ENVELOPE

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RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

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SERIAL: (U) IIR COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); JORDAN (JO). IPSP: (U) SECTION 1 OF 2

/****** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ******/

BODY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI (U) 20030101. REQS: (U)

(b)(1) SOURCE: (C) (REL)

SUMMARY: (CITREL) IN JULY 2002, JORDAN REQUESTED THAT IRAQ FIND FIVE

SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, INCLUDING MUSTAFA SAYYAM. M5 AND M7 CONDUCTED AN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT SEARCH TO CAPTURE SAYYAM IN DECEMBER 2002. SAYYAM WAS RELEASED ON ORDERS FROM SADDAM HUSAYN. TEXT. 1. (C//REL) BACKGROUND. THE JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (GID) REQUESTED THAT THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) LOCATE FIVE INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF CRIMES IN JORDAN. MUSTAFA ((SAYYAM)) WAS INCLUDED IN THE LIST AND WAS CONSIDERED A TERRORIST. JORDAN INCLUDED SAYYAM'S NAME AND PICTURE IN AS MANY AS THREE REQUESTS BEGINNING IN AUGUST 2002.

2. (U) IIS REACTION.

A. (C//REL) AGENCY-WIDE REQUEST. FROM THE TIME THE IIS RECEIVED THE FIRST REQUEST FROM THE GID, IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL ((HABBUSH)), DIRECTED THE IIS M5 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE TO FIND SAYYAM

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AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE DIRECTOR OF M5 JORDANIAN BRANCH, LAWRENCE ((AZZAWI)), PERSONALLY HEADED THE INVESTIGATION. BY 15 (b)(2) OCTOBER 2002, M5 HAD AMASSED A SIZABLE DOSSIER ON SAYYAM. (

	WAS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY. THE IIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF, OR FOCUSED ON, THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THESE SUSPECTS IN BAGHDAD, OR IRAQ, PRIOR TO THE GID REQUEST.) B. (C//REL) POSSIBLE AUTHENTIC MEMO. SEVERAL MEMOS WENT TO ALL DIRECTORATES AND EVERY EXTERNAL IIS UNIT IN IRAQ TO ASSIST THE SEARCH FOR SAYYAM. AN ORDER WENT WITH THE MEMO NOT TO USE THE PASSPORT NAMES TO FIND THE SUSPECTS, BUT TO USE THE ENCLOSED
b)(1)	PICTURES.
8	3. (U) INTRA-AGENCY COOPERATION.
	A. (CHREL) UNPRECEDENTED ACTION. BY NOVEMBER 2002, AZZAWI
	APPROACHED M7 TO HELP LOCATE AND CAPTURE SAYYAM. M7 WAS EVEN CALLED IN TO ASSIST THE SEARCH BEFORE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS WAS
	INITIATED. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME M7 WAS ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN A
	CAPTURE, AND IT WAS NOT STANDARD PROCEDURE.
	B. (CHREL) PERSONNEL INVOLVED. BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATES, THERE WERE
	A NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN INITIATING AND CONDUCTING THE SEARCH AND INTERROGATION OF SAYYAM. THEY WERE -
	- IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL HABBUSH
	- IIS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HASSIB SABR ((AL-RIFA'I))
	- M5, DIRECTOR, AHMAD ((AL-JAFARI))
	- M5, JORDANIAN BRANCH CHIEF, LAWRENCE AZZAWI - M7, DIRECTOR, HAYTHEM ((AL-RAWI))
	- M7, ARAB BRANCH CHIEF, AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM ((AL-ANI))
	- M7 INTERROGATOR, SA'AD MUHAMMAD ((JAWAD))
	- M7 INTERROGATOR, RUKAN ((AL-JANABY))
(b)(2)	- M7 INTERROGATOR, FADIL MADLOL ((ALSHALASH)).
(0)(2)	HANDLE THE SEARCH, ALTHOUGH
	이 이 것은 것 것 같은 것 같아요. 이 가 있다. 이 것 같아요. 이 가 있다. 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있다. 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 같아요. 이 가 있는 것 ? 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이 이

HANDLE THE SEARCH, ALTHOUGH AND IN WAS EASY TO SEE WHY THE LOOKED AS SUCH TO AN OUTSIDER.) ONCE THE SEARCH HAD BEGUN, ORDERS WERE DISPERSED IN A LINEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND MOST COMMANDS INITIATED WITH AZZAWI.

4. (U) THE SEARCH AND ARREST.

A. (CHREL) SEARCH. THE IIS USED ALL TECHNICAL MEANS POSSIBLE,

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INCLUDING WIRE TAPS, SURVEILLANCE, AND OTHER TECHNIQUES, IN THE SEARCH. M5 RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT SAYYAM REGULARLY VISITED HIS HALF-SISTER AND USED THAT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. WHEN AGENTS SEARCHED THE HOUSE, HOWEVER, THEY ONLY FOUND THE HALF-SISTER'S FAMILY. B (CHREL) FAMILY CONNECTION TO M7 OFFICER. SAYYAM' HALF-SISTER APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED ONE OF THE ARRESTING AGENTS AS AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM AL-ANI. THE HALF SISTER CLAIMED THAT AL-ANI AND SHE WERE RELATED AND ASKED FOR CLEMENCY, BUT AL-ANI ARRESTED THE HALF-SISTER'S HUSBAND TO FORCE THE FAMILY TO ASSIST IN CAPTURING SAYYAM. AFTER TWO DAYS OF DETAINMENT, THE HUSBAND AGREED TO ASSIST IN SAYYAM'S APPREHENSION. THE HUSBAND REQUESTED THAT THE ARREST TAKE (b)(2) PLACE OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE.

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HALF-SISTER THROUGH COMPLEX TRIBAL TIES ON HIS WIFE'S SIDE. AL-ANI PROBABLY ORDERED THIS RELATIVE TO BE HELD IN CUSTODY TO PROTECT HIS REPUTATION; HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS BEING LENIENT TO HIS RELATIONS.)

C. (C//REL) AMBUSH. AROUND 5 DECEMBER 2002, THE COERCED HALF-SISTER AND HUSBAND INVITED SAYYAM AND HIS WIFE TO THEIR HOUSE AND THEN NOTIFIED M5. M7 AND M5 OFFICERS JOINTLY AMBUSHED SAYYAM AS HE EMERGED FROM THE HOUSE. M7 AGENTS PERSONALLY ESCORTED SAYYAM, HIS

(b)(2) WIFE AND CHILD TO THE M7 DETENTION FACILITY. WORKED IN A SEPARATE BUILDING WITH ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES, WHICH WAS LOCATED ON 52ND STREET IN THE AR-RUSAFAH DISTRICT OF BAGHDAD IZ. IT WAS A THREE-STORY BUILDING ACROSS FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF PASSPORTS. THE DETENTION FACILITIES WERE ON THE 2ND AND 3RD FLOORS.)

5. (CHREL) INTERROGATION. M7 DETAINED SAYYAM FOR UP TO 15 DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME THEY CONDUCTED FOUR OR FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS. SAYYAM REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE THROUGH THE FIRST THREE SESSIONS, LAWRENCE AZZAWI THEN ORDERED M7 TO USE ROUGHER METHODS TO EMPHASIZED THAT THE EXTRACT A STATEMENT. IIS INTERROGATORS DID NOT TORTURE SAYYAM) AHMAD AL-ANI SUPERVISED TWO MORE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, WHERE RUKAN AL-JANABY AND FADIL AL-SHALASH USED OPEN SLAPS TO THE FACE, FISTS TO THE CHEST, AND BEAT THE BOTTOM OF HIS FEET WITH STICKS. AT FIRST THE INTERROGATORS THOUGHT THE IIS WOULD BE TURNING SAYYAM OVER TO THE JORDANIANS, SO M7 WAS LENIENT. THEY DID NOT WANT EVIDENCE LEFT OF A HARSH INTERROGATION. ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THE IIS WOULD NOT TURN HIM OVER TO JORDAN, HOWEVER, M7 USED THE ROUGHER METHODS) 6. (U) RELEASE ORDERS

A. (C//REL) M7 OBJECTIONS ON RELEASE. AFTER SAYYAM'S FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, LAWRENCE AZZAWI GAVE M7 RELEASE ORDERS FOR SAYYAM, WHICH INFURIATED M7 AHMAD AL-ANI AND HAYTHEM AL-RAWI FELT SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE RELEASE ORDER, THEY WENT ALL THE WAY UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO HABBUSH TO EXPRESS THEIR OBJECTIONS. HABBUSH THEN INFORMED THE PAIR THAT THE ORDER FOR RELEASE CAME DIRECTLY FROM

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SADDAM ((HUSAYN)). THE NEXT DAY LAWRENCE AZZAWI REMOVED SAYYAM FROM THE M7 FACILITIES.


B. (C//REL) REASONS FOR OBJECTIONS. AHMAD AL-ANI INITIALLY PROPOSED KILLING SAYYAM AND SENDING HIS BODY BACK TO JORDAN, ALLEGING A SUICIDE. AL-ANI REPORTEDLY BELIEVED THE RELEASE OF SAYYAM WOULD PROVOKE THE AMERICANS, WHEREAS KILLING HIM OR SURRENDERING HIM TO JORDAN WOULD BE IN IRAQ'S FAVOR. THE ACT WOULD DEMONSTRATE IRAQ'S INTOLERANCE FOR TERRORISM.

C. (CHREL) SPECULATION ON SAYYAM'S RELEASE. M7 AGENTS CONCLUDED THAT THE DECISION TO RELEASE SAYYAM WAS MADE FOR SEVERAL REASONS SENDING SAYYAM, DEAD OR ALIVE, TO JORDAN WOULD REVEAL THAT HE HAD BEEN IN IRAQ IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND MIGHT SUGGEST TO HOSTILE OBSERVERS THAT IRAQ HARBORED TERRORISTS IN ADDITION, THE ARABIC MEDIA MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCENSED THAT SADDAM WOULD <u>SURRENDER</u> A MUSLIM TO JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

7. (CHREL) PREVIOUS AMNESTY DECREE ON 20 OCTOBER 2002, SADDAM HUSAYN ISSUED A NATION-WIDE AMNESTY DECREE TO RELEASE ALL PRISONERS.


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THE DECREE ALSO AFFECTED M7, SINCE IT HAD ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES. M7 EMPTIED ITS ENTIRE FACILITY, WHICH AMOUNTED TO APPROXIMATELY 200 INDIVIDUALS. NONE OF THE <u>DETAINEES</u> HELD BY M7 WERE THOUGHT TO BE AL-QA'IDA RELATED. M7 <u>DETAINEES</u> WERE MOSTLY



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