

**IS MEXICO A FAILING STATE? THE INFLUENCE OF DRUG  
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS ON MEXICAN POLITICAL STABILITY**

by



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## **ABSTRACT**

**TITLE OF THESIS:** Is Mexico a Failing State? The Influence of  
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This thesis focused on the influences of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) on Mexico's political stability. It asked the questions: What are the key factors involving DTO activities and Mexican governmental characteristics, institutions, and organizations that would bring about Mexican state failure and what security implications would this entail for the United States? Of these factors, which has the most influence? The author's hypothesis was: Delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state.

This thesis utilized the six political indicators from the Failed States Index published by the Fund for Peace to identify DTO influences. Using the 18 measures associated with these political indicators as a framework, the author used the Delphi method and basic statistics to develop, disseminate, collect, and analyze expert panel questionnaires to answer the research questions and prove, or disprove, the hypothesis.

Expert panelists were identified based on their academic and professional experience and recent publications regarding subjects relevant to this study.

The findings partially supported the author's hypothesis. The factors most influenced by DTOs fall into the category of "Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State," as assessed by the expert panel respondents. The expert panel found that the factor in this category most influenced by DTO activities is the resistance of government officials to transparency, accountability, and political representation.

This thesis concluded that although Mexico exhibits many of the symptoms of a failing state, it is far from actual failure. The sharp increase in drug violence over the past two years appears to be driven from a strengthening of the central government due to democratic transition and efforts to decrease corruption and increase transparency. Drug trafficking will continue to pose problems for Mexico until reforms are completed in the national, state, and local law enforcement and judicial systems.

DTO activities directly affect U.S. national security. Drug related violence is spilling over the border into the United States. These organizations have managed to dominate the wholesale drug industry in the U.S. and facilitate their operations through street gangs in over 230 cities. This study attempted to highlight the primary areas that these organizations impact the stability of the Mexican government in order to better facilitate U.S. efforts to aid Mexico in their fight against organized crime.

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I thank you for the enthusiasm you have for this subject. Your time and professionalism are greatly appreciated.

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### Threats Posed By State Failure

On September 11, 2001, the global war on terror became the central focus of the George W. Bush presidential administration. The Barack Obama administration inherited the task of assisting both Iraq and Afghanistan in building strong central governments to provide stability. Failed states in those regions would create power vacuums, which would directly affect U.S. national security interests. How much more would a failed Mexican state on our southern border affect U.S. national security?

To determine Mexico's status as a failed state, it is important to understand exactly what the term 'failed state' means and the resultant threats. A strong state provides a certain level of public goods to its citizens. A state fails when it is consumed by internal conflict and ceases to deliver those goods. Weak states are essentially strong, but inconsistent in that they deliver some goods and services, but fail to deliver others. Robert I. Rotberg, Director of the John F. Kennedy School of Government's Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution, defined a failing state as a subcategory of these weak states. The failing state has not yet failed, but as it becomes weaker, "the more that weakness tends to edge toward failure."<sup>1</sup> States that have failed exhibit a varied mixture of symptoms according to Rotberg. Some of these include: violent conflict between government forces and armed factions, ineffective law enforcement, lack of security for state citizenry, increased criminal violence and urban

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<sup>1</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1-4.



crime, flawed legislative and judicial institutions, and widespread corruption at all levels of government.<sup>2</sup> At the far end of the spectrum are collapsed states. This phenomenon rarely occurs, according to Rotberg, but exhibits an extreme lack of governance that provides a breeding ground for illicit activities and terrorism.<sup>3</sup>

State failure poses significant threats to U.S. national security. The U.S. National Defense Strategy describes “ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas” as ripe for exploitation as safe havens by violent non-state actors “from which they can operate with impunity” and “undermine local stability and regional security.”<sup>4</sup> Former Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker asserts, “State failure directly affects a broad range of U.S. interests, including the promotion of human rights, good governance, and the rule of law, religious tolerance, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors and exporters. It also contributes to regional instability, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism.”<sup>5</sup> Hence, state failure, no matter where in the world, potentially damages U.S. interests domestically and globally. However, Mexican state failure poses especially significant threats to U.S. homeland security because of Mexico’s geographic proximity to and close economic ties with the United States.

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<sup>2</sup> Rotberg, 5-8.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 9-10.


<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, June 2008, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Chester Crocker, “Engaging Failing State,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003):

## Mexico: A Failing State?

Since winning its independence in 1822, Mexico has experienced political turmoil and rampant social inequality. The political scene shifted between liberal and conservative and has been autocratic since the state's inception. Economic development has been sporadic and unequally distributed and there are continuing disruptive struggles between competing races and social classes in the country. Illegal immigration and the illicit drug trade pose considerable challenges both internally and externally.<sup>6</sup> These issues can have a destabilizing effect on a state government.

Figure 1-1. Mexico



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook," under Mexico, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/MX.html> (accessed June 17, 2009).

Mexico is not historically perceived as a state with an unstable government or at risk for failure. Utilizing twelve social, economic, and political indicators, the 2008 Failed State Index ranked Mexico 105 out of 177 countries evaluated for risk of failure.

<sup>6</sup> Jaime Suchlicki, *Mexico: from Montezuma to the Fall of the PRI* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2001), 5-7, 203.

Mexico ranked above Israel, China, and Russia in this evaluation of stability.<sup>7</sup> Recently, however, Mexican stability has received much more attention in the media and from U.S. government entities. *The Seattle Times* reported that Mexico is a “fragmenting state that may spiral toward failure.”<sup>8</sup> *World Politics Review* wrote, “Once renowned for its political stability, Mexico now seems en route to becoming a failed state.”<sup>9</sup> Officials such as outgoing CIA director Michael V. Hayden, retired U.S. Army General Barry R. McCaffrey and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich have all commented on the perceived crisis in Mexico. Hayden mentioned Mexico along with Iran as a potential challenge for the new Obama administration. Speaker Gingrich also warned of a possible crisis for the new administration regarding Mexico. McCaffrey equated Mexico’s struggle with drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) as a fight for state survival.<sup>10</sup> All of this after U.S. Joint Forces Command reported that Mexico bears “consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse” due to “sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels.”<sup>11</sup> The escalation of drug-related violence and the potential impacts to U.S. national security are the common threads in this increased concern.

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<sup>7</sup> The Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index,” under Publications, [http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140](http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140) (accessed September 29, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> David Danelo, “The deadly, escalating drug war on our Southern border,” *The Seattle Times*, December 19, 2008, [www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2008540557\\_opin21mexico.html](http://www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2008540557_opin21mexico.html) (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>9</sup> Hal Brands, “Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency,” *World Politics Review*, December 22, 2008, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3072> (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>10</sup> Ken Ellingwood, “Calderon seeks to dispel talk of ‘failing state,’” *Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 2009, under “Mexico Under Siege,” <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-drugs25-2009jan25,0,7250521.story> (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment*, November 25, 2008, 36.

Mexican drug cartels, although having operated for many years prior, have increased their power with the decline of the major Colombian cartels in the early 1990s. The Mexican cartels have since managed to dominate the wholesale market for illicit drugs transiting into the United States.<sup>12</sup> The economic resources and firepower at the disposal of these cartels rival – and often surpass the Mexican government’s ability to deal with the problem. The vast resources at stake lead to violent clashes between cartels, which amplify the violence between the government and these organizations. Figure 1-2 shows the areas of influence for the Mexican drug cartels as of December 2008.

Figure 1-2. Mexican Drug Cartel Areas of Influence



Source: “Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, December 11, 2008, [https://www.opensource.gov/providers/stratfor/www/analysis/20081209\\_mexican\\_drug\\_cartels\\_government\\_progress\\_and\\_growing\\_violence](https://www.opensource.gov/providers/stratfor/www/analysis/20081209_mexican_drug_cartels_government_progress_and_growing_violence) (accessed April 28, 2009).

<sup>12</sup> Colleen W. Cook, *CRS Report for Congress: Mexico’s Drug Cartels*, Order Code RL34215 (Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2007).

Shortly after his election in December 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared war on drug trafficking organizations. He has deployed over 50,000 military and federal police to support this effort. Since January 2007, an estimated 9,700 drug-related deaths occurred in Mexico.<sup>13</sup> Cartel violence is directed primarily towards rival cartels, but affects journalists, law enforcement, the military, and high-level government officials as well. In May 2008, the highest-ranking law enforcement officer in Mexico, Edgar Millan Gomez was shot dead in Mexico City. The son of the Sinaloa cartel leader, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, was also killed recently in what is suspected to be rival cartel violence. Those same resources and firepower also allow for other illicit activities and corruption of government officials at every level.<sup>14</sup> The corruption of the government, unending violence, and drain on the financial resources of the country as a result of the activities of these drug cartels can have a destabilizing and debilitating impact on the Mexican state.

### **Research Question**

What are the key factors involving DTO activities and Mexican governmental characteristics, institutions, and organizations that would bring about Mexican state failure and what security implications would this entail for the United States?

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<sup>13</sup> "Mexico Under Siege: The drug war at our doorstep," *Los Angeles Times*, under "World News," <http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-war> (accessed June 19, 2009).

<sup>14</sup> George Friedman, "Mexico: On the Road to a Failed State?" *STRATFOR*, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico\\_road\\_failed\\_state](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_state) (accessed September 25, 2008).

## **Key Questions**

1. What are the factors that define DTO influence on Mexican political stability?
2. Of the factors directly impacted by DTOs and their activities, which has the most influence on Mexican political stability? And why?

## **Hypothesis**

Delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state.

## **Scope/Limitations**

Issues involving Mexican drug cartels are not only a national problem for Mexico, but affect other countries in the region as well. This thesis will not focus on the regional, hemispheric, or international problems associated with DTOs, but will concentrate on Mexico internally. DTOs can have an effect on most, if not all, of the factors that contribute to state failure. These include economic, political, and social issues. This thesis will focus specifically on the influence of DTOs on Mexican state stability as defined by the political indicators in the Failed State Index.

## **Thesis Overview**

This thesis seeks to take advantage of the increased attention on Mexican political stability to provide some specific insight into the impacts of DTO activities. The cause-and-effect relationship between DTOs and the potential for Mexican state failure will be

discussed, examining the linkages between DTO activities and specific indicators in the Failed State Index. In this way, the author will attempt to further highlight how the conflict involving the Mexican government and DTOs could lead to a failing state.

Chapter 2 reviews literature on topics such as state failure, the history of the Mexican political landscape, the history of drug cartel operations, and selected works regarding democratic governance and organized crime.

Chapter 3 describes the use of the Delphi technique and survey method. The author will use this methodology in conjunction with information from Chapter 2 to derive answers to the research and key questions.

Chapter 4 presents the research findings utilizing the results of the Delphi technique outlined in Chapter 3. This chapter will provide answers to the research and key questions.

Chapter 5 closes the thesis with a summary and discussion regarding implications for Mexico and U.S. national security interests.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter contains a review of existing literature related to state failure and weakness as well as the relationship between governance, stability, and drug trafficking in Mexico. The body of knowledge in this review contributes information essential to answering the research question, related key questions, and to proving or disproving the stated hypothesis.

#### **State Failure and Weakness**

This first section contains a review of relevant material regarding state failure and weakness. The review began with an investigation into two existing methods of examining governance and state failure. Since 2005, the Fund for Peace has published their Failed States Index, which uses analytical modeling to provide warning and assessment of weak and failing states based on twelve social, economic, and political indicators.<sup>15</sup> Per the focus of this thesis, the political indicators and measures used by the Failed State Index are listed below. It is important to note that according to the Fund for Peace, these measures are not all inclusive.<sup>16</sup>

#### **Political Indicators**

- I. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
  - A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
  - B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation
  - C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes,

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<sup>15</sup> Dr. Pauline H. Baker, "The Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST)," (Washington D.C.: The Fund for Peace, 2006). [http://www.fundforpeace.org/cast/pdf\\_downloads/castmanual2007.pdf](http://www.fundforpeace.org/cast/pdf_downloads/castmanual2007.pdf) (accessed April 9, 2009): vi.

<sup>16</sup> Baker, 8.



e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies

D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

## II. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

A. Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation

B. State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies

## III. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

A. Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated

B. Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians

C. Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices

D. Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)

## IV. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State within a State"

A. Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity

B. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition

C. Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique

D. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces

## V. Rise of Factionalized Elites

A. Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines

B. Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")

- VI. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors
  - A. Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict
  - B. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions<sup>17</sup>

In addition to examining the political indicators in the Failed State Index, the literature review included several articles, books, and academic papers. The following authors offer similar points of view, with varying details, and provide further context for an evaluation of state failure and weakness.

**Rotberg, Robert I. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.**

Robert I. Rotberg is Adjunct Professor of Public Policy and the Program Director for the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Resolution.<sup>18</sup> He has authored and edited several books and articles on the subjects of U.S. foreign policy, state weakness and failure, and conflict prevention and resolution. His purpose in writing *When States Fail* was to examine state failure and collapse and how such states may be resuscitated. The book also analyzes state weakness and how some states progress from weakness to failure while others perpetuate weakness but never succumb to failure. Rotberg attempts to characterize failed states to provide to policymakers who are dealing with prevention, resuscitation, and rebuilding of failed nation-states a model for understanding this issue.

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<sup>17</sup> Baker, 8-12.

<sup>18</sup> Harvard Kennedy School, "Robert Rotberg," Faculty and Staff Directory, <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/robert-rotberg> (accessed April 2, 2009).

Rotberg writes in his introduction, “Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders).” These goods are hierarchical, with security being the most critical. With a reasonable amount of security, other goods and services will follow. The spectrum of goods and services include, among others: rule of law, free and open electoral processes, health care, educational infrastructure, commerce, communications, and a monetary system. Strong states perform well across this spectrum. Weak states tend to perform well in some areas, but perform poorly in others. States that have failed exhibit a varied mixture of symptoms. Some of these include: violent conflict between government forces and armed factions, ineffective law enforcement, lack of security for state citizenry, increased criminal violence and urban crime, flawed legislative and judicial institutions, and widespread corruption at all levels of government. A state that fails to provide security will lead to internal violence, which directly points toward the likelihood of failure. When a nation-state is consumed by high levels of violence, its citizens begin to question the government’s credibility and legitimacy. However, as Rotberg points out, the presence of high levels of internal violence does not necessarily imply that a state is ripe for failure.

**Ghani, Ashraf and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.**

Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart are the founders of The Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE), which advises national and international leaders regarding global state-building activities. Dr. Ghani is chairman of ISE and has acted as both advisor and Finance Minister to the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. Clare Lockhart is

director of ISE and worked as a UN advisor to the Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan.<sup>19</sup>

These authors suggest that failed states present the biggest threat to global security for this century, and argue that the current international response to the threat of state failure is inherently flawed. In order to address this flawed response, the authors present a strategic framework to define state functions, design structures necessary to carry out those functions, and focus international actors on the state building process.

The authors suggest that the legitimate use of force is not the single factor defining states, but that states also derive legitimacy from providing functions in political, social, and economic realms. They present ten functions of a state:

1. Rule of law
2. A monopoly on the legitimate means of violence
3. Administrative control
4. Sound management of public finances
5. Investments in human capital
6. Creation of citizenship rights through social policy
7. Provision of infrastructure services
8. Formation of a market
9. Management of public assets
10. Effective public borrowing.

**Jackson, Richard. "Regime Security." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, edited by Alan Collins, 146-161. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.**

Richard Jackson lectures on critical terrorism studies, international conflict resolution, and security studies. He is also the founding editor of the journal, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.<sup>20</sup> In this piece, Jackson examines the security challenges facing

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<sup>19</sup> Afghanistan Online, "Ashraf Ghani," under Biography, <http://www.afghan-web.com/hios/ghani.html> (accessed April 3, 2009) and Stanford University, "CDDRL Events," under Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, [http://cddrl.stanford.edu/events/building\\_effective\\_states\\_from\\_practice\\_to\\_theory/](http://cddrl.stanford.edu/events/building_effective_states_from_practice_to_theory/) (accessed April 3, 2009).

<sup>20</sup> Centro Internacional Bancaya para la Paz y el Desarrollo, "JACKSON, Rohert," under Faculty, [http://www.epd.uji.es/master/cvs%20pdf/cv\\_richardjackson.pdf](http://www.epd.uji.es/master/cvs%20pdf/cv_richardjackson.pdf) (Accessed April 9, 2009).

weak states. He finds three important dimensions of state strength: “(1) infrastructural capacity in terms of the ability of state institutions to perform essential tasks and enact policy; (2) coercive capacity in terms of the state’s ability and willingness to employ force against challenges to its authority; and (3) national identity and social cohesion in terms of the degree to which the population identifies with the nation-state and accepts its legitimate role in their lives.” He also finds the most significant characteristic of weak states to be their inability to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence.

Jackson then examines the threats facing weak states. He identified significant internal threats such as individuals or groups that wield coercive or infrastructural power rivaling state authority. Examples of these are criminal gangs and warlords who maintain control of certain areas in order to facilitate their illicit activities. Another internal threat comes from the degradation of state institutions and processes, which leads to increased lawlessness. Due to security problems, most weak states face external threats stemming from inability to control their borders. As a result, the state is threatened by an increase in weapons trafficking, which exacerbates the internal security issues with criminal gangs or other armed factions challenging the government.

Jackson then discusses security strategies for weak states. The main point he makes in this discussion is that the strategies required for weak states to establish and maintain security potentially undermine the state’s authority and legitimacy. However, security is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of the institutions and processes required for a strong state. This piece provides a context for examining Mexico’s security dilemmas and the government’s capacity to resolve them.

**Patrick, Stewart. “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 27-53.**

Stewart Patrick is a Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations. He also has experience as a State Department policy planning staff member and as a Research Fellow at the Center for Global Development.<sup>21</sup> Stewart’s article addresses the increased emphasis on the perceived threats posed by weak states in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. He argues that there is little empirical evidence to support the perceived threats. To focus on the issue, he discusses the definition of weak and failing states in an effort to illustrate that all weak states are not the same. In doing so, he cautions against a cookie-cutter solution to the weak state problem.

He views state strength as measurable by the state’s capacity and will to provide essential goods. He lists these goods as “physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare.” He identifies four categories of weak states based on capacity and will. Table 2-1 is an excerpt from Stewart’s article that illustrates his analysis. Stewart then uses this analysis as a framework to examine the perceived risks of failed states. These risks include terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, pandemic disease, energy insecurity, and regional instability. He concludes by reiterating that although these risks can be attributed to weak and failing states, each specific case must be analyzed individually to identify the sources and consequences of weakness. Stewart’s analysis provides a framework for categorizing Mexico’s status as a weak state.

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<sup>21</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, “Stewart M. Patrick,” <http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/ghani.html> (accessed April 3, 2009).

**Table 2-1. Capacity and Will as Dimensions of State Weakness**

	Strong Will	Low Will
High Capacity	Relatively Good Performers (e.g., Senegal, Honduras)	Unresponsive/Corrupt/ Repressive (e.g., Burma, Zimbabwe)
Low Capacity	Weak but Willing (e.g., Mozambique, East Timor)	Weak and Not Willing (e.g., Haiti, Sudan)

Source: Data from Stewart Patrick, "'Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?' *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 30.

**Crocker, Chester A. "Engaging Failing States." *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 32-44**

Chester A. Crocker is the James R. Schlesinger professor of strategic studies at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. Dr. Crocker is well published and primarily focuses on subjects regarding international security, conflict management, and mediation.<sup>22</sup> In this article, Dr. Crocker argues that U.S. foreign policy has missed the point regarding how to achieve a safer global environment. He argues the focus must be on stabilizing the failing states of the world. He describes state failure as a gradual process that is caused by various issues. These issues range from corruption in the central government or loss of legitimacy to disputes over natural resources or ethnic separatist movements. Two strong points that Crocker makes are that state failure is "inextricably linked with internal strife," and – when failure occurs – a power shift results that favors armed, lawless factions over ordinary civilians. Crocker goes on to outline the

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<sup>22</sup> Georgetown University, "Chester A. Crocker," <http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/crockerc/?action=viewgeneral> (accessed April 2, 2009).

need for adequate resourcing and leadership to adequately address the growing threat of failing and failed states around the world.

### **Mexico: Governance, Stability, and Organized Crime**

The following pieces of literature provide insight into Mexican governance and stability and the effects of drug trafficking. The reviewed material illuminates a perception of a symbiotic relationship between Mexico's democratic transition with the genesis and rise of the drug trafficking industry. The authors point to specific factors of this relationship that affect Mexican political stability.

**Schedler, Andreas. "Mexico: Democratic Transition and Beyond." in *Politics in the Developing World*, 2nd ed., edited by Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.**

Andreas Schedler is Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of Political Studies at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City. He is a highly published author on subjects of democratic governance and electoral processes.<sup>23</sup> In this chapter, Schedler describes Mexico's democratization by elections from an electoral authoritarian state. He argues that after the Mexican Revolution from 1910-1920, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) presented a facade of democracy while practicing authoritarian rule. The PRI remained in power until 2000 when the National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency. Several economic crises during successive administrations from 1976 to 1994 – as well as socio-economic modernization – led to a push for democratic transition in Mexico. Opposition parties

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<sup>23</sup> Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, "Andreas Schedler," under Facultad de Estudios Políticos, <http://www.cide.edu/investigador/profile.php?IdInvestigador=175> (accessed April 5, 2009).



began slowly undermining the popular support and anti-democratic institutions of the PRI in a process Schedler describes as democratization by elections. Although the author views Mexico as a democratic state, he believes many challenges threaten its viability. According to the author, the rule of law and defending the state's claim to the monopoly of the use of force are among the most daunting challenges.

**Astorga, Luis.** "The Field of Drug Trafficking in Mexico." *Globalisation, Drugs and Criminalization. Final Research Report on Brazil, China, India and Mexico.* UNESCO, 2002. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001276/127644e.pdf> (accessed April 9, 2009).

Dr. Luis Astorga is a Professor and researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). His area of interest is the socio-history of drug trafficking in Mexico.<sup>24</sup> Dr. Astorga assesses four distinct historical phases in the evolution of the drug trafficking trade in Mexico. The first phase was from 1914 to 1947 in which illicit activity emerged from the prohibition policies led by the United States. During this period, the criminal activity became subordinate to the consolidating power of the PRI, the Mexican ruling political party. The second phase, from 1947 to 1985, saw the creation of institutional mediations between the fields of politics and drug trafficking. These institutions, such as the Federal Security Department (DFS), served to insulate the senior layer of politics from implication in the illicit activities, and maintained the subordinate relationship of the drug trade. During the third phase, from 1985 to 2000, opposition parties began to seriously challenge the PRI. Opposition parties won governorships, the PRI lost legislative majority, and finally the presidency. These

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<sup>24</sup> Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, "Luis Alejandro Astorga Almanza," Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, under Sociología de los procesos políticos, <http://www.iis.unam.mx/areas/procesos/astorga.html> (accessed April 9, 2009).

political changes and the breakdown of institutional mediations created in the second phase resulted in loss of governmental control over organized crime and a rise in violence. The final phase, from 2000 to present, is characterized by an unpredictability regarding the relationships between the fields of politics and organized crime in Mexico. This article is useful because it provides a comprehensive history of the symbiotic relationship between the drug trafficking trade and politics in Mexico. According to the author, the theory that drug traffickers infiltrated the political field is refuted. He argues that the two developed in concert.

**Chabat, Jorge. "Mexico: The Security Challenge." In *Canadian and Mexican Security in the New North America: Challenges and Prospects*, edited by Jordi Diez. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006.**

Jorge Chabat is a Professor and researcher at the Department of International Studies at CIDE. Dr. Chabat has a Ph.D. in International Affairs from University of Miami and focuses his research efforts on democracy, security, and drug trafficking in Mexico.<sup>25</sup> As the title suggests, Dr. Chabat focuses on Mexican state security in this article. He argues that, since the 1980s, an increase in drug trafficking, erosion in the security forces, and political transition in Mexico has led to a security crisis. He identifies security as the fundamental requirement for political, economic, and social development and as the main challenge facing democracy in Mexico. In order to improve the situation, changes are necessary at all levels: international, national, and local. He suggests improvements in the structure of police forces, prison systems, and judicial systems, and cautions that these reforms must be long term and accomplished

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<sup>25</sup> Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, "Jorge Chabat," Estudios Internacionales, under Facultad DEI, <http://www.cide.edu/investigador/profile.php?IdInvestigador=44> (accessed April 10, 2009).

simultaneously to be effective. Due to a lack of continuity and coherence, the reforms attempted by the previous administrations have been ineffective. The reforms need 10 to 15 years to be successful, and Chabat stresses that political forces in Mexico must put aside party differences to agree on a long-term strategy to solve the problem. This article highlights the security challenges posed by drug trafficking and other issues for the Mexican state.

**Manwaring, Max G. *A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.**

Dr. Max Manwaring is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and has edited or co-edited several pieces regarding democratization and governability and Latin American security affairs. This monograph describes a “clash of civilizations” between liberal democracy and criminal anarchy. He analyzes the threats to state sovereignty posed by multiple levels of criminal organizations involved in a battle for control of territory to further their commercial gains. He discusses the challenges presented by these organizations to include: straining government’s capacity for law enforcement and judicial control, challenging the legitimacy of the state, acting as surrogate governments in ungoverned areas, dominating an informal economic structure, and infiltration of law enforcement and government offices. Specifically in Mexico, he discusses the threat to political development providing an in-depth discussion of the erosion of the Mexican democracy, erosion of state sovereignty, and the emergence of criminally-controlled states in Quintana Roo and Sinaloa. He concludes that the situation in Mexico is far from just a law enforcement issue but is in reality a challenge to national

sovereignty. He argues that the situation is actually a clash of values that will determine the quality of governance, security, and stability in Mexico. Manwaring provides a unique philosophical perspective to the challenges posed by criminal organizations and their effects on state sovereignty.

**Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. "Democracy and organized crime." <http://www.norlarnet.uio.no/lib/pdf/various/flores.pdf> (accessed April 8, 2009).**

Dr. Carlos Flores is Senior Researcher, Center of Investigations and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS, Mexico). He has a Ph.D. in Political Science and is widely published on the subjects of drug trafficking and democratic governance.<sup>26</sup> Flores' paper begins with a brief discussion of state weakness and democracy in Latin America using the World Bank Governance Indicators to provide quantitative data related to state governance in Latin American countries. Flores then provides a theoretical approach to illustrate the links between weak states, the process of democratization and the strength of organized crime, and a brief assessment of the organized crime problem in Mexico. He links the current rise in violence and strengthening of the drug cartels in Mexico to the democratic transformations in Mexico culminating with the PRI's loss of the presidency in 2000. He proposes that during 70 years of authoritarian control, organized crime was a subordinate social actor to variable sources of political power within a central, vertical structure. Democratic transformation has resulted in a destabilization of this structure and the situation has declined into the current rash of violence. The paper provides a detailed historical picture of the dynamics between politics and organized crime and their unique relationships in Mexico.

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<sup>26</sup> Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, "Carlos ANTONIO FLORES PEREZ," under INVESTIGACION, <http://www.ciesas.edu.mx/> (accessed April 9, 2009).

**Velasco, José Luis. *Insurgency, Authoritarianism, and Drug Trafficking in Mexico's "Democratization."* New York: Routledge, 2005.**

Dr. José Luis Velasco is a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and has a Ph.D. in Political Science. His research focus is in comparative politics, democratization, and tax reform with a focus on Latin America.<sup>27</sup> Although the author recognizes Mexico's democratic transition from the 1970s to 2000, he analyzes some apparent anomalies particular to this case. He identifies and discusses the anomalies of insurgency, authoritarian practices and structures, and illegal drugs as they affect Mexico's political, social, and economic development. He argues that socio-economic inequality is the primary driver in the trends unique to Mexico. Of particular interest is an in-depth discussion regarding the influence of illegal drugs on democratic transition and vice versa. He identifies government corruption, decreased law-enforcement capacity, undermining the rule of law, democratic accountability, fostering militarization, and the provocation of human rights violations as avenues for drug traffickers to challenge the Mexican state. He also argues that democratic transition creates new opportunities for illegal activities by weakening the state, increasing campaign funding opportunities, and dispersing law enforcement responsibilities. He also estimates that this situation may continue for a long time before degenerating into chaos, escalating into conflict, or leading back to an authoritative regime. He cautions that unless decisive action is taken, a stable, democratic Mexico is unreachable. This work provides specific insight into the threats drug trafficking poses to political stability in Mexico.

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<sup>27</sup> Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, "José Luis Velasco Cruz," Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, under Gobierno, procesos y actores sociales, <http://www.iis.unam.mx/areas/gobierno/velasco.html> (accessed April 9, 2009).

## **Summary**

The literature review provided insight into the inherent characteristics of state weakness and failure. These works also revealed significant influences by DTOs on Mexican political stability. The literature lends support to the hypothesis presented in Chapter 1 that the primary factor affecting Mexican political stability as influenced by DTOs is delegitimization of the Mexican state. However, the literature review does not provide conclusive evidence to identify the major contributor to political instability based on the Failed States Index. Therefore, in order to answer the research and key questions, the author will utilize the Delphi method to survey a panel of experts to identify the key factors involved. In doing so, the author will prove or disprove the hypothesis presented in Chapter 1.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the data collection and analytical concept for this thesis. The literature review highlighted the links between DTO activities and Mexican political stability as defined by the political indicators in the Failed States Index. In order to further refine these links and provide definitive answers to the research and key questions, this thesis utilizes the Delphi method as described by the RAND Corporation. The author developed a questionnaire using the Failed States Index political indicators as a framework. This questionnaire was administered to a group of experts in order to form a consensus opinion regarding answers to the research and key questions identified for this study.

The word “Delphi” is linked to the hallowed site of an ancient Greek oracle.<sup>28</sup> The Greeks sought advice and direction from the gods through intermediaries at this oracle.<sup>29</sup> The founders of the methodology at the RAND corporation found the label “Delphi” unfortunate as it implies “something oracular, something smacking a little of the occult.”<sup>30</sup> On the contrary, the methodology involves making the best possible judgments utilizing “a less-than-perfect kind of information.”<sup>31</sup> According to RAND, Norman Dalkey and O. Helmer created what became known as the Delphi method in the 1963 publication “An Experimental Application of the Delphi method to the Use of

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<sup>28</sup> J. Fowles, *Handbook of Futures Research*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 273.

<sup>29</sup> Illinois Institute of Technology, “The Delphi Method,” <http://www.iit.edu/~it/delphi.html> (accessed January 29, 2009).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

Experts.”<sup>32</sup> In 1968, RAND conducted a series of experiments in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Delphi method in forming group judgments.<sup>33</sup>

Through these experiments RAND concluded that, in most instances, anonymous controlled feedback provided more accurate group estimates than face-to-face discussion.<sup>34</sup> This finding gives reason to conduct research via an anonymous survey method, such as Delphi, rather than through a personal interview process. Linstone and Turoff recommended the Delphi method when “the problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques, but can benefit from subjective judgments on a collective basis.”<sup>35</sup> The Delphi method is also recommended for other reasons including the following:<sup>36</sup>

- The individuals needed to contribute to the examination of a broad or complex problem have no history of adequate communication and may represent diverse backgrounds with respect to experience or expertise.
- More individuals are needed than can effectively interact in a face-to-face exchange.
- Time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible.
- The efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a supplemental group communication process.
- Disagreements among individuals are so severe or politically unpalatable that the communication process must be refereed and/or anonymity assured.
- The heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assure validity of the results, i.e. avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of personality (“bandwagon effect”).

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<sup>32</sup> Norman C. Dalkey, *The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion*, RM-5888-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 1969), 15.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, vi.

<sup>35</sup> Harold A. Linstone and Murray Turoff, eds., *The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications*, (n.p., 2002), <http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/> (accessed January 29, 2009), 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*



The descriptions above are representative of the conditions for this study. The author took advantage of the benefits provided by the Delphi method to gather the consensus opinion of geographically-separated experts. This methodology will provide expert opinions regarding the effects of DTO activities on Mexican political stability in the context of the previously discussed political indicators.

### **The Delphi Method**

In short, “Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem or issue.”<sup>37</sup> The Delphi method is a process that utilizes a panel of experts to form a consensus judgment. The method is characterized by three features—anonymous responses, controlled feedback, and statistical group response.<sup>38</sup> RAND found these features necessary to reduce biases introduced by dominant individuals, reduce pressures of group conformity, and to ensure that all opinions are represented in the final results.<sup>39</sup> Delphi was designed specifically to “remove conference room impediments to a true expert consensus.”<sup>40</sup> The concept takes advantage of expert opinions without allowing individual personalities to interfere with debate. Geographical separation and anonymity precludes the development of groupthink or the tendency for the strongest personality to override the soundest

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<sup>37</sup> Linstone and Turoff, 3.

<sup>38</sup> Dalkey, 16.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Theodore J. Gordon, *The Delphi Method*, Futures Research Methodology (AC/UNU Millennium Project: 1994) [http://www.gerenciamento.ufba.br/Downloads/delphi%20\(1\).pdf](http://www.gerenciamento.ufba.br/Downloads/delphi%20(1).pdf) (accessed January 29, 2009): 1.

argument.<sup>41</sup> It is important to note, however, that because the respondent pool is usually small, Delphi studies do not yield statistically significant results as they are intended to represent only the synthesis of opinion of a specific group of expert individuals. Therefore, the results provided by one panel of experts cannot predict the results from a larger or different panel.<sup>42</sup>

A successful Delphi study begins with the key step of selecting participants. It is important to solicit individuals who are knowledgeable, likely to cooperate, and will contribute valuable insight. Unlike a statistically-based poll in which participants represent a larger population, a Delphi study requires non-representative and knowledgeable participants. Typical studies use a panel comprised of 15 to 35 individuals of which between 35 and 75 percent participate.<sup>43</sup> Each person in the expert panel should be contacted individually. The researcher should ensure that each panel member understands the nature of the project, the objectives sought, the anticipated amount of participation required, and the promise of anonymity.<sup>44</sup>

Once the panel is formed, the research team devises questions that are pursued through a questionnaire or series of questionnaires posed to the experts previously identified.<sup>45</sup> The questions should be clear, answerable and designed to derive a consensus on the specific subject. During this step in the process, the researcher may utilize a small, separate panel to formulate and validate the questionnaire or

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<sup>41</sup> Gordon, 1.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 3.

questionnaires. When the questionnaire is adequately tested, it can be sent to the expert panel for their responses. The questionnaire should be accompanied by a cover letter describing the study's objectives, the timeline for responses, and any required instructions for completing the survey instrument. Most questionnaires are transmitted and returned by facsimile, mail, or e-mail.<sup>46</sup>

The next phase is the analysis of the returned questionnaires. During this phase, all quantitative and qualitative data must be analyzed for pertinent information. Quantitative data is easily collated using software and can be displayed using graphs or charts. Narrative or qualitative answers must not be ignored, however, as they may provide some of the most valuable information. Therefore, the researcher must be careful to consider all answers from each panelist in order to arrive at a group consensus on the issue. This group judgment should be based on the median because extreme answers tend to skew the mean dramatically.<sup>47</sup>

The Delphi method has been recognized as a preferred way to achieve consensus due to the degree of anonymity for participants, which reduces social pressures to conform.<sup>48</sup> Eggers and Jones discussed other advantages of using the Delphi method. Their research found that the Delphi approach produces more accurate estimates than face-to-face interaction. The method also reduces the influences of persuasion, the unwillingness to reverse publicly expressed opinions, and the strength of majority

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<sup>46</sup> Gordon, 7.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 7-8.

<sup>48</sup> Jeffrey S. Hornsby, Brien N. Smith, and Jatinder N. D. Gupta, "The Impact of Decision-Making Methodology on Job Evaluation Outcomes," *Group and Organization Studies (1986-1998)* 19, vol. 1 (Mar 1994): 122.

opinions. Of particular note is the advantage Delphi provides in gathering the opinions of geographically separated experts in order to form consensus opinion.<sup>49</sup>

### **Expert Panel Selection**

The author began compiling a preliminary list of prospective panelists during an extensive literature review on the topics of political stability and DTO activities in Mexico. This led to a process described by Gordon as “daisy-chaining.”<sup>50</sup> The literature review yielded a list of experts familiar with the subjects of interest. By investigating the bibliographies of the reviewed literature and the resumes of the authors, the list grew larger. The author also searched prominent academic institutions with specializations in Latin American studies for individuals with unique expertise in political science and an emphasis on Mexico and drug trafficking. As part of the “daisy-chaining” process, the author sent e-mail solicitations to individuals identified as potential participants. Part of this solicitation was a request for other potential experts that could contribute to the study. Once the author compiled a preliminary list, certain criteria were applied to finalize the potential panelists. The finalized list of 31 potential panelists met the following criteria: (a) a doctoral degree (e.g. Ph.D., Ed.D., J.D.); (b) at least two years of teaching or professional experience in the fields of Political Science, Mexico or Latin American studies, organized crime, or security issues; (c) and a contribution to the body of knowledge regarding the topics of interest in the form of publication in a scholarly


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<sup>49</sup> Renee M. Eggers and Charles M. Jones, “Practical considerations for conducting Delphi studies: The oracle enters a new age,” *Educational Research Quarterly* 21, vol. 3 (March 1998): 54.

<sup>50</sup> Gordon, 6.


journal, book, or official publication in the last 10 years. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 illustrate the demographics of the 31 panelists as defined by the above criteria.

Figure 3-1. Expert Panelist Doctoral Degrees



Source: Author's analysis.

Figure 3-2. Expert Panelist Experience/Publishing



Source: Author's analysis.

## Questionnaire Formulation and Dissemination

After completing the literature review and finalizing the list of panelists, the author formulated the questionnaire. The questionnaire was formulated using the online survey generator, SurveyMonkey.com. This survey generator allows the user to customize, disseminate, collect, and analyze survey data. During the formulation process, a small test panel reviewed the survey instrument. This test panel corrected any typographical or grammatical errors as well as advising the author of any ambiguity or potential for misinterpretation. Once completed, a web link to the survey was sent out via email to each individual panelist to protect anonymity.

The survey instrument consisted of an introductory letter, conditions of participation, brief instructions, and a seven-part questionnaire focusing on the political indicators from the Failed States Index (see Appendix A). Each of the first six parts focused on one of the political indicators and its associated measures as discussed in Chapter 2. These parts of the questionnaire consisted of two quantitative questions, which were worded in such a way as to solicit answers utilizing a Likert scale.<sup>51</sup> According to Cooper and Shindler, the Likert scale is the “most frequently used variation of the summated rating scale.”<sup>52</sup> Summated rating scales are composed of statements that indicate a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the subject. The panelist is asked to agree or disagree with each quantitative statement in the questionnaire and each response is numerically scored to reflect the degree of favor.<sup>53</sup> The Likert scale used in this

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<sup>51</sup> Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ommrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 8th ed., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Inc., 1989), 185; According to this text, rating scales were developed by Rensis Likert in the 1930s to assess people’s attitudes.

<sup>52</sup> Donald R. Cooper and Pamela S. Schindler, *Business Research Methods*, 7th ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2001), 234.

questionnaire offered the choices of: 'strongly disagree', 'disagree,' 'neutral,' 'agree,' or 'strongly agree.' The responses were coded with '1' being 'strongly disagree' and '5' being 'strongly agree.' In this way, the author sought to identify, through group consensus, which of the political indicators are most affected by DTO activities in Mexico. The final question in each of the first six parts was qualitative in nature. These questions were designed to generate thought and allow for each of the respondents to address the adequacy of the indicated measures in assessing DTO influences on Mexican political stability. Similarly, the seventh part contained a qualitative question addressing the adequacy of the six political indicators themselves.

All of the 31 expert panel members received via email a web link to the survey instrument. The first two pages of the instrument introduced the members to the purpose and scope of the study and the conditions of participation (see Appendix A). Each member was informed and assured of his or her anonymity and was required to formally accept the invitation to participate in the study. Fifteen of the panel members (48 percent) accessed the survey and provided responses, while 16 (52 percent) did not provide responses (see Figure 3-3). Figures 3-4 and 3-5 illustrate the demographics for the panelists that provided responses.


The 15 respondents are representative of the entire expert panel's demographics. A comparison of the doctoral degrees in Figures 3-1 and 3-4 reveal no change in percentages for '*Political Science*' and '*Economics*' categories. The decreased percentage in the '*Other*' category is distributed with a small increase in '*International Affairs/Relations*' category, and a large increase in the '*Law*' category. However, with the small survey population in this study, these changes represent only 1 or 2

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<sup>53</sup> Cooper and Schindler, 234.


demographic differences between the expert panel and the actual respondents. Likewise, the results are similar when comparing experience and publishing demographics in Figures 3-2 and 3-5.

Figure 3-3. Expert Panel Questionnaire Participation



*Source:* Author's analysis.


Figure 3-4. Respondent Doctoral Degrees



*Source:* Author's analysis.



Figure 3-5. Respondent Experience/Publishing



*Source:* Author's analysis.

After receiving the responses from the expert panel, the data was analyzed in order to answer the questions related to the study. The quantitative answers were analyzed using basic statistics and graphs were constructed to illustrate the results. The qualitative answers were analyzed closely to identify commonalities or extreme differences among the responses. The results for both the quantitative and qualitative questions are recorded in Chapter 4.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **FINDINGS AND RESULTS**

As described in Chapter 3, the author developed and disseminated a seven part questionnaire to a panel of experts using the Delphi method as described by the RAND Corporation. The first six parts consisted of two quantitative questions and one qualitative question each related directly to the measures associated with the six political indicators described in Chapter 2. The first quantitative question in each part was devised to elicit an answer to the research and key questions of this thesis. The second quantitative question in each part was used to determine the applicability of the measures outlined in the Failed States Index in the evaluation of the specific conditions affecting Mexican political stability as influenced by DTO activities. The qualitative question was formulated to allow the respondents to express open-ended thoughts regarding the measures used to evaluate each political indicator. The seventh part contained a qualitative question addressing the adequacy of these six political indicators in evaluating Mexican political stability.

This chapter presents the findings from the expert panel questionnaire. Each of the quantitative questions utilized a Likert scale with an assigned value for each response. The Likert scale in this survey ranged from 1 to 5 corresponding to ‘strongly disagree’ through ‘strongly agree’ respectively. By comparing the average ratings from each measure, the author attempted to answer the research and key questions stated in Chapter 1. This same process was used to evaluate the adequacy of the measures used for each political indicator. Finally, the responses to the qualitative questions were analyzed in

order to find further relevant information or consensus opinions. The entire response summary from the online survey generator is in Appendix B.

## **FINDINGS**

### **Part 1: Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability, and political representation
- C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

This question addressed the above four measures used to evaluate the political indicator, “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State.” Table 4-1 shows the responses from the expert panel. The measures are listed down the left column using the corresponding letters, A through D, as found above. Each row lists the response percentages, the number of responses in parenthesis, and the rating average on the 1 to 5 scale. The highest percentage response for each measure is in bold type. The total rating average for this political indicator is calculated in the bottom right corner of the table.

All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. The data shows that the majority of respondents (60 percent) agree or strongly agree that measure A is directly affected by Mexican DTO activities (see Table 4-1). Similarly, respondents agreed or strongly agreed that measures B and D are also affected (80 percent and 67 percent

respectively). Slightly less than half, but a majority, of respondents (47 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that measure C is affected by DTO activities.

Noteworthy is the high rating average for measure B, which indicates a consensus agreement that drug trafficking in Mexico contributes to a resistance to transparency, accountability, and/or political representation in the Mexican government. The rating averages for measures A and D also show consensus agreement that DTOs contribute to government links to organized crime and widespread corruption in the government. Measure C received a neutral rating of 3.07. The total average rating (3.60) shows a group consensus that these measures are affected by DTO activities. This total rating average will be compared to the remaining five in order to answer the research and key questions.

Table 4-1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	0.0% (0)	13.3% (2)	6.7% (1)	<b>46.7%</b> (7)	33.3% (5)	4.00
<b>D</b>	6.7% (1)	20.0% (3)	6.7% (1)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	3.67
						<b>3.60</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

This second question addressed the adequacy in evaluating DTO influence of the same measures discussed above. All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. A majority of respondents (53 percent for each) agreed or strongly agreed that measures B and D adequately evaluate the influence of DTOs on this political indicator (see Table 4-2). Forty-seven percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that measure A was adequate. For measure C, a majority of respondents (53 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that it adequately evaluated DTO influences on this political indicator. Overall, the expert panel’s responses showed slight agreement that these measures are adequate with a 3.32 total rating average.

Table 4-2. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State, Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	0.0% (0)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	20.0% (3)	3.47
<b>D</b>	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	3.67
						<b>3.32</b>

Source: Author’s analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

This was the first of seven qualitative questions presented to the expert panel. The purpose of this question was to allow the panel to offer suggestions for alternative

measures to evaluate the influences of DTO activities on the subject political indicator. Eleven of the 15 respondents (73 percent) provided answers to this question. A potential loss in confidence in the judicial system is evident from comments made by one respondent about organized crime groups controlling prosecution services and a failure to prosecute offenses by public security service individuals. Two other respondents expressed concerns about the weakness of the criminal justice system and other state institutions, such as the police and prison systems. These issues directly relate to the third measure associated with this political indicator: “Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes.” However, the respondents do not address whether this loss of confidence has to do with the influence of drug trafficking.

Three respondents suggested that the legitimacy problem for the Mexican government lies not at the national level, but at the local levels. According to one respondent, “the inability...of law enforcement to provide security in high-intensity drug trafficking areas has delegitimized LOCAL (emphasis original) governments (to the extent they are viewed as being in cahoots with the cartels), not the state” (see Appendix B). Although this concept does not directly provide information supporting or refuting the author’s hypothesis regarding Mexican state failure, it is something that needs to be evaluated when considering general stability within Mexico.

Many of the respondents used these qualitative questions as an opportunity to clarify their opinions regarding general conditions in Mexico that were outside the scope of this thesis.

## Part 2: Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation
- B. State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs, and collection agencies

This question addressed the two measures used by the Failed States Index to evaluate the political indicator: “Progressive Deterioration of Public Services.” All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. The respondents were split almost equally regarding measure A, resulting in an essentially neutral rating average of 3.07. Respondents leaned more toward disagreement on measure B with 67 percent responding “strongly disagree” or “disagree” (see Table 4-3). This is an indication that DTO activities in Mexico do not have great influence in narrowing the state’s apparatus to those agencies that serve the ruling elites as described by measure B. Overall, the total average rating of 2.80 shows a slight disagreement that these measures are directly affected by DTO activities.

Table 4-3. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, Question 1

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average
<b>B</b>	20.0% (3)	<b>46.7%</b> (7)	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.53
						<b>2.80</b>

Source: Author’s analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

This question addressed the adequacy of the above two measures. All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. A slight majority of respondents (47 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measure A (see Table 4-4). However, the rating average (3.07) shows a neutral result. A larger majority (60 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measure B, which resulted in a slightly less than favorable rating average of 2.67. The expert panel's responses resulted in a relatively neutral total rating average of 2.87 for the measures associated with this political indicator.

Table 4-4. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	13.3% (2)	<b>46.7%</b> <b>(7)</b>	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.67
						<b>2.87</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

This qualitative question was answered by nine of the fifteen respondents (60 percent). Again, many respondents took the liberty to describe conditions in Mexico that did not necessarily relate to the question. However, two of the respondents did highlight the perceived failure of the security apparatus in Mexico. This theory supports the measure above discussing the failure to protect citizens from violence. This situation is



also supported by the literature review material, specifically Jorge Chabat's article, "Mexico: The Security Challenge."

### **Part 3: Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated
- B. Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians
- C. Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices
- D. Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) provided answers to this question. At least half of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed on each of the four measures used for this political indicator (see Table 4-5). The rating average for measure A (2.79) was slightly less favorable than neutral, with 57 percent of the panel disagreeing that DTO activities have influence. Although measure B received a similar number of disagreeable responses, the rating average was lower (2.43) due to the distribution of answers. Sixty-four percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with measure C, but this time the rating average was higher (2.50) due to a single "strongly agree" answer to the question. Half of the respondents (50 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with measure D. Overall, the total rating average (2.66) reflects the consensus disagreement with measures B and C and relatively neutral opinions on measures A and D.

Table 4-5. Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	21.40% (3)	<b>35.70%</b> (5)	21.40% (3)	21.40% (3)	0.00% (0)	2.43
<b>D</b>	7.10% (1)	<b>42.90%</b> (6)	7.10% (1)	35.70% (5)	7.10% (1)	2.93
						<b>2.66</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question regarding the adequacy of the above four measures. Exactly 50 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measures A, B, and C (see Table 4-6). On measure D, 43 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. All of the rating averages show a small trend towards disagreement on the adequacy of these four measures resulting in a total rating average of 2.82.

Table 4-6. Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights, Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	14.30% (2)	<b>35.70%</b> (5)	21.40% (3)	21.40% (3)	7.10% (1)	2.71
<b>D</b>	14.30% (2)	<b>28.60%</b> (4)	<b>28.60%</b> (4)	7.10% (1)	21.40% (3)	2.93
						<b>2.82</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Eight respondents (53 percent) provided answers to this question. As with the first two qualitative questions, the respondents took liberty to make comments that did not necessarily suggest additional measures to evaluate the influence of Mexican DTOs on this political indicator. However, it is significant to note that three of the panelists commented that Mexico has a history of a weak judiciary system, other weak state institutions, and problems with upholding the rule of law that predates the rise of the drug trafficking industry. A respondent also commented on the increased risk for human rights violations as the military continues its involvement in fighting the DTOs.

#### Part 4: Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity
- B. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition
- C. Emergence of an “army within an army” that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique
- D. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces

Fourteen out of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question.

Responses to measure A were sharply divided with an equal 50 percent split between agreement and disagreement (see Table 4-7). This resulted in a neutral opinion for this measure. Fifty-seven percent of respondents disagreed with measures B, C, and D.

Table 4-7. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State,” Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>A</b>	50.00% (2)	50.00% (2)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)	2.50
<b>B</b>	28.60% (4)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	2.57
<b>C</b>	28.60% (4)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	2.57
<b>D</b>	28.60% (4)	28.60% (4)	0.00% (0)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	2.71
<b>Total</b>	28.60% (4)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	2.70

Source: Author’s analysis.

However, given the response distribution, measures B and C had rating averages of 2.57 while measure D had a 2.71. Consensus opinion for measure D was in slight disagreement while there was a stronger consensus for disagreement with the influence of

DTOs on measures B and C. Overall the total rating average for this political indicator was 2.70.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question. A majority of respondents (50 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that measure A was adequate in evaluating DTO influences on this political indicator (see Table 4-8). Results for measure B were neutral with a 36 percent response rate for both agreement and disagreement. Responses for measure C shows a slight consensus disagreement with a rating average of 2.86. Consensus opinion for measure D shows slight agreement with 50 percent of respondents answering either “agree” or “strongly agree.” The total rating average for this set of measures shows a neutral consensus opinion.

Table 4-8. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State,” Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	14.30% (2)	21.40% (3)	<b>28.60 %</b> (4)	14.30% (2)	21.40% (3)	3.07
<b>D</b>	14.30% (2)	<b>28.60 %</b> (4)	7.10% (1)	<b>28.60 %</b> (4)	21.40% (3)	3.14
						<b>3.07</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Seven of the 15 respondents (47 percent) provided answers to this question. Two of the respondents commented on the need to look at Mexico's security situation regionally or geographically. For example, the security situation in Tijuana entails a different set of variables as compared to Mexico City due to geography, border proximity, population demographics, and other issues. The security situation in Mexico should be examined not only at the national level, but also at the state and local levels taking into account the diverse environments and relationships involved. This type of examination exceeds the scope of this study.

Another respondent commented on the perception that "federal law enforcement tends to trump state and local law enforcement efforts under the guise of drug trafficking control." The respondent did not clarify, but the author assesses, based on previous research, that the respondent is referring to a tendency for federal law enforcement to use the drug war as an excuse to abuse their jurisdictional authorities. This tendency further delegitimizes local and state law enforcement. It would be useful to measure the prevalence of this trend in order to evaluate Mexican political stability as influenced by DTOs.

**Part 5: Rise of Factionalized Elites**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines
- B. Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question. A slight majority of respondents (50 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that measure A is affected by DTOs, however the rating average was neutral (see Table 4-9). Measure B, on the other hand, received an overwhelming number of responses in disagreement (78 percent). The resultant rating average of 1.86 shows a consensus opinion disagreeing that this measure is affected by drug trafficking in Mexico. Overall, the total rating average of 2.43 shows a consensus of disagreement.

Table 4-9. Rise of Factionalized Elites, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>42.9%</b> <b>(6)</b>	<b>35.7%</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>14.3%</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>7.1%</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>0.0%</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>1.86</b>
						<b>2.43</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen of the respondents (93 percent) answered this question. An equal number of respondents (43 percent) agreed and disagreed with the adequacy of measure A (see Table 4-10). However, given the distribution of answers, the rating average (3.21) shows a slight trend towards agreement. For measure B, 71 percent disagreed that this measure adequately evaluated the influence of DTOs on this political indicator. This consensus is reflected in the 2.29 rating average for measure B. Overall, the total rating average shows an opinion of slight disagreement with the adequacy of these measures.

Table 4-10. Rise of Factionalized Elites, Question 2

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average
<b>B</b>	14.3% (2)	<b>57.1%</b> (8)	21.4% (3)	0.0% (0)	7.1% (1)	2.29
						<b>2.75</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Four of the respondents (27 percent) responded to this question, but did not suggest any additional measures. Even though the responses above show that DTOs do not affect nationalistic tendencies in Mexico, the responses to this question (and others) suggest that there is a history of nationalism in that country. Those nationalistic tendencies apparently are caused by issues other than drug trafficking.

**Part 6: Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict
- B. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions

Fourteen respondents (93 percent) provided answers. The majority of respondents (57 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that DTO activities affect measure A (see Table 4-11). The rating average (2.50) shows a consensus toward



disagreement as well. Eleven of the 14 respondents (78 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that measure B is affected by DTO activities. The rating average (1.93) shows that the panel's consensus opinion is in firm disagreement. Similarly, the total rating average (2.22) illustrates the panel's disagreement.

Table 4-11. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>42.9%</b> <b>(6)</b>	<b>35.7%</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>7.1%</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>14.3%</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>0.0%</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>1.93</b>
						<b>2.22</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen respondents (93 percent) answered this question regarding the adequacy of the subject measures. Fifty percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measure A, resulting in a neutral rating average of 2.93 (see Table 4-12). Fifty-seven percent of respondents answered in disagreement regarding measure B. The rating average of 2.57 shows a consensus towards disagreement on the adequacy of this measure. Overall, the total rating average (2.75) shows a slight trend toward consensus disagreement with the adequacy of these measures in evaluating the influences of DTOs on the subject political indicator.

Table 4-12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	21.4% (3)	<b>35.7%</b> (5)	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.57
						<b>2.75</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Five of the 15 respondents (33 percent) answered this question. The respondents did not suggest any additional measures. However, the responses to this question illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the U.S. and Mexico concerning the drug trafficking problem. It is not a problem isolated to Mexico or any other country. Given the answers to this question, the respondents do not feel that this relationship has resulted in the Mexican government losing control or giving up any sovereignty over the issue as the measures above are meant to address.

## Part 7

**Question 1: In your professional opinion, are these six political indicators adequate to measure the influence of drug trafficking organizations on the political stability of the Mexican state? Why or why not?**

1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights
4. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”
5. Rise of Factionalized Elites
6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

This was the final qualitative question in the survey. Twelve of the 15 respondents (80 percent) provided an answer to this question. The answers to this question gave a great deal of insight into the thoughts of the expert panel respondents. Six of the 12 (50 percent) respondents answered “No.” Three respondents answered “Yes,” with the caveat that the indicators need refinement to fit the conditions in Mexico. One respondent answered that he had doubts about the adequacy of two of the indicators. Two of the respondents implied their disagreement with the adequacy of the indicators by strongly denying that Mexico is at risk of state failure.

The common theme from these responses is that the conditions in Mexico are much too unique and complicated to adequately evaluate its political stability utilizing these political indicators. Narrowing the analysis to the issue of drug trafficking further complicates the matter. From analyzing the respondents’ answers and the information provided from the literature review, the author assesses that the drug trafficking issue is not the cause of Mexico’s problems, but is a symptom that exacerbates the issues plaguing the Mexican nation.

## **RESULTS**

This study focused on identifying the factors that define DTO influence on Mexican state failure by utilizing the political indicators in the Failed States Index. To support this effort, the author asked two key questions:

1. What are the factors that define DTO influence on Mexican political stability?
2. Of the factors directly impacted by DTOs and their activities, which has the most influence on Mexican political stability?

The author’s hypothesis was that delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy

of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state.


In order to answer these questions and prove or disprove the hypothesis, the author compiled the rating averages for all of the quantitative responses presented above. The first step in this process was to compare rating averages for each measure associated with the six political indicators. Figure 4-1 shows the rating averages for each of the measures addressed in the quantitative questions. Only four of the measures received rating averages greater than 3.00, or neutral (see the blue bars in Figure 4-1). All of these measures are associated with the political indicator, “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State.” The four measures are:

- A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation
- C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

In order to ensure that these measures were adequate according to the expert panel respondents, the author then compared the data from the second set of quantitative questions discussed above (see Figure 4-2). The respondents agreed that three of the four factors identified above (measures A, B, and D) are adequate in evaluating the influence of DTO activities. The expert panel disagreed with the adequacy of measure C; therefore it will be discarded as one of the factors affected by DTOs. Based on these findings, the measures that define DTO influence on Mexican political stability are: (1) Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites, (2) Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability, and political representation, (3) Growth of crime syndicates

linked to ruling elites. The identification of these factors answers the first key question.

Figure 4-1: Measures affected by DTO activities.




Source: Author's analysis.

After all of this analysis, the answer to the second key question is readily apparent. The factor which has the most influence on Mexican political stability is: “Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability, and political representation.” This measure received the highest favorable rating (4.00) from the expert panel respondents (see Figure 4-1).

The analysis partially supports the author's hypothesis. The political indicator that received the most favorable responses was: “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State,” which directly relates to the hypothesis: Delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state. The resistance of

Figure 4-2. Adequacy of Measures



Source: Author's analysis.

government officials (ruling elites) to transparency, accountability, and political representation (the number one factor statistically) plays into the perceived legitimacy of a government.

The widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, which also relates directly to the hypothesis, finished with the fourth highest approval rating from the expert panel respondents. This measure also received a less than favorable rating with regard to its adequacy. This could have resulted from the respondents keying in on the specific processes and institutions listed in the measure (i.e. widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies). As mentioned by one respondent in the qualitative question relating to this political indicator, Mexico does not have a large problem with those

specific processes and institutions (see Appendix B). However, multiple respondents called into question the legitimacy of the local governments and the judicial system. Both of these concerns, in part, stem from drug trafficking operations as evidenced by respondents' answers and the literature review conducted for this study. Therefore, this measure—which evaluates the loss of confidence in institutions and processes—may be more adequate than the quantitative findings reveal.

In summary, these findings partially support the author's hypothesis. The data answered the research and key questions within the context of the political indicators of the Failed States Index. The results of this study show that, according to the respondents from this specific expert panel, the primary factor which has the most influence on Mexican political stability and is directly impacted by DTOs and their activities is the resistance of government officials (ruling elites) to transparency, accountability, and political representation. It is important to reiterate that this is the synthesis opinion of a specific group of expert individuals as identified by this author. The respondent pool (48 percent of the expert panel) met the criteria recommended for a Delphi study, but did not yield a large data set. The results derived from this panel of experts cannot predict the results from a larger or different panel.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS**

Although Mexico exhibits many of the symptoms described in Chapters 1 and 2, it is far from being a failed state. Nevertheless, drug trafficking organizations pose a significant internal security threat that challenges the rule of law and Mexican national security. The increased violence actually seems to be driven by a strengthening of the central government due to democratic transition and an effort to decrease corruption and increase transparency. It is imperative that President Calderon continue the fight against the cartels while, at the same time, continuing government reforms to national, state, and local law enforcement. Calderon must proceed with caution in order to limit widespread corruption in the military and deal with potential human rights violations. Continued vigilance on the part of the national government is essential to defeat the drug cartels and reinforce security.

The activities of Mexican DTOs pose a significant threat to the United States as well. According to the 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment, "Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States."<sup>54</sup> The drug trade generates billions of dollars in illicit revenue for these organizations, which utilize extensive ties to U.S. street gangs to further facilitate their distribution of products. Mexican DTOs have been tied to distribution networks in over 230 U.S. cities.<sup>55</sup> Drug-related cartel violence has already spread across the border from Mexico.

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<sup>54</sup> National Drug Intelligence Center, "National Drug Threat Assessment 2009," Product No. 2008-Q0317-005, (U.S. Department of Justice: December 2008) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2009): III.

<sup>55</sup> National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, 45.



The residents of Phoenix, Arizona, can attest to the fact that Mexican DTOs are contributing to violent crime on the U.S. side of the border. With over 370 reported cases in 2008, Phoenix became the kidnapping capital of the U.S., with Mexico City being the lone city in the world with more incidents.<sup>56</sup> On June 22, 2008, a team of highly trained hit men stormed a house in Phoenix on the orders of a Mexican drug cartel leader. This team wore police-style tactical gear to include body armor, Kevlar helmets, and Phoenix Police Department raid shirts.<sup>57</sup> These types of incidents have occurred in the Texas cities of Laredo, Rio Bravo, and even as far north as Dallas.

Violence against U.S. law enforcement personnel is also on the rise. According to the *LA Times*, drug traffickers “laid down suppressive fire” from across the Mexican border to stop U.S. authorities from moving in on a vehicle they had stopped.<sup>58</sup> Law enforcement agents in Arizona have also been alerted to reports that the head of the Sinaloa drug cartel has instructed his associates to use deadly force against law enforcement in the U.S. if necessary to protect their drug trafficking operations. This appears to be a move away from previous strategies of avoiding violent actions north of the U.S.-Mexico border.<sup>59</sup> Although Mexico may not be at immediate risk of failing as a

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<sup>56</sup> Brian Ross, Richard Esposito and Asa Eslocker, “Kidnapping Capital of the U.S.A.,” *ABC News*, February 11, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6848672&page=1> (accessed June 18, 2009).

<sup>57</sup> Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “Mexican Cartels and the Fallout From Phoenix,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, July 2, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexican\\_cartels\\_and\\_fallout\\_phoenix](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexican_cartels_and_fallout_phoenix) (accessed June 18, 2009).

<sup>58</sup> Josh Meyer, “Sinaloa cartel may resort to deadly force in the U.S.,” *LA Times*, May 6, 2009, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-mexico-chapo6-2009may06,0,5537420.story> (accessed June 18, 2009).

<sup>59</sup> Meyer, “Sinaloa cartel may resort to deadly force in U.S.”

state, the DTO influence imposes a security risk that impacts not only Mexico, but the United States and the region.

### **Synopsis**

This study focused on the influences of Mexican DTOs on Mexican political stability as defined by the political indicators in the Failed States Index. The first chapter introduced the problem of failed states and the question of Mexico becoming a failed state. The influence of DTOs was introduced as a common theme in discussion the topic of Mexican state failure. Key questions were formed to support this study using the political indicators as a framework for analysis.

A literature review of material related to state failure and the relationship between governance, stability, and drug trafficking provided insight into Mexico's unique situation dealing with drug trafficking. The literature informed and supported the author's hypothesis. However, the review did not provide conclusive evidence to answer the key questions involved in this study.

Chapter 3 identified and discussed the research methodology used to conduct this study. The author utilized the Delphi method as described by the RAND Corporation. The author devised a questionnaire consisting of both quantitative and qualitative questions in an attempt to answer the study's key questions. This questionnaire was then administered to a panel of experts selected for their professional and academic experience.

Chapter 4 presented the findings and results of the analysis of the expert panel responses to the questionnaire. In part, the findings support the author's hypothesis that

delegitimization of the Mexican state is the primary DTO-influenced factor that could lead to Mexican state failure. However, as the respondents to the questionnaire and the literature revealed, drug trafficking in Mexico is a much more complicated phenomenon than can be analyzed by a study of this size and scope.

### **Recommendations for Further Research**

The issues involved with drug trafficking in Mexico and political stability are much too extensive to be properly covered in this study. First, this study utilized a small panel of experts to obtain its results and a relatively short time period to conduct the research. The author recommends that a more extensive study be conducted utilizing a more robust expert panel. Second, this study focused on the measures used to evaluate the political indicators defined by the Failed States Index. The study further narrowed its focus to the influences of DTO activities on those measures. Future studies should incorporate analysis of social and economic indicators as well. Third, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the security situation in Mexico should be examined not only at the national level, but also at the state and local levels. A comprehensive study would have to take into account the diverse environments and relationships involved between government and DTOs throughout differing geographic regions as well as population demographics. Finally, drug trafficking is not isolated to Mexico. The destabilizing effects of DTOs are a regional and international challenge. In order to fully comprehend this problem, and thus propose solutions, a full examination of the social, economic, and political issues from the national, transnational, and global levels is required.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **SURVEY INSTRUMENT**

This appendix provides the text of the survey instrument as downloaded from the online survey generator. It contained a letter of introduction, conditions of participation, and the seven part questionnaire.

# Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

## 1. Introduction

Keith I. Crawford  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
National Defense Intelligence College  
Building 6000 Attn: Mailbox #55  
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a student at the National Defense Intelligence College pursuing a Master of Science Degree in Strategic Intelligence. As part of my course curriculum, I must complete a thesis paper on an Intelligence-related or National Defense related topic. In order to fulfill this requirement, I have chosen to research the influence of drug trafficking organizations on Mexican political stability.

The title of the thesis is: "Is Mexico a Failing State? The Influence of Drug Trafficking Organizations on Mexican Political Stability." The research focuses on identifying the key factors involving drug trafficking organization activities and Mexican political stability utilizing the six political indicators defined by the Failed States Index. Information about the Failed States Index can be found at the Fund for Peace website: <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/>

As part of the research for this thesis, I would like to request your professional experience, outlook, and opinions on this topic. I realize and understand that you are very busy and appreciate you taking part in this research study. Since this thesis is a part of the requirements for my degree, I have a short timeline in which to complete it. If you could finish this questionnaire by May 8, 2009 at the latest, I would greatly appreciate it.

It is important to note that I am utilizing the Delphi methodology for this study. I am soliciting several professionals of similar credentials in order to form a consensus opinion. It is extremely important that you keep your answers confidential and do not participate with colleagues in your area of expertise in order for the data to be valid. Again, I thank you for your time.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully,

Keith I. Crawford  
[keith.crawford@dia.mil](mailto:keith.crawford@dia.mil)

The Conditions for Participation are outlined on the following page.

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 2. Conditions of Participation

You have been invited to participate in a study regarding Mexican state failure that is being conducted by Major Keith Crawford. Major Crawford is a graduate student at the National Defense Intelligence College. He can be contacted via email at [keith.crawford@ndia.mil](mailto:keith.crawford@ndia.mil) or via telephone at (850)-495-5202. His thesis advisor and chair is Ms. Kathleen Acklin and you may contact her if you have further questions by calling (202) 231-3410.

The purpose of this research project is to identify the factors that define the influence of drug trafficking organizations on Mexican political stability using the political indicators defined by the Failed State Index published by the Fund for Peace.

You are being asked to participate in this study because of your academic background and area(s) of expertise. If you accept the invitation, your participation will include at least one round of survey questions supporting the Delphi methodology utilized in this study. Pending the analysis of the first round, a second round may be required in order to continue the study. The first round questionnaire should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.

There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this research.

Data that you provide in support of this study will be recorded anonymously. Major Crawford will be the only individual having knowledge of your participation and the specific data that you provide.

If you decide to participate, you may withdraw at any time without any consequences or explanation. If you do withdraw from the study your data will not be considered and will be discarded unless you request it for your own records. If you choose to participate, Maj Crawford will maintain data that is attributable to you for a period no longer than 6 months from the time of receipt unless further approval to maintain said data is received from you, the participant.

It is anticipated that the results of this study will be shared with others in the United States Intelligence Community as well as the Department of Defense. An electronic and hard copy will be filed at the National Defense Intelligence College, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. As a participant, you may request a copy of the completed thesis through Major Crawford or Ms. Kathleen Acklin.

In addition to being able to contact the researcher at the above phone number, you may verify the ethical approval of this study, or raise any concerns you might have, by contacting Ms. Kathleen Acklin at (202) 231-3410.

Your selection of "Yes" below indicates that you understand the above conditions of participation in this study and that you have had the opportunity to have your questions answered by the researcher.

Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this research project.

#### \* 1. I would like to participate in this study.

☐ Yes

☐ No

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 3. Questionnaire Instructions

This questionnaire is divided into seven parts. The questions in the first six parts are associated with the political indicator listed at the top of each survey page. Parts 1-6 consist of several quantitative questions and one qualitative question each. Part 7 is a stand-alone qualitative evaluation of the political indicators.

Part 1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State

Part 2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

Part 3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

Part 4. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"

Part 5. Rise of Factionalized Elites

Part 6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

Part 7. Qualitative evaluation of the political indicators used in this survey.

Please, use as much space as you feel necessary when answering the qualitative questions in this survey.

Thank you.

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 4. Questionnaire (Part 1)

Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 5. Questionnaire (Part 2)

Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 6. Questionnaire (Part 3)

Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious, or cultural persecution)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### \* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious, or cultural persecution)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

### 3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 7. Questionnaire (Part 4)

Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 8. Questionnaire (Part 5)

Rise of Factionalized Elites

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

	⋮
	⋮

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 9. Questionnaire (Part 6)

Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

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## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 10. Questionnaire (Part 7)

**1. In your professional opinion, are these six political indicators adequate to measure the influence of drug trafficking organizations on the political stability of the Mexican state? Why, or why not?**

**1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State**

**2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services**

**3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights**

**4. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"**

**5. Rise of Factionalized Elites**

**6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors**



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 11. Questionnaire Complete

You have completed the Round 1 questionnaire in support of this study. If a second round is required, you can expect a similar questionnaire in the next few weeks. Otherwise, you will be notified that the second round is not required.

If you would like to receive the results of this round of questioning, please select the appropriate answer below.

Thank you for your time!

**1. I would like to receive the results of this round of questioning.**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**2. In order to ensure you receive feedback from this survey, please leave your name and preferred email address below. Thank you.**

## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 12. Questionnaire Complete

Thank you for considering to participate in this study. If you decide in the future that you would like to participate, please feel free to contact me at any time.

Respectfully,

Keith I. Crawford  
keith.crawford@dia.mil  
(850) 499-5202

**13. End of Questionnaire**


## **APPENDIX B**

### **SURVEY RESPONSE SUMMARY**

This appendix contains a summary of all the responses received from the expert panel respondents through the online survey generator.

## Conditions of Participation

### Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

1. I would like to participate in this study.			
		Response Percent	Response Count
Yes		100.0%	15
No		0.0%	0
<b>answered question</b>			<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>			<b>0</b>

## Part 1: Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State

2. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.							
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	0.0% (0)	26.7% (4)	13.3% (2)	26.7% (4)	33.3% (5)	3.67	15
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	0.0% (0)	13.3% (2)	6.7% (1)	46.7% (7)	33.3% (5)	4.00	15
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g. disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	13.3% (2)	20.0% (3)	20.0% (3)	40.0% (6)	6.7% (1)	3.07	15
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	6.7% (1)	20.0% (3)	6.7% (1)	33.3% (5)	33.3% (5)	3.67	15
<b>answered question</b>							<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>

**3. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	6.7% (1)	20.0% (3)	<b>26.7% (4)</b>	20.0% (3)	<b>26.7% (4)</b>	3.40	15
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	0.0% (0)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3% (5)</b>	20.0% (3)	3.47	15
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	6.7% (1)	<b>46.7% (7)</b>	20.0% (3)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.80	15
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3% (5)</b>	3.60	15
<b>answered question</b>							<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>

**4. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

	<b>Response Count</b>
	11
<b>answered question</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>skipped question</b>	<b>4</b>

Response Text		
1	Comment, not other measure: I do not believe there is a monolithic group called the 'ruling elite.'	Apr 24, 2009 12:39 PM
2	La corrupción es localizada, no generalizada.	Apr 24, 2009 3:48 PM
3	1) Political campaign financing by the drug trafficker. 2) exchange pact between political campaign and the designation of Police in municipal and state level. 3) Control of the prosecution services by OGC groups. 4) evident organized crime activities in day light near police forces 5) open denial to victims of public security services and prosecution even in evident cases (woman of Juarez). 6) private comments of district attorney stating that they can do nothing because it is a FEDERAL jurisdiction 7) zero cases of corruption, political corruption and other infiltration to the state	Apr 24, 2009 4:14 PM
4	Your premise is wrong. The inability in the past two years of law enforcement to provide security in high intensity drug trafficking areas has delegitimized LOCAL governments (to the extent they are viewed as being in cahoots with the cartels), but not the state. The national government has actually increased its legitimacy for various reasons, including it's fight against organized crime. Profiteering by ruling elites is part of the system, and is very old, but it is not corruption, it is generous treatment by the government that produces it, so while it is seen as something that should be improved, it doesn't threaten the legitimacy of the state anymore than a lack of adequate health care for a high proportion of the US population threatens the legitimacy of the state. Transparency, accountability, and representation have improved in the last few years so these don't act to delegitimize or criminalize the state. Confidence in the state's institutions is higher now, on balance, than before, and crime syndicates are now being attacked by the state and de-linked from ruling elites, so none of these indicators work. I would say the legitimacy of the system is improving and the state, in the past two years, is stronger than before.	Apr 24, 2009 5:11 PM
5	High profits Firepower Party affiliation Level of governance - federal, state, local Weak institutionalization of courts, police, prison system, etc	Apr 25, 2009 1:19 AM
6	Words like "massive" and "elite" are too sweeping to be of much value here. Is corruption an enormous problem in Mexico? Yes, but it was also an enormous problem in the United States until the last few decades, but we were not considered to be on the verge of state collapse.	Apr 27, 2009 10:29 PM

Response Text		
7	Measures that you indicate are characteristic of Mexico for a century or more; drug trafficking has intensified them and injected more cash for corruption	May 8, 2009 6:19 PM
8	The third point is mixed, because the loss of popular confidence is a point to consider, but the inability to collect taxes, for example is related to other kind of problems different to organized crime. It is the same to resistance to military conscription (in Mexico there has not been such resistance). Armed insurgency in Mexico has not been related to drug trafficking issues	May 12, 2009 3:50 PM
9	Take into account 1. Consumption of drugs in US fuels this problem 2. Poverty in Mexico leads people into illicit and criminal activity 3. Mexico and US need to support substance abuse programs to address root cause of the problem 4. Mexico has always had a problem with collecting taxes 5. Need to examine the criminal justice system in Mexico	May 12, 2009 4:25 PM
10	The inability of the average citizen to influence elected officials to adopt policies beneficial to their lives	May 13, 2009 10:45 PM
11	prosecutions etc	May 15, 2009 3:27 PM

## Part 2: Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

**5. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	20.0% (3)	26.7% (4)	0.0% (0)	<b>33.3% (5)</b>	20.0% (3)	3.07	15
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	20.0% (3)	<b>46.7% (7)</b>	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.53	15
<b>answered question</b>							<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>

**6. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	6.7% (1)	<b>40.0% (6)</b>	13.3% (2)	20.0% (3)	20.0% (3)	3.07	15
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	13.3% (2)	<b>46.7% (7)</b>	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.67	15
<b>answered question</b>							<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>



7. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?	
	<b>Response Count</b>
	9
<b>answered question</b>	9
<b>skipped question</b>	6

Response Text		
1	Comment: not measure: The shrinkage of the state began, in part, with Mexico's entry into the GATT, mid-late 80s. Local and state law enforcement institutions have long been ineffective, as is as is common in many states.	Apr 24, 2009 12:41 PM
2	Solo esta fallado el aparato de seguridad. La educacion, salud, taxes collection, funcionan bien	Apr 24, 2009 3:49 PM
3	The degree in which this indicator are advancing in Mexico. 20 years ago there were only 1 state, 15 years ago 3. today more than 60% of states are with problems.	Apr 24, 2009 4:19 PM
4	The first indicators are not all tied together, while local governments in some places have failed to provide adequate security, I don't think the evidence would suggest other services such as education or transportation have deteriorated. I don't believe Mexicans perceive that the 'apparatus' has narrowed significantly. Government services are continuing to serve target populations. Again, your premise is wrong. I don't think there has been a significant deterioration in the delivery of services, so drug trafficking is irrelevant. Where delivery HAS decreased, i.e., public security at some local levels, I think the evidence would suggest the public blames the drug cartels for most of this, and applauds the government's courage for tackling this.	Apr 24, 2009 5:12 PM
5	Prior weak institutionalization culture of tolerance of illegality dysfunctional judicial system	Apr 25, 2009 1:22 AM
6	quantitative and qualitative measures of corruption linked to organized crime	May 8, 2009 6:20 PM
7	In the Mexican case, the functioning of public institutions are very heterogeneous, and some of the problems they have are not always related to drug trafficking. For example, even in some cities of the country where there are high rates of organized crime's violence, other kind of institutions may work, even in the limited conditions of a developing country, for example public health. The shortcomings of this institutions do not have anything to do to drug trafficking, but are related to other kind of inefficiency. However, they provide a certain amount of welfare to the population and it has not been directly hampered by drug trafficking. The principal indicator of state weakness that may lead to state's failure is that present in core state's institutions. To say it in other words, a state could live several years with an inefficient institutions to provide different kind of public services, but it cannot do it when the basis to guarantee that it can determine the meaning of collective life.	May 12, 2009 4:01 PM

Response Text		
8	1. Mexico has an aging infrastructure that needs upgrading and improvement 2. Certain services such as seguro social, public transportation, sanitation, education, while not perfect do meet the needs of the population 3. Take a look at the role of remittances- consulates in US are funded well to provide services to migrants who in turn are sending money back to Mexico hence the investment in diplomatic services. Customs and collections agencies- no longer important because Mexico imports a lot of goods	May 12, 2009 4:26 PM
9	Corruption charges	May 15, 2009 3:26 PM

### Part 3: Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

8. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.							
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	14.3% (2)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	14.3% (2)	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	2.75	14
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	21.4% (3)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	21.4% (3)	21.4% (3)	0.0% (0)	2.43	14
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	21.4% (3)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.50	14
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious, or cultural persecution)	7.1% (1)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	7.1% (1)	35.7% (5)	7.1% (1)	2.93	14
answered question							14
skipped question							1

**9. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	14.3% (2)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	28.6% (4)	0.0% (0)	21.4% (3)	2.79	14
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	14.3% (2)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	21.4% (3)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.71	14
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	7.1% (1)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	21.4% (3)	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	2.86	14
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	2.93	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>

10. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?	
	<b>Response Count</b>
	8
<b>answered question</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>skipped question</b>	<b>7</b>

Response Text		
1	Comment: Mexico's move to a multi-party system-- in the early 80s at the state and local level in the north, and in 2000, at the national level--is an indicator of civic 'health'. Under IFE, Mexico produces a relatively honest electoral process.	Apr 24, 2009 12:45 PM
2	I don't think the public makes a connection between problems in the rule of law and drug cartels. That is, while it is true that the judicial system works very poorly, it has for a long, long time, and has not gotten worse because of drug cartels, FOR THE MOST PART. An exception is Juárez, where for the past two months especially, but for a much longer time at a lower level, there has been a large presence of army troops providing security, and there have clearly been abuses, relatively frequently, and with impunity. But this is considered a fault of the military, totally expected, and not attributed the drug cartels.	Apr 24, 2009 5:17 PM
3	legacy of weak institutions under authoritarian regime prior history of human and civil rights abuses lack of effective citizenship absence of investigative press income and wealth inequalities deficient public educational system lack of strong middle class	Apr 25, 2009 1:27 AM
4	human rights abuses under the name of measures against drug trafficking	May 8, 2009 6:22 PM
5	The measures are correct, but those ones that I just agreed are a potential risk in Mexico, but they have not occurred yet in a significant degree and that is a reason for they could not be sufficiently evaluated.	May 12, 2009 4:05 PM
6	The Mexican judicial system needs improvement. Read Shirk and Cornelius' reforming the administration of justice in Mexico U of Notre Dame Press	May 12, 2009 4:30 PM
7	The increased role of the Mexican armed forces in national, state, and local public safety agencies	May 13, 2009 10:49 PM
8	You need a baseline - Mexico had problems before this ...	May 15, 2009 3:29 PM

## Part 4: Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”

11. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	21.4% (3)	28.6% (4)	0.0% (0)	35.7% (5)	14.3% (2)	2.93	14
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	28.6% (4)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	2.57	14
Emergence of an “army within an army” that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	21.4% (3)	35.7% (5)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	14.3% (2)	2.57	14
Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	28.6% (4)	28.6% (4)	0.0% (0)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	2.71	14
<i>answered question</i>							14
<i>skipped question</i>							1

**12. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	21.4% (3)	3.21	14
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	3.07	14
Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	2.86	14
Emergence of rival militias, guerrilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	7.1% (1)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	21.4% (3)	3.14	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>

<b>13. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?</b>		
	<b>Response Count</b>	
		7
<b>answered question</b>		7
<b>skipped question</b>		8

<b>Response Text</b>		
1	Maybe you need a geographical variable. Mexico is 800,000 sq. miles with lots of regional variations. This isn't reflected in the questions	Apr 24, 2009 2:07 PM
2	Use of dirty war techniques by narco personnel including torture, decapitation and solving in accid. of people. Amount of personnel that are in those private armies  number of groups that are operatin in certain regions. amount of money that is their salary ( a sinaloa cartel man infiltrated in police is paid 5000 usd, a guatemalan kaybil is paid 500 us. in south border.	Apr 24, 2009 4:37 PM
3	Mexico has a history of such institutional weaknesses before drug trafficking elitism has hitonically characterized mexico absence of democratic culture and engaged citizenry presence of ineualities and wealth concentration are key to Mexico past and present institutional weakness	Apr 25, 2009 1:31 AM
4	Federal law enforcement trumping state and local law enforcement under the guise of drug trafficking control	May 8, 2009 6:26 PM
5	Some of these measures refer to events that are actualy in a brooding condition but may increase to become a general concern	May 12, 2009 4:08 PM
6	Calderon has made great headway in weeding out corruption in the military and in police forces	May 12, 2009 4:31 PM
7	The sharp increase in the number of elite, especially in the business community who are bodyguards and security services.	May 13, 2009 10:51 PM

## Part 5: Rise of Factionalized Elites

**14. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	14.3% (2)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	21.4% (3)	3.00	14
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	35.7% (5)	14.3% (2)	7.1% (1)	0.0% (0)	1.86	14
<i>answered question</i>							<b>14</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>1</b>

**15. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	7.1% (1)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	28.6% (4)	3.21	14
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	14.3% (2)	<b>57.1% (8)</b>	21.4% (3)	0.0% (0)	7.1% (1)	2.29	14
<i>answered question</i>							<b>14</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>1</b>



16. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?

**Response  
Count**

4

*answered question*

4

*skipped question*

11

**Response Text**

1	By 'group,' I mean those seeking a more honest and transparent state versus the corrupt	Apr 24, 2009 12:48 PM
2	history of nationalism historuyy of fragmented elites during PRI rule geogrphilegacy of state d sfunctionality and weakness ca. fragmentation lack of national economic integration	Apr 25, 2009 1:33 AM
3	The ideolog cal factor in the Mexican case is mostly a void topic. There are no: any single reference to fundamentalistic topics that could arise.	May 12, 2009 4:10 PM
4	Strident reflexive nationalism such as the response to countries who canceled flights into Mexico during the recent influenza outbreak.	May 13, 2009 10:53 PM

## Part 6: Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

17. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	28.6% (4)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.50	14
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	42.9% (6)	35.7% (5)	7.1% (1)	14.3% (2)	0.0% (0)	1.93	14
answered question							14
skipped question							1

18. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	14.3% (2)	35.7% (5)	7.1% (1)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	2.93	14
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	21.4% (3)	35.7% (5)	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.57	14
answered question							14
skipped question							1

<b>19. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?</b>	
	<b>Response Count</b>
	5
<b>answered question</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>skipped question</b>	<b>10</b>

<b>Response Text</b>		
1	U.S. drug consumption fuels high-profit trafficking, whatever the country. Moreover, see Andreas and Nadelmann, POLICING THE WORLD, 2006, for the way that U.S. strategy is imposed on many countries around the world. Mexico exhibits a 'healthy' nationalism.	Apr 24, 2009 12:51 PM
2	drug trafficking exacerbates already existing problems no foreign country is likely to intervene directly, not even US economic interdependence with US leads to US involvement in Mexican domestic affairs on many issues, not just drug trafficking	Apr 25, 2009 1:36 AM
3	Political risk indices and drug trafficking	May 8, 2009 6:28 PM
4	Mexico does not face a problem of budget for counterattacking drug trafficking organizations and, for sure, in the current conditions, would reject any peace keeping mission.	May 12, 2009 4:12 PM
5	What Mexico needs is economic development, substance abuse programs improved justice system in order to function well. US aid - Plan Merida only benefits US contractors Mexico needs to ban importation of weapons from the US	May 12, 2009 4:33 PM

## Part 7

**20. In your professional opinion, are these six political indicators adequate to measure the influence of drug trafficking organizations on the political stability of the Mexican state? Why, or why not? 1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State 2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services 3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights 4. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State" 5. Rise of Factionalized Elites 6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors**

**Response  
Count**

12

**answered question** 12

**skipped question** 3

Response Text		
1	While cross-national analysis, with its universalist indicators, is one way to do research, I believe it must be supplemented with the sort of comparative politics approach that requires deep knowledge of the history and contemporary politics of a country in a regional context. The cross-national approach reveals the bankruptcy of the 'failed state' approach applied to Mexico (thankfully, media hype has diminished), but the latter approach allows us to understand Mexico's political-historical change in the North American economy, with its huge demand for drugs (from the U.S.).	Apr 24, 2009 12:55 PM
2	They may be too blunt for the Mexican case, which needs more attention to issues of corruption.	Apr 24, 2009 2:09 PM
3	Mexico is not a failed state. Only, there is a crisis in the security apparatus.	Apr 24, 2009 3:52 PM
4	To measure in general the presence of QC and state yes, but, it needs to be measure by regions or states in Mexico.	Apr 24, 2009 4:49 PM
5	<p>I believe the political stability of the Mexican state is exceptionally strong. The federal government has the capacity to monitor just about everything that happens in Mexico, and has a fairly high degree of support. There has been no deterioration of public services except in public security in high drug-conflict areas, and these are not attributed to the criminalization of the state, but to efforts, precisely, of the state to de-link drug cartels and law enforcement officials. So on balance the deterioration is considered something like when Eliot Ness went into Chicago: violence increased, but police corruption decreased. There has been very little suspension of the rule of law or widespread violation of human rights, except in some drug-conflicted communities, and this cuts both ways: some people think this is justified to get control over the bad guys. While the security apparatus can be very nasty with suspected drug cartel members, it is not perceived as operating as a state within a state, but rather as a pretty ham-fisted outfit that has the legitimate approval of all branches of government. There has been no rise of factionalized elites, and I see no evidence of intervention by external political actors (e.g. the US govt) that would not be highly monitored by the federal government of Mexico.</p> <p>In my professional opinion drug trafficking has never affected the political stability of the Mexican state, whether elements within the Mexican state were cooperating with drug traffickers or presently know that the official channels to the federal government have been or are in the process of being severed.</p>	Apr 24, 2009 6:49 PM

Response Text		
6	<p>No. Mexican problems with state institutions and rule of law pre-date drug trafficking</p> <p>Mexico has always had weak institutions, limited democratic participation, high levels of corruption and tendencies towards authoritarianism</p> <p>Drug trafficking is not cause but symptom that makes problems worse</p>	Apr 25, 2009 1:39 AM
7	<p>You are touching on many important factors for assessing political stability, but I think that the instrument needs to be refined a bit. Some of the concepts are very hard to measure. Among the most important in evaluating the integrity of the state, in my opinion, are the ability of the state to maintain the loyalty of (if not actually "control") judicial and military institutions, provide basic services, and compete with other political actors. The point about loyalty is important. Given rampant corruption, the Mexican government would like to exercise more control over its military and police; but those entities remain loyal to the state, and would evidently defend the state against actors that might seek to challenge the state's sovereignty and operational control of its defined territory.</p>	Apr 27, 2009 10:39 PM
8	<p>I don't think so. Most important are public attitudes regarding personal security and loss of confidence in the president and the state. Secondary crime such as kidnappings by drug traffickers are very important at the community level.</p>	May 8, 2009 6:31 PM
9	<p>I would have some doubts about points two and six. As I explained formerly, the deterioration of public services in Mexico could be more related to the change in social policies that Mexican government introduced in the 80s. The violence related to drug trafficking has not reached a condition in which government is not able to provide such public services.</p>	May 12, 2009 4:21 PM
10	<p>Yes, they are - although they seem to apply more to a category of 'failed states' than 'states that are progressing toward democracy.'</p>	May 13, 2009 5:28 PM
11	<p>No. They overlook the perceived impunity of law-breakers and the impotence that average citizens feel with respect to influencing elected officials.</p>	May 13, 2009 10:56 PM
12	<p>No - you need corruption and prosecution figures too</p>	May 15, 2009 3:31 PM

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**IS MEXICO A FAILING STATE? THE INFLUENCE OF DRUG  
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS ON MEXICAN POLITICAL STABILITY**

by

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do not reflect the official policy or position of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

**TITLE OF THESIS:** Is Mexico a Failing State? The Influence of  
Drug Trafficking Organizations on Mexican  
Political Stability

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This thesis focused on the influences of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) on Mexico's political stability. It asked the questions: What are the key factors involving DTO activities and Mexican governmental characteristics, institutions, and organizations that would bring about Mexican state failure and what security implications would this entail for the United States? Of these factors, which has the most influence? The author's hypothesis was: Delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state.

This thesis utilized the six political indicators from the Failed States Index published by the Fund for Peace to identify DTO influences. Using the 18 measures associated with these political indicators as a framework, the author used the Delphi method and basic statistics to develop, disseminate, collect, and analyze expert panel questionnaires to answer the research questions and prove, or disprove, the hypothesis.

Expert panelists were identified based on their academic and professional experience and recent publications regarding subjects relevant to this study.

The findings partially supported the author's hypothesis. The factors most influenced by DTOs fall into the category of "Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State," as assessed by the expert panel respondents. The expert panel found that the factor in this category most influenced by DTO activities is the resistance of government officials to transparency, accountability, and political representation.

This thesis concluded that although Mexico exhibits many of the symptoms of a failing state, it is far from actual failure. The sharp increase in drug violence over the past two years appears to be driven from a strengthening of the central government due to democratic transition and efforts to decrease corruption and increase transparency. Drug trafficking will continue to pose problems for Mexico until reforms are completed in the national, state, and local law enforcement and judicial systems.

DTO activities directly affect U.S. national security. Drug related violence is spilling over the border into the United States. These organizations have managed to dominate the wholesale drug industry in the U.S. and facilitate their operations through street gangs in over 230 cities. This study attempted to highlight the primary areas that these organizations impact the stability of the Mexican government in order to better facilitate U.S. efforts to aid Mexico in their fight against organized crime.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### Threats Posed By State Failure

On September 11, 2001, the global war on terror became the central focus of the George W. Bush presidential administration. The Barack Obama administration inherited the task of assisting both Iraq and Afghanistan in building strong central governments to provide stability. Failed states in those regions would create power vacuums, which would directly affect U.S. national security interests. How much more would a failed Mexican state on our southern border affect U.S. national security?

To determine Mexico's status as a failed state, it is important to understand exactly what the term 'failed state' means and the resultant threats. A strong state provides a certain level of public goods to its citizens. A state fails when it is consumed by internal conflict and ceases to deliver those goods. Weak states are essentially strong, but inconsistent in that they deliver some goods and services, but fail to deliver others. Robert I. Rotberg, Director of the John F. Kennedy School of Government's Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution, defined a failing state as a subcategory of these weak states. The failing state has not yet failed, but as it becomes weaker, "the more that weakness tends to edge toward failure."<sup>1</sup> States that have failed exhibit a varied mixture of symptoms according to Rotberg. Some of these include: violent conflict between government forces and armed factions, ineffective law enforcement, lack of security for state citizenry, increased criminal violence and urban

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<sup>1</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1-4.



crime, flawed legislative and judicial institutions, and widespread corruption at all levels of government.<sup>2</sup> At the far end of the spectrum are collapsed states. This phenomenon rarely occurs, according to Rotberg, but exhibits an extreme lack of governance that provides a breeding ground for illicit activities and terrorism.<sup>3</sup>

State failure poses significant threats to U.S. national security. The U.S. National Defense Strategy describes “ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas” as ripe for exploitation as safe havens by violent non-state actors “from which they can operate with impunity” and “undermine local stability and regional security.”<sup>4</sup> Former Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker asserts, “State failure directly affects a broad range of U.S. interests, including the promotion of human rights, good governance, and the rule of law, religious tolerance, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors and exporters. It also contributes to regional instability, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism.”<sup>5</sup> Hence, state failure, no matter where in the world, potentially damages U.S. interests domestically and globally. However, Mexican state failure poses especially significant threats to U.S. homeland security because of Mexico’s geographic proximity to and close economic ties with the United States.

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<sup>2</sup> Rotberg, 5-8.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 9-10.


<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, June 2008, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Chester Crocker, “Engaging Failing State,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003):

## Mexico: A Failing State?

Since winning its independence in 1822, Mexico has experienced political turmoil and rampant social inequality. The political scene shifted between liberal and conservative and has been autocratic since the state's inception. Economic development has been sporadic and unequally distributed and there are continuing disruptive struggles between competing races and social classes in the country. Illegal immigration and the illicit drug trade pose considerable challenges both internally and externally.<sup>6</sup> These issues can have a destabilizing effect on a state government.

Figure 1-1. Mexico



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook," under Mexico, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/MX.html> (accessed June 17, 2009).

Mexico is not historically perceived as a state with an unstable government or at risk for failure. Utilizing twelve social, economic, and political indicators, the 2008 Failed State Index ranked Mexico 105 out of 177 countries evaluated for risk of failure.

<sup>6</sup> Jaime Suchlicki, *Mexico: from Montezuma to the Fall of the PRI* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2001), 5-7, 203.

Mexico ranked above Israel, China, and Russia in this evaluation of stability.<sup>7</sup> Recently, however, Mexican stability has received much more attention in the media and from U.S. government entities. *The Seattle Times* reported that Mexico is a “fragmenting state that may spiral toward failure.”<sup>8</sup> *World Politics Review* wrote, “Once renowned for its political stability, Mexico now seems en route to becoming a failed state.”<sup>9</sup> Officials such as outgoing CIA director Michael V. Hayden, retired U.S. Army General Barry R. McCaffrey and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich have all commented on the perceived crisis in Mexico. Hayden mentioned Mexico along with Iran as a potential challenge for the new Obama administration. Speaker Gingrich also warned of a possible crisis for the new administration regarding Mexico. McCaffrey equated Mexico’s struggle with drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) as a fight for state survival.<sup>10</sup> All of this after U.S. Joint Forces Command reported that Mexico bears “consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse” due to “sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels.”<sup>11</sup> The escalation of drug-related violence and the potential impacts to U.S. national security are the common threads in this increased concern.

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<sup>7</sup> The Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index,” under Publications, [http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140](http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140) (accessed September 29, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> David Danelo, “The deadly, escalating drug war on our Southern border,” *The Seattle Times*, December 19, 2008, [www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2008540557\\_opin21mexico.html](http://www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2008540557_opin21mexico.html) (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>9</sup> Hal Brands, “Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency,” *World Politics Review*, December 22, 2008, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3072> (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>10</sup> Ken Ellingwood, “Calderon seeks to dispel talk of ‘failing state,’” *Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 2009, under “Mexico Under Siege,” <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-drugs25-2009jan25,0,7250521.story> (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment*, November 25, 2008, 36.

Mexican drug cartels, although having operated for many years prior, have increased their power with the decline of the major Colombian cartels in the early 1990s. The Mexican cartels have since managed to dominate the wholesale market for illicit drugs transiting into the United States.<sup>12</sup> The economic resources and firepower at the disposal of these cartels rival – and often surpass the Mexican government’s ability to deal with the problem. The vast resources at stake lead to violent clashes between cartels, which amplify the violence between the government and these organizations. Figure 1-2 shows the areas of influence for the Mexican drug cartels as of December 2008.

Figure 1-2. Mexican Drug Cartel Areas of Influence



Source: “Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, December 11, 2008, [https://www.opensource.gov/providers/stratfor/www/analysis/20081209\\_mexican\\_drug\\_cartels\\_government\\_progress\\_and\\_growing\\_violence](https://www.opensource.gov/providers/stratfor/www/analysis/20081209_mexican_drug_cartels_government_progress_and_growing_violence) (accessed April 28, 2009).

<sup>12</sup> Colleen W. Cook, *CRS Report for Congress: Mexico's Drug Cartels*, Order Code RL34215 (Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2007).

Shortly after his election in December 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared war on drug trafficking organizations. He has deployed over 50,000 military and federal police to support this effort. Since January 2007, an estimated 9,700 drug-related deaths occurred in Mexico.<sup>13</sup> Cartel violence is directed primarily towards rival cartels, but affects journalists, law enforcement, the military, and high-level government officials as well. In May 2008, the highest-ranking law enforcement officer in Mexico, Edgar Millan Gomez was shot dead in Mexico City. The son of the Sinaloa cartel leader, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, was also killed recently in what is suspected to be rival cartel violence. Those same resources and firepower also allow for other illicit activities and corruption of government officials at every level.<sup>14</sup> The corruption of the government, unending violence, and drain on the financial resources of the country as a result of the activities of these drug cartels can have a destabilizing and debilitating impact on the Mexican state.

### **Research Question**

What are the key factors involving DTO activities and Mexican governmental characteristics, institutions, and organizations that would bring about Mexican state failure and what security implications would this entail for the United States?

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<sup>13</sup> "Mexico Under Siege: The drug war at our doorstep," *Los Angeles Times*, under "World News," <http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-war> (accessed June 19, 2009).

<sup>14</sup> George Friedman, "Mexico: On the Road to a Failed State?" *STRATFOR*, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico\\_road\\_failed\\_state](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_state) (accessed September 25, 2008).

## **Key Questions**

1. What are the factors that define DTO influence on Mexican political stability?
2. Of the factors directly impacted by DTOs and their activities, which has the most influence on Mexican political stability? And why?

## **Hypothesis**

Delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state.

## **Scope/Limitations**

Issues involving Mexican drug cartels are not only a national problem for Mexico, but affect other countries in the region as well. This thesis will not focus on the regional, hemispheric, or international problems associated with DTOs, but will concentrate on Mexico internally. DTOs can have an effect on most, if not all, of the factors that contribute to state failure. These include economic, political, and social issues. This thesis will focus specifically on the influence of DTOs on Mexican state stability as defined by the political indicators in the Failed State Index.

## **Thesis Overview**

This thesis seeks to take advantage of the increased attention on Mexican political stability to provide some specific insight into the impacts of DTO activities. The cause-and-effect relationship between DTOs and the potential for Mexican state failure will be

discussed, examining the linkages between DTO activities and specific indicators in the Failed State Index. In this way, the author will attempt to further highlight how the conflict involving the Mexican government and DTOs could lead to a failing state.

Chapter 2 reviews literature on topics such as state failure, the history of the Mexican political landscape, the history of drug cartel operations, and selected works regarding democratic governance and organized crime.

Chapter 3 describes the use of the Delphi technique and survey method. The author will use this methodology in conjunction with information from Chapter 2 to derive answers to the research and key questions.

Chapter 4 presents the research findings utilizing the results of the Delphi technique outlined in Chapter 3. This chapter will provide answers to the research and key questions.

Chapter 5 closes the thesis with a summary and discussion regarding implications for Mexico and U.S. national security interests.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter contains a review of existing literature related to state failure and weakness as well as the relationship between governance, stability, and drug trafficking in Mexico. The body of knowledge in this review contributes information essential to answering the research question, related key questions, and to proving or disproving the stated hypothesis.

#### **State Failure and Weakness**

This first section contains a review of relevant material regarding state failure and weakness. The review began with an investigation into two existing methods of examining governance and state failure. Since 2005, the Fund for Peace has published their Failed States Index, which uses analytical modeling to provide warning and assessment of weak and failing states based on twelve social, economic, and political indicators.<sup>15</sup> Per the focus of this thesis, the political indicators and measures used by the Failed State Index are listed below. It is important to note that according to the Fund for Peace, these measures are not all inclusive.<sup>16</sup>

#### **Political Indicators**

- I. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
  - A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
  - B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation
  - C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes,

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<sup>15</sup> Dr. Pauline H. Baker, "The Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST)," (Washington D.C.: The Fund for Peace, 2006). [http://www.fundforpeace.org/cast/pdf\\_downloads/castmanual2007.pdf](http://www.fundforpeace.org/cast/pdf_downloads/castmanual2007.pdf) (accessed April 9, 2009): vi.

<sup>16</sup> Baker, 8.



e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies

D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

## II. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

A. Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation

B. State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies

## III. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

A. Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated

B. Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians

C. Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices

D. Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)

## IV. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State within a State"

A. Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity

B. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition

C. Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique

D. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces

## V. Rise of Factionalized Elites

A. Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines

B. Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")

- VI. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors
  - A. Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict
  - B. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions<sup>17</sup>

In addition to examining the political indicators in the Failed State Index, the literature review included several articles, books, and academic papers. The following authors offer similar points of view, with varying details, and provide further context for an evaluation of state failure and weakness.

**Rotberg, Robert I. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.**

Robert I. Rotberg is Adjunct Professor of Public Policy and the Program Director for the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Resolution.<sup>18</sup> He has authored and edited several books and articles on the subjects of U.S. foreign policy, state weakness and failure, and conflict prevention and resolution. His purpose in writing *When States Fail* was to examine state failure and collapse and how such states may be resuscitated. The book also analyzes state weakness and how some states progress from weakness to failure while others perpetuate weakness but never succumb to failure. Rotberg attempts to characterize failed states to provide to policymakers who are dealing with prevention, resuscitation, and rebuilding of failed nation-states a model for understanding this issue.

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<sup>17</sup> Baker, 8-12.

<sup>18</sup> Harvard Kennedy School, "Robert Rotberg," Faculty and Staff Directory, <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/robert-rotberg> (accessed April 2, 2009).

Rotberg writes in his introduction, “Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders).” These goods are hierarchical, with security being the most critical. With a reasonable amount of security, other goods and services will follow. The spectrum of goods and services include, among others: rule of law, free and open electoral processes, health care, educational infrastructure, commerce, communications, and a monetary system. Strong states perform well across this spectrum. Weak states tend to perform well in some areas, but perform poorly in others. States that have failed exhibit a varied mixture of symptoms. Some of these include: violent conflict between government forces and armed factions, ineffective law enforcement, lack of security for state citizenry, increased criminal violence and urban crime, flawed legislative and judicial institutions, and widespread corruption at all levels of government. A state that fails to provide security will lead to internal violence, which directly points toward the likelihood of failure. When a nation-state is consumed by high levels of violence, its citizens begin to question the government’s credibility and legitimacy. However, as Rotberg points out, the presence of high levels of internal violence does not necessarily imply that a state is ripe for failure.

**Ghani, Ashraf and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.**

Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart are the founders of The Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE), which advises national and international leaders regarding global state-building activities. Dr. Ghani is chairman of ISE and has acted as both advisor and Finance Minister to the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. Clare Lockhart is

director of ISE and worked as a UN advisor to the Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan.<sup>19</sup>

These authors suggest that failed states present the biggest threat to global security for this century, and argue that the current international response to the threat of state failure is inherently flawed. In order to address this flawed response, the authors present a strategic framework to define state functions, design structures necessary to carry out those functions, and focus international actors on the state building process.

The authors suggest that the legitimate use of force is not the single factor defining states, but that states also derive legitimacy from providing functions in political, social, and economic realms. They present ten functions of a state:

1. Rule of law
2. A monopoly on the legitimate means of violence
3. Administrative control
4. Sound management of public finances
5. Investments in human capital
6. Creation of citizenship rights through social policy
7. Provision of infrastructure services
8. Formation of a market
9. Management of public assets
10. Effective public borrowing.

**Jackson, Richard. "Regime Security." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, edited by Alan Collins, 146-161. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.**

Richard Jackson lectures on critical terrorism studies, international conflict resolution, and security studies. He is also the founding editor of the journal, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.<sup>20</sup> In this piece, Jackson examines the security challenges facing

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<sup>19</sup> Afghanistan Online, "Ashraf Ghani," under Biography, <http://www.afghan-web.com/hios/ghani.html> (accessed April 3, 2009) and Stanford University, "CDDRL Events," under Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, [http://cddrl.stanford.edu/events/building\\_effective\\_states\\_from\\_practice\\_to\\_theory/](http://cddrl.stanford.edu/events/building_effective_states_from_practice_to_theory/) (accessed April 3, 2009).

<sup>20</sup> Centro Internacional Bancaya para la Paz y el Desarrollo, "JACKSON, Rohert," under Faculty, [http://www.epd.uji.es/master/cvs%20pdf/cv\\_richardjackson.pdf](http://www.epd.uji.es/master/cvs%20pdf/cv_richardjackson.pdf) (Accessed April 9, 2009).

weak states. He finds three important dimensions of state strength: “(1) infrastructural capacity in terms of the ability of state institutions to perform essential tasks and enact policy; (2) coercive capacity in terms of the state’s ability and willingness to employ force against challenges to its authority; and (3) national identity and social cohesion in terms of the degree to which the population identifies with the nation-state and accepts its legitimate role in their lives.” He also finds the most significant characteristic of weak states to be their inability to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence.

Jackson then examines the threats facing weak states. He identified significant internal threats such as individuals or groups that wield coercive or infrastructural power rivaling state authority. Examples of these are criminal gangs and warlords who maintain control of certain areas in order to facilitate their illicit activities. Another internal threat comes from the degradation of state institutions and processes, which leads to increased lawlessness. Due to security problems, most weak states face external threats stemming from inability to control their borders. As a result, the state is threatened by an increase in weapons trafficking, which exacerbates the internal security issues with criminal gangs or other armed factions challenging the government.

Jackson then discusses security strategies for weak states. The main point he makes in this discussion is that the strategies required for weak states to establish and maintain security potentially undermine the state’s authority and legitimacy. However, security is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of the institutions and processes required for a strong state. This piece provides a context for examining Mexico’s security dilemmas and the government’s capacity to resolve them.

**Patrick, Stewart. “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 27-53.**

Stewart Patrick is a Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations. He also has experience as a State Department policy planning staff member and as a Research Fellow at the Center for Global Development.<sup>21</sup> Stewart’s article addresses the increased emphasis on the perceived threats posed by weak states in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. He argues that there is little empirical evidence to support the perceived threats. To focus on the issue, he discusses the definition of weak and failing states in an effort to illustrate that all weak states are not the same. In doing so, he cautions against a cookie-cutter solution to the weak state problem.

He views state strength as measurable by the state’s capacity and will to provide essential goods. He lists these goods as “physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare.” He identifies four categories of weak states based on capacity and will. Table 2-1 is an excerpt from Stewart’s article that illustrates his analysis. Stewart then uses this analysis as a framework to examine the perceived risks of failed states. These risks include terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, pandemic disease, energy insecurity, and regional instability. He concludes by reiterating that although these risks can be attributed to weak and failing states, each specific case must be analyzed individually to identify the sources and consequences of weakness. Stewart’s analysis provides a framework for categorizing Mexico’s status as a weak state.

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<sup>21</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, “Stewart M. Patrick,” <http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/ghani.html> (accessed April 3, 2009).

**Table 2-1. Capacity and Will as Dimensions of State Weakness**

	Strong Will	Low Will
High Capacity	Relatively Good Performers (e.g., Senegal, Honduras)	Unresponsive/Corrupt/ Repressive (e.g., Burma, Zimbabwe)
Low Capacity	Weak but Willing (e.g., Mozambique, East Timor)	Weak and Not Willing (e.g., Haiti, Sudan)

Source: Data from Stewart Patrick, "'Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?' *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 30.

**Crocker, Chester A. "Engaging Failing States." *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 32-44**

Chester A. Crocker is the James R. Schlesinger professor of strategic studies at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. Dr. Crocker is well published and primarily focuses on subjects regarding international security, conflict management, and mediation.<sup>22</sup> In this article, Dr. Crocker argues that U.S. foreign policy has missed the point regarding how to achieve a safer global environment. He argues the focus must be on stabilizing the failing states of the world. He describes state failure as a gradual process that is caused by various issues. These issues range from corruption in the central government or loss of legitimacy to disputes over natural resources or ethnic separatist movements. Two strong points that Crocker makes are that state failure is "inextricably linked with internal strife," and – when failure occurs – a power shift results that favors armed, lawless factions over ordinary civilians. Crocker goes on to outline the

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<sup>22</sup> Georgetown University, "Chester A. Crocker," <http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/crockerc/?action=viewgeneral> (accessed April 2, 2009).

need for adequate resourcing and leadership to adequately address the growing threat of failing and failed states around the world.

### **Mexico: Governance, Stability, and Organized Crime**

The following pieces of literature provide insight into Mexican governance and stability and the effects of drug trafficking. The reviewed material illuminates a perception of a symbiotic relationship between Mexico's democratic transition with the genesis and rise of the drug trafficking industry. The authors point to specific factors of this relationship that affect Mexican political stability.

**Schedler, Andreas. "Mexico: Democratic Transition and Beyond." in *Politics in the Developing World*, 2nd ed., edited by Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.**

Andreas Schedler is Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of Political Studies at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City. He is a highly published author on subjects of democratic governance and electoral processes.<sup>23</sup> In this chapter, Schedler describes Mexico's democratization by elections from an electoral authoritarian state. He argues that after the Mexican Revolution from 1910-1920, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) presented a facade of democracy while practicing authoritarian rule. The PRI remained in power until 2000 when the National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency. Several economic crises during successive administrations from 1976 to 1994 – as well as socio-economic modernization – led to a push for democratic transition in Mexico. Opposition parties

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<sup>23</sup> Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, "Andreas Schedler," under Facultad de Estudios Políticos, <http://www.cide.edu/investigador/profile.php?IdInvestigador=175> (accessed April 5, 2009).



began slowly undermining the popular support and anti-democratic institutions of the PRI in a process Schedler describes as democratization by elections. Although the author views Mexico as a democratic state, he believes many challenges threaten its viability. According to the author, the rule of law and defending the state's claim to the monopoly of the use of force are among the most daunting challenges.

**Astorga, Luis.** "The Field of Drug Trafficking in Mexico." *Globalisation, Drugs and Criminalization. Final Research Report on Brazil, China, India and Mexico.* UNESCO, 2002. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001276/127644e.pdf> (accessed April 9, 2009).

Dr. Luis Astorga is a Professor and researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). His area of interest is the socio-history of drug trafficking in Mexico.<sup>24</sup> Dr. Astorga assesses four distinct historical phases in the evolution of the drug trafficking trade in Mexico. The first phase was from 1914 to 1947 in which illicit activity emerged from the prohibition policies led by the United States. During this period, the criminal activity became subordinate to the consolidating power of the PRI, the Mexican ruling political party. The second phase, from 1947 to 1985, saw the creation of institutional mediations between the fields of politics and drug trafficking. These institutions, such as the Federal Security Department (DFS), served to insulate the senior layer of politics from implication in the illicit activities, and maintained the subordinate relationship of the drug trade. During the third phase, from 1985 to 2000, opposition parties began to seriously challenge the PRI. Opposition parties won governorships, the PRI lost legislative majority, and finally the presidency. These

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<sup>24</sup> Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, "Luis Alejandro Astorga Almanza," Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, under Sociología de los procesos políticos, <http://www.iis.unam.mx/areas/procesos/astorga.html> (accessed April 9, 2009).

political changes and the breakdown of institutional mediations created in the second phase resulted in loss of governmental control over organized crime and a rise in violence. The final phase, from 2000 to present, is characterized by an unpredictability regarding the relationships between the fields of politics and organized crime in Mexico. This article is useful because it provides a comprehensive history of the symbiotic relationship between the drug trafficking trade and politics in Mexico. According to the author, the theory that drug traffickers infiltrated the political field is refuted. He argues that the two developed in concert.

**Chabat, Jorge. "Mexico: The Security Challenge." In *Canadian and Mexican Security in the New North America: Challenges and Prospects*, edited by Jordi Diez. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006.**

Jorge Chabat is a Professor and researcher at the Department of International Studies at CIDE. Dr. Chabat has a Ph.D. in International Affairs from University of Miami and focuses his research efforts on democracy, security, and drug trafficking in Mexico.<sup>25</sup> As the title suggests, Dr. Chabat focuses on Mexican state security in this article. He argues that, since the 1980s, an increase in drug trafficking, erosion in the security forces, and political transition in Mexico has led to a security crisis. He identifies security as the fundamental requirement for political, economic, and social development and as the main challenge facing democracy in Mexico. In order to improve the situation, changes are necessary at all levels: international, national, and local. He suggests improvements in the structure of police forces, prison systems, and judicial systems, and cautions that these reforms must be long term and accomplished

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<sup>25</sup> Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, "Jorge Chabat," Estudios Internacionales, under Facultad DEI, <http://www.cide.edu/investigador/profile.php?IdInvestigador=44> (accessed April 10, 2009).

simultaneously to be effective. Due to a lack of continuity and coherence, the reforms attempted by the previous administrations have been ineffective. The reforms need 10 to 15 years to be successful, and Chabat stresses that political forces in Mexico must put aside party differences to agree on a long-term strategy to solve the problem. This article highlights the security challenges posed by drug trafficking and other issues for the Mexican state.

**Manwaring, Max G. *A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.**

Dr. Max Manwaring is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and has edited or co-edited several pieces regarding democratization and governability and Latin American security affairs. This monograph describes a “clash of civilizations” between liberal democracy and criminal anarchy. He analyzes the threats to state sovereignty posed by multiple levels of criminal organizations involved in a battle for control of territory to further their commercial gains. He discusses the challenges presented by these organizations to include: straining government’s capacity for law enforcement and judicial control, challenging the legitimacy of the state, acting as surrogate governments in ungoverned areas, dominating an informal economic structure, and infiltration of law enforcement and government offices. Specifically in Mexico, he discusses the threat to political development providing an in-depth discussion of the erosion of the Mexican democracy, erosion of state sovereignty, and the emergence of criminally-controlled states in Quintana Roo and Sinaloa. He concludes that the situation in Mexico is far from just a law enforcement issue but is in reality a challenge to national

sovereignty. He argues that the situation is actually a clash of values that will determine the quality of governance, security, and stability in Mexico. Manwaring provides a unique philosophical perspective to the challenges posed by criminal organizations and their effects on state sovereignty.

**Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. "Democracy and organized crime." <http://www.norlarnet.uio.no/lib/pdf/various/flores.pdf> (accessed April 8, 2009).**

Dr. Carlos Flores is Senior Researcher, Center of Investigations and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS, Mexico). He has a Ph.D. in Political Science and is widely published on the subjects of drug trafficking and democratic governance.<sup>26</sup> Flores' paper begins with a brief discussion of state weakness and democracy in Latin America using the World Bank Governance Indicators to provide quantitative data related to state governance in Latin American countries. Flores then provides a theoretical approach to illustrate the links between weak states, the process of democratization and the strength of organized crime, and a brief assessment of the organized crime problem in Mexico. He links the current rise in violence and strengthening of the drug cartels in Mexico to the democratic transformations in Mexico culminating with the PRI's loss of the presidency in 2000. He proposes that during 70 years of authoritarian control, organized crime was a subordinate social actor to variable sources of political power within a central, vertical structure. Democratic transformation has resulted in a destabilization of this structure and the situation has declined into the current rash of violence. The paper provides a detailed historical picture of the dynamics between politics and organized crime and their unique relationships in Mexico.

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<sup>26</sup> Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, "Carlos ANTONIO FLORES PEREZ," under INVESTIGACION, <http://www.ciesas.edu.mx/> (accessed April 9, 2009).

**Velasco, José Luis. *Insurgency, Authoritarianism, and Drug Trafficking in Mexico's "Democratization."* New York: Routledge, 2005.**

Dr. José Luis Velasco is a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and has a Ph.D. in Political Science. His research focus is in comparative politics, democratization, and tax reform with a focus on Latin America.<sup>27</sup> Although the author recognizes Mexico's democratic transition from the 1970s to 2000, he analyzes some apparent anomalies particular to this case. He identifies and discusses the anomalies of insurgency, authoritarian practices and structures, and illegal drugs as they affect Mexico's political, social, and economic development. He argues that socio-economic inequality is the primary driver in the trends unique to Mexico. Of particular interest is an in-depth discussion regarding the influence of illegal drugs on democratic transition and vice versa. He identifies government corruption, decreased law-enforcement capacity, undermining the rule of law, democratic accountability, fostering militarization, and the provocation of human rights violations as avenues for drug traffickers to challenge the Mexican state. He also argues that democratic transition creates new opportunities for illegal activities by weakening the state, increasing campaign funding opportunities, and dispersing law enforcement responsibilities. He also estimates that this situation may continue for a long time before degenerating into chaos, escalating into conflict, or leading back to an authoritative regime. He cautions that unless decisive action is taken, a stable, democratic Mexico is unreachable. This work provides specific insight into the threats drug trafficking poses to political stability in Mexico.

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<sup>27</sup> Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, "José Luis Velasco Cruz," Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, under Gobierno, procesos y actores sociales, <http://www.iis.unam.mx/areas/gobierno/velasco.html> (accessed April 9, 2009).

## **Summary**

The literature review provided insight into the inherent characteristics of state weakness and failure. These works also revealed significant influences by DTOs on Mexican political stability. The literature lends support to the hypothesis presented in Chapter 1 that the primary factor affecting Mexican political stability as influenced by DTOs is delegitimization of the Mexican state. However, the literature review does not provide conclusive evidence to identify the major contributor to political instability based on the Failed States Index. Therefore, in order to answer the research and key questions, the author will utilize the Delphi method to survey a panel of experts to identify the key factors involved. In doing so, the author will prove or disprove the hypothesis presented in Chapter 1.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the data collection and analytical concept for this thesis. The literature review highlighted the links between DTO activities and Mexican political stability as defined by the political indicators in the Failed States Index. In order to further refine these links and provide definitive answers to the research and key questions, this thesis utilizes the Delphi method as described by the RAND Corporation. The author developed a questionnaire using the Failed States Index political indicators as a framework. This questionnaire was administered to a group of experts in order to form a consensus opinion regarding answers to the research and key questions identified for this study.

The word “Delphi” is linked to the hallowed site of an ancient Greek oracle.<sup>28</sup> The Greeks sought advice and direction from the gods through intermediaries at this oracle.<sup>29</sup> The founders of the methodology at the RAND corporation found the label “Delphi” unfortunate as it implies “something oracular, something smacking a little of the occult.”<sup>30</sup> On the contrary, the methodology involves making the best possible judgments utilizing “a less-than-perfect kind of information.”<sup>31</sup> According to RAND, Norman Dalkey and O. Helmer created what became known as the Delphi method in the 1963 publication “An Experimental Application of the Delphi method to the Use of

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<sup>28</sup> J. Fowles, *Handbook of Futures Research*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 273.

<sup>29</sup> Illinois Institute of Technology, “The Delphi Method,” <http://www.iit.edu/~it/delphi.html> (accessed January 29, 2009).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

Experts.”<sup>32</sup> In 1968, RAND conducted a series of experiments in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Delphi method in forming group judgments.<sup>33</sup>

Through these experiments RAND concluded that, in most instances, anonymous controlled feedback provided more accurate group estimates than face-to-face discussion.<sup>34</sup> This finding gives reason to conduct research via an anonymous survey method, such as Delphi, rather than through a personal interview process. Linstone and Turoff recommended the Delphi method when “the problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques, but can benefit from subjective judgments on a collective basis.”<sup>35</sup> The Delphi method is also recommended for other reasons including the following:<sup>36</sup>

- The individuals needed to contribute to the examination of a broad or complex problem have no history of adequate communication and may represent diverse backgrounds with respect to experience or expertise.
- More individuals are needed than can effectively interact in a face-to-face exchange.
- Time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible.
- The efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a supplemental group communication process.
- Disagreements among individuals are so severe or politically unpalatable that the communication process must be refereed and/or anonymity assured.
- The heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assure validity of the results, i.e. avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of personality (“bandwagon effect”).

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<sup>32</sup> Norman C. Dalkey, *The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion*, RM-5888-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 1969), 15.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, vi.

<sup>35</sup> Harold A. Linstone and Murray Turoff, eds., *The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications*, (n.p., 2002), <http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/> (accessed January 29, 2009), 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*



The descriptions above are representative of the conditions for this study. The author took advantage of the benefits provided by the Delphi method to gather the consensus opinion of geographically-separated experts. This methodology will provide expert opinions regarding the effects of DTO activities on Mexican political stability in the context of the previously discussed political indicators.

### **The Delphi Method**

In short, “Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem or issue.”<sup>37</sup> The Delphi method is a process that utilizes a panel of experts to form a consensus judgment. The method is characterized by three features—anonymous responses, controlled feedback, and statistical group response.<sup>38</sup> RAND found these features necessary to reduce biases introduced by dominant individuals, reduce pressures of group conformity, and to ensure that all opinions are represented in the final results.<sup>39</sup> Delphi was designed specifically to “remove conference room impediments to a true expert consensus.”<sup>40</sup> The concept takes advantage of expert opinions without allowing individual personalities to interfere with debate. Geographical separation and anonymity precludes the development of groupthink or the tendency for the strongest personality to override the soundest

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<sup>37</sup> Linstone and Turoff, 3.

<sup>38</sup> Dalkey, 16.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Theodore J. Gordon, *The Delphi Method*, Futures Research Methodology (AC/UNU Millennium Project: 1994) [http://www.gerenciamento.ufba.br/Downloads/delphi%20\(1\).pdf](http://www.gerenciamento.ufba.br/Downloads/delphi%20(1).pdf) (accessed January 29, 2009): 1.

argument.<sup>41</sup> It is important to note, however, that because the respondent pool is usually small, Delphi studies do not yield statistically significant results as they are intended to represent only the synthesis of opinion of a specific group of expert individuals. Therefore, the results provided by one panel of experts cannot predict the results from a larger or different panel.<sup>42</sup>

A successful Delphi study begins with the key step of selecting participants. It is important to solicit individuals who are knowledgeable, likely to cooperate, and will contribute valuable insight. Unlike a statistically-based poll in which participants represent a larger population, a Delphi study requires non-representative and knowledgeable participants. Typical studies use a panel comprised of 15 to 35 individuals of which between 35 and 75 percent participate.<sup>43</sup> Each person in the expert panel should be contacted individually. The researcher should ensure that each panel member understands the nature of the project, the objectives sought, the anticipated amount of participation required, and the promise of anonymity.<sup>44</sup>

Once the panel is formed, the research team devises questions that are pursued through a questionnaire or series of questionnaires posed to the experts previously identified.<sup>45</sup> The questions should be clear, answerable and designed to derive a consensus on the specific subject. During this step in the process, the researcher may utilize a small, separate panel to formulate and validate the questionnaire or

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<sup>41</sup> Gordon, 1.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 3.

questionnaires. When the questionnaire is adequately tested, it can be sent to the expert panel for their responses. The questionnaire should be accompanied by a cover letter describing the study's objectives, the timeline for responses, and any required instructions for completing the survey instrument. Most questionnaires are transmitted and returned by facsimile, mail, or e-mail.<sup>46</sup>

The next phase is the analysis of the returned questionnaires. During this phase, all quantitative and qualitative data must be analyzed for pertinent information. Quantitative data is easily collated using software and can be displayed using graphs or charts. Narrative or qualitative answers must not be ignored, however, as they may provide some of the most valuable information. Therefore, the researcher must be careful to consider all answers from each panelist in order to arrive at a group consensus on the issue. This group judgment should be based on the median because extreme answers tend to skew the mean dramatically.<sup>47</sup>

The Delphi method has been recognized as a preferred way to achieve consensus due to the degree of anonymity for participants, which reduces social pressures to conform.<sup>48</sup> Eggers and Jones discussed other advantages of using the Delphi method. Their research found that the Delphi approach produces more accurate estimates than face-to-face interaction. The method also reduces the influences of persuasion, the unwillingness to reverse publicly expressed opinions, and the strength of majority

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<sup>46</sup> Gordon, 7.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 7-8.

<sup>48</sup> Jeffrey S. Hornsby, Brien N. Smith, and Jatinder N. D. Gupta, "The Impact of Decision-Making Methodology on Job Evaluation Outcomes," *Group and Organization Studies (1986-1998)* 19, vol. 1 (Mar 1994): 122.

opinions. Of particular note is the advantage Delphi provides in gathering the opinions of geographically separated experts in order to form consensus opinion.<sup>49</sup>

### **Expert Panel Selection**

The author began compiling a preliminary list of prospective panelists during an extensive literature review on the topics of political stability and DTO activities in Mexico. This led to a process described by Gordon as “daisy-chaining.”<sup>50</sup> The literature review yielded a list of experts familiar with the subjects of interest. By investigating the bibliographies of the reviewed literature and the resumes of the authors, the list grew larger. The author also searched prominent academic institutions with specializations in Latin American studies for individuals with unique expertise in political science and an emphasis on Mexico and drug trafficking. As part of the “daisy-chaining” process, the author sent e-mail solicitations to individuals identified as potential participants. Part of this solicitation was a request for other potential experts that could contribute to the study. Once the author compiled a preliminary list, certain criteria were applied to finalize the potential panelists. The finalized list of 31 potential panelists met the following criteria: (a) a doctoral degree (e.g. Ph.D., Ed.D., J.D.); (b) at least two years of teaching or professional experience in the fields of Political Science, Mexico or Latin American studies, organized crime, or security issues; (c) and a contribution to the body of knowledge regarding the topics of interest in the form of publication in a scholarly


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<sup>49</sup> Renee M. Eggers and Charles M. Jones, “Practical considerations for conducting Delphi studies: The oracle enters a new age,” *Educational Research Quarterly* 21, vol. 3 (March 1998): 54.

<sup>50</sup> Gordon, 6.


journal, book, or official publication in the last 10 years. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 illustrate the demographics of the 31 panelists as defined by the above criteria.

Figure 3-1. Expert Panelist Doctoral Degrees



Source: Author's analysis.

Figure 3-2. Expert Panelist Experience/Publishing



Source: Author's analysis.

## Questionnaire Formulation and Dissemination

After completing the literature review and finalizing the list of panelists, the author formulated the questionnaire. The questionnaire was formulated using the online survey generator, SurveyMonkey.com. This survey generator allows the user to customize, disseminate, collect, and analyze survey data. During the formulation process, a small test panel reviewed the survey instrument. This test panel corrected any typographical or grammatical errors as well as advising the author of any ambiguity or potential for misinterpretation. Once completed, a web link to the survey was sent out via email to each individual panelist to protect anonymity.

The survey instrument consisted of an introductory letter, conditions of participation, brief instructions, and a seven-part questionnaire focusing on the political indicators from the Failed States Index (see Appendix A). Each of the first six parts focused on one of the political indicators and its associated measures as discussed in Chapter 2. These parts of the questionnaire consisted of two quantitative questions, which were worded in such a way as to solicit answers utilizing a Likert scale.<sup>51</sup> According to Cooper and Shindler, the Likert scale is the “most frequently used variation of the summated rating scale.”<sup>52</sup> Summated rating scales are composed of statements that indicate a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the subject. The panelist is asked to agree or disagree with each quantitative statement in the questionnaire and each response is numerically scored to reflect the degree of favor.<sup>53</sup> The Likert scale used in this

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<sup>51</sup> Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ommrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 8th ed., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Inc., 1989), 185; According to this text, rating scales were developed by Rensis Likert in the 1930s to assess people’s attitudes.

<sup>52</sup> Donald R. Cooper and Pamela S. Schindler, *Business Research Methods*, 7th ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2001), 234.

questionnaire offered the choices of: 'strongly disagree', 'disagree,' 'neutral,' 'agree,' or 'strongly agree.' The responses were coded with '1' being 'strongly disagree' and '5' being 'strongly agree.' In this way, the author sought to identify, through group consensus, which of the political indicators are most affected by DTO activities in Mexico. The final question in each of the first six parts was qualitative in nature. These questions were designed to generate thought and allow for each of the respondents to address the adequacy of the indicated measures in assessing DTO influences on Mexican political stability. Similarly, the seventh part contained a qualitative question addressing the adequacy of the six political indicators themselves.

All of the 31 expert panel members received via email a web link to the survey instrument. The first two pages of the instrument introduced the members to the purpose and scope of the study and the conditions of participation (see Appendix A). Each member was informed and assured of his or her anonymity and was required to formally accept the invitation to participate in the study. Fifteen of the panel members (48 percent) accessed the survey and provided responses, while 16 (52 percent) did not provide responses (see Figure 3-3). Figures 3-4 and 3-5 illustrate the demographics for the panelists that provided responses.


The 15 respondents are representative of the entire expert panel's demographics. A comparison of the doctoral degrees in Figures 3-1 and 3-4 reveal no change in percentages for '*Political Science*' and '*Economics*' categories. The decreased percentage in the '*Other*' category is distributed with a small increase in '*International Affairs/Relations*' category, and a large increase in the '*Law*' category. However, with the small survey population in this study, these changes represent only 1 or 2

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<sup>53</sup> Cooper and Schindler, 234.


demographic differences between the expert panel and the actual respondents. Likewise, the results are similar when comparing experience and publishing demographics in Figures 3-2 and 3-5.

Figure 3-3. Expert Panel Questionnaire Participation



*Source:* Author's analysis.


Figure 3-4. Respondent Doctoral Degrees



*Source:* Author's analysis.



Figure 3-5. Respondent Experience/Publishing



*Source:* Author's analysis.

After receiving the responses from the expert panel, the data was analyzed in order to answer the questions related to the study. The quantitative answers were analyzed using basic statistics and graphs were constructed to illustrate the results. The qualitative answers were analyzed closely to identify commonalities or extreme differences among the responses. The results for both the quantitative and qualitative questions are recorded in Chapter 4.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **FINDINGS AND RESULTS**

As described in Chapter 3, the author developed and disseminated a seven part questionnaire to a panel of experts using the Delphi method as described by the RAND Corporation. The first six parts consisted of two quantitative questions and one qualitative question each related directly to the measures associated with the six political indicators described in Chapter 2. The first quantitative question in each part was devised to elicit an answer to the research and key questions of this thesis. The second quantitative question in each part was used to determine the applicability of the measures outlined in the Failed States Index in the evaluation of the specific conditions affecting Mexican political stability as influenced by DTO activities. The qualitative question was formulated to allow the respondents to express open-ended thoughts regarding the measures used to evaluate each political indicator. The seventh part contained a qualitative question addressing the adequacy of these six political indicators in evaluating Mexican political stability.

This chapter presents the findings from the expert panel questionnaire. Each of the quantitative questions utilized a Likert scale with an assigned value for each response. The Likert scale in this survey ranged from 1 to 5 corresponding to ‘strongly disagree’ through ‘strongly agree’ respectively. By comparing the average ratings from each measure, the author attempted to answer the research and key questions stated in Chapter 1. This same process was used to evaluate the adequacy of the measures used for each political indicator. Finally, the responses to the qualitative questions were analyzed in

order to find further relevant information or consensus opinions. The entire response summary from the online survey generator is in Appendix B.

## **FINDINGS**

### **Part 1: Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability, and political representation
- C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

This question addressed the above four measures used to evaluate the political indicator, “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State.” Table 4-1 shows the responses from the expert panel. The measures are listed down the left column using the corresponding letters, A through D, as found above. Each row lists the response percentages, the number of responses in parenthesis, and the rating average on the 1 to 5 scale. The highest percentage response for each measure is in bold type. The total rating average for this political indicator is calculated in the bottom right corner of the table.

All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. The data shows that the majority of respondents (60 percent) agree or strongly agree that measure A is directly affected by Mexican DTO activities (see Table 4-1). Similarly, respondents agreed or strongly agreed that measures B and D are also affected (80 percent and 67 percent

respectively). Slightly less than half, but a majority, of respondents (47 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that measure C is affected by DTO activities.

Noteworthy is the high rating average for measure B, which indicates a consensus agreement that drug trafficking in Mexico contributes to a resistance to transparency, accountability, and/or political representation in the Mexican government. The rating averages for measures A and D also show consensus agreement that DTOs contribute to government links to organized crime and widespread corruption in the government. Measure C received a neutral rating of 3.07. The total average rating (3.60) shows a group consensus that these measures are affected by DTO activities. This total rating average will be compared to the remaining five in order to answer the research and key questions.

Table 4-1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	0.0% (0)	13.3% (2)	6.7% (1)	<b>46.7%</b> (7)	33.3% (5)	4.00
<b>D</b>	6.7% (1)	20.0% (3)	6.7% (1)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	3.67
						<b>3.60</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

This second question addressed the adequacy in evaluating DTO influence of the same measures discussed above. All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. A majority of respondents (53 percent for each) agreed or strongly agreed that measures B and D adequately evaluate the influence of DTOs on this political indicator (see Table 4-2). Forty-seven percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that measure A was adequate. For measure C, a majority of respondents (53 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that it adequately evaluated DTO influences on this political indicator. Overall, the expert panel’s responses showed slight agreement that these measures are adequate with a 3.32 total rating average.

Table 4-2. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State, Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	0.0% (0)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	20.0% (3)	3.47
<b>D</b>	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3%</b> (5)	3.67
						<b>3.32</b>

Source: Author’s analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

This was the first of seven qualitative questions presented to the expert panel. The purpose of this question was to allow the panel to offer suggestions for alternative

measures to evaluate the influences of DTO activities on the subject political indicator. Eleven of the 15 respondents (73 percent) provided answers to this question. A potential loss in confidence in the judicial system is evident from comments made by one respondent about organized crime groups controlling prosecution services and a failure to prosecute offenses by public security service individuals. Two other respondents expressed concerns about the weakness of the criminal justice system and other state institutions, such as the police and prison systems. These issues directly relate to the third measure associated with this political indicator: “Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes.” However, the respondents do not address whether this loss of confidence has to do with the influence of drug trafficking.

Three respondents suggested that the legitimacy problem for the Mexican government lies not at the national level, but at the local levels. According to one respondent, “the inability...of law enforcement to provide security in high-intensity drug trafficking areas has delegitimized LOCAL (emphasis original) governments (to the extent they are viewed as being in cahoots with the cartels), not the state” (see Appendix B). Although this concept does not directly provide information supporting or refuting the author’s hypothesis regarding Mexican state failure, it is something that needs to be evaluated when considering general stability within Mexico.

Many of the respondents used these qualitative questions as an opportunity to clarify their opinions regarding general conditions in Mexico that were outside the scope of this thesis.

## Part 2: Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation
- B. State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs, and collection agencies

This question addressed the two measures used by the Failed States Index to evaluate the political indicator: “Progressive Deterioration of Public Services.” All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. The respondents were split almost equally regarding measure A, resulting in an essentially neutral rating average of 3.07. Respondents leaned more toward disagreement on measure B with 67 percent responding “strongly disagree” or “disagree” (see Table 4-3). This is an indication that DTO activities in Mexico do not have great influence in narrowing the state’s apparatus to those agencies that serve the ruling elites as described by measure B. Overall, the total average rating of 2.80 shows a slight disagreement that these measures are directly affected by DTO activities.

Table 4-3. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, Question 1

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average
<b>B</b>	20.0% (3)	<b>46.7%</b> (7)	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.53
						<b>2.80</b>

Source: Author’s analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

This question addressed the adequacy of the above two measures. All 15 respondents (100 percent) answered this question. A slight majority of respondents (47 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measure A (see Table 4-4). However, the rating average (3.07) shows a neutral result. A larger majority (60 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measure B, which resulted in a slightly less than favorable rating average of 2.67. The expert panel's responses resulted in a relatively neutral total rating average of 2.87 for the measures associated with this political indicator.

Table 4-4. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	13.3% (2)	<b>46.7%</b> <b>(7)</b>	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.67
						<b>2.87</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

This qualitative question was answered by nine of the fifteen respondents (60 percent). Again, many respondents took the liberty to describe conditions in Mexico that did not necessarily relate to the question. However, two of the respondents did highlight the perceived failure of the security apparatus in Mexico. This theory supports the measure above discussing the failure to protect citizens from violence. This situation is



also supported by the literature review material, specifically Jorge Chabat's article, "Mexico: The Security Challenge."

### **Part 3: Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated
- B. Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians
- C. Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices
- D. Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) provided answers to this question. At least half of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed on each of the four measures used for this political indicator (see Table 4-5). The rating average for measure A (2.79) was slightly less favorable than neutral, with 57 percent of the panel disagreeing that DTO activities have influence. Although measure B received a similar number of disagreeable responses, the rating average was lower (2.43) due to the distribution of answers. Sixty-four percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with measure C, but this time the rating average was higher (2.50) due to a single "strongly agree" answer to the question. Half of the respondents (50 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with measure D. Overall, the total rating average (2.66) reflects the consensus disagreement with measures B and C and relatively neutral opinions on measures A and D.

Table 4-5. Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	21.40% (3)	<b>35.70%</b> (5)	21.40% (3)	21.40% (3)	0.00% (0)	2.43
<b>D</b>	7.10% (1)	<b>42.90%</b> (6)	7.10% (1)	35.70% (5)	7.10% (1)	2.93
						<b>2.66</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question regarding the adequacy of the above four measures. Exactly 50 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measures A, B, and C (see Table 4-6). On measure D, 43 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. All of the rating averages show a small trend towards disagreement on the adequacy of these four measures resulting in a total rating average of 2.82.

Table 4-6. Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights, Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	14.30% (2)	<b>35.70%</b> (5)	21.40% (3)	21.40% (3)	7.10% (1)	2.71
<b>D</b>	14.30% (2)	<b>28.60%</b> (4)	<b>28.60%</b> (4)	7.10% (1)	21.40% (3)	2.93
						<b>2.82</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Eight respondents (53 percent) provided answers to this question. As with the first two qualitative questions, the respondents took liberty to make comments that did not necessarily suggest additional measures to evaluate the influence of Mexican DTOs on this political indicator. However, it is significant to note that three of the panelists commented that Mexico has a history of a weak judiciary system, other weak state institutions, and problems with upholding the rule of law that predates the rise of the drug trafficking industry. A respondent also commented on the increased risk for human rights violations as the military continues its involvement in fighting the DTOs.

#### Part 4: Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity
- B. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition
- C. Emergence of an “army within an army” that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique
- D. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces

Fourteen out of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question.

Responses to measure A were sharply divided with an equal 50 percent split between agreement and disagreement (see Table 4-7). This resulted in a neutral opinion for this measure. Fifty-seven percent of respondents disagreed with measures B, C, and D.

Table 4-7. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State,” Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>A</b>	50.00% (2)	50.00% (2)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)	2.50
<b>B</b>	28.60% (4)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	2.57
<b>C</b>	57.14% (8)	28.57% (4)	14.29% (2)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)	2.29
<b>D</b>	28.60% (4)	28.60% (4)	0.00% (0)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	2.71
<b>Total</b>	28.60% (4)	28.60% (4)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	14.30% (2)	2.70

Source: Author’s analysis.

However, given the response distribution, measures B and C had rating averages of 2.57 while measure D had a 2.71. Consensus opinion for measure D was in slight disagreement while there was a stronger consensus for disagreement with the influence of

DTOs on measures B and C. Overall the total rating average for this political indicator was 2.70.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question. A majority of respondents (50 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that measure A was adequate in evaluating DTO influences on this political indicator (see Table 4-8). Results for measure B were neutral with a 36 percent response rate for both agreement and disagreement. Responses for measure C shows a slight consensus disagreement with a rating average of 2.86. Consensus opinion for measure D shows slight agreement with 50 percent of respondents answering either “agree” or “strongly agree.” The total rating average for this set of measures shows a neutral consensus opinion.

Table 4-8. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State,” Question 2

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	14.30% (2)	21.40% (3)	<b>28.60 %</b> (4)	14.30% (2)	21.40% (3)	3.07
<b>D</b>	14.30% (2)	<b>28.60 %</b> (4)	7.10% (1)	<b>28.60 %</b> (4)	21.40% (3)	3.14
						<b>3.07</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Seven of the 15 respondents (47 percent) provided answers to this question. Two of the respondents commented on the need to look at Mexico's security situation regionally or geographically. For example, the security situation in Tijuana entails a different set of variables as compared to Mexico City due to geography, border proximity, population demographics, and other issues. The security situation in Mexico should be examined not only at the national level, but also at the state and local levels taking into account the diverse environments and relationships involved. This type of examination exceeds the scope of this study.

Another respondent commented on the perception that "federal law enforcement tends to trump state and local law enforcement efforts under the guise of drug trafficking control." The respondent did not clarify, but the author assesses, based on previous research, that the respondent is referring to a tendency for federal law enforcement to use the drug war as an excuse to abuse their jurisdictional authorities. This tendency further delegitimizes local and state law enforcement. It would be useful to measure the prevalence of this trend in order to evaluate Mexican political stability as influenced by DTOs.

**Part 5: Rise of Factionalized Elites**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines
- B. Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")

Fourteen of the 15 respondents (93 percent) answered this question. A slight majority of respondents (50 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that measure A is affected by DTOs, however the rating average was neutral (see Table 4-9). Measure B, on the other hand, received an overwhelming number of responses in disagreement (78 percent). The resultant rating average of 1.86 shows a consensus opinion disagreeing that this measure is affected by drug trafficking in Mexico. Overall, the total rating average of 2.43 shows a consensus of disagreement.

Table 4-9. Rise of Factionalized Elites, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>42.9%</b> <b>(6)</b>	<b>35.7%</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>14.3%</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>7.1%</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>0.0%</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>1.86</b>
						<b>2.43</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen of the respondents (93 percent) answered this question. An equal number of respondents (43 percent) agreed and disagreed with the adequacy of measure A (see Table 4-10). However, given the distribution of answers, the rating average (3.21) shows a slight trend towards agreement. For measure B, 71 percent disagreed that this measure adequately evaluated the influence of DTOs on this political indicator. This consensus is reflected in the 2.29 rating average for measure B. Overall, the total rating average shows an opinion of slight disagreement with the adequacy of these measures.

Table 4-10. Rise of Factionalized Elites, Question 2

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average
<b>B</b>	14.3% (2)	<b>57.1%</b> (8)	21.4% (3)	0.0% (0)	7.1% (1)	2.29
						<b>2.75</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Four of the respondents (27 percent) responded to this question, but did not suggest any additional measures. Even though the responses above show that DTOs do not affect nationalistic tendencies in Mexico, the responses to this question (and others) suggest that there is a history of nationalism in that country. Those nationalistic tendencies apparently are caused by issues other than drug trafficking.

**Part 6: Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors**

**Question 1 – The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

- A. Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict
- B. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions

Fourteen respondents (93 percent) provided answers. The majority of respondents (57 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that DTO activities affect measure A (see Table 4-11). The rating average (2.50) shows a consensus toward



disagreement as well. Eleven of the 14 respondents (78 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that measure B is affected by DTO activities. The rating average (1.93) shows that the panel's consensus opinion is in firm disagreement. Similarly, the total rating average (2.22) illustrates the panel's disagreement.

Table 4-11. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors, Question 1

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>42.9%</b> <b>(6)</b>	<b>35.7%</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>7.1%</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>14.3%</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>0.0%</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>1.93</b>
						<b>2.22</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 2 – These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

Fourteen respondents (93 percent) answered this question regarding the adequacy of the subject measures. Fifty percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the adequacy of measure A, resulting in a neutral rating average of 2.93 (see Table 4-12). Fifty-seven percent of respondents answered in disagreement regarding measure B. The rating average of 2.57 shows a consensus towards disagreement on the adequacy of this measure. Overall, the total rating average (2.75) shows a slight trend toward consensus disagreement with the adequacy of these measures in evaluating the influences of DTOs on the subject political indicator.

Table 4-12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>
<b>B</b>	21.4% (3)	<b>35.7%</b> (5)	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.57
						<b>2.75</b>

Source: Author's analysis.

**Question 3 – What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

Five of the 15 respondents (33 percent) answered this question. The respondents did not suggest any additional measures. However, the responses to this question illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the U.S. and Mexico concerning the drug trafficking problem. It is not a problem isolated to Mexico or any other country. Given the answers to this question, the respondents do not feel that this relationship has resulted in the Mexican government losing control or giving up any sovereignty over the issue as the measures above are meant to address.

**Part 7**

**Question 1: In your professional opinion, are these six political indicators adequate to measure the influence of drug trafficking organizations on the political stability of the Mexican state? Why or why not?**

1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights
4. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”
5. Rise of Factionalized Elites
6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

This was the final qualitative question in the survey. Twelve of the 15 respondents (80 percent) provided an answer to this question. The answers to this question gave a great deal of insight into the thoughts of the expert panel respondents. Six of the 12 (50 percent) respondents answered “No.” Three respondents answered “Yes,” with the caveat that the indicators need refinement to fit the conditions in Mexico. One respondent answered that he had doubts about the adequacy of two of the indicators. Two of the respondents implied their disagreement with the adequacy of the indicators by strongly denying that Mexico is at risk of state failure.

The common theme from these responses is that the conditions in Mexico are much too unique and complicated to adequately evaluate its political stability utilizing these political indicators. Narrowing the analysis to the issue of drug trafficking further complicates the matter. From analyzing the respondents’ answers and the information provided from the literature review, the author assesses that the drug trafficking issue is not the cause of Mexico’s problems, but is a symptom that exacerbates the issues plaguing the Mexican nation.

## **RESULTS**

This study focused on identifying the factors that define DTO influence on Mexican state failure by utilizing the political indicators in the Failed States Index. To support this effort, the author asked two key questions:

1. What are the factors that define DTO influence on Mexican political stability?
2. Of the factors directly impacted by DTOs and their activities, which has the most influence on Mexican political stability?

The author’s hypothesis was that delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy

of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state.


In order to answer these questions and prove or disprove the hypothesis, the author compiled the rating averages for all of the quantitative responses presented above. The first step in this process was to compare rating averages for each measure associated with the six political indicators. Figure 4-1 shows the rating averages for each of the measures addressed in the quantitative questions. Only four of the measures received rating averages greater than 3.00, or neutral (see the blue bars in Figure 4-1). All of these measures are associated with the political indicator, “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State.” The four measures are:

- A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation
- C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

In order to ensure that these measures were adequate according to the expert panel respondents, the author then compared the data from the second set of quantitative questions discussed above (see Figure 4-2). The respondents agreed that three of the four factors identified above (measures A, B, and D) are adequate in evaluating the influence of DTO activities. The expert panel disagreed with the adequacy of measure C; therefore it will be discarded as one of the factors affected by DTOs. Based on these findings, the measures that define DTO influence on Mexican political stability are: (1) Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites, (2) Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability, and political representation, (3) Growth of crime syndicates

linked to ruling elites. The identification of these factors answers the first key question.

Figure 4-1: Measures affected by DTO activities.




Source: Author's analysis.

After all of this analysis, the answer to the second key question is readily apparent. The factor which has the most influence on Mexican political stability is: “Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability, and political representation.” This measure received the highest favorable rating (4.00) from the expert panel respondents (see Figure 4-1).

The analysis partially supports the author's hypothesis. The political indicator that received the most favorable responses was: “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State,” which directly relates to the hypothesis: Delegitimization, or undermining the legitimacy of the Mexican state, and weakening of its institutions are the primary DTO-influenced factors that could lead to Mexico failing as a state. The resistance of

Figure 4-2. Adequacy of Measures



Source: Author's analysis.

government officials (ruling elites) to transparency, accountability, and political representation (the number one factor statistically) plays into the perceived legitimacy of a government.

The widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, which also relates directly to the hypothesis, finished with the fourth highest approval rating from the expert panel respondents. This measure also received a less than favorable rating with regard to its adequacy. This could have resulted from the respondents keying in on the specific processes and institutions listed in the measure (i.e. widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies). As mentioned by one respondent in the qualitative question relating to this political indicator, Mexico does not have a large problem with those

specific processes and institutions (see Appendix B). However, multiple respondents called into question the legitimacy of the local governments and the judicial system. Both of these concerns, in part, stem from drug trafficking operations as evidenced by respondents' answers and the literature review conducted for this study. Therefore, this measure—which evaluates the loss of confidence in institutions and processes—may be more adequate than the quantitative findings reveal.

In summary, these findings partially support the author's hypothesis. The data answered the research and key questions within the context of the political indicators of the Failed States Index. The results of this study show that, according to the respondents from this specific expert panel, the primary factor which has the most influence on Mexican political stability and is directly impacted by DTOs and their activities is the resistance of government officials (ruling elites) to transparency, accountability, and political representation. It is important to reiterate that this is the synthesis opinion of a specific group of expert individuals as identified by this author. The respondent pool (48 percent of the expert panel) met the criteria recommended for a Delphi study, but did not yield a large data set. The results derived from this panel of experts cannot predict the results from a larger or different panel.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS**

Although Mexico exhibits many of the symptoms described in Chapters 1 and 2, it is far from being a failed state. Nevertheless, drug trafficking organizations pose a significant internal security threat that challenges the rule of law and Mexican national security. The increased violence actually seems to be driven by a strengthening of the central government due to democratic transition and an effort to decrease corruption and increase transparency. It is imperative that President Calderon continue the fight against the cartels while, at the same time, continuing government reforms to national, state, and local law enforcement. Calderon must proceed with caution in order to limit widespread corruption in the military and deal with potential human rights violations. Continued vigilance on the part of the national government is essential to defeat the drug cartels and reinforce security.

The activities of Mexican DTOs pose a significant threat to the United States as well. According to the 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment, "Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States."<sup>54</sup> The drug trade generates billions of dollars in illicit revenue for these organizations, which utilize extensive ties to U.S. street gangs to further facilitate their distribution of products. Mexican DTOs have been tied to distribution networks in over 230 U.S. cities.<sup>55</sup> Drug-related cartel violence has already spread across the border from Mexico.

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<sup>54</sup> National Drug Intelligence Center, "National Drug Threat Assessment 2009," Product No. 2008-Q0317-005, (U.S. Department of Justice: December 2008) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2009): III.

<sup>55</sup> National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, 45.



The residents of Phoenix, Arizona, can attest to the fact that Mexican DTOs are contributing to violent crime on the U.S. side of the border. With over 370 reported cases in 2008, Phoenix became the kidnapping capital of the U.S., with Mexico City being the lone city in the world with more incidents.<sup>56</sup> On June 22, 2008, a team of highly trained hit men stormed a house in Phoenix on the orders of a Mexican drug cartel leader. This team wore police-style tactical gear to include body armor, Kevlar helmets, and Phoenix Police Department raid shirts.<sup>57</sup> These types of incidents have occurred in the Texas cities of Laredo, Rio Bravo, and even as far north as Dallas.

Violence against U.S. law enforcement personnel is also on the rise. According to the *LA Times*, drug traffickers “laid down suppressive fire” from across the Mexican border to stop U.S. authorities from moving in on a vehicle they had stopped.<sup>58</sup> Law enforcement agents in Arizona have also been alerted to reports that the head of the Sinaloa drug cartel has instructed his associates to use deadly force against law enforcement in the U.S. if necessary to protect their drug trafficking operations. This appears to be a move away from previous strategies of avoiding violent actions north of the U.S.-Mexico border.<sup>59</sup> Although Mexico may not be at immediate risk of failing as a

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<sup>56</sup> Brian Ross, Richard Esposito and Asa Eslocker, “Kidnapping Capital of the U.S.A.,” *ABC News*, February 11, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6848672&page=1> (accessed June 18, 2009).

<sup>57</sup> Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “Mexican Cartels and the Fallout From Phoenix,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, July 2, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexican\\_cartels\\_and\\_fallout\\_phoenix](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexican_cartels_and_fallout_phoenix) (accessed June 18, 2009).

<sup>58</sup> Josh Meyer, “Sinaloa cartel may resort to deadly force in the U.S.,” *LA Times*, May 6, 2009, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-mexico-chapo6-2009may06,0,5537420.story> (accessed June 18, 2009).

<sup>59</sup> Meyer, “Sinaloa cartel may resort to deadly force in U.S.”

state, the DTO influence imposes a security risk that impacts not only Mexico, but the United States and the region.

### **Synopsis**

This study focused on the influences of Mexican DTOs on Mexican political stability as defined by the political indicators in the Failed States Index. The first chapter introduced the problem of failed states and the question of Mexico becoming a failed state. The influence of DTOs was introduced as a common theme in discussion the topic of Mexican state failure. Key questions were formed to support this study using the political indicators as a framework for analysis.

A literature review of material related to state failure and the relationship between governance, stability, and drug trafficking provided insight into Mexico's unique situation dealing with drug trafficking. The literature informed and supported the author's hypothesis. However, the review did not provide conclusive evidence to answer the key questions involved in this study.

Chapter 3 identified and discussed the research methodology used to conduct this study. The author utilized the Delphi method as described by the RAND Corporation. The author devised a questionnaire consisting of both quantitative and qualitative questions in an attempt to answer the study's key questions. This questionnaire was then administered to a panel of experts selected for their professional and academic experience.

Chapter 4 presented the findings and results of the analysis of the expert panel responses to the questionnaire. In part, the findings support the author's hypothesis that

delegitimization of the Mexican state is the primary DTO-influenced factor that could lead to Mexican state failure. However, as the respondents to the questionnaire and the literature revealed, drug trafficking in Mexico is a much more complicated phenomenon than can be analyzed by a study of this size and scope.

### **Recommendations for Further Research**

The issues involved with drug trafficking in Mexico and political stability are much too extensive to be properly covered in this study. First, this study utilized a small panel of experts to obtain its results and a relatively short time period to conduct the research. The author recommends that a more extensive study be conducted utilizing a more robust expert panel. Second, this study focused on the measures used to evaluate the political indicators defined by the Failed States Index. The study further narrowed its focus to the influences of DTO activities on those measures. Future studies should incorporate analysis of social and economic indicators as well. Third, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the security situation in Mexico should be examined not only at the national level, but also at the state and local levels. A comprehensive study would have to take into account the diverse environments and relationships involved between government and DTOs throughout differing geographic regions as well as population demographics. Finally, drug trafficking is not isolated to Mexico. The destabilizing effects of DTOs are a regional and international challenge. In order to fully comprehend this problem, and thus propose solutions, a full examination of the social, economic, and political issues from the national, transnational, and global levels is required.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **SURVEY INSTRUMENT**

This appendix provides the text of the survey instrument as downloaded from the online survey generator. It contained a letter of introduction, conditions of participation, and the seven part questionnaire.



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 1. Introduction

Keith I. Crawford  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
National Defense Intelligence College  
Building 6000 Attn: Mailbox #55  
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a student at the National Defense Intelligence College pursuing a Master of Science Degree in Strategic Intelligence. As part of my course curriculum, I must complete a thesis paper on an Intelligence-related or National Defense related topic. In order to fulfill this requirement, I have chosen to research the influence of drug trafficking organizations on Mexican political stability.

The title of the thesis is: "Is Mexico a Failing State? The Influence of Drug Trafficking Organizations on Mexican Political Stability." The research focuses on identifying the key factors involving drug trafficking organization activities and Mexican political stability utilizing the six political indicators defined by the Failed States Index. Information about the Failed States Index can be found at the Fund for Peace website: <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/>

As part of the research for this thesis, I would like to request your professional experience, outlook, and opinions on this topic. I realize and understand that you are very busy and appreciate you taking part in this research study. Since this thesis is a part of the requirements for my degree, I have a short timeline in which to complete it. If you could finish this questionnaire by May 8, 2009 at the latest, I would greatly appreciate it.

It is important to note that I am utilizing the Delphi methodology for this study. I am soliciting several professionals of similar credentials in order to form a consensus opinion. It is extremely important that you keep your answers confidential and do not participate with colleagues in your area of expertise in order for the data to be valid. Again, I thank you for your time.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully,

Keith I. Crawford  
[keith.crawford@dia.mil](mailto:keith.crawford@dia.mil)

The Conditions for Participation are outlined on the following page.



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 2. Conditions of Participation

You have been invited to participate in a study regarding Mexican state failure that is being conducted by Major Keith Crawford. Major Crawford is a graduate student at the National Defense Intelligence College. He can be contacted via email at [keith.crawford@ndia.mil](mailto:keith.crawford@ndia.mil) or via telephone at (850)-495-5202. His thesis advisor and chair is Ms. Kathryn Acklin and you may contact her if you have further questions by calling (202) 231-3410.

The purpose of this research project is to identify the factors that define the influence of drug trafficking organizations on Mexican political stability using the political indicators defined by the Failed State Index published by the Fund for Peace.

You are being asked to participate in this study because of your academic background and area(s) of expertise. If you accept the invitation, your participation will include at least one round of survey questions supporting the Delphi methodology utilized in this study. Pending the analysis of the first round, a second round may be required in order to continue the study. The first round questionnaire should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.

There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this research.

Data that you provide in support of this study will be recorded anonymously. Major Crawford will be the only individual having knowledge of your participation and the specific data that you provide.

If you decide to participate, you may withdraw at any time without any consequences or explanation. If you do withdraw from the study your data will not be considered and will be discarded unless you request it for your own records. If you choose to participate, Maj Crawford will maintain data that is attributable to you for a period no longer than 6 months from the time of receipt unless further approval to maintain said data is received from you, the participant.

It is anticipated that the results of this study will be shared with others in the United States Intelligence Community as well as the Department of Defense. An electronic and hard copy will be filed at the National Defense Intelligence College, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. As a participant, you may request a copy of the completed thesis through Major Crawford or Ms. Kathleen Acklin.

In addition to being able to contact the researcher at the above phone number, you may verify the ethical approval of this study, or raise any concerns you might have, by contacting Ms. Kathleen Acklin at (202) 231-3410.

Your selection of "Yes" below indicates that you understand the above conditions of participation in this study and that you have had the opportunity to have your questions answered by the researcher.

Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this research project.

#### \* 1. I would like to participate in this study.

☐ Yes

☐ No



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 3. Questionnaire Instructions

This questionnaire is divided into seven parts. The questions in the first six parts are associated with the political indicator listed at the top of each survey page. Parts 1-6 consist of several quantitative questions and one qualitative question each. Part 7 is a stand-alone qualitative evaluation of the political indicators.

Part 1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State

Part 2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

Part 3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

Part 4. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"

Part 5. Rise of Factionalized Elites

Part 6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

Part 7. Qualitative evaluation of the political indicators used in this survey.

Please, use as much space as you feel necessary when answering the qualitative questions in this survey.

Thank you.



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 4. Questionnaire (Part 1)

Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**





## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 5. Questionnaire (Part 2)

Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 6. Questionnaire (Part 3)

Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious, or cultural persecution)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### \* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious, or cultural persecution)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

### 3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 7. Questionnaire (Part 4)

Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of rival militias, guerrilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergence of rival militias, guerrilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



### Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 8. Questionnaire (Part 5)

Rise of Factionalized Elites

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 9. Questionnaire (Part 6)

Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

**\* 1. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**\* 2. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**3. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 10. Questionnaire (Part 7)

**1. In your professional opinion, are these six political indicators adequate to measure the influence of drug trafficking organizations on the political stability of the Mexican state? Why, or why not?**

**1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State**

**2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services**

**3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights**

**4. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"**

**5. Rise of Factionalized Elites**

**6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors**





## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 11. Questionnaire Complete

You have completed the Round 1 questionnaire in support of this study. If a second round is required, you can expect a similar questionnaire in the next few weeks. Otherwise, you will be notified that the second round is not required.

If you would like to receive the results of this round of questioning, please select the appropriate answer below.

Thank you for your time!

**1. I would like to receive the results of this round of questioning.**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**2. In order to ensure you receive feedback from this survey, please leave your name and preferred email address below. Thank you.**



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 12. Questionnaire Complete

Thank you for considering to participate in this study. If you decide in the future that you would like to participate, please feel free to contact me at any time.

Respectfully,

Keith I. Crawford  
keith.crawford@dia.mil  
(850) 499-5202



## Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Crawford

### 13. End of Questionnaire

## **APPENDIX B**

### **SURVEY RESPONSE SUMMARY**

This appendix contains a summary of all the responses received from the expert panel respondents through the online survey generator.

## Conditions of Participation

### Thesis Questionnaire - Keith I. Newford

1. I would like to participate in this study.			
		Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	<div></div>	100.0%	15
No		0.0%	0
answered question			15
skipped question			0

## Part 1: Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State

2. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.							
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	0.0% (0)	26.7% (4)	13.3% (2)	26.7% (4)	33.3% (5)	3.67	15
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	0.0% (0)	13.3% (2)	6.7% (1)	46.7% (7)	33.3% (5)	4.00	15
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g. disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	13.3% (2)	20.0% (3)	20.0% (3)	40.0% (6)	6.7% (1)	3.07	15
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	6.7% (1)	20.0% (3)	6.7% (1)	33.3% (5)	33.3% (5)	3.67	15
answered question							15
skipped question							0

**3. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites	6.7% (1)	20.0% (3)	<b>26.7% (4)</b>	20.0% (3)	<b>26.7% (4)</b>	3.40	15
Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation	0.0% (0)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3% (5)</b>	20.0% (3)	3.47	15
Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies	6.7% (1)	<b>46.7% (7)</b>	20.0% (3)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.80	15
Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	26.7% (4)	20.0% (3)	<b>33.3% (5)</b>	3.60	15
<b>answered question</b>							<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>

**4. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?**

	<b>Response Count</b>
	11
<b>answered question</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>skipped question</b>	<b>4</b>

Response Text		
1	Comment, not other measure: I do not believe there is a monolithic group called the 'ruling elite.'	Apr 24, 2009 12:39 PM
2	La corrupción es localizada, no generalizada.	Apr 24, 2009 3:48 PM
3	1) Political campaign financing by the drug trafficker. 2) exchange pact between political campaign and the designation of Police in municipal and state level. 3) Control of the prosecution services by OGC groups. 4) evident organized crime activities in day light near police forces 5) open denial to victims of public security services and prosecution even in evident cases (woman of Juarez). 6) private comments of district attorney stating that they can do nothing because it is a FEDERAL jurisdiction 7) zero cases of corruption, political corruption and other infiltration to the state	Apr 24, 2009 4:14 PM
4	Your premise is wrong. The inability in the past two years of law enforcement to provide security in high intensity drug trafficking areas has delegitimized LOCAL governments (to the extent they are viewed as being in cahoots with the cartels), but not the state. The national government has actually increased its legitimacy for various reasons, including it's fight against organized crime. Profiteering by ruling elites is part of the system, and is very old, but it is not corruption, it is generous treatment by the government that produces it, so while it is seen as something that should be improved, it doesn't threaten the legitimacy of the state anymore than a lack of adequate health care for a high proportion of the US population threatens the legitimacy of the state. Transparency, accountability, and representation have improved in the last few years so these don't act to delegitimize or criminalize the state. Confidence in the state's institutions is higher now, on balance, than before, and crime syndicates are now being attacked by the state and de-linked from ruling elites, so none of these indicators work. I would say the legitimacy of the system is improving and the state, in the past two years, is stronger than before.	Apr 24, 2009 5:11 PM
5	High profits Firepower Party affiliation Level of governance - federal, state, local Weak institutionalization of courts, police, prison system, etc	Apr 25, 2009 1:19 AM
6	Words like "massive" and "elite" are too sweeping to be of much value here. Is corruption an enormous problem in Mexico? Yes, but it was also an enormous problem in the United States until the last few decades, but we were not considered to be on the verge of state collapse.	Apr 27, 2009 10:29 PM

Response Text		
7	Measures that you indicate are characteristic of Mexico for a century or more; drug trafficking has intensified them and injected more cash for corruption	May 8, 2009 6:19 PM
8	The third point is mixed, because the loss of popular confidence is a point to consider, but the inability to collect taxes, for example is related to other kind of problems different to organized crime. It is the same to resistance to military conscription (in Mexico there has not been such resistance). Armed insurgency in Mexico has not been related to drug trafficking issues	May 12, 2009 3:50 PM
9	Take into account 1. Consumption of drugs in US fuels this problem 2. Poverty in Mexico leads people into illicit and criminal activity 3. Mexico and US need to support substance abuse programs to address root cause of the problem 4. Mexico has always had a problem with collecting taxes 5. Need to examine the criminal justice system in Mexico	May 12, 2009 4:25 PM
10	The inability of the average citizen to influence elected officials to adopt policies beneficial to their lives	May 13, 2009 10:45 PM
11	prosecutions etc	May 15, 2009 3:27 PM

## Part 2: Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

**5. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	20.0% (3)	26.7% (4)	0.0% (0)	<b>33.3% (5)</b>	20.0% (3)	3.07	15
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	20.0% (3)	<b>46.7% (7)</b>	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.53	15
<b>answered question</b>							<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>

**6. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation	6.7% (1)	<b>40.0% (6)</b>	13.3% (2)	20.0% (3)	20.0% (3)	3.07	15
State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collections agencies	13.3% (2)	<b>46.7% (7)</b>	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	13.3% (2)	2.67	15
<b>answered question</b>							<b>15</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>



7. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?	
	<b>Response Count</b>
	9
<b>answered question</b>	9
<b>skipped question</b>	6

Response Text		
1	Comment: not measure: The shrinkage of the state began, in part, with Mexico's entry into the GATT, mid-late 80s. Local and state law enforcement institutions have long been ineffective, as is as is common in many states.	Apr 24, 2009 12:41 PM
2	Solo esta fallado el aparato de seguridad. La educacion, salud, taxes collection, funcionan bien	Apr 24, 2009 3:49 PM
3	The degree in which this indicator are advancing in Mexico. 20 years ago there were only 1 state, 15 years ago 3. today more than 60% of states are with problems.	Apr 24, 2009 4:19 PM
4	The first indicators are not all tied together, while local governments in some places have failed to provide adequate security, I don't think the evidence would suggest other services such as education or transportation have deteriorated. I don't believe Mexicans perceive that the 'apparatus' has narrowed significantly. Government services are continuing to serve target populations. Again, your premise is wrong. I don't think there has been a significant deterioration in the delivery of services, so drug trafficking is irrelevant. Where delivery HAS decreased, i.e., public security at some local levels, I think the evidence would suggest the public blames the drug cartels for most of this, and applauds the government's courage for tackling this.	Apr 24, 2009 5:12 PM
5	Prior weak institutionalization culture of tolerance of illegality dysfunctional judicial system	Apr 25, 2009 1:22 AM
6	quantitative and qualitative measures of corruption linked to organized crime	May 8, 2009 6:20 PM
7	In the Mexican case, the functioning of public institutions are very heterogeneous, and some of the problems they have are not always related to drug trafficking. For example, even in some cities of the country where there are high rates of organized crime's violence, other kind of institutions may work, even in the limited conditions of a developing country, for example public health. The shortcomings of this institutions do not have anything to do to drug trafficking, but are related to other kind of inefficiency. However, they provide a certain amount of welfare to the population and it has not been directly hampered by drug trafficking. The principal indicator of state weakness that may lead to state's failure is that present in core state's institutions. To say it in other words, a state could live several years with an inefficient institutions to provide different kind of public services, but it cannot do it when the basis to guarantee that it can determine the meaning of collective life.	May 12, 2009 4:01 PM

Response Text		
8	1. Mexico has an aging infrastructure that needs upgrading and improvement 2. Certain services such as seguro social, public transportation, sanitation, education, while not perfect do meet the needs of the population 3. Take a look at the role of remittances- consulates in US are funded well to provide services to migrants who in turn are sending money back to Mexico hence the investment in diplomatic services. Customs and collections agencies- no longer important because Mexico imports a lot of goods	May 12, 2009 4:26 PM
9	Corruption charges	May 15, 2009 3:26 PM

### Part 3: Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

8. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.							
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	14.3% (2)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	14.3% (2)	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	2.75	14
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	21.4% (3)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	21.4% (3)	21.4% (3)	0.0% (0)	2.43	14
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	21.4% (3)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.50	14
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious, or cultural persecution)	7.1% (1)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	7.1% (1)	35.7% (5)	7.1% (1)	2.93	14
answered question							14
skipped question							1

**9. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial, or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated	14.3% (2)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	28.6% (4)	0.0% (0)	21.4% (3)	2.79	14
Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians	14.3% (2)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	21.4% (3)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.71	14
Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices	7.1% (1)	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	21.4% (3)	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	2.86	14
Widespread abuse of legal, political, and social rights, including those of individuals, groups, or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	2.93	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>

10. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?	
	Response Count
	8
answered question	8
skipped question	7

Response Text		
1	Comment: Mexico's move to a multi-party system-- in the early 80s at the state and local level in the north, and in 2000, at the national level--is an indicator of civic 'health'. Under IFE, Mexico produces a relatively honest electoral process.	Apr 24, 2009 12:45 PM
2	I don't think the public makes a connection between problems in the rule of law and drug cartels. That is, while it is true that the judicial system works very poorly, it has for a long, long time, and has not gotten worse because of drug cartels, FOR THE MOST PART. An exception is Juárez, where for the past two months especially, but for a much longer time at a lower level, there has been a large presence of army troops providing security, and there have clearly been abuses, relatively frequently, and with impunity. But this is considered a fault of the military, totally expected, and not attributed the drug cartels.	Apr 24, 2009 5:17 PM
3	legacy of weak institutions under authoritarian regime prior history of human and civil rights abuses lack of effective citizenship absence of investigative press income and wealth inequalities deficient public educational system lack of strong middle class	Apr 25, 2009 1:27 AM
4	human rights abuses under the name of measures against drug trafficking	May 8, 2009 6:22 PM
5	The measures are correct, but those ones that I just agreed are a potential risk in Mexico, but they have not occurred yet in a significant degree and that is a reason for they could not be sufficiently evaluated.	May 12, 2009 4:05 PM
6	The Mexican judicial system needs improvement. Read Shirk and Cornelius' reforming the administration of justice in Mexico U of Notre Dame Press	May 12, 2009 4:30 PM
7	The increased role of the Mexican armed forces in national, state, and local public safety agencies	May 13, 2009 10:49 PM
8	You need a baseline - Mexico had problems before this ...	May 15, 2009 3:29 PM

## Part 4: Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”

11. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	21.4% (3)	28.6% (4)	0.0% (0)	35.7% (5)	14.3% (2)	2.93	14
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	28.6% (4)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	2.57	14
Emergence of an “army within an army” that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	21.4% (3)	35.7% (5)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	14.3% (2)	2.57	14
Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	28.6% (4)	28.6% (4)	0.0% (0)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	2.71	14
<i>answered question</i>							14
<i>skipped question</i>							1

**12. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	21.4% (3)	3.21	14
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	3.07	14
Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	2.86	14
Emergence of rival militias, guerrilla forces, or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces	14.3% (2)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	7.1% (1)	<b>28.6% (4)</b>	21.4% (3)	3.14	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>

<b>13. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?</b>		
	<b>Response Count</b>	
		7
<b>answered question</b>		7
<b>skipped question</b>		8

Response Text		
1	Maybe you need a geographical variable. Mexico is 800,000 sq. miles with lots of regional variations. This isn't reflected in the questions	Apr 24, 2009 2:07 PM
2	Use of dirty war techniques by narco personnel including torture, decapitation and solving in accid. of people. Amount of personnel that are in those private armies  number of groups that are operatin in certain regions. amount of money that is their salary ( a sinaloa cartel man infiltrated in police is paid 5000 usd, a guatemalan kaybil is paid 500 us. in south border.	Apr 24, 2009 4:37 PM
3	Mexico has a history of such institutional weaknesses before drug trafficking elitism has hitonically characterized mexico absence of democratic culture and engaged citizenry presence of ineualities and wealth concentration are key to Mexico past and present institutional weakness	Apr 25, 2009 1:31 AM
4	Federal law enforcement trumping state and local law enforcement under the guise of drug trafficking control	May 8, 2009 6:26 PM
5	Some of these measures refer to events that are actualy in a brooding condition but may increase to become a general concern	May 12, 2009 4:08 PM
6	Calderon has made great headway in weeding out corruption in the military and in police forces	May 12, 2009 4:31 PM
7	The sharp increase in the number of elite, especially in the business community who are bodyguards and security services.	May 13, 2009 10:51 PM

## Part 5: Rise of Factionalized Elites

**14. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	14.3% (2)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	7.1% (1)	21.4% (3)	21.4% (3)	3.00	14
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	<b>42.9% (6)</b>	35.7% (5)	14.3% (2)	7.1% (1)	0.0% (0)	1.86	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>

**15. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.**

	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Rating Average</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines	7.1% (1)	<b>35.7% (5)</b>	14.3% (2)	14.3% (2)	28.6% (4)	3.21	14
Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., a "greater Serbia"), or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")	14.3% (2)	<b>57.1% (8)</b>	21.4% (3)	0.0% (0)	7.1% (1)	2.29	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>



16. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?

**Response  
Count**

4

*answered question*

4

*skipped question*

11

**Response Text**

1	By 'group,' I mean those seeking a more honest and transparent state versus the corrupt	Apr 24, 2009 12:48 PM
2	history of nationalism history of fragmented elites during PRI rule geographical legacy of state dysfunctionality and weakness ca. fragmentation lack of national economic integration	Apr 25, 2009 1:33 AM
3	The ideological factor in the Mexican case is mostly a void topic. There are no: any single reference to fundamentalistic topics that could arise.	May 12, 2009 4:10 PM
4	Strident reflexive nationalism such as the response to countries who canceled flights into Mexico during the recent influenza outbreak.	May 13, 2009 10:53 PM

## Part 6: Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

17. The following measures associated with the above political indicator are directly affected by Mexican drug trafficking organization activities.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	28.6% (4)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.50	14
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	42.9% (6)	35.7% (5)	7.1% (1)	14.3% (2)	0.0% (0)	1.93	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>

18. These measures are adequate in evaluating the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict	14.3% (2)	35.7% (5)	7.1% (1)	28.6% (4)	14.3% (2)	2.93	14
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions	21.4% (3)	35.7% (5)	14.3% (2)	21.4% (3)	7.1% (1)	2.57	14
<b>answered question</b>							<b>14</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>1</b>

<b>19. What other measures, if any, should be used to evaluate the influence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations on the above political indicator?</b>	
	<b>Response Count</b>
	5
<b>answered question</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>skipped question</b>	<b>10</b>

<b>Response Text</b>		
1	U.S. drug consumption fuels high-profit trafficking, whatever the country. Moreover, see Andreas and Nadelmann, POLICING THE WORLD, 2006, for the way that U.S. strategy is imposed on many countries around the world. Mexico exhibits a 'healthy' nationalism.	Apr 24, 2009 12:51 PM
2	drug trafficking exacerbates already existing problems no foreign country is likely to intervene directly, not even US economic interdependence with US leads to US involvement in Mexican domestic affairs on many issues, not just drug trafficking	Apr 25, 2009 1:36 AM
3	Political risk indices and drug trafficking	May 8, 2009 6:28 PM
4	Mexico does not face a problem of budget for counterattacking drug trafficking organizations and, for sure, in the current conditions, would reject any peace keeping mission.	May 12, 2009 4:12 PM
5	What Mexico needs is economic development, substance abuse programs improved justice system in order to function well. US aid - Plan Merida only benefits US contractors Mexico needs to ban importation of weapons from the US	May 12, 2009 4:33 PM

## Part 7

**20. In your professional opinion, are these six political indicators adequate to measure the influence of drug trafficking organizations on the political stability of the Mexican state? Why, or why not? 1. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State 2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services 3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights 4. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State" 5. Rise of Factionalized Elites 6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors**

**Response  
Count**

12

**answered question**

12

**skipped question**

3

Response Text		
1	While cross-national analysis, with its universalist indicators, is one way to do research, I believe it must be supplemented with the sort of comparative politics approach that requires deep knowledge of the history and contemporary politics of a country in a regional context. The cross-national approach reveals the bankruptcy of the 'failed state' approach applied to Mexico (thankfully, media hype has diminished), but the latter approach allows us to understand Mexico's political-historical change in the North American economy, with its huge demand for drugs (from the U.S.).	Apr 24, 2009 12:55 PM
2	They may be too blunt for the Mexican case, which needs more attention to issues of corruption.	Apr 24, 2009 2:09 PM
3	Mexico is not a failed state. Only, there is a crisis in the security apparatus.	Apr 24, 2009 3:52 PM
4	To measure in general the presence of QC and state yes, but, it needs to be measure by regions or states in Mexico.	Apr 24, 2009 4:49 PM
5	<p>I believe the political stability of the Mexican state is exceptionally strong. The federal government has the capacity to monitor just about everything that happens in Mexico, and has a fairly high degree of support. There has been no deterioration of public services except in public security in high drug-conflict areas, and these are not attributed to the criminalization of the state, but to efforts, precisely, of the state to de-link drug cartels and law enforcement officials. So on balance the deterioration is considered something like when Eliot Ness went into Chicago: violence increased, but police corruption decreased. There has been very little suspension of the rule of law or widespread violation of human rights, except in some drug-conflicted communities, and this cuts both ways: some people think this is justified to get control over the bad guys. While the security apparatus can be very nasty with suspected drug cartel members, it is not perceived as operating as a state within a state, but rather as a pretty ham-fisted outfit that has the legitimate approval of all branches of government. There has been no rise of factionalized elites, and I see no evidence of intervention by external political actors (e.g. the US govt) that would not be highly monitored by the federal government of Mexico.</p> <p>In my professional opinion drug trafficking has never affected the political stability of the Mexican state, whether elements within the Mexican state were cooperating with drug traffickers or presently, now that the official channels to the federal government have been or are in the process of being severed.</p>	Apr 24, 2009 6:49 PM

Response Text		
6	<p>No. Mexican problems with state institutions and rule of law pre-date drug trafficking</p> <p>Mexico has always had weak institutions, limited democratic participation, high levels of corruption and tendencies towards authoritarianism</p> <p>Drug trafficking is not cause but symptom that makes problems worse</p>	Apr 25, 2009 1:39 AM
7	<p>You are touching on many important factors for assessing political stability, but I think that the instrument needs to be refined a bit. Some of the concepts are very hard to measure. Among the most important in evaluating the integrity of the state, in my opinion, are the ability of the state to maintain the loyalty of (if not actually "control") judicial and military institutions, provide basic services, and compete with other political actors. The point about loyalty is important. Given rampant corruption, the Mexican government would like to exercise more control over its military and police; but those entities remain loyal to the state, and would evidently defend the state against actors that might seek to challenge the state's sovereignty and operational control of its defined territory.</p>	Apr 27, 2009 10:39 PM
8	<p>I don't think so. Most important are public attitudes regarding personal security and loss of confidence in the president and the state. Secondary crime such as kidnappings by drug traffickers are very important at the community level.</p>	May 8, 2009 6:31 PM
9	<p>I would have some doubts about points two and six. As I explained formerly, the deterioration of public services in Mexico could be more related to the change in social policies that Mexican government introduced in the 80s. The violence related to drug trafficking has not reached a condition in which government is not able to provide such public services.</p>	May 12, 2009 4:21 PM
10	<p>Yes, they are - although they seem to apply more to a category of 'failed states' than 'states that are progressing toward democracy.'</p>	May 13, 2009 5:28 PM
11	<p>No. They overlook the perceived impunity of law-breakers and the impotence that average citizens feel with respect to influencing elected officials.</p>	May 13, 2009 10:56 PM
12	<p>No - you need corruption and prosecution figures too</p>	May 15, 2009 3:31 PM

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