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ACTION

DIA:

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CJCS DJS(03) J3(14) J5(02) J3INMCC SECDEF(07) SECDEF:

ASD:ISA(10) :DIA(15) (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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FILE(1)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10
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(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: THIS IS (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)

2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: (U) MILITARY INTENSIONS: GUA NEGOTIATING
SCENARIO FOR BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A

5. DATE OF INFOR: 771126

6. DATE OF REPORT: 771128

7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 771126, BUENOS AIRES,
ARGENTINA

8. REFERENCE: INITIATIVE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

228

52

PAGE 1

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PAGE 2

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12342

9. ASSESSMENT SOURCE INFO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO.

12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

13. APPROVING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. SOURCE: (A) (b)(3):10 USC 424

15. DIRC: NO. - ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (c)

16. SUMMARY: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~

INDICATE THAT GOA POLICY TOWARD DISAGREEMENT WITH CHILE OVER THE BEAGLE ISLANDS IS TO NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH.

22. DETAILS: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ 1. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

DURING A LUNCHEON GIVEN BY (b)(1);1.4 (c) FOR ALL THE MILITARY (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) ASSIGNED TO BUENOS AIRES, AND ALL THE ARGAF (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) DESIGNATES, (b)(1);1.4 (c) A TABLE WITH (b)(1);1.4 (c)

WHEN THE LADIES AT THE TABLE HAD DEPARTED FOR ANOTHER ACTIVITY,

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) MADE A SHARP CHANGE IN CONVERSATION BY ASKING — WHAT (b)(1);1.4 (c)

HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE SITUATION BETWEEN CHILE AND ARGENTINA IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE PROBLEM THERE WAS ONE FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES TO SETTLE, AND THAT IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USG TO MAKE ANY JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE MERITS OF THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

THEN ASKED WHAT (b)(1);1.4 (c) WAS THE CHILEAN PERCEPTION OF GOA POLICY TOWARD THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN THE AREA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE MIXED SIGNALS THAT HAD APPEARED IN THE MEDIA DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, EG., THE RELATIVELY HARD LANGUAGE OF ADMIRAL MASSERA, AND THE MORE MODERATE POSITION THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA HAS USED. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ATTENDANCE OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AT CHILEAN NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS, WHILE THE NAVY MADE ITS ABSENCE CONSPICUOUS,

2. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1);1.4 (c) DEFINITE FLAVOR OF PLEASURE IN HIS VOICE, SAID THAT IF THE CHILEANS HAD PERCEIVED THESE SAME SIGNALS AND WERE CONFUSED BY THEM, THAT MEANT THAT GOA POLICY WAS WORKING WELL. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THEN ADDED THAT GOA POLICY TOWARD THE BEAGLE CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS WAS PRECISELY TO CONFUSE THE CHILEANS WITH MIXED SIGNALS OF FORCE, AND SIGNALS OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THIS POLICY WOULD PERMIT THE GOA TO KEEP THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT OFF BALANCE, AND PERMIT THE GOA TO NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE DIFFERENCE IN TONE OF

PAGE 2

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PAGE 3

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THE (b)(1);1.4 (c) WERE A CALCULATED PART OF THE GOA SCENARIO TO PREPARE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT ARGENTINA TO RECOVER SOME OF THE TERRITORY AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE THAT IT HAS LOST AS A RESULT OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL ARBITRATION.

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

SIGNALS THAT (b)(1);1.4 (c) IS RECEIVING FROM THE GOA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) HAD SPECULATED THAT THE SIGNALS COULD BE GENERATED BY DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE JUNTA ON THE APPROPRIATE POLICY TO FOLLOW. THE INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN PROVIDED (b)(1);1.4 (c) WOULD INDICATE THAT THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN THE JUNTA ON THE SCENARIO TO FOLLOW WITH RESPECT TO THE BEAGLE CHANNEL, AND THAT THE MIXED SIGNALS ARE A PURPOSEFUL PART OF THE SCENARIO. IF THAT IS THE CASE, THE PROPOSITION THAT THE MASSERA-VIDELA CONFLICT IS A SELF-GENERATED POLITICAL TACTIC OF THE JUNTA, AS (b)(3);10 USC 424 BECOMES MORE CREDIBLE, THERE ALSO EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CONVERSATION (b)(1);1.4 (c) ON THIS SUBJECT WAS (b)(1);1.4 (c) AND A PART OF A SCENARIO DEVELOPED TO COVER OVER SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE JUNTA ON THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION TO TAKE WITH REFERENCE TO THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AREA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT ALL THE DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE JUNTA, THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY SO MANY DIFFERENT (b)(1);1.4 (c) ARE FABRICATED. IT IS FEASIBLE THOUGH, THAT IN THE CASE OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE APPROACHES OF MASSERA AND VIDELA ARE A CALCULATED PLAN WHICH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY PERCEIVE WILL STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION. THIS COULD ALSO BE AN ATTEMPT TO RATIONALIZE BY POINTING TO WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS A POSITIVE RESULT OF MIXED SIGNALS RESULTING FROM SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WHICH DO, IN FACT, EXIST WITHIN THE JUNTA. THIS MSG COORD W/EMBASSY.

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PAGE 3

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