CDS CDSN = LGX608 MCN = 89136/07331 TOR = 891360539 RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS5554 1360503- CCCC- -RUEALGX. ZNY CCCCC- HEADER R 160503Z MAY 89 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC TO DIA INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC [\$\mathcal{P}(0):50 USC 3024()]
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIALNOFORNR SECTION 01 OF 05 (b)(3):10 USC 424
/SERIAL: (U) IIR(b)(3):10 USC 424 /********* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *********/
BODY COUNTRY: (U) SOMALIA (SO).
(b)(3):10 USC 424 TRIP TO BERBERA AND HARGEISA ON
9 AND 10 MAY 1989 (U).
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIALNOFORN.
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 - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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DOI: (U) 890509 - 890510.
(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(h)(1)(1 + 4)(h)	;1.4 (c);1.4 (d)
	, 1.+ (0), 1.+ (d)
(b)(1)(1)(1)(a)	·1 / (d)
(b)(1);1.4 (c)	BERBERA AND HARGEISA ON 9-10
MAV 1080 (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c) STATED THAT THE U.S.
	TED DISASTER HOSPITAL WAS NOT BEING UTILIZED.
CUPPENTI	Y, THERE WAS NO DOCTOR THERE. (b)(1);1.4 (c)
	E OF THE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY SITTING IN
	TAL SHOULD BE MOVED TO THE MILITARY HOSPITAL
	SA. THE HARGEISA HOSPITAL NOW HAS ABOUT 200
	PATIENTS. THERE ARE THREE SOMALI DOCTORS THERE,
	ANENT, AND TWO OTHERS WHO ROTATE. IT HAS AN
	EED FOR SUR <u>GICAL GOWNS, BED</u> SHEETS, AND AN
ANESTUES	A MACHINE.(b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT SOME OF THE
	ED MEDICAL EQUIPMENT WAS BEING SOLD IN PHARMACIE A. COTS THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN FOR USE BY
	A. COTS THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN FOR USE BY IAD BEEN CONFI SCATED BY THE SOMALI ARMY AND WERE
	D BY THE SOLDIERS. $(b)(1)$; 1.4 (c) THE
	IOSPITAL AND IN FACT FOUND ALMOST NO ACTIVITY.
	S WERE EMPTY EXCEPT FOR ABOUT 10 PATIENTS. MOST OF
	S WERE LOCKED AND THERE WERE NO MEDICAL PERSONNEL
SEEN.	
;1.4	
1 (d) ((C/TAT)	
	JUST ADJACENT TO THE U.S. DONATED HOSPITAL.
	RE ICRC PERSONNEL BUSILY TRYING TO ORGANIZE THE
	OR AN ICRC OPERATION SCHEDULED TO BEGIN
	1989. STAFF WILL CONSIST OF ABOUT 120 PERSONNEL
	CH WILL BE SOMALIS AND 20 ICRC MEDICAL AND
	OPLE. IT IS INTENDED TO TREAT UP TO 80 PEOPLE
THERE, MII	JTARY OR CIVILIAN, SNM OR GOVERNMENT. NORWAY
HAS DONA	TED A FULL MEDICAL FACILITY WHICH WILL BE
INSTALLED) IN THE EXISTING STRUCTURES AND SOME NEW

BUILDINGS TO BE CONSTRUCTED.

	belebinds to be constructed.
	3. (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) SOME STATISTICS (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)
	5. (b) SOME STATISTICS (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) SINCE JUNE
	1988, 1521 WOUNDED SOMALI MILITARY HAD BEEN MOVED TO THE
	MILITARY HOSPITAL LOCATED IN THE NORTHWEST SECTION OF MOGA
	DISHUR OFF VIA LENIN. THE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:
	850 FROM HARGEISA; 516 BURAO; 70 MANDERA; 76 BERBERA;
	AND 9 ERIGAVO. OF THESE 1521 PATIENTS, 70 HAD DIED WHICH
(b)(1);1.4	
	HAVE EXACT STATISTICS ON MARTINI HOSPITAL BUT ESTIMATED
	ABOUT 3000 PATIENTS HAD BEEN TREATED THERE.
	- 4. (C/NF) (b)(1);1.4 (c) IF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
	WAS AVAILABLE ON THE MYSTERIOUS DEATHS IN BERBERA (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC
	(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (c)
	(b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INFORMATION. (b)(1);1.4 (c)
	NEVER SEEN ANY BODIES, HAD NEVER BEEN CONSULTED
	OR EVEN INFORMED OF THE DEATHS BY ANYONE OTHER THAN (b)(1);1.4 (c)
(b)	DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT AFTER THE RAINS, THERE
(1);1.4	WAS EXTENSIVE MALARIA AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD RESPONDED
(c);1.4	TO THIS BY SENDING UP TO BERBERA A MALARIA TEAM. (b)(1);1.4 (c)
	ATTEMPT TO GET FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DEATHS MET
	WITH ALMOST NO PROGRESS (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE O NSET
	OF DEATH AFTER FIRSTSYMPTOMS WAS ABOUT THREE DAYS. ON
	9 MAY, (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)
	SAME DAY, THREE MEN AND A WOMAN. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT
	HIS INFORMATION AS FIRST REPORTED WAS ACCURATE, I.E.,
	15 TO 20 PER DAY DYING. (b)(1) HAD NOT SEEN
	ANY BODIES. THE SOMALI AIR FORCE BASE COMMANDER DID
	CONFIRM THAT PEOPLE WERE DYING BUT HIS NUMBERS TOTALED ONLY 20 AND HE TOO DIDN'T KNOW THE REASON. (b)(1);1.4 (c)
	STATE THAT RECENTLY HE HAD OBSERVED IN BERBERA TOWN ITSELF
	A SOMALI RUNNING FROM HOUSE TO HOUSE ADVISING PEOPLE TO
	BOIL THEIR WATER. NO ONE (b)(1);1.4 (c) COULD STATE
	THAT LIVEST <u>OCK WAS DEAD OR THAT SOMALIS WERE EATING DEAT</u> H
	CARCASSES. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)
	(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)
	_ (b)(1);1.4
	5. (c);1.4 (d) BERBERA CITY AND PORT ON 9 AND 10 MAY.
	THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE TOWN, TO INCLUDE WOMEN AND
	CHILDREN, ARMED AND UNARMED SOLDIERS, AND SOMALI MALES.
	THE NUMBER IS ABOUT THE SAME AS SEEN ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS
(b)(1):1.4	
	ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOT A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CONDUCTING

BUSINESS. (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) IMPRESSION THAT PEOPLE WERE IN A HOLDING PATTERN, TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO. THE CITY OF BERBERA WAS FAR FROM NORMAL AS PRIOR TO PRE-INSUR-GENCY DAYS. THE PORT WAS OUIET WITH A FEW SOMALI SOLDIERS LYING AROUND. A SOMALI FLAG SHIP WAS LOADING DANISH EOUIPMENT WHICH WAS DESTINED FOR MERCA. THE DANES WERE SUPPOSED TO START BUILDING A POWER PLANT IN MERCA. AROUND THE PORT THERE WERE ABOUT 200 TO 300 55 GALLON DRUM OF MOTOR OIL, SEA, CALTEX WHICH HAD ARRIVED FROM DUBAI APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 3 MONTHS PRIOR. THERE WERE ALSO SACK S OF U.S. DONATED CORN PILED ON THE PORT BUT NOT IN A VERY LARGE AMOUNT. JUST OUTSIDE OF BERBERA THERE WAS A HASTILY CONSTRUCTED REFUGEE CAMP WHICH CONTAINED FROM 500 TO 700 REFUGEES RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM BIYOLLEY (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THESE REFUGEES WERE LOOKING FOR FOOD, BUT UNHCR OFFICIALS SAID THEY WOULD NOT BE FED UNTIL THEY RETURNED TO BIYOLLEY.

6. (C) ON THE MORNING OF 10 MAY, (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) HEAVILY ARMED MILITARY CONVOY (b)(1);1.4 (c) JUST AT THE MAIN GATE OF BERBERA POINTED IN THE DIRECTION OF HARGEISA INCLUDED IN THE CONVOY WAS A BM21 (STALIN'S ORGAN) PLUS A TRAILER LOADED WITH ROCKETS, TOWED ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY, AND ABOUT FIFTY ARMED SOMALI SOLDIERS. A TOTAL OF ABOUT 10 TRUCKS WAS SEEN. SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION REVEALED THAT THE CONVOY WAS HEADED TOWARDS ZEILA. ALSO SEEN WERE ABOUT FIVE DOUBLE TRAILER TRUCKS LOADED WITH HOUSEHOLD BELONGINGS. (b)(1);1.4 (c) ON 11 MAY THAT THESE CIVILIAN TRUCKS HAD HEADED SOUTH FROM BERBERA ON 11 MAY.

7. (C) WHILE AT BERBERA	(b)(1);1.4 (c)
(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4	(c);1.4 (d)

(b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) EIGHT SOMALI AIR FORCE PERIMETER PERSONNEL HAD NOT BEEN KILLED WHILE ON GUARD DUTY AT BERBERA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE AIR FORCE BASE COMMANDER HAD REQUESTED ON 27 APRIL ASSISTANCE BECAUSE 8 TO 10 OF HIS PERSONNEL HAD BEE INVOLVED IN A SERIOUS TRUCK ACCIDENT. (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) THAT DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAD BEEN VERY LITTLE FIRING FROM SOMALI GUARDS ON THE PERIMETER. ON THE EVENING OF 9-10 MAY, (b)(1); 1.4 (c) ANY FIRING AT ALL IN BERBERA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) REPORTED THAT ON FRIDAY, 5 MAY AND SATURDAY, 6 MAY, (b)(1); 1.4 (b); 1.4 (c) FLIGHTS HAD TAKEN AMMUNITION TO BERBERA. ESPECIALLY ON SATURDAY. THE LOAD WAS EXTENSIVE WITH A SEMI-TRAILER TRUCK BEING COMPLETELY FILLED WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE MOSTLY GREEN COLORED AMMO CRATES ABOUT 3 1/2 FEET LONG AND 8 INCHES HIGH.

(b)(1);1.4 (CANF) DEPARTED FOR HARGEISA ON 10 MAY AND
(c):1.4 (d)DEFINITED FOR THE AIRPORT. THE AIRPORT WAS
EXTREMELY QUIET AND (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)
(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)
(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (b), 1.4 (c), 1.
WAS QUIET BUTTHE ENTIRE REGION WAS NOT. (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c)
THE REMAINING SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT (SNM) STRENGTH
AT ABOUT 3000. HE SAID THE F6S WERE NOT FLYING BUT THE
MARCHETTI 260'S HAD BEEN FLYING RECON MISSIONS IN THE
BORAMA-ZEILA (b)(1);1.4 (c) 5 F6'S IN THE
AREA JUST ADJACENT TO THE AIRPORT. ONE MARCHETTI FLEW
ON A RECON MISSION TOWARDS BORAMA AROUND 1115 HOURS.
A SECOND MARCHETTI FOLLOWED SOON AFTER. ALSO PRESENT
(b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)
THE F6S IN HARGEISA WERE IN "SAD SHAPE." THE PRIMARY
PROBLEM WITH THE F6S WAS HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AND LACK OF
SPARE PARTS.
SPARE PARTS.
9. (C/NF)(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(b);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)
9. (0,11) (0) (1),500. 1.4 (0),500. 1.4 (0),500. 1.4 (0)
SAID THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE LIFE IN HARGEISA. HE LAMENTED THE LACK OF HELICOPTERS WHICH HE
FELT WERE THE ONLY WEAPONS NEEDED TO DEFEAT THE SNM. (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c)
STATED THAT THE SNM ARE DISPERSED IN THE MOUNTAINS AND
ONLY HAVE WITH THEM 2 OR 3 ZU 23S. (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c)
THAT COL ((OMAR)) GES WAS NO LONGER THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
26TH SECTOR HQS AND WAS PRESENTLY WITHOUT A JOB. HE
DIDN'T APPEAR TOO ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS OMAR GES. (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c)
SAID THAT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND A DELEGATION HAD
VISITED HARGEISA ON 8 MAY. HE DENIED THAT MORGAN WAS
INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION AND SAID IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE
FOR THE MINISTER AND VICE-MINISTER TO ABSENT THEMSELVES
FROM MOGADISHU AT THE SAME TIME. (b)(1);1.4 (c)
A SECOND VEHICLE, WERE TOLD (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)
(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) THAT HARGEISA WAS
PRESENTLY A GHOST TOWN. HE CONFIRMED THE MEDICAL NEEDS IN
HARGEISA MEN TIONED (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT CASUALTIES IN
HARGEISA HOSPITAL WERE ALL WAR-RELATED. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) ALSO
TOLD(b)(1);1.4 (c) CIRCUITOUS ROUTE AROUND THE CITY TO
THE SECTOR HQS WAS BEING TAKEN BECAUSE THE MILITARY DOES
NOT LIKE "OUTSIDERS" TO SEE THE DAMAGE IN HARGEISA ITSELF.
(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)
MATAN HAD BEEN UP ON 8 MAY BUT ALSO WAS NEGATIVE ON THE
VISIT BECAUSE " MATAN DOES NOT UNDERSTAND MILITARY MATTERS
(b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) NOT GETTING THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT HE

NEEDS AND NO ONE IN MOGADISHU UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEMS (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)ACKNOWLEDGED HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN GENERAL AND PLANNED TO GO TO BORAMA ON 11 MAY TO DISCUSS TRIBAL ISSUES (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)(b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT THE CONVOY SEEN IN BERBERA WAS HEADING TOWARDS ZEILA. (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) CONFIRMED THAT COL OMAR GES HAD BEEN REMOVED AS CHIEF OF STAFF ABOUT 20 DAYS AGO AND WOULD BE REPLACED BY COL SHUKRI (b)(1);1.4 (c) SAID OMAR GES WAS STILL IN HARGEISA BUT WITHOUT A POSITION. GES IS SUPPOSED TO BECOME CHIEF OF STAFF (COS) AT THE 21ST SECTOR (b)(1);1.4 (c) (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) TO HARGEISA SAYING HE WOULD DO A LOT OF THINGS BUT NOW HE IS SUFFERING FROM A LACK OF COURAGE. THE OGADENIS ARE STILL ARMED AND ARE STILL A PROBLEM. (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) IF THE PROBLEM WOULD BECOME GREATER NOW THAT OMAR GES HAS BEEN RELIEVED (b)(1):1.4 (c) (b)(1);1.4(c)(b)(1); 1.4 (c) ÔN MONDAY, 8 MAY AT AROUND 1015 A PRIVATE 8 PAX PLANE WAS COMMANDEERED BY ((HUSSEIN)) MATAN, DEFENSE MINISTER; (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4(c)(b)(1);1.4 (c) FIRST TIME THAT THIS PLANE WAS COMMANDEERED. THE ENTIRE GROUP WAS EXTREMELY AGITATED AND INVOLVED IN A SPIRITED CONVERSATION ALL THE WAY TO HARGEISA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) (b)(1):1.4 (c) APPROACH INTO HARGEISA FROM ABOUT 10 MILES OUT. UPON ARRIVING AT HARGEISA (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) TO GO TO BERBERA AND WAIT (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE BECAUSE HE WASN'T SURE HOW BAD THE SITUATION WAS. WHEN THE PLANE LANDED TWO VEHICLES PULLED UP TO THE PLANE EVEN BEFORE IT STOPPED TAXING AND THEN ALL FOU R PAX GOT ON THE VEHICLES AND LEFT, PRESUMABLY FOR SECTOR HOS (b)(1);1.4 (c) WAS TOLD THAT THE FOKKER HAD ALSO BEEN COMMANDEERED AND HAD TAKEN UP TO HARGEISA THAT SAME MORNING ABOUT 20 SOMALI (b)(1);1.4 (c) SAW A FULLY ARMED F6 DEPART HARGEISA AIRPORT AND 15 TO 20 MINUTES LATER RETURN WITHOUT ANY TOLD THAT THE F6 PILOTS ARE ORDNANCE. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

REFUSING TO FLY. HE DIDN'T KNOW THE REASONS.

13. (C) (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT ON THE MORNING OF 11 MAY, FOKKER LEFT MOGADISHU WITH A LARGE CONTINGENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL OF A CERTAIN RA(b)(1); 1.4 (b); 1.4 (c) 13 MAY THAT IN FACT BG MORGAN LEFT ON THIS FLIGHT TO BERBERA AND ALSO TO BORAMA. (b)(1);1.4 (c) TO SAY WHAT MORGAN'S MISSION WAS. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THERE ARE SOME PROBLEMS WITH OMAR GES REFUSING TO RELIN-QUISH HIS POSITION AS CHIEF OF STAFF. (b)(1);1.4 (c) THAT OMAR GES IS THE MOST IMPORTANT MILITARY OGADENI IN THE SOMALI ARMED (b)(1);1.4 (c) MORGAN COULD BE UP NORTH ABOUT A WEEK. HE ALSO SAID THAT UPON HIS RETURN TO MOGADISHU, MORGAN WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE HIS PLANS OF GOING TO ITALY, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES. MORGAN'S WIFE INTENDS TO GIVE BIRTH TO THEIR FOURTH CHILD IN SWITZERLAND. (b)(1);1.41. (C) CONFIRMED THAT ON FRIDAY, 12 MAY, A SOMALI 707 DEPARTED MOGADISHU LOADED WITH TROOPS. IT LANDED IN BERBERA A FEW HOURS LATER. ALSO ON SATURDAY,

13 MAY, ANOTHER SOMALI 707 WAS BEING LOADED WITH TROOPS (ABOUT 160 ALMOST ALL UNARMED) AND MILITARY CARGO HEADING FOR BERBERA. (b)(1):1.4 (c) PORTED THAT ON 11 MAY 1989, A SOMALI ARMY VEHICLE HIT A LAND MINE BETWEEN BERBERA AND SHEIKH AND 12 GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS WERE KILLED.

(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

(c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) |CANNOT AT THIS TIME, CONNECT THESE DEATHS IN ANY WAY WITH THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF POISONS OR CHEMICAL AGENTS BY EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OR SNM SIDE. ALSO THE RINDERPEST ASSERTION IS VERY UNCERTAIN SINCE THIS VIRUS COMMON TO EAST AFRICA, SUPPOSEDLY DOES NOT HURT HUMANS. IF (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

2. (C/NF) BERBERA IS QUIET BUT (b)(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d)

COULD QUICKLY CHANGE. RAMAD AN IS OVER, THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE INSURGENCY IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING, THE GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO SHOW IT CAN CONTROL THE REBELS AND THE REBELS APPEAR AS COMMITTED AS EVER. (b)(1);(b)(6);1.4 (c) CLEARLY CONCERNED. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS NOT SETTLED AND WILL PROBABLY GET WORSE. OMAR GES, A HIGHLY RESPECTED OGADENI, IS OUT OF A JOB. RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING IN MOGADISHU THAT OMAR GES IS OPENLY RESISTING LEAVING HARGEISA. THE SPECIAL FLIGHT BY FOUR PROMINENT OGADENIS ON 8 MAY 1989 MAY HAVE BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THIS [(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;1.4 (c)

ALSO, MORGAN'S SUDDEN TRIP TO BERBERA AND BORAMA IS A SIG THAT ALL IS NOT WELL IN THE NORTHWEST. (b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) SUPPOSED TO BE IN BORAMA ON 11 MAY. TROOPS ARE BEING MOVED TO THE NORTH IN LARGE NUMBERS. THE MARCHETTIS ARE RECONNING THE BORAMA - ZEILA AREA. FIGHTING IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO INCREASE.

(b)(1);1.4

(C)

(C) DIDN'T SEE INNER HARGEISA ON 10 MAY, BUT WAS TOLD I T WAS A GHOST TOWN. IF THIS IS TRUE, THE POPULATION MUST SUSPECT SOMETHING BIG WILL HAPPEN IN HARGEISA VERY SOON. (b)(1);1.4 (c) ABSENCE OF LIVESTOCK ON THE TRIP BACK AND FORTH TO HARGEISA AIRPORT ON 10 MAY. (b)(1);1.4 (c) TOLD THAT IF THE PEOPLE LEAVE THEY TAKE THEIR LIVESTOCK WITH THEM. (b)(1);1.4 (c) A CULTURAL SHORTFALL!

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DECL:OADR BT #5554

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