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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/

TO DIA

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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*POLITICAL MATTERS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3930

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 540-220-7465 (ASIS) 1445 EST 6 DEC 77

09-12-210-7465

20 DEC 9 1977

169-12-210

109-12-210-7465

ANGOLA: ~~COORDINATED~~ STATEMENTS. (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ ~~FIDEL~~ ^{Castro} AND ~~RAUL~~ ~~CASTRO~~ HAVE MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ANSWER TO RECENT US CHARGES OF AN INCREASE IN HAVANA'S AFRICAN PRESENCE. BOTH CALLED THE STATIONING OF TROOPS IN ANGOLA A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF PERSONNEL AN ISSUE STRICTLY BETWEEN LUANDA AND HAVANA.

2. ~~(C)~~ PRESIDENT CASTRO TOLD VISITING US REPRESENTATIVES ON 6 DECEMBER THAT THE ISSUE "HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.... IT PERTAINS TO COMMITMENTS WE HAVE HAD WITH OTHER COUNTRIES FOR MANY YEARS." HIS YOUNGER BROTHER, RAUL, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT OF CUBA AND MINISTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES, ADOPTED A SIMILAR

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LINE DURING HIS SPEECH TO THE MPLA CONGRESS IN ANGOLA ON THE 5TH. ALWAYS CONSIDERED MORE HARDLINE THAN FIDEL, HE COMMENTED THAT THE US WAS "WASTING ITS TIME AND BEING USELESSLY PERSISTENT" IN ATTEMPTING TO TRADE OFF WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM ANGOLA FOR RAPPROCHEMENT. RAIL COMMENTED THAT THE SIZE OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE THERE WAS THE EXCLUSIVE CONCERN OF THE SOVEREIGN CUBAN AND ANGOLAN GOVERNMENTS, THE MPLA, AND THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

3. ~~(S)~~ COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCILS OF STATE AND MINISTRIES, IN MUCH THE SAME VEIN, THESE REMARKS NO DOUBT WILL FORM THE CUBAN RESPONSE TO THE MID-NOVEMBER DISCLOSURE OF CUBA'S AFRICAN PRESENCE. CUBA QUITE LIKELY CONSIDERS THE THREAT POSED TO THE NETO GOVERNMENT FROM THE UNITA AND FNLA A TACTICAL PROBLEM THAT CAN BE REMEDIED THROUGH INCREASED MILITARY MANPOWER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CUBANS FEAR THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS BEING MANIPULATED BY THE US TO EFFECT A TROOP REDUCTION IN EXCHANGE FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS ON NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON. FOR ECONOMIC REASONS, THEY FEEL THAT US MUST ONCE AGAIN ASSUME A FAVORABLE TRADE RELATIONSHIP

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
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WITH HAVANA TO PULL THE COUNTRY OUT OF ITS ECONOMIC DOLDRUMS.
FOR THE NEAR TERM, THE CUBAN RESPONSE WAS PREDICTABLE, AND IT
ACTUALLY REFLECTED HAVANA'S INTENT TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY
OPTION IN ANGOLA WHILE PLAYING DOWN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PRO-
BLEM.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)



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