

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 08 1977

TELETYPE

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. *YMK* \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgt. \_\_\_\_\_  
S. & T. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

R 032233Z FEB 77 ZEX

FM DIA WASH DC

TO RUCRDIB/DIA

(b)(3):10 USC  
424

POLITICAL MATTERS - Cuba

109-12-210

BT

SECRET / NOFORN / NOINTELM / NOINTTEL 2601

FROM

(b)(3):10 USC 424

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/3/05 BY 60290 AM BCF/TCG/ECU

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 34-4A (AS OF: 1140 EST 3 FEB 77)

(b)(3):10  
USC 424

CUBA-PER U: CUBAN AMBASSADOR MAY BE REPLACED. (S//NOFORN)

(b)(3):10  
USC 424

109-12-210-7177

FEB 8 1977

(b)(1), 1.4 (d)

XEROX

FEB 10 1977

109-12-210-7177

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~~SECRET~~

THAT THE MAJORITY OF CUBAN PERSONNEL WILL BE ROTATED BACK  
TO HAVANA.

2. ~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//WNINTEL)~~ CUBAN PRESIDENT CASTRO  
IS APPARENTLY UPSET THAT HIS AMBASSADOR CANNOT PROVIDE

(b)(1),1.4 (d)

(b)(1),1.4 (d)

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~~SECRET~~

4. ~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//NOINTEL)~~ THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HAVANA WILL MAKE AN ENTIRE SWITCH IN PERSONNEL IN PERU IS HARD TO GAUGE. IN RECENT MONTHS, REPORTS OF CLOSURES OF SCHOOLS ATTENDED EXCLUSIVELY BY CHILDREN OF CUBAN DIPLOMATS AND ADVISORY PERSONNEL HAVE SURFACED, AS WELL AS CLANDESTINE REPORTS THAT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HAVANA AND LIMA WAS DETERIORATING.

5. ~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//NOINTEL)~~ FURTHER, CUBA HAS APPARENTLY NOT BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THE MOST RECENT SOVIET/PERUVIAN ARMS DEALS, INCLUDING THE SU-22 TRANSACTION. CONCURRENTLY, CUBA MAY FEEL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING BETTER EQUIPMENT OFFERS TO LIMA THAN TO HAVANA. FOR THE MOST PART, SOVIET DELIVERIES TO CUBA HAVE ONLY GRADUALLY IMPROVED THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES. NONETHELESS, PERU PRESENTS ONE OF THE MOST FAVORABLE BASES OF OPERATIONS FOR CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTINENT. UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES MIGHT LEAD TO THE SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS, BUT CUBA WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE

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~~SECRET~~

ITS REPRESENTATIVES ACCEPTABLE TO THE MORALES BERMUDEZ  
GOVERNMENT, EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES A CHANGEOVER OF KE  
PERSONNEL IN LIMA.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

~~(X)CDS 2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINAL~~

BT

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC  
3024(i)

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