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CDS

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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FROM

(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ): SYRIA (SY).

IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SECTION 1 OF 2

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO **USAMA BIN LADIN** AND **AL QAEDA** IN THE EARLY 1990'S (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 19940101.

(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) [] THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD LITTLE INTEREST IN AL QAEDA AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EARLY 1990'S. IRAQI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WAS CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH IRAN AND INTELLIGENCE THAT WOULD IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, LEADING TO EASED SANCTIONS.

TEXT: 1. (U) LACK OF INTEREST IN EXTERNAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD LITTLE INTEREST IN EXTERNAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EARLY 1990'S. THE IIS DID NOT HAVE MUCH DETAIL ON OR INTEREST IN USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL) AND THE AL QAEDA

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(AQ) ORGANIZATION. THE IIS LEARNED ABOUT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING IN 1993 AFTER THE CAPTURE OF AN IRAQI AMERICAN SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING. [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

[REDACTED] IRAQ DID NOT PURSUE RELATIONS WITH UBL BECAUSE UBL CALLED IRAQ'S REGIME "INFIDELS". [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

2. (C) [REDACTED] IIS ATTEMPT TO LEVERAGE IRAQI AMERICAN SUSPECT OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING IN 1993 TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN 1993, THE IIS DIRECTOR DECIDED TO PASS TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE INFORMATION ABOUT THE IRAQI AMERICAN CAPTURED IN BAGHDAD, SUSPECTED WITH INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING. THE IIS SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE THAT IRAQ USE THE IRAQI AMERICAN SUSPECT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE REPLIED AND TOLD THE IIS THAT TARIQ AZIZ WOULD DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF THE IRAQI AMERICAN. [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

3. (C) [REDACTED] IIS M4.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

A. (C) [REDACTED] M4 FOCUS. THE IIS M4 DIRECTORATE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. THE IRANIAN THREAT WAS A MAJOR FOCUS; CONCERNING OTHER COUNTRIES, THE FOCUS FOR M4 WAS ECONOMICAL, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT COULD BE USED TO HELP BUILD BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE RULING PARTIES OF THE FOREIGN COUNTRIES. DUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS, TIMES WERE VERY HARD IN IRAQ. THE IIS WORKED TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. TO HELP EASE THE SANCTIONS, BUT THE IIS LACKED THE ASSETS TO DO SO. AT ONE TIME, MUHAMMAD TURKEY AL-DURI, A SECTION DIRECTOR IN M4, ATTEMPTED TO USE HIS TIES TO FOREIGN MINISTER YUSIF BIN ALAWI FROM OMAN TO AFFECT IRAQ'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

B. (C) [REDACTED] M4 FLOW OF INFORMATION. INTELLIGENCE FLOW IN THE M4

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FOLLOWED A TYPICAL SCHEME. IIS AGENTS GATHERED INTELLIGENCE AT THE EMBASSIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THE AGENTS SUBMITTED THE INTELLIGENCE TO RESPECTIVE M4 DEPARTMENTS AT THE IIS. THE DEPARTMENT WOULD THEN FORWARD THE INTELLIGENCE TO THE RESPECTIVE SPECIALIZED SECTION COVERING THE SPECIFIC COUNTRY. THE COUNTRY SECTION WOULD THEN SUBMIT THE INFORMATION TO THE BRANCH WHICH HANDLED INTELLIGENCE ON SEVERAL COUNTRIES. THE BRANCH THEN SUBMITTED THE INTELLIGENCE TO ONE OF FOUR REGIONAL SECTIONS. THE REGIONAL SECTION REPORTED THE INTELLIGENCE TO THE M4 DIRECTOR. THE INTELLIGENCE THEN FLOWED FROM THE M4 DIRECTOR TO THE DEPUTY IIS DIRECTOR AND FINALLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF IIS. THE DEPUTY IIS DIRECTOR RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE/OPERATIONAL UPDATES FROM THE M4 THROUGH DAILY E-MAILS. THE M4 DIRECTOR PROVIDED A DAILY SUMMARY OF M4 ACTIVITIES AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERED FROM IIS AGENTS ABROAD. THE M4 SUMMARY TO THE DEPUTY IIS DIRECTOR INCLUDED INFORMATION CONCERNING AGENT - SOURCE MEETINGS AND INFORMATION PROVIDED. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

C. (S) [REDACTED] M4 SYRIA CONNECTION. FARUK ABDALLAH YAHYA ((HIJAZI)) (b)(3):10 USC 424 WAS THE DIRECTOR OF M4 IN THE EARLY 1990'S. THE M4 DID NOT HAVE IIS AGENTS OPERATING IN SYRIA DUE TO THE STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA SINCE THE 1970'S. HOWEVER, THE M4 DID HAVE A BRANCH IN BAGHDAD DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE ON SYRIA. THE IIS OBTAINED INTELLIGENCE FROM SOURCES IN SYRIA THAT WOULD OFTEN MEET WITH IIS AGENTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES SUCH AS JORDAN. NFI. SALIM SA'ID JUMAILY WAS THE CHIEF OF THE BRANCH IN M4 COVERING SYRIA AND JORDAN. JUMAILY LATER WAS TRANSFERRED AS THE CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH IN THE M4. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

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