

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

~~NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Penalties~~

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Classification/Control Markings

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This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)	2. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]
3. TITLE: Hostilities & Insurgencies Estimate of Security Situation (U)	4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 7710 [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424	6. DATE OF REPORT: 771011
7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 771006, Buenos Aires, Argentina	8. REFERENCES: [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED]	10. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. REQUEST EVALUATION: OPO [REDACTED] (country)	12. PREPARING OFFICER: [REDACTED]
14. SOURCE: [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424	13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

RSO, AMEMBASSY

REC'D DS-4B 28 OCT '77

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:	YES <input type="checkbox"/>
	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

16. SUMMARY:

(C) The first of the three documents forwarded (Estimate of Present Security Situation, Oct 77), was prepared by the RSO and probably has been forwarded to the State Department. The Second document (Statistical Review of Subversive Activities in the Argentine Republic, Sept 1, 1976 to Sept 1, 1977) was compiled from data obtained from Argentine sources. The third document is an internal memo from RSO to Charge (Minister) dated 4 Oct 77 referring to security in the provinces. The RSO's estimate (Encl 1) concludes that the security situation is greatly improved and the statistical summary bears this out by showing a major reduction in almost all areas of terrorist activities over the past year. The estimate goes on to caution, however that a terrorist threat still exists and that US personnel should continue to exercise good security practices and discipline. RSO's memo on Security in the Provinces (Encl 3) is consistent with the other two documents.

SUBJECT AND AREA CODES

MICROFICHE'D BY DIA/DS

18. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA (original) DIA/RCI-1 USCINCSO/SCJ2-AD CDR 193RD INF BDE w/o encl	19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EC 1 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADE AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1999 [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority: EO 13526 DIA FOIA & Declassification Services Offices Date: Oct 18, 2018	20. ENCLOSURES: 3. Enclosures 1. Estimate of the Security Situation Oct 77, 1 Cy, 2 Pg 2. Statistical Review of Subversive Activities in the Argentine Republic, 1 Sep 76-1 Cy, 19 Pgs, (FOI) 3. RSO Memo to Ch dtd 4 Oct 77, Sec in the Province, 4 pages (4) REQUEST ENCL (57) FROM ENC #1, 2, 3 HAS NO REPRODUCED
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21. This IR contains 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Continuation Sheet

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Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

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COMMENT: ~~(C)~~ [] generally agrees with RSO's estimate of the overall security situation and his comments on security in the provinces. It is particularly worth noting that the possibility of a deterioration of the security situation as the result of labor problems, especially in Cordoba and Rosario still exists. [] would add Buenos Aires, La Plata, and Bahia Blanca as possible centers of labor unrest.

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

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30640 (3300)
806000 (10540 - AR)
806000 (7AR)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : THE MINISTER

DATE: October 4, 1977

FROM : RSO:RJKelly *RJKelly*

SUBJECT: SECURITY in the PROVINCES

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On September 26, 1977, I traveled to San Juan and met with Comisario Horacio Julio NIETO, Chief of the Federal Police Delegation to San Juan. Com. Nieto has been in this position for over two years, having replaced the previous Comisario who was shot and killed by a group of terrorists in San Juan on March 22, 1975. Source stated that San Juan is one of the richest provinces in Argentina with a population of approximately 350,000. The principle industry is wine and new industries of long-husk cotton and aluminum mining are being developed. The new dam is under construction which will be the second largest in Argentina; it is expected to be completed next year and will provide power and irrigation to all the province.

Source stated that during the year there has been some minor labor discontent and mining workers had requested increases in wages. These had been granted and salaries are now well above the minimum national level. As a result, the potential labor problems have cleared up. Recently, the Minister of the Interior and the Economy Minister met with the Governor to review the overall economic progress of the province. Source stated that government officials are generally optimistic about San Juan. The terrorist situation has been very quiet and there have been no recent incidents, although there is one woman attempting to reactivate the Montonero movement in the province. She is under surveillance. Recently, the Communist Party started a fund raising campaign in San Juan. The leaders were arrested, tried and convicted. Source stated that overall the San Juan situation is tranquil and social conditions are progressing well.

cc: POL/R	USIS	ECOM
POL	LEGATT	DEA
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MLGRP	NCOIC	ADMIN

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RJK:mek



5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Enclosure

2

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On September 28, I met with General Fernando SANTIAGO, Deputy Chief of the Army III Corps. Source stated that the situation in Cordoba was very quiet. There were no labor problems and he and General MENENDEZ had visited factories recently and had spoken with the workers and owners. Source stated that more and more terrorists were surrendering and many families have visited him to obtain information on treatment their relatives would receive if they surrender. Source stated there was a great need for publicity on the part of the government regarding the proper and legal handling of terrorists who surrender. Source stated there has been a tendency to overestimate terrorist strengths and plans, as their expectations overshadow their deeds and their organizational charts are unrealistic and were never realized. Source stated that recently he had been visited by members of the legal Communist Party who denounced revolutionary activities against the government by the Communist Revolutionary Party. In summary, source was optimistic about the situation in Cordoba but stated emphatically the military will never allow the subversives to gain a foothold in the country again.

On the same date, I met with Comisario Justo Antonio REZZA, Chief of the Federal Police Delegation and his deputy, Ruben G. PASCUAL, in Cordoba. Source stated that the present situation in Cordoba was very quiet and there had been no significant terrorist activities lately. The Commander of the Third Corps, the Chief of the Provincial Police and the Chief of the Federal Police all travel in the area without custodias. However, Cordoba has been the scene of very serious disturbances in the past, partly due to social and economic influences. This is because many technological centers are located in this area and are used for training numerous employees of the automotive companies. Cordoba University has numerous courses in mechanical skills and the University is the second largest in the country, attracting many automobile and factory workers. This creates linkage between factory workers and students. Consequently, student activities are supported by labor/workers and labor activities are supported by students. In the past, this has led to numerous situations of unrest, similar to the Cordobazo in 1969. Security forces are aware of this linkage and pay it close attention. Source stated social and economic pressures at present are not sufficient to cause problems. Factory owners are paying above normal wages to keep the workers happy and the student situation is under control. In March 1977 there was a reduction in student enrollment from 12,000 to 6,000 and the universities were handed from the military to civil authorities. At that time, the security forces anticipated a possible reaction on the part of the students. However, these expectations did not materialize.

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Source stated that at present terrorist and subversive elements have no influence on the people in Cordoba and the student situation is totally under control, and that the situation would not be allowed to deteriorate again to what it was in the past. However, he did not personally think this subversive/terrorist problem would be finished within 2-3 years because even the few remaining terrorists can create problems.

On September 29, I met with Major Italo Angel Piaggi, Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division, II Army Corps. Source stated that the security situation was favorable. Only minor terrorist activities existed. These consisted of sending propaganda leaflets by mail to military, police and workers. Source stated that the terrorists at the present time have no capability for violent action and that the military forces plan to continue tight control over the situation. Source was surprised at the extreme success of terrorist elements in raising the human rights issue abroad.

On the same date, I met with Comisario Roberto José MONACO, Chief of the Federal Police Delegation in Rosario. Source stated that overall the security situation was very quiet. There was some restlessness on the part of labor in June due to the low salaries but there had been no major problems. Generally, the laborers do not sympathize with the subversive groups and there has been some economic improvement and progress in the city. Also, the commercial activities in the port have picked up, stimulating the economy. Source stated there has been great improvement in the situation in Rosario due to the extensive cooperation and coordination between the military, police and other government officials.

On September 29, I met with Subcomisario Ricardo CARROUCHE, acting Chief of the Federal Police Delegation in Santa Fe. Source stated that the situation in Santa Fe has been quiet for quite some time. There had been no significant terrorist activities reported and the crime rate had also dropped due to reinforcement of police in the area. Source stated that the economic situation in Santa Fe was quite favorable and was expected to improve when Santa Fe became an ocean port which is in plans for the future. Source stated that the Argentine public in general had little sympathy for terrorist activities and they anticipated no problems in the province of Santa Fe.

RSO COMMENTS: The general situation reflects massive improvement from February of this year to the present. This can be partially attributed to the close cooperation between military,

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police and other government authorities in exchanging information on terrorist activities. Additionally, the police in every province reported that since the coup in 1976 they have received excellent support from the military, both in the technical sense, weapons and communications, but also as far as housing, buildings for their delegations, and personal support.

General reflection is that the militant terrorist groups are eliminated as a military force but that individual activities will linger on for some time. In every province both the military and police sources are very attuned to the economic conditions as possible sources of public dissatisfaction. The general impression is that their sensitivity to public and social institutions is quite successful because they appear to have a good feel for the pulse of the area they are working in. There appears in many of the provinces to be considerable interface between leading business people and Federal Delegation officials. A case in point was an owner of an aluminum mine in San Juan who I met through the Federal Delegation. He had erected and financed a primary school, paying all expenses, including salaries.

There also is a reduced presence of police and military in most areas and a more relaxed atmosphere around the military camps as well as the police delegations. On my last visit to Rosario, the police delegation area was barricaded so that neither traffic nor pedestrians could approach without clearance. On this trip, the barricades had been lifted and traffic passed from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. According to all sources, there is strong cooperation from members of the public in reporting suspicious or possible terrorist activities. The overall impression of the situation in the interior is greatly improved, safe for U.S. government or private travel, including business executives. The only caveat is that both government and private visitors should be unobtrusive, discreet, avoid prominent display of custodias, maintain irregular schedules and follow generally good security procedures. Business executives should avoid visiting during any time their companies are involved in labor disputes.

Overall it would seem that terrorists would have a difficult time reentrenching themselves in large numbers in any of these areas. However, there is the possibility that labor problems could give rise to a temporary deterioration of the security situation, particularly in Cordoba and Rosario and, consequently, security evaluation of these two areas must be periodically updated.

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ESTIMATE of the PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION

Presented to the Country Team
by the RSO
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES
October 6, 1977

Military and police security sources have indicated that since February of this year there has been a massive reduction in both the Montonero and the ERP logistic, intelligence and combative capabilities. Most recent estimates of Montonero strength is approximately 800 combatives, scattered throughout the country. The central area of concentration is in Buenos Aires, La Plata and the surrounding provinces. Activities in most areas of the interior are limited. The Montonero central leadership is in Europe and recent attempts to infiltrate leaders back into the country for short visits have not been successful. There is a definite breakdown in leadership and many of the Montonero groups are functioning without overall guidance, intelligence or logistic support. Consequently, the cells/platoons have been given freer rein in selecting targets. For the most part, targets are limited to safe, sure, easy hits. Kidnappings have become increasingly difficult due to the lack of personnel, the inability of cells or platoons to coordinate activities. Statistics available show an important reduction in terrorist activities from September 1, 1976 until September 1, 1977.

Earlier this year, all Montonero elements were requested to become combative and to stage attacks during commemorative holidays such as August 22, the anniversary of the Trelew massacre. However, in spite of apparent concentration of effort, the level of terrorist activity was not significantly increased over that period. The Montonero monthly publication, Evita Montonero, which is used to laud their successes and encourage further activity, has had little to report over the last several months. Additionally, the quality of the publication itself even since March 1977 has deteriorated due to confiscation of printing resources by the

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security forces. There have been numerous defections from the Montoneros and police report a considerable amount of cooperation on the part of the public in reporting suspicious terrorist activities. These observations tend to reinforce the security services official view that the Montonero combative strength has been destroyed. However, they still retain the capability for assassination of easy targets, for minor political agitation in factories and universities and, on the international front, political opposition to the present government.

Security sources state that the present ERP combative strength is approximately 100 and that its main leadership has left the country and that its combative elements have also been requested to withdraw from Argentina in preparation to returning under more favorable circumstances. This would apparently exclude those members of the ERP who have never been so identified. There has been very little reported activity on the part of the ERP since May 1977 when an ERP cell assassinated Mr. Battista, a director of Cellulose Co., whom they had kidnapped. Security services doubt that the ERP will retain any viable presence in Argentina as they have been defeated as a terrorist/guerilla organization and they have never been a viable political movement. They do not have a Peronist or a populist movement to work behind. There are several other small terrorist movements which the security forces hope to eliminate by the end of the year.

RSOs evaluation reflects that the situation is greatly improved. The terrorist elements are for the most part reduced to a capability for assassinating soft targets, planting bombs and low level propaganda. They may retain this capability for several years in spite of government expectations that the problem will be solved by next year. Although the prevalent opinion is that U.S. personnel are not targets of terrorist activities, there is no guarantee that if this is true it will remain so indefinitely. With freer targeting by the cells and the lack of firm political direction, a group may choose any easy target for attack without weighing whether or not this activity would be politically counter-productive. Also, terrorist elements may feel that the U.S. campaign on human rights, which heretofore has favored them is in reality a blind. Their instinctive distrust and animosity toward the U.S. as the leading capitalist nation in the world may outweigh other considerations. In view of this, Mission personnel should remain alert to this potential threat.

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C O N T E N T S

STATISTICAL REVIEW of SUBVERSIVE ACTION (Chart 1)
ATTEMPTS on PERSONS in DETAIL (Chart 2)
KILLED and WOUNDED PERSONS (Chart 3)
DEAD and WOUNDED MILITARY MEN (Chart 4)
DEAD and WOUNDED POLICEMEN (Chart 5)
DEAD and WOUNDED CIVILIANS (Chart 6)
SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS in the MAIN CITIES (Chart 7)
SUBVERSION: MAIN CITIES (Maps)

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STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES in the ARGENTINE REPUBLIC,
SEPTEMBER 1st, 1976 to SEPTEMBER 1st, 1977.

The data used to compile this statistical review was obtained from official Argentine government sources. However, the information is not complete because there is no absolute centralization of terrorist reports and many times information about these activities is concealed from other elements of the security forces. Additionally, some terrorist attacks are never reported to the authorities. This is particularly true in the case of kidnapping. Also, occasionally labor violence manifests itself as terrorist violence in official reports. However, in spite of these caveats the information is accurate in portraying a major reduction in almost all areas of terrorist activities from September 1, 1976 to September 1, 1977.

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Chart No. 1

STATISTICAL REVIEW of SUBVERSIVE ACTION - September 1, 1976 - September 1, 1977

Kidnappings: This is the crime most difficult to obtain authentic figures on because many of those affected come to an agreement with the terrorists on their own, without reporting it to the authorities.

Attempts on Persons: Refers to the number of attempts on the lives of civilians, military men and policemen, regardless of the results achieved. Failed attempts have been included.

Attacks on Units and Patrols: Refers to attacks organized by terrorist forces against police stations, posts, guard posts and police patrols. Combats as a result of casual confrontations with the terrorists are not included.

Robbery of Weapons: Most of them from police personnel that were killed or wounded, in order to obtain their weapons.


Bombs: Statistics for bombs are the least centralized of crimes. Those that have been detonated are included here, but not those which were deactivated.

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Chart No. 2

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ATTEMPTS on PERSONS in DETAIL - September 1, 1976 - September 1, 1977

This chart refers to DIRECT actions against INDIVIDUALS by firearms or explosives. Attacks on groups are not included.


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AS ON PERSONS IN DETAIL - September 1st, 1976 to September 1st, 1977.

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KILLED and WOUNDED PERSONS - September 1, 1976 - September 1, 1977

The chart includes any victim of terrorism: military men, policemen, public officials, executives, labor union leaders; also those civilians who, not being the object of the attack, were accidentally killed or wounded.

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
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total number of incidents

killed persons

wounded persons



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Chart No. 4

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DEAD and WOUNDED MILITARY MEN - September 1, 1976 - September 1, 1977

Refers to military personnel who have been victims of direct attempts on their lives, as well as collective actions with bombs. It comprises officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

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UNDEAD MILITARY MEN - September 1st, 1976 to September 1st, 1977

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Chart No. 5

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
DEAD and WOUNDED POLICEMEN - September 1, 1976 - September 1, 1977

This chart refers to police personnel who have been victims of direct attempts on their lives, as well as collective attacks with bombs. It comprises officers, non-commissioned officers and policemen.

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ARMED POLICEMEN - September 1st, 1976 to September 1st, 1977



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DEAD and WOUNDED CIVILIANS - September 1, 1976 - September 1, 1977

Refers to civilians killed and wounded as a result of direct attacks, as well as persons who were injured as a result of being in the area of a terrorist attack.


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ARMY CIVILIANS - September 1st, 1976 to September 1st, 1977

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CITIES	Subversive Accident.	
	actions	confront.

CITIES	Subversive Accident.	
	actions	confront.

BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE

-Acoronado.....	-	1
-Adrogué.....	2	4
-Almirante Brown....	3	1
-AVE LLANEDA.....	10	8
-Bahía Blanca.....	4	4
-Barrfield.....	2	2
-Bartolomé Bvicio....	1	-
-Borazategui.....	4	-
-Borlino.....	3	2
-Bernal.....	2	3
-Bellinghurst.....	1	-
-Boulogne.....	1	-
-Brandsen.....	-	1
-Canet.....	-	1
-CAMPANA.....	1	-
-CAMPO DE MAYO.....	1	-
-CAJEROS.....	1	-
-Castelar.....	1	2
-Celestino Vidal....	1	-
-Ciudadela.....	4	2

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-Claypole.....	-	1
-Dock Sud.....	2	-
-Esteban Echeverria..	1	1
-Ensenada.....	2	-
-Etcheverry.....	-	1
-Fancajo.....	1	-
-Florencio Varela...	1	-
-Florida.....	1	-
-Gral. Pueyrredón....	-	1
-Gral. Rodríguez....	1	-
-General Serri.....	-	1
-Gerli.....	1	-
-Gonnet.....	1	-
-González Catán....	2	-
-Gregorio Laferrere..	1	1
-Haedo.....	3	2
-Ituzaingó.....	3	1
-Junín.....	1	-
-LA PLATA.....	36	40
-LANUS.....	8	3

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CITIES	Subversive Accident.	
	actions	confront.
-Ayulio.....	1	1
-Alejandro Olmos...	1	-
-LOMAS DE ZAMORA..	6	3
-MAR DEL PLATA....	10	5
-Muros Paz.....	1	2
-Martínez.....	1	1
-Matanza.....	3	1
-Merlo.....	1	-
-MONTE CHINGOLO...	-	1
-Monte grande.....	1	2
-Moreno.....	2	-
-Morón.....	4	2
-Muro.....	1	-
-Olavarría.....	1	-
-Pilar.....	3	1
-QUILMES.....	16	2
-Ramon Mejía.....	3	2
-Riachuelo.....	1	-
-Remedios Escalada	1	1
-SAN ISIDRO.....	2	-
-San Justo.....	3	1
-SAN MARTIN.....	5	3

CITIES	Subversive Accident.	
	actions	confront.
-San Miguel.....	1	-
-SAN NICOLAS.....	4	1
-San Vicente.....	1	-
-Temperley.....	4	1
-TIGRE.....	1	-
-Tres de Febrero..	2	-
-Vicente López....	3	-
-Villa Alsina.....	2	-
-Villa Ballester..	2	-
-Villa Bosch.....	1	-
-Villa Diamante...	-	1
-Villa Elisa.....	-	1
-Villa Insuperable	1	-
-Villa Luzuriaga..	1	-
-Villa Madero.....	2	-
-Wilde.....	1	1
-ZARATE.....	2	-

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BUENOS AIRES CITY 156 30

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CITIES
actions confront.

CORDOBA
-CORDOBA (City)..... 17 9
-Rio Colorado..... - 1
-Rio Primero..... - 1

ENTRE RIOS
-Villaguay..... 1 -

FORMOSA
-Formosa (City)..... - 1
-Clorinda..... 1 -

MENDOZA
-Mendoza (City)..... - 1
-Guaymallén..... - 1

MISSIONES
-Campo Grande..... - 1

SANTA
-Santa (City)..... 1 -
-Coronel Moldes..... - 1

CITIES
actions confront.

SAN JUAN
-San Juan (City).. 1 -

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SANTA FE
-Santa Fe (City).. 3 3
-Alvear..... - 1
-Capitán Bermúdez. 1 -
-Granadero Baigorria - 1
-Tberlucea..... - 1
-Pérez..... 1 -
-Ricardone..... 1 -
-ROSARIO..... 23 32

SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO
-Santiago E. (City) 1 1


TUCUMAN
-Tucumán (City)... 1 -

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
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BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE

○ OLAVARRIA

MAR DEL PLATA

BAHIA BLANCA

ATLANTIC
OCEAN

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