

4 JANUARY 1971
DIAIS 2-71

AP-2
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~No Foreign Dissem~~



MASTER LIBRARY COPY
DS-4A1 PENTAGON



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Pages 7,9,10 and 11
are denied in full and
are not included.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

COPY 351

100402

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Defense Intelligence Summary is produced by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to serve the needs of the Department of Defense for appropriate current intelligence. It is furnished to non-Defense Department agencies for information only. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain items may be designated specifically for limited distribution. Other items not bearing release restrictive markings may be provided to eligible recipients by authorized DOD releasing agencies and intelligence components of the USIB. The releasing authority is responsible that items so provided conform to a specific need-to-know of the recipient and are in accordance with security and disclosure regulations. DIA Instruction No. 50-4 is applicable concerning release to contractors of any item in this publication. (The titles of individual articles contained herein have the same classification as the article.)

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3), 50 USC 403-1(i)

It is to be seen only by United States personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information. Its security must be maintained in accordance with (b)(3), 50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(3), 50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(3), 50 USC 403-1(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403
-1(i)

DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

CAMBODIA	Forces clearing Route 4 south of Pich Nil Pass suffer a major setback, and the Communists are reportedly reinforcing troops in the Kompong Cham area.	1
LAOS	Government forces near Ban Ban continue to withdraw, and the situation in the panhandle is static.	3
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	Hanoi tells Communists to increase self-sufficiency in support of Cambodian-Lao war effort.	4
	Another independent regiment in MR 3 is disbanded.	5
USSR	A new Soviet destroyer is identified.	6
	(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36	7
BOLIVIA-PANAMA	Terrorism may be renewed this week.	8
	(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36	9
		10

4 Jan 71

DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

DIAIS 2-71


~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

TOP SECRET

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

CAMBODIAN SITUATION




TOP SECRET

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

CAMBODIA

Government forces clearing Route 4 have suffered a major setback south of the Pich Nil Pass, and the Communists are reportedly reinforcing troops in the Kompong Cham area.



A three-battalion government task force moved north on Route 4 from Veal Rinh early on 1 January. The lead element, a battalion with 10 trucks, was ambushed three miles south of Stung Chhay. Radio contact was lost, the trucks were burned, and by evening only 100 survivors had returned to a gathering point three miles south of the ambush at Taney. Taney was attacked that night by a force that destroyed a bridge and cut Route 4. The remaining two task force battalions were ambushed the following day one mile north of Taney; results of this action are not known. The enemy forces are probably elements of the 101D Regiment, 1st NVA Division.

The six-battalion government task force proceeding southwest from Sre Khlong reached a position nine miles from the Pich Nil Pass without incident. The setback in the south, however, may cause the government to halt the entire drive temporarily and reevaluate the situation. When route-clearing drives have been stalled in the past, the army has reacted by reinforcing the area rather than by pressing forward. The ARVN may provide reinforcements again; it helped reopen Route 4 in mid-June when the 101D Regiment had cut it by capturing Kompong Speu. The recent success of the combined ARVN-Cambodian Army operation north of the capital on Route 7 may cause Phnom Penh to speed up negotiations with Saigon.

Action has remained light in the Kompong Cham area, but Cambodian agents continue to report the

(Continued)

4 Jan 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

infiltration and reinforcement of Communist forces there. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that enemy troops are crossing to the Kompong Cham side of the Mekong River.

A battalion-size government clearing operation began south of Siem Reap on the 30th. Communist activity had been reported there, particularly along the banks of the Tonle Sap. Troops reached their objective, Phnom Krom, on the 31st without incident. This friendly operation may be partially designed to pacify the fishing community, largely of Vietnamese stock, in the area.

Elsewhere, Leach was reportedly surrounded by the enemy on 31 December. It has been an enemy target, and he may be planning to attack it again to enhance his prestige in Military Region 3. ~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

4 Jan 71

DIA Intelligence Summary



Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~


(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS
PLAINE DES JARRES

LOCATION MAP



SOUTHERN LAOS



LAOS


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
4 JAN 71

LAOS

Government forces near Ban Ban continue to give ground, while at Muong Phalane and on the Bolovens Plateau the situation remains static.

Irregular forces east of the Plaine des Jarres are bogged down near Ban Ban. There is only light activity south of the town. To the north, however, the task force is still withdrawing. Two irregular battalions were attacked and forced from four forward positions on 2 January; the positions had been hit on 31 December.

In southern Laos, the fighting at Muong Phalane has diminished. A light mortar and ground attack was launched against friendly positions at Ban Houei Sai on the Bolovens Plateau. This and the retaking of Sites 23 and 42 without opposition were the only significant activity since the government lost Sites 23, 40, and 42 on 1 January. (CONFIDENTIAL)




~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Communist troops in northern Republic of Vietnam are being asked to make more sacrifices so that Hanoi can increase support of the war effort in Cambodia and Laos.

Clandestine sources claim that district-level cadres in Quang Tri Province have been told to become more self-sufficient. This has resulted from the impact of cross-border operations, loss of port access at Kompong Som and of local resources because of government pacification efforts, and increasing logistic and manpower requirements in Laos and Cambodia. Communist ability to maintain adequate forces in the Republic has been drastically reduced; supplies and manpower are being diverted to Laos and Cambodia, and efforts are to be made to recruit locally and transfer personnel for service in Cambodia.




Cadres were also reportedly told that a general uprising campaign is being prepared, to begin in early 1971 in Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MR TTH). The enemy, however, has repeatedly failed during the past year to mount military operations successfully in the populated lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This and the highly successful pacification program make it extremely unlikely that he can accomplish an uprising in MR TTH, even if accompanied by the major offensive effort that senior government commanders in the area expect next spring. The Communists may nevertheless hope to generate popular support through local uprisings. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

NVA REGIMENT DISBANDED



TOP SECRET

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

TOP SECRET

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)


~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The 1st NVA Regiment, previously subordinate to the VC Long An Subregion in South Vietnam's Military Region 3, has been disbanded.

Numerous intelligence sources indicate that the regiment, which had operated mainly in Long An Province but had elements in Cambodia's Svay Rieng Province, was disbanded in August. Two of the unit's badly understrength battalions were deactivated with remaining personnel absorbed by other units. Another, with an estimated strength of 120 troops, was redesignated the An My NVA Battalion, directly subordinate to the Long An Subregion.



This is the third independent regiment in Military Region (MR) 3 disbanded during the past year; the first two were the Quyet Thang and Dong Nai Regiments. All were apparently deactivated because of personnel shortages probably caused by the increased effectiveness of ARVN. Allied cross-border operations last year may have additionally affected the 1st's breakup.

Deletion of the 1st NVA Regiment leaves MR 3 with 95 combat battalions, of which 67 are maneuver battalions. (SECRET

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)


~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403
-1(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

SENEGALESE SUPPORT OF PORTUGUESE REBELS



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
4 JAN 71

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

BOLIVIA-PANAMA

Leftists are reportedly planning acts of terrorism which could start this week.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) in Bolivia plans either to kidnap or assassinate a US official. This move would coincide with attacks against US property in Santa Cruz and Bolivian industrialists in the area and with the initiation of urban guerrilla warfare. Despite recent losses, the ELN may be able to carry out sporadic terrorism, but US officials are taking precautions against such attacks.



The leftist extremist Movement of National Liberation in Panama intends to kidnap a USIS official. The organization, however, has limited capabilities and has almost ceased to exist, but some members may attempt an act of terrorism to demonstrate its viability.

Both groups have carried out terrorist attacks in the past, but neither is currently believed to be a serious threat to its government. Leftist terrorists in many Latin American countries continue trying to harass their governments by sporadic terrorism, with US officials their favorite targets. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY-CONTROLLED DISSEM)~~