

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20050313.

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SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ AGREEMENTS
IN HAND WITH THE PA ON HANDOVER OF WEST BANK CITIES TO
PA SECURITY CONTROL AND WITH EGYPT FOR DEPLOYMENT OF
BORDER GUARDS TO THE EGYPT-GAZA BORDER. GOI WILL NOT
REMOVE ILLEGAL OUTPOSTS UNTIL AFTER DISENGAGEMENT.

TEXT: ~~(S)~~ 1

(b)(1): Sec. 1.4(c)

AND SAID

THE MEETING WAS VERY POSITIVE. HE SAID THE MEETING
COVERED FIVE MAIN SUBJECTS:

A. ~~(S)~~ FIRST, (b)(1): Sec. 1.4(c) HAD AGREED (b)(1): Sec. 1.4(c) ON
NEARLY EVERY POINT OF CONTENTION OVER THE AGREEMENTS
FROM THE SHARM EL SHEIK SUMMIT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. HE
SAID THE GOI HAD AGREED TO ADDITIONAL WORKERS ENTERING
ISRAEL, TO RELEASE TRUCKS FOR PALESTINIANS SECURITY
FORCES BEING DELAYED AT ISRAELIS PORTS, TO OPEN ABU
KHOULI CHECKPOINT IN GAZA TO PRIVATE VEHICLES, TO OPEN
EREZ CROSSING INTO ISRAEL TO ADDITIONAL WORKERS AND
MERCHANTS, AND TO EXTEND THE NIGHT HOURS OF OPERATION
FOR QARNI AND SUFA CROSSINGS. HE PROVIDED SLIDES WITH
DETAILS ABOUT THESE AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE GOI
HAVING AUTHORIZED 38,640 TOTAL PALESTINIANS TO WORK
INSIDE OF ISRAEL AND 31,540 ACTUAL ENTRIES FOR WORK;
OPENING OF ABU KHOULI CHECKPOINT IN GAZA TO PRIVATE

AUTOMOBILE TRAFFIC; EXTENDING THE HOURS OF QARNI AND SUFA CROSSINGS; AND THE RELEASE OF 54 PA SECURITY VEHICLES TO THEM FROM ASHDOD PORT CUSTOMS.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

B. (S) ON THE SUBJECT OF COORDINATING DISENGAGEMENT WITH THE PALESTINIANS, [REDACTED] HE HAD EMPHASIZED THREE THINGS--THE NEED TO PREPARE PA SECURITY FORCES FOR OPERATING EFFECTIVELY DURING DISENGAGEMENT, THE NEED FOR THE PA TO CONVINCING ITS PEOPLE TO AVOID VIOLENCE DURING THE DISENGAGEMENT, AND THE NEED FOR A COUNTERPART TO BEGIN COORDINATING IMMEDIATELY.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] HAD PROMISED A DESIGNATED COUNTERPART

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

BUT HAD NOT YET

CHOICE OFFICIAL.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

C. (S) THIRD [REDACTED] HE HAD ASKED ABBAS HOW MUCH TIME HE NEEDED TO REFORM THE SECURITY FORCES AND BE READY TO OPERATE. [REDACTED] HAD SAID 4-6

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

MONTHS. [REDACTED] THOUGHT THAT TOO LONG, SAYING THE PALESTINIANS HAD THREE KEY MISSIONS FOR 2005--FIGHTING TERROR, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY IN THE WEST BANK, AND BEING STRONG ENOUGH TO PREVENT VIOLENCE DURING THE DISENGAGEMENT. BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO SEE MOVEMENT ON THESE ITEMS QUICKLY, [REDACTED] THOUGHT A 4-6 MONTH ORGANIZATIONAL PERIOD TO BE TOO LONG.

D. (S) FINALLY [REDACTED] DISCUSSED THE HANDOVER OF WEST BANK CITIES TO PALESTINIAN SECURITY.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c) THE PA HAD BEEN RAISING OBJECTIONS TO THE TURNOVER, THOUGH HE DID NOT COMPLETELY UNDERSTAND WHY. HE SAID THE EXCHANGE WITH [REDACTED] HAD BEEN GOOD, THAT HE WAS MEETING TONIGHT [REDACTED]

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

AND

HE EXPECTED ALL THE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED TODAY. IF THAT HAPPENS, HE SAID, JERICHO COULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE PA TOMORROW (20050315), WITH TUL KARM LATER IN THE WEEK OR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FOLLOWING WEEK.

E. (S) [REDACTED] CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS ON THE PA BY NOTING THE POSITIVE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT, CHARACTERIZED BY A MUCH LOWER LEVEL OF INCITEMENT AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE PA PRESS, REAL PA PROGRESS IN CLOSING SMUGGLING TUNNELS FROM EGYPT TO RAFAH, AND THE ARREST OF 3-4 PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD SUSPECTS FOR THE TEL AVIV BOMBING. [REDACTED] THAT THE GOI WAS NOT SURE THEY REMAINED IN JAIL, BUT THEIR ARREST WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.) ON THE DOWN SIDE,

HE SAID, THE PA'S BLAMING OF THE TEL AVIV BOMBING ON A "THIRD PARTY" WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THE PALESTINIAN PERPETRATORS FROM PIJ, AVOIDED THE PROBLEM AND THE NEED TO TARGET THIS GROUP AND END ITS TERROR ACTIVITIES.

STILL [REDACTED] FINISHED, THE MEETING HAD BEEN "VERY POSITIVE".

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(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

THERE WOULD BE ONE ADDITIONAL MILITARY-TO-MILITARY MEETING IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER WHICH HE BELIEVED THE DEPLOYMENT COULD HAPPEN. HE SAID THE TALKS HAD INCLUDED SIX MAJOR UNDERSTANDINGS:

(b)(1);
Sec.
1.4(c)

A. (S) [REDACTED] THE SIDES HAD AGREED THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 750 BORDER GUARDS IS A PILOT PROGRAM AND THAT

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

HE ALSO CONFIRMED PRESS REPORTING THAT HE HAD

(b)(1);
Sec.
1.4(c)

GIVEN THE NAMES OF KEY SMUGGLERS IN THE SINAI TO THE EGYPTIANS.

B. (S) [REDACTED] HE HAD EMPHASIZED THAT EQUIPMENT USED FOR THE MISSION SHOULD BE MISSION-ORIENTED, THAT IS, USEFUL FOR FINDING AND DESTROYING TUNNELS, FINDING AND ARRESTING SMUGGLERS AND FIGHTING TERROR.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c)

THE TWO SIDES, [REDACTED] ALSO AGREED THERE WOULD BE NO REVISION OF THE PEACE TREATY OR MILITARY ANNEX THERETO.

E. (S) BOTH SIDES ALSO AGREED THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE OBSERVERS IN THE SINAI WOULD BE INVOLVED IN MONITORING THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT.

(b)(1); Sec.
1.4(c)

F. (S) FINALLY, [REDACTED] THAT, ON A SEPARATE ISSUE, HE AND [REDACTED] HAD AGREED TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE ON GLOBAL TERROR AND TO WORK ON A MILITARY EXERCISE INVOLVING RESCUE OPERATIONS TO AVOID SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THEY HAD DURING THE BOMBINGS AT TABA LAST FALL.

(b)(1); (b)(3):10 USC 424; Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c)

HE SAID TO ATTEMPT
REMOVAL NOW WOULD BE "STARTING DISENGAGEMENT NOW" AND
THE GOI IS NOT YET READY.

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c)

HE ALSO SAID THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET MADE A
DECISION ON THE STATUS OF THE 81 OUTPOSTS ESTABLISHED
BEFORE MARCH 2001, BUT A COMMITTEE HEADED BY THE
JUSTICE MINISTER WOULD DEAL WITH THAT ISSUE.

(b)(1); (b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i); Sec. 1.4(c)

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