


~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~FOUO/NOFORN/X5~~

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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403-1(i)

25 August 2003
161-03

DIA/J2




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 J2 WARNING CONCERNS 25 AUG 03							
COUNTRY	STATUS	DATE OF WATCHCON	OUTLOOK				
LIBERIA	◆	06 Jun 03	(S/NF) Peace Challenges: Belligerents picked businessman-politician Gyude Bryant as interim leader on 21 August. Bryant, a consensus-builder, is seen as least contentious candidate. Slow, but steady progress in peace process will likely continue; however, cease-fire implementation and enforcement remain key unsettled issues. Although all sides voiced willingness to undergo eventual disarmament, peacekeeping efforts must eliminate the current weapons stocks and the potential to rearm, or factions will continue to view force as a ready option. ECOMIL lacks capability to enforce cease-fire in interior. AS OF: 18 Aug 03				
ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY	▲	31 Oct 02	(C) Collapse of Middle East Peace Process: Moderate violence resumed after a unilateral Palestinian cease-fire crumbled in mid-August. The escalating violence aborted a bilateral agreement to turn over additional cities to Palestinian Authority (PA) control, and has placed the implementation of the US-sponsored Road Map in jeopardy. The cease-fire had been under strain since early August from Israeli counterterrorism operations, terrorist attacks and reprisals. Israel's current offensive is targeting terrorist groups which used the cease-fire to rebuild infrastructure, but not the PA. The PA allegedly canceled a planned crackdown on militants due to the Israeli operations, although it is not clear the PA is yet capable of conducting a decisive engagement with extremists. Meanwhile, peace talks have been suspended. AS OF: 25 Aug 03				
NORTH KOREA	□	20 Dec 02	(S/NF) Government Collapse: Despite economic failure and diplomatic isolation, regime shows no sign of imminent collapse, largely due to its "military first" policy, ensuring continued loyalty of million-person military. Vertical command and control, and extensive network of internal surveillance have ensured any unrest in military will be contained and suppressed. Despite the repercussions of an admitted nuclear program, regime continues to receive international aid from countries such as China, and to earn currency from illicit activities such as missile and drug sales to maintain subsistence. No outward signs of social unrest or unusual changes to military or political leadership are evident. Significant turnover of personnel in the Supreme People's Assembly elections suggests the September assembly session will provide indicators of policy changes and national priorities. AS OF: 18 Aug 03				
INDIA-PAKISTAN	□	19 Nov 02	(S/NF) Escalation of Conflict Beyond Kashmir: New Delhi and Islamabad continue to implement peace initiatives following Prime Minister Vajpayee's April speech in Kashmir. High commissioners have been restored and bus links resumed. Talks on the resumption of air links will be held later this month. The Indian Army continues to conduct aggressive counter-insurgency operations inside Kashmir to root out militants. India moved additional infantry units, artillery, and ammunition to the northern Line of Control, and may be preparing for limited attacks against Pakistani posts. Artillery shelling in this area remains high. If increased fighting does occur, it will be intended to improve tactical positions and is expected to remain limited to the northern sector. AS OF: 18 Aug 03				
IRAN	□	27 Jan 03	(C) Civil Unrest: The regime will continue to crush any signs of unrest by employing state security forces and vigilante groups. The ongoing crackdown on reformers and regime opponents continues, but the government will be careful not to incite public anger with inflammatory acts. Iran will not concede to foreign demands, but will continue to make the appearance of cooperating with the Europeans while claiming to be the victim of US plotting. AS OF: 20 Aug 03				
VENEZUELA	□	13 May 03	(C) Constitutional Crisis Developing: Congress is deadlocked on the appointment of a new National Electoral Council that is needed to allow for a binding referendum on Chavez's presidency. The Supreme Court announced that it will intervene and appoint the National Electoral Council on 25 August. The pro-Chavez congressional majority is threatening to reject Supreme Court intervention. Continued government attempts to derail or delay referendum threaten to increase the violence between Chavez supporters and opposition groups. The increasing potential violence could lead to dissident military activism against the regime. AS OF: 18 Aug 03				
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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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NOTES IN BRIEF

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DIA/J2 EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

IRAQ-IRAN: ~~(S)~~ Tehran's Plan To Increase Influence

~~(S)~~ Tehran is continuing with a multifaceted plan to expand political, social, religious, and economic influence in Iraq. To counter Coalition activities in Iraq, Tehran is using elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Iranian media.

~~(S/NF)~~ The IRGC and MOIS are Iran's covert actors of influence in Iraq. Both are implementing an approved covert action plan to subtly extend Iran's influence into Iraq while concurrently preparing for the prospect of conflict with the US and Coalition forces. The IRGC is playing the dominant role in Tehran's policy in Iraq at this juncture.

--~~(S)~~ Covert activities seek to counter Coalition influences, promote a non-hostile Shia Islamic government and induce the Coalition's departure from Iraq through resourcing key allies such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and more militant groups such as Muntada al-Wilaya.

~~(C)~~ Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is pursuing a more moderate agenda than the IRGC and MOIS but its activities have no less of an impact on extending Tehran's influence inside Iraq.

--~~(C)~~ Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is trying to enhance Tehran's economic and political positions inside Iraq through its support of the Iraqi Governing Council and has been actively engaged in sending delegations to Iraq to arrange cooperation on such issues as refugees, humanitarian aid, trade, cultural exchanges, and the travel of pilgrims to Shia holy sites in Iraq.

~~(C)~~ Tehran is using a multipronged media campaign targeting Iraqis as the final component of its overall strategy to extend its influence inside

Iraq.

-- ~~(C)~~ Using radio, TV, and newspapers, Iran's anti-US/Coalition message distorts facts to portray the Coalition as an occupation force in an apparent effort to turn Iraqi Shia against Coalition forces in Iraq.

~~(S)~~ Tehran will continue its effort to shape a favorable political, religious, and military situation in Iraq covertly through the IRGC and MOIS and overtly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Iran's media. This dual track policy allows Tehran to actively confront the Coalition's influence in Iraq without forcing a direct confrontation.

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
(U) Iran's influence: mid-August photo showing Iraqi youth in Baghdad shouting anti-US slogans while carrying a picture of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Khomeini.

~~(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)~~

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DIA/J2 EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

LIBERIA: (U) Post-Taylor Troubles

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(U) Rebel and government forces clashed in the countryside; President Blah is trying to ease tension with Liberia's neighbors.

-- (U) Government officials claimed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebels attacked positions near Buchanan. A UN spokesman stated fighting caused thousands to seek safety at Harbel, near Roberts International Airport.

-- (U) Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the government blamed each other for continued fighting near Gbarnga.

-- (U) Blah returned to Monrovia on 23 August after visiting Guinea, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. Although a step toward

improving relations with countries once affected by Liberian-backed insurgencies, regional leaders will remain wary of any government that includes associates of former President Taylor.

~~(S)~~ Tension reportedly is building between LURD leaders as they vie for influence and position in Liberia's future interim government.

-- ~~(S)~~ Some are concerned that LURD leader Conneh will ensure prominent positions go only to members of his own Mandingo ethnic group.

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~~(S)~~ Relief organizations are trying to extend humanitarian assistance to Buchanan, as conditions in Monrovia continue to improve.

-- ~~(S)~~ Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) officials met with MODEL leaders last week to coordinate sustained relief deliveries to Buchanan. Several MSF deliveries were scheduled to occur later this week but could be delayed by fighting.

-- ~~(S)~~ Last week, a LURD official promised safe passage for UN and other NGOs traveling in LURD-controlled areas.

~~(S)~~ Despite last week's peace agreement, competition for influence in the future interim government will fuel tension between rebel factions and the current government. Power struggles also will likely intensify within and between the two rebel movements, as ambitious rebel leaders, having achieved their objective of removing President Taylor, focus on attaining power for themselves and members of their respective ethnic groups.

-- Liberia Cell (b)(3):10 USC 424

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DIA/J2 EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

NIGERIA: (U) Administration Drifting

~~(S)~~ President Obasanjo began his second term in office in May. Since then he has done little to move the country forward, bungling key policy initiatives. Criticism of his leadership is mounting.

-- ~~(C)~~ Obasanjo's attempts to raise the price of fuel, a measure key to economic revival, resulted in a nationwide strike that forced the government to back down. An attempt to review constitutional provisions on local governments led to speculation that the president might alter the constitution to allow him to run for a third presidential term.

-- ~~(C)~~ Regional disaffection with the government remains high. Northerners perceive the administration as favoring southerners in key appointments, especially in the military, and the president is disinclined to build bridges to this important region. In the southeast, antagonism centers on the government's fraudulent actions during the April presidential election.

-- ~~(C)~~ Nigeria's print media reflect widespread concern among the public with the country's instability and Nigerians are privately talking about military intervention.

~~(S)~~ Military dissatisfaction with Obasanjo is high,

but the president retains considerable control over the armed forces.

-- ~~(S)~~ Appointees to critical positions such as chief of Defense Staff, chief of Army Staff, and minister of defense are Obasanjo loyalists and the president has kept the military weak by restricting its funding.

-- ~~(C)~~ With the armed forces occupied with peacekeeping commitments, especially its contribution to ECOMIL, and internal security missions, such as that in Warri, few top ranking officers are likely to have time to plot a coup, and Nigeria's coups historically were carried out by those at the top.

~~(S)~~ The recent fuel price strike, media focus on instability, regional antagonism, talk of military intervention, and ongoing domestic security crises are signs of serious trouble for Obasanjo. A military takeover is not imminent, but if the president is perceived as having lost control, the military will act.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DIA/J2 EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

SAUDI ARABIA: ~~(S)~~ Defense Officials Request Closer US Military Ties

~~(S)~~ Senior Saudi defense officials recently declared Riyadh's readiness for "new directions in the security relationship" in their initial meetings with the CENTCOM commander. Although eager to demonstrate the strength of the bilateral relationship through more US-provided training, bilateral exercises, border control, and counterterrorism, limited Saudi financial resources could thwart new initiatives.

-- ~~(S)~~ During recent meetings with US officials, Minister of Defense Prince Sultan expressed optimism about an improved bilateral military relationship in the future. **Sultan emphasized that the Saudi government is "determined to show the world the strength of the alliance."** He pressed for increased combined exercises and also requested improved Coalition cooperation along the Iraqi border.

-- ~~(S)~~ Sultan pointed out that both countries have suffered from terrorism, and requested increased cooperation with the US in "really combating" terrorism. Sultan opined that the Saudis held prisoner by Coalition forces in Iraq should be executed.

-- ~~(S)~~ Echoing Sultan's themes, Assistant Minister of Defense Prince Khalid added that the kingdom desired to move quickly on increased combined exercises involving Air Force, Navy, Air Defense, and especially Land Forces. **Asserting that illegal weapons are flowing in both directions, Khalid suggested a bilateral working committee be constituted to combat illegal smuggling of weapons and explosives along the Iraqi border.**

~~(S)~~ Although encouraging and substantive, the objectives discussed are subject to Princes Sultan and Khalid's varying ability to deliver on promises or commitments. Diminishing military budgets continue to force cutbacks in procurement and operations, and recently forced cancellation of planned exercises. **Despite the constraining financial realities, US officials stated the Saudis are clearly signaling a strong desire to remain in close step with the US as the region enters the post-Saddam era.**

-- (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

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DIA/J2 EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

RUSSIA-CHINA-BRAZIL: ~~(S)~~ Imagery Satellites Lost

~~(S)~~ Russia and China-Brazil recently lost imagery satellites. Russia lost Cosmos-2392, a reconnaissance satellite, while China and Brazil lost the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS-1), a jointly financed, built, and operated low-resolution Earth resources satellite.

~~(S)~~ Cosmos-2392, Russia's second ARAKS-N electro-optical satellite, became unstable on 10 August. It experienced a major malfunction and appears unlikely to return to service. Cosmos-2392 was orbited on 25 July 2002 and the reason for its failure 1 year into a mission expected to last 2-3 years is undetermined. This failure most likely is a major setback for Moscow's efforts to upgrade its military space capabilities, which are focused on higher quality satellites with longer lifetimes.

-- ~~(S//NF)~~ ARAKS-N satellites collect panchromatic (visible to near infrared) imagery with 0.73-meter to 1.32-meter resolution. The first ARAKS-N, Cosmos-2344, failed (probably because of operator error) after only 4 months in 1997.

-- ~~(S)~~ Russia's only active imagery reconnaissance satellite is Cosmos-2399, a first-generation panoramic imaging capsule satellite (PICSAT-1). It was orbited on 12 August 2003, and is expected to have about a 120-day mission, during which it will deorbit about eight film capsules. The first capsule was returned 20 August. PICSAT-1s collect visible-band imagery with ground sampling distance equivalent resolution estimated to be between 0.31 meter and 0.93 meter.


~~(S)~~ CBERS-1 apparently ceased operations on 13 August; when observed on the 19th, it was unstable. CBERS-1 was orbited on 14 October 1999 and operated well beyond its 2-year design life. CBERS-2 was to be orbited in 2001, but

technical problems have delayed it; it may be launched this fall, leaving only a short gap in CBERS imagery. In addition, various sources of commercial satellite imagery are still available.

-- ~~(S)~~ CBERS-1 was generally successful for a first mission; most of its numerous problems were resolved. The 260-meter-resolution wide-field imager failed in May 2000, but the primary 19.5-meter-resolution imagery system and the secondary 78-meter and 156-meter infrared scanners remained active.

~~(S)~~ China still has two 3-meter-resolution Jianbing-3 electro-optical satellites operational. They were orbited on 1 September 2000 and 27 October 2002. Each lost one of its two recorders after 12 and 8 months, respectively, halving the amount of imagery they can take beyond line of sight of Chinese ground stations.

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~~(S//NF)~~ CBERS-2 is expected to be similar to CBERS-1 (shown); they transmit imagery to Chinese and Brazilian ground sites.


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DIA/J2 EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

RUSSIA: (S) Work Continues On Early Warning Radar

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(S) Russia is continuing work on a large phased-array radar (LPAR) near Mischelevka designed for ballistic missile early warning and space surveillance. Efforts to complete Mischelevka most likely reflect Russian concerns about future US missile defense and space capabilities.

-- (S) Imagery revealed that two possible satellite communication dishes and an antenna mast were added in the operations support area at Mischelevka during the past year. In addition, a security fence was erected around the cooling facility between the transmitter and receiver buildings.

-- (S) Construction of the Mischelevka LPAR began in 1981, but slowed markedly in the early 1990s, probably owing to funding shortages. Emigre reports and imagery showing periodic deliveries to the site indicated internal radar components installation has proceeded since that time, but at a slow place.

-- (S) Additional work on support buildings, component installation, and signal testing will be required before the Mischelevka LPAR becomes operational.

(S) In the late 1990s, Russia resumed work on another Soviet-era space surveillance and missile early warning site that had remained dormant for nearly a decade.

~~(TS)~~ ~~FGI/NOFORN/X5~~ In mid-1999, Russia resumed construction of a similar LPAR near Baranovichi, Belarus. This radar is undergoing signal testing and could achieve full operational capability (FOC) as early as this year.

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-- (S) The past year's activity at Mischelevka suggests Russia will focus more resources on completing this radar now that Baranovichi is nearing FOC.

(S) Russian efforts to complete key aerospace defense sites probably are prompted by a need to improve early warning coverage of the Far East but likely also reflect an interest in cooperating with the US in shared early warning and concern about the pending US deployment of missile defenses and Moscow's perception that the US intends to "weaponize" space.

-- (U) In an April 2002 interview, Deputy Commander of the Space Troops Gen Vladimir Popovkin argued new space surveillance sites could "be transformed into the information basis for opposing a space enemy."

-- (S) Once operational, the Mischelevka LPAR will provide coverage of eastern China, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean.

~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~

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