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[SUBJ]

SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY U DITSUM 220-97, 20 AUG 1998(U)

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EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS

- 4. (U) WORLDWIDE TERRORISM NOTES
- -- A. (U) |Non Responsive
- 2. (U) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
- (U) WORLDWIDE: ISLAMIC FRONT AND ISLAMIC ARMY THREATEN MORE ANTI-US ATTACKS
- [1] (U) IN ITS 19 AUGUST EDITION THE ARABIC DAILY AL HAYAT NEWSPAPER CARRIED THREE NEW STATEMENTS FROM THE ISLAMIC ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY PLACES [ISLAMIC ARMY] AND ONE NEW STATEMENT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT FOR JIHAD AGAINST CRUSADERS AND JEWS [ISLAMIC FRONT]. THESE STATEMENTS WARNED AGAINST FURTHER ATTACKS AGAINST WORLDWIDE US INTERESTS. THE RHETORIC WITHIN THE STATEMENTS RESEMBLED PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED VERBIAGE AND REITERATED THE GROUP'S DEMANDS/COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING A US WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL MUSLIM LANDS, THE CESSATION OF US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, AND THE CESSATION OF THE US WAR AGAINST ISLAM. IN ONE OF ITS THREE STATEMENTS, THE ISLAMIC ARMY CLAIMED THE OPERATION IN NAIROBI WAS NOT INTENDED TO HARM KENYANS; HOWEVER, THE GROUP BLAMED THE KENYAN AND US GOVERNMENTS FOR BRINGING WAR TO KENYA. THOUGH THE ISLAMIC FRONT'S AND ISLAMIC ARMY'S STATEMENTS ARE NEARLY IDENTICAL IN CONTENT AND TONE, NONE OF (b)(3):10 USC 424

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THE STATEMENTS MENTION A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS.

(U) COMMENT: THE ISLAMIC ARMY ANNOUNCED ITS FORMATION AND

CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE NAIROBI AND DAR ES SALAAM BOMBINGS IN THREE STATEMENTS ISSUED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE NEAR-SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS. THE GROUP NAMED THE OPERATIONS AFTER THE AL AQSA MOSQUE IN JERUSALEM AND THE KAABA LOCATED IN THE GRAND MOSQUE IN MECCA. THE SECRET

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PAGE 03 200135Z DELIBERATE NAMING OF THE OPERATIONS CORRESPONDS TO ONE OF THE GROUP' STATED GOALS--LIBERATING MUSLIM HOLY SITES. THE ISLAMIC FRONT IS THE SELF-CHOSEN NAME GIVEN TO THE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION CREATED BY USAMA BIN LADIN EARLIER THIS YEAR. IN FEBRUARY, A BIN LADIN-SPONSORED FATWA WAS ISSUED UNDER THE MONIKER OF THE FRONT AND CALLED FOR A WORLDWIDE JIHAD AGAINST US AND ISRAELI INTERESTS. THE FATWA WAS SIGNED BY BIN LADIN, AIMAN ZAWAHIRI OF THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD [EIJ], FAZLUR RAHMAN OF THE PAKISTANI HARAKAT AL ANSAR, MEIR HAMZA OF THE PAKISTANI JAMIAT I ULEMA, ABD AL SALAM MUHAMMAD OF THE BANGLADESHI HARAKAT AL JIHAD, AND RIFAI MUSA OF THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC GROUP [IG]. IN LATE JULY MUSA OFFICIALLY DISASSOCIATED THE IG FROM THE FRONT, BUT CLAIMED TO SUPPORT THE FRONT'S GOALS. (S) IT IS ASSESSED THE ISLAMIC ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY PLACES IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN AD HOC NAME USED BY BIN LADIN RELATED

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PAGE 4 SECRET NOFORN ACTIVISTS FOR THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING THE ISLAMIC FRONT FOR JIHAD AGAINST CRUSADERS AND JEWS IS A BIN LADIN

ORGANIZED AND SPONSORED LOOSE GROUPING OF MILITANT ISLAMISTS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES. WITHIN THE FRONT, THE EIJ LIKELY PLAYS A PRIMARY ROLE. BIN LADIN, THE EIJ, AND THE IG REMAIN THE PRIMARY SUSPECTS BEHIND THE BOMBINGS. Non Responsive

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(S/NF) SUPPORTERS AND SYMPATHIZERS OF THE ALGERIA-BASED ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT [FIS] AND ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP [GIA] CAN BE FOUND	
WITHIN (b)(1),1.4 (d) ARAB COMMUNITY.	
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(b)(1),1.4 (c)	
BOTH BIN LADIN AND THE ALGERIAN GROUPS ARE COMPRISED OF	
SUNNI MUSLIMS AND SHARE THE SAME BASIC GOAL TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC	
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REGIME IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES BASED ON SHARIA ISLAMIC LAW.	
(b)(1),1.4 (c)	e.
ALTHOUGH GIA TERRORISTS HAVE TARGETED WESTERN INTERESTS, THEY HAVE NOT ATTACKED US INTERESTS.	
3. (U) SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
A. (U) USAMA BIN LADIN: A PRIMER ON ONE OF THE SUSPECTS IN THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS	ê
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PAGE 2 SECRET NOFORN	
[1] (S/NF) SUMMARY: USAMA BIN LADIN'S ORGANIZATION IS ONE OF THE	

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PRIME SUSPECTS BEHIND THE 7 AUGUST BOMBINGS OF THE US EMBASSIES IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA. THE OTHER PRIMARY SUSPECTS ARE THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD [EIJ] AND THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC GROUP [IG]. BIN LADIN IS CLOSELY TIED TO THE EIJ, AND HAS NUMEROUS CONNECTIONS WITH THE IG. BIN LADIN HAS LONG WAGED A WAR OF WORDS AGAINST THE US, WHICH HAS HEATED UP IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS. BIN LADIN'S ORGANIZATION HAS THE CAPABILITIES TO ATTACK US INTERESTS, AND ENHANCES THESE CAPABILITIES THROUGH COOPERATION WITH OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS.

- [2] (U) DISCUSSION:
- [A] (C/NF) BACKGROUND. USAMA BIN LADIN IS A MAN OF MANY FACES. HE IS A WEALTHY FINANCIER OF ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS AROUND THE WORLD. HE IS A SAUDI DISSIDENT, WHOSE OPPOSITION TO THE ROYAL FAMILY COST HIM HIS CITIZENSHIP AND LED TO HIS EXPULSION FROM THE KINGDOM IN 1991. HIS ORGANIZATION, MADE UP OF ISLAMIC MILITANTS OF MANY NATIONALITIES, IS BASED IN QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN -- THE CAPITAL OF THE TALIBAN MILITIA. THOUGH BIN LADIN'S ORGANIZATION IS BASED IN AFGHANISTAN, HE HAS ACTIVE ASSETS AROUND THE WORLD. BIN LADIN'S IMMEDIATE GOAL IS THE EXPULSION OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES,

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PARTICULARLY THE US PRESENCE, FROM THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, WHILE HE ULTIMATELY HOPE TO OVERTURN WHAT HE VIEWS AS A CORRUPT SAUDI REGIME.

[B] (S) THE BIN LADIN THREAT TO US INTERESTS. BESIDES HIS ORGANIZATION'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES [SEE BELOW], THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN BIN LADIN'S RHETORIC ALONE WILL INSPIRE THOSE WHO ARE PREPARED TO USE VIOLENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THEIR AIMS.

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SINCE BIN LADIN'S INITIAL CALL FOR JIHAD AGAINST THE US IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IN AUGUST 1996, THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY FLOW OF THREAT REPORTING ALLEGING FUTURE ANTI-US ATTACKS IN (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) BIN LADIN'S RHETORIC ALSO SERVES TO INCITE OTHER EXTREMISTS TO COMMIT ACTS AGAINST THE US, AND TO RECRUIT NEW MEMBERS. HE HAS YET TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON HIS THREATS TO CONDUCT AN ANTI-US ATTACK IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. HOWEVER, BIN LADIN DID STATE IN A NOVEMBER 1996 INTERVIEW THAT PREPARATIONS FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS REQUIRE TIME. BIN LADIN PROVIDED THIS ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION OF WHY AN ATTACK SIMILAR TO KHOBAR TOWERS HAD NOT OCCURRED AFTER HIS INITIAL CALL FOR JIHAD AGAINST THE US IN LATE AUGUST 1996. THE CULTURAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MIDDLE EASTERN AND WESTERN MINDSETS REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF TIME MAY ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR

(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONSIDERATION. USING THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DAYS OR WEEKS AS THE MEASURING STICK WHEN BIN LADIN REFERS TO NEAR-TERM ATTACKS MAY BE CONTRARY TO HIS MIDDLE EASTERN MINDSET OF MONTHS OR YEARS.

(S/NF) OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, BIN LADIN'S THREATS AGAINST US FORCES HAVE BEEN GETTING MORE NUMEROUS AND MORE SPECIFIC, MENTIONING BOTH A TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL TARGETS. IN FEBRUARY BIN LADIN PUBLICLY ISSUED A RELIGIOUS DECREE URGING ALL MUSLIMS TO KILL AMERICANS WHEREVER THEY ARE FOUND. DURING A 26 MAY PRESS CONFERENCE IN KHOWST, AFGHANISTAN BIN LADIN STATED THE RESULTS OF HIS JIHAD AGAINST THE US PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE RULING REGIME WOULD BE FELT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. IN HIS RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS, BIN LADIN HAS ALSO FOCUSED ON THE TARGETING OF US CIVILIANS.

(U) IN A LATE-MAY INTERVIEW WITH A US TELEVISION NETWORK, BIN LADIN

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SECRET PAGE 04 200136Z MADE A VEILED THREAT TO US MILITARY AIRCRAFT. BIN LADIN ASKED HYPOTHETICALLY HOW THE US COULD JUSTIFY THE DEATHS OF 250 SOLDIERS ABROAD FROM A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE ATTACK AGAINST A MILITARY PASSENGER AIRPLANE. HE ALSO ADMITTED SAUDI AUTHORITIES HAD RECENTLY CAPTURED A NUMBER OF MISSILES FROM HIS SUPPORTERS, INCLUDING STINGERS. HOWEVER, HE CLAIMED HIS SUPPORTERS, PRESUMABLY IN THE KINGDOM, HAD MANY MORE SUCH WEAPONS AVAILABLE. SECRET NOFORN PAGE 5 INTELLIGENCE INDICATES BIN [C] (C/NF) CAPABILITIES AND TACTICS. LADIN CONTROLS A CORE ORGANIZATION THAT FOLLOWS HIS EDICTS. INTENTIONS TO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS, COUPLED WITH VARIOUS CONNECTIONS TO KNOWN MILITANT GROUPS AND ACCESS TO AND FUNDING FOR WEAPONRY LEADS TO AN ASSESSMENT THAT BIN LADIN FOLLOWERS ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT ATTACKS AGAINST US INTERESTS. THIS INCLUDES ASSASSINATIONS, ARMED ASSAULTS, AND BOMBINGS. BIN LADIN'S PERVASIVE NETWORK INCLUDES: MULTIPLE COMMUNICATIONS CONDUITS, BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT; SUPPORTERS, INCLUDING OPERATIVES; AND ACCESS TO WEAPONS. THE NETWORK HE HAS ESTABLISHED IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE: BIN LADIN HAS THE IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR CARRYING OUT ATTACKS; HE HAS ACCESS TO VAST SUMS OF MONEY, WEAPONS, AND FIGHTERS; AND ACCESS TO EXTREMIST CIRCLES OUTSIDE OF HIS OWN ORGANIZATION. (8) HIS FOLLOWERS ARE WELL ARMED, WELL FINANCED AND WELL MOTIVATED MANY WITH MILITARY EXPERIENCE THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN THE VARIOUS JIHADS WHICH BIN LADEN HAS SUPPORTED. HE HAS CLAIMED PUBLICLY TO HAVE PROVIDED FIGHTERS FROM HIS ORGANIZATION TO TAKE PART IN VARIOUS JIHAD AROUND THE GLOBE; (b)(1),1.4 (c) HIS FIGHTERS CURRENTLY IN AFGHANISTAN SPEND SECRET (b)(3):10 USC 424 SECRET PAGE 05 200136Z PAGE 6 S E C R E T NOFORN TIME AT THE FRONTLINES FIGHTING ALONGSIDE TALIBAN MILITIAMEN. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S/NF) BIN LADIN ADMITTED TO WEAPONS SEIZURES IN SAUDI ARABIA DURING A LATE-MAY 1998 INTERVIEW ON A US TELEVISION NETWORK, DURING WHICH HE MADE A VEILED THREAT TO US MILITARY AIRCRAFT. HE CLAIMED SAUDI AUTHORITIES HAD RECENTLY CAPTURED A NUMBER OF MISSILES, INCLUDING STINGERS. HOWEVER, HE CLAIMED THERE WERE MANY MORE SUCH WEAPONS AVAILABLE, PRESUMABLY IN THE KINGDOM, AND ASKED HYPOTHETICALLY HOW THE US COULD JUSTIFY THE DEATHS OF 250 SOLDIERS ABROAD FROM A MISSILE ATTACK AGAINST A MILITARY PASSENGER AIRPLANE. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE BIN LADIN SUPPORTERS (b)(1),1.4 (c) ARE IN POSSESSION OF SAMS, TO

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	03 OF 05 SECTION 3 OF 5 QQQQ SUBJ:DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TERRORISM SUMMARY U INCLUDE STINGERS; HOWEVER, IT IS LIKELY BIN LADIN'S ORGANIZATION HAS THEM IN AFGHANISTAN. IN FACT, A REPORTER AT HIS 26 MAY PRESS CONFERENCE IN KHOWST REPORTED SEEING SA-7S IN THE HANDS OF HIS (b)('GUARDS. REGARDLESS, IF BIN LADIN WANTS TO GET SUCH WEAPONS HE IS CAPABLE OF DOING SO. (b)(1),1.4 (c)	1),1.4 (d)
	[E] 1C) NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. SOME ISLAMIC NGOS ARE EXPLOITED BY TERRORISTS AS KEY SEGMENTS OF A WORLDWIDE LOGISTICS NETWORK. (b)(1),1.4 (c)	

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	(b)(1),1.4 (c)			•
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	TODAY EGYPTIANS COMPRISE A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF BIN LADIN'S SENIOR GROUP OF LIEUTENANTS AND	I.		, .
	ADVISORS.			
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	(b)(1),1.4 (c)			E.
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	(U) A LEADING AL-JIHAD MEMBER CLAIMED IN A JULY 1995 INTERVIEW WITH	1		٠
	EGYPTIAN JOURNALISTS THAT BIN LADIN HELPED FUND THE GROUP AND WAS AT TIMES WITTING OF SPECIFIC TERRORIST OPERATIONS MOUNTED BY THE GROUP			
	AGAINST EGYPTIAN INTERESTS. EGYPTIAN SECURITY SERVICES HAVE ALSO PUBLICLY ACCUSED BIN LADIN OF FUNDING AL-JIHAD AND OTHER EGYPTIAN AFGHANS.	•		
	(b)(1),1.4 (c)			
	AND THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC MILITANTS SHARE A SIMILAR, (b)(1),1.4 (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c) DESIRE TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC CALIPHATE GOVERNED BY			
	ISLAMIC [SHARIA] LAW. BOTH PARTIES REJECT THE STATE OF ISRAEL, ARE CRITICAL OF THE WEST AND THE US IN PARTICULAR, AND ADVOCATE THE USE		8	
	OF VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS. CONVERSELY, THOUGH BIN LADIN READILY ASSISTS ISLAMIC MILITANTS IN SEVERAL STATES AND CLAIMS TO SEEK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GLOBAL ISLAMIC CALIPHATE, HIS FOCUS IS			100.
٠	THE GULF REGION AND THE EXPULSION OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA.			
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THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD

THE EIJ, PARTICULARLY THE ZAWAHIRI FACTION, WILL BECOME FURTHER IMMERSED IN THE BIN LADIN NETWORK AS TIME PASSES. WHETHER OR NOT THIS INCREASES THE THREAT TO US INTERESTS WILL DEPEND UPON BIN LADIN'S WILLINGNESS TO TARGET US INTERESTS.

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THE FOUR SAUDI SUNNI RADICAL ISLAMISTS BEHEADED FOR THE NOVEMBER 1995 OPM/SANG BOMBING IN RIYADH CLAIMED DURING THEIR TELEVISED CONFESSIONS THAT BIN LADIN HAD "INSPIRED" THEM.

(S/NF) BIN LADIN HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCTING ATTACKS AGAINST US INTERESTS IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA, MOST NOTABLY THE ATTACKS THAT OCCURRED AT TWO HOTELS IN ADEN, YEMEN, ON 29 DECEMBER 1992.

(b)(1),1.4(c)

HOWEVER, TWO AUSTRIAN TOURISTS AND A YEMENI BYSTANDER WERE KILLED. BEYOND BIN LADIN'S CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITY, THE ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS ARRESTED FOR THE BOMBINGS ALSO CLAIMED THAT BIN LADIN FINANCED THEIR GROUP.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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(U) AL-KHALIFAH WAS ALSO ONE OF 25 PERSONS CHARGED -- AND LATER ACQUITTED -- IN JORDAN FOR ORGANIZING AN ISLAMIC EXTREMIST GROUP, CARRYING OUT CINEMA BOMBINGS THERE, AND PLOTTING TO BOMB AND ASSASSINATE PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS AND THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER. ONE OF LEADERS OF JORDANIAN BOMBING PLOT, ABDULLAH KAMEL ABDULLAH AL HASHAIKAH, LEFT JORDAN IN MID-1993 TO WORK IN THE IMAM AL-SHAFI CENTER, RUN BY KHALIFAH, IN THE PHILIPPINES. ANOTHER OF THE ORGANIZATION'S LEADERS REPORTEDLY TRAVELLED TO YEMEN, ALLEGEDLY STAYING IN A BIN LADIN-SPONSORED TRAINING CAMP FOR THREE MONTHS TO LEARN BOMB-MAKING.

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