WEBVTT 00:00.009 --> 00:02.140 Thank you , General Glavey . Our next 00:02.150 --> 00:04.372 speaker is the honorable John Sherman . 00:04.670 --> 00:06.392 Mr Sherman was sworn in as the 00:06.392 --> 00:08.614 Department of Defense Chief Information 00:08.614 --> 00:12.010 Officer in December of 2021 . He serves 00:12.020 --> 00:13.798 as the principal advisor to the 00:13.798 --> 00:15.853 Secretary of Defense for Information 00:15.853 --> 00:18.079 Management , Information Technology and 00:18.090 --> 00:20.750 Information Assurance . It is always a 00:20.760 --> 00:22.760 pleasure to have Mr Sherman back at 00:22.760 --> 00:24.982 doti . Please give him a warm welcome . 00:33.330 --> 00:35.497 Yeah , I chose little John for my walk 00:35.497 --> 00:37.909 out . Turn down for what ? All right , 00:38.680 --> 00:41.639 that was amazing by General Glavey . Um 00:41.650 --> 00:44.229 that what an outstanding presentation 00:44.700 --> 00:46.589 and you're gonna hear a lot of my 00:46.589 --> 00:48.589 remarks and we didn't quite plan it 00:48.589 --> 00:50.367 this way , but we're in so many 00:50.367 --> 00:52.644 meetings and other activities together . 00:52.644 --> 00:54.644 It's gonna dovetail just right away 00:54.644 --> 00:56.700 here . It's so great to be here with 00:56.700 --> 00:58.700 you at Dous . This is like old home 00:58.700 --> 01:00.810 week for me being the IC Cio and now 01:00.819 --> 01:03.630 the Dod Cio . It's wonderful to see so 01:03.639 --> 01:06.290 many colleagues here , so many folks 01:06.300 --> 01:08.411 working in industry and government to 01:08.411 --> 01:10.411 help us get after what I'm gonna be 01:10.411 --> 01:12.790 talking about here . So what I plan to 01:12.800 --> 01:16.180 do today is how we see the battle space 01:16.190 --> 01:18.610 the environment right now and what 01:18.620 --> 01:21.290 we're gonna be doing in fiscal 24 to 01:21.300 --> 01:23.522 get after this and then I'm gonna leave 01:23.522 --> 01:25.689 you with a thought . I wanna challenge 01:25.689 --> 01:29.519 everybody with here . So getting into 01:29.529 --> 01:32.239 this . So as General Glave indicated , 01:32.250 --> 01:34.250 our pacing challenge is clearly the 01:34.250 --> 01:36.250 People's Republic of China . As you 01:36.250 --> 01:38.417 look at my graphic here , a few things 01:38.417 --> 01:40.769 I've got on here on the big uh graphic 01:40.779 --> 01:43.879 on the left here . we have a US uh 01:43.889 --> 01:47.800 Arley Burke , the U uh the uh hung tune 01:48.050 --> 01:51.360 there . And we've got a Lu Yong DDG 01:51.569 --> 01:54.250 Chinese ship dangerously cutting across 01:54.260 --> 01:56.260 the wake there and there's just off 01:56.260 --> 01:58.482 screen there . A Canadian ship , the HC 01:58.482 --> 02:00.839 MS Montreal . This is happening 02:00.849 --> 02:02.809 constantly as we do freedom of 02:02.819 --> 02:06.279 navigation uh routes near the Taiwan 02:06.290 --> 02:08.512 Strait there . The upper right , you've 02:08.512 --> 02:11.080 got AJ 11 fighter aircraft coming off 02:11.089 --> 02:13.199 the wing of a rivet joint aircraft 02:13.369 --> 02:15.369 about this time last year in a very 02:15.369 --> 02:17.425 dangerous approach . And then at the 02:17.425 --> 02:19.536 bottom , right , you've got a Chinese 02:19.536 --> 02:21.425 Coast Guard ship spraying a water 02:21.425 --> 02:23.425 cannon uh against the Filipino Navy 02:23.425 --> 02:25.758 there that are out on the Thomas Shoals . 02:25.758 --> 02:27.869 This is what we're dealing with every 02:27.869 --> 02:30.147 single day here . A very sophisticated , 02:30.147 --> 02:32.550 modern assertive challenger in the 02:32.559 --> 02:35.440 Western Pacific now . Meanwhile , 02:35.449 --> 02:37.227 Ukraine is going on right now . 02:37.227 --> 02:38.949 President Zelensky was just in 02:38.949 --> 02:41.171 Washington , talking to President Biden 02:41.171 --> 02:43.393 and speaking at NDU and elsewhere . You 02:43.393 --> 02:45.505 look at the upper right hand corner , 02:45.505 --> 02:47.671 you see a Ukrainian soldier firing out 02:47.671 --> 02:49.838 of a trench line . It's like World war 02:49.838 --> 02:51.838 one , almost our great grandparents 02:51.838 --> 02:51.490 would have found that recognizable , 02:51.500 --> 02:53.740 but in a highly digital battle space , 02:54.070 --> 02:56.520 we see we have a patriot radar there . 02:56.529 --> 02:58.696 That's actually one of ours , but it's 02:58.696 --> 03:00.807 the same sort of thing we've deployed 03:00.807 --> 03:02.918 and given to the Ukrainians to defend 03:02.918 --> 03:04.918 Kiev . And you may have seen on the 03:04.918 --> 03:06.751 news this morning , more Russian 03:06.751 --> 03:08.973 strikes going on on Kiev . And then you 03:08.973 --> 03:08.742 see at the bottom left there , 03:08.753 --> 03:10.864 President Zelensky standing next to a 03:10.864 --> 03:13.322 Shaheed drone that struck near Kiev 03:13.332 --> 03:16.423 area , very uh cheap but modern 03:16.432 --> 03:18.543 capability in the lower right there . 03:18.543 --> 03:21.203 You see high Mars uh rocket artillery 03:21.212 --> 03:23.045 firing there of the same sort we 03:23.045 --> 03:25.268 provided to the Ukrainians . Now within 03:25.268 --> 03:27.434 Ukraine , we've all seen this before . 03:27.434 --> 03:29.490 We have electronic warfare coming to 03:29.490 --> 03:31.490 the fore . We have proliferated low 03:31.490 --> 03:33.601 earth orbit sat com capabilities . We 03:33.601 --> 03:36.106 have cyber attacks going on . We have 03:36.115 --> 03:37.948 the criticality of positioning , 03:37.948 --> 03:40.115 navigation and timing . We're seeing a 03:40.115 --> 03:42.985 21st century battlefield , but in the 03:43.106 --> 03:45.376 mud and context again , of what would 03:45.386 --> 03:47.906 not be unfamiliar to a world war one 03:47.916 --> 03:50.729 soldier . And then this is going on 03:50.740 --> 03:53.169 right now . Tensions in the Red Sea . 03:53.619 --> 03:55.841 You've got the US S Carney out there on 03:55.841 --> 03:58.063 station with the hudner and the mason . 03:58.063 --> 04:00.175 And by the way , did anyone watch the 04:00.175 --> 04:02.341 Army Navy game with the US S Carney co 04:02.341 --> 04:05.460 on there saying 22 and O against Hootie 04:05.470 --> 04:07.637 Lacks and UAVS , let's give them a big 04:07.637 --> 04:10.080 round of applause . Way to go us S 04:10.089 --> 04:13.820 Carney , the Houthis know the US 04:13.830 --> 04:15.960 Navy is on station there . But 04:15.970 --> 04:18.026 meanwhile , too , the Houthis aren't 04:18.026 --> 04:20.248 sitting still . That middle image is an 04:20.248 --> 04:22.649 MQ nine being brought down . You've got , 04:22.660 --> 04:25.760 who would have thought houti commandos 04:25.769 --> 04:27.825 or whatever they are landing on an , 04:27.825 --> 04:30.600 with an mi a hip on the Galaxy Leader 04:30.609 --> 04:32.720 car carrier ship . Those are those uh 04:32.720 --> 04:34.887 commandos or whatever they are landing 04:34.887 --> 04:36.831 on there . And you've also got the 04:36.831 --> 04:39.609 Carney's uh uh 25 millimeter firing 04:39.619 --> 04:42.239 away . So there's a lot going on here 04:42.250 --> 04:44.472 in terms of everything from what we are 04:44.472 --> 04:46.694 looking at the Western Pacific , what's 04:46.694 --> 04:49.230 going on on the land combat in Ukraine 04:49.260 --> 04:52.049 and now in the Red Sea , the bottom 04:52.059 --> 04:54.281 line is the enemy gets a vote on this . 04:54.281 --> 04:56.392 We're gonna train doctrinally , we're 04:56.392 --> 04:58.337 gonna deploy the ones and zeros as 04:58.337 --> 05:00.392 general Glavey indicated . But we've 05:00.392 --> 05:02.559 got a very , very dynamic battle space 05:02.559 --> 05:04.615 that we may have to deal with and is 05:04.615 --> 05:06.503 being dealt with right now . So I 05:06.503 --> 05:09.309 thought about as the dod Cio , what do 05:09.320 --> 05:11.440 we need in terms of information 05:11.450 --> 05:13.700 technology and C three . Now , I bet 05:13.709 --> 05:15.931 some of you out here can come up with a 05:15.931 --> 05:18.153 number of more adjectives , but this is 05:18.153 --> 05:20.320 what I came up with over the past week 05:20.320 --> 05:22.265 or so . Now , this is , you know , 05:22.265 --> 05:24.376 whether we talk about rugged flexible 05:24.376 --> 05:26.431 scalable , I won't read every one of 05:26.431 --> 05:28.542 these , but this is do as Dod Cio and 05:28.542 --> 05:30.487 working with General Glave and the 05:30.487 --> 05:32.760 other sixes and fellow Cio s , we 05:32.769 --> 05:35.230 better have information technology that 05:35.239 --> 05:38.239 can survive , provide key capabilities 05:38.250 --> 05:40.417 and win and all those environments . I 05:40.417 --> 05:42.639 just showed you whether it's in the mud 05:42.639 --> 05:45.369 in eastern Ukraine or aboard A US DDG 05:45.779 --> 05:48.420 in the Red Sea or wherever else it 05:48.429 --> 05:50.809 might be . I've added some other words 05:50.820 --> 05:53.890 on here . Disposable . Maybe as General 05:53.899 --> 05:55.899 Glavey was showing we're gonna have 05:55.899 --> 05:57.989 forces fighting on the terrain of an 05:58.000 --> 06:00.111 island somewhere . We may not be able 06:00.111 --> 06:02.167 to keep our hands on everything . We 06:02.167 --> 06:04.000 may have to be able to move past 06:04.000 --> 06:06.222 something . It better be shareable . We 06:06.222 --> 06:08.389 better be work with our allies who are 06:08.389 --> 06:10.611 here with us today and be interoperable 06:10.611 --> 06:12.667 and very importantly affordable . We 06:12.667 --> 06:12.459 may have the most resilient scalable 06:12.470 --> 06:14.637 capabilities , but we can't pay for it 06:14.637 --> 06:16.748 and particularly as we have competing 06:16.748 --> 06:18.970 investments we have to make , we're not 06:18.970 --> 06:21.137 doing our job . And so you look at the 06:21.137 --> 06:23.081 pictures there that that top one , 06:23.081 --> 06:25.309 there is an F six bravo robot dealing 06:25.320 --> 06:27.480 from an explosive ordinance disposal 06:27.489 --> 06:29.489 sort of capability dealing with the 06:29.489 --> 06:31.600 drone that's down in the bottom photo 06:31.600 --> 06:33.656 is Captain Colleen Berry Hill of the 06:33.656 --> 06:35.711 74th fighter squadron flying an A 10 06:35.711 --> 06:37.890 along with a bomber task force mission 06:38.010 --> 06:40.177 about a year ago off the Philippines . 06:40.445 --> 06:42.667 This is the environment we're operating 06:42.667 --> 06:44.556 in and we better have information 06:44.556 --> 06:46.556 technology that can do all of these 06:46.556 --> 06:48.667 things here . So what are we doing in 06:48.667 --> 06:51.095 Dod Cio ? What are we doing with our 06:51.105 --> 06:53.984 counterparts in Dod and the IC and with 06:53.994 --> 06:56.216 industry and elsewhere ? I'm gonna walk 06:56.216 --> 06:57.938 you a few through a few of our 06:57.938 --> 06:59.883 priorities here that we're getting 06:59.883 --> 07:02.670 after . So edge compute , many of you 07:02.679 --> 07:04.709 have heard me talk , uh hear me 07:04.720 --> 07:07.100 emphasize this before . One of our 07:07.109 --> 07:09.459 flagship accomplishments over the past 07:09.470 --> 07:11.526 year has been the joint war fighting 07:11.526 --> 07:14.019 cloud capability or JWCC . So we 07:14.029 --> 07:16.510 awarded that back on December 7th about 07:16.519 --> 07:19.019 a year ago to four us world class 07:19.029 --> 07:21.600 vendors . And we're well in progress on 07:21.609 --> 07:25.109 this . Uh nearly 40 task orders so far , 07:25.220 --> 07:28.140 about 270 million thereabouts task 07:28.149 --> 07:30.371 orders awarded . And we're moving along 07:30.371 --> 07:32.482 on there providing for the first time 07:33.029 --> 07:35.209 enterprise cloud capability in all 07:35.220 --> 07:37.450 three security classifications . We've 07:37.459 --> 07:40.109 got top secret secret UN class from 07:40.119 --> 07:43.089 Conus out to the tactical edge and this 07:43.100 --> 07:45.322 is where we're really learning here . I 07:45.322 --> 07:47.433 would characterize it as almost cloud 07:47.433 --> 07:49.656 trade craft . How do we get this done ? 07:49.656 --> 07:51.656 You're gonna hear a term and Sharon 07:51.656 --> 07:53.822 Woods from Dissa has talked about this 07:53.822 --> 07:56.044 and Lily Zalecki from my team , the Joe 07:56.044 --> 07:58.100 Cloud , the joint operational edge . 07:58.100 --> 08:00.322 Now , I know this is a little bit of an 08:00.322 --> 07:59.619 eye chart at the bottom , but I just 07:59.630 --> 08:01.741 want to throw it in there . Joe Cloud 08:01.741 --> 08:03.910 is basically kind of a Lily pad if you 08:03.920 --> 08:06.459 will from Kis out to that very tactical 08:06.470 --> 08:08.414 edge , whether it's in the Western 08:08.414 --> 08:10.359 Pacific , Eastern Europe or on the 08:10.359 --> 08:12.600 continent of Africa or elsewhere . As 08:12.609 --> 08:14.831 my friend , Greg Smith , the former NSA 08:14.831 --> 08:17.200 Cio would often say the speed of light 08:17.209 --> 08:19.265 matters . And as we're talking about 08:19.265 --> 08:21.589 going from Kis out to the very tactical 08:21.600 --> 08:23.910 edge thinking edge device out maybe on 08:23.920 --> 08:26.142 the island of Palau or somewhere in the 08:26.142 --> 08:28.364 Philippine Sea or elsewhere . We've got 08:28.364 --> 08:30.476 to have a capability between here and 08:30.476 --> 08:32.642 there and that's what the Joe Cloud is 08:32.642 --> 08:34.809 all about . We're already running some 08:34.809 --> 08:37.031 pilot capabilities out near Indo paycom 08:37.031 --> 08:39.253 in Hawaii , but that's not gonna be the 08:39.253 --> 08:41.253 only one here . So think of a stack 08:41.253 --> 08:43.476 between the Conus side of the house and 08:43.476 --> 08:45.531 all the way out to the tactical edge 08:45.531 --> 08:47.531 and we're gonna move out on more of 08:47.531 --> 08:49.531 these in the future . We're working 08:49.531 --> 08:51.587 with all four of our JWCC vendors on 08:51.587 --> 08:53.698 this as well as with a dis a provided 08:53.698 --> 08:55.698 capability called Stratus . This is 08:55.698 --> 08:55.669 something we're learning with you all 08:55.679 --> 08:57.901 in industry . We're figuring out how to 08:57.901 --> 09:00.049 do true enterprise edge compute at 09:00.070 --> 09:02.070 scale and Joe Cloud is one of those 09:02.070 --> 09:04.270 ways we're gonna do it . Now , as we 09:04.280 --> 09:06.349 look over the next hill , the sky is 09:06.359 --> 09:08.581 the limit here as we're able to spin up 09:08.581 --> 09:10.526 new capabilities as we really move 09:10.526 --> 09:12.303 towards virtualization and very 09:12.303 --> 09:14.192 particularly harsh environments . 09:14.192 --> 09:16.026 General Glavey was showing you a 09:16.026 --> 09:18.137 picture of an island out there in the 09:18.137 --> 09:19.803 Western Pacific and where our 09:19.803 --> 09:21.803 grandparents and great grandparents 09:21.803 --> 09:23.748 fought on areas could it be in the 09:23.748 --> 09:25.748 Ryuko or somewhere else out there . 09:25.799 --> 09:28.159 It's gonna be salt water , it's gonna 09:28.169 --> 09:30.570 be rainy weather . It's gonna be sandy 09:30.580 --> 09:32.802 and gradient . Not that we , our forces 09:32.802 --> 09:34.913 didn't have to deal with this in Iraq 09:34.913 --> 09:37.136 and Afghanistan and East Africa . But a 09:37.136 --> 09:39.191 maritime environment that's mobile , 09:39.191 --> 09:41.650 that's highly contested . We haven't 09:41.659 --> 09:43.826 done this in many years here and our , 09:43.826 --> 09:45.603 it , hardware and equipment and 09:45.603 --> 09:47.715 capabilities . So we'll be able to be 09:47.715 --> 09:49.381 able to survive those sort of 09:49.381 --> 09:53.330 conditions JWC CTO . We 09:53.340 --> 09:56.250 are in calendar year 2024 gonna start 09:56.260 --> 09:58.371 looking at the follow on contract for 09:58.371 --> 10:01.989 JWCC . When we announced JWCC , it's a 10:02.000 --> 10:04.111 three year base with two option years 10:04.111 --> 10:06.111 and we're already into the one year 10:06.111 --> 10:08.333 base of this . And we said all along in 10:08.333 --> 10:10.278 24 in that round that time frame , 10:10.278 --> 10:12.500 we're gonna start looking at what comes 10:12.500 --> 10:14.611 next and no , I don't have a date for 10:14.611 --> 10:16.722 the RFP or exactly when this is gonna 10:16.722 --> 10:18.833 come out . But I will tell you we are 10:18.833 --> 10:21.056 firmly committed to multi cloud , multi 10:21.056 --> 10:23.222 vendor and this is what we're gonna be 10:23.222 --> 10:25.222 doing going forward . So watch this 10:25.222 --> 10:27.444 space more to fall and we'll be working 10:27.444 --> 10:29.722 with our disa colleagues on this . Now , 10:29.722 --> 10:31.444 cyber security , we talk about 10:31.444 --> 10:33.969 resilience securing our enterprise and 10:33.979 --> 10:36.312 I'm joined with several colleagues here , 10:36.312 --> 10:38.312 Roger Greenwell , Randy Resnick and 10:38.312 --> 10:40.312 others that we work very closely on 10:40.312 --> 10:42.423 this . We are all in on zero trust at 10:42.423 --> 10:44.423 the Department of Defense . We have 10:44.423 --> 10:46.646 been for well over a year now since our 10:46.646 --> 10:48.868 zero trust strategy was published . And 10:48.868 --> 10:51.035 starting here a couple of months ago , 10:51.035 --> 10:53.257 we started to get in the implementation 10:53.257 --> 10:55.659 plans from the military services , from 10:55.669 --> 10:57.725 the combatant command hands from the 10:57.725 --> 10:59.947 defense agencies and field activities . 10:59.947 --> 11:02.002 And if he hadn't done so already , I 11:02.002 --> 11:04.002 know Mr Resnick is gonna be talking 11:04.002 --> 11:05.891 about this and I'll tell you it's 11:05.891 --> 11:05.867 looking pretty good , it's looking 11:05.877 --> 11:08.044 pretty good because Randy and the team 11:08.044 --> 11:09.988 have laid out clear capabilities , 11:09.988 --> 11:11.821 those 91 capabilities to get the 11:11.821 --> 11:14.437 targeted zero trust by the year 2027 . 11:14.637 --> 11:16.637 Now , I think this audience is very 11:16.637 --> 11:18.637 familiar with what zero trust is an 11:18.637 --> 11:20.859 assumption that an adversary is already 11:20.859 --> 11:22.970 on your network and you're preventing 11:22.970 --> 11:25.137 them from moving laterally and getting 11:25.137 --> 11:27.193 to your most critical data . It is a 11:27.193 --> 11:29.415 paradigm shift and what I'm happy about 11:29.415 --> 11:31.637 is zero trust has moved from a what you 11:31.637 --> 11:33.859 hear on a radio commercial or something 11:33.859 --> 11:36.023 on social media or an ad to something 11:36.033 --> 11:38.089 that is going to be tangible . It is 11:38.089 --> 11:40.311 not unobtainium , it is something we're 11:40.311 --> 11:42.255 going to be able to accomplish and 11:42.255 --> 11:44.366 we're moving aggressively and the way 11:44.366 --> 11:46.589 we're doing it is a flexible approach . 11:46.589 --> 11:48.422 I've used the term pick your own 11:48.422 --> 11:50.366 adventure before because we're not 11:50.366 --> 11:52.589 telling the services and others exactly 11:52.589 --> 11:54.755 how to do it . We're just telling them 11:54.755 --> 11:56.811 what needs to be done so they can go 11:56.811 --> 11:58.866 with the Brown Field approach . They 11:58.866 --> 12:00.811 can use the JWCC clouds or private 12:00.811 --> 12:02.866 cloud or some combination there in . 12:02.866 --> 12:04.977 And as Randy and the team are getting 12:04.977 --> 12:06.977 the implementation plans in , we're 12:06.977 --> 12:08.922 seeing some combinations there and 12:08.922 --> 12:11.144 that's what we do from the OS D side of 12:11.144 --> 12:12.977 the house is provide those broad 12:12.977 --> 12:12.940 parameters , but also hold the 12:12.950 --> 12:15.020 enterprise accountable on that . And 12:15.031 --> 12:17.520 per the NDAA , I owe an update to 12:17.531 --> 12:19.642 Congress in the springtime . So we'll 12:19.642 --> 12:21.642 be getting after that . Meanwhile , 12:21.642 --> 12:23.698 securing the defense industrial base 12:23.698 --> 12:25.920 remains a top priority for my staff and 12:25.920 --> 12:29.090 me and Dod Cio . Now that means 12:29.099 --> 12:32.640 securing the dib between 350 to 400,000 12:32.650 --> 12:34.817 companies depending upon how you count 12:34.817 --> 12:36.983 it against a very sophisticated set of 12:36.983 --> 12:39.094 state actor threats . We're expanding 12:39.094 --> 12:41.094 the DEV cybersecurity program , for 12:41.094 --> 12:42.594 example , working with NSA 12:42.594 --> 12:44.817 Cybersecurity Collaboration Center with 12:44.817 --> 12:46.928 General nca's folks on this providing 12:46.928 --> 12:49.150 service services out to the Deb , a lot 12:49.150 --> 12:51.261 of engagement with the Deb . And also 12:51.261 --> 12:53.317 we have a new dibs cyber or di cyber 12:53.317 --> 12:55.428 security strategy coming out soon . A 12:55.428 --> 12:57.594 lot of what we're doing to try to help 12:57.594 --> 12:59.965 bring the Deb along ring tide raises 12:59.974 --> 13:02.141 all ships sort of thing , particularly 13:02.141 --> 13:04.307 with the small and medium businesses . 13:04.307 --> 13:06.530 And we also work with the defense Cyber 13:06.530 --> 13:08.530 Crime Center and others . Now , the 13:08.530 --> 13:10.752 other big thing we're working and it is 13:10.752 --> 13:12.918 coming out soon for public comment . I 13:12.918 --> 13:12.804 can tell you the Cyber maturity model 13:12.815 --> 13:15.037 certification . I know there's a lot of 13:15.037 --> 13:17.460 controversy and a lot of words around 13:17.469 --> 13:20.119 CM MC . But this , I tell you is where 13:20.130 --> 13:22.859 we hold the Deb accountable to make 13:22.869 --> 13:26.330 sure they have n 801 71 standards that 13:26.340 --> 13:28.507 have already been in the contracts for 13:28.507 --> 13:30.729 the most part within the last six years 13:30.729 --> 13:32.784 adhered to . Now , I'll tell you , I 13:32.784 --> 13:34.896 know CMNC is a compliance regime . It 13:34.896 --> 13:37.007 is as necessary but not sufficient to 13:37.007 --> 13:39.173 get to the sort of cyber security . We 13:39.173 --> 13:41.284 need to keep our blueprints and plans 13:41.284 --> 13:43.507 out of the Pr CS and Russians hands and 13:43.780 --> 13:45.969 it takes a culture of cyber security . 13:45.979 --> 13:48.035 So I want you to hear it from me . I 13:48.035 --> 13:50.599 understand that CM MC is not the end 13:50.609 --> 13:53.070 all be all , but it is a very , very 13:53.080 --> 13:55.330 good foundation to what we need to do 13:55.340 --> 13:58.179 to get after this to frankly hold folks 13:58.190 --> 14:00.849 handling cu I accountable along with 14:00.859 --> 14:02.970 other measures we're doing to provide 14:02.970 --> 14:05.137 services to them to help with it . And 14:05.137 --> 14:07.248 this is an evolving situation . We're 14:07.248 --> 14:09.192 gonna keep working on this . We're 14:09.192 --> 14:11.415 gonna keep listening , we're gonna keep 14:11.415 --> 14:13.637 working with the dib and I look forward 14:13.637 --> 14:15.803 to that . Now , another key area as we 14:15.803 --> 14:18.419 look at transport and PNT and sensing 14:18.429 --> 14:20.318 the environment here . This is so 14:20.318 --> 14:22.429 important to what the C three aspects 14:22.429 --> 14:24.762 under my portfolio that we need to work . 14:24.919 --> 14:27.141 General Glavey talked about SAT com and 14:27.141 --> 14:29.700 had that great picture with the kind of 14:29.710 --> 14:32.599 big dod government SAT com and then a 14:32.609 --> 14:35.010 marine putting down what appeared to be 14:35.020 --> 14:37.520 a starlink receiver there as we work 14:37.530 --> 14:39.697 with our enterprise management control 14:39.697 --> 14:41.919 plan implementation that Mike Dean from 14:41.919 --> 14:44.086 my staff worked with Space Com , Space 14:44.086 --> 14:46.340 Force and others to promulgate earlier 14:46.349 --> 14:48.460 this year . This is gonna be critical 14:48.460 --> 14:50.349 to working to how we put all this 14:50.349 --> 14:52.516 together . We understand as we work to 14:52.516 --> 14:55.880 defeat D DI as well . Our forces have 14:55.890 --> 14:57.890 to operate far forward in the first 14:57.890 --> 14:59.890 island chain . We want to create so 14:59.890 --> 15:02.057 many dilemmas for the adversary to cut 15:02.057 --> 15:04.223 us off that they cannot cut our forces 15:04.223 --> 15:06.190 off out there and sat com is a key 15:06.200 --> 15:08.409 aspect of that . Now , additionally , 15:08.419 --> 15:10.770 we're pressing hard with the five G way 15:10.780 --> 15:13.940 ahead . The five GCFT came over to me 15:13.950 --> 15:16.859 from R and E and the team here earlier 15:16.869 --> 15:19.036 this year . So we're moving out , Juan 15:19.036 --> 15:21.258 Ramirez heads the cross functional team 15:21.258 --> 15:23.880 on that out of CIO . And as we look at 15:23.890 --> 15:26.001 the pilots that underway that picture 15:26.001 --> 15:28.223 there is five G mobile antenna Hill Air 15:28.223 --> 15:30.279 Force Base this past year as part of 15:30.279 --> 15:32.390 the pilot that was going on out there 15:32.390 --> 15:34.994 to look at how five G may may affect or 15:35.005 --> 15:36.838 not affect avionics and some air 15:36.838 --> 15:38.894 activity . We're gonna continue with 15:38.894 --> 15:40.783 these pilots . But one of the big 15:40.783 --> 15:43.005 things we're working here for the NDA A 15:43.005 --> 15:45.335 is to get five G on all dod containment 15:45.344 --> 15:48.005 areas . Conus and Ocona by the end of 15:48.015 --> 15:51.585 Fy 28 and open radio access networks . 15:51.594 --> 15:54.604 O A compliance is gonna be a key aspect , 15:54.614 --> 15:56.725 we're gonna be pushing the vendors on 15:56.725 --> 15:59.219 this . Another area is with dynamic 15:59.229 --> 16:00.951 spectrum sharing . Many of you 16:00.951 --> 16:02.951 hopefully saw the National Spectrum 16:02.951 --> 16:04.896 strategy the White House published 16:04.896 --> 16:07.007 which we contributed to recently what 16:07.007 --> 16:09.062 is very key in that particularly for 16:09.062 --> 16:11.285 the lower three gigahertz span which is 16:11.285 --> 16:13.570 gonna be critical for future potential 16:13.619 --> 16:16.849 five G . Next G sort of capabilities is 16:16.859 --> 16:19.000 going to be , we said that sharing or 16:19.010 --> 16:21.559 excuse me vacating is not an option for 16:21.570 --> 16:24.299 dod but and sharing is not possible 16:24.309 --> 16:27.210 right now . However , however , dynamic 16:27.219 --> 16:29.289 spectrum sharing across the whole of 16:29.299 --> 16:32.650 the US nation , Kis the lower 48 as 16:32.659 --> 16:34.770 well as Alaska and Hawaii too , we'll 16:34.770 --> 16:36.603 have to look at that is gonna be 16:36.603 --> 16:38.603 critical to seeing if we're able to 16:38.603 --> 16:40.881 operate in this area with the telecoms . 16:40.881 --> 16:43.103 And we know there's economic reasons we 16:43.103 --> 16:45.215 need to do this , but we also must be 16:45.215 --> 16:47.326 able to protect our ability to defend 16:47.326 --> 16:49.215 the homeland and train our forces 16:49.215 --> 16:51.103 overseas . And finally PNT modern 16:51.103 --> 16:53.765 modernization GPS remains our gold 16:53.775 --> 16:55.997 standard working with our colleagues in 16:55.997 --> 16:57.775 space force . It undergirds the 16:57.775 --> 16:59.886 American and Western way of war to be 16:59.886 --> 17:01.886 able to put steel on target , to be 17:01.886 --> 17:04.108 able to navigate and do everything else 17:04.108 --> 17:05.831 we need to do . Also , we need 17:05.831 --> 17:07.553 resilience . We need alternate 17:07.553 --> 17:09.719 complimentary sources of PNT . We know 17:09.719 --> 17:11.942 our adversary , the first shot they may 17:11.942 --> 17:14.108 take is against GPS either kinetically 17:14.108 --> 17:16.219 or non kinetically . And we've got to 17:16.219 --> 17:18.399 have multiple ways to ensure that that 17:18.409 --> 17:20.848 sort of data gets into the cockpit onto 17:20.859 --> 17:22.803 the bridge of the ship or into the 17:22.803 --> 17:24.915 turret of the tank . And this remains 17:24.915 --> 17:27.270 an absolute priority for me . A few 17:27.280 --> 17:29.280 other areas I wanna hit on that are 17:29.280 --> 17:32.060 very important software advantage we've 17:32.069 --> 17:34.979 seen in Ukraine that they reportedly 17:34.989 --> 17:37.880 have over 300,000 individuals as part 17:37.890 --> 17:39.946 of their quote unquote software army 17:39.946 --> 17:42.640 doing almost on the fly desk ops , 17:42.650 --> 17:44.939 ensuring that code is getting onto 17:44.949 --> 17:47.099 platforms in real time . It's true 17:47.109 --> 17:49.053 survival what they're dealing with 17:49.053 --> 17:51.276 there . That is exactly what we need to 17:51.276 --> 17:53.220 be able to do at the Department of 17:53.220 --> 17:53.114 Defense . We're doing a lot of work 17:53.125 --> 17:55.564 moving to DEF s right now with our 17:55.574 --> 17:57.875 software implementation plan as we 17:57.885 --> 17:59.996 transition our enterprise away from a 17:59.996 --> 18:02.594 hardware focus using our software 18:02.604 --> 18:04.660 factory ecosystem . I got the marine 18:04.660 --> 18:06.964 software factory seal right there and 18:06.974 --> 18:09.915 moving to continuous A to where we can 18:10.839 --> 18:13.219 before I talk about a to si wanna bring 18:13.229 --> 18:15.285 your attention . That picture at the 18:15.285 --> 18:18.540 bottom left is an M five tank in 1944 18:18.550 --> 18:20.829 with the hedge cutter on it . This was 18:20.839 --> 18:22.895 an innovation by an individual named 18:22.895 --> 18:25.140 Sergeant Kurt Kurt Cullen of the 100 18:25.329 --> 18:28.819 102nd cavalry regiment at Normandy . 18:28.829 --> 18:30.885 Some of you may know the story , our 18:30.885 --> 18:33.107 tanks were getting hung up in the hedge 18:33.107 --> 18:34.940 rows right after the invasion of 18:34.940 --> 18:37.107 Normandy . And it was a group of NC OS 18:37.107 --> 18:40.125 who knew how to weld and do things took 18:40.135 --> 18:42.024 obstacles from Normandy Beach and 18:42.024 --> 18:44.246 welded them on to the front of tanks to 18:44.246 --> 18:46.468 cut through the , cut through the hedge 18:46.468 --> 18:48.691 rows . That sort of innovation , I want 18:48.691 --> 18:50.802 you to look at the picture right next 18:50.802 --> 18:53.024 to them . Those are soldiers of today's 18:53.024 --> 18:54.802 second armored cavalry regiment 18:54.802 --> 18:56.913 operating the Balkans . Now , they're 18:56.913 --> 18:59.135 working on striker communications . But 18:59.135 --> 18:59.084 that sort of same innovation , that 18:59.094 --> 19:01.261 same sort of creating dilemmas for the 19:01.261 --> 19:03.538 enemy getting software onto a platform . 19:03.538 --> 19:05.761 That's what we're gonna have to be able 19:05.761 --> 19:07.705 to do and channel exactly what the 19:07.705 --> 19:10.038 Ukrainians are showing us on this . Now , 19:10.038 --> 19:12.150 very importantly , here we talk about 19:12.150 --> 19:14.150 authorities to operate A T OS . One 19:14.150 --> 19:16.150 thing we're working on right now in 19:16.150 --> 19:18.038 addition to the desk off piece is 19:18.038 --> 19:20.150 getting to a yes by default on A T Os 19:20.150 --> 19:22.316 within the department of Defense right 19:22.316 --> 19:24.261 now . And I get it for authorizing 19:24.261 --> 19:26.483 officials . There's the show me kind of 19:26.483 --> 19:28.427 thing . I need to see your body of 19:28.427 --> 19:30.372 evidence . I need to do my own due 19:30.372 --> 19:32.594 diligence and we don't want to put a Os 19:32.594 --> 19:34.761 into any sort of tough situation where 19:34.761 --> 19:36.761 they're taking on risk , they don't 19:36.761 --> 19:38.816 feel that they should be taking on . 19:38.816 --> 19:40.872 But at the same time as a steward of 19:40.872 --> 19:42.949 the taxpayers money and making sure 19:42.959 --> 19:45.015 that we can get things done at speed 19:45.015 --> 19:47.260 and scale . Having to go through each a 19:47.270 --> 19:49.489 to process over and over again is 19:49.500 --> 19:51.667 burdensome and it takes too long and I 19:51.667 --> 19:53.611 can tell you secretary hicks . The 19:53.611 --> 19:55.667 deputy secretary is very much behind 19:55.667 --> 19:57.869 this as we get to a yes by default 19:57.880 --> 19:59.949 approach . So some guidance from my 19:59.959 --> 20:02.237 office will be coming out on this soon . 20:02.237 --> 20:04.070 And Dave mcewan and the team are 20:04.070 --> 20:07.329 working this the Sizz . Now , another 20:07.339 --> 20:10.209 key area I call it combat ready tech . 20:10.369 --> 20:12.591 We've heard about fix our computers and 20:12.591 --> 20:15.199 use our experience and so on here . But 20:15.209 --> 20:17.890 we need stuff that works plain and 20:17.900 --> 20:20.170 simple here and on this , the defense 20:20.180 --> 20:22.291 business board , some of you may have 20:22.291 --> 20:24.291 seen in about January February this 20:24.291 --> 20:26.347 year , put out a report on this user 20:26.347 --> 20:28.513 experience issue and what I'm gonna be 20:28.513 --> 20:30.513 putting out here shortly through MS 20:30.513 --> 20:33.050 Lily Zalecki . Our D cio for IE is some 20:33.060 --> 20:35.459 tech refresh guidance . Now , I know 20:35.469 --> 20:37.459 it's not all about hardware , it's 20:37.469 --> 20:39.691 about software too and the image on the 20:39.691 --> 20:41.802 device and everything else but having 20:41.802 --> 20:44.025 stuff that is more than a few years old 20:44.025 --> 20:46.191 isn't gonna cut it anymore . And we've 20:46.191 --> 20:48.302 all seen the horror stories about the 20:48.302 --> 20:50.358 hardware that's way too old and it's 20:50.358 --> 20:52.413 not only the end points , it's stuff 20:52.413 --> 20:54.525 like routers and switches , but we're 20:54.525 --> 20:56.580 gonna start working on this with the 20:56.580 --> 20:56.540 military departments and services and 20:56.550 --> 20:58.606 others . We've got to do better than 20:58.606 --> 21:00.717 we've been doing in terms of the tech 21:00.717 --> 21:03.199 refresh . We are standing up a uh user 21:03.209 --> 21:05.487 experience portfolio management office . 21:05.487 --> 21:07.598 We just announced Mr seven Kong as an 21:07.598 --> 21:09.750 HQ E used to work at D DS defense 21:09.760 --> 21:11.982 digital service . And he's got a lot of 21:11.982 --> 21:14.204 industry experience is gonna be helping 21:14.204 --> 21:16.260 our team on this . And again , we're 21:16.260 --> 21:18.427 not reinventing anything . The service 21:18.427 --> 21:18.390 is already moving out smartly . For 21:18.400 --> 21:20.800 example , Colt Weidel , who was over at 21:20.810 --> 21:22.810 Department of Air Force did uh some 21:22.810 --> 21:24.921 great work and he is actually helping 21:24.921 --> 21:27.143 advise us on this . But this is another 21:27.143 --> 21:29.310 one of these areas that the status quo 21:29.310 --> 21:31.310 is not sufficient . We're gonna get 21:31.310 --> 21:33.310 after tech debt remediation , we're 21:33.310 --> 21:35.143 gonna continue to invest in user 21:35.143 --> 21:37.143 experience . Now , we're also gonna 21:37.143 --> 21:39.310 work on enterprise licenses and how we 21:39.310 --> 21:41.477 work this . Now , when I was on the IC 21:41.477 --> 21:43.643 CIO side , everything almost had to go 21:43.643 --> 21:45.910 through enterprise licenses . Not so 21:45.920 --> 21:47.976 much on the dod side , it's a little 21:47.976 --> 21:50.253 more Federated , a little more diffuse . 21:50.253 --> 21:52.309 But I'm telling you as the Dod Cio , 21:52.309 --> 21:54.531 we're gonna bring the rear sta a little 21:54.531 --> 21:56.642 bit over here where we're not getting 21:56.642 --> 21:58.698 pitched over and over throughout the 21:58.698 --> 22:00.531 department and having to compete 22:00.531 --> 22:02.698 against ourselves . I mean , this with 22:02.698 --> 22:04.698 love in my heart to our vendor base 22:04.698 --> 22:06.809 here , but we're gonna work this as a 22:06.809 --> 22:09.031 unified buyer and as a spokesperson for 22:09.031 --> 22:11.239 the women and men in uniform to make 22:11.250 --> 22:13.472 sure we're not buying things repeatedly 22:13.472 --> 22:15.583 and competing against ourselves . And 22:15.583 --> 22:17.194 there's gonna be a drive for 22:17.194 --> 22:19.361 competition inherent in that . And one 22:19.361 --> 22:21.528 thing we talk about the money piece of 22:21.528 --> 22:23.694 this . So many of you are aware that a 22:23.694 --> 22:25.750 few years ago , my predecessor was a 22:25.750 --> 22:27.469 Cio Dana DC . We have budget 22:27.479 --> 22:29.646 certification authority within the dod 22:29.646 --> 22:31.949 CIO . This is a pretty cool uh 22:31.959 --> 22:34.181 authority we have . So at the beginning 22:34.181 --> 22:36.015 of the calendar year , I put out 22:36.015 --> 22:38.420 something called the CPG , the 22:38.430 --> 22:40.500 Capability Planning Guidance , which 22:40.510 --> 22:43.015 lays out what we want , see investments 22:43.025 --> 22:45.675 in , in areas like compute areas like 22:45.685 --> 22:48.444 cyber security areas like C three . We 22:48.454 --> 22:50.565 also have some of the CD A O stuff in 22:50.565 --> 22:52.732 there like data and A I and some other 22:52.732 --> 22:55.135 things . And towards as we get into the 22:55.145 --> 22:57.255 fall time frame , we do budget 22:57.265 --> 22:59.487 certification to make sure we're seeing 22:59.494 --> 23:01.375 the investments , we need to see 23:01.464 --> 23:03.724 against those key priority areas . And 23:03.734 --> 23:07.109 I've got an authority to decertify part 23:07.119 --> 23:10.189 of a services or mill depths or other 23:10.199 --> 23:12.910 organizations it or cyber budget . Now 23:12.920 --> 23:15.031 that's a pretty big hammer . And I'll 23:15.031 --> 23:17.142 tell you this , we've come close over 23:17.142 --> 23:19.198 the last two years . We've had to do 23:19.198 --> 23:21.309 one of these things and I'm not gonna 23:21.309 --> 23:23.420 tell you who , which service , but by 23:23.420 --> 23:22.969 goodness , it gets their attention . 23:23.119 --> 23:25.500 When I say the pins coming out , we 23:25.510 --> 23:27.732 better see some more investment in some 23:27.732 --> 23:29.621 of these key areas and C three or 23:29.621 --> 23:31.899 cybersecurity , a dialogue happens now , 23:31.899 --> 23:34.349 we may not get in toto everything we're 23:34.359 --> 23:36.248 after , but it starts to move the 23:36.248 --> 23:38.026 needle and then with one of the 23:38.026 --> 23:40.192 services that actually helped them get 23:40.192 --> 23:42.137 better insights from their program 23:42.137 --> 23:44.303 level of what was going on there . And 23:44.303 --> 23:46.303 then foundational capabilities very 23:46.303 --> 23:49.270 critical talent , the people you hear 23:49.280 --> 23:51.336 me talk about this a lot here and so 23:51.336 --> 23:53.224 much what our team has done . Our 23:53.224 --> 23:55.336 workforce innovation directorate that 23:55.336 --> 23:57.558 Mark Gora has been leading with Patrick 23:57.558 --> 23:59.336 Johnson and others as we have a 23:59.336 --> 24:01.613 workforce strategy implementation plan , 24:01.613 --> 24:03.729 the 8140 policy series , putting meat 24:03.739 --> 24:05.800 on the bone of how we're going to 24:05.810 --> 24:08.400 manage work roles , use the incentives . 24:08.410 --> 24:10.521 We've got like cyber accepted service 24:10.521 --> 24:12.280 and targeted local management 24:12.290 --> 24:14.800 supplement to try to create not try . 24:14.810 --> 24:16.866 We're going to create a 21st century 24:16.866 --> 24:19.032 workforce that looks like America , as 24:19.032 --> 24:21.143 I've said over and over again , if we 24:21.143 --> 24:23.143 leverage every bit of the talent we 24:23.143 --> 24:25.310 have in this country and we plan to no 24:25.310 --> 24:27.421 authoritarian competitor can stand up 24:27.421 --> 24:29.532 to us . But we've got to come at this 24:29.532 --> 24:31.699 with different paradigms and different 24:31.699 --> 24:33.588 ways of thinking on this . And of 24:33.588 --> 24:35.366 course , all of this feeds into 24:35.366 --> 24:37.979 flagship capabilities like combined , 24:37.989 --> 24:40.100 joint , combined , joint , all domain 24:40.100 --> 24:42.322 command and control . That's a mouthful 24:42.322 --> 24:44.489 particularly . So we've added the C on 24:44.489 --> 24:46.711 to the front of that areas like A I and 24:46.711 --> 24:48.822 data use . What Doctor Craig Martel , 24:48.822 --> 24:51.270 the CD A O was leading task force , 24:51.280 --> 24:53.560 Lima looking at large language models 24:53.569 --> 24:55.736 and generative A I , everything I just 24:55.736 --> 24:57.902 talked to you about with cloud compute 24:57.902 --> 24:59.791 transport command and control all 24:59.791 --> 25:01.650 undergirds that and then very 25:01.660 --> 25:04.140 importantly , the replicator initiative 25:04.150 --> 25:06.317 that Deputy Secretary Hicks has talked 25:06.317 --> 25:08.372 about often with autonomous vehicles 25:08.372 --> 25:10.372 being able to swarm , being able to 25:10.372 --> 25:12.339 overwhelm an adversary out of the 25:12.349 --> 25:14.405 tactical edge . None of that's gonna 25:14.405 --> 25:16.420 happen without the five G I talked 25:16.430 --> 25:18.550 about without the capabilities for 25:18.560 --> 25:20.449 transport , without having a very 25:20.449 --> 25:23.579 secure enterprise based on zero trust . 25:23.750 --> 25:25.619 All of this are foundational 25:25.630 --> 25:27.979 capabilities . So I wanted to tell you , 25:27.989 --> 25:30.810 leave you with a thought here . I read 25:30.819 --> 25:32.930 a book , I've read a lot like many of 25:32.930 --> 25:34.930 you do . It was John mcmanus's book 25:34.930 --> 25:37.152 Called To the End of the Earth . It was 25:37.152 --> 25:39.152 the third in a trilogy about the US 25:39.152 --> 25:41.208 army in the Pacific Theater in World 25:41.208 --> 25:43.263 War Two . I highly commend the , the 25:43.263 --> 25:45.152 entire set there . But one of the 25:45.152 --> 25:47.208 scenes and I've read a lot about the 25:47.208 --> 25:49.152 campaigns there that I didn't know 25:49.152 --> 25:52.599 about occurred in 19 early 1945 25:52.770 --> 25:55.229 as the US military , both the army 25:55.239 --> 25:57.500 coming ashore and the navy offshore 25:57.510 --> 25:59.232 were coming , returning to the 25:59.232 --> 26:01.540 Philippines and they were liberating 26:02.030 --> 26:04.829 areas around the Phil in Manila where 26:04.839 --> 26:06.989 our prisoners of war and inters who 26:07.000 --> 26:09.278 were not part of the Baton Death March , 26:09.278 --> 26:11.333 but who were kept in the Manila area 26:11.333 --> 26:13.111 were being held by the Imperial 26:13.111 --> 26:16.180 Japanese army . So when Halsey , the 26:16.189 --> 26:19.390 fleet commander shows up and F six F 26:19.400 --> 26:21.400 six F Hellcats you see in the color 26:21.400 --> 26:23.567 picture there start coming over , over 26:23.567 --> 26:25.579 Manila . The prisoners who had been 26:25.589 --> 26:27.700 held for three years had never seen a 26:27.700 --> 26:29.811 combat aircraft like that . They knew 26:29.811 --> 26:31.700 what Wildcats were . But this new 26:31.700 --> 26:33.478 aircraft was amazing . It had a 26:33.478 --> 26:35.533 different wingspan , different speed 26:35.533 --> 26:37.589 and coming over and more importantly 26:37.589 --> 26:39.589 too . So you look at the lower left 26:39.589 --> 26:41.589 there , you see soldiers with their 26:41.589 --> 26:43.533 doughboy helmets on and 30 caliber 26:43.533 --> 26:45.589 water cool machine gun that was from 26:45.589 --> 26:47.589 right before world war two or right 26:47.589 --> 26:49.756 about 1940 there . And all of a sudden 26:49.756 --> 26:51.978 you have Sherman tanks like in that top 26:51.978 --> 26:53.922 picture there at the time , highly 26:53.922 --> 26:56.145 modern 50 caliber machine guns on their 26:56.145 --> 26:57.867 soldiers wearing helmets . The 26:57.867 --> 26:59.756 prisoners had never seen carrying 26:59.756 --> 27:01.811 weaponry and kit that had never been 27:01.811 --> 27:04.033 seen before or they wept obviously with 27:04.033 --> 27:05.811 joy and they were amazed at the 27:05.811 --> 27:07.989 technological advancements the US and 27:08.000 --> 27:10.790 allies had made in the 3 to 3.5 years 27:10.800 --> 27:12.967 that they were kept as prisoners . And 27:12.967 --> 27:15.229 you see Douglas macarthur there right 27:15.239 --> 27:17.461 outside of Santo Tomas University where 27:17.461 --> 27:19.750 many of the prisoners were kept . They , 27:19.760 --> 27:21.982 they were stunned and don't think for a 27:21.982 --> 27:24.038 second that throughout the war , our 27:24.038 --> 27:26.260 adversaries weren't stunned either with 27:26.260 --> 27:28.316 our technological innovation . So my 27:28.316 --> 27:30.316 question to you is , can we do this 27:30.316 --> 27:32.538 again ? Are we ready to do this again ? 27:32.538 --> 27:34.760 Are we ready to shock our adversaries ? 27:34.760 --> 27:36.871 But not only with hardware , not with 27:36.871 --> 27:38.982 new armored vehicles necessarily , or 27:38.982 --> 27:41.204 aircraft and theirs are certainly gonna 27:41.204 --> 27:43.260 be important but with new software , 27:43.260 --> 27:45.371 with new ew electronic warfare , with 27:45.371 --> 27:47.427 new SAT com capabilities with , with 27:47.427 --> 27:49.482 cyber security , they can't get into 27:49.689 --> 27:51.800 where they're shocked . I never wanna 27:51.800 --> 27:54.160 see pows kept for another several years 27:54.170 --> 27:56.560 take that aside , but we're , we're 27:56.569 --> 27:58.979 ready to shock our adversaries and I 27:58.989 --> 28:01.211 can't wait to get after this with you . 28:01.211 --> 28:04.329 So , no wrong way . Thank you very much 28:04.640 --> 28:06.529 and I appreciate all your help on 28:06.529 --> 28:07.040 everything . Thank you .