AQ / Zarqawi Network near-term Strategies

Overview of AQ/Zarqawi in Iraq

	Al	Qaida and Zarqawi Network combine to undertake attack
(b)(1);1.4 (c)	-	directly links Zarqawi to AQ
		Senior AQ leadership not in Iraq – some mid-level

- CPA/US presence presents some target opportunities, however most are hardened Prefers to conduct "spectacular" near-simultaneous attacks
 - Targeting of CF, CPA & infrastructure targets will probably remain with FRE and criminals
 - East Africa, USS Cole, 9/11, Kuwait, British Embassy Turkey
 - Most AQ attacks have obscure precedents
 - Interest in CBRN weapons
- Most AQ attacks occur with local logistic support
 - Large pool of disenchanted Iraqi's
 - Iraq awash with arms & explosives
 - Several cells identified but network capabilities unknown
- AQ fundamentalist doctrine despises deviant forms of Islam.
 - AQ has no qualms regarding collateral damage to other Muslims
 - Target 'apostates', Shia & Kurds
 - Use sectarian violence to cause instability
- Disrupt Coalition goals and attack US presence in region
 - Fracture Iraqi stability & society cause maximum civil disruption / impact election process
 - Target 'collaborators', Shia & Kurds

Shia Targets

Coordinated attacks on important Religious/Cultural symbols and people

Specific Targets

- Religious Leadership
 - Ayatollah Sistani / Hawza clerical leadership
 - Assassination of Sistani and/or other leading Hawza & GC (Jafari) members to focus duality
 of blame amongst Shia toward the Coalition and Sunni
- Other prominent Shia leaders
 - Hakim, Sadr, etc..
- Shia shrines and madressas in Najaf and Karbala are global Shiite centers
 - Attacks religious centers in Najaf and/or Karbala resulting in mass casualties, or multiple coordinated attacks against other mosques
- Shia gatherings centres
 - Markets, Religious Festivals, Sadr City, etc,...

Results

- Widespread civil unrest in southern Iraq pressures minor CF contributing nations
- Destruction of Shia shrines/leadership would not degrade the AQ's support base
- Possible spillage of Shia unrest across Mid-East
- Shia will retain large weapon stockpiles in readiness for self-protection & civil war
- · Expansion of covert Iranian activity

Kurdish Targets

Coordinated attacks on important Ethnic/Nationalist/Cultural symbols and people

Specific Targets

- Leadership
 - Talabani, Barzani, Barham Saleh (PUK PM), Hoshyar Zebari (FM)
- Municipal/Party Offices
 - Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Mosul
- Population Concentrations
 - Markets, Festivals, Cultural events, Political gatherings, etc...

Results

- · Widespread civil unrest in northern Iraq pressures US in lead-up to US elections
- New Kurdish leadership will not be strategically mature & attuned to Western interests
- Turkish involvement will impact on Al/AQ recruitment in refugee camps in AO and among Kurdish émigré communities
- Kurds will retain large weapon stockpiles in readiness for self-protection & civil war
- Force open a new Coalition front potentially fostering sectarian violence with Iraqi-Arabs
- · Military action against Kurds in north and Shia in south will add to impression of 'victimization' of Sunni
- Accelerate move toward independence; harden demands

Sunni Targets

Coordinated attacks on important Religious/Political symbols and people

Specific Targets

- Leadership
 - Assassination of Sunni GC participants and other 'collaborators'
 - · Current GC President Mushin al-Hamid
- Religious Sites
 - Attack on key places of worship and gathering
- Information Operation
 - AQ/Zarqawi information operations targeting disaffected Sunni


Results

- · Removal of voices of moderation against possible civil war
- Provides platform for inciting sectarian hatred and inter-communal violence
- · Reinforce belief in 'tit-for-tat' attacks by Shia
- Reinforce belief in inability of CF to provide protection to minorities
- · Highlights vulnerability of 'collaborators' and inability of security apparatus to provide protection
- · Lead to large weapon stockpiles in readiness for self-protection & civil war
- · Return to the fundamentals of Islam and the glory days of Baghdad



Kuwaiti Targets

- AQ publicly condemn Gulf governments for providing support to Coalition in Iraq.
 - Most dangerous threat may consist of a complex VBIED against HN or coalition diplomatic facility
 - Attacks against HN targets would reduce support by HN government and locals.
- US military installations present large and attractive targets for 'spectacular' attacks
 - US vulnerabilities are easy to identify
 - Publicized force movements
 - Facilities/convoys are easy to surveil
 - Significant TCN population resident in Kuwait
 - High value targets include:
 - US military facilities/camps
 - · Civilian housing
 - Western economic interests
 - Troop movements
 - VIPs
 - Infrastructure



Other Potential Targets

Key Governmental Infrastructure

- Disruption of power, water, etc...
 - Contributes to civil instability and insecurity

International Organizations

- Diminishes legitimacy and international acceptance of Coalition
 - UN Election Assessment Team

Coalition Forces/Installations

- Embarrasses US and Allies
- Reduce potential for new Coalition Partners / Possible pull-out of minor contributing nations
 - Mass casualty attacks against CPA, BIAP, etc...
 - Kidnapping of US/CF personnel

Ethnic and Religious minorities; Turkomen, Christians, Sabaen etc..



THE ENEMY

- Terrorist and FISS Threat Level is HIGH
- Known Terrorist Groups &
 Sympathizers to include: AL Qaida
 Affiliates, Individual Extremist, IZ
 Based Terrorists Groups, Kuwaiti
 Hezbollah.
- Foreign Intelligence Security
 Service (FISS) Threat
 - North Korea
 - Iranian Security Services
 - Russia/Syria/China

Threat Environment

Higher level of Force
Flow + Greater Threat
+ RIP in combat
increase the potential
for attacks against
KUWAIT and
Coalition Soft Targets

THE CONDITIONS

- Border Security Concerns
- Abundance of weapons/explosives into Kuwait
- Volunteer foreign fighters
- Large footprint/targets of opportunity

THE TERRORIST OBJECTIVES

Maximize Casualties / Damage
Degrade Public Support from HN
Influence US/KU Relations
Reduce Coalition Morale





Possible Timings


- AQ has not normally been influenced by historical timeframes but will be influenced by opportunities presented by major events and gatherings.
- Attack needs to occur <u>soon</u> in order to influence transition process.

Key dates might include:

08 Feb	Anniversary of Ba'ath Party taking power
22 Feb	Islamic Year Year
28 Feb	Transitional Administrative Law
02 Mar	Ashura (assassination of 3rd Imam)
16 Mar	Halabja CW Attack
20 Mar	Naw Ruz (Kurdish New Year)
15 Apr	Anniversary Martyrdom of Ayatollah Baqir Sadr
31 May	Transitional National Authority
30 Jun	Transition to sovereignty Anniversary of 1921 Revolt
?? ???	Arrival of UN election monitors
?? ???	Key Caucus / Election Meetings

Leaning Forward

- Multiple VBIED attack in An Najaf
 - mass casualties including high profile Shia personalities
 - dominate media
 - highlight Coalition shortcomings
- Serial attacks on both Shia and Sunni mosques
 - 'tit for tat' attacks
 - sectarian violence
- Attacks against Coalition personalities
 - dominate media
 - highlight Coalition shortcomings
- Multiple VBIED attack against Coalition Forces in MND CS/SE
 - Test diplomatic resolve
- Attacks IVO Kirkuk
 - Stir existing ethnic tensions



Questions?

