)~~ Present mobilization capabilities of the reserve forces are unknown.

d. Civil Aviation

(U) Approximately 13 civil transport aircraft with a gross takeoff weight of at least 9,000 kilograms currently are registered, owned, and operated in Zimbabwe:

Long-Range Transport Aircraft (greater than 3,500 NM or 6,500 km)	**Owner/Operator**
5 Boeing 707-330B	Air Zimbabwe
2 McDonnell Douglas DC-8F-55	Affretair
7 Total	
Medium-Range Transport Aircraft (1,200-3,500 NM or 2,200-6,500 km)	
1 Boeing 737-200	Air Zimbabwe
1 Vickers VISCOUNT 700	Air Zimbabwe
2 Total	

(U) Air Zimbabwe is entirely owned by the Government of Zimbabwe. Air Zimbabwe acquired the first of three Boeing 737-200s it had ordered in 1987. There has been no confirmation of the delivery of the other two. Affretair merged with Air Zimbabwe in 1983 but continues to operate separately.

(U) The total number of civilian pilots of major transport aircraft in Zimbabwe is not known. Air Zimbabwe reportedly employs about 75 pilots.

~~(C)~~ Most of Zimbabwe's civil aircraft and virtually all indigenous civilian aviation personnel could be mobilized in the event of war or comparable national emergency.

e. Paramilitary Forces

(1) Police Support Unit (PSU or "Black Boots")

(a) Mission

(U) To provide paramilitary support for urban and rural police districts faced with situations beyond their capability to handle. This includes controlling civil disturbances, suppressing large-scale banditry, and assisting in border security.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The PSU appears marginally capable of performing its mission. Since 1982, it has been heavily involved in suppressing dissidence in Matabeleland. Trained in counterinsurgent operations, the PSU frequently operates in conjunction with the ZNA.

(c) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ The estimated strength of the force is 2,000. Its size was doubled in 1982 at the direction of the Minister of Home Affairs. All newly assigned personnel are former ZANU combatants.

(d) Organization

~~(C)~~ The PSU is headquartered in Harare and is subordinate to Zimbabwe Republic Police

Headquarters. Subordinate elements of the PSU usually operate in platoon strength when supporting local police or conducting security patrols.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ The PSU is equipped as light infantry. Weaponry includes FN and G-3 7.62-mm rifles, light machineguns, and some 60-mm mortars. The unit has organic transport assets that are allocated from headquarters. When in the field, PSU elements either live off the land or purchase consumable supplies locally.

(2) Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)

(a) Mission

(U) To maintain law and order, aid in the lawful functions of the Government and of the community, supervise immigration, and assist the Armed Forces in maintaining internal security. The police have received a greater share of responsibility for antidissident operations and border security in recent years.

(b) Capabilities

(U) Due to a large number of commitments, the ZRP has been able to only partially perform its mission. The dissident problem in Matabeleland, and RENAMO violence and refugee problems along the Mozambique border have placed a severe strain on ZRP resources. The organization's effectiveness has been further damaged due to its use as a political tool by former Minister of Home Affairs Ushewokunze. However, the ZRP is basically a professional force that can be expected to respond, albeit with limited effect, to government directives.

(c) Personnel Strength

~~(S/NF)~~ The estimated strength of the force is 15,000, of which about 2,000 to 3,000 are white.

(d) Organization

(U) Under a Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police in Harare, there are six provincial headquarters, each divided into a rural and an urban division. Urban police report through town police stations to provincial headquarters; rural police report directly to provincial headquarters. The ZRP employs military organization throughout its ranks.

~~(C)~~ Police reserves total approximately 20,000 men, including whites. Reserves consist of the following elements:

"A" Reserve: (About 300 personnel) — This is a volunteer force of police reservists whose specific task is normal police work to relieve the regular force at urban police stations. It does not have a paramilitary role.

Field Reserve: (About 20,000 personnel) — Personnel are recruited throughout the country and employed whenever they are required for "emergency assistance." Their task is often paramilitary, such as escort and protection duties, and seldom involves police work.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ The ZRP has small arms, including 7.62-mm automatic rifles. The ZRP also has a small number of locally built armored cars fashioned from truck bodies. Light vehicles such

as Land Rovers are in wide use. Weapons and equipment are believed to be adequate for the force and are maintained in usable condition.

(3) Farm Militia

(a) Mission

~~(C)~~ In 1986, the Government authorized the Commercial Farmers Union to organize a small number of paramilitary personnel to protect farmers in Matabeleland from dissident violence. Farm Militia units are responsible for protecting the property and farmers to whom they are assigned.

(b) Capabilities

~~(C)~~ The Farm Militia is generally capable of providing defense against dissidents of equal or smaller numbers. They have little capability to pursue and destroy dissident units.

(c) Personnel Strength

~~(C)~~ Approximately 300 personnel. They are chiefly ex-Army or seconded People's Militia troops.

(d) Organization

~~(C)~~ Farm Militia are assigned to farmers in units or "sticks" of 5-10 men. Generally, only one unit is assigned per farmer, but very large farms may have two. The farmers themselves are responsible for paying the troops.

(e) Status of Equipment

~~(C)~~ Equipment consists of a variety of small arms from ZNA and People's Militia stocks.

f. ~~(S/NF)~~ Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	44,000
Air Force	2,500
Paramilitary	2,000
Militia (Includes Reserve)	4,500
Police	15,000
Police Reserves	20,000
Total	**88,000**

g. Foreign Military Presence

(1) ~~(S)~~ Foreign Military In-Country

UK: 44 Army instructors (service schools)

PRC: 30 (Pilot and maintenance instructors for the F-7)

Pakistan: 8 Air Force advisers

(2) ~~(S)~~ Presence Abroad

Soviet Union: Approximately 50 undergoing flight and flight support training.

East Germany: 20 Army personnel attending 4-year course that began in December 1984.

North Korea: 15 undergoing flight training.

PRC: Approximately 80 undergoing flight and maintenance training for the F-7 aircraft.

Algeria: 30

Canada: 3 Army personnel, at least one of whom is in the Command and Staff Course.

Greece: 9 Army and Air Force technicians.

United Kingdom: 7 Army and Air Force trainees.

West Germany: 2 attending Combined Arms Course.

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ZIMBABWE

Appendix

Installation BE List (U)

Name	BE Number	Category	Latitude	Longitude
Paradise Camp — Bindura Militia Training Ctr	1176CA0040	90140	17-22-58S	031-22-57E
Bulawayo — 1 Bde HQ	1275-00031	91140	20-02-28S	028-36-20E
Bulawayo District Cmd	1275-00031	91031	20-08-21S	028-36-18E
Fylde Airfield	1176-88015	80080	18-09-40S	029-58-00E
Guinea Fowl — 5 Bde HQ	1176-00980	91140	19-32-00S	029-56-00E
Gweru Military Academy	1176-00017	90130	19-28-25S	029-48-35E
Gweru/Thornhill Flying Wing	1176-00855	81313	19-26-50S	029-51-30E
Harare — 2 Bde HQ	1176-00107	91141	17-51-20S	031-04-00E
Harare — District Cmd	1176-00018	91031	17-48-05S	031-03-55E
Harare — Inkomo Ammo Storage Facility SW	1176CA0032	92010	17-41-05S	030-42-10E
Harare/New Sarum Flying Wing	1176-00852	81313	17-55-50S	031-06-10E
Harare King George IV Bks (Staff College)	1176-00018	90130	17-48-05S	031-03-55E
Nyanga — Battalion Battle School	1176CA0027	90120	18-11-30S	032-39-30E
Masvingo — 4 Bde HQ	1275CA0006	91141	20-04-00S	030-50-00E
Mutare — 3 Bde HQ	1176-00381	91141	18-58-30S	032-42-13E

SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL

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