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FROM

FM [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

PASS: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

COUNTRY: (U) PERU (PE); JAPAN (JA).

//IPSP: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] JAPANESE CONCERN OVER

((MONTESINOS))' PREFERENCE FOR A HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION

(S)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 970418.

REQS: [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SUMMARY: (S) JAPANESE DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE REPS TO THE
CRISIS RESPONSE CELL IN LIMA CONCERNED WITH POWER STRUGGLE
BETWEEN ((MONTESINOS)) AND ((HERMOZA)) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR INFLUENCING PRESIDENT ((FUJIMORI))'S CHOICE OF A
SOLUTION TO THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.

TEXT: 1. (S) [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

2. (S) POSING MOST OF THE QUESTIONS DURING THE MEETING,

(b)(1),1.4 (c) STARTED THE MEETING BY ASKING [] WHAT [] THOUGHT ABOUT THE TIMING AND REASON FOR THE RECENTLY PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE SCANDAL RELATED TO THE KILLING OF ONE PERUVIAN ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENT AND THE TORTURE OF ANOTHER.

(b)(1),1.4
(c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) DID NOT APPEAR SATISFIED WITH OPEN SOURCE

(b)(1),1.4 (c) INFORMATION OFFERED BY [] HE ASKED FOR [] OPINION ON THE (b)(1),1.4 (c)

TIMING OF THE DISCLOSURE AND WHETHER THE NEGATIVE

INFORMATION WAS AIMED AT CRITICIZING PRESIDENT ALBERTO

((FUJIMORI)) AND VLADIMIRO ((MONTESINOS)). HE ASKED IF []

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

THOUGHT THERE WAS A STRUGGLE FOR POWER GOING ON IN THE ARMY

OR BETWEEN THE **NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIN)** AND THE

ARMY'S LEADER, GEN NICOLAS DE BARI ((HERMOZA)) RIOS. []

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

REITERATED OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION.

3. (S) ANALYZING THE SITUATION FOR (b)(1),1.4 (c)

OPINED THAT BECAUSE FUJIMORI HAD NOT YET CONDEMNED

MONTESINOS FOR ANY TIES TO THE INTELLIGENCE SCANDAL RELATED

TO THE KILLING AND TORTURE OF THE AGENTS, HE MUST BE WILLING

TO PROTECT MONTESINOS IN ORDER TO GAIN POWER OVER HIM.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) STATED THAT HE EXPECTED MONTESINOS WOULD

APPRECIATE THE PRESIDENT'S PROTECTION OR SHIELDING FROM THE

NEGATIVE PRESS AND BE IN HIS DEBT.

4. (S) IN THE NEXT STEP OF QUESTIONING, (b)(1),1.4 (c) ASKED

(b)(1),1.4 THE [] IF [] THOUGHT THAT MONTESINOS WAS TRYING TO GAIN

(b)(1),1.4 (c) INFLUENCE OVER THE MILITARY. [] SAID THAT ALL HE KNEW ABOUT

MONTESINOS WAS WHAT THE PRESS REPORTED. (b)(1),1.4 (c) ARGUED

THAT MONTESINOS IS TRYING TO EXPAND HIS POWER BASE IN THE

MILITARY IN OPPOSITION TO HERMOZA'S. AS EXAMPLES, (b)(1),1.4 (c)

SAID THAT TWO OF THE THREE COMMANDING GENERALS OF THE

SERVICES, ADM ((IBARCENA)) FROM THE NAVY AND GEN ((BELLO))

OF THE AIR FORCE, ARE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS LOYAL TO

(b)(1),1.4 MONTESINOS. WHEN [] ASKED [] IF HE THOUGHT THAT

(c) MONTESINOS WANTED TO GAIN POWER OVER THE ARMED FORCES,

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ANSWERED THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTELLIGENCE

OFFICERS IN KEY POSITIONS SERVED AS IMPORTANT INDICATORS.

(b)(1),1.4 5. (S) [] ASKED [] WHY HE WAS SO CONCERNED WITH THE

(c) MACHINATIONS FOR POWER BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE ARMED FORCES

AND THE **SIN**. (b)(1),1.4 (c) FIRST EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS

INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF HERMOZA HAD CONTROL OVER HIS

GENERALS AND ESPECIALLY OVER THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE,

DINTE. (b)(1),1.4 (c) CONTINUED SAYING THAT HIS CONCERN OVER THE APPARENT POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS WAS CONNECTED TO THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE THAT EACH EXERTED OVER FUJIMORI. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHOSE ADVICE FUJIMORI WOULD FOLLOW IF IT CAME DOWN TO CHOOSING BETWEEN THAT FROM THE SIN DE FACTO CHIEF AND THAT FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES.

6. (S) THE WHOLE LINE OF QUESTIONING BOILED DOWN TO WHETHER FUJIMORI WOULD PREFER TO GO WITH MONTESINOS' ADVICE TO ATTEMPT A HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION USING FORCE OR PREFER TO FOLLOW THE MILITARY'S ADVICE OF OPTING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. (b)(1),1.4 (c) CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IN HIS OPINION, IF HERMOZA EXERTS GREATER INFLUENCE OVER FUJIMORI, THEN THE PRESIDENT WILL REJECT THE PUSH BY MONTESINOS, WHO FAVORS A RESCUE OPERATION TO FREE THE REMAINING 72 HOSTAGES HELD IN THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE (JAR) IN LIMA.

7. (S) (b)(1),1.4 (c) REMAINED QUIET THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE DISCUSSION ONLY ADDING COMMENTS WHEN PRODDED BY (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) FOR HIS OPINION ON THE PROBABILITY OF A RESCUE OPERATION BEING CONDUCTED. (b)(1),1.4 (c) SAID THAT

(b)(1),1.4 (c) THE COMMANDER OF THE POLICE COUNTERTERRORIST FORCE, DUAT, SURROUNDING THE JAR, TOLD HIM THAT IF AN EMERGENCY OCCURRED IN THE JAR WHICH REQUIRED ACTION BE TAKEN, (b)(1),1.4 (c) WOULD FIRST SEEK PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL VIA HIS SUPERIORS TO GO INTO THE COMPOUND. ADDITIONALLY, (b)(1),1.4 (c) SAID THAT ANOTHER POLICE OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HIM THAT IF THE ORDER WERE GIVEN TO GO IN, THE DUAT FORCE WOULD ONLY ASSUME THE ROLE OF A CORDON FORCE, PERMITTING ANOTHER MILITARY ELEMENT TO CONDUCT THE ACTUAL ASSAULT. (b)(1),1.4 (c) --THE DUAT (DIVISION DE UNIDADES DE ACCIONES TACTICAS - DIVISION OF TACTICAL ACTION UNITS) IS THE PARENT ORGANIZATION OVER THE SUAT (SUB-UNIDAD DE ACCIONES TACTICAS - SUB-UNIT OF TACTICAL ACTIONS) AND OF THE UDEX (UNIDAD DE EXPLOSIVOS - EXPLOSIVES UNIT).

COMMENTS: 1. (S) THIS IIR PROVIDES ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON THE ONGOING MRTA HOSTAGE SITUATION AT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

Pg. 73 is denied in full

