RATCZYUW RHEFSNG0601 3501221-CCCC-RHEFAFM RHEFDIA RHEFISG
RHEFJWC RHEFLGX RHEFMSC RHEFNGB RHEFQAN RHEFSNG RHEHWSR RHHJJAA
RHHMUNA
RHMFISS RUCBACJ RUCNFB RUCXONI RUEAIIA RUEAIJU RUEHC RUEKJC
RUENAAA
RUEPGBA RUESBDA RUETDAA RUETIAA RUFOADA RUMICEA RUQVKEW
ZNY CCCCC
R 150753Z DEC 04
FM (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
TO (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
((2)(3):33 333 332 1(1)
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
PAGE 2 (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) CONFIDENTIAL
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
(AN/2)/50 LIGO 2024/i)
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
BT
CONTIDENTIAL

(b)(3):10 USC 424

QQQQ (b)(3):10 USC 424
SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ).
IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
SUBJ: (b)(3):10 USC 424 - MEETING BETWEEN IRAQ
NATIONAL MONITORING DIRECTORATE AND IRAQ SURVEY GROUP OFFICERS
TO
DISCUSS AL MUTHANNA AND AN NIBA'I SITES, AND DESTRUCTION OF
CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS. (U)
WARNING. (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL,
(0)(0), 10 000 424
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
@p=====0000======000======000======000====
DOI: (U) 20041201.
(b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(7)(D)
TO A COMPANY OF CHIEF
SUMMARY: (E) IRAQ SURVEY GROUP'S CBW TEAM PARTICIPATED IN A
MEETING WITH IRAQ NATIONAL MONITORING DIRECTORATE CBW EXPERTS
TO
DISCUSS AL MUTHANNA AND AN NIBA'I SITES. TOPICS OF C ONCERN
INCLUDED DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS AND MATERIALS
AT THEOR OFFICE
THESE SITES. TEXT: 1. (C) ON 01 DECEMBER 2004, THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP'S (ISG)
TEXT: 1. (Ch(b) ON 01 DECEMBER 2004, THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP'S (ISG) CBW TEAM MET WITH CBW EXPERTS FROM THE IRAQ NATIONAL
MONITORING DIRECTORATE (b)(7)(D) THE TWO PARTIES DISCUSSED AL MUTHANNA AND
SECURITY ISSUES REGARDING CRUCIFORM BUNKERS, DESTRUCTION OF
HYDROGEN
FLUORIDE (HF) AND THE FATE OF 550 MUSTARD ROUNDS. ADDITIONAL
DISCUSSION INCLUDED THE DESTRUCTION OF ANTHRAX AT AN NIBA'I, AND
ANTHRAX MASS BALANCE DECLARED.
2. (C(b)(3):1 AL MUTHANA. THE SECURITY OF THE CRUCIFORM BUNKERS AND
DESTRUCTION OF THE TANK CONTAINING ONE TON OF HYDROGEN
FLUORIDE WERE
DISCUSSED. (b)(3):10 USC 424 THE CONTENTS OF THE BUNKERS WERE
ARTILIERV
SHELLS FILLED WITH MUSTARD, SOME LEAKING; EMPTY SHELLS; SODIUM
AND
POTASSIUM CYANIDE SALTS; REMNANTS OF THE MUSTARD INCINERATOR
USED TO
DESTROY MUSTARD: AND EMPTY 1,000 KG CONTAINERS WITH RESIDUE OF
MUSTARD AND NERVE AGENTS. ISG REQUESTED THAT NMD PREPARE A

COST

PAGE 5 RHEFSNG0601 CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL FOR SECURING THE CRUCIFORM BUNKERS. THE PROPOSAL SHOULD

INCLUDE TWO BARB WIRE FENCES, WITH LIGHTS, LIVING QUARTERS TO SUPPORT A PLATOON OF SOLDIERS (30); INCLUDING HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, AN ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, WATER, AND POWER

(b)(3):10 USC 424

WATER AND POWER WOULD MOST LIKELY UTILIZE ON-SITE

GENERATORS). A GUARD POST ON TOP OF THE CRUCIFORM BUNKERS WOULD

PROVIDE A GOOD VIEW IN ALL DIRECTIONS. THE GUARDS, WHETHER MILITARY

OR CONTRACT, MUST BE VERY RELIABLE PEOPLE, AND GIVEN AUTHORITY TO

USE DEADLY FORCE. ANOTHER OPTION PRESENTED WAS USING THE US ARMY TO

SEAL THE BUNKERS, BUT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REMEDIATE THEM

IN THE FUTURE IF THIS ROUTE WAS CHOSEN. (b)(3):10 USC 424 THAT THE HF TANK WILL BE DESTROYED. (b)(3):10 USC 424 THAT BECAUSE OF VALVE DAMAGE.

NO INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN IRAQ WOULD WANT IT. THE TANK WILL BE EXCAVATED

AND LIFTED OUT OF THE PIT. THE PIT WILL BE FILLED WITH LIME, A SMALL EXPLOSIVE CHARGE PLACED ON THE TANK, THE TANK LOWERED INTO THE PIT,

ADDITIONAL LIME ADDED, AND THE CHARGE DETONATED. THE TANK WILL BE

BACKFILLED. NMD WAS INVITED TO SEND AN OBSERVER. FINALLY, ISG SUGGESTED MUTHANA, SINCE IT IS UNSUITABLE FOR CIVILIAN USE BECAUSE

OF CONTAMINATION, AND WOULD MAKE A GOOD MILITARY TRAINING AREA.

3. (C)(b)(3):10 NMD REPORTED THE MUSTARD IRAQ PRODUCED WAS NEVER PAGE 6 RHEFSNG0601 C O N F I D E N T I A L

DISTILLED. ITS PURITY WAS BETWEEN 80 TO 90%. IRAQI MUSTARD WAS A STABLE AGENT WITH ONLY ABOUT 5% DEGRADATION PER YEAR, AND COULD

STILL BE ABOUT 60% VIABLE TODAY. THE BULK AGENT WAS RELATIVELY PRISTINE. THE SAME QUALITY MUSTARD WAS USED IN ALL IRAQI MUNITIONS.

WAS AMAZED WITH UNMOVIC'S RESULT OF 94% PURITY DURING SAMPLING

OF SOME REMAINING SHELLS IN 2003. NMD QUESTIONED THE SAMPLING PROCESS AND ASKED IF UNMOVIC HAD SHAKEN THE SHELLS. NMD BELIEVED THE

SHELLS SAMPLED IN 2003 OBTAINED 2.5 LITER OF POLYMERIZED POLYMER, 1 LITER OF GOOD AGENT (FILL FOR 155 MM ROUND IS 3.5 L). [(b)(7)(] BELIEVED THE HIGH PURITY COULD BE AN ARTIFA CT OF SAMPLING, USING A SMALL HOSE

TO ONLY SUCK UP LIQUID, AND LEAVING ANY LARGE PARTICLES (POLYMERIZED

MUSTARD) BEHIND. THEREFORE, AS THE MUSTARD IMPURITIES POLYMERIZE OUT

OF SOLUTION, THE CONCENTRATION OF MUSTARD IN THE UNPOLYMERIZED PORTION COULD ACTUALLY INCREASES.

4. (Cl^{(b)(3):1}) FATE OF 550 MUSTARD ROUNDS. NMD PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE "MISSING" MUSTARD ROUNDS. AFTER THE GULF WAR IN

1991, IRAQ DECLARED 13,000 155 MM MUSTARD FILLED ARTILLERY ROUNDS. ALL THE ROUNDS WERE TO BE COLLECTED AT MUTHANNA FOR **VERIFICATION AND**

DESTRUCTION. ARTILLERY ROUNDS FROM NASARIYAH WERE TAKEN DIRECTLY TO

MUTHANA FOR DESTRUCTION. ROUNDS FROM AL OKADA **EXACT NAME**

PAGE 7 (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) CONFIDENTIAL

NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED) FIRST WENT TO KARBALA. FROM THERE, THE **CONVOY**

WAS ATTACKED BY REBELS (1991) AND ONE TRUCK CAPTURED. THE REBELS

FIRE TO THE TRAILER AND MUNITIONS AND ABANDONED THEM A FEW KILOMETERS FROM THE AMBUSH SITE. THE REPUBLICAN GUARD BECAME INVOLVED AND DECIDED TO COVER THE BURNT MUNITIONS AND TRAILER WITH

SAND TO PROTECT THEM FROM LOOTERS. IN 1997, SITE WAS EXCAVATED IN THE PRESENCE OF UNSCOM AND NO MUNITIONS WERE FOUND. AN AREA ONE

KILOMETER ON EACH SIDE OF THE SUSPECTED BURIAL SITE WAS SURVEYED **FOR**

THE "MISSING" TRAILER AND CONTENTS. THE 550 MUSTARD ROUNDS WERE DECLARED "MISSING" AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER IN 1992, AT MUTHANNA, THE IRAQIS AND AN UNSCOM INSPECTOR NOTICED SEVERAL HUNDRED BURNT ROUNDS.

THESE ROUNDS WERE DESTROYED WITH THE OTHER MUSTARD ROUNDS. **NMD**

BELIEVES THE STOLEN ROUNDS WERE RECOVERED A MONTH AFTER BEING **BURIED**

AND TRANSPORTED TO MUTHANNA, WHERE THEY WERE DESTROYED WITH THE

REMAINING ROUND. SOMEHOW THESE ROUNDS WERE NEVER TALLIED WITH THE

MUNITIONS ALREADY LOCATED AT MUTHANA. THIS IS HOW THE CLERICAL **ERROR**

STARTED. IRAQ LOST ACCOUNTABILITY AND DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE BURNED ROUNDS FOUND AT MUTHANNA WERE THE ONES FROM THE **STOLEN**

TRAILER.

5. (C) AN NIBA'I AND ANTHRAX MASS BALANCE. AN NMD PERSONNEL WAS

PAGE 8 (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

PRESENT DURING THE DESTRUCTION OF ANTHRAX MATERIAL AT A
LOCATION
CALLED AN NIBA'I (NFI). THE ANTHRAX CAME FROM THE AL HUSAYN
WARHEADS
IN 1991 AND WAS TREATED WITH PERMANGANATE AND FORMALIN. THE
NUMBER
OF ANTHRAX WARHEADS WAS BETWEEN 5 AND 15; IRAQ DID NOT KEEP
GOOD
RECORDS AND COULD NOT VERIFY HOW MANY WARHEADS WERE FILLED
WITH
ANTHRAX. (b)(3):10 USC 424 BIOLOGICAL WARHEAD COULD HAVE BEEN
FILLED BIOLOGICAL WARTIEAD COULD HAVE BEEN
WITH OTHER BIOLOGICAL AGENT SUCH AS BOTULINUM TOXIN AND
AFLATOXIN.)
EACH AL HUSAYN WARHEAD CONTAINED 145 LITERS OF AGENT. (FIELD
COMMENT: SOURCE GAVE THE SENSE THAT THE VOLUME OF THE FILL
DEPENDED ((b)(3):10 USC 424
ON THE AGENT). (b)(3):10 USC 424 THAT THE TWO ONE CUBIC METER TANKS
FILLED WITH INACTIVATED ANTHRAX (TREATED WITH PERMANGANATE
AND
FORMALIN) WERE DESTROYED AT AL AZIZIYAH. THE ANTHRAX WAS TO BE
USED
TO FILL THE DROP TANKS IRAQ MODIFIED FOR A SPRAY DELIVERY SYSTEM.
THE SPRAY TANKS WERE NEVER FILLED. (b)(3):10 USC 424 THEY BELIEVE THE
ANTHRAX PRODUCTION RECORDS FOR 1989 WERE NOT COMPLETE.
HOWEVER, NMD
ALSO QUESTIONED UNSCOM AND UNMOVIC MEDIA CALCULATIONS SAYING
IRAQ
WAS NOT GIVEN CREDIT FOR ENOUGH PARTIAL FILLED CONTAINERS OF
MEDIA.
EACH R400 BOMB COULD CONTAIN 85 LITERS OF AGENT. THE FILL
DEPENDED
ON THE AGENT. (b)(3):10 USC 424 MENTIONED THEY HAD A CONTAMINATION
PROBLEM WITH THEIR FERMINATORS SOME PATCHES OF A CENT HAD FUNICAL
WITH THEIR FERMENTORS, SOME BATCHES OF AGENT HAD FUNGAL
SUBJ: (b)(3):10 USC 424 - MEETING BETWEEN IRAQ
CONTAMINATION.
TEAR LINE
6. (U) AN NIBA'I AND ANTHRAX MASS BALANCE. AN NMD PERSONNEL WAS
PRESENT DURING THE DESTRUCTION OF ANTHRAX MATERIAL AT A
LOCATION
CALLED AN NIBA?I (NFI). THE ANTHRAX CAME FROM THE AL HUSAYN
WARHEADS IN 1991 AND WAS TREATED WITH PERMANGANATE AND
FORMALIN. THE
NUMBER OF ANTHRAX WARHEADS WAS BETWEEN 5 AND 15; IRAQ DID NOT
KEEP
GOOD RECORDS AND COULD NOT VERIFY HOW MANY WARHEADS WERE
FILLED WITH
ANTHRAX.
7. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 THAT THE TWO ONE CUBIC METER TANKS FILLED
WITH

INACTIVATED ANTHRAX (TREATED WITH PERMANGANATE AND FORMALIN)
WERE
DESTROYE D AT AL AZIZIYAH. THE ANTHRAX WAS TO BE USED TO FILL THE
DROP TANKS IRAQ MODIFIED FOR A SPRAY DELIVERY SYSTEM. THE SPRAY
PAGE 4 (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) CONFIDENTIAL
TANKS WERE NEVER FILLED. (b)(3):10 USC 424 THEY BELIEVE THE ANTHRAX
PRODUCTION RECORDS FOR 1989 WERE NOT COMPLETE. HOWEVER, NMD
ALSO
QUESTIONED UNSCOM AND UNMOVIC MEDIA CALCULATIONS SAYING IRAQ
WAS NOT
GIVEN CREDIT FOR ENOUGH PARTIAL FILLED CONTAINERS OF MEDIA.
(b)(3):10 USC 424
(D)(3). 10 03C 424
INSTR: (U)
PREP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
ACQ: (U)
DISSEM: (U)
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED GONFIDENTIAL,
(b)(3):10 USC 424
PAGE 5 (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) CONFIDENTIAL
(b)(3):10 USC 424
DRV FROM: DH HUMINT SCG, MAR 04
DECL: X1
BT.
#0601
NINN