


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
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaida in Iraq

The Overall Classification of this Briefing is
~~**SECRET//NOFORN**~~

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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi



(b)(1);1.4 (a);1.4
(c)

- **Background**

- In Afghanistan/Pakistan late 1980s/early 1990s
- Detained in Jordan in mid-1990s
- Returned to Afghanistan/Pakistan, ran training camp
- Late 2001 fled to Iran, established base in N. Iraq
- Traveled throughout region in 2002/2003, in Iraq since mid-2003

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
(aka Ahmed Fadhil al-Khalaliyah)

Nationality: Jordanian
of Palestinian descent


DOB: 30 Oct 1966

- **Pre-OIF involvement in several terrorist operations**


- Millennium plot in Jordan, Dec 1999 and assassination of USAID official in Jordan, Oct 2002
- Toxins network/operations in Europe/Middle East

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Al-Zarqawi Merger With al-Qaida




- **Al-Zarqawi is the key face of jihad in Iraq**
 - Executed more high-profile attacks in Iraq than Usama Bin Ladin has worldwide
 - Capability and intent to conduct operations outside of Iraq
- **Publicly pledged allegiance to Bin Ladin in October 2004**
 - Changed group name to al-Qaida in Iraq
 - Formal alignment with bin Ladin will augment capabilities of jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan
 - Increases likelihood transnational operations will be conducted by veterans of Iraq jihad
- **Iraq jihad will continue after al-Zarqawi is captured/killed**
 - Network has proven adaptability and resiliency
 - External support nodes will remain critical



Al-Qaida in Iraq: Goals and Strategy

- **Al-Zarqawi strategy detailed in letter to Bin Ladin in Jan 2004**
 - Window of opportunity for jihad battle
 - Inciting war with Shia key to prolonging instability, motivating Iraqi and foreign Sunni extremists
- **Iraq elections have not altered al-Qaida goals, strategy, target set**
 - Al-Zarqawi views Iraqi Government as a US proxy, “apostate regime”
 - Targets include MNF-I, Iraqi Government, Shia, secular Kurdish leaders, elements supporting reconstruction efforts, and international organizations
 - Focusing attacks against Iraqi Government/security forces and MNF-I to hinder stability
- **Propaganda is window into jihadist goals**
 - Al-Zarqawi stated jihad in Iraq will continue until Islamic state established
 - Bin Ladin reference to Iraq as a “decisive war”

Al-Qaida in Iraq: Outlook for 2005



- **Resilient despite major set-backs**
 - More than 50 significant al-Zarqawi associates killed/captured since 2003
 - Loss of al-Fallujah as main operating base in late 2004
 - Coalition actions force network to continuously adapt
- **Continued high operational/propaganda tempo**
 - 2005 pace of attacks, propaganda higher than 2004 averages
 - Percentage of jihadist attacks small, but have disproportionate effect
- **Five key strengths**
 - Percentage of acquiescence/support from local populace, mergers with Iraqi extremist groups ensure freedom of movement
 - Mix of centralized/decentralized C2 fosters efficient, flexible attack plans
 - Propaganda garners sustained external support
 - Logistical pipelines replenish losses
 - Operatives able to quickly assume new responsibilities after key personnel losses
- **Al-Zarqawi as key driver of plots outside Iraq**
 - Support for multiple operations – Europe, Jordan, Lebanon, and Arabian Peninsula, including possible CONUS attack