

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

VZCZCHLT497

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZYUW

MULT

53595

ACTION

DIAI

DISTR

J3(14) J5(02) J31NMCC SECDEF(07) SECDEF: ASD/ISA(10)

ASD/PA&E(01) DIA(20) (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

- CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

- CSAF WASHINGTON DC

- CNO WASHINGTON DC

- CSA WASHINGTON DC

- C I A

- SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

- NSA WASH DC

FILE

(054)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

TRANSIT/3532117/3532143/000126TOR3532142

DE RUEBAA #0023 3532117

ZNY CCCCC

O 192100Z DEC 78

(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO RULPALJ/USCINCSO GUARRY HTS CZ (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)/CHILE (CI)

2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: (U) BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A

5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 781219

6. DATE OF REPORT: 781219

7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781219, (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424 CONTINUES

PAGE 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00110110

75

C

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

93599

9. ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ORIGINATOR:

11. REQUEST EVALUATION: OMIT

12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

14. SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC-NO

16. SUMMARY: (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ARGENTINA HAS MADE ITS
LAST ATTEMPT TO INVITE CHILE TO NEGOTIATE.

22. DETAILS: (C) AT A (b)(1);1.4 (c) ON 781219, (b)(1);1.4 (c)

TALKED WITH (b)(1);1.4 (c)

PROBLEM, (b)(1);1.4 (c)

ARGENTINE

CLASSMATE

HAD DISCUSSED BRIGADIER LAMI DOZO'S TRIP TO SANTIAGO OF 781218.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) REMARKED THAT THE TRIP HAD BEEN FRUITLESS, ALTHOUGH

ARGENTINA'S (b)(1);1.4 (c) (b)(1);1.4 (c) IF THE

VISIT HAD BEEN A FINAL OFFER BY ARGENTINA TO ELICIT SINCERE
NEGOTIATIONS FROM CHILE, (b)(1);1.4 (c) IN THE

AFFIRMATIVE, (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ARGENTINA'S NEXT STEP

WOULD PROBABLY BE OCCUPATION OF ONE OR MORE UNOCCUPIED ISLANDS

IN THE BEAGLE AREA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT EVOUT AND BARNEVELT ISLANDS

WERE THE MOST LIKELY, SINCE THEY ARE SUPPOSEDLY UNOCCUPIED.

WHEN (b)(1);1.4 (c) IF OCCUPATION OF CABO DE HORNO (CAPE HORN)

WAS A POSSIBILITY, (b)(1);1.4 (c) YES. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT

ACCORDING TO SOME PEOPLE, CHILE WOULD FIGHT TO PREVENT

ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF CAPE HORN. (b)(1);1.4 (c) CONVINCED

THAT CHILE WOULD NEVER FIGHT TO RETAIN CAPE HORN

BUT (b)(1);1.4 (c) THE MESSAGE IN HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE

RELAYED BY (b)(1);1.4 (c)

COMMENT: (C) (b)(1);1.4 (c) OF THE POTENTIAL
BATTLE AREA TO EVOUT, BARNEVELT AND CAPE HORN ISLANDS.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) HOWEVER, WAS TOLD BY A HIGH-LEVEL FLAG OFFICER IN

THE NAVY GENERAL SECRETARIAT ON 781218 THAT AS MANY AS

TEN ISLANDS COULD BE INVOLVED IN AN ARGENTINE OCCUPATION

ATTEMPT. (b)(1);1.4 (c) REMARK THAT LAMI DOZO'S FRUITLESS TRIP

TO SANTIAGO HAD BEEN A LAST CHANCE FOR CHILE MAY

INDICATE THAT HOSTILITIES ARE IMMINENT IF A DIPLOMATIC

BREAKTHROUGH IS NOT FORTHCOMING.

THIS MSG AMEMBASSY COORDINATED. DECL 19 DEC 84.

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00110110

BT

JAL117