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HEADER

R 030935Z AUG 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

R 030927Z AUG 88

(b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

INFO RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU

(b)(3):10 USC 424

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 (b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

COUNTRY: (U) SOMALIA (SO); SOUTH AFRICA (SF);

ZIMBABWE (ZI); UNITED KINGDOM (UK).

(b)(3):10 USC 424 SOMALI NORTH- 26TH SECTOR

CDR SACKED; BURAO ATTACK SUPPORTED BY AIR BUT DECLINE

IN OVERALL ACTIVITY REPORTED; MORALE SAGGING (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY

EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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DOI: (U) 880705-880726.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (b);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) AT HARGEISA REGARDING PERIOD 5 THROUGH 26 JULY INDICATES THAT ACTIVITY THERE BOTH ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR HAS ALMOST GROUND TO A HALT.

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) WITHIN THE LAST 5 DAYS PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE ON WEDNESDAY, 27 JULY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO TACTICAL FLYING AT ALL WITH THE ONLY AIR ACTIVITY BEING RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS BY SF-260. THE SINGLE BREAK IN THE "BOREDOM" WAS ON 19 OR 20 JULY (COULD NOT RECALL SPECIFICALLY) WHEN HAWKERS WERE CALLED UPON TO FLY STRIKES AGAINST BURAO, HQ OF THE NEW 27TH SECTOR. ON THAT OCCASION A TWO PLANE ELEMENT FLEW "A NUMBER" (UNSPECIFIED) OF ATTACKS (GUNS/ROCKETS) AGAINST THE TOGDHEER REGIONAL CAPITAL. SUBSEQUENT TO THE STRIKES SEVERAL HUNDRED SOMALI GOVERNMENT TROOPS WERE OBSERVED BI VOUACKED NEAR AIRFIELD AND OBSERVERS WERE TOLD BY

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

THAT TROOPS WERE FROM BURAO AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO HARGEISA IN THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER NEEDED THERE. HE CONTINUED THAT GOVERNMENTAL FORCES HAD ATTACKED AND TAKEN BURAO. AS OF THE DATE OF (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) DEPARTURE, TWO HAWKERS WERE OPERATIONAL PLUS A SINGLE F-6 (TWO MORE AT BALEDOGLE; 3 DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE) AND A MIG-17. ONE SF-260 WAS AVAILABLE FOR RECONNAISSANCE.

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2. ~~(S)~~ SECURITY AT THE AIRFIELD DURING THE PERIOD

5 JULY THROUGH 26 JULY (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

OBSERVERS INDICATED THE SINGLE TIME THAT ANY ACTIVITY HAD TAKEN PLACE THAT POSED A THREAT TO THE AIRPORT WAS ABOUT 13 OR 14 JULY WHEN THREE (3) ARTILLERY ROUNDS (IDENTIFIED AS BEING FROM BMR21 STALIN ORGAN) LANDED IN CONFINES OF THE AIRPORT, BUT CAUSED NO DAMAGE. THE INCIDENT, HOWEVER, PROVOKED A BARRAGE OF RETURN ARTILLERY FIRE FROM GOVERNMENTAL FORCES THAT LASTED WELL INTO THE EVENING. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THAT ATTACK THE SCENE AT THE AIRPORT HAS BEEN DOWNRIGHT "DULL" (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(3):10  
USC 424

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3. (S) [REDACTED] SOMALI GOVERNMENT TROOPS ARE COMPLETELY DISENCHANTED WITH UNDERTAKING AT HARGEISA ACCORDING TO OBSERVERS. FEW, IF ANY, WISH TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT WITH MANY INDICATING IT IS LIKE ATTACKING "MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY". HOWEVER, THERE IS A VERY PRAGMATIC SENTIMENT AMONG THE ARMED FORCES AS WELL. OBSERVERS COUCHED FEELING AS "THEY (SNM/ISSAKS) STARTED IT; NOW THEY MUST PAY". (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

THE LOW ACTIVITY LEVEL, CONTINUING DISPUTES OVER PAY, AND A PERCEPTION THAT THEIR EFFORTS ARE NOT APPRECIATED BY THE SOMALIS ARE ALL CAUSUAL (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) RETURN TO BAIDOA BUT THUS FAR ISSUE HAS BEEN SIDESTEPED BY SOMALI CHAIN OF COMMAND.

(b)(1);1.4 (c) DID INDICATE THAT EARLY ON IN THE CONFLICT (DATE NOT SPECIFIED) SNM PRISONERS HAD SPECIFICALLY CITED HUNTER ATTACKS AS THE MOST THREATENING ASPECT OF THE WHOLE CAMPAIGN. (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) BECAUSE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAT THE HAWKERS POSE (b)(1);1.4 (c)

THAT SOMALI AIR FORCE MAY WELL WANT TO KEEP GROUP AT HARGEISA FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD. A PROSPECT THAT GRATES (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

- (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

4. (S) [REDACTED] OBSERVERS INDICATED THEY LAST SAW MORGAN AROUND THE 20TH OF JULY AND THAT HE DEPARTED HARGEISA SHORTLY BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) WAS THAT THE WELL KNOWN COMMANDER WAS REPLACED BY BG "AHMED" OR "ALI"

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

MORGAN'S REPLACEMENT IS BG ((AHMED)) WARSAME HASHI, GARRISON/SPECIAL DISTRICT COMMANDER AT BERBERA. THE

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

COMMENTS: 1. (S) (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) DEPARTURE OF THE HIGHLY POPULAR 26TH SECTOR, BG ((MOHAMED)) SAID HERSI "MORGAN", AND HIS REPORTED REPLACEMENT BY MAREHAN TRIBESMAN BG ((AHMED)) WARSAME HASHI BODES ILL FOR LONG TERM PROSPECTS IN THE NORTHWEST (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) MOST IMMEDIATE IMPACT WILL BE ON MORALE OF 26TH SECTOR TROOPS. MORGAN'S FLAMBOYANT LIFESTYLE AND WHOLLY WESTERN QUALITIES AS A MILITARY LEADER WERE PURE

HOLLYWOOD AND HOKUM - BUT HE KNEW HOW TO SAY WHAT U.S. AND OTHER MILITARY LEADERS WANTED TO HEAR. HIS LARGER THAN LIFE PERSONA AND THE HINT OF GLAMOUR THAT SEEMED TO SURROUND HIM IN HIS FIFEDOM IN THE NORTHWEST (PLUS A MARRIAGE INTO THE RULING FAMILY) SERVED TO MAKE HIM AN INTERNATIONAL FIGURE WITH ARTICLES APPEARING ABOUT HIM IN BOTH GERMAN AND ITALIAN PERIODICALS. HIS CHARISMATIC APPEAL MADE HIS TROOPS "IDENTIFY" STRONGLY WITH MORGAN AND SUBSEQUENT TO HIS REPLACEMENT OF THE REPRESSIVE HASHI GANNI LATE IN 1986, MORGAN GENERALLY RECEIVED HIGH MARKS AS WELL FROM CIVILIAN AND TRIBAL LEADERS IN THE NW FOR HIS APPARENT EVEN HANDED APPROACH TO CONTROLLING THE SNM INSURGENT PROBLEM. THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED SUCCESS OF 26TH SECTOR TROOPS AT THE BATTLE OF BALLIDHIIG IN FEB 87 (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ADDED MEASURABLY TO HIS AURA OF MILITARY COMPETENCE. LATER, FACTS CAME TO LIGHT INDICATING THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD EARLIER INTERCEPTED INFORMATION REGARDING THE UPCOMING CONFLICT THUS ALLOWING SOMALI TROOPS TO REINFORCE THE AREA - THEREBY HEIGHTENING THE IMAGE OF A WHOLLY SUCCESSFUL MILITARY LEADER WHO KNEW HOW TO USE ALL HIS ASSETS.

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(b);Sec. 1.4(d)

3. ~~(S)~~ BUT MORGAN'S STAR STILL SEEMED ASCENDANT NOTWITHSTANDING HIS INACCURATE ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SOMALI NORTH

AND THE STRENGTH OF THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT. AS THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN PEACE ACCORDS WERE SIGNED IN APRIL (b)(3):10 USC 424 IT WAS BG MORGAN WHO WAS TAPPED TO LEAD THE MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT COMMITTEE ON THE SOMALI SIDE.

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4. (S) HOWEVER, BG MORGAN'S STOCK STARTED ITS FALL INTO DECLINE WITH THE SNM ATTACK ON HARGEISA SUBSEQUENT TO THE EARLIER CONFLICT AT BURAO (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424 NOTWITHSTANDING WARNINGS PRECEEDING THE ATTACK AT HARGEISA THE INSURGENTS STRUCK A BLOW THAT SEVERELY THREATENED THE GALBEED CAPITAL. WITH MORGAN'S RETURN THE SITUATION WAS STABILIZED BUT THE 26TH SECTOR FORCES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY PERFORMED POORLY AND HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY TAKE THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY.

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5. (S) WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SECTOR (27TH) CARVED PRIMARILY OUT OF MORGAN'S TURF THE HANDWRITING WAS ON THE WALL. (b)(1);1.4 (c) EVEN WITH MAJOR REORGANIZATION THE CONFLICT CONTINUES TO DRAG ON. THE SOMALI MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AS A WHOLE AND THE FORCES OF THE 26TH SECTOR HAVE DISPLAYED LITTLE COMPETENCE IN CONFRONTING THE SNM LEAD INSURGENCY. SOMA LIA HAS BEEN BADLY EMBARRASSED IN FRONT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IN A PART OF THE WORLD WHERE "FACE" IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE "HEADS WILL ROLL" IN PAYMENT. MORGAN HAS BEEN FOUND WANTING.HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS (WITHIN THE MASLAH FACTION)HAVE FOUND A SCAPEGOAT AND HAVE MOVED TO HAVE HIM UNSEATED NOTWITHSTANDING HIS POSITION AS A "COURT FAVORITE". EVEN MARRIAGE TO SIAD'S DAUGHTER COULD NOT PREVENT MORGAN'S FALL FROM GRACE (b)(1);1.4 (c) HIS FALL CANNOT BE VIEWED AS OTHER THAN A VICTORY FOR BG MASLAH.

(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ NOT  
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

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