то	Pages 44-46 were denied in full and are
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY	not included
DTG 111738Z MAY 93	5
EDOM	
FM <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>	
CONTROLS	4
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 (b)(3):10 USC 424	T
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/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************************************	/
COUNTRY: (U) <b>PERU</b> (PE). SUBJ: IIR <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup> COMMENTS BY GEN RODOL	
	FO ROBLES
(U) . WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, N	
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLA	
CONFIDENTIAL.	
- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	
DOI: (U) 930505-930508.	
REQS: (U)	
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SUMMARY: -(G) THIS IS A SUMMARY OF COMMENTS	
RODOLFO ((ROBLES)) ESPINOSA DURING THE PERI	
MAY 93 CONCERNING ARMY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA CANTUTA UNIVERSITY AND RELATED ISSUES.	HUNS AT LA
TEXT: 1. (C) DURING THE PERIOD OF 5 - 7 MAY 93 W	VHILE
PERUVIAN ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL RODOLFO	
ESPINOSA	
(b)(1),1.4 (c)	l
LTG ROBLES WAS OPEN AND COOPERATIVE DURIN	G THE ENTIRE
PERIOD. HE ACCURATELY PREDICTED THE GOVER	
RESPONSE TO HIS CHARGES AND SEEMED RELATIV	VELY

	UNPERTURBED AT THE SWIRL OF EVENTS SURROUNDING HIM. 2. (C) FROM THE VERY BEGINNING ROBLES STATED THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT HE SUPPORTED PRES. FUJIMORI'S ACTIONS ON 5 APR 92. THERE WERE PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE CORRECTED IN ORDER TO PROPERLY AND EFFECTIVELY PURSUE THE COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THESE HAVE BASICALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. HE ALSO OUTLINED THE COVERUP OF THE CANTUTA CASE (SEE FURTHER DISCUSSION BELOW) AND STATED THAT (b)(1),1.4 (b) HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE
	FELT AND HOPED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT INVOLVED.
	WHEN ASKED ABOUT POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS TO HIS
	"DEFECTION," ROBLES OUTLINED TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF
	ACTION HE BELIEVED WERE AVAILABLE TO PRESIDENT
(b)(1),1.4 (b)	FUJIMORI. THE FIRST OPTION
	COST OF FURTHER CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH MONTESINOS AND
	HERMOZA RIOS, WILL DECIDE TO CLEAN HOUSE. IN BOTH HIS
	WRITTEN STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE PRESS AND IN
	CONVERSATION, HE CLAIMS THAT THE PERUVIAN ARMY SHOULD BE RESTORED TO WHERE IT SHOULD BE BASED UPON RANK
	(ANTIGUEDAD). THIS WOULD MEAN LTG JOSE ((VALDIVIA))
	DUENAS, CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE INTERAMERICAN DEFENSE
	BOARD, WOULD BE ARMY COMMANDER, WITH LTG ROBERTO
	((SALDANA)) VASQUEZ AS CHIEF OF STAFF, HIS CURRENT
	POSITION, AND GEN ROBLES AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (IG) (NO. 3 POSITION IN THE PERUVIAN ARMY).
	(b)(1),1.4 (b)

(b)(1),1.4 (b)

6. (C) IN JAN 93 ROBLES WAS TRANSFERRED TO BE THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY INSTRUCTION AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

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(COINDE) AND CHIRINOS WAS TRANSFERRED FROM ARMY INTELLIGENCE TO BE THE INSPECTOR AT COINDE. ROBLES ALLEGED THAT CHIRINOS' TRANSFER WAS ENTIRELY DUE TO CHIRINOS' NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THE SITUATION

(b)(1),1.4 (b)

7. (C) SHORTLY AFTER THE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION AND THE CSJM OPENING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENTS OF LA CANTUTA UNIVERSITY MG PICON TOLD ROBLES IN MID-APRIL 93 THAT HE WAS NOT MOVING ON THE CANTUTA CASE BECAUSE HE HAD NOTHING OTHER THAN UNFOUNDED, UNSIGNED DOCUMENTS.

(b)(1),1.4 (b)

8. (C) THE OTHER SCENARIO DISCUSSED BY ROBLES WAS IF FUJIMORI OPTED TO CONTINUE THE STATUS QUO, I.E., MAINTAIN HERMOZA RIOS AND MONTESINOS IN THEIR CURRENT JOBS. ROBLES BELIEVES THIS WILL LEAD A FURTHER BREAKDOWN OF LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE ARMY, INCLUDING POSSIBLE REBELLIONS BY INDIVIDUAL COMMANDERS.

(b)(1),1.4 (b)