17 DECEMBER 1971 DIAIS 294-71







DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Published by - Deputy Director for Intelligence

## DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

INDIA- PAKISTAN	Islamabad is considering New Delhi's cease-fire offer for the West following yesterday's surrender in the East.	1
CHINA	Peking increases its support for Islamabad.	3
CAMBODIA	Communists again interdict Route 6.	4
LAOS	Both sides intensify military operations.	5
	The level of logistic activity remains con- stant.	6
NORTH VIETNAM	Elements of three combat divisions may be relocating.	7
(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50	Two AAA regiments could be moving north.	8
(b)(1),(b)(3). 18 030 730,(b)(3).00		9
		10
LIBYA- EGYPT	The air forces are developing a pilot- interchange capability.	11
MIDDLE EAST	The 13 December UN resolution leaves much unresolved.	12
SYRIA	Three Soviet shipments are delivered.	13
(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):5	0 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36	14
		14
		15
	Press highlights	16

17 Dec 71

# DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

DIAIS 294-71

-TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

## INDIA-PAKISTAN

Islamabad is considering New Delhi's ceasefire offer for the West which followed the surrender of Pakistani forces in the East yesterday.

Lt Gen Niazi, commander of Pakistani units in the East, surrendered his forces to Lt Gen Aurora, Commander of the Indian Army Eastern Command, yesterday at 0601 hours EST in Dacca. The terms included a call for Pakistani forces to lay down arms at their present locations and surrender to the nearest regular troops under Aurora's command. Repatriation of Pakistani forces reportedly has been postponed until the cessation of hostilities in the West. Assurances were given that the surrendering Pakistani military and paramilitary units would be protected by the "Geneva Convention." Ethnic minorities and individuals of West Pakistani origin would also be guaranteed "protection."

Following the surrender, Prime Minister Gandhi stated that it was "pointless" to continue the conflict in the West and ordered a unilateral cease-fire effective 0930 hours EST today. In an address to the nation yesterday, Pakistani President Yahya Khan admitted the loss of the eastern province but stated that a "setback in one theater of war did not by any means signify the end of the struggle." He later tempered his statement saying that Islamabad was "prepared to honor any decision of the United Nations designed to bring about an honorable solution of the crisis.

Artillery shellings, small unit probes, and light air activity characterized military activity on the western front yesterday. Any increase in the level of fighting will presumably be dependent

(Continued)

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page 1

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

upon the Pakistani Government, as the Indian forces are supposed to begin a unilaterally imposed cease-fire today. According to a reliable clandestine source, Pakistani Army officers realize that the opportunity for an offensive in the West has been lost with the surrender of East Pakistan. The military have apparently concluded that if India chooses to shift units from East Pakistan, Islamabad can only wage a defensive war. <u>(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED</u> DISSEM)

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403 -1(i)

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403

#### **PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

Peking has apparently raised the level of its political support for Pakistan while continuing its policy of nonintervention.

In the first authoritative government statement published, the Chinese yesterday affirmed that they "will continue to render support materially" as well as politically. The statement asserted for the first time that India wants not only to annex the east wing "but also to annihilate all of Pakistan." It said that if New Delhi's aggressive action is not checked, all other nearby countries will be in danger. Despite a protest also issued yesterday by the Chinese Foreign Ministry accusing India of border intrusions, as well as recent indications that Peking may be strengthening its security along the Sino-Indian border, the government statement does not explicitly portray Indian actions as a threat to China's security.

The statement is more indicative of Chinese willingness to continue its military assistance to Pakistan rather than a sign that Peking is now prepared to intervene. Its restrained terminology seems to reflect Peking's estimate that the Chinese capability to alter the course of events is limited. The statement also underscores Chinese awareness that the campaign in the East is over, thus raising more sharply the question of Indian intentions toward West Pakistan

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRE

(b)(3):50 USC 403-

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### CAMBODIA

The communists have again interdicted Route 6.


Elements of the 271st VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, attempted to isolate Tang Kauk on 15 December by cutting the road. Friendly forces subsequently launched a counterattack from both Tang Kauk and Prakham, and effected a brief link-up. Early this morning, however, enemy forces surrounded Prakham and again interdicted Route 6. A friendly relief brigade with armored personnel carriers is en route from Skoun.

East of the Mekong River, communications intelligence indicates that Hq, 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, has moved westward from Dambe into the Chup Plantation. The regiment's relocation is most likely in response to South Vietnamese operations in the region. Enemy reaction to the penetration of the plantation has so far been light. (SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(1) NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



#### LAOS

Both sides are beginning to intensify military operations.

In the north, the communists heavily shelled Bouam Long on 15 December. Although an NVA prisoner had said earlier that the town would be overrun prior to the enemy's dry-season offensive on the Plaine des Jarres, a major assault is not anticipated at this time. Steppedup attacks by fire and ground probes are, however, likely to be launched to tie down friendly forces there and prevent harassment of the enemy's rear areas while his units are engaged on the Plaine.

Friendly troops are aggressively reacting to increased pressure on the Bolovens Plateau. In response to the communists' sharply intensified activity around Paksong, the government will soon deploy a new fourbattalion task force from Pakse to the area. A fourbattalion irregular force is already sweeping suspected North Vietnamese base areas north of Paksong in an effort to reduce enemy pressure. Elements of the 9th NVA Regiment are in the vicinity, and stiff resistance is


Government strategists may also believe that stepped-up operations on the Bolovens will prevent a massing of enemy troops for assaults on friendly units near Thateng. The communists are expected to renew their efforts to regain control of the vital lines of communication that pass through the area. Hq, 1st NVA Independent Battalion, has moved closer to Thateng and is now in a position to engage the task force trying to link up from the east with units in the town. (SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(1) NO

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET (i) (b)(3):50 USC 403-1

Páge 5



LAOS

Enemy logistic activity is continuing to follow patterns established over the past six weeks.

Support of units near the Plaine des Jarres in the past week remained well above that of last year. The number of truck sightings has declined but is still substantially higher than in the same period of 1970. Route 72, connecting staging areas in North Vietnam with the region southeast of the Plaine, will be open soon. Air observers have reported two-wheeled traffic and stacks of supplies as far west as Xieng Khouangville.


In the south, supplies are being fed into southbound logistic corridors at continuing low rates. An estimated 740 tons crossed the border from North Vietnam last week. This is a slight decrease from the previous seven days and about half of the tonnage noted during the same period last year. Sensor detections show logistic activity comparable to levels observed in 1970 only in the vicinity of Saravane.

The enemy may deliberately have slowed his logistic pace to avoid accumulations of supplies in areas vulnerable to Allied cross-border operations. A 10 December message contained a warning issued by the 70th NVA Front that friendly forces were preparing to launch a large-scale operation in the Muong Nong-Quang Tri Province area. In anticipation of such a threat, the communists may have decided to concentrate their supplies within North Vietnam rather than disperse them in threatened regions in Laos. If an Allied operation does materialize, the enemy can commit all his logistic reserve to the area of the incursion. (SECRET (D)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET 403-1(i)



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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

#### NORTH VIETNAM

Signal intelligence continues to indicate that elements of the 304th, 320th, and 324B NVA Divisions are relocating from North Vietnam.

The 70B Front has warned the 304th Division of Allied preparations to launch a large-scale operation. Units from that division, detected in a deployment status, have also warned subordinates of planned Allied operations in the Laos-Quang Tri Province border area.

On 11 December, Hq, 320th Division, was near the Ban Karai Pass; its subordinate 64th Regiment is tenuously located there. Indications that the 320th was deploying out of North Vietnam were first noted on the 4th. Intercepted messages since then have stated that its 48th and 52C Regiments were also relocating. These units may now be just inside southern Laos. Further substantiation of the movement was contained in a message of the 9th, which disclosed deployment to the B-3 Front of 10 infiltration groups, eight of which are believed to be integral to the 320th. The division has not been noted in communications with the 70B Front, which had maintained tactical control over it, since 25 November, and it may become subordinate to the B-3 Front.

The 70B Front has apparently replaced the 320th with the 324B Division as one of its principal subordinates. On 10 November, the 324B's headquarters appeared in communications with the Front on a facility previously utilized solely by the 320th. Communications between regimental elements of the 324B Division and the High Command of the Armed Forces of North Vietnam (HCAFNV) have recently been noted. In the past, the establishment of such communications between any

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
17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET

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divisional element and the HCAFVN has indicated intended movement by the element. These developments suggest that the 324B Division will also move.

While offensive activities may be planned, the enemy apparently continues to be apprehensive of another operation similar to LAMSON 719. These deployments may, therefore, be in response to this danger. (SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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## NORTH VIETNAM

Enemy messages suggest that two AAA regiments are moving northward in the southern panhandle.

Tenuous indications point toward a deployment of the 222d and 223d AAA Regiments to Nghe An Province. The 222d was operating in the lower Quang Binh Province-DMZ area as late as 24 November, and the 223d has been in Ha Tinh Province.

Following the buildup to 17 AAA regiments in Quang Binh Province late in the summer, some units were expected to deploy farther south along the main lines of communication into Laos. So far, the 224th, 227th, and 284th AAA Regiments and elements of the 210th and 218th have been detected in Laos west of the province.

The northward movement of AAA units in the southern panhandle is unusual at this time and suggests a change in plans. The deployment of the 226th and 213th AAA Regiments into Laos through the Barthelemy Pass in November may have left gaps in the defenses around Vinh or Quan Lang that Hanoi is now filling. Moreover, the recent increase in flight activity over northeastern Laos might have convinced the North Vietnamese that the units could be effectively employed to provide protection to returning MIGs. (SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1())

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

# LIBYA-EGYPT

The air forces are developing a pilot-interchange capability.

Egyptian pilots and support personnel have been training in Libya's MIRAGE fighter-bombers, C-130 HERCULES transports, and SUPER FRELON helicopters for some time. Libyans are now about to begin flight training in Egypt's Soviet-built aircraft. In a recent ceremony at the Egyptian Air Academy, War Minister Gen Sadiq acknowledged the presence of 50 Libyans in the graduating class. Twenty-five will reportedly be trained as pilots and 25 as navigators for service with the Egyptian Air Force.

The members of the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR) -- Egypt, Libya, and Syria -- have agreed to establish a unified military command for training and operations. According to a recent Egyptian announcement, Sadiq is its head. Attempts to develop an armed forces personnel-interchange capability, at least between Libya and Egypt, are likely to be accelerated in the coming months. The combined efforts of the three member states will not, however, materially improve CAR capabilities vis-a-vis Israel, principally because of personnel and logistic problems. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403

# MIDDLE EAST

The 13 December UN resolution on the Middle East leaves much unresolved.

The General Assembly passed a resolution urging Israel to withdraw from occupied territories and calling for a renewal of talks through UN special representative Jarring by a 72-vote margin; there were 36 abstentions. Israel opposed the resolution on the basis that the call for its withdrawal represents a precondition which it does not accept. The resolution was the product of considerable behind-the-scenes work among African and Western delegates. Neither European nations nor the Israelis were happy over the US abstention. The Europeans considered the resolution mild, while the Israelis wanted the US to oppose it. Israeli lobbying apparently was too intense to be productive.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 USC 798,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

The vote does not change the positions of the major participants. US abstention will provide Cairo new "proof" of Washington's support for Tel Aviv, but the Egyptians say they want the US to continue its diplomatic activity. Israel will not readily alter its adamant position, although there is talk of renewed clashes in the next two weeks. Neither side is believed to want a renewal of major hostilities, although limited fighting may occur. (TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) NO-FOREIGN DISSEM)

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page 12

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403 -1(i)


#### SYRIA

Damascus received three shipments of Soviet materiel last month.

Between 16 and 21 November at Latakia, LENINSKIY PIONER discharged 20 armored vehicles, 16 57- or 85mm antiaircraft guns, 11 ZIL-157 shop trucks, and a large quantity of ammunition. Four MIG-17/FRESCOs, one MIG-15/FAGOT, and 11 aircraft-associated crates were also unloaded (see photo); the latter were thought to have been delivered to Egypt. Also at Latakia between the 17th and 20th, ROMEN ROLLAN unloaded 12 artillery pieces of "medium calibre" and four trucks. On the 25th, SVETLOGORSK discharged ammunition.

Other ground-force equipment delivered this year from the USSR includes 35 tanks, 10 heavy field guns, an undetermined number of antiaircraft pieces, 43 antitank guns, and 872 trucks. Moreover, a Syrian Army newspaper has printed a photo of a Soviet 152-mm JSU-152 self-propelled assault gun, the first evidence that this weapon is in the country.

Damascus may be trying to bring a new mechanized unit up to full strength to create a second mechanized infantry division. To do so, however, more medium tanks and armored personnel carriers will be needed. Since the June 1967 war, Syria has been employing the Soviet doctrine of infantry mobility. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

# SOVIET PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

<u>Pravda</u> says foreign governments should avoid becoming involved in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. It has criticized the US and Chinese anti-Indian position at the UN and noted "sober voices" against US condemnation of India as an aggressor. <u>Izvestiya</u> has criticized Pakistani "repressions" and called Islamabad a tool of Chinese "maniacal" policy. TASS has called for an end to the "bloodshed" and a political settlement.

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403

Following the visit to Moscow of the Yemen Arab Republic delegation, President Podgorny condemned US and international Zionist support of Middle East "aggression." <u>Red Star</u> has claimed Tel Aviv is "internationally isolated," while <u>Izvestiya</u> has called for the unmasking of Washington's "quiet diplomacy" that "supports Israeli aggression."

The political climate for the Conference on European Security continues to improve because of Premier Kosygin's trips to Denmark and Norway and the initial Berlin agreements. <u>Pravda</u> sees the need for admission of both Germanys to the UN. It has called the Polish Party Congress and General Secretary Brezhnev's speech on "Party sensitivity to demands of the times" internationally significant.

Intense attacks on China's UN position on the Indo-Pakistani conflict continue unabated. <u>Pravda</u> claims Maoist political instability is evidenced in the current "palace-type plots," while TASS has called the Chinese leadership indifferent to the interests of the "antiimperialist" struggle.

Operation CHENLA II in Cambodia has been a complete failure, according to <u>Pravda</u>. Green Beret raids were said to be testimony of the "politically significant" US presence on the ground. (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

17 Dec 71

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page 16

TOP SECRET (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)