

**CDS**

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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**FROM**

FM JOINT STAFF (b)(3):10 USC 424

**CONTROLS**

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SECTION 1 OF 2

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/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

**BODY**

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SUBJ: (U) DIA NMJIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 14 FEBRUARY.

SUMMARY OF FEATURES

**IRAQ: (U) WEEKLY SECURITY REVIEW**

~~(S)~~ THE NUMBER OF **ATTACKS** DURING THE 3-9 FEBRUARY PERIOD DROPPED 57 PERCENT FROM THE PREVIOUS REPORTING PERIOD, RETURNING ROUGHLY TO PRE-ELECTION LEVELS

Non  
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
**IRAQ: (U) MOSUL POLICE FORCE STATURE, EFFECTIVENESS REMAIN DAMAGED**

~~(S/NP)~~ ALTHOUGH IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN **MOSUL** RECENTLY HAVE

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PERFORMED REMARKABLY WELL, RESTORING THE MOSUL POLICE SERVICE'S FLAWED REPUTATION AND IMPROVING ITS EFFECTIVENESS PRESENTS A MOMENTOUS, LONG-TERM CHALLENGE; NEWLY APPOINTED PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF MAJ GEN AHMAD AL-JABOURI'S RELUCTANCE TO COOPERATE WITH US OFFICIALS IN COMBATING THE INSURGENCY AND HIS INABILITY TO WIN THE CONFIDENCE OF NINAWA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPEDE EFFORTS TO BRING SECURITY TO AN AREA WITH HIGH LEVELS OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY AND A HISTORY OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR MISMANAGEMENT.



Non  
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**IRAQ: (U) WEEKLY SECURITY REVIEW**

1. (S) THE NUMBER OF **ATTACKS** DURING THE 3-9 FEBRUARY PERIOD DROPPED 57 PERCENT FROM THE PREVIOUS REPORTING PERIOD, RETURNING ROUGHLY TO PRE-ELECTION LEVELS. THIS DECLINE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE

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EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH LEVEL OF **ATTACKS** DURING THE PREVIOUS WEEK (WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS), COMBINED WITH THE INSURGENTS' SUBSEQUENT NEED TO REFIT AND REGROUP FOLLOWING THAT PERIOD OF ELEVATED ACTIVITY. IN ADDITION TO THE LEVEL OF **ATTACKS**, OVERALL TARGETING HAS ALSO RETURNED TO PRE-ELECTION PATTERNS. DURING THE PREVIOUS REPORTING PERIOD (27 JANUARY THROUGH 2 FEBRUARY), **ATTACKS** ON IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) AND CIVILIANS COMPRISED MORE THAN 40 PERCENT OF ALL REPORTED INCIDENTS, AN UNUSUALLY HIGH PROPORTION; HOWEVER, DURING THE 3-9 FEBRUARY REPORTING PERIOD, **ATTACKS** ON ISF AND CIVILIANS ACCOUNTED FOR LESS THAN 30 PERCENT OF ALL INCIDENTS, WHICH IS MORE IN LINE WITH TYPICALLY OBSERVED LEVELS. VIOLENCE REMAINED CONCENTRATED IN THE SUNNI AREAS, WITH FEWER THAN 6 PERCENT OF THE REPORTED **ATTACKS** OCCURRING IN THE SHIA-DOMINATED CENTER-SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST REGIONS.

2. -- (S) **ATTACKS** ON COALITION FORCES DROPPED BY 47 PERCENT, FROM 591 TO 315. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DECREASES OCCURRED IN THE WEST (58 PERCENT), BAGHDAD (49 PERCENT), AND NORTH-CENTRAL (48 PERCENT) REGIONS. JUST UNDER HALF OF THE WEEK'S **ATTACKS** WERE DIRECTED AGAINST PATROLS, WITH CONVOYS AND BASES THE NEXT MOST COMMON TARGETS. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDS) WERE THE MOST COMMONLY USED WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION FORCES, ACCOUNTING FOR MORE THAN A THIRD OF THE **ATTACKS**.

3. -- (S) **ATTACKS** ON ISF DROPPED FROM 161 TO 63, A DECREASE OF 61 PERCENT. ISF PERSONNEL CONTINUED TO BE **ATTACKED** WHILE ON AND OFF DUTY. NOTEWORTHY INCIDENTS INCLUDED A VEHICLE-BORNE IED **ATTACK** ON A POLICE STATION IN BAQUBAH AND A SUICIDE **ATTACK** ON A POLICE FORMATION AT A HOSPITAL IN MOSUL. SMALL ARMS WERE INVOLVED IN JUST OVER HALF OF THE **ATTACKS** TARGETING ISF.


4. -- (S) **ATTACKS** ON CIVILIANS DECREASED 77 PERCENT, FROM 257 TO 58. TARGETS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD INCLUDED POLITICAL FIGURES AND IRAQI CIVILIANS SUPPORTING THE COALITION. NOTABLE **ATTACKS** INCLUDED A SUICIDE BOMBING AT AN ISF RECRUITING FUNCTION IN BAGHDAD AND THE ASSASSINATIONS OF A SHIA CITY COUNCILMAN FOR AL KHALIS (NEAR BAQUBAH) AND A SPOKESMAN FOR THE AL BASRAH GOVERNORATE, WHO ALSO WAS A CORRESPONDENT FOR THE US-BACKED TV/RADIO STATION. SMALL ARMS WERE INVOLVED IN JUST OVER HALF OF THE **ATTACKS** ON CIVILIANS.

5. (S) OVERALL VIOLENCE WILL LIKELY REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT IN THE NEAR TERM; HOWEVER, MASS CASUALTY INCIDENTS TARGETING THE SHIA POPULATION DURING THE UPCOMING ASHURA/ARBAEEN CELEBRATIONS ARE POSSIBLE. LAST YEAR'S ASHURA OBSERVANCE WAS MARKED BY SPECTACULAR **ATTACKS** IN BAGHDAD AND KARBALA. IN ADDITION, TARGETING OF CIVILIANS, PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT, IS ALSO

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EXPECTED TO INCREASE NOW THAT ELECTION RESULTS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED.

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**IRAQ: (U) MOSUL POLICE FORCE STATURE, EFFECTIVENESS REMAIN DAMAGED**

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ ALTHOUGH IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN **MOSUL** RECENTLY HAVE PERFORMED REMARKABLY WELL, RESTORING THE **MOSUL** POLICE SERVICE'S FLAWED REPUTATION AND IMPROVING ITS EFFECTIVENESS PRESENT A MOMENTOUS, LONG-TERM CHALLENGE. NEWLY APPOINTED PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF MAJ GEN AHMAD AL-JABOURI'S RELUCTANCE TO COOPERATE WITH US OFFICIALS IN COMBATING THE INSURGENCY AND HIS INABILITY TO WIN THE CONFIDENCE OF NINAWA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPEDE EFFORTS TO BRING SECURITY TO AN AREA WITH HIGH LEVELS OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY AND A HISTORY OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR MISMANAGEMENT.

2. -- ~~(S//NF)~~ JABOURI

Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

INSTRUCTED HIS SENIOR OFFICERS TO RESIST COOPERATING WITH US OFFICIALS, AS WELL, OR FACE PUNITIVE ACTION.

3. -- ~~(S//NF)~~ JABOURI SAID HE HAD NOT VISITED ANY AREAS OF NINAWA PROVINCE OUTSIDE **MOSUL'S** OUTSKIRTS BECAUSE IT WAS TOO DANGEROUS TO DO

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

4. -- ~~(S//NF)~~ DURING THE 10 NOVEMBER POLICE COLLAPSE, KASHMULLA REPLACED THEN-POLICE CHIEF MAJ GEN BARHAWI WITH DEPUTY CHIEF BRIG GEN ADIL FATHALLAH, WHO RESIGNED ON 12 DECEMBER. AFTER AT LEAST FIVE GENERAL-LEVEL OFFICERS DECLINED THE JOB, MINISTER OF INTERIOR NAQIB FOUND JABOURI, WHO REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN RETIRED FOR 10 YEARS AND LOOKED AND ACTED LIKE SOMEONE WHO HAD BEEN TALKED INTO TAKING THE POSITION.

5. ~~(S)~~ IN THE PUBLIC'S VIEW, THE POLICE ARE STILL SEEN AS CORRUPT, COWED, POORLY RESOURCED, AND UNTRAINED. RECENT INFORMATION INDICATES INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO HOLD INFLUENCE OVER THE EXISTING FORCE, WHICH REMAINS ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF ITS MID-NOVEMBER STRENGTH. THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FURTHER UNDERCUT THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS) RECOVERY AND DIMINISHED ITS OWN AUTHORITY AND STATURE BY PROMOTING NEPOTISM

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DURING A CRITICAL PERIOD FOR SECURITY.

6. -- (~~S//NF~~) IN EARLY FEBRUARY, AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF THE **MOSUL** IPS REPORTEDLY DISAPPROVED OF THE DETENTION OF A HIGH-VALUE TARGET, ALLEGEDLY DISCUSSING WAYS TO EFFECT HIS RELEASE.

7. -- (~~S~~) IN EARLY FEBRUARY, **MOSUL**-BASED EXTREMISTS CONSIDERED THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPROVING OWING TO NEGLIGIBLE IPS PRESENCE AND A COALITION FORCE DRAWDOWN.

8. -- (~~S//NF~~) AN IPS COLONEL WORKING IN THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE REPORTEDLY PASSED SENSITIVE IPS INFORMATION TO ZARQAWI-ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS IN LATE JANUARY. HE WAS ASSISTED BY ANOTHER IPS OFFICER.

9. -- (~~S//NF~~) IN LATE DECEMBER, **MOSUL** IPS OFFICERS WERE GIVEN CREDIBLE, ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE ON ABU MARWAN (A HIGH-LEVEL ZARQAWI-ASSOCIATED OPERATIVE) FROM AN AGGRIEVED FATHER. HOWEVER, THE POLICE REPORTEDLY DID NOT INVESTIGATE -- CLAIMING IT WAS TOO DANGEROUS.

10. -- (~~S//NF~~) IN LATE NOVEMBER, A PROMINENT TRIBAL SHEIKH DESCRIBED PROBLEMS WITH THE IPS, INCLUDING TOP-TO-BOTTOM DOMINANCE OF INSURGENTS AND INSURGENT SYMPATHIZERS, CORRUPT OFFICERS HIRED THROUGH CRONYISM, POOR QUALITY OF RECRUITS, AND GENERAL INTIMIDATION. AS A RESULT, CITIZENS WOULD NOT GO TO THE IPS FOR EVEN MINOR PROBLEMS. A KURDISH CITIZEN CLAIMED THAT THOSE WORKING FOR THE COALITION TRIED KEEPING THE **MOSUL** IPS FROM DISCOVERING THEIR EMPLOYER FOR FEAR OF RETRIBUTION.

11. -- (~~S//NF~~) KASHMULLA REPEATEDLY REQUESTED BARHAWI'S DISMISSAL AND REPLACEMENT FROM JULY TO NOVEMBER. THOSE REQUESTS WERE DENIED BECAUSE OF BARHAWI'S FRIENDSHIP WITH A RELATIVE OF IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT PRESIDENT YAWR AND FRIEND OF NAQIB. THROUGH THIS CONNECTION, HE SECURED A PROMOTION TO A HIGH-LEVEL MINISTRY OF INTERIOR POST IN BAGHDAD. IN LATE DECEMBER, BARHAWI REPORTEDLY WAS INTERFERING WITH **MOSUL** IPS ACTIVITIES, WHICH DISCOURAGED RESPONSIBLE POLICE FROM RETURNING TO WORK.

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Pgs 154-162 are non responsive and pg.163 is denied in full.

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