DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

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SUBJ: THIS IS IR NO	
1. (U) COUNTRYS ARGENTINA (AR)/CHILE (CI)	
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424	
3. (U) TITLE: MILITARY/POLITICAL AFFAIRS - ARGENTINE- CHILEAN BEAGLE CHANNEL SITUATION	
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBERS N/A	•
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATIONS 781181	
6, (U) DATE OF REPORT: 781181	
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUSITIONS 781181, BUENOS	
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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PARTY WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUIRED AND THAT THE POPE HAS THE ONE BEING CONSIDERED TO MODERATE A MEETING BETWEEN VIDELA AND PINOCHET.

D, when (b)(1);1.4(c) The problems with major cabinet shifts occurring at antime when cohedion has necessary, the (b)(1);1.4(c) That it was a bhame, that sen (r) klex had left the defense ministry and it was a disaster in terms of operation now (b)(3):10 USC 424 That vice anniral: Luis maria mendia, exactive, argentine delegation to the intermanerican defense board (iadb), hould probably set the new defense minister).

COMMENTS ALTHOUGH OVERT ARGENTINE HILITARY EFFORT WAS NOT STATED, (b)(1):1.4 (c) THAT A HARD APPROACH WILL BE TAKEN AND THAT ARGENTINA WILL FIRMT IF NECESSARY FOR THE LAND ANGHOR FOR THE SOUNDARY. THENINDICATION THAT THE PERIOD 18-47 NOVEMBER WOULD BE POLITICALLY BAD WOULD TEND TO CONFIRM INDICATORS OF CONTINUED MOSILIZATION. THIS MSG COORD W/AMEMBASSY.

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