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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

R 212340Z SEP 78
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/3/05 BY 606019086/CMJW
#347226

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~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~ 3363

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE CDIN) (U)
DIADIN-264-1A (AS OF: 0340 EDT 21 SEP 78)

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107-12 10-7608
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109-12-770
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1. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ PRIME MINISTER SUAREZ' 9 TO 10 SEPTEMBER VISIT TO HAVANA RECEIVED GENERALLY FAVORABLE REVIEWS IN THE SPANISH PRESS BUT ENGENDERED SOME GRUMBLING IN HIS OWN PARTY. SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER OREJA REVEALED THAT SUAREZ HAD ACHIEVED HIS THREE MAJOR GOALS DURING THE VISIT, WHILE GIVING LITTLE MORE THAN AN "EMBRACE" IN RETURN.

2. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE PRESS, MUCH OF WHICH IS LEFT-ORIENTED, POR-

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TRAYED CASTRO AS A HOMETOWN BOY WHO MADE IT TO THE BIG TIMES, AND THE WARMTH AND INTENSITY OF HIS RECEPTION FOR SUAREZ WAS VIEWED AS GREATLY AFFECTING HIS GUEST. THIS PRESS REACTION WAS PROBABLY WHAT SUAREZ WAS HOPING FOR, AS HIS TRIP WAS APPARENTLY AIMED AT IMPROVING HIS CREDENTIALS AMONG CENTER-LEFT VOTERS AS A PROGRESSIVE LEADER CAPABLE OF DEALING EFFECTIVELY ON A PERSONAL LEVEL WITH HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS FROM BOTH THE DEMOCRATIC AND NONDEMOCRATIC LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA. SUAREZ' VISIT ALSO APPEALED TO A POPULAR CONCEPT IN SPAIN OF THE NATION'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA AS WELL AS AN ASPIRATION TO ACT AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND EUROPE.

3. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ DESPITE ALL THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE VISIT, ONLY A FEW RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN WERE DEALT WITH. IN FOREIGN MINISTER OREJA'S OPINION, SUAREZ GOT MORE OUT OF THE MISSION FOR SPAIN THAN HE GAVE TO HAVANA. FOR EXAMPLE, SPAIN HAD BEEN OBLIGATED TO BUY 75,000 TONS OF SUGAR FROM CUBA AT 17 CENTS PER POUND IN 1978. DURING THE VISIT, IT WAS AGREED ONLY THAT CUBA WOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY IF SPAIN NEEDED SUGAR IN THE FUTURE, AN UNLIKELY EVENT IN THAT

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PROPERTIES, SPAIN WAS ASKING \$150 MILLION IN REPAYMENT, ALTHOUGH BELIEVING THAT LESS THAN HALF THAT AMOUNT WAS JUSTIFIED. HAVANA WAS OFFERING \$20 MILLION TIED TO A SUGAR PURCHASE OVER A 20-YEAR PERIOD. THE OUTCOME WAS A \$30 TO \$35 MILLION REPAYMENT OVER THE NEXT 10 TO 15 YEARS, WITH NO TIES TO A SUGAR PURCHASE. FINALLY, CASTRO AGREED TO THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF TWO SPANISH PRISONERS AND THE RETURN TO SPAIN OF 62 FAMILY GROUPS TALLING 130 PERSONS. IN RETURN FOR ALL THIS, SUAREZ INVITED CASTRO TO VISIT SPAIN AT SOME UNSPECIFIED TIME IN THE FUTURE. CASTRO BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO, SAYING MADRID COULD PLAY ITS ROLE MORE EFFECTIVELY IF IT WERE NOT A MEMBER. HOWEVER, CASTRO DID NOT PRESS THE ISSUE. HE ALSO PROMISED TO SPEAK TO THE MORE RADICAL AFRICAN STATES ON BEHALF OF SPAIN WITH REGARD TO THE CANARY ISLANDS INDEPENDENCE ISSUE AND ADDED THAT HE DOES NOT AND WILL NOT SUPPORT THE CANARIES INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

4. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ FOREIGN MINISTER OREJA APPEARED ANXIOUS THAT THE US NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE VIEW OF THE CUBA VISIT. HE SAID THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF SPAIN ATTENDING THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT SUMMIT IN HAVANA AND REAFFIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT

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TO SEEK MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. HE STATED THAT THE NATO MATTER WOULD BE RAISED PUBLICLY AFTER THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN EARLY 1979 BUT FELT IT INADVISABLE TO HAVE THE ISSUE DISCUSSED TOO MUCH BEFORE THEN. CONCERNING CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, OREJA RELATED THAT THE MATTER WAS NOT RAISED, ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTS A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH HAVANA DURING WHICH IT WOULD BE BROUGHT UP. THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE OR COMMERCIAL CREDITS TO HAVANA, SAYING ONLY THAT SPAIN HAD IN THE PAST PROVIDED CREDIT AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.

5. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ IN ALL, SPANISH PRIME MINISTER SUAREZ APPEARS TO HAVE ACHIEVED HIS POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THE DISSENT IN HIS PARTY, CHIEFLY AIMED AT THE PROPRIETY OF HIS PUBLIC BACKSLAPPING WITH CASTRO, WILL PROBABLY HAVE NO REAL EFFECT ON THE ELECTORATE. HE WILL VERY LIKELY GET SOME MORE MILEAGE OUT OF THE TRIP BY HAVING CASTRO VISIT AT A POLITICALLY FORTUITOUS TIME. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGN THAT THE TRIP REPRESENTS A TURNING AWAY FROM EUROPE AND TOWARD CUBA AND THE THIRD WORLD.

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~~(XGDS - DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR)~~

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