

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

17

Nov 14 5 28 PM '77

RECEIVED  
FEDERAL BUREAU  
OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Ident. Tolson  
Exec. AD-Adm.   
Exec. AD-Inv.   
Asst. Dir.   
Adm. & Insp.   
Ext. Affs.   
Files & Com.   
Gen. Inv.   
Ident.   
Intell.   
Lab.   
Legal Coun.   
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.   
Rec. Mgmt.   
Tech. Serv.   
Training   
Public Affs. Off.   
Telephone Rm.   
Director's Sec'y

POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA b7C

Sullivan

R 142158Z NOV 77 ZEX

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//

TO DIA

(b)(3):10 USC  
424

DECLASSIFIED  
ON 2

BT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/14/05 BY 60325 auc BCL/mclaw

NOT RECORDED  
2 NOV 21 1977

54 NOV 29 1977 235

109-12-210 Document not recorded dated 11/14/77

Original Filed In 109-12-210-210

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 318-3A (AS OF: 1115 EST 14 NOV 77)

SOMALIA: SOVIETS AND CUBANS EXPELLED. (U)

1. ~~IS~~ SOMALIA HAS CANCELLED THE 1974 FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE USSR AND ORDERED ALL SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT BEEN BROKEN ALTHOUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES ARE REPORTEDLY TO BE REDUCED IN SIZE. SOMALIA DID SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND ORDERED THE EXPULSION OF CUBAN PERSONNEL WITHIN 48 HOURS. THIS DRAMATIC MOVE BY SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE IS THE RESULT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN JULY. THE EXPULSION OF THE APPROXIMATELY 250 CUBANS WILL HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON MOGADISCIO AND IS A DEVELOPMENT THAT

PAGE 2

~~SECRET~~

HAS BEEN EXPECTED IN RECENT MONTHS. HOWEVER, IF STRICTLY ENFORCED, THE EXPULSION OF THE APPROXIMATELY 2,500 SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISORS COULD RESULT IN PROBLEMS FOR THE SIAD BARRE GOVERNMENT. SIAD HAD DECIDED AGAINST SUCH A MOVE IN THE PAST BECAUSE HE FEARED A SOVIET-GENERATED COUP ATTEMPT, BELIEVED A SOVIET EXPULSION WOULD RESULT IN INCREASED SOVIET SUPPORT TO ETHIOPIA AND HAS FAILED TO FIND AN ALTERNATE ARMS SUPPLIER.

2. ~~(S)~~ SOVIET CIVILIAN ADVISORS PERMEATE EVERY LAYER OF THE SOMALI GOVERNMENTAL BUREAUCRACY AND SECURITY SERVICE. THE LOSS OF SOVIET EXPERTISE IN THESE AREAS COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE THE VOID COULD BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL FROM THE VARIOUS ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE SUPPORTED SOMALIA IN THE PAST.

3. ~~(S)~~ WHILE SOME SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS HAVE PROBABLY PERFORMED LIMITED FUNCTIONS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WITH ETHIOPIA, MOST WERE REPORTEDLY DENIED ACCESS TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND SENSITIVE AREAS. THE ABILITY OF THE SOMALI MILITARY TO CONDUCT THE ETHIOPIAN WAR FOR OVER FOUR MONTHS WITHOUT SOVIET ADVISORY SUPPORT MAY HAVE LED SIAD TO BELIEVE IT WAS NO LONGER NEEDED. OTHER FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN THE

SOVIET REFUSAL TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT LOSSES; SIAD'S FEELING THAT HE IS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY; A PERCEIVED NECESSITY FOR A DRAMATIC MOVE TO GARNER WESTERN ARMS SUPPORT; SIAD'S PERCEPTION THAT THE SOVIETS NEEDED HIM MORE THAN HE NEEDED THEM; OR HIS PERCEPTION THAT THE SHOCK EFFECT ON MOSCOW OF THE MOVE MIGHT CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO REEVALUATE THEIR POLICY IN THE HORN.

4. ~~(S)~~ AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, LOSS OF ACCESS TO SOMALI AIR AND NAVAL FACILITIES WILL CAUSE PROBLEMS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR MOSCOW TO DUPLICATE THESE FACILITIES ELSEWHERE. THE MOST LIKELY ALTERNATIVE FOR THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ETHIOPIA, WITH ITS PORTS OF ASSAB AND MASSAWA. HOWEVER, THIS OPTION IS AFFECTED BY THE GENERAL ETHIOPIAN DISTRUST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT REQUIRED OF ETHIOPIAN PORTS AND THEIR LACK OF DEVELOPED AIRFIELDS, THE FACT THAT BOTH PORTS ARE LOCATED IN ERITREA PROVINCE, AND THE FACT THAT THE LOCATION OF OTHER ETHIOPIAN AIRFIELDS WOULD REDUCE THE OPERATING RANGES OF THE IL-33/MAY.

5. ~~(S)~~ AT PRESENT, THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAS FAILED. PRESIDENT

PAGE 4

~~SECRET~~

SIAD HAS DONE WHAT THEY GAMLED HE WOULD NOT DO, AND IT REMAINS  
TO BE SEEN WHAT MOVES WILL NOW BE FORTHCOMING FROM SOMALIA AND  
THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

~~EX GDS 2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR~~

BT

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

cc

b7c