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(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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SECTION 1 OF 2

SUBJECT: THIS IS IN (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)

2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: (U) POLITICAL-MILITARY • CHILEAN
PERCEPTIONS OF BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A

5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 780105

6. DATE OF REPORT: 780105

7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 780105, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

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8. REFERENCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

9. ASSESSMENT:

10. ORIGINATOR:

11. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO

12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

14. SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

15. SPECIAL INST:

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

16. SUMMARY: (C/NOFORN) (b)(1);1.4 (c) EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MACHINATIONS CONCERNING THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE ARE THE RESULT OF AN ATTEMPT TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SERIOUS CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOA ON DOMESTIC POLICIES.

22. DETAILS: (C/NOFORN) (b)(1);1.4 (c) IN THE (b)(1);1.4 (c) DURING A RECENT INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH THE QUESTION OF THE DIVERGENT POSITIONS OF THE CHILEAN AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL WAS BROUGHT UP BY (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THE GOA IS NOT BEING VERY SERIOUS OR REALISTIC ABOUT THE DISPUTE. HE SAID THAT HE DOUBTS VERY MUCH THAT THE DISPUTE WILL LEAD TO AN ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, DESPITE ARGENTINA'S BELLIGERENT AND PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT CHILE DOES NOT HAVE ANY PRETENSIONS FOR AN OUTLET AND AREA OF CONTROL IN THE ATLANTIC, BUT THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION OF THREATENING WITH ARMED CONFLICT IF THE SITUATION IS NOT RESOLVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GOA PROPOSALS DOES NOT MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS EASY FOR EITHER SIDE. CHILE, IN (b)(1);1.4 (c) DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO WAR OVER THE DISPUTE, AND IN FACT WOULD FIND ARMED ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA TO BE VERY INCONVENIENT BECAUSE PERU MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFLICT TO TRY TO RECLAIM TERRITORY LOST TO CHILE 100 YEARS AGO. ON THE OTHER HAND CHILE CAN NOT AFFORD TO BACK DOWN BEFORE ARGENTINE BELLIGERENCE FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL PRIDE AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES.

2. (C/NOFORN) (b)(1);1.4 (c) WHY THERE WAS SO MUCH PROBLEM COMING TO A SOLUTION IF THE CHILEANS DON'T HAVE AN PRETENSIONS ON THE ATLANTIC, AND THE ARGENTINES SAY THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT CHILEAN OWNERSHIP OF THE THREE CONTESTED ISLANDS.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT HE VIEWS THE PROBLEM AS BEING ONE OF DOMESTIC POLICY PROBLEMS WITHIN THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE ONLY

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INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSO GUARRY HTS (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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COMMANDERS TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO ARBITRATION, AMONG THOSE WHO SIGNED THE DOCUMENT SUPPORTING THAT DECISION WAS ADMIRAL MASSERA, CURRENT NAVY CINC AND THE MOST VOCIFEROUSLY AGAINST THE RESULTS OF THE ARBITRATION, (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE LACK OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATING BY THE GOA IS THAT FOREIGN MINISTER MONTES WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE JUNTA TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL TO GOC IN SANTIAGO, AND THEN WHEN THE CHILEAN

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FOREIGN MINISTER TRAVELLED TO BUENOS AIRES TO DISCUSS THAT PROPOSAL, HE WAS TOLD BY MONTES THAT THE JUNTA AND WITHDRAWN ITS APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSAL, AND HE (MONTES) WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS IT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER REFUSED TO RETURN TO CHILE IMMEDIATELY, SO HE SPENT THE MORNING TALKING TO MONTES ABOUT THE WEATHER AND DIFFERENT KINDS OF CANOY.

3. (C/NOFORN) (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THESE EVENTS ARE EVIDENCE THAT THE GOA WANTS TO CONFUSE AND STRETCH OUT THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS CONCERNING THE CHANNEL IN ORDER TO AVOID ADDRESSING SERIOUS INTERNAL POLICY ISSUES SUCH AS A DEFINITION OF THE FUTURE POWER SCHEME WITHIN THE GOA AND THE MATTER OF THE FOURTH MAN. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE RECENT RESIGNATION OF MINISTER OF PLANNING, GENERAL DIAZ BESSONE, IS FURTHER PROOF THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS DIVISIONS AND STRUGGLES FOR POWER GOING ON WITHIN THE GOA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT HE DOESN'T THINK THE PRESENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA WILL LAST LONGER THAN MARCH OR APRIL 1978.

COMMENT: (C/NOFORN) (b)(1);1.4 (c) ABOUT THE DOCUMENT SUPPORTING THE DECISION TO SUBMIT THE BEAGLE QUESTION TO ARBITRATION PARALLEL NOT WELL GUARDED RUMORS IN BUENOS AIRES. (b)(1);1.4 (c) AND RUMORS CONCERNING A MASSERA SIGNATURE. ON DOCUMENT SUPPORTING ARBITRATION IS INTERESTING IN THAT OUR BID FILES INDICATE MASSERA WAS NOT PROMOTED TO REAR ADMIRAL UNTIL 31 DEC 71, WHEN HE BECAME NAVY SECRETARY GENERAL. DURING 1971 HE WAS A CAPTAIN ASSIGNED AS AN INSTRUCTOR AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. THE LOCAL PRESS HAS CARRIED SEVERAL STORIES THAT THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION OF THE POWER STRUCTURE WAS NOT ADDRESSED BY THE JUNTA BECAUSE ATTENTION HAD TO BE GIVEN TO THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE. IN A WORD,

(b)(1);1.4 (c) COULD BE MERELY REPEATING WHAT HE HAS SEEN AND HEARD HERE IN BUENOS AIRES, AND THEN MAKING (b)(1);1.4 (c) CONCLUSIONS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THOUGH, THAT (b)(1);1.4 (c)

IS REPEATING THE OFFICIAL GOC PERCEPTION OF THE DISPUTE AS SEEN FROM SANTIAGO. (b)(1);1.4 (c) REALIZATION THAT A CONFLICT IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA COULD BE AN INVITATION FOR THE PERUVIANS TO START ACTION IN THE ARICA AREA, AND HIS STATEMENT THAT CHILE THEREFORE WOULD TRY TO AVOID LETTING THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE DEGENERATE INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT, IS PRECISELY THE REALIZATION THAT SEVERAL (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) HAVE SAID THE GOA IS COUNTING ON TO GET A FAVORABLE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE GOA WILL NOT LAST BEYOND MARCH OR APRIL IS SPECULATION OR PERHAPS WISHFUL THINKING, WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE.

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WAY TO RATIONALIZE THE GOA CONDUCT IS TO REALIZE
THAT IT WANTS TO USE THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE TO
DIVERT ATTENTION OR ACTION FROM DOMESTIC POLICY ISSUES.
AS EXAMPLES, (b)(1);1.4 (c) CLAIMS THAT THE DECISION
TO SUBMIT THE BEAGLE CHANNEL QUESTION TO ARBITRATION
IS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS MADE BY A DEFACTO GOVERNMENT
(LANUSSE-1971) IS RIDICULOUS. PRESIDENT LANUSSE, ACCORDING
(b)(1);1.4 (c) HAD THE WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE SENIOR MILITARY

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