WEBVTT 00:00.200 --> 00:02.256 Thank you , Representative Bacon for 00:02.256 --> 00:04.478 those uh passionate remarks . Um Next , 00:04.478 --> 00:06.644 we'll be hearing from our intelligence 00:06.644 --> 00:08.811 integration panel featuring several of 00:08.811 --> 00:10.922 our combatant commands . J Twos and J 00:10.922 --> 00:13.033 Sixes moderated by Lieutenant General 00:13.033 --> 00:15.256 Henry at this time . Please give a warm 00:15.256 --> 00:17.144 welcome to all of our panelists . 01:03.930 --> 01:07.169 All right . Uh Well , I get to um to 01:07.180 --> 01:10.089 moderate a , a GUST panel here today . 01:10.540 --> 01:12.769 Um Those seats very , by the way , are 01:12.779 --> 01:15.610 very uncomfortable . Um I don't know if 01:15.620 --> 01:17.676 you noticed when I was standing here 01:17.676 --> 01:19.731 before how uncomfortable I looked it 01:19.731 --> 01:22.009 because the seat is very uncomfortable . 01:22.009 --> 01:24.009 I can't even imagine what it's like 01:24.009 --> 01:26.231 sitting back there . It's gotta be even 01:26.231 --> 01:28.342 even different . Uh But , but again , 01:28.342 --> 01:30.790 um thanks to uh Mr Casa and uh the 01:30.800 --> 01:33.620 whole dia team for uh hosting this and 01:33.629 --> 01:36.150 giving us an opportunity uh to talk 01:36.160 --> 01:39.370 about some uh particular topics on war 01:39.379 --> 01:42.760 fighting , how uh the , the folks that 01:42.769 --> 01:45.199 actually utilize what you provide , uh 01:45.209 --> 01:47.480 put those to use and , and hopefully 01:47.489 --> 01:49.545 hear from them on some of the things 01:49.545 --> 01:51.378 that they need from you and from 01:51.378 --> 01:53.489 industry and our partners uh that are 01:53.489 --> 01:55.600 in the audience . Uh But before we do 01:55.600 --> 01:58.800 that um right now on the , on the stage 01:58.809 --> 02:01.180 or panelists uh that represent the 02:01.190 --> 02:03.180 various commands and parts and in 02:03.190 --> 02:05.301 different parts of the world . And so 02:05.301 --> 02:07.468 I'm gonna ask each one of them to give 02:07.468 --> 02:09.634 you a quick overview of the a or , and 02:09.634 --> 02:11.634 kind of in with the , with just one 02:11.634 --> 02:13.801 because it'll be other times where you 02:13.801 --> 02:13.699 can tell them what else you need . But 02:13.710 --> 02:16.500 one thing that um you have as a 02:16.509 --> 02:18.287 technical challenge inside your 02:18.287 --> 02:20.398 organization , so we'll start on this 02:20.398 --> 02:22.565 in with Mo All right . Uh Good morning 02:22.565 --> 02:24.342 r regular General Mo Cal Braz , 02:24.342 --> 02:26.176 director of Intelligence at us , 02:26.176 --> 02:28.398 Northern Command and the North American 02:28.398 --> 02:30.231 Aerospace Defense Command . So I 02:30.231 --> 02:32.176 actually have two hats , NORAD and 02:32.176 --> 02:34.570 north com . So I have two A ors uh on 02:34.580 --> 02:36.639 the NORAD side , it's a binational 02:36.649 --> 02:38.649 command , the only one in the world 02:38.649 --> 02:40.760 between us and Canada to defend North 02:40.760 --> 02:42.816 America . So it goes out , obviously 02:42.816 --> 02:44.316 North American air defense 02:44.316 --> 02:46.538 identification zone is about 100 and 50 02:46.538 --> 02:46.470 miles off the coast in the Canadian 02:46.479 --> 02:48.630 archipelago . And then in us , north 02:48.660 --> 02:51.190 com uh imagine again , homeland defense 02:51.199 --> 02:53.889 number one . And that would include all 02:53.899 --> 02:56.320 of North America of us in North America , 02:56.330 --> 02:59.039 Mexico and Canada in our bilateral 02:59.050 --> 03:00.994 relationships . And definitely the 03:00.994 --> 03:03.050 technical challenge we have is , you 03:03.050 --> 03:05.050 know , if you want to do integrated 03:05.050 --> 03:07.217 deterrence , the key to integration is 03:07.217 --> 03:09.383 communication across partners , allies 03:09.383 --> 03:11.494 and our combatant command . So that's 03:11.494 --> 03:11.360 the number one technical challenge . 03:11.410 --> 03:13.509 And I'll pass it on . Good morning , 03:13.520 --> 03:15.576 everybody . I'm Liz Do Maurice . I'm 03:15.576 --> 03:17.750 the J six for us Strategic Command and 03:17.759 --> 03:19.926 also the CIO for a strategic Command . 03:19.926 --> 03:21.981 So you heard General Cotton a little 03:21.981 --> 03:24.203 bit earlier today . Um You know that uh 03:24.203 --> 03:26.037 us Strategic Command is a global 03:26.037 --> 03:27.815 command . We're responsible for 03:27.815 --> 03:29.815 strategic deterrence and , and many 03:29.815 --> 03:31.537 other missions uh that must be 03:31.537 --> 03:33.426 performed just , just perfectly . 03:33.426 --> 03:35.592 That's all . So , so one of the things 03:35.592 --> 03:37.703 that , that we are responsible for is 03:37.703 --> 03:39.815 making sure that we have , we call it 03:39.815 --> 03:41.759 light switch capability . And that 03:41.759 --> 03:43.870 means that all of our systems need to 03:43.870 --> 03:46.037 function just as reliably as the light 03:46.037 --> 03:48.092 switch does . So as we're looking at 03:48.092 --> 03:50.315 integrated deterrent , our challenge is 03:50.315 --> 03:52.203 to make sure that we have nuclear 03:52.203 --> 03:54.148 command control , communications , 03:54.148 --> 03:56.370 kinds of capabilities that are reliable 03:56.370 --> 03:58.537 on your very worst day and are able to 03:58.537 --> 04:01.554 function reliably and um precisely for 04:01.565 --> 04:04.274 all all uh contingencies . So that's 04:04.285 --> 04:06.118 the biggest challenge we have at 04:06.118 --> 04:08.229 Stratcom and kind of like you , we've 04:08.229 --> 04:10.452 got to be able to do that also with our 04:10.452 --> 04:12.785 allies and partners as well . All right . 04:12.785 --> 04:14.952 Well , thank you , uh Mels Stone . I'm 04:14.952 --> 04:16.952 the J two for us , Cyber command uh 04:16.952 --> 04:19.118 which also has a global uh a or as you 04:19.118 --> 04:20.952 know , so uh we are charged with 04:20.952 --> 04:23.063 defending the nation in cyberspace as 04:23.063 --> 04:25.118 part of a whole of government effort 04:25.118 --> 04:26.896 with securing and defending dod 04:26.896 --> 04:28.729 networks with providing military 04:28.729 --> 04:30.729 options in cyberspace for the whole 04:30.729 --> 04:32.618 joint force and all the combatant 04:32.618 --> 04:34.841 commanders and of course , working with 04:34.841 --> 04:37.007 uh partners and allies in that space , 04:37.007 --> 04:39.118 which we would include uh industry in 04:39.118 --> 04:39.059 that conversation . Biggest challenge , 04:39.070 --> 04:41.292 of course , uh as this audience knows , 04:41.292 --> 04:43.295 just the scope and of adversary 04:43.304 --> 04:45.415 activity in cyberspace , every one of 04:45.415 --> 04:47.360 our adversaries has prioritized uh 04:47.360 --> 04:49.605 cyber as a war fighting domain . And 04:49.614 --> 04:52.005 that just gives us uh a large surface 04:52.015 --> 04:54.293 area uh of attack to be concerned with . 04:54.293 --> 04:56.575 But thankfully , we have a lot of great 04:56.584 --> 04:58.640 folks working in that mission and we 04:58.640 --> 05:02.100 are hiring . All right . Uh I'm Anne 05:02.109 --> 05:04.053 Weirs gone . I'm the United States 05:04.053 --> 05:06.220 Southern Command . J six . Most people 05:06.220 --> 05:08.165 think about United States Southern 05:08.165 --> 05:10.331 Command is guns , drugs and thugs . Um 05:10.559 --> 05:12.670 But it's , it's more than that , more 05:12.670 --> 05:15.329 than just that . Um we have some unique 05:15.339 --> 05:18.040 challenges right to our Southern uh 05:18.049 --> 05:21.549 borders with mass migration , uh 05:21.559 --> 05:25.216 with a prevail and pervasive threat 05:25.226 --> 05:28.485 by our pacing threat in terms of 05:28.496 --> 05:31.186 illegal underwater fishing , uh strip 05:31.196 --> 05:34.066 mining , clear cut deforestation . And 05:34.075 --> 05:36.686 then uh from an economic perspective , 05:36.696 --> 05:39.455 bringing in exquisite technologies and 05:39.466 --> 05:41.446 then the people to install those 05:41.455 --> 05:43.511 exquisite technologies and then data 05:43.511 --> 05:46.511 flow out back to China . I would say uh 05:46.522 --> 05:49.381 from uh uh a threat perspective and 05:49.391 --> 05:51.558 from a challenge perspective in the in 05:51.558 --> 05:53.058 the it world , it's , it's 05:53.058 --> 05:55.224 interoperability and its modernization 05:55.224 --> 05:58.641 and our modernization has to outpace 05:58.652 --> 06:00.874 our pacing threat , but not outpace our 06:00.874 --> 06:03.096 partners . Uh So I would just give that 06:03.096 --> 06:05.541 uh for consideration as we talk about 06:05.552 --> 06:07.641 the integration and how it enables 06:07.652 --> 06:10.399 integrated deterrence . Good morning . 06:10.410 --> 06:12.410 I'm Brian Sri . I'm the Director of 06:12.410 --> 06:14.466 Intelligence for United States Space 06:14.466 --> 06:17.320 Command . Uh We raor goes 100 06:17.329 --> 06:21.149 kilometers and out . And so we my boss , 06:21.160 --> 06:22.938 uh General Steven Whiting has a 06:22.938 --> 06:25.260 responsibility both to protect and 06:25.269 --> 06:27.440 defend in the domain , but also to 06:27.450 --> 06:30.470 ensure the joint force is protected and 06:30.480 --> 06:32.799 defended from space enabled attacks 06:32.809 --> 06:35.100 from our adversaries . When I think 06:35.109 --> 06:37.779 about what we need to do , it's speed 06:37.790 --> 06:40.500 accuracy and resiliency because the 06:40.510 --> 06:44.179 joint force relies on the services that 06:44.190 --> 06:46.523 uh United States Space command delivers . 06:46.523 --> 06:48.468 You've seen it in the news missile 06:48.468 --> 06:50.690 warning . Congressman bacon spoke about 06:50.690 --> 06:53.079 it . Precision navigation and timing , 06:53.230 --> 06:56.019 global sat com . Um But that's all 06:56.029 --> 06:58.640 underpinned on the speed accuracy , uh 06:58.649 --> 07:01.459 reliability , but also the soft 07:01.470 --> 07:03.692 underbelly that our adversaries look at 07:03.692 --> 07:07.079 for asymmetric attacks . Um So again , 07:07.089 --> 07:09.256 happy to be here and I look forward to 07:09.256 --> 07:11.367 the questions that General Henry will 07:11.367 --> 07:14.029 tee up . Right . Good morning . I'm 07:14.040 --> 07:16.579 Rick Chancellor J two here at uh 07:16.589 --> 07:20.529 Stratcom and uh our chief 07:20.540 --> 07:23.880 uh uh requirement here is to integrate 07:23.890 --> 07:27.660 uh nuclear deterrent uh across all the 07:27.670 --> 07:29.281 domains across the , all the 07:29.281 --> 07:31.859 adversaries to understand , to make 07:31.869 --> 07:34.570 sure that we have a safe , secure and 07:34.579 --> 07:37.989 reliable it and information flow that 07:38.000 --> 07:40.760 we gives us the credible level of 07:40.769 --> 07:42.491 intelligence to provide to the 07:42.491 --> 07:44.459 commander . And in so doing then 07:44.470 --> 07:47.399 support the uh the president uh 07:48.450 --> 07:51.549 at this time . Hi , I'm John Phillips , 07:51.559 --> 07:53.726 I'm the director of C four Cyber at us 07:53.726 --> 07:57.130 European command . As I look at Europe , 07:57.140 --> 08:00.709 it is not your father's NATO . NATO is 08:00.720 --> 08:03.239 drastically changed uh enhanced 08:03.250 --> 08:06.429 directly through the Russian aggression 08:06.440 --> 08:08.700 inside Ukraine . And so if you just go 08:08.709 --> 08:11.709 back to 36 years ago where NATO was 08:11.720 --> 08:14.420 just 16 countries to today , it's 32 08:14.980 --> 08:18.440 and the NATO border with the Warsaw 08:18.450 --> 08:20.720 pact was just a couple of 100 08:20.730 --> 08:24.140 kilometers in what was East Germany to 08:24.149 --> 08:26.205 West Germany . And then a little bit 08:26.205 --> 08:28.829 with Italy against then Yugoslavia . 08:28.839 --> 08:30.779 The map of Europe has drastically 08:30.790 --> 08:33.380 changed and we've expanded NATO to 08:33.390 --> 08:35.446 bring in very collaborative partners 08:35.446 --> 08:37.501 and allies and the United States has 08:37.501 --> 08:40.440 very limited footprint on the continent 08:40.450 --> 08:43.000 of Europe today due to the increased 08:43.010 --> 08:46.109 capability of NATO as we bring in those 08:46.119 --> 08:49.440 32 countries of which my boss General 08:49.450 --> 08:51.950 Cavoli is commander of U , but he's 08:51.960 --> 08:54.016 also Supreme allied Commander Europe 08:54.016 --> 08:57.859 and he focuses us on convergence and 08:57.869 --> 09:00.219 being just a part of NATO and not being 09:00.229 --> 09:02.396 the predominant member going forward . 09:03.869 --> 09:05.925 Hello , I'm Colonel Chris Robinson . 09:05.925 --> 09:08.091 I'm with the US Transportation Command 09:08.091 --> 09:10.270 as a military deputy J six . Our role 09:10.280 --> 09:12.799 is to execute global mobility 09:12.809 --> 09:15.000 operations um to project and sustain 09:15.010 --> 09:17.121 the joint force . So we get the force 09:17.121 --> 09:19.288 to the fight , we sustain the force in 09:19.288 --> 09:21.399 the fight and then we bring them back 09:21.399 --> 09:23.566 home where we help them pivot in uh to 09:23.566 --> 09:25.732 another area uh uh as appropriate . Um 09:25.732 --> 09:27.954 We do that through three components and 09:27.954 --> 09:30.121 a sub unified command , joint enabling 09:30.121 --> 09:32.232 capabilities , command , um your your 09:32.232 --> 09:34.369 tactical coms , C two experts and 09:34.380 --> 09:36.690 planners and uh uh public affairs 09:36.700 --> 09:38.700 support . We also have air mobility 09:38.700 --> 09:41.109 command um for our air mobility or our 09:41.119 --> 09:42.989 air operations . We have uh the 09:43.000 --> 09:45.111 military sea lift command and we also 09:45.111 --> 09:47.222 have the uh from the navy side and we 09:47.222 --> 09:49.389 also have the army uh military service 09:49.389 --> 09:51.389 and deployment and dis distribution 09:51.389 --> 09:53.500 command . Um Our commander also has a 09:53.500 --> 09:55.389 role of leading the broader joint 09:55.389 --> 09:57.667 deployment and distribution enterprise . 09:57.667 --> 09:57.659 So when you think of that , that's not 09:57.669 --> 10:00.150 just the dod that's partnering with the 10:00.159 --> 10:02.159 Maritime Administration , the , the 10:02.159 --> 10:04.270 Department of Transportation . Um And 10:04.270 --> 10:06.437 the , our fellow combined commands and 10:06.437 --> 10:08.492 across the department , um They also 10:08.492 --> 10:10.770 lead the uh joint petroleum enterprise . 10:10.770 --> 10:12.937 Um So all of that to say , uh the , we 10:12.937 --> 10:14.770 have three components and it's a 10:14.770 --> 10:16.715 unified command . The one I didn't 10:16.715 --> 10:15.909 mention is essentially that for 10:15.989 --> 10:17.767 component and that's really our 10:17.767 --> 10:19.211 commercial partners , our 10:19.211 --> 10:21.267 transportation service providers who 10:21.267 --> 10:23.433 deliver the move the proponents of the 10:23.433 --> 10:25.600 resources around the globe um on our , 10:25.600 --> 10:27.822 on our behalf and in , in collaboration 10:27.822 --> 10:29.545 with our activities to support 10:29.545 --> 10:31.719 operations uh C two and um and getting 10:31.729 --> 10:33.919 after things . So um the challenge 10:33.929 --> 10:36.090 being uh with that commercial side is 10:36.099 --> 10:38.099 when you think of that the critical 10:38.099 --> 10:40.155 infrastructure um and also how do we 10:40.155 --> 10:42.321 partner and collaborate to ensure that 10:42.321 --> 10:44.043 the , the threats and that our 10:44.043 --> 10:44.010 adversaries pose to our commercial 10:44.020 --> 10:46.080 partners that we can help them fight 10:46.090 --> 10:48.090 through that mitigate that but also 10:48.090 --> 10:50.090 continue to execute our missions as 10:50.090 --> 10:52.201 appropriate . So , looking forward to 10:52.201 --> 10:54.534 the panel . All right , thank you . Hey , 10:54.534 --> 10:56.368 so uh before we get into uh some 10:56.368 --> 10:58.479 questions for the panels , um I chose 10:58.479 --> 11:01.130 Jimi Hendrix um as my walk on song 11:01.140 --> 11:02.918 because Jimi Hendrix in my mind 11:02.919 --> 11:05.700 represents everything about innovation . 11:06.039 --> 11:08.270 Uh that uh you can , you can imagine , 11:08.280 --> 11:11.669 actually you talk about AAA person who 11:11.679 --> 11:15.330 uh came from an area where um his home 11:15.340 --> 11:18.250 life , uh certainly wasn't uh about uh 11:18.260 --> 11:20.593 rock and roll or about playing a guitar . 11:20.830 --> 11:23.270 Uh and he was left handed and most uh 11:23.280 --> 11:25.336 guitarists as you know , aren't left 11:25.336 --> 11:27.710 handed . Uh And some uh folks don't 11:27.719 --> 11:29.719 even know that there's a difference 11:29.719 --> 11:31.886 between guitars and , and the hand you 11:31.886 --> 11:34.052 play , but he was very innovative . Uh 11:34.052 --> 11:36.052 He took what he had and did what he 11:36.052 --> 11:37.830 needed to do in order to uh be 11:37.840 --> 11:40.130 innovative . And to this day , uh is 11:40.140 --> 11:42.362 considered one of the greatest , um you 11:42.362 --> 11:45.320 know , um guitarists of all time . And 11:45.330 --> 11:47.052 I think that is because of his 11:47.052 --> 11:49.150 innovation . And so having said that 11:49.280 --> 11:51.390 for the J two's on the panel and 11:51.400 --> 11:53.450 actually the J Sixes will have a 11:53.460 --> 11:55.539 similar question . But right now for 11:55.549 --> 11:58.500 the J twos uh back to integrated 11:58.510 --> 12:01.659 deterrence , what adaptations and 12:01.669 --> 12:05.080 changes has your office or command made 12:05.090 --> 12:07.469 to improve and institute the concept of 12:07.479 --> 12:10.450 integrated deterrence . And uh mo you 12:10.460 --> 12:12.571 look like you're ready to go . So I'm 12:12.571 --> 12:14.571 not gonna call on you . I , I'll go 12:14.571 --> 12:17.239 back over to see it . Oh , so me , I'll 12:17.250 --> 12:19.361 confirm the seats are uncomfortable . 12:19.369 --> 12:23.080 Um , for integrated deterrent . I think 12:23.090 --> 12:24.979 the first fundamental question we 12:24.979 --> 12:27.201 worked through is we redid our campaign 12:27.201 --> 12:29.312 plan , right ? The department defense 12:29.312 --> 12:31.257 campaigns , right ? To campaign to 12:31.257 --> 12:33.200 defer set the conditions if , if 12:33.210 --> 12:35.321 deterrence fails , right ? So you set 12:35.321 --> 12:37.543 the conditions for the joint force to , 12:37.543 --> 12:39.654 to prevail . First one is you have to 12:39.654 --> 12:41.599 go back and deter what . And so as 12:41.599 --> 12:43.654 you're looking back , what , what is 12:43.654 --> 12:45.766 the behavior you want change . And so 12:45.766 --> 12:47.821 one as general Henry , as you said , 12:47.821 --> 12:49.877 it's not the thing , the guitar , it 12:49.877 --> 12:51.543 was the thought I could do it 12:51.543 --> 12:53.543 differently . And so you have to go 12:53.543 --> 12:55.488 back , but you also have to assess 12:55.488 --> 12:57.599 we're real good at doing activities . 12:57.599 --> 12:59.710 But are there the right activities to 12:59.710 --> 13:01.766 get the outcome ? You need to change 13:01.766 --> 13:03.654 the perception and it doesn't not 13:03.654 --> 13:05.877 perception . I I in the literal sense , 13:05.877 --> 13:08.200 but to start getting people to think 13:08.210 --> 13:10.210 different of why you're doing it so 13:10.210 --> 13:12.321 that our adversaries wake up and it's 13:12.321 --> 13:14.488 not , not today , but how do I go back 13:14.488 --> 13:16.809 and assess it ? So how do I go back and 13:16.820 --> 13:19.650 assess at the speed ? Right . So how do 13:19.659 --> 13:21.381 I get that information loop or 13:21.381 --> 13:24.070 intelligence loop back so that you can 13:24.080 --> 13:27.809 get the analyst outside of doing manual , 13:28.080 --> 13:30.349 right ? Doing the hard work and letting 13:30.359 --> 13:32.692 the data come back at the speed we need . 13:32.692 --> 13:34.979 So they make the informed decisions and 13:34.989 --> 13:37.010 then brief the boss . And so we've 13:37.020 --> 13:39.630 really reinstituted that kind of how we 13:39.640 --> 13:41.807 went back . You and I had a discussion 13:41.807 --> 13:44.049 about reimagining warning . We did the 13:44.059 --> 13:46.429 same thing . What are the end states we 13:46.440 --> 13:48.662 wanna get to ? How do we walk it back ? 13:48.662 --> 13:50.718 So it was the thought and putting no 13:50.718 --> 13:53.080 new processes in and then assessing 13:53.090 --> 13:55.830 every month or month and a half . Are 13:55.840 --> 13:58.118 we meeting those operations activities , 13:58.118 --> 14:00.340 investment to set the conditions ? OK . 14:00.650 --> 14:02.820 And then I'll go out to the global uh 14:02.830 --> 14:06.349 starting with rich at stratcom . So 14:06.419 --> 14:08.679 some of the integrated uh uh 14:09.429 --> 14:11.318 initiatives that we've taken here 14:11.318 --> 14:13.750 working with the uh national defense 14:13.760 --> 14:16.210 strategy is looking at nuclear command 14:16.219 --> 14:18.275 and control and communications or NC 14:18.275 --> 14:20.830 three systems . I si said it earlier . 14:20.840 --> 14:22.951 It's much larger than it , it's the , 14:22.951 --> 14:25.118 it's the whole information flow , it's 14:25.118 --> 14:27.229 moving the intelligence , making sure 14:27.229 --> 14:29.340 that we have a resilient architecture 14:29.530 --> 14:32.289 that facilitates our abilities to 14:32.299 --> 14:34.466 accomplish , to accomplish our mission 14:34.940 --> 14:38.000 uh supporting the intelligence 14:38.010 --> 14:39.510 requirements for the joint 14:39.510 --> 14:42.210 electromagnetic spectrum operations 14:42.219 --> 14:44.441 that General Cotton mentioned earlier . 14:44.479 --> 14:48.299 Uh that is that is a , a tall order by 14:48.309 --> 14:51.320 any means . And we're working closely 14:51.330 --> 14:54.969 with uh with our uh our 14:55.000 --> 14:58.549 Jim so uh Enterprise Center uh 14:58.559 --> 15:01.469 to make sure that we can identify what 15:01.479 --> 15:03.646 is needed , we're working closely with 15:03.646 --> 15:06.599 Dia as well to look for the analytic 15:06.609 --> 15:08.940 sweet spot there where we can bring in 15:09.109 --> 15:11.380 the requirements , the training and 15:11.390 --> 15:14.909 understand what is needed for uh for 15:14.919 --> 15:17.590 that mission . Space on the NC three , 15:17.679 --> 15:20.719 we're working with our J six . For 15:20.729 --> 15:22.859 example , we've created an analytic 15:22.940 --> 15:26.539 division uh that focuses on NC 15:26.549 --> 15:28.716 three that focuses on the intelligence 15:28.716 --> 15:31.380 requirements for that . Uh So those are 15:31.390 --> 15:34.489 two quick hitters of what we've done to 15:34.500 --> 15:36.500 demonstrate our initiative in going 15:36.500 --> 15:38.778 after some of these complex tests . OK . 15:38.778 --> 15:41.056 And uh mel over to you . Yeah , thanks , 15:41.056 --> 15:43.278 sir . I , I think like I said , we've , 15:43.278 --> 15:45.333 we put a lot of time and effort into 15:45.333 --> 15:47.556 how we are uh assessing because I think 15:47.556 --> 15:47.489 that's um you , you can't have 15:47.500 --> 15:49.556 deterrence unless you understand how 15:49.556 --> 15:51.611 the adversary is viewing what you're 15:51.611 --> 15:53.500 doing . Uh And the way we look at 15:53.500 --> 15:55.722 deterrence in , in cyberspaces in a few 15:55.722 --> 15:57.778 ways , one uh cost and position , of 15:57.778 --> 15:59.778 course , which is probably the most 15:59.778 --> 16:01.889 familiar . And I don't mean that just 16:01.889 --> 16:04.111 in terms of cyber operations , but also 16:04.111 --> 16:06.333 our contribution to whole of government 16:06.333 --> 16:06.000 efforts which might result in a 16:06.010 --> 16:08.099 sanction , a disclosure or something 16:08.109 --> 16:11.570 else . Um And then also we look at uh 16:11.580 --> 16:13.830 integrated deterrence uh in terms of 16:13.840 --> 16:16.500 resiliency and defense actions . Uh we 16:16.510 --> 16:18.732 have to have uh prioritize our , our uh 16:18.732 --> 16:20.677 department of defense networks and 16:20.677 --> 16:22.899 making them very difficult targets . Uh 16:22.899 --> 16:24.954 The folks in the it industry in this 16:24.954 --> 16:24.659 room are , are part of that 16:24.669 --> 16:27.900 conversation . Uh It has to be uh cyber 16:27.909 --> 16:30.890 secure . Uh Of course , um but not as 16:30.900 --> 16:32.567 an afterthought . And so when 16:32.567 --> 16:34.400 capabilities are provided to the 16:34.400 --> 16:36.400 command , we're looking at um , the 16:36.400 --> 16:38.511 cyber security to be baked in and not 16:38.511 --> 16:41.260 bolted on . Ok . And over to mo for the 16:41.270 --> 16:44.130 last of the geographic . All right . So 16:44.140 --> 16:46.340 for uh my boss , General Guillo , uh 16:46.349 --> 16:48.571 the one thing he always needs is domain 16:48.571 --> 16:51.409 awareness uh from undersea all the way 16:51.419 --> 16:53.890 to space because homeland defense is 16:53.900 --> 16:56.122 the number one priority in the National 16:56.122 --> 16:59.750 Defense uh strategy . And uh everything 16:59.760 --> 17:01.927 happening in the world this , this day 17:01.927 --> 17:04.038 and age can come back and touch us in 17:04.038 --> 17:06.038 the homeland . And so this is why I 17:06.038 --> 17:07.871 come back to what we really have 17:07.871 --> 17:09.982 focused on the J two is how do we one 17:09.982 --> 17:09.869 educate everybody in every other 17:09.880 --> 17:12.102 combatant command that any actions they 17:12.109 --> 17:14.220 take or may not take in their part of 17:14.220 --> 17:16.331 the world can actually affect us back 17:16.331 --> 17:18.442 here in the homeland , whether that's 17:18.442 --> 17:20.498 through surrogates or others already 17:20.498 --> 17:22.665 inside the homeland uh that can create 17:22.665 --> 17:24.831 havoc or chaos here . Um So that's one 17:24.831 --> 17:26.998 aspect . And then the second is really 17:26.998 --> 17:26.969 focusing on Mel's last point on 17:26.979 --> 17:29.020 resiliency , defense , critical 17:29.030 --> 17:31.086 infrastructure is a key point for uh 17:31.086 --> 17:33.308 our boss . Uh but homeland defense is a 17:33.308 --> 17:35.530 team sport , you know , we don't own it 17:35.530 --> 17:37.752 necessarily as us Northern Command . Uh 17:37.752 --> 17:39.530 but we have to partner with the 17:39.530 --> 17:41.641 Department of Homeland Security , the 17:41.641 --> 17:43.808 FBI and others to be able to do this . 17:43.808 --> 17:46.030 And especially again as North America , 17:46.030 --> 17:48.252 we defend with our Canadian partners uh 17:48.252 --> 17:50.252 and building those relationships to 17:50.252 --> 17:52.086 understand that , you know , our 17:52.086 --> 17:54.141 adversaries don't look at Canada and 17:54.141 --> 17:56.363 the US is different , right ? They look 17:56.363 --> 17:58.586 at us as one team , one NATO team . And 17:58.586 --> 18:00.641 so again , I really , my focus , you 18:00.641 --> 18:00.589 know , in the time I've been in the J 18:00.599 --> 18:02.488 two is like , hey , let's educate 18:02.488 --> 18:04.432 everybody that homeland defense is 18:04.432 --> 18:06.599 number one and everything that happens 18:06.599 --> 18:08.821 around the world affects us . And let's 18:08.821 --> 18:08.270 strengthen those partnerships both 18:08.280 --> 18:10.391 internal to the homeland , as well as 18:10.391 --> 18:12.447 external with partners . All right . 18:12.447 --> 18:14.613 And let's go . Um I'm gonna go over to 18:14.613 --> 18:16.724 the J Sixes of the world . Uh But I'm 18:16.724 --> 18:18.836 gonna stay on the topic of deterrence 18:18.836 --> 18:21.058 and take a little bit of different turn 18:21.058 --> 18:23.280 on it . Um This , this one is the theme 18:23.280 --> 18:24.947 of this year's dous Worldwide 18:24.947 --> 18:27.058 Conference is integrated deterrence . 18:27.058 --> 18:29.113 Talk about the role that information 18:29.113 --> 18:31.119 technology plays in providing 18:31.130 --> 18:33.849 integrated deterrence . And what uh do 18:33.859 --> 18:35.810 we need to continue providing that 18:35.819 --> 18:38.160 deterrence from AJ six perspective ? 18:38.170 --> 18:40.550 And let's start with uh South com . All 18:40.560 --> 18:42.727 right , thanks , sir . So when I think 18:42.727 --> 18:44.782 about integrated deterrent , we , we 18:44.782 --> 18:47.680 talk about , you know , a whole of dod 18:47.689 --> 18:49.699 a whole of us government and then 18:49.709 --> 18:51.989 integrated deterrence with our allies 18:52.000 --> 18:55.140 and our partners , information sharing 18:55.150 --> 18:57.483 and intelligence sharing is key to that . 18:57.910 --> 18:59.743 So our strategic advantage , our 18:59.743 --> 19:02.359 competitive advantage over our pacing 19:02.369 --> 19:04.650 threat is our information environment , 19:04.739 --> 19:06.572 whether that's a network centric 19:06.572 --> 19:08.461 information environment or a data 19:08.461 --> 19:10.572 centric information environment . Our 19:10.579 --> 19:13.300 strategic advantage is the ability to 19:13.310 --> 19:16.449 share information and intelligence 19:16.459 --> 19:19.910 faster than our adversary can . So how 19:19.920 --> 19:23.770 do we uh see first at first understand , 19:23.780 --> 19:25.969 first engage , decisively and then re 19:25.979 --> 19:29.089 engage at will . And our network 19:29.099 --> 19:31.109 enables us to do that through the 19:31.119 --> 19:33.119 commodity that we deploy , which is 19:33.119 --> 19:35.286 information technology , which is just 19:35.286 --> 19:36.897 the tool it's , but it's the 19:36.897 --> 19:40.750 applications that we use to share that 19:41.099 --> 19:43.925 to capitalize on that strategic 19:43.935 --> 19:45.984 advantage . So what we have to do 19:45.994 --> 19:48.175 moving forward is one , maintain that 19:48.185 --> 19:51.084 strategic adva advantage uh of the 19:51.155 --> 19:52.822 employment of the information 19:52.822 --> 19:56.145 environment . Uh and then also 19:56.155 --> 19:58.984 exquisitely employ the tools that we 19:58.994 --> 20:02.425 have as we modernize at the pace and 20:02.435 --> 20:04.665 capability of our partners . 20:05.530 --> 20:07.729 Conversely , our information 20:07.739 --> 20:09.709 environment is also our critical 20:09.719 --> 20:13.650 vulnerability . So as general Stone was 20:13.660 --> 20:15.849 uh mentioning cyber security must be 20:15.859 --> 20:18.920 baked in . And as we bake that in , we 20:18.930 --> 20:22.750 have to bake it in , in partnership 20:22.760 --> 20:25.319 with allies and partners globally so 20:25.329 --> 20:27.189 that we can achieve integrated 20:27.199 --> 20:29.709 deterrence from a global perspective . 20:30.270 --> 20:33.959 Ok . Let's go to Transcom . Thanks , 20:33.969 --> 20:37.119 sir . Um uh I've been in the command 20:37.130 --> 20:40.040 for a little over a year but um what 20:40.050 --> 20:41.994 I've found from our , my teammates 20:41.994 --> 20:44.161 who've been in the command much longer 20:44.161 --> 20:46.161 than me is that our command and our 20:46.161 --> 20:48.439 command , hers have prioritized um our , 20:48.439 --> 20:50.689 it and our , our cyber footprint um A 20:50.849 --> 20:53.410 as as a really treated as a in a 20:53.420 --> 20:55.369 foundational capability for us to 20:55.380 --> 20:58.550 execute command and control um drive 20:58.560 --> 21:00.504 decision advantage uh and decision 21:00.504 --> 21:02.819 making and , and really just get after 21:02.829 --> 21:05.051 executing our operations and leveraging 21:05.051 --> 21:07.218 everything that's available to us . Um 21:07.218 --> 21:09.273 A lot of that's come by prioritizing 21:09.273 --> 21:11.040 cyber resilience and digital 21:11.050 --> 21:13.329 modernization . Um When we talk about 21:13.339 --> 21:15.450 that cyber resilience , we've , we've 21:15.450 --> 21:17.339 invested in our cyber security uh 21:17.339 --> 21:19.395 service provider uh to be able to ac 21:19.395 --> 21:21.561 actually understand what's going on in 21:21.561 --> 21:23.506 our networks . Uh but also to , to 21:23.506 --> 21:25.672 create those bridges and relationships 21:25.672 --> 21:27.895 across uh not just the dod but with our 21:27.895 --> 21:30.006 commercial service providers . Uh and 21:30.006 --> 21:32.117 the digital modern piece is really um 21:32.117 --> 21:34.283 upping our game and , and investing in 21:34.283 --> 21:33.819 those capabilities that , that give us 21:33.829 --> 21:37.380 the uh that lead us to uh more modern 21:37.390 --> 21:39.760 cloud based uh constructs as opposed to 21:39.770 --> 21:41.881 some of the things that we've , we've 21:41.881 --> 21:44.103 done traditionally from an on premise . 21:44.103 --> 21:46.369 Um And along those lines . All right . 21:46.380 --> 21:48.790 And zero trust , sir . Um I'll offer is 21:48.800 --> 21:50.967 uh a really a core principle that we , 21:50.967 --> 21:52.911 we focus on implementing within us 21:52.911 --> 21:55.022 transportation command because that's 21:55.022 --> 21:56.856 really gonna give us that , that 21:56.856 --> 21:56.609 ability to be resilient , to 21:56.619 --> 21:58.930 reconstitute and to , to , to really 21:58.939 --> 22:02.390 not focus on the , the , the , the more 22:02.400 --> 22:04.400 traditional aspects of defending as 22:04.400 --> 22:06.949 opposed to just being aware of where 22:06.959 --> 22:09.126 our assets need to go and data . Um We 22:09.126 --> 22:11.292 really need to focus on our data too . 22:11.292 --> 22:13.403 Um We treat that as a strategic asset 22:13.403 --> 22:15.626 and we need to protect it and make sure 22:15.626 --> 22:17.626 it gets to the places we need to go 22:17.626 --> 22:19.681 appropriately . All right , let's uh 22:19.681 --> 22:21.848 stray with uh Stratcom and Liz . Yes , 22:21.848 --> 22:23.515 sir . So , from an integrated 22:23.515 --> 22:25.626 deterrence perspective , I think it's 22:25.626 --> 22:27.792 uh not that we're not all a little bit 22:27.792 --> 22:29.626 different , but from a strategic 22:29.626 --> 22:31.792 command perspective , we depend upon a 22:31.792 --> 22:34.015 series of about 100 and three different 22:34.015 --> 22:36.181 systems , national systems that , that 22:36.181 --> 22:38.181 stratcom doesn't own . So , from an 22:38.181 --> 22:40.181 integrated deterrence perspective , 22:40.181 --> 22:39.780 it's important for us to make sure that 22:39.790 --> 22:42.329 all those 103 systems are modernized 22:42.339 --> 22:44.609 are integrated and can provide the 22:44.750 --> 22:46.972 information that we need to perform all 22:46.972 --> 22:49.028 of the functions for that . Stratcom 22:49.028 --> 22:51.139 depends upon everything from decision 22:51.139 --> 22:53.306 making to force direction to situation 22:53.306 --> 22:55.472 monitoring . There's there's tie overs 22:55.472 --> 22:55.449 between all of us from a strategic 22:55.459 --> 22:58.109 command perspective . So uh what we 22:58.119 --> 23:00.341 really depend upon is making sure we've 23:00.341 --> 23:02.063 got those systems and networks 23:02.063 --> 23:04.119 integrated . But as we're proceeding 23:04.119 --> 23:06.341 more toward upgrading those systems and 23:06.341 --> 23:08.452 networks , we realize it's really all 23:08.452 --> 23:10.563 about the data . And do we know where 23:10.563 --> 23:12.897 our data is ? Can we leverage that data ? 23:12.897 --> 23:15.063 24 73 65 on a very bad day ? So from a 23:15.063 --> 23:17.063 stratcom perspective , we're really 23:17.063 --> 23:19.175 looking at where the data is . Are we 23:19.175 --> 23:21.175 going to be able to access it ? How 23:21.175 --> 23:23.286 much of that should be in a cloud and 23:23.286 --> 23:25.508 how will we go forward in in a a period 23:25.508 --> 23:25.119 of , as you mentioned , zero trust ? 23:25.130 --> 23:27.297 Certainly we want to get to zero trust 23:27.297 --> 23:29.463 as well . Uh but we have to do that in 23:29.463 --> 23:31.630 conjunction with all of the services , 23:31.630 --> 23:34.030 making sure that cyber security is , is 23:34.040 --> 23:36.290 either baked in or our systems are 23:36.300 --> 23:38.300 retrofit to make sure we can get to 23:38.300 --> 23:40.300 that perspective . So um integrated 23:40.300 --> 23:42.310 deterrence is , is for a stratcom 23:42.319 --> 23:44.375 perspective , is , is certainly with 23:44.375 --> 23:46.430 our partners and allies , but really 23:46.430 --> 23:48.375 for us , a lot of it is across the 23:48.375 --> 23:50.630 department and with the presidential um 23:50.640 --> 23:52.584 uh ex experts as well to make sure 23:52.584 --> 23:54.529 we're integrated uh as we take our 23:54.529 --> 23:56.862 orders directly from the president . OK . 23:56.862 --> 23:59.084 And before I close out this one with uh 23:59.084 --> 24:02.140 Major General Phillip , um one of the 24:02.150 --> 24:04.317 things that struck me is 100 and three 24:04.317 --> 24:06.150 different systems that you don't 24:06.150 --> 24:08.372 actually own , but you actually have to 24:08.372 --> 24:10.869 utilize in order to , to uh to get your 24:10.880 --> 24:12.991 mission accomplished . And I was , as 24:12.991 --> 24:14.991 you were saying that I was thinking 24:14.991 --> 24:17.158 about John and his team there at U COM 24:17.158 --> 24:19.158 and thinking about all the partners 24:19.158 --> 24:21.324 that they have and the different types 24:21.324 --> 24:23.324 of uh things that they have to deal 24:23.324 --> 24:25.547 with . So John , no pressure , but uh I 24:25.547 --> 24:27.658 expect you will have something to say 24:27.658 --> 24:29.769 about that as well . So uh apparently 24:29.769 --> 24:32.102 microphone problem , it's it's let down . 24:32.102 --> 24:34.410 Um but integrated deterrence is 24:34.420 --> 24:36.587 basically the premise of NATO . And so 24:36.587 --> 24:38.698 when the Washington Treaty was signed 24:38.698 --> 24:40.920 over 75 years ago , it established NATO 24:40.920 --> 24:43.329 as a collective defense Organization , 24:44.270 --> 24:48.150 defense . And so general cavoli 24:48.160 --> 24:51.400 is converging the New NATO as he calls 24:51.410 --> 24:54.229 it uh going forward and not focusing 24:54.239 --> 24:56.949 directly on article five , but all 24:56.959 --> 24:59.329 those actions pre article five that 24:59.339 --> 25:03.310 would deter the the any adversary uh in 25:03.319 --> 25:06.650 Europe from taking action to provide a 25:06.660 --> 25:09.869 safe and secure European continent 25:11.589 --> 25:14.609 to do that . It goes to information 25:14.619 --> 25:16.979 exchange requirements . If I look at 25:16.989 --> 25:20.229 the collaborative nature of NATO , uh 25:20.239 --> 25:24.109 the US now has once had two cores and 25:24.119 --> 25:26.175 four divisions in Europe . Uh When I 25:26.175 --> 25:29.010 first raised my right hand uh to just 25:29.020 --> 25:30.964 two forward postured brigade and a 25:30.964 --> 25:33.076 rotational brigade that we have right 25:33.076 --> 25:36.640 now . How we do that is better partners 25:36.650 --> 25:40.079 inside the 31 other members of NATO 25:40.479 --> 25:42.423 and establishing those information 25:42.423 --> 25:44.201 exchange requirements where the 25:44.201 --> 25:46.368 information is available to everyone . 25:46.380 --> 25:49.119 Now , truth and lending 88 percent of 25:49.130 --> 25:52.339 NATO intelligence is US provided . And 25:52.349 --> 25:54.520 so it has to be at a release ability 25:54.939 --> 25:57.199 that it's available to all those NATO 25:57.209 --> 26:00.300 countries . Yet we still have inside 26:00.310 --> 26:02.532 the European theater of operation about 26:02.532 --> 26:05.859 16 different M pe s of which only one 26:05.869 --> 26:08.780 is at the NATO secret release ability . 26:08.790 --> 26:11.012 There are some bilas and triads that we 26:11.012 --> 26:13.012 have out there and we have to weigh 26:13.012 --> 26:15.680 those down to where all information is 26:15.689 --> 26:17.522 available to the NATO collective 26:18.010 --> 26:20.280 because as general cavoli visions , 26:20.290 --> 26:22.880 NATO going forward , it is not us led , 26:23.449 --> 26:26.339 it is it is NATO led and through the 26:26.349 --> 26:28.729 three joint forces commands depending 26:28.739 --> 26:31.140 on whether the conflict or crisis is in 26:31.150 --> 26:33.430 northern central or southern Europe . 26:33.969 --> 26:37.630 Those JF CS would then command towed 26:37.640 --> 26:40.170 forces from the United States . And 26:40.180 --> 26:42.390 keep in mind now , just as General 26:42.400 --> 26:45.130 Cavalli is dual had it as both army 26:45.140 --> 26:48.030 Europe is dual headed as the land com 26:48.040 --> 26:51.989 for NATO UAE is dual 26:52.040 --> 26:55.969 hatted as the air com for NATO and 26:56.750 --> 27:00.040 the US Navy . Europe is dual headed as 27:00.050 --> 27:03.060 the mar component uh for NATO 27:03.689 --> 27:07.599 of our five components , all of them uh 27:07.609 --> 27:11.609 both service us Africa command 27:12.060 --> 27:14.510 and us European command . So they have 27:14.520 --> 27:16.750 two bosses themselves . And then in 27:16.760 --> 27:19.093 general , Williams case for army Europe , 27:19.093 --> 27:21.260 for example , he has three bosses both 27:21.260 --> 27:24.729 to the JFC uh to U COM and the army and 27:24.739 --> 27:27.329 the US Africa command , getting 27:27.339 --> 27:28.950 convergence and getting that 27:28.950 --> 27:31.349 information out in a shareable domain 27:31.359 --> 27:33.459 and then protecting the adversaries 27:33.469 --> 27:36.390 that have it is critical and we have to 27:36.400 --> 27:39.020 have it and we have demonstrated almost 27:39.030 --> 27:42.010 to the level of CJ A DC two . Now as we 27:42.020 --> 27:45.300 execute operations , we have a 27:45.310 --> 27:48.869 Federated mission network not utilizing 27:48.880 --> 27:51.469 cross domain solutions which inhibits 27:51.479 --> 27:54.410 information flow in a real time 27:54.420 --> 27:57.670 environment where Latvia can observe a 27:57.680 --> 28:00.569 particular target , relay that 28:00.579 --> 28:02.790 information to a fire direction center 28:02.800 --> 28:05.609 uh inside army Europe . And then then 28:05.619 --> 28:07.508 prosecution of that target can be 28:07.508 --> 28:09.675 relayed to an artillery battery inside 28:09.675 --> 28:12.500 Poland . That network exists today . 28:13.209 --> 28:16.109 That network must continue to develop 28:16.530 --> 28:19.310 and share information in all countries 28:19.319 --> 28:21.900 with inside NATO , not only being 28:21.910 --> 28:24.650 consumers of intelligence but also 28:24.660 --> 28:27.260 providers of intelligence to improve 28:27.270 --> 28:29.548 that network going forward . All right . 28:30.199 --> 28:32.310 Hey , I'm , I think I'm gonna stay on 28:32.310 --> 28:35.219 partnerships . Um but I'm gonna go back 28:35.229 --> 28:38.770 to the J twos and uh start uh thinking 28:38.780 --> 28:41.260 about partnerships . The specific uh 28:41.270 --> 28:44.050 point though is for you to describe a 28:44.060 --> 28:46.540 role that partnerships play in advance 28:46.550 --> 28:48.939 in your missions . Sounds , sounds 28:48.949 --> 28:51.550 trivial . Uh But as John was just 28:51.560 --> 28:53.449 talking , I think he just kind of 28:53.449 --> 28:55.116 described partnerships uh but 28:55.119 --> 28:57.099 specifically to the twos and we'll 28:57.109 --> 28:59.430 start with uh I think male at Cyber 28:59.439 --> 29:02.310 command . Thanks , sir . Um partnership . 29:02.319 --> 29:05.150 So uh absolutely vital to cyber command 29:05.160 --> 29:07.327 operations and we look at them in , in 29:07.327 --> 29:08.882 several different ways . Uh 29:08.882 --> 29:10.938 partnerships with industry for , for 29:10.938 --> 29:13.160 capability uh development and providing 29:13.160 --> 29:15.829 capability uh partnerships with our 29:15.839 --> 29:18.989 academic uh networks uh for kind of new 29:19.000 --> 29:21.111 and innovative thinking . Uh And then 29:21.111 --> 29:22.778 of course , our international 29:22.778 --> 29:24.778 partnerships . Um and , and I think 29:24.778 --> 29:26.889 that's a little cyclical to , to what 29:26.889 --> 29:29.111 general Phillips was talking about with 29:29.111 --> 29:31.333 um mission partner environments and you 29:31.333 --> 29:33.278 com . Uh So one important thing to 29:33.278 --> 29:35.167 highlight about our international 29:35.167 --> 29:37.619 partners is uh our ability to share 29:37.630 --> 29:39.741 intelligence with them no matter what 29:39.741 --> 29:41.797 combatant command we , we work in uh 29:41.797 --> 29:43.797 hinges on that partner's ability to 29:43.797 --> 29:45.819 protect that information and so 29:45.829 --> 29:49.780 reliable uh systems . Uh Cyber secure 29:49.790 --> 29:51.846 partners . Uh We spend a lot of time 29:51.846 --> 29:53.679 focusing on , on how we can help 29:53.679 --> 29:55.901 strengthen our partners uh so that they 29:55.901 --> 29:57.901 can be harder targets , but also so 29:57.901 --> 29:59.901 that we can enable that information 29:59.901 --> 30:02.068 sharing . So it just gives you a sense 30:02.068 --> 30:01.829 of how we're looking at partners , uh 30:01.839 --> 30:03.950 interagency partners , of course , in 30:03.950 --> 30:06.030 the command and cyberspace uh are 30:06.040 --> 30:08.096 absolutely crucial whether that's uh 30:08.096 --> 30:10.199 with the FBI Department of Homeland 30:10.209 --> 30:12.829 Security , with CISA uh and others . Uh 30:12.839 --> 30:15.339 But partnerships is , is , is frankly 30:15.410 --> 30:17.521 uh the way of life in cyber command . 30:18.209 --> 30:20.098 And I , well , I started with you 30:20.098 --> 30:22.209 because I wanted you to bring out the 30:22.209 --> 30:24.376 interagency piece and industry piece . 30:24.376 --> 30:26.487 Uh because uh most of the time when , 30:26.487 --> 30:28.542 when we're wearing this uniform , we 30:28.542 --> 30:30.709 think of our partners , we think of uh 30:30.709 --> 30:32.653 five of our partners or some of if 30:32.653 --> 30:34.820 you're in NATO , uh certainly uh those 30:34.820 --> 30:36.765 partners . But uh there is a broad 30:36.765 --> 30:38.876 coalition of folks , certainly in the 30:38.876 --> 30:40.876 Cyber domain uh that are gaining an 30:40.876 --> 30:42.876 understanding and better because of 30:42.876 --> 30:44.931 what the work that you and your team 30:44.931 --> 30:46.987 does . Uh let's go to uh mo at north 30:46.987 --> 30:49.189 com . Uh So from the north com 30:49.199 --> 30:51.366 perspective , uh really , if you think 30:51.366 --> 30:53.421 about us , three broad missions , we 30:53.421 --> 30:55.643 have homeland defense , we have defense 30:55.643 --> 30:57.755 support of civil authorities . Uh And 30:57.755 --> 30:59.421 then we have theater security 30:59.421 --> 31:01.532 cooperations , right ? So if you talk 31:01.532 --> 31:01.109 about partners in homeland defense , 31:01.119 --> 31:03.230 sort of what mel said the interagency 31:03.230 --> 31:05.979 becomes uh key to knowing uh what to 31:05.989 --> 31:07.822 defend . If you're talking about 31:07.822 --> 31:10.045 defense support of civil authorities or 31:10.045 --> 31:12.378 disco , this is your hurricane response , 31:12.378 --> 31:14.545 fire response uh being able to partner 31:14.545 --> 31:16.211 with uh the Federal Emergency 31:16.211 --> 31:18.322 Management Agency fema uh becomes key 31:18.322 --> 31:20.322 in understanding uh where we can uh 31:20.322 --> 31:22.378 apply resources if required . Um And 31:22.378 --> 31:24.433 then of course , the security cooper 31:24.433 --> 31:26.545 operation on the north com side , you 31:26.545 --> 31:28.711 know , Mexico Bahamas and Canada , you 31:28.711 --> 31:28.354 know , it's working bilaterally with 31:28.364 --> 31:30.354 them again toward those homeland 31:30.364 --> 31:33.055 defense issues . Um On the NORAD side , 31:33.064 --> 31:35.120 it's fairly obvious , you know , the 31:35.120 --> 31:37.286 Canadian partnerships are key , what a 31:37.286 --> 31:39.453 lot of people may not understand is we 31:39.453 --> 31:41.564 actually have two chains of command . 31:41.564 --> 31:43.731 Uh My boss , Jon Guillo works not just 31:43.731 --> 31:43.050 for the Secretary of Defense in the 31:43.060 --> 31:44.949 United States , he also works for 31:44.949 --> 31:47.171 General Carignon , the chief of defense 31:47.171 --> 31:49.393 staff of Canada . And so my boss's boss 31:49.393 --> 31:51.504 on one hat is Canadian and American , 31:51.504 --> 31:53.727 not just American . So that makes it uh 31:53.727 --> 31:55.838 partnerships are day in , day out for 31:55.838 --> 31:58.060 that . And then with industry , um as I 31:58.060 --> 31:59.893 talked about before , integrated 31:59.893 --> 31:59.469 deterrence , you can't have without 31:59.479 --> 32:01.535 communication . So if you're sitting 32:01.535 --> 32:03.812 out there today and you're like , well , 32:03.812 --> 32:03.319 what , how does this apply to me ? My 32:03.329 --> 32:05.662 guess is when it comes to communication , 32:05.662 --> 32:07.959 you're part of the , you know , data 32:07.969 --> 32:11.239 transport or data veracity and velocity 32:11.339 --> 32:13.672 or are you part of that data resiliency ? 32:13.770 --> 32:15.826 Uh because either way you're playing 32:15.826 --> 32:17.881 into homeland defense , we need that 32:17.881 --> 32:19.937 domain awareness and we need to make 32:19.937 --> 32:22.159 sure that stays resilient uh so that we 32:22.159 --> 32:24.326 can have what we would call deterrence 32:24.326 --> 32:24.239 by denial that no matter how we get hit 32:24.469 --> 32:26.969 in a conflict in the homeland , we can 32:26.979 --> 32:29.090 still survive that hit and be able to 32:29.090 --> 32:31.839 respond appropriately . Ok . Let's um 32:31.849 --> 32:35.520 go to Stratcom Rich . 32:36.229 --> 32:38.660 Yes , sir . So , uh partnerships are 32:38.670 --> 32:40.989 key to how we do business at Stratcom . 32:41.310 --> 32:44.239 Uh We rely heavily on our interagency 32:44.250 --> 32:47.079 and IC partners whether that's uh NSA 32:47.089 --> 32:49.010 NGA , others within the defense 32:49.020 --> 32:50.853 intelligence enterprise or other 32:50.853 --> 32:53.569 agencies in the uh intelligence 32:53.579 --> 32:56.380 community . We need uh technical uh 32:56.390 --> 32:59.369 capabilities that , that uh perhaps uh 32:59.380 --> 33:02.170 Department of Energy or other uh 33:02.599 --> 33:05.660 defense uh threat agencies bring to 33:05.670 --> 33:08.859 bear for us . We rely 33:08.869 --> 33:11.650 critically on , on uh our , our 33:11.660 --> 33:15.300 partners as well . Five eyes uh and , 33:15.310 --> 33:17.366 and not just five eyes , but looking 33:17.366 --> 33:19.421 across the various theaters where we 33:19.421 --> 33:22.060 might need to employ or contemplate the 33:22.069 --> 33:26.010 employment of uh weapons . To me . If 33:26.020 --> 33:28.199 uh if we're , if we're thinking of a 33:28.209 --> 33:31.439 partner in a , in an after the fact 33:31.449 --> 33:34.520 role versus an integrated role , we've 33:34.530 --> 33:36.808 sort of missed the point . And I think , 33:36.808 --> 33:38.863 I think there's a lot to be said for 33:38.863 --> 33:41.709 that . Uh In fact , one of my uh 33:41.719 --> 33:44.069 colleagues in another uh in a five eye 33:44.079 --> 33:46.079 nation pointed that out and , and I 33:46.079 --> 33:48.190 thought it was a brilliant insight on 33:48.190 --> 33:51.060 that . So we then bring in that 33:51.069 --> 33:53.790 capability , whether it's uh those , 33:53.800 --> 33:56.209 those uh various agencies or various 33:56.219 --> 34:00.150 partners or academia or industry 34:00.260 --> 34:03.630 to bring together a , a resilient and 34:03.640 --> 34:06.650 reliable in this case subject of today 34:06.660 --> 34:08.949 uh integrated deterrent feature . So 34:08.959 --> 34:11.181 the data security that uh you mentioned 34:11.181 --> 34:13.629 earlier , gotta have it . So we can't , 34:13.639 --> 34:15.806 we can't go without that , but we need 34:15.806 --> 34:17.750 to be able to move data seamlessly 34:17.750 --> 34:20.169 across and still make sure that we have 34:20.179 --> 34:23.689 provided the uh the safety and security 34:23.699 --> 34:26.850 of our NC three systems , our Jim . So 34:26.860 --> 34:29.850 uh uh information , our database 34:29.860 --> 34:32.610 repositories , we need to , to uh 34:32.620 --> 34:34.787 reinvigorate those as a matter of fact 34:34.787 --> 34:37.009 and work closely . In fact , I think we 34:37.009 --> 34:39.009 have Miss uh Kathy Bolt out here uh 34:39.009 --> 34:40.953 representing Mars and there she is 34:40.953 --> 34:43.120 waving right there . She's a rock star 34:43.120 --> 34:45.231 as far as I'm concerned . So uh we'll 34:45.231 --> 34:47.453 thank her for coming out here and we'll 34:47.453 --> 34:49.610 meet with her later . Ok . And we'll 34:49.919 --> 34:52.969 end with space . Yeah , thanks , sir . 34:53.000 --> 34:55.278 So as I sit here and look at the clock , 34:55.278 --> 34:57.278 it's all about the timing and so we 34:57.278 --> 34:59.222 work with the inter agency because 34:59.222 --> 35:01.167 everything in society right in the 35:01.167 --> 35:03.929 globe works on time . And so it's 35:03.939 --> 35:05.995 working with commerce , it's working 35:05.995 --> 35:07.772 with energy , it's working with 35:07.772 --> 35:09.770 Treasury . So we work tightly with 35:09.780 --> 35:13.570 inter agency through Dod Dod Cio , 35:13.719 --> 35:16.052 right ? Because you had the GPS Council , 35:16.419 --> 35:19.000 I think we also it would be who just 35:19.010 --> 35:21.350 not a five eye is from an intelligence 35:21.360 --> 35:23.379 perspective , but also from an 35:23.389 --> 35:25.429 operational perspective . So we do 35:25.439 --> 35:28.320 coalition space operations with the 35:28.330 --> 35:30.739 Five Eye . But also uh my boss was over 35:30.750 --> 35:32.705 last week in Europe , France and 35:32.715 --> 35:35.354 Germany joined as well uh because 35:35.364 --> 35:37.586 they're space varying nations and , and 35:37.586 --> 35:39.814 it's driving coherence and but more 35:39.824 --> 35:42.044 importantly convergence , but I'd be 35:42.054 --> 35:44.387 remiss if we didn't talk about academia , 35:44.387 --> 35:46.745 the the great ideas come from academia , 35:47.034 --> 35:50.804 right ? Um The other one is commercial , 35:50.814 --> 35:54.024 commercial powers , the space community , 35:54.524 --> 35:57.975 right ? Uh You see that um in 35:57.985 --> 35:59.985 writings from China , you see it in 35:59.985 --> 36:01.989 writings from Russia , uh the 36:02.000 --> 36:04.340 commercial market drive space and it's 36:04.350 --> 36:06.461 not just the thing , the satellite or 36:06.461 --> 36:08.350 the bus , it's the payload or the 36:08.350 --> 36:10.406 service that's it's providing to the 36:10.406 --> 36:13.489 greater good . Uh And as we work 36:13.500 --> 36:15.611 through that , just in the commercial 36:15.611 --> 36:17.778 markets , a global commercial market , 36:17.778 --> 36:20.111 but that really powers the global South , 36:20.111 --> 36:22.056 right ? And so it's not just a war 36:22.056 --> 36:24.679 fighting function , it's also a way of 36:24.689 --> 36:27.350 life function from smart farming , 36:27.570 --> 36:29.800 right ? Precision if we want to employ 36:29.810 --> 36:31.977 weapons or drive your car using ways , 36:31.977 --> 36:33.866 but it's all based on timing . So 36:33.866 --> 36:35.866 everything we do at us space com is 36:35.866 --> 36:37.921 through allies and partners and it's 36:37.921 --> 36:40.729 not just their traditional sense . OK . 36:41.179 --> 36:43.449 We're gonna stay on partnerships and go 36:43.479 --> 36:46.590 back to the uh J Sixes and uh it's a 36:46.600 --> 36:48.620 different spin on partnerships but 36:48.629 --> 36:52.189 partnerships nonetheless . So the what 36:52.199 --> 36:54.199 steps are you taking to engage and 36:54.209 --> 36:56.500 integrate partners both traditional and 36:56.510 --> 36:58.850 nontraditional and what technical 36:58.860 --> 37:01.550 barriers exist to increase partnership 37:01.560 --> 37:05.239 connectivity . And I think um John 37:05.250 --> 37:07.417 because I end ended with you , I think 37:07.417 --> 37:09.472 I'll begin with you here because you 37:09.472 --> 37:11.472 talked a lot about partnerships but 37:11.472 --> 37:13.694 I'll start with you John on , on uh out 37:13.694 --> 37:16.028 at uconn . So as I look at partnerships , 37:16.028 --> 37:18.194 there's the 31 other members of NATO , 37:18.194 --> 37:20.028 but then there's the rest of the 37:20.028 --> 37:22.219 European Alliance . Um And probably 37:22.229 --> 37:24.285 most people think I spend most of my 37:24.285 --> 37:27.100 time on , on providing network service 37:27.320 --> 37:30.830 uh or cybersecurity . The majority of 37:30.840 --> 37:34.820 our focus inside UOJ six is to enhance 37:34.830 --> 37:37.163 our partners capabilities going forward . 37:37.250 --> 37:39.889 We conduct CC I BS or command and 37:39.899 --> 37:42.830 control integration boards uh with 37:42.840 --> 37:45.459 various countries . Uh We're just , we 37:45.469 --> 37:47.636 just wrapped up the very last one with 37:47.636 --> 37:49.858 Sweden because once they're a member of 37:49.858 --> 37:52.429 NATO , the intent is NATO takes over 37:52.439 --> 37:54.439 that mission , but we prep them for 37:54.439 --> 37:57.370 that . And we look at a span of things , 37:57.379 --> 37:59.490 their capabilities , their ability to 37:59.490 --> 38:02.949 integrate cybersecurity , crypto 38:03.310 --> 38:06.810 modernization link 16 for what they add 38:06.820 --> 38:09.439 to the air picture and getting that to 38:09.449 --> 38:13.199 a modern capability set . Because again , 38:13.209 --> 38:16.139 I talked about how large the span of 38:16.149 --> 38:19.340 NATO is against Russia before it was a 38:19.350 --> 38:21.699 couple 100 kilometers of East Germany . 38:21.709 --> 38:23.931 Now it goes all the way from the Arctic 38:23.931 --> 38:26.909 circle to the northern border of Poland 38:26.919 --> 38:29.141 at Ukraine and then picks up again with 38:29.141 --> 38:31.030 Romania through the Black Sea and 38:31.030 --> 38:34.179 Turkey into the Caucasus huge 38:34.189 --> 38:36.500 massive terrain footprint . And it's 38:36.510 --> 38:40.020 now the exposure with , with Russia and 38:40.030 --> 38:41.899 we need the capability of those 38:41.909 --> 38:44.459 partners to be an integrated deterrent 38:44.469 --> 38:47.379 capability . So we spend those times 38:47.389 --> 38:49.611 going forward . I leave this conference 38:49.611 --> 38:53.239 tomorrow . Uh I fly to Latvia . Uh and 38:53.250 --> 38:55.361 I have an engagement there to improve 38:55.361 --> 38:57.250 their interoperability capability 38:57.250 --> 38:59.417 forward . And then I stri fly straight 38:59.417 --> 39:01.583 from Latvia to Romania . Uh And you're 39:01.583 --> 39:03.583 all thinking , oh , great locations 39:03.583 --> 39:05.750 he's going to . But have you ever been 39:05.750 --> 39:07.750 in uh the Carpathians in November ? 39:07.750 --> 39:09.861 Probably not a pleasant time to visit 39:09.861 --> 39:13.530 Romania . Pretty cold . All our focus 39:13.540 --> 39:15.800 is to bring them up in a capability . 39:15.949 --> 39:19.090 Uh We do it at cyber engagements . Uh 39:19.100 --> 39:22.090 and we get them from a nascent level up 39:22.100 --> 39:25.530 to where we give them a road map uh to 39:25.540 --> 39:29.310 recruit , retain and train individuals 39:29.320 --> 39:32.070 to be able to provide cybersecurity uh 39:32.080 --> 39:33.913 at a capability level . And once 39:33.913 --> 39:35.969 they're at a certain level , we turn 39:35.969 --> 39:38.136 them over from a relationship from the 39:38.136 --> 39:40.247 J six to the J three . And then the J 39:40.247 --> 39:43.120 three integrates them in exercises to 39:43.129 --> 39:45.840 provide that built up capacity . And 39:45.850 --> 39:48.030 eventually that relationship gets 39:48.040 --> 39:49.929 turned over once they have a very 39:49.929 --> 39:52.479 capable force to cybercom and we have 39:52.489 --> 39:55.870 about five nations inside uh NATO now 39:55.879 --> 39:57.879 that have direct relationships with 39:57.879 --> 40:00.320 cybercom to improve their both 40:00.350 --> 40:02.017 offensive and defensive cyber 40:02.017 --> 40:04.429 capability . All right . And uh Colonel 40:04.439 --> 40:06.439 Robinson , before I go to you , I'm 40:06.439 --> 40:08.550 gonna , I'm gonna ad lib here because 40:08.550 --> 40:11.030 I've been thinking about this as we 40:11.040 --> 40:14.149 work . Uh you know , at uh at the joint 40:14.159 --> 40:16.159 staff , there's a lot of discussion 40:16.159 --> 40:18.159 about contested logistics and I was 40:18.159 --> 40:21.030 just thinking about uh what mel uh is 40:21.040 --> 40:23.419 doing and working uh with industry and 40:23.429 --> 40:25.485 the like and it , it uh dawned on me 40:25.485 --> 40:28.270 obviously that you guys uh depend a lot 40:28.280 --> 40:31.870 on uh the open systems uh to get things 40:31.879 --> 40:34.429 moving or to augment you . So , as you 40:34.439 --> 40:36.495 look at the partnerships , I suspect 40:36.495 --> 40:38.606 that uh we'll hear a little bit about 40:38.606 --> 40:40.772 uh some of the things that uh that you 40:40.772 --> 40:42.939 have to deal with that , you know , we 40:42.939 --> 40:44.939 may not be thinking about . So , um 40:44.939 --> 40:47.260 Chris , other than that I put you on 40:47.270 --> 40:49.381 the spot , but I think you can handle 40:49.381 --> 40:51.492 it , sir , I'll emphasize really that 40:51.492 --> 40:53.381 fourth component , our commercial 40:53.381 --> 40:55.381 transportation service providers uh 40:55.381 --> 40:57.270 because that's really where we uh 40:57.270 --> 40:59.437 actively engage them to integrate them 40:59.437 --> 41:01.548 and through um formal agreements with 41:01.548 --> 41:03.659 um partner with the National Security 41:03.659 --> 41:05.159 Agency , uh Cyber Security 41:05.159 --> 41:07.485 Collaboration Center for uh the Dod 41:07.495 --> 41:09.551 Cyber Crime Center as well as the um 41:09.551 --> 41:11.875 Department of Homeland Security CISA um 41:11.885 --> 41:14.514 to , to really give them access to 41:14.524 --> 41:16.302 those no cost uh Cyber security 41:16.302 --> 41:19.330 resources that are out there . Um We 41:19.340 --> 41:21.300 also work with our com um with the 41:21.310 --> 41:23.780 commercial partners to , to , to help 41:23.790 --> 41:27.040 them with their uh compliance type uh 41:27.050 --> 41:29.161 activity . So when you think of the , 41:29.161 --> 41:31.860 the national um the N standards , um 41:31.870 --> 41:33.870 they'll do self assessments , we'll 41:33.870 --> 41:36.092 help step them through those as they uh 41:36.092 --> 41:38.203 do plan of actions and milestones and 41:38.203 --> 41:39.981 mitigate things . Uh We produce 41:39.981 --> 41:42.092 newsletters that highlight um threats 41:42.092 --> 41:43.870 um that we're seeing within the 41:43.870 --> 41:46.037 department , the defense um and things 41:46.037 --> 41:48.259 that we're doing to mitigate that . And 41:48.259 --> 41:50.481 we also have contractual language . And 41:50.481 --> 41:50.344 so if there's a cyber incident that 41:50.354 --> 41:52.576 reports into our cyber operation center 41:52.576 --> 41:54.910 within us Transportation Command and we , 41:54.910 --> 41:57.132 we help , that gives us visibility . Uh 41:57.132 --> 41:59.354 We don't have that visibility necessary 41:59.354 --> 42:01.298 from um access to their , their um 42:01.298 --> 42:03.410 their systems , but that's one avenue 42:03.410 --> 42:05.632 that we help inform the command and the 42:05.632 --> 42:07.632 commanders about the things and the 42:07.632 --> 42:07.054 challenges we're seeing in the 42:07.064 --> 42:10.060 commercial sector . Ok ? And uh we'll , 42:10.070 --> 42:12.840 we'll stay with Stratcom and Liz and uh 42:12.969 --> 42:15.080 see how you treat your partnerships , 42:15.080 --> 42:17.302 partnerships . So there , there , there 42:17.302 --> 42:20.080 are just an exceeding number of 42:20.090 --> 42:22.312 partnerships . So let me just stay with 42:22.312 --> 42:24.423 Transportation command for a minute . 42:24.423 --> 42:26.479 We depend upon our partnership , not 42:26.479 --> 42:28.646 only with Transcom but other combatant 42:28.646 --> 42:28.399 commands because we must have those 42:28.409 --> 42:30.576 capabilities if Stratcom is to be able 42:30.576 --> 42:32.639 to execute our forces . So for ex 42:32.719 --> 42:35.070 example , uh we've got uh our bomber 42:35.080 --> 42:37.136 aircraft must be able to execute the 42:37.136 --> 42:39.302 orders of the president . They find it 42:39.302 --> 42:41.524 difficult to go someplace without gas . 42:41.524 --> 42:43.636 So Transcom , we , we're continuously 42:43.636 --> 42:45.580 working with Transcom to make sure 42:45.580 --> 42:47.747 we've got the the capabilities married 42:47.747 --> 42:49.969 up as we , as we deploy our forces . Uh 42:49.969 --> 42:52.080 space command , same type of things . 42:52.080 --> 42:51.610 We've got to be able to make sure we 42:51.620 --> 42:53.453 have the capability that we need 42:53.453 --> 42:55.453 provided from space at the time and 42:55.453 --> 42:57.287 place that we need to have those 42:57.287 --> 42:59.453 capabilities . So huge partnerships uh 42:59.453 --> 43:01.453 across all the combatant commands . 43:01.453 --> 43:03.676 Cybercom , in particular , a very close 43:03.676 --> 43:05.620 partnership with with our cybercom 43:05.620 --> 43:07.731 teammates . Um Other than that , uh I 43:07.731 --> 43:09.787 will tell you with the national , uh 43:09.787 --> 43:11.676 the national leadership , we have 43:11.676 --> 43:13.398 strong partnerships across the 43:13.398 --> 43:15.564 intelligence community with all of the 43:15.564 --> 43:17.398 three letter agencies to help us 43:17.398 --> 43:19.342 perform our mission . We work very 43:19.342 --> 43:21.342 closely with our J two teammates to 43:21.342 --> 43:23.398 make sure that we're , we're very uh 43:23.398 --> 43:25.342 well informed . We , we um tend to 43:25.342 --> 43:25.165 execute our mission based upon the 43:25.175 --> 43:27.459 threat . So every briefing that you 43:27.469 --> 43:29.691 would get from Stratcom would start off 43:29.691 --> 43:31.636 with a threat brief and that would 43:31.636 --> 43:33.636 shape how we decide to execute that 43:33.636 --> 43:35.525 particular mission . We also have 43:35.525 --> 43:37.636 strong partnership with our component 43:37.636 --> 43:39.580 commands . We have air component , 43:39.580 --> 43:41.747 Cyber component , maritime component , 43:41.747 --> 43:43.802 those are key in providing the , the 43:43.802 --> 43:45.636 capabilities and the forces that 43:45.636 --> 43:47.580 general cotton needs to be able to 43:47.580 --> 43:49.580 execute his mission . And finally , 43:49.580 --> 43:51.858 I'll tell you about a partnership that , 43:51.858 --> 43:53.969 that we have internal to us Strategic 43:53.969 --> 43:56.080 Command . We have what we call uh the 43:56.080 --> 43:58.302 Cyber senior leader team and that those 43:58.302 --> 44:00.247 are representatives that reach out 44:00.247 --> 44:02.191 across the department , across the 44:02.191 --> 44:04.413 government . But even within Stratcom , 44:04.413 --> 44:06.580 that's the J two , the J three , the J 44:06.580 --> 44:08.413 six , our centers , our uh Joint 44:08.413 --> 44:10.580 Electro Magnetic Spectrum Center , our 44:10.580 --> 44:12.858 Nuclear Command Control Communications , 44:12.858 --> 44:14.636 enterprise Center , all working 44:14.636 --> 44:16.636 together as a cohesive team to make 44:16.636 --> 44:18.969 sure that we can accomplish our mission . 44:18.969 --> 44:21.136 So Stratcom is big on partnerships for 44:21.136 --> 44:22.858 everything from at home to the 44:22.858 --> 44:24.913 combatant commands to our components 44:24.913 --> 44:27.025 and the final partnership , I'll just 44:27.025 --> 44:26.340 mention briefly is our , our 44:26.350 --> 44:28.128 partnership with our commercial 44:28.128 --> 44:29.906 partners , our partnership with 44:29.906 --> 44:32.128 Academia , we depend a lot we're hiring 44:32.128 --> 44:34.294 too . So a lot , a lot of partnerships 44:34.294 --> 44:36.517 with , with talent and making sure that 44:36.517 --> 44:38.628 we can uh provide that talent to keep 44:38.628 --> 44:40.739 the strategic forces going , not only 44:40.739 --> 44:42.709 now but into the future . Ok . And 44:42.719 --> 44:45.300 before I go to Anne Marie at South com , 44:45.679 --> 44:48.540 um I just wanted to point out that uh 44:48.860 --> 44:51.082 the chairman challenged the , the joint 44:51.082 --> 44:53.027 staff and he said , hey , if we're 44:53.027 --> 44:55.209 really gonna uh have partnerships , uh 44:55.229 --> 44:57.429 we need to actually start here at the 44:57.439 --> 44:59.606 joint staff and start doing the things 44:59.606 --> 45:01.828 that we need to do in order to model uh 45:01.828 --> 45:03.772 what that would look like . And so 45:03.772 --> 45:05.828 we've started uh integrating some of 45:05.828 --> 45:08.199 our , not some of at least one meeting 45:08.209 --> 45:10.689 a week uh where we briefed the , the 45:10.699 --> 45:12.810 chair and , and the rest of the joint 45:12.810 --> 45:14.977 staff and , and our partners are right 45:14.977 --> 45:17.255 there with us uh at the highest levels . 45:17.255 --> 45:19.754 And uh it's , it's going well so far . 45:19.935 --> 45:22.102 Uh But we have a lot of work to do but 45:22.102 --> 45:24.157 uh it , it's very heartening to hear 45:24.157 --> 45:26.475 all of you talk about the partnerships 45:26.485 --> 45:28.707 that you have and , and even those that 45:28.707 --> 45:30.541 are challenged , uh whether it's 45:30.541 --> 45:32.596 technology and we'll talk about that 45:32.596 --> 45:34.707 here because that's gonna be the next 45:34.707 --> 45:36.929 question uh for industry and uh and the 45:36.929 --> 45:39.152 like , but uh uh before that , I'll let 45:39.152 --> 45:41.096 uh Anne Marie close us out on this 45:41.096 --> 45:43.096 topic . Thanks , sir . So I'm gonna 45:43.096 --> 45:45.096 talk about uh team America and team 45:45.096 --> 45:47.041 democracy and I'll start with team 45:47.041 --> 45:49.041 America first . So at United States 45:49.041 --> 45:50.929 Southern Command , we have a very 45:50.929 --> 45:53.152 unique relationship with the , with the 45:53.152 --> 45:55.429 inter agency and , and how we organize . 45:55.429 --> 45:57.263 So as an example , we uh execute 45:57.263 --> 45:59.485 combatant commander stand up most every 45:59.485 --> 46:01.596 morning . Uh And sitting at the table 46:01.596 --> 46:03.818 every day is our civilian deputy to the 46:03.818 --> 46:05.929 commander , former ambassador uh to a 46:05.929 --> 46:08.770 country in uh in , in South America um 46:08.780 --> 46:10.836 member of the Department of State on 46:10.836 --> 46:12.891 assignment to the , to the um to the 46:12.891 --> 46:14.989 dod . Also sitting at the table is 46:15.000 --> 46:18.239 United States uh USA . Uh 46:18.250 --> 46:21.639 So when we do our command brief about 46:21.649 --> 46:25.169 the third slide and uh we talk about 46:25.179 --> 46:28.189 the inter agency approach is about two 46:28.199 --> 46:31.129 dozen different organizations on that 46:31.139 --> 46:33.449 slide , who all have representatives 46:33.459 --> 46:35.229 within our Combatant Command 46:35.239 --> 46:37.989 headquarters . So it everything that we 46:38.000 --> 46:40.830 do within the South com A or is an 46:40.840 --> 46:43.062 integrated approach with our , with our 46:43.062 --> 46:45.489 partners . And I'll give you an example . 46:45.590 --> 46:47.646 Uh We talked a little bit about what 46:47.646 --> 46:49.590 we're doing with our partners . So 46:49.590 --> 46:51.479 Cyber security security operation 46:51.479 --> 46:53.969 centers uh dod funded as well as 46:53.979 --> 46:57.870 department of state funded uh s subject 46:57.879 --> 47:00.590 matter expertise , en engagements uh 47:00.600 --> 47:03.530 with Nraor by the Department of State , 47:03.540 --> 47:05.570 United States , Cyber Command uh 47:05.580 --> 47:08.290 Department of Homeland Security . So 47:08.300 --> 47:10.889 team America translates to team 47:10.899 --> 47:13.469 democracy . So what is team democracy 47:13.479 --> 47:15.909 doing ? So we expand on that United 47:15.919 --> 47:18.830 States team America approach with 47:18.840 --> 47:21.729 academia and industry . Now , if I look 47:21.739 --> 47:24.669 at the , so the US south com A or I 47:24.679 --> 47:27.250 look at a map of Latin America and the 47:27.260 --> 47:31.139 Caribbean , I can take uh little 47:31.149 --> 47:33.260 pinpoints like , hey , where have you 47:33.260 --> 47:35.590 been ? And I can put industry , I can 47:35.600 --> 47:38.080 put company names on that map and how 47:38.090 --> 47:40.419 are our industry partners and how are 47:40.429 --> 47:43.129 academia promoting democracy and 47:43.139 --> 47:45.409 democratic values with our partners ? 47:45.419 --> 47:47.197 Right . So how does information 47:47.197 --> 47:49.330 technology enable that ? Well , it's 47:49.340 --> 47:51.507 the information environments . How are 47:51.507 --> 47:53.810 we sharing information ? How are we 47:53.820 --> 47:57.010 sharing our values ? How are we 47:57.020 --> 47:59.760 continuing to be the partner of choice ? 47:59.770 --> 48:01.764 And it professionals enable that 48:01.774 --> 48:04.044 whether you're in the dod or you're in 48:04.054 --> 48:06.221 the commercial sector , you're on team 48:06.221 --> 48:08.443 America or your team democracy , you're 48:08.443 --> 48:10.995 enabling communication flow so that we 48:11.004 --> 48:13.604 can engage decisively with our partners 48:13.614 --> 48:15.503 and continue to be the partner of 48:15.503 --> 48:17.558 choice . All right . And uh this was 48:17.558 --> 48:19.558 not planned , but uh this is a good 48:19.558 --> 48:21.892 segue and Marie , thanks for doing that . 48:21.892 --> 48:24.058 We're gonna now open it up to the rest 48:24.058 --> 48:26.281 of the , to all of the panelists . Same 48:26.281 --> 48:28.392 question . Uh And certainly to you in 48:28.392 --> 48:30.447 the audience , uh hopefully you'll , 48:30.447 --> 48:32.558 you'll uh have your pins out . Uh But 48:32.558 --> 48:34.781 the , the question for all of you is uh 48:34.781 --> 48:36.892 we do have a lot of vendors uh out in 48:36.892 --> 48:39.114 the audience , at least I hope they are 48:39.114 --> 48:41.760 today . Um And uh other partners out 48:41.770 --> 48:44.219 there . How do you incentivize uh and 48:44.229 --> 48:45.896 foster greater investment and 48:45.896 --> 48:47.951 partnerships with the private sector 48:47.951 --> 48:50.118 companies to meet your mission needs ? 48:50.118 --> 48:52.229 And this is the lightning round . All 48:52.229 --> 48:54.451 right . So you just gonna hit it and go 48:54.451 --> 48:56.562 and you just get through it because I 48:56.562 --> 48:59.719 wanna end this with uh you telling your 48:59.729 --> 49:02.290 top problem that you have from an it 49:02.300 --> 49:04.959 perspective or technology perspective . 49:04.969 --> 49:07.136 That'll just be a one answer thing and 49:07.136 --> 49:09.358 then it , it move . But I'm gonna start 49:09.358 --> 49:11.413 here mo because you , you look at me 49:11.413 --> 49:13.580 like you , you're really ready to go . 49:13.580 --> 49:15.802 Yes , sir . OK . All right . So again , 49:15.802 --> 49:17.691 defense critical infrastructure , 49:17.691 --> 49:19.691 number one , it problem is we don't 49:19.691 --> 49:21.691 know what's connected to what quite 49:21.691 --> 49:23.969 honestly outside the defense perimeter . 49:23.969 --> 49:23.310 And I'm not sure that industry does 49:23.320 --> 49:25.530 either . Um There are a lot of things 49:25.540 --> 49:27.651 that can affect us and I tell you the 49:27.651 --> 49:29.707 number one , I'd really like to know 49:29.707 --> 49:31.484 how all the links and nodes are 49:31.484 --> 49:31.379 connected to make sure that we have 49:31.389 --> 49:33.556 that resiliency in case we're attacked 49:33.556 --> 49:35.667 in the homeland . Our number one , it 49:35.667 --> 49:37.611 problem is very similar to yours . 49:37.611 --> 49:39.778 Although ours is really codifying what 49:39.778 --> 49:42.229 the , what the um architecture is and 49:42.239 --> 49:44.295 being able to ensure that it's cyber 49:44.295 --> 49:46.295 secure and that . No kidding , it's 49:46.295 --> 49:48.517 gonna function 24 73 65 under the worst 49:48.517 --> 49:50.628 possible crisis scenario . So what we 49:50.628 --> 49:52.295 really need from industry are 49:52.295 --> 49:54.406 interesting . So are , are out of the 49:54.406 --> 49:56.461 box thinking about how to do that in 49:56.461 --> 49:58.406 both a connected environment and a 49:58.406 --> 49:58.399 disconnected environment , leveraging 49:58.409 --> 50:00.631 cloud computing as best we can while we 50:00.631 --> 50:02.687 make sure that the that the networks 50:02.687 --> 50:04.853 and architectures are secure . OK . Uh 50:04.853 --> 50:07.270 Three things I think first , um you 50:07.280 --> 50:09.489 know , humility on the department's uh 50:09.500 --> 50:12.080 side and recognizing that uh the scope 50:12.090 --> 50:14.312 and scale of technological change in in 50:14.312 --> 50:16.389 the domain , um We have to rely on 50:16.399 --> 50:18.288 industry partners . So thanks for 50:18.288 --> 50:20.343 working for the good guys uh in that 50:20.343 --> 50:22.121 regard . Uh The second is cyber 50:22.121 --> 50:24.121 security for systems being provided 50:24.121 --> 50:23.989 across the department . We've talked 50:24.000 --> 50:26.222 about that and the third is humility on 50:26.222 --> 50:28.056 your part . Um So if there is an 50:28.056 --> 50:30.659 incident uh or uh you've been a victim 50:30.669 --> 50:32.447 of espionage or cyber attack uh 50:32.447 --> 50:34.613 following the appropriate uh reporting 50:34.613 --> 50:36.558 procedures quickly . Uh and timely 50:36.558 --> 50:38.669 enables us to get a sense for what an 50:38.669 --> 50:40.780 adversary is up to and feed that back 50:40.780 --> 50:43.002 into the rest of the IC and the rest of 50:43.002 --> 50:42.649 the department so we can take action . 50:42.659 --> 50:45.989 Thanks . So relationships are about 50:46.000 --> 50:49.060 risk , our risk on the department side 50:49.159 --> 50:51.270 and then risk on the industry side as 50:51.270 --> 50:53.326 well . So we've got to be willing to 50:53.326 --> 50:55.949 accept some shared risk uh so that we 50:55.959 --> 50:58.389 can maintain flexibility . Uh So 50:58.399 --> 51:00.621 industry , we can give you requirements 51:00.621 --> 51:02.989 and not tell you how to do things . Uh 51:03.000 --> 51:05.209 And then you can produce as industry 51:05.219 --> 51:07.275 partners a minimum viable capability 51:07.275 --> 51:09.996 that we can then iterate all on uh so 51:10.006 --> 51:12.456 that we maintain that flexibility now 51:12.466 --> 51:14.635 go one step further from a from a 51:14.645 --> 51:16.867 higher level . We've got to rethink the 51:16.875 --> 51:18.946 far . We've got to put demand signal 51:18.956 --> 51:21.355 out to , to rethink the far so that we 51:21.365 --> 51:23.956 can be more agile so that we can 51:23.966 --> 51:27.476 outpace the pacing threat . Um so that 51:27.486 --> 51:29.805 we can maintain interoperability with 51:29.815 --> 51:32.691 our partners , secure interoperability 51:32.701 --> 51:34.645 with our partners , so that we can 51:34.645 --> 51:36.701 share information and we can share , 51:36.701 --> 51:38.868 share intelligence uh in a dynamic and 51:38.868 --> 51:42.352 agile and resilient way . I'm gonna 51:42.362 --> 51:44.529 flip the narrative . So it's the field 51:44.529 --> 51:46.751 of dreams . If you build it will come . 51:46.751 --> 51:48.741 Show me the requirement , the 51:48.751 --> 51:51.451 department of Defense levied for a 51:51.461 --> 51:54.461 proliferated low earth orbit 51:54.471 --> 51:57.701 constellation to provide reliable SAT 51:57.812 --> 52:00.112 com and data services . There is not 52:00.122 --> 52:02.620 one and we're using it every day across 52:02.629 --> 52:04.949 the globe . Show me the requirement 52:04.959 --> 52:07.469 that says build me a reusable rocket 52:07.780 --> 52:09.891 and you can land it and do it again . 52:09.891 --> 52:11.724 They thought it was crazy be the 52:11.724 --> 52:13.947 disruptor . If you're waiting for us to 52:13.947 --> 52:16.500 write the requirement down to go do it . 52:16.510 --> 52:18.409 We're super busy . You heard uh 52:18.419 --> 52:20.252 Congressman Bacon , you've heard 52:20.260 --> 52:22.610 everybody . How do we articulate the 52:22.620 --> 52:25.360 risk back when we have to sit down and 52:25.370 --> 52:27.520 write the problem while you're in the 52:27.530 --> 52:30.290 market ? And so I would flip the 52:30.300 --> 52:32.590 narrative on you . Be the disruptor . 52:32.659 --> 52:34.659 Don't come back and say I have this 52:34.659 --> 52:36.992 great visualization tool not interested , 52:37.060 --> 52:39.282 right ? Not interested . It's about the 52:39.282 --> 52:41.370 data . You have to be the disruptor 52:41.379 --> 52:43.323 because that's what the commercial 52:43.323 --> 52:45.323 market does . That's what everybody 52:45.323 --> 52:47.979 here does be the disruptor to help lead 52:47.989 --> 52:50.211 us through it because we understand the 52:50.211 --> 52:52.267 problem but hope to have the time to 52:52.267 --> 52:54.489 write it in the 5000 series acquisition 52:54.489 --> 52:56.489 rule to get back to you . So that's 52:56.489 --> 52:59.590 mine . All right . Let's go to trans 52:59.699 --> 53:01.699 com . I , I'd say um understanding 53:01.709 --> 53:03.876 critical infrastructure , uh the , the 53:03.876 --> 53:06.139 challenges out there um echo uh North 53:06.199 --> 53:09.649 com um helping our partners get trans 53:09.709 --> 53:11.876 commercial partners get through and um 53:11.876 --> 53:13.876 understand their terrain as well so 53:13.876 --> 53:16.098 that we can understand that um managing 53:16.098 --> 53:18.449 um and setting standards for our data . 53:18.459 --> 53:20.879 Um and the as growth , the volume of 53:20.889 --> 53:22.778 growth that we're , we're working 53:22.778 --> 53:24.945 through that and really modernizing in 53:24.945 --> 53:26.889 our , our it and uh it portfolio . 53:26.889 --> 53:29.000 Those are things we have to get after 53:29.000 --> 53:28.479 and those are things we're working at 53:28.489 --> 53:31.840 Transcom . Two things . Um 53:32.320 --> 53:35.520 One is setting the standard uh and 53:35.530 --> 53:38.879 classification for uh operations going 53:38.889 --> 53:41.409 forward . First is integrated air and 53:41.419 --> 53:44.870 missile defense . Uh using link 16 . We 53:44.879 --> 53:47.379 can only operate at the lowest 53:47.389 --> 53:49.409 capability uh of the lowest common 53:49.419 --> 53:51.752 denominator of the contributing country . 53:51.752 --> 53:53.975 There are some countries within NATO uh 53:53.975 --> 53:56.350 that are only gonna be on track to 53:56.360 --> 53:58.629 reaching crypto modernization as 53:58.639 --> 54:02.080 required uh for modern link 16 for 54:02.090 --> 54:04.429 about 34 years from now because we're 54:04.439 --> 54:06.106 fielding the United States uh 54:06.106 --> 54:08.500 requirements first . But we have to 54:08.510 --> 54:10.850 develop and increase the capacity of 54:10.860 --> 54:13.100 the defense industrial base to turn out 54:13.110 --> 54:15.550 those systems to bring in all of our 54:15.560 --> 54:17.893 partner nations that contribute greatly . 54:18.159 --> 54:20.381 Uh The previous speaker talked about uh 54:20.389 --> 54:22.610 the effect of a hypersonic hitting the 54:22.620 --> 54:24.840 Pentagon . Well , think about one 54:24.850 --> 54:26.906 hitting Warsaw , that's only about a 54:26.906 --> 54:29.939 2.5 minute flight . Um You have very 54:29.949 --> 54:31.949 little reaction time and we have to 54:31.949 --> 54:34.340 improve that capability . The second 54:34.429 --> 54:37.100 looking at my J two counterparts here 54:37.270 --> 54:40.500 is writing for release . We have a 54:40.510 --> 54:42.979 tendency in the United States to over 54:42.989 --> 54:46.030 classify information uh and not 54:46.040 --> 54:49.290 intend or or not develop to what the 54:49.300 --> 54:51.750 intended ar audience needs to be , to 54:51.760 --> 54:53.871 receive that information . So we need 54:53.871 --> 54:55.840 to write to release for our most 54:55.850 --> 54:58.350 capable partners to be able to utilize 54:58.360 --> 55:00.471 that intelligence and be more capable 55:00.471 --> 55:03.120 going forward . OK . And bridge close 55:03.129 --> 55:05.729 out as we operate in this uh strategic 55:05.739 --> 55:07.979 competition environment with two near 55:07.989 --> 55:11.169 peer adversaries who are determined to 55:11.179 --> 55:14.810 threaten our , our data flow , our 55:14.820 --> 55:18.250 systems . Uh We need to as , as Liz 55:18.260 --> 55:20.371 mentioned earlier and Mo you may have 55:20.371 --> 55:22.149 talked about this as well , the 55:22.149 --> 55:24.409 interdependencies of our systems to no 55:24.419 --> 55:27.689 kidding . Find the , the sweet spot of 55:27.699 --> 55:29.532 how we go about it . And there's 55:29.532 --> 55:31.532 probably , in fact , I'm certain of 55:31.532 --> 55:33.866 this , there's more than one sweet spot , 55:33.866 --> 55:36.199 but how do we , how do we go after that ? 55:36.199 --> 55:38.310 That is a critical challenge for us . 55:38.310 --> 55:40.588 All right . And uh before we close out , 55:40.588 --> 55:42.649 we got about five minutes , uh I did 55:42.659 --> 55:44.969 wanna recap a little bit . Uh You saw 55:44.979 --> 55:47.201 me up here writing if you were , if you 55:47.201 --> 55:49.201 even paying attention to what I was 55:49.201 --> 55:51.423 doing , I wasn't just uh Jon Stewart in 55:51.423 --> 55:53.423 it up here . I was actually writing 55:53.423 --> 55:55.479 some stuff down . Uh But here's some 55:55.479 --> 55:57.646 things that I captured from the , from 55:57.646 --> 55:59.757 the discussion . One was uh the , the 55:59.757 --> 56:02.219 word foundational . Uh And uh I know 56:02.229 --> 56:04.729 Miss Buchholz is out there uh Looking 56:04.739 --> 56:07.050 at making sure that we have access to 56:07.060 --> 56:09.260 that foundational data , that those 56:09.270 --> 56:11.492 things that are out there that are just 56:11.492 --> 56:14.060 everyday grind work . I think that's 56:14.070 --> 56:15.870 important interoperability was 56:15.879 --> 56:18.520 mentioned several times . Uh We talked 56:18.530 --> 56:20.474 about services , spacecom , talked 56:20.474 --> 56:23.570 about services PNT delivery sat com so 56:23.580 --> 56:26.489 on and so forth . Uh We talked about uh 56:26.500 --> 56:29.750 from the , from the sea to space and I 56:29.760 --> 56:32.080 think that may have been you mo uh we 56:32.090 --> 56:34.034 talked about cost imposition and I 56:34.034 --> 56:36.639 think that may have been south com . I 56:36.649 --> 56:38.482 don't know who talked about cost 56:38.482 --> 56:40.593 imposition as far as risk goes . That 56:40.593 --> 56:43.270 was uh mel um But then I started 56:43.280 --> 56:45.502 writing some of the other bigger themes 56:45.502 --> 56:47.447 on here , Domain awareness . We've 56:47.447 --> 56:49.447 heard that several times and that's 56:49.447 --> 56:51.558 where certainly industry . And uh and 56:51.558 --> 56:54.260 you guys uh the it community as you 56:54.270 --> 56:56.449 start to try to make sure that we can 56:56.459 --> 56:58.850 integrate uh and be interoperable . One 56:58.860 --> 57:01.290 of those things we uh that I'm charged 57:01.300 --> 57:04.800 with as AJ two uh is uh battle Space 57:04.810 --> 57:07.209 Awareness on behalf of the joint force 57:07.219 --> 57:10.439 that's in my uh Bailey wick to do on 57:10.449 --> 57:12.671 behalf of the joint force . So , domain 57:12.671 --> 57:14.727 awareness is critical for everything 57:14.727 --> 57:16.782 that we do and that all goes back to 57:16.782 --> 57:18.919 data and our ability to do to get at 57:18.929 --> 57:21.270 that data and utilize it in a way that 57:21.280 --> 57:23.224 the the team here has been talking 57:23.224 --> 57:25.459 about , talked about release , talked 57:25.469 --> 57:28.070 about convergence , resiliency , 57:28.300 --> 57:31.600 interagency , seamless 57:31.870 --> 57:34.679 visibility , commercial 57:34.870 --> 57:38.179 flexibility , interdependence . And 57:38.189 --> 57:40.370 then the the piece that kept coming up 57:40.379 --> 57:42.546 and almost every one of the discussion 57:42.546 --> 57:44.712 is the defense industrial base and our 57:44.712 --> 57:47.270 ability uh to be able to actually do 57:47.280 --> 57:50.060 things at scope and scale . And uh if 57:50.070 --> 57:52.181 you're sitting up here on the panel , 57:52.280 --> 57:54.129 uh certainly every one of us is 57:54.139 --> 57:56.649 affected by it . Uh whether it's in our 57:56.659 --> 57:59.550 reliance on the industrial base , uh 57:59.560 --> 58:02.800 whether that is to produce more uh for 58:02.810 --> 58:04.921 the future or whether that is to help 58:04.921 --> 58:07.360 us move uh in a contested environment . 58:07.610 --> 58:09.277 Uh defense industrial base is 58:09.277 --> 58:11.332 everything to us . And right now , I 58:11.332 --> 58:13.889 think we're not in a , a place where we 58:13.899 --> 58:15.810 are actually putting it uh at the 58:15.820 --> 58:18.280 forefront . And uh both this , the 58:18.290 --> 58:20.750 Senator and the congressman uh both 58:20.760 --> 58:23.510 discussed that about the awareness that 58:23.520 --> 58:26.229 we don't have or that we uh don't have 58:26.239 --> 58:28.580 enough of to understand the threat . 58:28.899 --> 58:31.066 And so I think the , the panelists and 58:31.066 --> 58:33.232 thank you for doing this . I think you 58:33.232 --> 58:35.979 illuminated uh not only uh for your own 58:35.989 --> 58:39.020 domain or your own geographic uh area . 58:39.229 --> 58:41.173 But I think you did illuminate the 58:41.173 --> 58:43.396 threat in a way that allows each one of 58:43.396 --> 58:45.790 us to think about uh what we can do as , 58:45.800 --> 58:48.770 as it professionals or as industry who 58:48.780 --> 58:51.219 is trying to enable us uh to help get 58:51.229 --> 58:53.451 at some of the problems that you have . 58:53.451 --> 58:55.673 So I'll stop there to see if any of you 58:55.673 --> 58:57.949 have any follow up . You wanna do if I 58:57.959 --> 59:00.709 uh pull one of your uh key words out 59:00.719 --> 59:02.775 and you wanna elaborate on that . We 59:02.775 --> 59:05.979 have two minutes . Hm . 59:07.709 --> 59:09.765 I don't know if we can , we can take 59:09.765 --> 59:11.876 probably one question . Maybe so make 59:11.876 --> 59:13.765 it one that all the panelists can 59:13.765 --> 59:15.931 hopefully uh give you a little bit but 59:15.931 --> 59:19.600 you have one minute and 50 seconds . We 59:19.610 --> 59:22.330 don't have to use all the time , sir . 59:22.340 --> 59:25.580 If I , if I may 1 of our greatest uh 59:25.590 --> 59:28.760 treasures in this whole discussion of 59:28.770 --> 59:32.199 uh architecture and it , and data is 59:32.209 --> 59:35.929 our human resource , our , our analyst , 59:35.939 --> 59:39.429 our contractors , our planners , you 59:39.439 --> 59:41.659 name it . They're all critical to this 59:41.669 --> 59:44.729 thing . And from a selfish perspective , 59:44.739 --> 59:47.560 as General Cotton said earlier , Omaha 59:47.570 --> 59:51.010 is a uh is a hidden gem off . It is a 59:51.020 --> 59:54.070 hidden gem and it , it is truly an 59:54.080 --> 59:56.247 amazing place to be and the mission is 59:56.247 --> 59:58.413 critical . So I'll just get off this . 59:58.413 --> 01:00:00.580 That was Info ops . That's very good . 01:00:00.580 --> 01:00:04.189 II I agree . But um hey , thanks uh for 01:00:04.199 --> 01:00:06.199 having a Panelist come . I know you 01:00:06.199 --> 01:00:08.199 guys took a , took time out of your 01:00:08.199 --> 01:00:10.421 schedule , but I appreciate it . Please 01:00:10.421 --> 01:00:10.250 give a round of applause for the 01:00:10.260 --> 01:00:14.250 panelists . All 01:00:14.260 --> 01:00:16.427 right , I don't think we have any walk 01:00:16.427 --> 01:00:18.649 off music , so we're just gonna leave . 01:00:19.760 --> 01:00:20.310 Oh , 01:00:24.989 --> 01:00:25.199 so 01:00:32.949 --> 01:00:35.282 thank you Lieutenant General Henry . Uh , 01:00:35.282 --> 01:00:37.505 and to all of our panelists uh for that 01:00:37.505 --> 01:00:39.727 very insightful discussion . Uh At this 01:00:39.727 --> 01:00:41.838 time , we're gonna take about an hour 01:00:41.838 --> 01:00:44.250 uh for lunch , uh and networking . Uh 01:00:44.260 --> 01:00:46.260 There's some really cool technology 01:00:46.260 --> 01:00:48.427 downstairs . So I uh implore you to go 01:00:48.427 --> 01:00:50.538 see some of uh some of the vendor and 01:00:50.538 --> 01:00:52.538 some of our uh industry partners uh 01:00:52.538 --> 01:00:54.704 technology they got for us . Um Please 01:00:54.704 --> 01:00:56.482 be back up here by 1330 for our 01:00:56.482 --> 01:00:58.770 afternoon panel uh afternoon panel . 01:00:58.780 --> 01:00:59.209 Thank you .