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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY FACT BOOK

JANUARY 1968



A JOINT JCS-DIA PUBLICATION

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PREFACE

(U) This publication is produced by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Director for Operations (J-3) of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The facilities of these offices were joined to compile this expanded Military Fact Book which is produced semi-annually, covering both intelligence and operational aspects of the war in Southeast Asia.

(U) The statistics have been primarily compiled from COMUSMACV reports.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Geography

(U) South Vietnam is a crescent-shaped part of Indochina with an area of about 66,000 square miles; it has a 1,000-mile land border with North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and a 1,650-mile seacoast. In 1954, the whole of Vietnam was divided provisionally into approximately equal parts by the Geneva Accords. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the North and South runs west from the coast along the Ben Hai River to the village of Bo Ho Su, about halfway across Vietnam, and from there due west to the Laotian border. Its width varies from four to six miles, and it is about 50 miles in length.

(U) There are three major geographic regions discernible in South Vietnam -- the Mekong Delta, the southern portions of the Annamite Mountains and the Central Lowlands. The Mekong Delta roughly occupies the southern third of the country, and its fertile alluvial plains, favored by heavy rainfall, make it one of the world's great rice-growing areas. The Annamite Mountain chain, with several high plateaus, begins about 50 miles northeast of Saigon extends to the DMZ and continues on into North Vietnam. The Central Lowlands -- still so designated even though the area is central only to North and South Vietnam combined -- consist of a fertile, narrow, coastal strip along the eastern slopes of the Annamite chain.

(U) The weather is generally hot and humid (mean temperature is about 80° fahrenheit), and the annual rainfall is consistently heavy. Of the two monsoons, the southwest has the greater effect on the terrain since it brings heavy rains to most of the country between May and September. The transitional seasons occur in March-April and again in October. The northeast monsoon which lasts from November through February follows the Autumn transition and brings rain to the northern half of South Vietnam. The warm climate and heavy rainfall, heavy vegetation and tropical forests, and numerous inland waterways and major regions utilized for wet-rice cultivation tend to hamper military operation, especially during the two monsoon seasons.

(U) South Vietnam has 842 miles of railway, and over 12,000 miles of roads, over one-half of which are earth-surfaced.

Government


(U) The constitutional transfer of power from an authoritarian military regime to a popularly-elected government occurred on 31 October 1967 with no serious disruptive opposition from anti-GVN elements. The continued stability of the new government, headed by President Nguyen

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Commentary was furnished on 7/20/67

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
Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, will depend upon the maintenance of a viable relationship between the two leaders and continued unity within the military. The government is patterned after a modified presidential system and the legislature, or National Assembly, is composed of a 60-member upper house (Senate) and a 137-member lower house (House of Representatives). Prime Minister Nguyen Van Loc heads the cabinet, and it is composed primarily of men with previous governmental experience; almost all of them are Thieu and/or Ky men. The previous government, under the leadership of Ky and Thieu, was established on 19 June 1965, and ruled through a grouping of high-ranking military officers commonly referred to as the Directory.

(C) With prospects for a four-year term in hand, it remains to be seen how well Thieu and Ky can carry out reform measures which they pledged to undertake during the campaign. While some specific parts of their platform probably never will be implemented, they have reiterated that the objectives of the new government would be to "build democracy, end the war, and improve the Vietnamese society." The government, in addition, must seek to weld the rural populace more closely to Saigon, if the regime is to develop a stronger political base at the village and hamlet level, and in some population centers. The Thieu-Ky ticket received only 35 percent of the vote cast in the September election which cannot really be considered a mandate.

(U) Chronology of Major Government Changes in the Republic of Vietnam

1963	Nov 1-2	Diem deposed by military junta headed by M/G Duong Van Minh. M/G Minh became Chief of State of the new Provisional Revolutionary Government.
1964	Jan 30	Bloodless coup led by M/G Nguyen Khanh deposed Minh. Minh remained as Chief of State (largely figurehead) and Khanh became Prime Minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.
1964	Aug 27	The Revolutionary Military Council named a Triumvirate to head the government, composed of Gens Khanh, Minh, and Khiem.
1964	Aug 29	Gen Khanh resigned; Dr. Nguyen Xuan Oanh became acting Premier.
1964	Sept 5	Gen Khanh returned as Premier.
1964	Oct 26-30	Civilian government established with Phan Khac Suu as Chief of State and Tran Van Huong as Premier.

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LAOS

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1965 Jan 28 Premier Huong was deposed; Dr. Oanh became acting Premier in a caretaker government. Suu remained as Chief of State.

1965 Feb 16 Dr. Phan Huy Quat became Premier, Suu remained as Chief of State.

1965 Jun 19 The military returned to power. Chief of State was Lt Gen Nguyen Van Thieu, and the Prime Minister was Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky.

1967 Oct 31 Present government inaugurated; it is headed by President Thieu and Vice President Ky.

Important Holidays/Events

(U) The following is a listing of some of the holidays celebrated by the Viet Cong. A few, such as Tet and the day dedicated to the Trung Sisters, are celebrated by all Vietnamese. Military activity, except for scattered incidents, is virtually terminated for the three-day Tet celebration. In the past, "cease-fires" have been declared by both sides. On many of the other holidays listed (May Day, Ho Chi Minh's Birthday) terrorist activity and military actions by the Viet Cong have increased.

January or February -- Tet (New Year)

(U) Initiation of Tet corresponds with the New Moon and takes place between the winter solstice and the spring equinox. Historically, January was a month for rest and amusement but the celebration now lasts only three days. The first day is dedicated to ancestor worship; the second is for visiting parents, relatives and friends; the third is for the dead and the living. Tet corresponds with the Chinese New Year and is celebrated by all Vietnamese (friendly and enemy) during late January or early February.

6 January 1946	-	First Election Day of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
3 February 1930	-	Establishment of the Indochinese Communist Party
6 February 43 AD	-	Death of the Trung Sisters (the Trung Sisters are credited with leading the first revolt against Chinese rule in 39 AD. The kingdom they established died and they committed suicide in 43 AD after defeat by the Chinese. Both North and South Vietnam revere the Trung Sisters)

3 March 1959	-	Foundation of the Vietnamese Labor Party (Lao Dong)
3 March 1919	-	The Third Communist International (first one attended by Vietnamese Communists)
8 March 1910	-	International Women's Day
19 March 1950	-	Anti-US Movement led by Saigon-Cholon population (originally inspired by Communists against the beginning of US aid to the French in 1950)
1 May 1886	-	May Day (Labor Day)
8 May 1954	-	Victory at Dien Bien Phu
19 May 1941	-	Establishment of the Viet Minh Front
20 July 1954	-	The signing of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam
27 July 1947	-	Wounded Soldiers and War Dead Day (similar to US Veteran's Day)
22 August 1461	-	Death of Le Loi (Le Loi drove the Chinese out of Vietnam in 1428 and established the Le Dynasty which lasted for 360 years. For the Communists Le Loi is a national leader second only to Ho Chi Minh)
2 September 1945	-	Vietnam Democratic Republic Day (formal establishment of the DRV by the Viet Minh)
19 December 1946	-	The Resistance Day of South Vietnam
20 December 1960	-	Formation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV)
22 December 1944	-	Armed Forces Day of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (NVN)

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(U) Military Alliances and Agreements

South Vietnam receives military aid under MAP from the US for all three services. It is not a signatory of SEATO, although it is a protocol state which could receive protection from SEATO when threatened by external aggression. South Vietnam is not a signatory of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, and it generally does not attempt to adhere to these agreements. It is recognized "de jure" by 98 states, including the Vatican, and "de facto" by 8 states. At least thirty-two Free World nations have furnished or agreed to furnish some sort of aid. The following countries have sent varying size military contingents to aid the Government of Vietnam: Australia; Republic of China; Republic of Korea; New Zealand; Philippines; Thailand; and the US.

(U) Military Budget

For fiscal year ending 31 December 1967, \$355,932,000; 56 percent of total budget, 18 percent of the GNP. Dollar values converted from Piastres at the official exchange rate of 118 Piastres to \$1.00.

(U) Manpower Resources

Population: 17,194,000 as of 1 January 1968; males (ages 15-49) - 4,406,000; physically fit - 2,550,000; average number reaching military age (20) annually, 1968 through 1972, about 120,000. Major components: Annamites - 78 percent; Chinese - 8 percent; Moi - 5 percent; Cambodians - 4 percent; Others - 5 percent. Illiteracy (1967) 80-85 percent.

(U) Conscription


The partial mobilization decree of 25 October 1967, to take effect on 1 January 1968, envisions the following: (a) drafting by roster of young men between the ages of 18 and 33 years of age, 18-year olds will not be called up before the end of 1968; (b) requisitioning of specialists between the ages of 34 and 45; (c) suspension of discharges for military personnel aged 18 to 33, those with 6, 7, or 8 years service will not be retained; (d) recall of veterans still within the 18 to 33 age limit, exceptions would be made of those with more than six years of service; (e) abolition of draft deferments for men in government service and essential occupations; (f) limitation, according to standards to be set by the cabinet, of deferments for reason of education, religion, and residence abroad; and (g) mobilization in place, according to standards to be set by the cabinet, of certain specialists required by security organizations and businesses vital to the country's economic development.

Chain of Command

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

MINISTER OF DEFENSE
Nguyen Van Vy

CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF
Gen Cao Van Vien



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(C) Reserves

The army has no overall organized reserve system; however, a source of reserve manpower exists in the form of individuals who have served on active duty and have been demobilized. A mobilization order provides for induction into reserve officer training of all 31-37-year-old men who hold a baccalaureate. The order has not yet been implemented, and may become a political bone of contention. No organized reserve system exists for the navy and air force.

(S/NF) Mobilization Capacity

South Vietnam has been mobilizing at near peak capacity since mid-1961. Although overall manpower resources are adequate to meet presently planned military force requirements, actual acquisition is problematical due to the shortcomings in population control and induction practices. Implementation of the partial mobilization decree of 25 October 1967 may help to overcome some of the induction problems. Total manpower resources of about 1,072,000, between ages of 18-30, are estimated to be available during 1967 for duty with the military forces. New 18-year-old additions to pool number about 55,000 yearly. With the projected monthly buildup of about 17,000 for the army, the Regional Forces, and Popular Force, the available manpower appears to be more than manpower base of about 925,000 between ages 31-45, are available for other ground forces (including all ethnic groups and possible physical rejects, but excludes personnel under Viet Cong control and those now in various forces). The mobilization capacity of the naval forces, including Marines, is estimated to be 24,500 on M+90 days. The air force has no mobilizable reservists.

Armed Forces


Army

(C) Mission: The mission of the 295,900-man* Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) is territorial defense and counterinsurgency. In 1967, (ARVN) was given the added mission of providing support and security for the Revolutionary Development Program.

(C) Capabilities and Limitations: The ARVN is capable of maintaining security in major populated centers and carrying out offensive actions against its less powerful neighbors. It is incapable of continuing the war without US assistance. The principal strength of ARVN in an internal security role stems from the fact that it is a military organization which can be assigned a mission and which can coordinate diverse efforts to

* Strength figure is as of 31 October 1967; detailed strength given on page A-12 is as of 31 September 1967.

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PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIAAP)

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ARVN

~~(S)~~ TROOP LIST -- MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

NDTE: Divisions include 3 infantry regiments of 4 battalions each, 2 artillery battalions (105-mm howitzer), a pioneer battalion, and an armored recon company, plus organic elements.

I CORPS

1st Div (15 Bns)
2d Div (15 Bns)

Non-Divisional:
51st Regt (Sep) (4 Bns)
4th Armd Cav Gp
7th Armd Cav Gp
34th FA Bn
1st Ranger Gp Hq
21st Ranger Bn
30th Ranger Bn
37th Ranger Bn
39th Ranger Bn
10th Engr Grp
101st Engr Bn
102d Engr Bn
103d Engr Bn
104th Engr Bn

II CORPS

22d Div (15 Bns)
23d Div (14 Bns)

Non-Divisional:
3d Armd Cav Gp
8th Armd Cav Gp
2d Ranger Gp Hq
11th Ranger Bn
22d Ranger Bn
23d Ranger Bn
37th FA Bn
39th FA Bn

III CORPS

5th Div (15 Bns)
18th Div (13 Bns)
25th Div (15 Bns)

Non-Divisional:
35th FA Bn
38th FA Bn
1st Armd Cav Gp
5th Armd Cav Gp
10th Armd Cav Gp
3d Ranger Gp Hq
31st Ranger Bn
34th Ranger Bn
35th Ranger Bn
36th Ranger Bn
51st Ranger Bn
52d Ranger Bn
30th Engr Gp
301st Engr Bn
302d Engr Bn
303d Engr Bn
52d Engr Bn

IV CORPS

7th Div (15 Bns)
9th Div (14 Bns)
21st Div (15 Bns)

Non-Divisional:
2d Armd Cav Gp
6th Armd Cav Gp
9th Armd Cav Gp
4th Ranger Gp Hq
32d Ranger Bn
41st Ranger Bn
42d Ranger Bn
43d Ranger Bn
44th Ranger Bn
36th FA Bn

CMD

5th Ranger Gp Hq
33d Ranger Bn
38th Ranger Bn

GENERAL RESERVE*

Abn Div (8 Abn Bns)

Marine Bde (6 Infantry and 1 FA Bn)

* General composition is as shown, but it changes for short periods of time due to tactical considerations.

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~~(S)~~ ARVN OB

COMBAT UNITS	CORPS HQ	DIV HQ	REGT HQ	BN	SEP CO	BDE	GP	ASSIGNED STRENGTH
I CORPS								
Quang Nam	1	0	1	11	0	0	2	7,010
Quang Ngai	0	1	1	6	1	0	0	4,484
Quang Tin	0	0	2	50	0	0	0	5,722
Quang Tri	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	3,344
Thua Thien	0	1	2	12	1	0	0	8,223
SUB-TOTAL	1	2	7	45	2	0	2	28,783
Cbt Spt & Admin Str								20,767
TOTAL								49,550
II CORPS								
Binh Dinh	0	1	2	10	3	0	0	8,200
Binh Thuan	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1,130
Darlac	0	1	1	8	5	0	0	6,543
Kontum	0	0	1	4	2	0	0	3,141
Lam Dong	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	960
Ninh Thuan	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	696
Phu Bon	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	790
Phu Yen	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	2,258
Pleiku	1	0	0	5	1	0	1	3,508
Tuyen Duc	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	149
SUB-TOTAL	1	2	6	35	15	0	1	27,375
Cbt Spt & Admin Str								36,183
TOTAL								63,558
III CORPS								
Bien Hoa	1	0	1	9	0	0	0	5,727
Binh Duong	0	1	2	11	2	0	0	8,150
Binh Long	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	2,365
Binh Tuy	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1,145
Gia Dinh	0	1	13	13	0	0	3	8,262
Hau Nghia	0	1	1	9	2	0	0	6,388
Long An	0	0	2	9	0	0	0	5,801
Long Khanh	0	1	2	8	1	0	0	5,663
Phuoc Long	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1,174
Phuoc Tuy	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1,255
SUB-TOTAL	1	4	9	68	6	0	3	45,830
Cbt Spt & Admin Str								77,147
TOTAL								129,977
IV CORPS								
An Giang	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1,336
An Xuyen	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	1,893
Ba Xuyen	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1,287
Bac Lieu	0	1	0	8	1	0	0	5,610
Chau Doc	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1,085
Chuong Thien	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	1,890
Dinh Tuong	0	1	2	11	1	0	0	8,127
Go Cong	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1,018
Kiang Giang	0	0	0	1	D	0	0	566
Kien Hoa	0	0	1	5	D	D	0	3,151
Kien Phong	0	0	1	1	D	0	0	859
Phong Dinh	1	0	D	2	0	0	1	2,089
Sadec	0	0	0	1	1	0	D	688
nh Binh	0	D	1	3	0	0	0	1,790
nh Long	0	1	0	7	D	0	D	5,006
SUB-TOTAL	1	3	9	52	3	0	1	36,395
Cbt Spt & Admin Str								20,107
TOTAL								56,502
SUPPORT UNITS	0	0	D	63	0	D	0	155,441
GRAND TOTAL	4	11	31	264	26	0	7	292,587

- NOTE 1: The 6 infantry bns of the Marine Brigade (Navy) are part of the General Reserve but excluded from strength totals. The Airborne Division & Ranger Bns, however, are included in the above tabulation.
- NOTE 2: Combat engineer bns organic to divisions are included in the "BN" column for the four CORPS; the six combat engineer bns subordinate to engineer groups are included in the "BN" column for support units.
- NOTE 3: Strength shown for SUPPORT UNITS is country-wide and is not applicable solely to number of units shown.

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accomplish a common goal. ARVN, for the most part, is currently deployed and employed to afford that degree of internal security which permits the functioning of normal government services. Where ARVN operates, it is familiar with the people, geography, and economy. This knowledge is a principal asset when functioning in an internal security role and it enables the force to effectively perform most, if not all, functions commonly associated with civic affairs while simultaneously protecting civil government institutions. Noteworthy of ARVN in a combat role is their capability to develop semipermanent and permanent defensive positions. Significant increases in combat effectiveness, morale, and aggressiveness of ARVN units equipped with M16 rifles have been reported. To further improve the combat effectiveness, it is intended to modernize ARVN's equipment by issuing 2,168 M60 machine guns and 765 M28 81-mm mortars with M23A1 mounts to selected units. The Military Assistance Command Vietnam recommends that these weapons be provided by the end of CY 1968. Principal weaknesses are insufficient qualified and aggressive leadership; insufficient but improving counterinsurgency training; low education and technical background; limited but improving logistic and maintenance efficiency.


(S) Organization: The ARVN is organized into four corps and a Capital Military District, with headquarters at Danang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, and Saigon. Combat units consist of 10 infantry divisions, one airborne division headquarters with eight airborne battalions, one separate infantry regiment, 10 armored cavalry squadrons, six separate artillery battalions, 20 ranger battalions, and five Ranger Group Headquarters (equivalent to a regiment).

Navy

(S) Mission: The mission of the 24,200-man (8,400 Marines) Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN) is patrol of the coast and inland waterways and support of army forces in maintaining internal order.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The country's large coastline and the VNN's small number of ships limit the navy's capability to perform its mission. Its ASW capability, though improving is still limited by the lack of experienced personnel and modern equipment. Overall effectiveness will increase as the navy gains operational experience. Minesweeping capabilities are very limited, as the three coastal minesweepers and seven of the minesweeper boats are employed primarily for patrol. Coastal Force has been effective to some degree (and is improving) in controlling intracoastal shipping of supplies to Viet Cong units in South Vietnam. It has apprehended many Viet Cong infiltrating intracoastally under the guise of fishermen. The Marine Corps is capable of conducting small-scale, approximately battalion-size assaults against light resistance. The navy has the capability to

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lift the Marine Corps or an equivalent number of army personnel for amphibious-type operations.

(4) Ship Strength: 27 patrol (6 PCE, 1 PC, 20 PGM), 13 mine warfare (3 MSC, 10 MSR/YP*), 147 amphibious ships and craft (3 LST, 6 LSSL, 5 LSIL, 7 LSM (2 LSMH), 7 LCU, 70 LCM, 49 LCVP), 1 auxiliary craft (AKL), 12 service craft (5 YTL, 2 YON, 1 YW, 2 YWN, 2 YOG), 290 junks, 100 assorted river patrol craft, 70 miscellaneous craft and boats.

(5) Organization: The VNN is organized into the Sea Forces, River Forces, and Coastal Force. Sea Forces are divided into Patrol, Amphibious, and Mine Flotillas. The River Forces are organized into 14 river group units. Major bases at Saigon, Danang, Nha Trang, and My Tho. The Coastal Force, organized into 27 divisions, is assigned to four coastal districts with command headquarters at Danang, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and Phu Quoc. The Marine Corps consists of five infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and one amphibious support battalions.

Air Force

(6) Mission: The mission of the 16,000-man Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) is to provide close air-ground support, liaison, interdiction, air escort, air transport, medical evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance in support of the army. Destruction of installations in North Vietnam supporting the enemy is an additional mission.

(7) Capabilities and Limitations: The tactical air capabilities of the VNAF have increased during the past year. It has provided sustained and effective support to the army in accomplishing its mission, especially in the 4th Corps. The conversion of one of the six tactical fighter squadrons from A-1H/G light bomber aircraft to F-5 jet fighter aircraft, the activation of one helicopter squadron and one transport squadron, improved communications and strike request techniques, and a reduction in accident and desertion rates have been major factors in upgrading the VNAF's tactical air capabilities and performance. A limited number of cross-border missions have been flown in the southern sectors of North Vietnam. With the conversion of the 522d Fighter Squadron at Bien Hoa to F-5 jet fighters, the VNAF has acquired a definite but limited day air defense capability. The VNAF/US-manned facilities of the ACW units at Danang, Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang, and Binh Tuy provide the EW/GCI capability. The helicopter squadrons utilize the CH-34 helicopter and the transport squadrons are assigned C-47D transports. The liaison squadrons are composed of U-17As and O-1As.


(8) Aircraft Strength: Total - 461 21 jet fighters (F-5C/Ds), 4 jet light bombers (B-57Cs), 148 prop light bombers (117 A-1Hs, 31 A-1Gs) 50 transports (C-47Ds), 91 helicopters (88 CH-34Cs, 3 Alouettes) 147 miscellaneous types (2 Aero Commander, 2 C-45, 52 Cessna 185s, 82 L-19As, 9 L-20As).

* Seven of the MSBs have been modified for patrol work.

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(S) Aircraft in Operational Units: Total - 385 21 jets (21 F-5Bs, 2 F-5Ds), 94 prop light bombers (73 A-1Hs, 21 A-1Gs), 50 transports (C-47Ds), 88 helicopters (CH-34Cs), 132 miscellaneous types (50 Cessna 185s, 73 L-19As).

(S) Organization: The VNAF is organized into five composite wings, one each in Danang, Nha Trang, Binh Thuy, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut. Units included are six tactical fighter squadrons, five helicopter squadrons, four liaison squadrons, 3 transport squadrons, and one reconnaissance squadron.

Paramilitary Forces

Regional Forces

(S) Mission: The mission of the 145,000-man Regional Forces is to provide internal security at province level.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The capabilities of the Regional Forces have improved during the past year as a result of retraining, reequipping, and enhanced tactical mobility. Weaknesses include lack of aggressive leadership at low levels of command, high desertion rate, and lack of trust between peasant and soldier. It is capable of combined operations with the regular armed forces.


(S) Organization: The Regional Forces are organized into squads, platoons, companies, and battalions. They are directly under the control of the national headquarters, with subordinate commands at Corps, Sector (Province), and Sub-Sector (District) levels. Operations of the Regional Forces are geared primarily to security at the civil province level.

Other

(S) In addition to the foregoing paramilitary forces, which make a substantial contribution to the country's combat strength, there is a 144,000-man Popular Force and a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) of about 42,000 full-time personnel trained by Special Forces personnel. The Popular Force, although penetrated by the Viet Cong, provides some local protection and conducts counterinsurgency programs at village and hamlet level. The Popular Force is organized into squads and platoons. The CIDG conducts special forces-type operations in areas beyond the GVN control and is limited in size but otherwise generally capable of effective operations.

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OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

~~(S/INT)~~ The military objectives for the area are as follows:

- a. To cause the North Vietnamese Government (NVN) to cease its control, direction, and support of the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam (SVN) and Laos.
- b. To assist the GVN to defeat the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnam (NVN) forces in SVN.
- c. To assist the GVN in extending its dominion and control over SVN, including suppression of guerrilla activity.

(b)(1);1.4 (a)

~~(S/INT)~~ The United States Government, in concert with the Government of South Vietnam and other Free World Governments, has committed a large and still growing military force toward these objectives. The US military presence in SVN totaled some 487,000 at the end of December 1967.

~~(S/INT)~~ Detail relating to exact strength and disposition of these forces is presented in other sections of this coverage of SVN. The pace of the US military buildup in SVN is depicted in the table below:


US MILITARY STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM As of End of Period (Thousands)

<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
0.9	3.2	11.3	16.3	23.3	184.3	385.3	486.9
<u>1967</u>							
<u>End 2nd Qtr</u>	<u>End 3rd Qtr</u>			<u>End 4th Qtr</u>			
	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	
448.8	458.5	466.3	461.1	468.5	470.7	486.9	

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

USMACV Command Arrangements



① RETAINS COMMAND FOR OTHER THAN RVN AND CERTAIN LAOS AIR OPERATIONS.

② DUAL-HAT AS COMUSMACV AND CG USARV.

③ AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE, FORCES ATTACHED FOR OP CON AS REQUIRED.

④ US NAVY FORCES, VIETNAM-USMACV NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND.

⑤ MAY BE DESIGNATED AS A TASK FORCE HQ FOR CONTROL OF ATTACHED UNITS AS REQUIRED.

⑥ ALL US ARMY ADVISORS ASSIGNED TO MACV, OP CON AS INDICATED.

⑦ COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE.

⑧ FIRST FIELD FORCES, VIETNAM - CONTROLS US ARMY COMBAT UNITS IN II CTZ.

⑨ SECOND FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM - CONTROLS US ARMY COMBAT UNITS IN III CTZ.

⑩ ATTACHED FOR OP CON AS REQUIRED.

⑪ RIVER PATROL FORCE.

⑫ RIVER FLOTILLA-SUPPORTS DELTA RIVERINE OPERATIONS

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COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS - SOUTH VIETNAM


(C) The direction of all military operations in SVN is the responsibility of the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), a subordinate unified commander under the operational command of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). The forces under his operational control are elements of the three major Pacific Command (PACOM) service components; US Army, Pacific (USARPAC), US Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT), and US Pacific Air Force (USPACAF).

(U) The above Service components are directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), who reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the link between the senior field commander, CINCPAC, in this case, and the highest military authority in Washington.

(U) The chart on the opposite page depicts the various headquarters and their relationships as they existed.

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US GROUND COMBAT UNITS - SOUTH VIETNAM

(U) The map on page A-22 depicts the base camp locations of the major US ground combat elements in SVN. Temporary tactical locations in connection with specific combat operations are not shown. The summaries below present further data on the number of battalions of combat and combat support type units in-country as of 31 December 1967. The overall strength totals shown below depict the total ground unit strengths which include the logistical support and administrative units in addition to the combat elements spelled out in more detail.

GROUND COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, SOUTH VIETNAM As of 31 December 1967

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Maneuver Battalions	72	19*	91
Special Forces Group	1	-	1
Tank Battalions	2	2	4
Cavalry Squadrons	10	-	10
Artillery Battalions	54 1/3	10 2/3	65
HAWK Battalions	2	2	4
Engineer Battalions	35	16**	51
AD Bn (AWSP)	3	-	3
 TOTAL PERSONNEL	 299,533	 62,450	 361,983 (8)


* Does not include two SLFs

** Includes 11 Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (8).

US AIR AND NAVAL ELEMENTS - SOUTH VIETNAM

(U) The air and naval elements depicted on page A-24 are those units which operate essentially high performance and/or strike aircraft. The table below further summarizes these and includes the helicopter, logistic, observation, and utility air units which were also in-country at the end of the period but not shown on the map.

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<u>AIR UNITS</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>TOTAL UNITS</u>	<u>TOTAL A/C</u>
Strike A/C	20 +	9	10	-	39 +	641
Sqdns	1 Det				1 Det	
Recon/Elec	6 +	4	1	-	11 +	150
A/C Sqdns	1 Det				1 Det	
Interceptor	2 Det	-	-	-	2 Det	18
A/C						
Helicopter	-	1	11	80	92	2,990
Co's/Sqdns						
Logistics A/C	11 +	-	-	-	11 +	221
Co's/Sqdns	14 Det				14 Det	
Observation/	7	-	3	18	28	892
Utility A/C						
Co's/Sqdns						
 AIR UNIT STRENGTHS	 56,209	 **	 15,837	 20,751		 92,797* (s)

* This total includes only those personnel for the air units which were ashore in SVN as of 31 December 1967.

** All US Navy squadrons included here are carrier-based off-shore. The personnel strength is included in the naval summary below. (U)


NAVAL COMBAT UNITS OPERATING OFF SVN DURING PERIOD

Attack Carrier (CVA)	2
Antisubmarine Warfare Carrier (CVS)	1
Cruiser	2
Destroyer/Frigate/Escort	25
Amphibians (LST, APA, AKA, etc.)	27
Minecraft	5
Fire Support Ships	2 (s)

NAVY/COAST GUARD STRENGTH (31 DECEMBER 1967)

Navy: Afloat (As of 31 Dec 67)	36,500
Ashore	31,524
Coast Guard	476
	68,500 (c)

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GROUND OPERATIONS - SVN
1 July - 31 December 1967

(S) Total activity remained at a high level during the period. Ground operations continued to accent search and destroy operations against known enemy base areas and against confirmed and suspected infiltration routes. At the same time, emphasis continued on military support of Revolutionary Development programs of the GVN.


I CORPS AREA

(S) The defeat of the NVA/VC forces and their subsequent withdrawal was the objective of the ground operations conducted in the I CTZ. Operation KINGFISHER, conducted northwest of Camp Carroll during the period 13 July-31 October 1967 was the major engagement fought in the vicinity of the DMZ. To the south, operation WHEELER/WALLOWA, conducted deep in Quang Tin Province, culminated a series of operations which had driven the enemy from the coast. A summary of the 13 most significant operations conducted during the period follows.

OPERATION	No. of Bns	Casualties		
		US/FW/GVN		Enemy
		KIA	WIA	KIA
LEJEUNE	2	17	65	176
CIMARRON	6	38	470	245
CROCKETT	2	52	255	206
BUFFALO	6	159	885	1,290
CHOCTAN	2	18	153	160
COCHISE	3	10	113	156
SWIFT	2	127	352	571
BENTON	3	41	263	397
TF OREGON	9	32	213	674
MALHEUR II	3	30	260	488
KINGFISHER	6	340	3,086	1,117
KENTUCKY	5	65	675	318
WHEELER/WALLOWA	8	253	1,181	3,137

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II CORPS AREA

(S) Ground operations in II CTZ consisted of two main types, both designed to contribute to the defeat and withdrawal of the enemy and separate him from the population. In addition to search and destroy operations, which constituted the bulk of the activity, and FRANCIS MARION, a border surveillance and interdiction operation in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, were conducted. A summary of the eight most significant operations conducted during the period follows.

OPERATION	No. of Bns	Casualties		
		US/FW/GVN		Enemy
		KIA	WIA	KIA
HONG KIL DONG	9	27	68	638
TUY HOA 711	2	22	49	135
GREELEY	3	129	210	191
PERSHING	5	588	2,787	5,008
DAN QUYEN 822	2	44	74	141
FRANCIS MARION	6	183	843	1,203
BOLLING	3	23	93	242
BYRD	4	34	335	833

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
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III CORPS AREA

(*) The nature of ground operations in III CTZ, while designed with the same objective as in the other CTZs, was considerably different than in I and II CTZs. Primarily, this difference is due to great emphasis by the VC in maintaining a hold on the Saigon perimeter, the existence of an extensive, well developed, relatively sophisticated base camp network, and the predominance of jungle and paddies rather than mountainous terrain. Search and destroy, crop protection, jungle clearing, and interdiction operations conducted in support of the objective were characterized by extensive use of not only air and land mobility, but also of river mobility provided by the Riverine Mobile Force to seal off the enemy's exfiltration routes and force him to fight. A summary of the ten most significant operations conducted during the period follows.

OPERATION	No. of Bns	Casualties		
		US/FW/GVN		Enemy
		KIA	WIA	KIA
CORONADO IV	2	3	27	10
YELLOWSTONE	7	36	335	122
SHENANDOAH	7	107	322	956
BARKING SANDS	3	15	1,029	268
DIAMOND HEAD	3	79	544	241
KITTY HAWK	1	42	147	121
RILEY	1	40	177	113
FAIRFAX	4	156	899	1,225
ENTERPRISE	3	190	1,099	1,496
KOLEKOLE	3	92	633	671

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IV CORPS AREA




(a) The objective in IV CTZ is the same as elsewhere: to engage and defeat the VC/NVA forces, cause them to withdraw, and separate them from the population. The geography of the IV CTZ represents a unique and challenging area of operation. The challenge was met through extensive use of air mobile, river mobile and where possible, land mobile operation. A summary of the seven most significant operations conducted during the period follows.

OPERATION	No. of Bns	Casualties		
		US/FW/GVN		Enemy
		KIA	WIA	KIA
DAN CHI 285	7	57	224	243
DAN CHI 289	4	5	60	210
CORONADO	2	39	176	483
CUU LONG 64/SD	3	16	102	234
SONG THAN 63	2	44	115	122
CORONADO V	3	34	174	330
CORONADO IX	3	59	286	344

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SEA ATTACK SORTIES



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
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COMBAT AIR OPERATIONS - SOUTHEAST ASIA

(S) The following two charts present a recapitulation of Southeast Asia combat air operations. The first chart outlines information related to sortie requirements, sortie capability, and sorties flown by attack capable aircraft expending nonnuclear ordnance. Combat sorties are shown by country. B-52 activity is displayed separately at the bottom of the charts. The next chart provides air munitions information in tons. Detailed sortie information on South Vietnam, North Vietnam (ROLLING THUNDER), and Laos may be found on pages A-35, A-36, and C-19.

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ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS
1 July - 31 December 1967

(S//NF) During the report period, B-52 strikes have supported every major ground action in SVN. The major effort however has shifted from the interior of SVN to the border areas providing enemy routes of ingress into SVN from NVN and Laos. Approval authority for strikes in the area of NVN south of 17°10' N latitude was delegated to CINCPAC in December 1967. In addition, the restriction on overflight of Laos was eliminated. These actions have significantly improved responsiveness of ARC LIGHT forces to COMUSMACV requirements.

(S//NF) An 800 sortie per month rate was in effect during this period. The Secretary of Defense has approved an increase to 1,200 sorties per month beginning 1 February 1968.

QUARTERLY SORTIE/ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

<u>Month</u>	<u>No. of Missions</u>	<u>No. of Sorties</u>	<u>M117/ 750#</u>	<u>M82/ 500#</u>	<u>Ordnance Expended</u>		
					<u>BLU 3B*</u>	<u>BLU 26B**</u>	<u>M-35 Incd Clus</u>
JUL	128	836	26,612	37,426	432	2,154	-
AUG	121	832	25,581	44,773	-	-	-
SEP	122	833	19,798	58,491	-	399	-
OCT	122	847	18,590	61,798	-	2,085	-
NOV	115	816	21,040	55,301	-	-	-
DEC	<u>110</u>	<u>808</u>	<u>17,541</u>	<u>61,153</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	718	4,972	129,171	318,942	432	4,638	0

* Indicates number of cartons. Each carton contains 74 BLU 3B bomblets.


** Indicates number of cartons. Each carton contains 175 BLU 26B bomblets.

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SEA MUN EXPEND


NVN EXPEND

SVN EXPEND



TOTAL EXPEND

LAOS EXPEND



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MARKET TIME OPERATIONS - 1 JULY to 31 DECEMBER 1967

(C) Operation MARKET TIME, US Navy and Coast Guard sea surveillance of coastal waters off SVN in coordination with the Vietnamese Navy (VNN), was begun in March 1965 to minimize sea infiltration into SVN. US MARKET TIME operations are commanded by CTF 115, with headquarters in Cam Ranh Bay.

(C) US forces are authorized to stop, visit, and search vessels (less warships) of any nation within SVN territorial waters. In the SVN contiguous zone (within 12 miles of the coast), US forces may require identification and declaration of intent of vessels of any nation. In international waters beyond the contiguous zone, US forces may stop, visit, and search SVN vessels.

(C) USN/USCG/VNN Naval Forces form barriers at the 17th parallel and Cambodian border. Waters off the SVN coastline are divided into nine major patrol areas (see map, page A-40). An aircraft is kept airborne continuously on one northern (blue) and one southern (red) air patrol track. Army O-1 observation aircraft with naval observers embarked overfly most of the coastline twice daily.

MARKET TIME FORCES


(C) Eleven patrol ships are maintained on station with at least one in each major patrol area. To accomplish this, nine Radar Destroyer Escorts (DERs) are made available to CTF 115 from Seventh Fleet assets. Of this number, normally 304 DERs are actually on station with CTF 115. The DERs are augmented by minesweepers (MSO/MSG), high endurance Coast Guard cutters (WHEC) and patrol gunboats (PG) as required.

(C) Twenty-six Coast Guard cutters (WFB) are in-country. Seventeen of these are maintained on continuous patrol. They have been concentrated near the 17th Parallel, along the SVN coast from Vung Tau to the Cau Mau Peninsula and in the vicinity of the Cambodian border in the Gulf of Thailand near Phu Quoc Island.

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MARKET TIME OPERATING FORCES AND AREAS



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(C) Twelve SP2H Navy patrol aircraft are based at NAF, Cam Ranh Bay and patrol the northern (blue) sea. P3A aircraft from U Tapao, Thailand, are assigned patrol responsibility in the southern (red) area.

(C) During this period, the USN/USCG, maintained an average of 63 ships/craft on continuous patrol. The VNN maintained an average of 8-10 ships/craft on patrol in addition to approximately 140-150 junks of the VNN Coastal Force employed in surveillance operations.

(C) Two PGs, based at Cam Ranh Bay, are assigned to augment or replace offshore patrol units.

(C) A total of 84 Swift Craft (PCF) are assigned for close-in patrols of which 40 are required to be continuously underway in assigned patrol stations.

(C) Support craft are:

- 1 LST (Landing Ship Tank)
- 1 ARL (Landing Craft Repair Ship)
- 1 YR (Floating Workshop)
- 2 AKL (Light Cargo Ship)
- 1 APL (Light Transport)
- 1 ARG (Internal Combustion Engineer Repair Shop)

MARKET TIME RESULTS - JULY THROUGH DECEMBER 1967

ENEMY LOSSES

(C) In addition to capturing various unmanifested cargoes (such as rice, salt, medicine, and money) and delivering numerous draft dogs, and other violators of RVN laws to GVN authorities, MARKET TIME forces have inflicted the following losses on the enemy.

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed/Damaged</u>
VC Personnel	87	0	--
Junks	--	1	7/9
Sampans	--	3	91/78
Structures	--	-	15/228
Trawler	--	1	--

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FRIENDLY LOSSES - US

(S) Ten ships and one aircraft were damaged during the conduct of MARKET TIME operations during the last six months of CY 1967. Two US personnel were killed and 12 wounded.

FRIENDLY LOSSES - VIETNAMESE

(S) Five VNN personnel were killed and 42 were wounded during the last six months of CY 1967.

MARKET TIME OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

(S) The following table shows MARKET TIME activity for the last half of CY 1967.

SHIPS DETECTED/BOARDED/INSPECTED
Last six months CY 67

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>WOODEN SHIPS</u>							
<u>DAY</u>							
Detected	57,713	46,910	51,236	32,682	23,900	24,228	236,669
Boarded	17,373	12,063	14,461	8,724	6,379	5,791	64,791
Inspected	21,265	20,196	20,228	12,622	11,583	10,490	96,384
<u>NIGHT</u>							
Detected	58,648	63,825	43,804	19,111	11,579	10,129	207,096
Boarded	11,502	18,931	7,891	3,000	2,084	1,764	45,172
Inspected	22,906	22,996	16,836	6,965	4,866	4,192	78,757
<u>STEEL SHIPS</u>							
<u>DAY</u>							
Detected	827	812	774	732	597	831	4,573
Boarded	91	70	60	40	44	53	358
Inspected	494	473	489	421	460	474	2,811
<u>NIGHT</u>							
Detected	789	814	976	641	561	796	4,577
Boarded	36	26	29	10	11	9	121
Inspected	473	791	505	478	393	528	3,168
Total Detected		452,915					
Total Boarded		110,442					
Total Inspected		181,120					

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GAME WARDEN OPERATIONS - 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1967

(c) Operation GAME WARDEN, under operational control of CTG 116, River Patrol Force, Vietnam, was established 18 December 1965 with the mission, "to assist GVN to deny enemy use of major rivers of Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone." Initial patrol operations commenced in the Rung Sat Special Zone in March 1966 and were gradually phased into the Delta commencing in May 1966. By early September 1966, patrols were being conducted on all major rivers of the Delta from the Cambodian border to the South China Sea. Ten PBRs are based at Tan My in the I CTZ to patrol the Song Hue River.

GAME WARDEN FORCES

(c) GAME WARDEN forces on 31 December 1967 included 148 PBRs, 3 LST, 13 MSBs (minesweepers), 22 helicopters, 2 seed teams, and boat support unit detachments. The helicopters (on loan from US Army) are manned and operated by naval personnel but maintained by Army personnel.

PROGRAMMED GAME WARDEN FORCES

(c) One hundred-two PBRs are scheduled for deployment in 68. An additional 31 armed helicopters have been approved for deployment but are not currently available and their arrival date in country is unknown.

GAME WARDEN OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY


(c) The chart on page depicts GAME WARDEN activity for the last six months of CY 1967.

NUMBER SHIPS/DETECTED/INSPECTED/BOARDED AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS

		Detected	Inspected	Boarded	Curfew Viola- tions	% Boarded or Inspected
JUL	Ships/Day	51,660	10,815	28,846	-	69
	Ships/Night	8,283	2,150	4,889	59	86
AUG	Ships/Day	69,113	13,328	41,203	-	79
	Ships/Night	4,956	857	3,372	62	85
SEP	Ships/Day	69,730	15,218	44,460	-	86
	Ships/Night	5,737	909	4,075	124	87
OCT	Ships/Day	53,008	11,091	31,985	-	81
	Ships/Night	3,014	639	1,990	46	87
NOV	Ships/Day	58,979	13,649	35,058	-	83
	Ships/Night	4,131	1,174	2,537	23	90
DEC	Ships/Day	57,710	14,103	33,309	-	82
	Ships/Night	3,722	1,068	2,501	60	96

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GAME WARDEN BASES & FORCE DISPOSITION



PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIAAP)

1 January 1968

A-44

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GAME WARDEN RESULTS - JULY THROUGH DECEMBER 1967

ENEMY LOSSES

(c) In addition to the destruction or capture of large rice caches, medicines, ammunition, and numerous documents, GAME WARDEN forces inflicted the following losses on the enemy:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Enemy Personnel	616	51	--	--
Junks/Sampans	--	55	452	660
Structures	--	--	624	952
Rifles	--	49	--	--
Grenades	--	52	--	--

US/FWMAF LOSSES

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
US Personnel	13	216	8	--	--
RVN Personnel	1	21	--	--	--
Vessels	--	--	--	95	2
Helicopters	--	--	--	40	5

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NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT - SOUTH VIETNAM
1 July - 31 December 1967

(e) US Navy/Coast Guard cruisers, destroyers, and other ships or craft have delivered a total of 977,725 rounds of naval gunfire in support of US/FWMAF in SVN since May 1965.

(e) The actual number of rounds expended in SVN by month/ by type during the second quarter CY 1967 is indicated below:

	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
8"/55	1,535	88	1,103	820	1,452	2,467	7,465
6"/47	1,409	2,482	692	2,312	742	861	8,498
5"/54	5,152	7,457	12,374	15,940	9,424	7,004	57,351
5"/38	18,256	16,104	19,353	24,968	26,772	29,264	134,717
5"/SSR (Rockets)	7,243	16,345	5,371	14,173	19,721	10,098	72,951
3"/50	3,253	405	2,810	1,466	2,005	--	9,939
40mm	908	455	1,023	2,716	2,718	202	8,022
81mm	--	--	--	--	8	1	9
Total	37,756	43,336	42,726	62,395	62,842	49,897	298,952

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Free World Assistance to Vietnam (as of 31 December 1967)

(U) A number of nations have provided military and non-military assistance since the Government of Vietnam launched an appeal for aid on 14 July 1964. Five Asian and Pacific countries (Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, and Thailand) have more than 60,000 troops on the ground. Additional troops recently committed by Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand will bring the total to more than 71,000. Germany, Australia, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Netherlands have large continuing programs of economic, humanitarian, and technical assistance. Several other countries make continuing contributions, though of a smaller magnitude; and many others have sent relief or commodity aid since 1964. A total of thirty-one nations besides the United States are or have assisted Vietnam under the Free World Assistance Program.

(U) A detailed listing compiled by the Department of State follows:

Asia-Pacific

Australia

(U) Australia is providing a wide and substantial range of aid to Vietnam under the Colombo Plan and by direct bilateral assistance.

(U) Military aid presently consists of approximately 6,300 combat troops (which constitute a brigade and supporting personnel), 100 combat advisors, a 73-man Air Force Unit at Vung Tau with six Caribou planes which fly daily logistical transport missions in support of Vietnamese military forces, and eight Canberra jet bombers operate out of Phan Rang. A guided missile destroyer is presently on duty off the coast of Vietnam, and the navy also has an underwater demolition team in-country.

(U) Economic and technical assistance has totaled more than \$10 million including three surgical teams totaling 42 personnel, a group of civil engineers working on water supply and road construction projects, three experts in dairy and crop practices and radio techniques, training of 130 Vietnamese in Australia, goods and materials (1,250,000 textbooks in Vietnamese for rural schools, 3,300 tons of corrugated roofing for Vietnamese military dependents' housing, six large community windmills, 15,750 sets of hand tools, 400 radio sets and 2,400 loudspeakers, 16,000 blankets and 14,000 cases of condensed milk), and a 55 kilowatt broadcasting station at Ban Me Thout.

Republic of China

(U) The Republic of China has provided an 80-man agricultural team, an 18-man military psychological warfare team, a 34-man electrical power mission under the leadership of Taipower, and a 16-man surgical team.

(U) China also provided training for more than 200 Vietnamese in Taiwan. In the way of goods and materials they have provided 26 aluminum prefabricated warehouses, agricultural tools, seeds and fertilizers, cement, medical supplies, 500,000 copies of mathematics textbooks and an electrical power substation.

Japan

(U) Japan has provided over \$55 million worth of economic assistance to Vietnam, chiefly through reparations. Japan has sent two medical teams, considerable amounts of medical goods (4,544 cases), 20,000 transistor radios, and 25 ambulances; a surgical team is now stationed in Saigon. It has provided technical personnel and funds for the construction of a large power dam across the Da Nhim River and an electrical transmission line.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

(U) The 48,800 ROK personnel participating in the conflict account for the majority of Third Country forces in South Vietnam. These forces include two army divisions, one marine brigade, a 130-man Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), 10 military instructors for training Vietnamese military in hand-to-hand combat, and a 2,200-man Task Force Unit composed of the following elements: one army engineer battalion, one headquarters group, one army transportation company, one marine corps engineer company, one infantry battalion, one LST and two LSM's and one composite support unit (communications, medical supplies, etc.)

(U) Korean military medical personnel are providing some medical care to the local population in areas where ROK troops are stationed. In addition, seven civilian medical teams totaling 118 doctors, nurses, and support personnel are working in provincial health programs.

Laos

(U) One million kip (\$4,167) for flood relief in 1965 and a small cash donation for refugees in 1966.

Malaysia

(U) Since 1964, Malaysia has trained almost 3,000 Vietnamese military and police officers. Groups of 30-60 are regularly sent for about a month's training in counterinsurgency with Malaysian Police Special Constabulary. Malaysia has also provided some counterinsurgency equipment primarily military and police transport vehicles, and medicines and relief supplies.

New Zealand

(U) New Zealand has sent an artillery battery and an infantry company (approximately 350 men) and provided a 25-man army engineer detachment.

(U) In non-military aid, New Zealand assistance has averaged 250,000 NZ dollars (US \$347,500) annually. (Civilian aid expenditures in 1968 are expected to exceed 300,000 NZ dollars.) This has financed

a 15-man surgical team at Qui Nhon, scholarships for 80 Vietnamese in New Zealand, medical and teaching equipment for Hue University, equipment for a technical high school, and a contribution towards the construction of a science building at the University of Saigon.

Pakistan

(U) Contributed financial relief assistance for flood victims and has also donated clothing.

Philippines

(U) The Philippine Government has sent a 2,000-man military engineering unit with security support personnel, a station hospital, and rural health and civic action teams.

(U) In non-military aid, a 12-man medical team has been financed and clothing, food and medical supplies have been donated.

Thailand

(U) A total of about 2,450 Thai personnel are serving in South Vietnam. This consists of a recently arrived army combat brigade, a 150-man naval contingent manning an LST and a PGM patrol craft, and a 35-man air force detachment which has been flying transport aircraft for the Vietnamese Air Force. In addition, jet aircraft training for Vietnamese pilots in Thailand has been provided.

(U) Rice for refugees and cement and corrugated iron roofing materials have been provided as non-military aid.

Middle East

Iran

(U) Iran has contributed 1,000 tons of petroleum products and a medical team consisting of 20 personnel.

Israel

(U) Pharmaceutical supplies for flood victims were donated and three Vietnamese have been trained in irrigation techniques.

Turkey

(U) Turkey has provided medicines and also offered to provide a substantial amount of cement.

Europe

Belgium

(U) Medicines and an ambulance have been provided and scholarships for 15 Vietnamese to study in Belgium have been granted.

Denmark

(U) Denmark has provided medical supplies and has offered to train 12 Vietnamese nurses in Denmark.

France

(U) Since 1956, France has contributed about \$115 million in assistance to South Vietnam. Present aid is running at a rate of about 4 million per year, largely in the cultural field.

(U) Most French now in Vietnam are serving in some form of cultural capacity; some of them teach in secondary schools and a few are professors on university staffs. France provided 55 fellowships for technical training and 85 academic fellowships for schooling in France in 1965 and these programs are continuing, but at a slightly reduced scale.

(U) France has provided low-interest credits of 100 million francs (20 million dollars) for financing imports of French equipment for Vietnamese industry and a grant of 500,000 francs (\$100,000) for equipment for L'Ecole Nationale d'Ingenieurs des Arts Industriels.

(U) In 1960, a low-interest credit of 70 million francs (\$14 million) was made to aid construction of the major coal and chemical complex at An Hoa-Nong Son south of Danang which is underway. A low interest, five-year credit of 60 million francs (\$12 million) has also been provided for construction of Vietnam's largest cement-producing complex with plants at Ha Tien and Thu Duc. In 1964, France provided a 930,000 franc (\$186,000) grant for the installation of a training center for electrical technicians and in 1965 a gift of 1.25 million francs (\$250,000) for teaching equipment, primarily in the medical field.

Germany

(U) German economic and humanitarian aid averages about \$7.5 million annually, and more than 200 personnel are serving in-country. A 3,000-ton hospital, the HELGOLAND, with eight doctors and 30 other medical personnel, is stationed at Danang, and German medical teams render aid to refugees and to rural inhabitants in central Vietnam. Other Germans serving in Vietnam teach at the new Technical High School at Thu Duc near Saigon and five professors are on the Hue University facility. Twenty Vietnamese are being trained in Germany to replace the seven Germans at the Technical High School, and scholarships at German schools are granted to seven students each year.

(U) The German Government has provided the following credits: DM 15 million (\$3.75 million) for the import of German products such as machine tools, fertilizer, etc.; a credit of DM 50 million (\$12.5 million) for development of the industrial complex at An Hoa-Nong Son; and a credit of DM 20 million (\$5 million) for capital projects.

(U) Other assistance includes the construction and staffing, with German aid funds, nine social centers in Saigon. A training center for experts in the social field is being established, and a home for juvenile delinquents is under construction at Thu Duc. Substantial quantities of pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies and equipment have been donated for distribution to civilian hospitals and dispensaries.

Greece

(U) Greece has contributed \$15,000 worth of medical supplies.

Ireland

(U) Ireland has contributed \$2,800 to Vietnam through the Red Cross.

Italy

(U) The Italians have provided a 10-man surgical team and have offered science scholarships to 10 Vietnamese to study in Italy.

Luxembourg

(U) This country has provided plasma and blood transfusion equipment.

The Netherlands

(U) The Netherlands aid program, which began in 1965, has financed scholarships for Vietnamese doctors, the construction and equipping of three tuberculosis centers, and the renovation and expansion of a hospital in Cholon. The Dutch Government has also earmarked \$1 million of funds in trust for UN projects in Vietnam.

Norway

(U) Norway sent a contribution through the International Red Cross for flood victims in February 1965.

Spain

(U) About 2,200 pounds of medicines, medical equipment, and blankets have been provided and a 12-man medical team is in Vietnam.

Switzerland

(U) The Swiss have provided microscopes for the University of Saigon. In addition, an 11-man medical team was sent through the International Committee of the Red Cross to work in a provincial hospital in the central highlands in April 1966. Another team arrived in Danang in late 1967, and a government grant is being used to finance the construction of a pediatric wing at the Danang hospital.

United Kingdom

(U) The United Kingdom has supplied economic aid valued at \$2.4 million in the past three years. It has provided seven police advisors, a Professor of English at Hue University, and technical experts. Twenty-one Vietnamese are receiving training in the United Kingdom. A pediatric team of five British doctors and six nurses went to Saigon in August 1966 to remain for five years; the team will be expanded to 18 members and X-ray and other equipment is being supplied for a new hospital block.

(U) In 1963-64, the United Kingdom provided the following goods and materials: laboratory equipment for Saigon University; a type-setting machine for the Government Printing Office; a cobalt deep-ray therapy unit for the National Cancer Institute; various equipment for the faculties of Medicine, Science and Pharmacy at Saigon University, the Meteorologic Service and the Agricultural School at Saigon, and Atomic Research Establishment at Dalat and the Faculty of Education at Hue.

Latin America

Argentina

(U) Argentina recently sent 5,000 tons of wheat flour.

Brazil

(U) Brazil provided 5,000 sacks of coffee and sent a substantial quantity of medical supplies.

Costa Rica

(U) This country has contributed an ambulance for use by the Ministry of Health.

Ecuador

(U) A gift of medical supplies has been sent to Vietnam.

Guatemala

(U) Approximately 15,000 doses of typhoid-paratyphoid serum were donated.

Honduras

(U) Honduras has contributed drugs and dry goods for refugees in Vietnam.

Uruguay

(U) A contribution of \$21,500 for relief supplies and medicines.

Venezuela

(U) Two civilian doctors and 500 tons of rice have been sent to Vietnam.

Africa

Liberia

(U) A gift of \$50,000 was given for the purchase of medical supplies and hospital equipment.

Tunisia

(U) Tunisia has made available 15 to 20 scholarships for Vietnamese.

North America

Canada

(U) More than \$4.6 million of development assistance has been provided since 1964. At Quang Ngai, a small tuberculosis clinic is being constructed, and two doctors and four nurses have arrived in Vietnam to staff the clinic. A professor of orthopedics is working at Cho Ray Hospital in Saigon, and there is a Canadian instructor at the University of Hue. In Canada, almost 500 Vietnamese have received technical training, and there are 231 currently receiving such training under the Colombo Plan.

(U) Since 1958, Canada has provided \$850,000 worth of food and the funds generated by sales are used for capital construction projects in Vietnam. A new \$333,000 building for the medical school at the University of Hue is under construction and the Canadians have agreed to allocate about \$125,000 for the construction of an auditorium at the university. In addition, \$1 million has been allocated for medical assistance which, in part, will fund delivery of 10 200-bed emergency hospital units. The first two units have arrived and are located near Saigon. About 650,000 doses of polio vaccine have been delivered for inoculation of school children and Canada has offered additional vaccines against polio, TB, and smallpox. Canada is also printing half a million copies of a social science textbook for grade school children.

United Nations

(U) The United Nations and its specialized agencies are also making a significant contribution to the social and economic development of Vietnam. Under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance of the UN Development Program, 15 technical assistance projects were scheduled for 1967-68 at a cost of \$724,475. These projects range across such varied fields as maternal and child health, labor administration, educational planning, telecommunications, meteorology and civil aviation. Among the participating agencies are ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, ITU, WMO, and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN. In addition, UNICEF has substantially expanded its health and child programs with the 1967 program totalling \$562,000, an increase over the 1966 level of \$226,000.

(U) Two major projects financed by the Special Fund of the UN Development Program are about to get underway. The Government of Vietnam has signed the Plan of Operations for a Fisheries Development Project, including exploratory and experimental fishing in the South China Sea, to be executed by FAO. The US has pledged an additional \$2 million to enlarge the scope of this project through a funds-in-trust arrangement. The Dutch are providing a fishing vessel for the project, also through a funds-in-trust arrangement. UNESCO is the executing agency for a \$1.5 million Special Fund project establishing a National Technical Center near Saigon. The Bureau of Social Affairs of the UN is administering a Dutch contribution of \$350,000 to establish a Social Welfare Training Center. ECAFE is pressing ahead with regional projects of benefit to the nations of the Mekong Basin and has undertaken surveys of irrigation, hydro-electric facilities and bridge construction projects in Vietnam.

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(S) FREE WORLD FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

COUNTRY	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
<u>RVN FORCES</u>								
Army	138.2	165.8	197.8	192.1	220.4	267.9	284.0	301.0
Navy	3.2	4.4	5.8	6.2	8.2	14.5	17.3	15.9
Marines	2.2	3.1	5.4	5.6	7.2	7.4	7.0	8.3
Air Force	4.4	5.4	6.6	8.4	10.5	12.8	14.6	15.8
Coastal Force* not ac-		.6	3.2	3.7	3.7	-		
tivated								
Regional	55.2	66.6	77.0	85.9	96.0	132.2	149.9	150.0
Popular	44.5	60.1	99.5	95.5	168.3	136.4	150.1	148.0
CIOG not ac-		.5	15.0	18.0	21.5	28.4	34.7	41.5
tivated								
Nat'l Pol	16.7	16.7	16.9	19.7	31.4	52.3	58.3	70.0
Armed Cmbt								
Youth	10.0	15.0	40.0	90.7	44.5	39.6	20.0	44.4 P
TOTAL	274.4	338.2	467.2	525.8	611.7	691.5	735.9	750.5 P
<u>US FORCES</u>								
Army	.7	2.1	7.9	10.1	14.6	116.8	239.4	321.1 1/
Navy	.015	.1	.5	.8	1.2	8.4	23.3	31.4 2/
Air Force	.002	.005	.5	.8	.9	20.6	52.9	56.1 1/
Marine Corps	.058	1.0	2.4	4.6	6.6	38.2	69.2	77.8
Coast Guard						.3	.5	.5
TOTAL	.8	3.2	11.3	16.3	23.3	184.3	385.3	486.9 P
<u>THIRD NATION</u>								
Australia					.2	1.5	4.4	6.6
Korea					.2	20.7	45.6	48.8
New Zealand					.03	.1	.2	.5
Thailand					.017	.016	.2	2.2
Philippines						.072	2.1	2.0
Republic of China						.014	.030	.030
Spain							.012	.013
TOTAL					.447	22.4	52.6	60.1 P
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>								
	275.2	341.4	478.5	542.1	635.4	898.2	1,173.8	1,297.5

* Coastal Force absorbed by Navy in July 1965.

** ACY is being converted to "Revolutionary Development Peoples Groups (RDPG)." Strength of RDPG is not currently available.

P Preliminary

1/ Includes Air Units (See page A-25).

2/ Represents number ashore (See page A-25).

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COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(U) In negotiating an end to the Indochina War in 1954, the Communists calculated that all of Vietnam would fall under Ho Chi Minh's regime in a short time. The South Vietnamese Government, however, did not approve the nationwide elections by mid-1956 as called for by the 1954 Geneva Agreement. It was evident that there could be no "completely free and democratic" expression of opinion in the more populous North and that the South would thus be at a distinct disadvantage in any voting. Following this setback, the Communists reverted to their earlier military strategy for seizing control of the entire country.

(U) From the outset, the overall effort was to be guided, led, directed and supported by North Vietnam, although it was to be publicly portrayed as an internal revolution. To aid in this pretense, former Viet Minh bases, transportation corridors, and manpower resources became Viet Cong -- or Vietnamese Communist. During 1956-60, Viet Cong forces expanded according to plan, a development aided considerably by conditions in the South where political apathy was widespread and government control in the countryside weak and frequently nonexistent.

(U) Up to 1961, the two highest Viet Cong offices in South Vietnam were Hq, Intersection Five, in the northern part of the country, and Hq, Nam Bo, in the south. In early 1962, however, Nam Bo was augmented by high-level cadre from North Vietnam's Lao Dong (Communist) Party and reorganized into the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). As the top in-country Communist headquarters, it of course needed a "front" organization. This was found in the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), whose aim is to gain internal and international support for the Viet Cong and lend it an air of legitimacy.

(U) Despite the Viet Cong's apparent political and military momentum of 1962-64, they had little success in winning the true sympathy and support of the South Vietnamese. Even among the population controlled by the Viet Cong, much of the backing that was given derived from intimidation and threats. This is still true today.

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(U) By the end of 1962, it was evident that the government was holding its own and had made some military progress against the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong, however, demonstrated a favorable strength increase, mounted several large-scale attacks, and there was a noticeable increase in their use of mortars and recoilless rifles. Evidence of arms provided from external sources mounted.

(U) By the end of 1963, the Viet Cong were optimistic. From the Ap Bac battle in January 1963, where the Viet Cong fought for several days, to the widespread surge of terrorism following Diem's downfall, they constantly improved their military and political situation throughout the countryside while the Saigon government's influence steadily declined as the political situation worsened. Viet Cong regular forces, bolstered by infiltrated cadre, continued to expand and improve their capabilities for larger scale military operations.

(U) Into 1964, Viet Cong objectives seemed to be: to destroy or prevent the establishment of New Life Hamlets; to consolidate "liberated" areas; and to destroy government forces. Viet Cong military successes during 1964 included gains in territory and population control in the coastal regions of 1st and 2d Corps as well as the virtual isolation of government forces in many provincial and district capitals. Similar efforts were made in the 3d and 4th Corps areas. Operations involving one or more battalions were carried out by the Viet Cong with relative impunity, and terrorism and propaganda efforts, particularly among the rural population, were successful in gaining either widespread active cooperation with the Viet Cong or at least non-cooperation with the government.

(U) The Viet Cong continued to maintain their initiative and momentum during the first half of 1965.

(U) As a result of the growing Viet Cong strength and concurrent signs of government instability, the Communists apparently believed they might achieve victory during the summer monsoon. In large-scale attacks in February, heavy losses were inflicted on government forces in Binh Dinh Province. Similar Viet Cong victories accrued in the Ba Gia battle in May and in the overrunning of Tou Morong and Dak Sut district towns in June and August. Serious disruptions of lines of communication occurred -- the central highlands were completely

isolated for extended periods -- and the Viet Cong gained some territory. By mid-year, government forces were finding it difficult to stem the Viet Cong tide.

(U) The achievement of a workable political agreement among the South Vietnamese generals and the massive mid-year introduction of US combat troops saved the highlands and thwarted the Viet Cong summer offensive. Slowly but surely the government began to gain a momentum of its own -- the number of Communist successes declined, and there were some important government victories. Severe Viet Cong losses accrued at Dong Xoai in June and at Bu Dop in July, and the siege of Duc Co was broken in August. Major US contributions were the victory south of Chu Lai in August, the opening of Route 19 from Qui Nhon to An Khe, the successful resupply of Pleiku, and the destruction and harassment inflicted by increased air strikes. These successes and Viet Cong reversals were followed by a decline in the tempo of Viet Cong activity which was a major factor in allowing the government to gain a semblance of political and military equilibrium as of late 1965.

(U) During 1966, Communist military activity in South Vietnam continued to follow the familiar pattern of terrorism, general harassment, sabotage, and small-scale attacks, with occasional large-scale operations against isolated or lightly defended government positions. Free World Forces operations and air strikes in critical areas are believed to have generally discouraged large-scale enemy activity and disrupted Communist plans. Operation HASTINGS in July-August of 1966 was notable in that friendly forces engaged elements of the 324B Division after they had infiltrated through the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam into Quang Tri Province. Free World Forces also initiated several large-scale actions designed to destroy Viet Cong base areas. Operations BIRMINGHAM and ATTLEBORO were both designed to interrupt the activities of Communist Headquarters (COSVN) elements and the enemy units using the base areas of "War Zone C." In both instances enemy forces were forced to relocate across or near the Cambodian border.

(U) By mid-1966, the enemy was denied the capability to move into "stage three" of the classic "Peoples' War" and Allied forces gained the battlefield initiative throughout most of South Vietnam. The enemy apparently reassessed the

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situation and Ho Chi Minh, in the summer of 1966, set a policy of "protracted war." The enemy realized that a military victory was not imminent; however, he may be convinced that success can be attained through perseverance. This resolve requires the maintenance and probable expansion of his power base, that is, his orthodox military structure committed against South Vietnam, his irregular forces, and his political infrastructure.


(U) In an effort to exert maximum military pressure with a minimum risk to his forces, the Communists positioned large forces in sanctuaries and base areas adjacent to strategically important objectives in South Vietnam. These forces, particularly those in the DMZ area, require constant surveillance and the maintenance of large friendly forces in contiguous areas to counter the threat.

(U) The threat of action worked well for the enemy during the first few months of 1967. Initially, large Allied forces swept Communist-controlled areas that had long remained immune to such action (JUNCTION CITY in War Zone "C" and CEDAR FALLS in the "Iron Triangle" were two of the largest operations), provoking, in a few instances, attacks by enemy regiments in an effort to defend their bases. These attacks were in every case unsuccessful and cost the enemy dearly in men and materiel.

(U) In what appeared to have been, at least in part, an effort to reduce the pressure on their forces elsewhere in the country, the NVA units located in the DMZ area became more active and a new NVA division was inserted into the DMZ fighting. The use of conventional artillery against the friendly outpost line south of the zone was marked by the heavy pounding -- at least 1,000 rounds on a single day -- against bases in the eastern portion of the zone. A serious threat was evident to the friendly units and installations in the 1st Corps area. By the end of the year, there seemed to be a shift of the major enemy units to the DMZ, Laotian, Cambodian border areas in what was estimated as an attempt to draw friendly forces away from the populated coastal plain when the pacification efforts were starting to progress. Reports also indicated that the interior divisions -- those operating along the coasts were in serious difficulty. During the latter part of the year the enemy fought sustained battles at Loc Ninh and Dak To in these border areas. These actions were not in keeping with his past tactics and he suffered severe casualties.

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VC/NVA SUPPLY AND INFILTRATION ROUTES



PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIAAP)

1 January 1968

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The Vietnamese Communists

(C) The mission of the enemy in South Vietnam is the creation of a politico-military climate conducive to the establishment of a Communist government. Overall direction and control is provided by North Vietnam whose North Vietnamese Army (NVA) provides military guidance and infiltrates supplies, personnel replacements, and regular NVA units into South Vietnam. North Vietnam controls the Viet Cong effort through the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the highest Viet Cong headquarters in the country. Subordinate to COSVN is the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), the overt political arm of the Viet Cong. The NFLSV functions as a front organization for the enemy and serves as a screen behind which the leadership in Hanoi directs the war. This direction is accomplished through the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in South Vietnam; the PRP is an extension of North Vietnam's Lao Dong (Communist) Party and its members undoubtedly serve as the hard core element in the Front. Both the NFLSV and the PRP are similarly structured, and COSVN probably functions as the Central Committee of the PRP. The Viet Cong are organized politically and militarily from the national level, down through military regions, provinces, districts, villages, and hamlets.

Supply and Infiltration Routes

(C) Support of the Viet Cong from North Vietnam covers a wide range of supplies and equipment which have been either infiltrated overland by vehicle, bicycle, coolie, and animal transport or by sea or inland waterways on various types of watercraft. This system and procedure for both types of infiltration were minutely planned and well-established. The system takes advantage of the remoteness of the established base areas, the poor state of relations between the RVN and Cambodian governments, the security provided by the Communist-controlled portions of Laos and the 1,650 mile coastline.

NVA Infiltration into SVN

(C) The augmentation and replacement of personnel by infiltration from NVN began early in the insurgency. From 1959 to mid-1964, the majority of infiltrators were former Viet Minh who had regrouped to the North. Known infiltration ranged from about 5,600 men in the 1959-1960 period to over 12,000 men in 1964. As mid-1964 approached, it became evident that a change in infiltration was taking place. The pool of former Viet Minh regroupes was running out and young NVN soldiers were taking their place. By the end of 1964, the first NVA regiment had infiltrated South Vietnam. According to data for all infiltration categories as of 31 December 1967, at least 175,000 personnel entered South Vietnam during the last three years.

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1 January 1968

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(C) It appears that since mid-1966 the major portion of the infiltrators has been used to flesh-out existing units or as replacements. Experience has shown that a time lag of at least six months exists in detection of infiltration groups/units entering South Vietnam. This time lag can be expected to become greater as more and more groups are sent into the conflict as replacements and dispersed to different units.

(C) Prior to mid-1966, most of the infiltration occurred over the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex through Laos. Although a large portion continues to use these routes, North Vietnam added a new dimension to the war in the summer of 1966 when the 324B NVA Division entered the conflict directly across the Demilitarized Zone.

(C) North Vietnam has the capability to continue and increase infiltration of troops into the South. In view of the recent reports indicating that Viet Cong in-country recruitment may be lagging and of the high casualty rate being sustained by VC/NVA units, it can be expected that North Vietnam will vigorously exercise this capability in order to maintain the enemy force structure in South Vietnam at least at its present strength.

(C) Infiltration routes are shown on page A-61; statistical infiltration data are presented on pages A-65, A-66, A-67, and A-68.

Regions and Base Areas

(C) Enemy forces are organized territorially under nine regional command elements and two front headquarters. Base areas depicted on page A-63 are used by the VC/NVA forces for the following purposes: serve as relatively safe areas for the training of personnel and units; as permanent or temporary locations for military, political, and logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution of various categories of supplies; and for units to rest, regroup, retrain, evade Allied operations and/or initiate preparatory phases of offensive operations.

(C) Military Regions (MR) in the northern two-thirds of the country include MRs 5, 6, 10 and Tri Thien. In the populated southern or "Nam Bo" area, the regions are designated MR 1, 2, 3, and 4; the GVN Rung Sat Special Zone, a marshy area southeast of Saigon, is called Special Region (SR) 10. All of the Military Regions and SR 10, with the exception of Tri Thien, are subordinate to COSVN, the highest Communist command element in the South. Tri Thien MR, which was created in 1966, is directly subordinate to the North Vietnamese High Command in Hanoi. The map on page A- shows the Communist and GVN administrative divisions.

(C) In addition to the VC/NVA forces controlled by the nine regions, a significant number of NVA units are controlled by two front headquarters which, in turn, are subordinate to Hanoi High Command. The Front areas of responsibility overlap and/or are contiguous to Tri Thien MR and MR 5.

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In the north, major units controlled by the DMZ Front include the NVA 324B and 325C Divisions, plus artillery and other support units. These units are stationed in the DMZ, and north and south of it; when deployed in South Vietnam, they generally operate between the DMZ and Route 9 in northern Quang Tri Province. The B-3 Front, deployed in the Central Highland provinces of Pleiku and Kontum, and in Laos and Cambodia in the triborder area, controls the 1st NVA Division with four regiments and the NVA 24th, 33d, and 95B Regiments. There are a few unconfirmed reports that indicate two more fronts have been formed or are being formed -- one in Tri Thien MR and the other in MR 10.

(C) Many sanctuaries/base areas have been in use since the 1946-54 Indochina War. (See page A-63 for major historic sanctuaries/war zones.) Up to mid-1965, only minor penetrations of these areas of ARVN units had been accomplished, thereby allowing the Viet Cong almost complete freedom within the boundaries of the bases. This situation has changed since the last half of 1965. US forces -- and to some degree, South Vietnamese forces -- have conducted numerous successful operations not only in many of the base areas but also in contiguous areas containing vital overland communications routes used by the enemy. This growing ground pressure and accompanying bombardment by aircraft and ships have substantially reduced the security previously provided to VC/NVA forces by historic sanctuaries and war zones. The increasing reliance by the enemy on smaller, dispersed base areas in recent years has, however, facilitated resupply efforts and has probably increased security in some areas because of decentralization.

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
NVA INFILTRATION

IN OCTOBER 1966, COUSMACV ESTABLISHED NEW CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTANCE OF INFILTRATION INTO SVN. THE NEW ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ARE SHOWN ON PAGE A-66 USING THESE CRITERIA, THE TOTALS FOR 1965 WERE ADJUSTED; HOWEVER, TOTALS PRIOR TO 1 JANUARY 1965 WERE NOT ADJUSTED AND REMAIN AS COMPILED UNDER THE OLD CRITERIA. THE TOTALS BY YEAR FOLLOW:

* IN COMPLETE DATA

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DATA AS OF 31 DEC. 67



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(This page is unclassified)

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NVA INFILTRATION TOTALS SINCE 1 OCTOBER 1965*

Month	<u>ACCEPTED</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	Confirmed	Probable	-----		(Accepted & Possible)
4th Qtr/ 1965					
Oct	7,000	-	7,000	400	7,400
Nov	3,300	-	3,300	1,000	4,300
Dec	200	400	600	800	1,400
Sub-Total	10,500	400	10,900	2,200	13,100
1966					
Jan	4,200	2,000	6,200	3,000	9,200
Feb	6,800	2,300	9,100	2,100	11,200
Mar	11,800	1,300	13,100	3,600	16,700
Apr	100	500	600	600	1,200
May	1,800	400	2,200	3,600	5,800
Jun	12,300	700	13,000	2,200	15,200
Jul	4,000	700	4,700	4,200	8,900
Aug	1,800	400	2,200	3,700	5,900
Sep	1,400	700	2,100	700	2,800
Oct	100	600	700	5,200	5,900
Nov	900	100	1,000	600	1,600
Dec 1966	1,000	600	1,600	2,500	4,100
Sub-Total (1966)	46,200	10,300	56,500	32,000	88,500
1967					
Jan	1,000	800	1,800	4,300	6,100
Feb	1,700	2,000	3,700	1,500	5,200
Mar	4,300	400	4,700	4,600	9,300
Apr	4,300	600	4,900	400	5,300
May	4,000	1,300	5,300	1,500	6,800
Jun	5,400	-	5,400	1,800	7,200
Jul	1,600	-	1,600	1,300	2,900
Aug	3,800	-	3,800	2,000	5,800
Sep	400	100	500	1,800	2,300
Oct	1,100	-	1,100	800	1,900
Nov	-	-	-	800	800
Dec	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-Total (1967)	27,600	5,200	32,800	20,800	53,600
Grand Total (Since 1 Oct 65)	84,300	15,900	100,200	55,000	155,200

** Average monthly infiltration from 1 October 1965 through 30 June 1967.

<u>ACCEPTED</u>			<u>POSSIBLE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Confirmed	Probable	Total		
3,700	750	4,450	2,300	6,750

* Data as of 31 December 1967.

MACV's data for computation of statistics on the infiltration of North Vietnamese Army personnel into South Vietnam are computed from 1 October 1965. MACV considers this date most valid as a base since it coincides with a period of substantial increase in infiltration.

LIMITATIONS**

The nature of enemy infiltration into South Vietnam makes it difficult to detect many groups until after they have been in the country for six months or longer. Statistics are subject to continuing evaluation because of the receipt of new information. The figures listed for the period 1 Jul 67-31 Dec 67 are considered to be incomplete, and information for recent months is considered inadequate to determine trends.

The monthly averages shown are subject to change as additional information is received, particularly as regards the more recent months.

The totals shown are derived from valid but incomplete information and are indicative of only a part of the infiltration believed to have occurred. Infiltration data for past months, as well as the averages shown, cannot be used as a basis for making valid projections of future trends.

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

ACCEPTED - Accepted Confirmed: A confirmed infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by a minimum of two PW's or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or two captured documents from the unit, or a combination of personnel and documents.

Accepted Probable: A Probable infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by one PW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or a captured document, supported by information from other sources which can be evaluated as probably true.

POSSIBLE - A Possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the basis of information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no PW, returnee (Hoi Chanh), or document is available to verify the reports.

NOTE: In addition to the infiltrators falling into the confirmed, probable, and possible categories, other units or groups have been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, interrogation reports, or sightings by friendly forces. Based upon the application of consistent criteria and the professional judgment of analysts, this information has been evaluated as insufficient to warrant placement into one of the three infiltration categories.

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INFILTRATION OF CURRENT NVA REGIMENTS CONFIRMED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

LISTED CHRONOLOGICALLY BY DATE OF ARRIVAL IN SVN

REGIMENT	SUBORDINATION	INFILTRATION DATA	MONTH CONFIRMED AND STRENGTH*	GENERAL OPERATING AREA
95th	NT 5	Dep NVN Oct 64 Arr SVN Dec 64	Oct 65 2,000	Phu Yen
32nd	NT 1/33 Front	Dep NVN Sep-Oct 64 Arr SVN Jan 65	Nov 65 1,800	Kontum
101st	Sep Regt	Dep NVN Dec 64 Arr SVN Feb 65	Jul 65 2,000	Binh Duong
18th	NT 3	Dep NVN Feb 65 Arr SVN Apr 65	Oct 65 2,000	Binh Dinh
22d	NT 3	Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Sep 65	Feb 66 2,000	Quang Ngai
33d	B3 Front	Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	Nov 65 2,000	Darlac
6th	Sep Regt	Activated in Quang Tri Province Oct 65	Apr 66 1,500	Thua Thien
21st	NT 2	Dep NVN Aug 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	Mar 66 2,000	Quang Tin
66th	NT 1	Dep NVN Aug 65 Arr SVN Nov 65	Nov 65 1,500	Kontum
18B	NT 5	Dep NVN Nov 65 Arr SVN Feb 66	May 66 2,000	Khanh Hoa
95B	B3 Front	Dep NVN Dec 65 Arr SVN Feb 66	Apr 66 2,000	Pleiku
24th	B3 Front	Dep NVN Dec 65 Arr SVN Feb 66	May 66 2,000	Kontum
141st	CT 7	Dep NVN Jan 66 Arr SVN Mar 66	May 66 1,500	Binh Long
88th	NT 1/33 Front	Dep NVN Jan 66 Arr SVN Mar 66	Jun 66 2,000	Kontum
3d	NT 2	Dep NVN Feb 66 Arr SVN Mar 66	Jul 66 1,500	Quang Tin
812th	32LB	Dep NVN Jun 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Jul 66 1,500	Quang Tri
90th	32LB	Dep NVN Jun 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Jul 66 1,500	Quang Tri
8D3d	32LB	Dep NVN Jun 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Jul 66 1,500	Quang Tri
52d	CT 7	Dep NVN Feb 66 Arr SVN Jul 66	Jan 67 2,000	Tay Ninh
165th	CT 7	Dep NVN Mar 66 Arr SVN Jul 66	Jan 67 1,638	Tay Ninh
2nd Army	Sep Regt	Dep NVN Mar 66 Arr SVN Aug 66	Oct 66 1,200	Long Khanh
5th	Sep Regt	Activated in Quang Tri Province Feb 67	May 67 1,390	Quang Tri
95C	325th	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Mar 67	May 67 1,550	Quang Tri/DHZ
29th	325th	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Apr 67	Jul 67 2,200	Quang Tri/DHZ
368B	Sep Regt	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN May 67	Aug 67 1,100	Quang Nam
174th	NT 1	Dep NVN Jan 67 Arr SVN Jun 67	Aug 67 1,760	Kontum
Dong Nai	Sep Regt	Dep NVN May 67 Arr SVN Jul 67	Dec 67 2,360	Binh Duong
9th	Sep Regt	Dep NVN Jul 67 Arr SVN Aug 67	Nov 67 1,000	Quang Tri

* Strength figures represent the reported infiltrating strength or the initial accepted strength.

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INFILTRATION OF CURRENT NVA SEPARATE BATTALIONS CONFIRMED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

LISTED CHRONOLOGICALLY BY DATE OF ARRIVAL IN SVN

FOR-REPT BNS	INFILTRATION DATA	MONTH CONFIRMED AND STRENGTH	GENERAL OPERATING AREA
810th	Dep NVN Jan 65 Arr SVN Feb 65	Mar 66 300	Thua Thien
500th Trans/MT3 Div	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Jul 65	Apr 66 300	Binh Dinh
600th Med/MT3 Div	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Aug 65	Apr 66 200	Binh Dinh
RQ-20 Sig/MT3 Div	Activated in Quang Tin Aug 65	Jul 66 300	Quang Tin
300th Arty/MT3 Div	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Sep 65	Apr 66 400	Binh Dinh
19th Trans/MT1 Div	Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Sep 65	Aug 66 300	Pleiku
200th AA/MT3 Div	Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	Mar 66 400	Binh Dinh
RQ-22 RR/MT2 Div	Dep NVN Jun 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	Jul 66 300	Quang Tin
RQ-21 AA/MT2 Div	Dep NVN Jul 65 Arr SVN Oct 65	Dec 65 400	Quang Tin
RQ-23 Mortar/MT2 Div	Dep NVN Sep 65 Arr SVN Nov 65	Jul 66 300	Quang Tin
RQ-24 Engr/MT2 Div	Dep NVN Sep 65 Arr SVN Nov 65	Jul 66 150	Quang Tin
15th Engr/MT1 Div	Dep NVN Aug 65 Arr SVN Nov 65	Aug 66 230	Pleiku
18th Med/MT1 Div	Dep NVN Aug 65 Arr SVN Nov 65	Oct 66 200	Pleiku
H-13 AA/MT1 Div	Dep NVN Sep 65 Arr SVN Jan 66	Aug 66 400	Pleiku
16th Sig/MT1 Div	Dep NVN Nov 65 Arr SVN Feb 66	Oct 66 200	Pleiku
K101/101C Regt	Dep NVN Dec 65 Arr SVN Mar 66	Apr 67 500	Kontum
95th Arty	Dep NVN Feb 66 Arr SVN May 66	Jul 66 400	Phu Yen
24th AD/CTS VC Div	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN May 66	Jun 67 300	Phuoc Tuy
13th Arty/324B Div	Dep NVN May 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Sep 66 300	Quang Tri
14th AA/324B Div	Dep NVN May 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Sep 66 300	Quang Tri
15th Engr/324B Div	Dep NVN May 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Sep 66 300	Quang Tri
16th Sig/324B Div	Dep NVN May 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Sep 66 200	Quang Tri
19th Med/324B Div	Dep NVN May 66 Arr SVN Jun 66	Sep 66 200	Quang Tri
300th Sapper/MT3 Div	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Dec 66	Sep 67 220	Binh Dinh
4th RL/Van An Arty/RKT Regt	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Feb 67	Nov 67 350	Quang Tri
27th	Dep NVN Feb 67 Arr SVN Mar 67	Nov 67 300	Quang Tri
90th Engr/MT3 Div	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Apr 67	Apr 67 350	Binh Dinh
551st Sig/MT3 Div	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN Apr 67	Apr 67 400	Binh Dinh
107th AD	Dep NVN Unk Arr SVN May 67	Sep 67 350	Quang Ngai
Hue City Sapper	Activated in Thua Thien Aug 67	Dec 67 225	Thua Thien

NOTE: Strength figures represent the reported infiltrating strength or the initial accepted strength.

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Order of Battle Terms and Definitions

(C) Categories of Units

Maneuver Units: Infantry, armor, security, sapper, and reconnaissance elements from platoon level upward, regardless of subordination.

Combat Support Units: Fire support, air defense and technical service units organized at battalion level and above and not classified under administrative services. Separate fire support companies are classed as combat support.

Administrative Service Units: Military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military sub-region, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters.

(C) Classification of Units

Viet Cong (VC) Main Force (MF). Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), at Viet Cong Military Region, or sub-region.

Viet Cong (VC) Local Force (LF). Those military units which are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a specified VC province or district.

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Units. A unit formed, trained, and designated by North Vietnam as a NVA unit, and composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese. Viet Cong replacements are often found in NVA units, and NVA infiltrators have been integrated into many VC battalions as fillers. At times, either VC or NVA units and individual replacements appear in units that are predominantly NVA or VC at the command level.

Guerrillas. Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlets. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

(C) Political Definitions

Viet Cong Infrastructure. The Viet Cong infrastructure is defined as the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central Office for South Vietnam) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (National Front for the

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Liberation of South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level.

(*) Strengths

Combat Strength. The sum of maneuver unit and combat support unit strengths.

Administrative Service Strength. The sum of unit strengths listed under this designation.

Guerrilla Strength. The sum of strengths listed under this designation.

Total Strength (Armed Forces Strength). The sum of Combat, Administrative Service and Guerrilla strengths.

Current Strength. A current estimate of the strength of an enemy unit based upon the best information available. This estimate may be based upon limited information.

Retroactive Strength. A retroactive estimate of enemy unit strength based upon an accumulation of firm documentary evidence. Retroactive strength is computed from the date a unit was activated or entered SVN for the first time.

(*) Major Unit/Headquarters Definitions

Light Infantry Divisions (LID) are VC and NVA divisional formations tailored specifically for operations in South Vietnam. These divisions are highly foot-mobile and are flexible in force structure, organization, and strength. Normally these light infantry divisions are composed of two to four infantry regiments and a varying number of technical and fire support elements. They lack wheeled transport and the type artillery normally associated with NVA conventional divisions. (All VC and NVA divisions accepted in Order of Battle to date are light infantry divisions.)

Front Headquarters. A military organization designed to perform tactical and administrative functions and to control divergent units in a specific area. A front is intentionally unstable, its military force composition changes as operational requirements dictate, and no permanency is attached to its formation (although it may provide the framework for a permanent military unit). A Viet Cong Front or North Vietnamese Army Front in South Vietnam, normally consists of two or more regimental units; however, it can consist of a few small units, a number of regiments exceeding the accepted composition of a division, or several divisions.

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(C) Criteria for Order of Battle Acceptance

Confirmed Unit. A confirmed unit is one with a known designation, subordination has been established, and the location determined from a minimum of two reports from VC/NVA PWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured documents (any combination).

Probable Unit. A probable unit has a known designation, subordination has been established, and the location determined from one VC/NVA PW or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured documents are available to verify the reports.

Reported Unit. A reported unit is one which has been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, or interrogation reports, but the available information is insufficient to include the unit in accepted order of battle holdings.

(C) Base Areas

Base Area. A section of terrain which contains installations, defensive fortifications or other physical structures used for the following purposes: for basic or advanced training of personnel and units; as a permanent or temporary location for political, military or logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution of medicine; and for units to rest, regroup, retrain, evade friendly operations and/or initiate preparatory phases of offensive operations.

(C) Border Areas

Border Areas: An area either in or north of the DMZ or contiguous to SVN in Laos or Cambodia from which the enemy may operate or to which they may withdraw for the purposes of refuge or reconsolidation.

Criteria for Acceptance and Retention of Border Area Units in Order of Battle:

The unit has entered SVN.

The unit is still located in the border area or has elements remaining in SVN.

The unit constitutes a direct threat to friendly forces in SVN.

Available evidence indicates that the unit continues to be committed against friendly forces or that its mission continues to be operations against friendly forces in RVN.

When the unit no longer meets all the criteria stated above, it is dropped from Order of Battle.

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Enemy Order of Battle in South Vietnam

(C) A series of recent studies concerning the enemy force structure in South Vietnam by COMUSMACV and concurred in by the intelligence community has resulted in a change in the reporting of order of battle information. These studies concluded that past estimates contained certain elements of the enemy force structure that did not constitute a true military threat and that existing estimates of the strengths of the administrative services, guerrillas, and political infrastructure were conservative.

(C) In the future, the enemy military threat in South Vietnam will be expressed as consisting of regular Viet Cong and NVA combat units, the administrative services, and guerrillas.

(C) The strength of the enemy's combat elements is essentially unchanged as a result of the new studies. The overall combat strength has, however, decreased because of the heavy losses sustained during the past months. Collection efforts have been primarily targeted against the combat forces over the past two years, and the resulting intelligence is considered of good quality.

(C) In the case of the administrative services, which comprise personnel of military staffs from the national to the district level as well as noncombat military-support units directly subordinate to these staffs, the information obtained from friendly operations in former enemy safehavens and increased documentation indicates that there are at least 35,000-40,000 personnel serving full-time in this grouping; past estimates showed about 25,000.

(C) The old intelligence data, based on a South Vietnamese Government study, included an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 in the category of "irregulars." These were roughly broken down into three subdivisions -- guerrillas, self-defense forces, and secret-self-defense forces -- with one-third of the estimated strength attributed to each subdivision. Whereas the guerrilla is considered a full-time soldier and a definite part of the military threat, those in the other two subcategories are best described as poorly armed, untrained, and low-level fifth columnists.

(C) These subdivisions constitute a problem for the National Police, counterintelligence, and the Revolutionary Development Program but do not present a valid military threat; they will not, therefore, be included in future estimates. The guerrilla strength is believed to be between 10,000 and 80,000 and, although this is higher than the estimates carried in the past, available information indicates that guerrilla strength has declined from that of last year.

(C) The country team developed the following working definition for Viet Cong infrastructure: "... the political and administrative

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organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the Vietnamese people. It embodies the Party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central Office for South Vietnam) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level."

(e) Past estimates included a figure of 39,000-40,000 for this political infrastructure; it was based on a South Vietnamese study from the early years of the war which went down only to the village level. Increased intelligence now permits MACV to focus on the infrastructure in much more detail, and the new estimate which incorporates personnel at the hamlet level, now totals 75,000-85,000. This estimate is still not considered as firm as that of the military forces, and efforts are underway to refine it.

(f) Since the function of the political cadre is not a military one, these elements will no longer be carried in the order of battle. The political organization, however, is under orders from Hanoi and controls and directs all phases of the struggle, including the level of military operations. It should not be overlooked as a key factor and will be considered -- although not specifically listed -- in future enemy estimates.


(g) The map on page A-74 shows the general operating areas of the Viet Cong and NVA combat elements in South Vietnam as well as a tabulation of the units and their strengths that make up the enemy's armed forces -- the military threat. MACV's latest order of battle summary contains single strength figures for the categories of administrative services and guerrillas. These figures are not indicative of precise knowledge; rather, they represent MACV's "best figure." The strengths of both categories fall within the estimated bracket developed in MACV's recent studies.

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GENERAL OPERATING AREAS

PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIAAP)

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CONFIRMED COMMUNIST COMBAT STRENGTH BY RVN PROVINCES AND VC MILITARY REGIONS

VC MIL REGION	PROVINCE	FRONT HQ	BIV HQ	REGT HQ	ALL BN	SEP CO	SEP PLAT	STRENGTH
Tri-Thien MR	(1) QUANG TRI	0	1	6	25	10	0	15,700
	(2) THUA THIEN	0	0	2	8	17	0	4,735
Subtotal for Tri-Thien MR		0	1	8	33	27	0	20,435
MR 5	(3) QUANG NAM	0	1	3	13	6	0	6,150
	(4) QUANG TIN	0	0	1	11	8	0	4,250
	(5) QUANG NGAI	0	0	0	6	11	0	2,960
	(6) KONTUM	1	1	3	12	0	8	5,678
	(7) BINH DINH	0	1	3	19	11	8	8,459
	(8) PLEIKU	0	0	2	12	8	8	4,680
	(9) PHU BON	0	1	0	0	1	3	305
	(10) OARLAC	0	0	1	3	1	8	1,375
	(11) KHANH HOA	0	0	1	3	10	5	2,220
	(12) PHU YEN	0	0	1	6	8	0	2,895
Subtotal for MR 5		1	4	15	85	56	8	38,964
MR 6	TUYEN OUC	0	0	0	0	8	5	125
	NINH THUAN	0	0	0	0	2	5	330
	BINH THUAN	0	0	0	2	5	0	985
	LAM DONG	0	0	0	2	5	7	1,245
	BINH TUY	0	1	0	0	2	0	830
Subtotal for MR 6		0	1	0	4	14	17	3,515
MR 10	QUANG BUC	0	0	0	0	2	2	195
	(13) BINH LONG	0	1	2	6	0	1	4,360
	(14) PHUOC LONG	0	1	5	17	4	1	8,282
Subtotal for MR 10		0	2	7	23	6	4	12,837
MR 1	BIEN HOA	0	0	0	1	4	3	785
	(15) BINH BUONG	8	0	2	13	6	0	6,510
	(16) LONG KHANH	0	0	2	4	0	1	1,850
	(17) PHUOC TUY	0	0	8	2	2	1	775
	TAY NINH	0	0	1	6	7	8	3,350
Subtotal for MR 1		0	0	5	26	19	5	13,190
MR 2	HAU NGHIA	0	0	0	2	5	2	935
	LONG AN	0	0	0	3	7	1	1,520
	AN GIANG	0	0	0	0	2	2	250
	CHAU OOC	0	0	0	1	4	1	995
	QUINH TUONG	0	0	1	4	10	8	3,388
	GO CONG	0	0	8	0	2	0	235
	KIEN HOA	0	0	0	2	9	0	1,840
	KIEN PHONG	0	0	0	2	4	1	1,030
	KIEN TUONG	0	0	0	1	6	0	760
Subtotal for MR 2		0	0	1	15	49	7	10,945
MR 3	AN XUYEN	0	0	0	3	7	0	1,980
	BA XUYEN	0	0	0	1	5	0	820
	BAC LIEU	0	0	0	1	5	0	920
	CHUONG THIEN	0	0	1	3	2	3	2,805
	KIEN GIANG	0	0	0	1	2	4	770
	PHONG DINH	0	0	0	1	3	8	745
	SA DEC	0	0	0	1	3	0	348
	VINH BINH	0	0	0	1	9	0	1,228
	VINH LONG	0	0	0	1	6	0	905
Subtotal for MR 3		0	0	1	13	42	7	9,705
Gia Dinh		8	0	0	8	8	2	855
TOTAL		1	8	37	199	221	50	110,446 2/
GUERRILLA								37,725
ADMIN SERVICES								71,788
GRAND TOTAL		1	8	37	199	221	50	219,871

- (1) Includes 324B NVA Div Hq with subord 803d, B12th, and 98th NVA Regts, and the 13th Arty, 14th AA, 15th Engr, 16th Sig, and 19th Med Bns (NVA); 95C and 29th NVA Regts subord 325th NVA Div; 808th and 814th Bns subord 5th NVA Regt; 9th NVA Regt (Sep); 4th RL Bn subord VAN AN NVA Arty/RKT Regt; 27 NVA Bn (Sep).
- (2) Includes 5th NVA Regt Hq with subord 416th Bn; 6th NVA Regt; B18th NVA Bn (Sep); Hue City Sapper Bn (Sep).
- (3) Includes NT2 NVA Div Hq with subord 3d NVA Regt; 368B NVA Arty Regt.
- (4) Includes 21st NVA Regt and GK 3B Sig; GK 31 AA, GK 32 RR, GK 33 Mort, and GK 40 Bns (NVA) subord NT2 NVA Div.
- (5) Includes 107th NVA AD Bn (Sep).
- (6) Includes B3 NVA Front Hq with subord NT1 NVA Div Hq with subord 66th and 174th Regts; 26th subord B3 NVA Front; 101C Bn subord K101 NVA Regt.
- (7) Includes NT3 NVA Div Hq with subord 18th NVA Regt; 22d NVA Regt Hq; 90th Engr, 200th AA, 300th Arty, 308th Sapper, 588th Trans, 551st Sig, and 600th Med Bns.
- (8) Includes 32d NVA Regt, H-13 AA, 15th Engr, 16th Sig, 18th Med, and 19th Trans subord NT1 NVA Div; 95B NVA Regt subord B3 NVA Front.
- (9) Includes NT5 NVA Div Hq.
- (10) Includes 33d NVA Regt subord B3 NVA Front.
- (11) Includes 18B NVA Regt subord NT5 NVA Div.
- (12) Includes 95th NVA Regt subord NT5 NVA Div; 95th (Sep) NVA Bn.
- (13) Includes CT7 NVA Div Hq with subord 141st and 165th NVA Regts.
- (14) Includes 88th NVA Regt subord NT1 NVA Div.
- (15) Includes 101st NVA Regt subord CT7 NVA Div; Dong Nai NVA Regt (Sep).
- (16) Includes 84A NVA Arty Regt (Sep).
- (17) Includes 24th NVA Air Defense Bn subord CT5 VC Div.

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NVA/VC Battalions and Strength
in South Viet-Nam 2/

	1964 Dec	1965												1966												1967											
		Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec											
BATTALIONS b/																																					
North Vietnamese																																					
Confirmed	4	33	37	46	49	52	51	63	66	65	68	87	67	64	64	65	68	70	70	70	69	70	70	72	72	72	72										
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	4	33	37	46	49	52	51	63	66	65	68	87	67	64	64	65	68	70	70	70	69	70	70	72	72	72	72										
Prob/Poss																																					
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total																																					
Total NVA Combat Battalions																																					
- Infantry	4	36	40	49	55	58	57	70	73	72	72	71	71	68	68	69	75	77	77	77	76	77	77	79	79	79	79										
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	4	36	40	49	55	58	57	70	73	72	72	71	71	68	68	69	75	77	77	77	76	77	77	79	79	79	79										
Viet Cong - Main/Local Forces																																					
Confirmed	69	91	91	91	89	89	86	86	86	86	85	82	82	80	79	79	79	80	82	83	81	81	81	81	81	81	81										
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	78	105	105	105	105	105	98	98	98	98	97	94	94	92	91	91	91	91	93	93	93	93	94	94	94	94	94										
Prob/Poss	2	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2										
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	2	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2										
Total VC Combat Battalions																																					
- Infantry	71	95	96	96	96	93	90	90	90	90	88	85	84	82	80	80	80	82	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83										
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	80	111	111	111	108	106	105	105	105	105	103	99	95	92	91	91	91	93	96	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97										
Total Enemy Combat Bns in South Viet-Nam																																					
	84	151	166	176	182	182	181	202	204	206	204	199	197	193	191	193	199	216	216	217	225	227	227	227	227	227	227										
STRENGTH (Thousands)																																					
North Vietnamese																																					
Confirmed	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
Prob/Poss																																					
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total																																					
Total NVA Combat Strength																																					
- Infantry	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
Viet Cong																																					
Confirmed	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
Prob/Poss																																					
- Infantry																																					
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total																																					
Total VC Combat Strength																																					
- Infantry	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
- Other Manuever																																					
- Combat Support																																					
- Total	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											
Total VC Combat Strength in South Viet-Nam																																					
	2.4	35.6	39.0	42.3	43.6	43.6	43.6	51.2	51.9	52.7	54.2	50.6	46.9	46.4	47.3	47.5	50.3	53.2	52.2	51.6	52.5	52.3	54.6	52.2	51.6	51.6											

NOTES: The first NVA battalion is now estimated to have entered SVN in November 1965.

b/ These data reflect MACV's current estimate of enemy battalions and strength deployments for each month.


c/ Includes Administrative Services Battalions.

d/ Includes strength of confirmed VC battalions and separate VC companies and platoons.


e/ Includes Prob/Poss.

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
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
7.62MM RIFLE (SOVIET M1941, CHICOM TYPE 53) PRINCIPALLY USED AS A SNIPERS RIFLE BY BOTH VC AND NVA. BOLT ACTION. 7.62X54R AMMUNITION. 8 TO 10 RDS/MIN. EFFECTIVE RANGE 800 YARDS, (ONLY SOVIET MODEL CAPTURED)



7.62MM CARBINE (SOVIET M1941, CHICOM TYPE 53) PRINCIPAL USE BY VC UNITS. BOLT ACTION. 7.62X54R AMMUNITION. 8 TO 10 RDS/MIN. EFFECTIVE RANGE 400 YDS WITH SPIGOT GRENADE LAUNCHER CALLED RED STOCK CARBINE. (BOTH SOVIET AND CHICOM MODELS CAPTURED)




7.62MM CARBINE (SOVIET SKS, CHICOM TYPE 56, NK TYPE 63) USED IN NVA AND VC UNITS. SEMI-AUTOMATIC. 7.62X39 AMMUNITION. 20 RDS/MIN. EFFECTIVE RANGE 400 YARDS (BOTH SOVIET, CHICOM AND NORTH KOREAN TYPES CAPTURED).



7.62 MM SUBMACHINE GUN (SOVIET PPSH-41, CHICOM TYPE 50) LIMITED USE. AUTOMATIC, SEMI-AUTOMATIC. 7.62X25 AMMUNITION. 900 YARDS

AMMUNITION. 900 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC)
100 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL). EFFECTIVE RANGE 300 YARDS.



7.62MM SUBMACHINE GUN - CHICOM TYPE 50 MODIFIED, POSSIBLY A NVN MODIFICATION (SOVIET NONE) EXTENSIVE USE GENERALLY BY VC UNITS. AUTOMATIC, SEMI-AUTOMATIC. 7.62X25 AMMUNITION. 900 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC) 100 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL) EFFECTIVE RANGE - 300 YARDS.

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Communist Infantry Weapons in South Vietnam

(C) A wide range of infantry weapons with varied national origins are in use by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main Force units in South Vietnam. At any one time, US, French and Soviet/CHICOM weapons may be represented in a particular unit. Weapons of the Communist forces are acquired by the capture of arms from Free World Allied Forces, French weapons from the Indo-China War, and by increasingly large infiltrations from North Vietnam and other Communist countries. Most of the infiltrated weapons are standard or limited standard in the Soviet and CHICOM armies. Appearing in every increasing quantities are members of the 7.62-mm "new family" of weapons.

(C) The "new family" consists of the Soviet-designed (or North Korean and Chinese copies) AK-47 assault rifle, SKS carbine, and RPD light machine-gun. The term "family" is used since all three weapons fire the short 7.62-mm M1943 cartridge. Weapons of this type were first captured in December 1964 and have since appeared in increasing numbers.

(C) In-country weapons, ordnance, and engineer facilities have been established to supplement the infiltration logistical system; however, Viet Cong munitions factories cannot manufacture 7.62-mm small arms. Since captured US 7.62-mm ammunition is not compatible with Communist weapons, and the in-country production of small arms ammunition is relatively limited, major logistical support of cartridges must come from outside South Vietnam. The in-country work sites have greatly reduced the overall logistical burden by manufacturing homemade mines and grenades, many of which are standard and quite effective.

(C) In addition to the provision of newer model rifles and light machine guns to the NVA and VC in South Vietnam, the RPG-2 Soviet Antitank Grenade Launcher and the Chinese version, Type 56, have been issued in large numbers to infantry units. Designed as an antitank weapon, the RPG-2 is also effective in destroying field fortifications, including reinforced concrete structures. The first capture of an RPG-2 in South Vietnam took place in April 1966. Also in the hands of the Communist troops is the B-50 antitank grenade launcher which appears to be the only weapon of purely North Vietnamese design. This weapon is similar to but larger than the RPG-2. Though the effective range is about the same as the Soviet weapon, the B-50 has greater armor penetration. The RPG-2 has been replaced in the Soviet inventory by the RPG-7, a greatly improved grenade launcher. The appearance of this weapon in South Vietnam was not surprising; the first RPG-7 was captured in April 1967. The RPG-7 has been designated by the VC as the B-41. As more weapons become available, they should replace the B-50.

(C) Reports indicate that the NVA and VC are also being supplied with small arms manufactured by other Communist countries. North Korean AK-47's have been observed. A Czech M58 assault rifle (a copy of the AK-47) was found on an NVN soldier killed in Laos. Reports further relate

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
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
7.62MM ASSAULT RIFLE (SOVIET AK-47, CHICOM TYPE 56, NK TYPE 58) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, AUTOMATIC, SEMI-AUTOMATIC, 7.62X39 AMMUNITION, 600 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC), 80 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL), EFFECTIVE RANGE - 440 YARDS (SOVIET, CHICOM AND NORTH KOREAN MODELS CAPTURED).




7.62MM LIGHT MACHINE GUN (SOVIET DPM, CHICOM TYPE 53) PRINCIPALLY USED BY VC UNITS, AUTOMATIC, 7.62X54R AMMUNITION, 550 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC), 80 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL), EFFECTIVE RANGE - 875 YARDS (ONLY CHICOM TYPE CAPTURED).



7.62MM LIGHT MACHINE GUN (SOVIET RPO, CHICOM TYPE 56 AND TYPE 56-1, NK TYPE 62) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS (SQUAD SUPPORT), AUTOMATIC, 7.62X39 AMMUNITION, 750 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC), 150 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL), EFFECTIVE RANGE - 875 YARDS (SOVIET, CHICOM, NK AND VC TYPES CAPTURED).



7.62MM COMPANY MACHINE GUN (SOVIET RP-46, CHICOM TYPE 58) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, COMPANY SUPPORT, AUTOMATIC, 7.62X54R AMMUNITION, 600 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC), 250 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL), EFFECTIVE RANGE - 1100 YARDS (CHICOM AND SOVIET TYPES CAPTURED).



7.62MM HEAVY MACHINE GUN (SOVIET SG-43/SGM, CHICOM TYPE 53/57) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, BATTALION SUPPORT, AUTOMATIC, 12.7X108 AMMUNITION, 700 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC), 250 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL), EFFECTIVE RANGE - 1100 YARDS (SOVIET, CHICOM, AND POLISH MODELS CAPTURED).

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that NVN has received sniper rifles of both Hungarian and Czechoslovakian manufacture.

North Vietnam Army Weapons

(C) North Vietnam Army (NVA) units are armed entirely with Soviet/CHICOM manufactured weapons. Some of these are the most modern type. The NVA squad weapons are the AK assault rifle, the SKS carbine, and the RPD light machine gun. A typical squad has 3 AKs, 5 SKs and 1 RPD. These, plus the other weapons in use by NVA units, are the most modern in use by the Chinese Communists.

Viet Cong Main Force Weapons

(C) Probably 55-60 percent of the Viet Cong combat units are armed with Soviet/Chinese weapons, but not all of these are the same as those held by NVA units. Probably only 20 percent of VC Main Force units are armed with the same weapons as NVA units. Some increase in the percent of Soviet/Chinese weapons can be expected, but large numbers of US models will be used as long as US weapons and ammunition are captured.


Viet Cong Irregular Unit Weapons

(C) A few of the VC irregulars are armed with infiltrated Communist weapons; however, French, US and homemade versions make up the bulk of those used. The French arms are hold-overs from the Indo China War, and their use is decreasing rapidly because of loss, lack of spare parts, and general deterioration. The smooth-bore homemade weapons are not efficient and are frequently used merely to show the local populace the VC manufacturing capability. It is estimated that only 50 percent of the personnel in the Irregular units are armed at any one time.


(C) Future Soviet-Chinese weapons introduced will probably be all modern - particularly the "new family" of small arms - in an effort to simplify spare parts and ammunition resupply problems. They may also be issued in larger quantities to VC Main Force units to standardize VC-NVA weaponry and to increase VC firepower.

(C) The infiltrated small arms, the RPG-2 and RPG-7 grenade launchers and the 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, have been designed by the Soviets; 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles, 3.5-inch rocket launcher, and 60-mm mortar are of US design. The Chinese have copied these weapons and have occasionally tried to improve performance by minor modification. The Chinese version is generally as good as the original design. A case in point is the Chinese 60-mm mortar, Type 63, recovered in SVN in March 1967. This copy of the US 60-mm mortar M2 has been modified to include a carrying handle mounted to the tube for ease of handling. Modification of the tripod has also been made.


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
12.7MM HEAVY MACHINE GUN (SOVIET DSHIK 38/46, CHICOM TYPE 54) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT SUPPORT, AUTOMATIC, ARMOR PIERCING- INCENDIARY 12.7X108 AMMUNITION, 600 RDS/MIN (CYCLIC) 80 RDS/MIN (PRACTICAL), EFFECTIVE RANGE - GROUND 1640 YARDS, AA 1100 YARDS (CHICOM AND SOVIET TYPES CAPTURED)




40MM ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER (SOVIET RPG-2, CHICOM TYPE 56) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA UNITS, 80MM HEAT GRENADE EFFECTIVE RANGE- 110 YARDS, ARMOR PENETRATION 7 IN. (ONLY CHICOM TYPES CAPTURED DESIGNATED B-40 BY NVA).



40MM ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER (SOVIET RPG-7) 80MM HEAT GRENADE, EFFECTIVE RANGE - 550 YARDS, ARMOR PENETRATION 9.4 IN. (SOVIET AND RUMANIAN MODELS CAPTURED).



3.5 INCH ROCKET LAUNCHER (US DESIGN, CHICOM TYPE 51) USED BY VC UNITS (BEING REPLACED BY THE B-40/RPG-2) HE AMMUNITION EFFECTIVE RANGE 200 YARDS (MOVING TARGET) 300 YARDS (STATIONARY TARGET), ONLY CHICOM TYPE CAPTURED.



57MM RECOILLESS RIFLE (US DESIGN, CHICOM TYPE 36) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA UNITS HE AND HEAT AMMUNITION MAXIMUM RANGE - 4900 YARDS (ONLY CHICOM TYPE CAPTURED).

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
Forecast

(S) The Soviets are continuing to improve their posture in the field of infantry weapons. Recently they replaced the RPD with the RPK, a heavier version of the AK assault rifle; and the RP-46 company machine gun with the PK, a similar, but improved weapon. The M1891/30 sniper's rifle has also been replaced by a semi-automatic version. Following the example of the rocket launcher previously noted, it is probable that some of these new weapons will appear in Southeast Asia in the foreseeable future.


(S) The pattern of weapon use by the Viet Cong continually changes, depending on the number and type of weapons available. Based on statistics compiled during the years 1963-1966, it is projected that the increased use of Soviet/Chinese manufactured weapons will continue.

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
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
120MM MORTAR (SOVIET M 1943, CHICOM TYPE 55) USED BY NVA AND POSSIBLY VIET CONG UNITS. 33.9 LB. HE PROJECTILE. MAX. RANGE 6,235 YARDS (CHICOM AMMUNITION AND BIPOD CAPTURED).



50MM ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER (B-50, PROBABLY NVN) USED BY VC AND NVA, 100-MM HEAT GRENADE EFFECTIVE RANGE 100 YARDS ARMOR PENETRATION 10-12 INCHES (ONLY NVN TYPE CAPTURED).



75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE (US DESIGN, CHICOM TYPES 52 - ILLUSTRATED AND TYPE 56) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA HE AND HEAT AMMUNITION MAX. RANGE 7,300 YARDS (ONLY COMMUNIST CHINA TYPE CAPTURED).



82-MM MORTAR (SOVIET M 1937, COMMUNIST TYPE 53) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVN UNITS. 6.9 LB. HE PROJECTILE (CAN FIRE US 81-MM AMMUNITION, MAX. RANGE 3,320 YARDS (ONLY COMMUNIST CHINA TYPE CAPTURED))

60MM MORTAR (US DESIGN, CHICOM TYPE 31 ALSO CHICOM TYPE 63) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA UNITS 3.25 LB HE PROJECTILE MAXIMUM RANGE - 1675 YARDS (BOTH CHICOM TYPES 31 AND 63 CAPTURED).



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Enemy Continues to Use Artillery Rockets In South Vietnam

(S) Since the introduction of man-portable artillery rocket launcher systems by VC/NVA forces in February of 1967, numerous attacks on US/RVN installations and base camps have been made with CHICOM 102-mm and Soviet 122-mm and 140-mm rockets. The most significant of these was the 15 July 1967 attack on Danang Airbase in which a battalion-size force launched 122-mm rockets from some 18 launch positions located 10,500 meters from the base. During the last several months, much information has been collected on the 122-mm DKZB system. All components of the weapon system have been captured, to include the complete rocket, tube and launch tripod mount, and the optical sight used with the launcher.

(S) Recent analysis of the Soviet 122-mm DKZB launch tube indicates that the launcher used by VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam was dismantled from the Soviet 40-round truck-mounted launcher designated the BM-21. The modified launcher, adapted to a ground emplaced tripod mount, is probably the same launcher used in the March 1967 attack on Camp Carroll and the July 1967 attack on Danang.


The launch tube recently captured in South Vietnam provides the first real evidence of the size and weight of the launcher for the 122-mm spin/folding fin rocket. The tube is over 8 feet long and weighs 55 pounds. (See Photo #1,) A captured VC document has provided an authentic sketch of the tripod and sighting device. (See Sketch #2,) Analysis of the captured launch tube shows that a number of modifications have been applied to the tube for adaption to the ground mount. Approximately 18 inches have been cut off the front end of the original tube length of ten feet, and a reinforcing ring welded to the muzzle end. The front support bracket, a necessary part of the tube structure when used on the 40-round launcher, has been removed to eliminate the obstruction for sighting of the launch tube in azimuth and elevation. A bracket, with two square lugs, has been installed slightly to the rear of the center of the tube to accommodate the tripod mount. A firing sight mount has also been welded to this bracket, for mounting of a panoramic scope; and, a gunner's quadrant seat has been installed on the top-rear end of the tube. Cyrillic markings on the bracket confirm that these modifications were performed by the Soviets. The retaining mechanism at the breech end of the tube used to hold the rocket in position prior to launch and the electrical firing system have been modified for the single tube manual operation.

The letters BM-21 stamped on the breech end of the tube identify the VC/NVA weapon as part of the Soviet 40-round multiple rocket launcher with the same designation. (The BM-21 was announced by the East Berlin press in coverage of the 1967 May Day Parade.) The Soviet 40-round system mounted on the URAL 375 truck had been identified as a 115-mm (?) rocket-based on scaling of previous parade photography. (See Photo #3,) Based on the correlation between the tube recovered from Vietnam and the Soviet truck (URAL 375) mounted system, the 40-round system has been redesignated the Soviet 122-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (40-round) BM-21.

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
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ROCKETS USED IN SOUTH VIETNAM




CHICOM 102-mm Type 488 SPIN-STABILIZED ROCKET & LAUNCHER

Length	28.1 inches
Weight	35 pounds
Warhead Wgt.	12.5 pounds
Fuze	Point Detonating, Quick
Max. Range	5,500 yards
Launcher	Single Tube From Type 505 Launcher
Length	32 inches
Weight	25 pounds



SOVIET 122-mm DKZ-B FIN- STABILIZED ROCKET & LAUNCHER




SOVIET 122-mm DKZ-B FIN- STABILIZED ROCKET A & LAUNCHER

Length	75 inches
Weight	102 pounds
Warhead Wgt.	41 pounds
Fuze	Point Detonating with long and short delay options.
Max. Range	12,000 yards (est)
Launcher	Single Tube From Soviet BM-21 Launcher
Tube Length	8.2 ft.
Weight	55 lb.
Tripod Mount	57 lb.

SOVIET 140-mm SPIN-STABILIZED ROCKET



Length	43 inches
Weight	87 pounds
Warhead Wgt	39 pounds
Fuze	Point Detonating with long and short delay options
Max. Range	11,600 yards
Launcher	Single Tube on Wooden Base
Tube Length	45 inches
Weight	20 pounds (tube and board)



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
The Soviets have thus converted an existing artillery multiple rocket launcher to a relatively light weight, man portable system which can be carried, set into position and fired by a crew of three or four men plus ammo bearers. The DKZB rocket launcher system is relatively easy to emplace and conceal, and is capable of delivering its 41 pound warhead to a maximum range of approximately 11,000 meters. The warhead is designed for maximum fragmentation effect against personnel and materiel and employs an up-to-date contact fuze with long and short delay options.

For ease in transporting through jungle-type terrain over long distances, the rocket itself is separable into three components; fuze, warhead, and rocket motor. Each of the components is carried in a canvas case equipped with a carrying strap. The launch tube and tripod mount can each be carried by one man.


Two different length 122-mm rockets have been identified for the Soviet BM-21 system to date. These are undoubtedly short and long range versions. This feature has been seen previously with the Soviet 140-mm and 240-mm multiple rocket systems. To date, only the shorter, 75-inch rockets have been seen in Vietnam. (See Photo #4.) The longer, nine-foot rockets, having an estimated range of 19,000 meters, are probably fired from the longer tubes mounted on the BM-21 system. (See Photo #5.) If the Soviets supplies VC/NVA forces with the longer rockets and tubes, a significant increase in range over present Vietnam deployed weapons would be achieved. However, the larger weapon would not be easily infiltrated into South Vietnam and would probably require a minimum crew of five or six plus additional ammunition bearers.

Another element of information on the 122-mm rocket, obtained from Vietnam, is the identification of a "spoiler ring" attached to the nose of the rocket between the fuze and warhead section. (See Photo #6.) This ring apparently changes the trajectory of the rocket to permit firing at higher angles of elevation when necessary because of terrain masking. The ring is used for high angle fire at target ranges between 3,000 and 7,000 meters. This technique of modifying the normal ballistic trajectory of rockets to permit engagement of targets at intermediate ranges, obstructed by terrain masking, has not been noted previously on Soviet systems. The use of the adapter ring would allow more flexibility in the employment of tube launched rockets, at shorter ranges.

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


SOVIET 122-mm DKZ-B FIN-STABILIZED ROCKET A & LAUNCHER



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8.2 FOOT LAUNCH TUBE FOR 122-MM DKZ-B ROCKET LAUNCHER




SOVIET 122-MM ROCKET LAUNCHER (40 ROUND) BM-21


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
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APPROXIMATELY NINE FOOT 122-MM ROCKET
BEING LOADED INTO BM-21 LAUNCHER



122-MM SPIN/FOLDING FIN STABILIZED ROCKET 75 INCHES LONG



122-MM ROCKET WITH "SPOILER RING" ATTACHED TO FUZE/WARHEAD SECTION

A-88

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Vietnamese Communist Peace Formulas

(U) The "four points" of the North Vietnamese Government, announced by Premier Pham Van Dong at a National Assembly session 8 April 1965 says:

It is the unserving policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Reaffirmation of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. In accordance with the Geneva agreements, the US Government must withdraw all US troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds from South Vietnam, dismantle all US military bases there, cancel its "military alliance" with South Vietnam. The US Government must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. In accordance with the Geneva agreements, the US Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, and there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel on their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the people of South Vietnam themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an internal conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any approach contrary to the above-mentioned stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

(U) The Viet Cong "five points" are interspersed in a rambling statement by the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam of 22 March 1965. Essentially, they are:

1. A condemnation of US policy in Vietnam along with a catalogue of US "war crimes" there since 1954.

2. An expression of the determination of the Vietnamese "people" to "kick out" the US "imperialists" from Vietnam and to "liberate" South Vietnam. According to the statement, the Vietnamese will never stop fighting until their ultimate objectives of "independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality" have been obtained; the "only way out" for the US is to "withdraw" from South Vietnam, and "at present, all negotiations are useless" on the war as long as "the US imperialists do not withdraw all troops, weapons, and means of war from Vietnam, and as long as the Liberation Front does not have the "decisive voice."

3. A pledge of determination to "advance toward" the reunification of Vietnam.

4. A declaration that the Front has the "full right" to receive international assistance. While relying primarily on its own force, the Front "will buy war materiel from any country," and will call "if necessary" for foreign volunteers.

5. A call on all South Vietnamese people to join in the flight to "liberate" the South.

(U) On 13 February 1967, in response to a letter from Pope Paul VI, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh restated the Communist conditions for peace. He demanded the following five concessions of the United States:

1. An end to aggression in Vietnam.
2. An unconditional halt to the bombing of and other acts of war against North Vietnam.
3. The withdrawal of all US forces from South Vietnam.
4. No interference in "Vietnamese" affairs.
5. Official recognition of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam--Viet Cong.

(U) On 30 December 1967 the North Vietnamese modified a statement made earlier in the year by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh which concerned a willingness to talk with the United States. He stated:

"after the United States has ended unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, the DRV will hold talks with the United States on questions concerned."

Graphs and Statistical Data

(U) The graphs on the following pages portray aspects of general interest. Alone, they should not be considered as indicative of any trend or trends which follow them. The statistical tables result from manual compilation and should not be considered precise. When a MACV weekly reporting period overlaps the beginning and end of any two months, the figures for that period are prorated by sevenths between the two months. The statistical data are, however, sufficient for research reference when used with other information. In some cases, component portions will not total correctly because of year-end adjustments, which are not related to any specific calendar month. All statistical data are subject to continuing refinement and reconciliation.

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VC/NVA - INITIATED INCIDENTS

Note 1: Attacks for 1962 and 1963 were reported as company-size or larger. These attacks appear in company-size column.


Note 2: Reports of antiaircraft fire were initiated in May 1964.

Note 3: Attacks for 1966 listed only as Bn-size or larger and small scale (all less than a battalion in size).

Note 4: Totals on attacks for 1967 are preliminary and may be adjusted as additional data becomes available.

VC/NVA INITIATED INCIDENTS

JANUARY 1968



PERIOD	ATTACKS				TOTAL ATTACKS	OTHER INCIDENTS				TOTAL INCIDENTS
	BN	CO	SM	SC		TERR	SAB	PROP	AAA	
Jan	62	8	21	528	549	839	180	257	---	1,825
	63	2	8	242	252	447	49	179	---	927
	64	3	2	218	223	1,244	129	174	---	1,770
	65	1	5	57	62	1,489	272	170	212	2,206
	66	5	-	65	70	2,490	312	299	767	3,914
	67	5	-	137	142	1,772	70	128	1,257	3,369
Feb	62	8	20	480	500	613	137	210	---	1,468
	63	1	13	181	195	433	69	91	---	788
	64	3	3	211	217	1,389	201	271	---	2,878
	65	3	6	73	82	1,411	267	91	131	1,982
	66	6	-	63	69	1,829	201	172	829	3,100
	67	2	-	115	117	1,499	39	76	1,452	3,183
Mar	62	0	27	561	588	460	290	423	---	1,961
	63	8	11	333	344	653	131	154	---	1,282
	64	1	4	198	203	1,632	158	167	---	2,160
	65	3	3	80	86	1,476	240	90	164	2,056
	66	10	-	42	52	2,332	212	154	920	3,670
	67	10	-	211	221	1,844	58	45	1,221	3,381
Apr	62	0	27	470	497	1,024	228	192	---	1,933
	63	3	9	371	383	688	105	155	---	1,331
	64	3	6	211	220	1,738	169	157	---	2,284
	65	6	1	38	43	1,407	149	96	145	1,860
	66	4	-	73	77	2,283	252	110	513	3,255
	67	8	-	155	163	1,992	67	109	1,164	3,495
May	62	0	28	490	528	892	154	251	---	1,838
	63	0	13	344	357	608	93	150	---	1,208
	64	2	3	170	175	1,418	217	140	193	2,143
	65	11	7	40	58	1,555	365	115	170	2,263
	66	4	-	49	53	2,552	293	186	560	3,566
	67	6	-	189	193	1,985	74	59	1,260	3,571
Jun	62	0	23	339	342	736	157	222	---	1,477
	63	1	11	398	410	652	107	142	---	1,311
	64	2	10	128	148	1,390	176	162	194	2,062
	65	6	1	62	69	1,784	469	103	172	2,597
	66	6	-	62	68	2,382	211	118	588	3,259
	67	2	-	166	168	1,537	72	44	1,052	2,893
Jul	62	1	18	437	448	735	158	223	---	1,564
	63	1	8	398	407	698	80	183	---	1,369
	64	7	12	166	185	2,132	286	224	218	3,045
	65	6	8	42	48	1,706	400	154	212	2,520
	66	0	-	91	91	2,070	200	86	561	3,008
	67	9	-	190	199	1,739	141	61	940	3,020
Aug	62	8	18	368	378	885	146	252	---	1,642
	63	1	11	356	368	647	113	221	---	1,349
	64	3	3	187	193	1,775	315	173	204	2,580
	65	5	9	38	52	1,597	349	280	300	2,498
	66	5	-	59	64	1,752	113	47	385	2,401
	67	1	-	209	204	1,653	145	96	1,173	3,271
Sep	62	0	9	382	391	624	178	182	---	1,375
	63	3	17	683	503	889	164	207	---	1,763
	64	4	4	110	118	1,938	482	178	775	3,091
	65	3	7	19	31	1,530	278	185	449	2,473
	66	0	-	86	86	1,972	90	115	601	2,864
	67	5	-	255	260	2,148	206	65	1,078	3,757
Oct	62	1	12	406	419	583	189	166	---	1,357
	63	0	6	359	365	882	185	190	---	1,422
	64	6	2	75	83	1,790	488	197	277	2,827
	65	12	8	24	44	1,969	415	198	704	3,330
	66	2	-	121	123	1,719	183	81	869	2,925
	67	3	-	262	265	1,604	149	41	992	3,131
Nov	62	3	7	411	421	614	144	132	---	1,311
	63	3	11	631	645	1,990	269	278	---	3,182
	64	1	2	57	48	1,391	247	109	175	1,982
	65	10	16	24	52	2,234	486	255	611	3,638
	66	2	-	84	86	1,781	125	72	794	2,778
	67	7	-	257	264	1,499	201	36	759	2,759
Dec	62	1	8	375	384	670	107	185	---	1,346
	63	8	3	258	261	1,298	111	251	---	1,921
	64	6	9	81	96	1,719	318	128	243	2,304
	65	7	18	32	57	2,572	442	317	718	4,106
	66	1	-	100	181	1,761	98	112	765	2,837
	67	8	-	277	285	1,822	229	41	942	3,319


ANNUAL TOTALS

Year	BN	CO	SM	SC	ATTACKS	TERR	SAB	PROP	AAA	TOTAL
1962	6	212		5,247	5,465		8,075	2,060	2,676	19,076
1963	15	121		4,354	4,498		9,805	1,396	2,161	17,852
1964	41	60		1,732	1,833	19,556	7,178	2,080	1,879	28,526
1965	73	81		531	685	20,730	4,132	1,974	4,008	31,529
1966	44	—		896	948	24,873	2,212	1,504	8,128	37,657
1967	64	—		2,617	2,481	21,194	1,443	841	13,290	39,209

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SECRET

SECRET TOTAL CASUALTIES*



1967

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(S) CONFIDENTIAL

VIET CONG/NVA				REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM				US 1/			FREE WORLD FORCES (ROK, AUST, NZ, PHIL)		
PERIOD	KIA	PO	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	CAP	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	TOTAL
Jan 62	1,294	---	---	299	475	116	890	---	---	---	---	---	---
63	1,754	---	---	453	908	102	1,463	12	---	12	---	---	---
64	1,223	---	---	343	913	555	1,811	30	---	30	---	---	---
65	2,203	---	---	904	1,938	471	3,313	12	109	121	---	---	---
66	2,648	---	2,648	747	1,557	450	2,754	282	1,318	1,600	74	238	312
67	6,064	500	6,564	887	2,036	166	3,089	512	3,450	3,962	77	149	226
Feb 62	1,205	---	---	244	300	124	668	11	---	11	---	---	---
63	1,082	---	---	379	656	82	1,112	4	---	4	---	---	---
64	1,055	---	---	374	916	383	1,593	7	---	7	---	---	---
65	1,564	---	---	880	1,840	1,394	4,114	44	254	298	---	---	---
66	4,727	---	4,727	1,014	2,095	477	3,586	433	2,622	3,055	58	138	196
67	7,361	724	8,085	771	2,125	154	3,050	658	3,853	4,511	95	209	304
Mar 62	1,456	---	---	523	737	140	1,400	---	---	---	---	---	---
63	1,443	---	---	410	851	66	1,327	1	---	1	---	---	---
64	1,456	---	---	439	1,249	345	2,033	12	---	12	---	---	---
65	2,022	---	---	751	1,633	720	3,104	15	79	94	---	---	---
66	5,685	---	5,685	938	1,941	466	3,345	506	2,956	3,462	59	165	224
67	9,351	829	10,180	1,118	2,786	468	4,372	503	6,314	7,257	54	192	246
Apr 62	1,596	---	---	387	532	151	1,070	2	---	2	---	---	---
63	1,660	---	---	506	878	96	1,480	3	---	3	---	---	---
64	1,671	---	---	594	1,584	398	2,576	6	---	6	---	---	---
65	1,909	---	---	591	1,650	232	2,473	40	125	165	---	---	---
66	2,818	---	2,818	574	1,522	121	2,217	311	2,449	2,760	30	160	190
67	6,227	947	7,174	935	2,490	134	3,559	718	4,964	5,674	56	188	244
May 62	1,756	---	---	398	509	94	993	---	---	---	---	---	---
63	1,895	---	---	435	889	94	1,418	5	---	5	---	---	---
64	1,135	---	---	458	981	202	1,647	12	---	12	---	---	---
65	1,975	---	---	1,049	2,143	873	4,065	32	171	203	---	---	---
66	4,239	---	4,239	661	1,454	194	2,311	462	2,879	3,341	19	68	87
67	9,808	456	10,264	1,026	2,830	168	4,004	1,232	5,250	5,612	112	201	313
Jun 62	1,666	---	---	325	613	77	1,015	3	---	3	---	---	---
63	1,863	---	---	389	772	90	1,251	3	---	3	---	---	---
64	1,005	---	---	594	1,145	313	1,952	12	---	12	---	---	---
65	2,208	---	---	1,211	1,920	1,260	4,391	71	272	343	---	---	---
66	4,815	---	4,815	860	1,800	183	2,843	503	2,774	3,272	41	67	108
67	7,354	523	7,877	771	2,118	139	3,028	828	4,956	5,774	74	163	237
Jul 62	1,544	---	---	384	686	212	1,282	5	---	5	---	---	---
63	1,918	---	---	529	1,071	306	1,906	4	---	4	---	---	---
64	1,427	---	---	900	1,812	510	3,222	15	---	15	---	---	---
65	2,980	---	---	1,160	1,591	674	3,425	76	365	421	---	---	---
66	5,297	---	5,297	860	1,638	242	2,740	435	2,324	2,759	26	60	86
67	7,503	645	8,148	664	1,855	1,05	2,724	741	5,471	6,252	1,00	170	270
Aug 62	2,271	---	---	377	626	63	1,066	1	---	1	---	---	---
63	1,685	---	---	411	804	352	1,567	7	---	7	---	---	---
64	1,449	---	---	721	1,612	478	2,811	9	---	9	---	---	---
65	3,624	---	---	808	1,945	287	3,040	38	547	635	---	---	---
66	5,860	---	5,860	722	1,491	289	2,422	395	2,470	2,865	24	138	162
67	5,810	559	6,369	552	1,221	131	3,264	535	4,604	5,239	90	171	261
Sep 62	2,218	---	---	419	646	59	1,124	---	---	---	---	---	---
63	1,982	---	---	672	1,155	566	2,393	---	---	---	---	---	---
64	1,187	---	---	814	1,759	737	3,315	7	---	7	---	---	---
65	3,485	---	---	655	1,724	264	2,645	97	545	642	---	---	---
66	4,459	---	4,459	566	1,554	185	2,385	419	2,651	3,078	28	106	134
67	6,454	102	6,556	740	2,426	102	3,268	775	6,609	7,084	159	280	439
Oct 62	1,967	---	---	365	619	64	1,048	6	---	6	---	---	---
63	1,320	---	---	428	989	398	1,815	19	---	19	---	---	---
64	1,617	---	---	739	1,583	693	3,015	22	---	22	---	---	---
65	3,874	---	---	961	2,416	225	3,602	169	823	992	---	---	---
66	5,665	---	5,665	906	2,118	216	3,240	338	2,186	2,524	63	250	313
67	6,212	756	6,968	751	2,255	156	3,162	732	5,222	5,954	50	191	241
Nov 62	1,982	---	---	410	834	92	1,336	4	---	4	---	---	---
63	2,333	---	---	664	1,554	665	2,883	4	---	4	---	---	---
64	1,747	---	---	574	1,404	410	2,388	14	---	14	---	---	---
65	5,516	---	---	1,034	2,056	520	3,610	469	1,470	1,939	---	---	---
66	5,447	---	5,447	804	1,933	199	2,936	473	2,994	3,467	87	201	288
67	7,402	322	7,724	1,112	2,901	251	4,264	571	5,400	5,971	90	177	267
Dec 62	2,303	---	---	294	618	78	998	1	---	1	---	---	---
63	1,440	---	---	389	961	320	1,670	15	---	15	---	---	---
64	1,813	---	---	1,802	2,053	1,092	4,947	20	---	20	---	---	---
65	4,076	---	---	1,239	2,262	926	4,427	252	1,320	1,622	---	---	---
66	3,864	---	3,864	815	1,851	338	3,004	432	2,417	2,849	29	96	125
67	7,025	95	7,120	1,219	3,025	350	4,700	771	5,241	5,610	102	169	271

1959	1,132	---	---	138	203	---	341	---	---	---	---	---	---
1960	5,669	---	---	2,223	2,788	---	2,515	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	6,801	---	---	2,361	2,991	---	2,515	---	---	---	---	---	---
1961	12,133	---	---	4,004	5,449	---	3,233	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	18,934	---	---	6,365	8,440	---	5,748	---	---	---	---	---	---
1962	31,158	---	---	4,457	7,195	---	1,270	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	40,092	---	---	10,822	15,635	---	2,018	---	---	---	---	---	---
1963	20,575	---	---	5,665	11,488	---	3,137	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	60,667	---	---	16,487	27,123	---	10,155	---	---	---	---	---	---
1964	16,785	---	---	7,457	17,017	---	6,036	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	77,452	---	---	23,944	44,140	---	16,191	---	---	---	---	---	---
1965	35,436	---	---	11,243	23,118	---	7,848	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	112,888	---	---	35,187	67,258	---	24,039	---	---	---	---	---	---
1966	55,324	---	---	9,469	20,975	---	3,283	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	168,212	---	---	44,656	88,233	---	27,322	---	---	---	---	---	---
1967	88,104	9,743	97,847	10,880	29,448	---	2,339	---	---	---	---	---	---
CUM	256,316	9,743	266,059	55,536	117,681	---	9,661	---	---	---	---	---	---

US KIA figures include any individual who is treated for a minor wound at any aid station and returned to duty.
 RVNAF considers as KIA only individuals who are hospitalized.

1/ Cumulative US KIA - 615; US Detained - 229. US KIA and WIA figures include losses over NVN but not Laos.

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
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RVNAF CASUALTIES

(KIA, WIA, CAP/MIA)

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TYPE FORCES

- REGULAR
- REGIONAL
- POPULAR


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JANUARY 1968

TOTAL RVNAF CASUALTIES

42,213

33,725



SECRET

RVNAF CASUALTIES

REGULAR (ARVN)					REGIONAL				POPULAR				TOTAL			
DATE	KIA	WIA	CAP/NIA	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	CAP/NIA	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	CAP/NIA	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	CAP/NIA	TOTAL
JAN 65	360	851	56	1,267	132	410	86	628	412	677	329	1,418	904	1,938	471	3,313
66	216	705	36	957	258	408	77	743	273	444	337	1,054	747	1,557	450	2,754
67	339	933	19	1,291	221	436	49	706	327	667	98	1,092	887	2,036	166	3,089
FEB 65	328	794	457	1,579	166	418	117	701	390	628	820	1,838	884	1,840	1,394	4,118
66	464	1,324	140	1,928	306	347	171	824	246	424	166	836	1,016	2,095	477	3,588
67	342	1,173	34	1,549	192	487	37	716	237	465	81	785	771	2,125	154	3,050
MAR 65	770	820	70	1,660	154	330	76	560	327	483	574	1,384	751	1,633	720	3,104
66	426	1,121	49	1,596	221	348	81	650	291	492	336	1,119	938	1,961	466	3,365
67	477	1,526	144	2,147	213	571	126	910	428	689	198	1,315	1,118	2,786	468	4,372
APR 65	273	908	67	1,248	73	213	13	299	245	529	152	926	591	1,650	232	2,473
66	185	834	27	1,046	86	258	52	396	303	410	42	755	574	1,522	121	2,217
67	576	1,669	20	2,265	123	347	50	520	236	474	64	774	935	2,490	134	3,559
MAY 65	420	1,136	249	1,805	384	508	187	1,079	245	499	437	1,181	1,049	2,143	873	4,065
66	270	799	14	1,083	151	252	45	448	240	403	137	780	661	1,454	196	2,311
67	530	1,863	39	2,432	132	398	59	589	364	569	50	983	1,026	2,830	148	4,004
JUN 65	554	999	492	2,045	268	356	184	808	389	565	584	1,538	1,211	1,920	1,260	4,391
66	431	1,059	62	1,552	215	368	63	646	214	373	58	645	860	1,800	183	2,843
67	270	974	4	1,248	165	420	29	614	336	724	106	1,166	771	2,118	139	3,028
JUL 65	642	674	165	1,481	264	399	71	734	254	518	438	1,210	1,160	1,591	674	3,425
66	346	811	39	1,196	211	393	53	657	303	434	150	887	860	1,638	242	2,740
67	349	1,210	91	1,650	147	370	38	555	170	355	34	559	666	1,935	123	2,724
AUG 65	341	999	33	1,373	181	372	63	616	286	574	191	1,051	808	1,945	287	3,040
66	255	734	20	1,009	182	274	125	581	285	483	64	832	722	1,491	209	2,422
67	382	1,334	16	1,732	205	465	42	712	245	433	73	831	552	2,251	131	3,264
SEP 65	274	873	45	1,192	146	426	83	655	235	425	138	798	655	1,724	266	2,645
66	272	808	56	1,136	97	261	11	369	197	485	118	800	566	1,554	185	2,305
67	281	1,178	29	1,488	188	561	32	781	271	677	40	988	740	2,416	103	3,259
OCT 65	430	1,372	73	1,875	184	370	27	581	347	674	125	1,146	961	2,416	225	3,602
66	325	1,143	33	1,501	188	339	58	585	393	636	125	1,154	906	2,118	216	3,240
67	340	1,252	18	1,610	174	521	60	755	259	582	58	899	753	2,355	136	3,244
NOV 65	451	1,095	147	1,693	296	444	150	890	287	517	223	1,027	1,034	2,056	520	3,610
66	322	994	25	1,341	162	364	44	570	320	575	130	1,025	804	1,933	199	2,936
67	570	1,742	89	2,401	212	574	49	835	330	665	143	1,138	1,112	2,681	281	4,374
DEC 65	661	1,298	335	2,294	275	441	136	852	303	523	455	1,281	1,239	2,262	926	4,427
66	327	904	228	1,459	202	422	45	669	286	525	65	876	815	1,851	338	3,004
67	554	1,476	39	2,069	249	857	56	1,162	446	762	261	1,469	1,249	3,005	356	4,700
TOTAL																
1965	5,004	11,819	2,189	19,012	2,523	4,687	1,193	8,403	3,720	6,612	4,466	14,798	11,247	23,118	7,848	42,213
1966	3,839	11,236	729	15,804	2,279	4,034	825	7,138	3,351	5,704	1,728	10,783	9,469	20,974	3,282	33,725
1967	4,980	16,319	502	21,801	2,221	6,007	627	8,855	3,670	7,122	1,210	12,011	10,890	29,448	2,339	42,667
CUM	13,823	39,374	3,420	56,617	7,023	14,728	2,645	24,406	10,750	19,438	7,404	37,592	31,596	73,540	13,469	118,605


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PERSONNEL KILLED IN ACTION

JANUARY 1968



1967

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
WEAPONS LOST

	<u>VC/NVA</u>	<u>REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM</u>
Jan 63	683	457
64	532	917
65	711	1,700
66	979	935
67	2,360	738
Feb 63	399	253
64	471	708
65	620	2,454
66	1,219	1,077
67	2,395	532
Mar 63	367	467
64	532	814
65	698	1,442
66	1,607	1,391
67	3,826	984
Apr 63	468	797
64	424	990
65	973	757
66	829	595
67	2,118	725
May 63	564	463
64	281	723
65	831	1,701
66	1,087	493
67	2,781	646
Jun 63	394	580
64	387	718
65	793	2,387
66	3,761	735
67	1,979	536
Jul 63	374	663
64	447	1,889
65	822	1,375
66	1,614	744
67	3,502	560
Aug 63	428	637
64	619	1,106
65	1,074	705
66	1,342	654
67	2,062	521
Sep 63	389	878
64	525	1,465
65	838	778
66	1,430	426
67	1,577	544
Oct 63	330	753
64	482	1,510
65	1,013	762
66	1,977	851
67	3,502	556
Nov 63	455	1,595
64	515	1,104
65	2,164	1,126
66	1,423	650
67	2,572	865
Dec 63	546	724
64	666	2,111
65	1,158	1,728
66	1,338	830
67	2,502	932
<u>ANNUAL TOTALS</u>		
1961	2,753	5,932
1962	4,049	5,195
1963	5,397	8,267
1964	5,881	14,055
1965	11,695	16,915
1966	18,606	9,381
1967	31,158	8,039

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RVN DESERTIONS

SECRET



1967

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SECRET

* ESTIMATED

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RVN

~~TOP~~ DESERTIONS

(includes Regular, Regional and Popular Forces)

PERIOD	REGULAR	RF	PF	TOTALS
Jan 62	933	544	1,009	2,486
63	865	661	1,153	2,679
64	1,439	852	3,784	6,075
65	2,384	1,160	3,359	6,903
66	5,790	1,086	2,375	9,251
67	3,451	1,240	2,412	6,902
Feb 62	483	479	603	1,565
63	723	241	1,148	2,112
64	1,160	751	2,993	4,884
65	2,532	812	3,894	7,238
66	7,951	1,859	4,300	14,118
67	3,995	1,451	1,497	6,943
Mar 62	1,168	906	1,204	3,278
63	656	948	1,320	2,916
64	2,501	2,090	3,957	8,548
65	5,018	1,437	5,010	11,465
66	7,529	1,119	4,628	13,276
67	3,848	2,727	2,542	9,117
Apr 62	1,273	644	780	2,697
63	843	660	1,354	2,857
64	2,085	1,879	3,700	7,664
65	3,611	1,254	5,402	10,267
66	6,439	2,086	4,376	12,901
67	3,016	2,540	1,426	6,982
May 62	1,344	241	816	2,401
63	949	905	1,260	3,114
64	1,412	1,059	2,200	4,671
65	4,310	2,141	3,245	9,596
66	7,169	2,550	2,905	12,688
67	3,289	1,505	1,685	6,479
Jun 62	1,160	246	1,392	2,798
63	877	81	1,360	2,318
64	1,232	755	1,983	3,970
65	3,755	2,440	4,838	11,033
66	5,723	1,466	3,553	10,742
67	3,071	2,451	2,427	7,949
Jul 62	855	892	1,105	2,852
63	686	864	1,443	2,993
64	1,164	1,704	2,214	5,082
65	3,409	1,346	5,178	9,933
66	4,882	1,006	3,333	9,221
67	2,450	1,375	1,534	5,359
Aug 62	867	989	1,116	2,972
63	830	1,050	1,451	3,331
64	1,355	1,282	3,858	5,695
65	3,881	1,530	5,388	10,639
66	4,133	887	3,220	8,240
67	2,325	1,555	1,711	5,591
Sep 62	629	494	775	1,898
63	675	651	1,660	2,986
64	1,200	1,332	2,708	5,232
65	4,011	1,464	3,214	8,689
66	3,541	635	1,915	6,091
67	2,217	1,325	2,627	6,169
Oct 62	767	403	1,102	2,272
63	584	639	1,678	2,901
64	2,586	988	3,675	7,249
65	5,279	1,026	3,982	10,287
66	3,440	674	1,848	5,962
67	2,524	1,352	1,777	5,653
Nov 62	847	733	978	2,558
63	883	267	1,975	3,125
64	2,820	1,076	3,171	7,067
65	4,625	936	3,380	8,941
66	3,638	997	2,341	6,976
67	2,555	502	1,548	4,605
Dec 62	877	193	1,077	2,147
63	1,045	1,276	2,734	5,055
64	2,507	1,193	3,173	6,873
65	5,362	1,401	2,414	9,177
66	3,529	1,115	2,304	6,948
67	2,512	1,400	1,600	5,512

ANNUAL TOTALS

1962	11,203	6,764	11,957	29,924
1963	9,666	8,235	18,540	36,441
1964	21,441	14,961	36,408	73,010
1965	47,297	16,647	49,224	113,168
1966	63,764	15,484	37,158	116,406
1967	41,195	10,710	23,126	81,031

* Estimated.


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VIET CONG/NVA PRISONERS-OF-WAR



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Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Prisoners-of-War

(c) The nature of the conflict in South Vietnam and the fact that the enemy easily blends with the people often leads to difficulty in properly classifying the "captives" taken during military operations. To avoid misleading reports, COMUSMACV, in October 1966, directed that all "captives" be classified as DETAINEES. After screening and interrogation, the detainees are divided into groups which include prisoners-of-war, civil defendants, returnees, and innocent civilians.

(c) The following classification guidelines were established by MACV:

Prisoners-of-War - Persons who qualify under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In addition, the following persons shall be extended this protection:

a. Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying against the Republic of Vietnam (SVN) or US and other Free World Forces.

b. Any captive member of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces or of the Viet Cong, whether captured in combat or not, except a terrorist, saboteur, or spy.

Civil Defendants - Persons who are suspected of being spies, saboteurs, terrorists, or criminals and who do not qualify as prisoners-of-war.

Returnees (Hoi Chanh) - Persons who voluntarily return to GVN control after having actively supported the Viet Cong in some form of political or military activity.

Those detainees classified as prisoners-of-war are confined to Corps area PW Camps of the Army of Vietnam. Civil defendants (only terrorists, spies, saboteurs, and criminals) are processed through the Vietnamese civil court system for disposition, while the returnees are processed through Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Centers for rehabilitation. Innocent civilians are, of course, released and returned to their place of capture.

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
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1 January 1968

THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM



* MILITARY TOTAL NOT AVAILABLE

1967

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(c) It was not until recently that the Vietnamese accepted the term "prisoner-of-war" with its required responsibilities. In the years prior to 1966, the thousands of "captives" taken were treated as outlaws under the Vietnamese court system. Since the adoption of the new classification procedures, a systematic screening of all persons held at GVN detention facilities has been underway attempting to determine who should be classified as valid prisoners-of-war and transferred to PW camps. The following table shows the result of this screening under the new classification system. The totals reflect the enemy population in PW camps as of 31 December 1967.

<u>MONTH OF CAPTURE</u>	<u>NVA</u>	<u>REGROUPEE*</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>UNK</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Prior to Jan 66	149	58	178	2	387
Jan-Dec 66	658	98	2,121	32	2,909
Jan 67	74	12	411	3	500
Feb	86	14	546	78	724
Mar	75	11	613	130	829
Apr	30	5	592	320	947
May	58	5	420	13	496
Jun	73	11	419	20	523
Jul	128	8	497	12	645
Aug	102	12	443	2	559
Sep	93	10	348	0	451
Oct	64	4	288	0	356
Nov	59	4	258	1	322
Dec	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>95</u>
TOTAL	1,656	253	7,221	613	9,743

* Regroupee - Vietnamese who lived in what is now SVN and at the time of the 1954 Geneva Conference moved to the North, later infiltrated into SVN and were captured.

NOTE: Of the 9,743 PWs confined to camps, 5,487 were captured by US forces, 3,566 by RVNAF, and 690 by FVMAF.

NOTE: It should be noted that the monthly figures are tentative and are being adjusted continuously as classifications are made and the systematic screening of persons confined in GVN detention facilities progresses.

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CHIEU HOI RETURNEES

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>
Jan 65	393	231
66	1,253	886
67	2,521	1,497
68		
Feb 65	443	295
66	2,214	1,547
67	3,169	2,105
68		
Mar 65	504	343
66	1,982	1,345
67	4,913	3,155
68		
Apr 65	581	422
66	1,624	1,133
67	3,018	1,873
68		
May 65	1,049	703
66	1,324	848
67	2,350	1,466
68		
Jun 65	984	719
66	1,379	885
67	2,105	1,412
68		
Jul 65	826	562
66	1,307	894
67	2,044	1,536
68		
Aug 65	1,477	1,278
66	1,173	791
67	1,925	1,269
68		
Sep 65	1,161	793
66	975	626
67	1,543	1,076
68		
Oct 65	1,066	726
66	1,829	1,089
67	1,569	1,069
68		
Nov 65	1,543	1,129
66	2,648	1,457
67	1,070	660
68		
Dec 65	1,106	735
66	2,516	1,396
67	951	554
68		
 <u>ANNUAL TOTALS</u>		
1964	5,417	---
1965	11,124	7,936
1966	20,242	12,897
1967	27,178	17,672
1968		

NOTE: Monthly statistics for 1964 are not available.

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NORTH VIETNAM

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NORTH VIETNAM

Geography

(U) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) is that part of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel, the demarcation line determined at the Geneva Conference in July 1954. The country has an area of about 63,000 square miles, approximately the size of the state of Washington.

(U) The greater part of North Vietnam (NVN) is covered by rough mountains (including the northern part of the Chaine Annamitique) that generally have a north-west/south-east trend. West of the Red River there are peaks ranging from 7,000 to 10,000 feet, but elsewhere heights are generally less than 6,000 feet. The principal rivers -- the Red and its tributaries, the Claire, the Black, as well as the Song Ma farther south -- follow the same north-west/south-east trend. The most significant feature of the non-mountainous region is the triangular Red River delta plain which, measuring about 100 miles from its apex on the Red River to the base (80 miles long) formed by the coast, contains many water-courses. Coastal plains 5 to 50 miles wide extend southward from the delta; these plains and the delta are mostly rice fields. Forests interspersed with scrub and grass are found on the mountains. Because of flooded rice fields and rugged mountains, vehicular movement away from the roads is impracticable almost everywhere, except in the dry season in marginal areas of the delta and the coastal plains and in some parts of the wider valleys. Movement is believed slow for men on foot.

(U) The climate is monsoonal, with a humid, hot and wet southwest season between May and September and a cool dry northeast season between October and March; however, in coastal regions heavy rains from the northeast monsoon, which inhibit overland movement, occur south of the 20th parallel from October to December, and a light continuous drizzle causing high humidity and poor visibility often occurs between January and April. The average annual rainfall is between 55 and 125 inches. The average annual rainfall at Hanoi is 66 inches. During the southwest monsoon, the maximum temperatures range between 75 degrees F in the mountains and 90 degree F on the plains, and the minima between 64 and 80 degrees F respectively; during the north-east monsoon the corresponding maxima are between 50 and 70 degrees F and minima between 40 and 55 degrees F.

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HO CHI MINH
PRESIDENT
(PARTY CHAIRMAN)
NEUTRAL

POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY



LE DUAN
(PARTY 1ST SECRETARY)
MILITANT



TRUONG CHINH
CHAIRMAN OF STANDING
COMMITTEE OF NVN
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
NEUTRAL



PHAM VAN DONG
PRIME
MINISTER
MODERATE



PHAM HUNG
DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER
MODERATE



VO NGUYEN GIAP
DEFENSE MINISTER
CINC-NVA ARMED FORCES
ALSO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
MODERATE



LE DUC THO
MILITANT



HOANG VAN HOAN
MILITANT



NGUYEN DUY TRINH
MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
NEUTRAL



LE THANH NGHI
DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER
MODERATE



TRAN QUOC HOAN
MINISTER
OF PUBLIC SECURITY
(ALTERNATE MEMBER)
NEUTRAL



VAN TIEN DUNG
CHIEF
(ALTERNATE MEMBER)
MODERATE

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Government

(U) Hanoi, the capital of NVN, has a population of 400,000.* The country is politically divided into 17 provinces, two autonomous regions, two centrally governed municipalities, and one special zone. The NVN constitution provides for a national assembly, a highly centralized executive, universal suffrage for all citizens who are eighteen or older and for proforma elections for national and local assemblies. The ruling Communist political party - the Lao Dong (Vietnamese Workers) Party - has no organized opposition. It has approximately 700,000 members, comprising about three percent of the population. The Party is completely dominant and its members hold key posts in the government. It fully controls non-Communist national elements, and membership is a prerequisite to high military responsibility. The government is a Communist dictatorship and was so proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in 1945. The government has consolidated its political position and exchanges recognition with and receives aid from the Communist World. It seeks international recognition and unification of all of Vietnam under Communist control through political/insurgent action. The pressures of protracted war and the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute have generated some differences among the NVN leaderships; however, the interplay between the militant vs moderate and between the pro-Moscow and pro-Peiping factions has not reached a level which threatens the stability of the regime. North Vietnam, as a recipient of significant aid from both Communist China and the Soviet Union, officially has maintained an impartial attitude toward the Sino-Soviet dispute. An unprecedented, thinly-veiled attack against Mao Tse-tung's leadership in a recent issue of the Lao Dong Party journal, however, may be indicative of reportedly developing Sino-Soviet Vietnamese friction over the issue of China's Cultural Revolution, the conduct of the Vietnam war, and the question of peace negotiations.


(U) Significant Personalities and Their Posts

President and Chairman of the Lao.....	Ho Chi Minh
Dong (Communist) Party Central Committee	
Bao Dong (Communist) Party 1st Secretary.....	Le Duan
Chairman of Standing Committee of NVN.....	Truong Chinh
National Assembly	
Prime Minister.....	Pham Van Dong
Deputy Prime Minister.....	Pham Hung
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of.....	Nguyen Duy Trinh
Foreign Affairs	
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of.....	Sr Gen Vo Nguyen Giap
National Defense	
Deputy Prime Minister.....	Le Thanh Nghi
Minister of Public Security (Alternate.....	Tran Quoc Hoan
Member)	

* This is an estimate based upon the present partial evacuation of the capital.

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(U) Significant Personalities and Their Posts (continued)

Commander in Chief, North Vietnamese.....Sr Gen Vo Nguyen Giap
Army (NVA)
Director, Research Bureau (responsible.....Sr Col Le Trong Nghia
for military intelligence)
Commander, Naval Forces, Coastal.....Sr Cpt Nguyen Ba Paht
Defense Bureau
Chief, Air Defense Command.....Unknown
Commander, Armed Public Security ForcePham Kiet
(APSF)

Agriculture, Economy, and Lines of Communication


(C) North Vietnam is predominantly an agricultural country with about 80 percent of the labor force engaged in this field. Agriculture accounts for about 45 percent of the gross national product (GNP). NVN's agriculture is mainly of the subsistence type; the main crops are rice, corn, sweet potatoes, manioc, and sugar cane. NVN is self-sufficient at a basic subsistence level. Caloric intake is 1,700-2,000 calories per day, per capita.

(C/NVD) The GNP for 1965 was estimated to equal US \$1,639 million which amounts to US \$92 capita. Major industries are food processing, textiles, machine building, mining, and cement. Foreign trade amounted to US \$299 million in 1965 (exports -- US \$104 million, imports -- US \$195 million). Eighty-five percent of the foreign trade is with the Communist countries and the remaining 15 percent is with non-Communist countries. The main exports are agriculture and handicraft products, coal, cement, and apatite. The principal imports consist of petroleum, steel products, railroad stock, vehicles, complex machinery and equipment, chemicals, medicines, and raw cotton. Considerable economic aid has been extended to NVN by Communist nations. Total non-military aid during the period 1955 to 1967 was US \$1,765 million of which Communist China supplied US \$705 million, USSR gave \$835 million, and the East European Communist countries furnished US \$225 million. The 1967 estimate of aid extended to NVN was about US \$340 million. NVN's main imports are petroleum, foodstuffs, industrial machinery and transportation equipment.

(C) The 665-route mile railroad system of North Vietnam is government-owned and operated and is generally adequate to meet the present military and economic requirements. The railroad system is relatively sparse; however, it is of prime importance in the area in which it serves. The lines serve the most densely populated regions, the largest industrial centers, and the principal port of Haiphong.

(C) Of the total route miles of rail lines in North Vietnam, there are approximately 520 miles of 3'3 3/8" gauge, 25 miles of 4'8 1/2" gauge, and 105 miles of dual-gauge (3'3 3/8" and 4'8 1/2"). All lines

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are single track and there is no electrification. The highway network totals about 7,300 miles of motorable roads, of which an estimated 700 miles have bituminous surface treatment; the remaining 6,600 miles have surfaces of crushed stone, gravel, or earth. Condition of these roads varies from poor to good. The highway network contains an estimated 10,000 crossings of possible significance, of which 3,000-4,000 are bridges. Although an estimated 2,500 bridges have been damaged or destroyed since the beginning of the air campaign, at least 1,500 (20 feet or over in length) remain on the selected highway system. There are 3,380 miles of inland waterways (1,500 miles navigable by shallow-draft river steamer during high water season (May-November) and about 900 miles navigable perennially). Freight carried in 1965 by rail was 790 million metric ton/km; by highway - 200 million metric ton/km; by waterways - 540 million metric ton/km; and by coastal shipping - 170 million metric tons/km. There are 13 ports (1 principal - Haiphong; 2 secondary; and 10 minor).

(C) The NVN merchant marine consists of six ships totaling 8,493 GRT, 11,589 DWT. It includes four cargo and two tankers. (Only two ships are over 1,000 GRT - November 1965.) The air transport fleet is made up of 54 aircraft, all of which are believed to be of military subordination. There are 14 airfields believed to have been in use since 1964. Three additional airfields are under construction. Of these, nine have permanent surface runways and 12 have runways in excess of 4,000 feet in length. Three of the fields are currently unserviceable as a result of US air strikes. NVN's minimal open-wire networks are supplemented by point-to-point radio. International telecommunication facilities are adequate and ample coverage is provided by radio and wired broadcast. There is no television in NVN. All lines of communication are subject to seasonal conditions.

(U) Insurgency

None


(C) Communist Influence

The Lao Dong (Communist) Party is completely dominant. Its members hold key posts in the government and they fully control non-Communist nationalist elements. As recipient of significant aid from both Communist China and the Soviet Union, North Vietnam officially has maintained impartial attitude toward Sino-Soviet dispute.

(C) Military Alliances and Agreements

Military alliances are prohibited under the 1954 Geneva Agreement; however, Chinese Communists have openly stated readiness to assist in defense of North Vietnam. The agreement also prohibits a net increase in war materiel, but terms have been violated and surface-to-air missiles, artillery, vehicles, and communications equipment, as well as aircraft and naval craft, have been provided by Communist World countries. Communist

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China and the USSR provide military support and train both NVA officers and NCO's including jet pilots. A secret tri-party agreement reportedly was signed last March permitting the transfer of Soviet aid to North Vietnamese ownership at the Sino-Soviet border for more expeditious transit across China to North Vietnam.

~~(S/NID)~~ Value of Military Aid 1955 - 1967

Over US \$1.895 million in military aid has been provided during the period from the following countries: USSR - \$1.475 million, Communist China - \$420 million, and negligible amounts from the East European countries.

~~(U)~~ Manpower Resources

Population: 18,707,000; as of 1 January 1968; males (ages 15-49) - 4,356,000; physically fit - 2,470,000; average number reaching military age (17) annually, 1968 through 1972, about 205,000. Major components: Kinh (Vietnamese) - 86 percent; Tay (Tha) - 3 percent; Muong - 2 percent; Thai - 2 percent; Nung - 2 percent; Others - 5 percent. Illiteracy (1967) 80-85 percent.

~~(C)~~ Conscription

Compulsory military service system was implemented in 1959. All able-bodied males 17 to 30-years of age are subject to two or more years of service. In 1965, the period of service was extended indefinitely. Some males who have completed service have been recalled.


~~(C)~~ Reserves

The reserve forces consist of: the Regional Forces, a lightly armed, full-time force organized on the basis of one battalion per province and subordinate to Military Region Headquarters; the armed provincial militia with headquarters elements in each provincial capital and units in each district; the self-defense forces organized in government agencies and civilian industry for local security and air defense; and a registered group, only partially armed, including overage, underage, and females, which has a potential reserve of about 3,000,000. Arms range from small arms and hand grenades to pikes and poles. The provincial militia and self-defense forces are organized into infantry-type units up to battalion size. Some training is provided by the army, Regional Forces, or the Armed Public Security Forces, depending on location of units in training.

~~(C)~~ Mobilization Capacity (Army Forces)

Since mid-1965, North Vietnam has been mobilizing at an increasing rate to meet internal requirements and to provide for expanding commitments in South Vietnam and Laos. Manpower resources currently provide over

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100,000 males annually for military service. The table below reflects NVN capability to expand if the conflict were intensified. North Vietnam requires extensive support of Communist World arms and equipment deliveries and economic assistance.

		Inf	Arty	AAA	Sep	Sep	Sep
		Div	Div	Div	Inf	Armd	Inf
					Bdg	Regt	Regt
M-D	436,000	10*	1	1	2	2	5
M+60	480,000	15	2	2	2	2	5
M+180	525,000	18	2	3	2	2	5
M+1 yr	625,000	21	2	3	2	2	3

Armed Forces

(C) The Armed Forces are thoroughly indoctrinated and subordinated to the Lao Dong Party, although military leaders may exert some influence on political affairs. Most military leaders are concurrently members of the central committee of the Lao Dong Party. Military establishment enjoys high prestige and respect of the populace.

Army


(C) Mission: The mission of the 436,000-man army (368,000 in-country, an estimated 68,000 in Laos and South Vietnam) is territorial defense and support of the national strategy in Southeast Asia.

(C) Capabilities and Limitations: The army is a well-organized, well-equipped, and well trained combat-effective force capable of coordinated division-level offensive and defensive conventional operations as well as guerrilla campaign. It is capable of maintaining internal security and repelling aggression by neighboring countries other than Communist China. The army is capable of invading and defeating military forces of other Southeast Asian countries, except where local non-Communist forces receive external reinforcements and support as in the case of American troop commitments to South Vietnam. Personnel are combat-trained, inured to physical hardship, and capable of high-level guerrilla warfare and paramilitary activity in Laos and South Vietnam. Leadership is dedicated and capable and a cohesive and disciplined organization assures loyalty through tight party control. Principal limitations are deficiencies in advanced weapons and heavy equipment, an underdeveloped and vulnerable transportation system, low level of education, and a lack of technical skills.

(C) Organization: The army is organized into 10 infantry divisions,* one artillery division, one AAA division, two infantry brigades, five independent infantry regiments, two armored regiments, 103 antiaircraft regiments, 20 to 30 SA-2 battalions, seven border guard battalions and 11 coastal defense battalions. Tactical command is exercised by the Commander in Chief through the General Staff. Logistic and administrative functions

* In addition, there are seven division equivalents out-of-country.

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are provided through five Military Regions (Quan Khu) and a Capital Area Headquarters.

Navy*

(S) Mission: The navy, with a personnel strength of 2,500 has the mission of coastal surveillance and the security of territorial waters.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The navy is a small coastal patrol force with modest offensive capability for surprise torpedo boat attacks. North Vietnam has sufficient patrol craft to fulfill coastal surveillance mission. Its amphibious capabilities are negligible. The major weakness of the navy is the lack of large naval craft, especially minesweepers.

(S) Ship Strength: The navy has no principal combatant ships. Its inventory consists of 2 Submarine Chasers (SC), 3 Fast Patrol Boats (PTF), 13 Motor Torpedo Boats (PT), 19 Motor Gunboats (PGM) and an estimated 40 service craft, including YP's (additional junks may exist).

(S) Organization: The navy is organized into patrol boat squadrons generally stationed at five bases along the coast. Currently, however, afloat strength is concentrated at anchorage areas in the northern waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. Attacks by US aircraft have inflicted damages and possible losses in the naval units; however, the extent cannot be determined.


Air Force*

(S) Mission: The mission of the estimated 4,200-man force is to provide air defense of North Vietnam and airlift and resupply in support of ground forces in Laos.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: North Vietnam currently has a relatively small, but proficient fighter force, composed of a mixture of high-performance (MiG-21) and medium performance (MiG-17) jet fighters. Although most of the jet interceptors are dispersed just across the border in China, those remaining in-country are flown by highly skilled pilots and are putting up a surprisingly good defense effort despite their small number (15-20). The dependence on outside sources for logistical support is the major weakness of the air force.

* Under 1954 Geneva Agreement, no formal navy or air force organization is supposed to exist; however, coastal patrol and air force air defense organizations are maintained. The acquisition of military aircraft and the existence of airborne troops confirm existence of an air arm.

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(S) Aircraft Strength: Total - 217 124 jet fighters (23 MiG-21s, 111 MiG-15/17s), 8 light bombers (IL-28s), 64 transports (1 IL-18, 3 AN-24s, 22 AN-2s, 14 IL-14s, 24 LI-2s), 21 helicopters (5 MI-1s, 1 MI-4s, 4 MI-6s).

Surface-to-Air Missile Defense:

(S) Since April 1965 when the first SAM site was detected under construction near Hanoi, the system, by 10 January 1968, had expanded to 2/3 SA-2 sites (77 of which have been deleted from active status). All of the vital areas of North Vietnam in the Red River delta and the populace coastal regions south to the 18th parallel are within the potential SAM envelope. There are between 20-30 SAM battalions presently estimated in operation in North Vietnam. These units deploy from one site to another, but no pattern of movement is presently discernible. SAM defenses have been ineffective in the hands of the North Vietnamese.

Paramilitary Forces

(S) Mission: The mission of the 16,500-man of the Armed Public Security Forces is internal security and frontier protection and training of Militia and Self-Defense Forces.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The Armed Public Security Forces are capable of performing functions of North Vietnam Army units of the same size. Capabilities are limited by lack of equipment and transportation items.


(S) Organization: The Armed Public Security Forces are organized into seven regiments and five battalions.

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NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 1 JAN 1968

8 IL-28/BEAGLE _____ 8 YUNNANI
 LIGHT JET BOMBER
 23 MIG-21/FISHBED _____ 12 YUNNANI, 9 PHUC PEN, 2 KEP
 JET FIGHTER
 98 MIG-15/17/FAGDT/FRESCO _____ 91 YUNNANI, 3 GIA LAM,
 JET FIGHTER 4 MIG 17
 3 UMIG-15/MIOGET _____ YUNNANI
 JET TRAINER
 22 AN-2/COLT _____ HAIPHONG/LANG SON/HANOI
 LIGHT TRANSPORT YUNNANI AREA AIRFIELDS

38 IL-14/LI-2 CRATE/CAB _____ HANOI/HAIPHONG/YUNNANI
 TRANSPORT AREA AIRFIELDS
 17 MI-1/4/HARE/HOUND _____ VARIDUS AIRFIELDS
 HELICOPTER PRIMARILY HONO/HAIPHONG
 4 MI-6/HOOK _____ CAT BI/GIA LAM
 HELICOPTER
 3 AN-24/CDKE _____ GIA LAM/YUNNANI
 TRANSPORT
 1 IL-18/COOT _____ PHUC YEN
 TRANSPORT




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
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NORTH VIETNAM RADAR INVENTORY

	MISSILE CONTROL		FIRE CONTROL		EW/GCI	
	TAN SONG A/B	FIRE CAN	UNID FIRE CONTROL	BAR LOCK	SCORE BOARD	FLAT FACE
DAC GIANG	1					
BAC MAI						
BAC NINH						
BAI THUONG						
CHO TUAN						
CHU						
DAP CAU						
HIEN BIEN PHU						
DONG HOI						
DONG HOI AF						
DONG LAI						
DONG THAP						
DO SON						
HA DONG						
HA DUONG						
HAIPHONG						
HAIPHONG KIEN AN						
HANOI						
HA TINH						
HA TOU						
HOA BINH						
HOA LAC						
HON ME IS.						
HON NGH SON						
HON NHO IS.						
HO XA						
HUU LAI						
ILE DE CAC BA						
ILE DE LA TABLE						
KEP						
KE SAT						
KIM LU XA						
LANG CHANH						
LANG MO						
LANG SON						
LONG DAI						
HAU XA						
MOC CHAU						
MY DUC						
NAM DINH						
NA SON AF						
NGAN SAN						
NGHA XA						
NINH BINH						
ON						
PHUC HAI						
PHUC YEN						
PHU NONG CHANG						
PHU THO						
PHU VAN						
PHU KAYE						
QUANG KHE						
QUAN YEN						
QUI HAU						
RON						
SON TAY						
THAI DINH						

	MISSILE CONTROL		FIRE CONTROL		EW/GCI	
	TAN SONG A/B	FIRE CAN	UNID FIRE CONTROL	BAR LOCK	SCORE BOARD	FLAT FACE
THANH HOA						
THUONG CHE						
THUY KIEN						
TUYEN QUANG						
UY YEN						
VIET TRI						
VINH						
VINH AF						
VINH LINH						
VINH SON						
VINH YEN						
VO HOI						
XOM LOM						
TOTAL	26	150	142	7	13	11


(MISSILE CONTROL-22, FIRE CONTROL-104, EW/GCI-162)

TOTAL - 300

AS OF 8 DEC 67

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Foreign Shipping To North Vietnam - 1967

(S/NPD) There were marked changes in the Communist and Free World shipping patterns to North Vietnam in 1967 as compared to those of the previous year. Soviet arrivals sharply increased to 181, contrasted with 122 recorded for 1966. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets did employ a larger number of smaller ships. East European totals dropped slightly; there were 29 arrivals -- 15 less than in 1966. Chinese Communist port calls totaled 97 -- 41 less than in the previous 12 months. One Cuban ship arrived in 1967 and one in 1966. There have been indications that North Vietnamese ships have been engaged in trade with China, however, specifics are unknown. There were 78 Free World ship arrivals in 1967 -- four more than in 1966; 67 were British flag (all owned by Hong Kong-based companies under Chinese Communist control), five were Cypriot-flag, three Maltese, two Italian, and one Lebanese.

(S/NPD) Overall ship arrivals during 1967 totaled 386, a slight increase from the 379 in 1966. About 125 of these originated in East European ports and carried mostly general cargo; the remainder came from the Far East and carried the bulk of POL and foodstuff imports.

(S/NPD) The total cargo imported rose from 925,700 metric tons to 1,349,481 metric tons with grain and other foodstuffs accounting for most of the increase, and POL and general cargo the balance.

(S/NPD) The type of dry cargo delivered by the Communist countries during 1967 did not change significantly. The USSR continued to ship economic-aid goods as well as military support material -- such as trucks, heavy construction equipment, rolled steel products, bridge-building material, drugs, and medical equipment. As in past years, no shipments of arms and ammunition were detected.

(S/NPD) Soviet POL shipments to North Vietnam totaled 188,429 metric tons, about 10,000 metric tons less than in 1966. Thirty-nine tankers accounted for the bulk of the deliveries, and all but four came from Vladivostok. One Free World tanker accounted for about 50,000 metric tons of the total petroleum imported.


(S/NPD) Export cargo was reduced by 50 percent from last year's total of 1,168,000 metric tons, with cement, coal, and pig iron bearing the brunt of the cutbacks; miscellaneous cargo remained about the same -- 84,200 metric tons for 1967.

(S/NPD) In August, two Soviet merchant ships were sighted in the Gulf of Tonkin with Soviet ensigns painted on their hatches and free-boards. The Soviets probably resorted to additional identification markings because of alleged air attacks on their merchant ships while in port. The average Soviet ship cargo in 1967 was 3,690 metric tons -- a significant decrease, from the 1966 average of 4,410 metric tons and prior years of 4,870 metric tons. The steady decrease is apparently a result of restrictions caused by silting at Haiphong. Congestion of the port reached its peak during

MERCHANT SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM

FEB 1966 - JAN 1968

ARRIVALS
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June through August, thereby extending turnaround time for each ship. To expedite dock-side off-loading and reduce turnaround time, numerous small barges and lighters have been employed to transfer cargo from ships at anchor.

(S/NP) As the above analysis indicates, the Vietnamese have thus far demonstrated their capability to handle increased imports, and unless there is a major change in their cargo handling capability, it is expected that this new level will be maintained.

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IDENTIFIED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS TO NORTH VIETNAM CARRIED BY FOREIGN-FLAG SHIPS (THOUSAND METRIC TONS)

<u>Total Seaborne Cargo</u> ^{a/}	<u>1966</u>		<u>1967</u>																	
All foreign ships	2,093.7		1,922.1																	
Communist ships only	1,504.8		1,503.0																	
<u>Identified Imports</u>									Ammonium Sulfate and other Fertilizers		Petroleum ^{b/}		Bulk Foodstuffs		Timber		Miscellaneous and General Cargo		Total	
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>		
Yearly Total	226.6	147.4	200.8	246.3	77.6	446.0	13.6	12.8	407.2	497.0	925.7	1,349.5								
Communist Ships	177.3	126.4	200.8	190.1	41.3	320.4	6.6	8.9	234.2	375.9	710.2	1,021.8								
USSR	133.3	108.4	198.2	188.4	7.9	173.6	6.6	5.9	186.2	191.2	532.2	667.5								
Eastern Europe	26.9	5.8	2.3	.8	12.8	2.5	0	0	70.0	91.8	112.1	100.9								
Communist China	17.1	12.2	.2	.9	20.5	132.1	0	3.0	24.0	93.0	61.9	241.2								
Cuba						12.3			4.0		4.0	12.3								
Free World Ships	49.3	20.9	0	56.2	36.3	125.6	7.0	3.9	123.0 ^{c/}	121.1	215.6	327.7								
<u>Identified Exports</u>	<u>Apatite</u>		<u>Coal</u>		<u>Cement</u>		<u>Pig Iron</u>		<u>Miscellaneous</u>		<u>Total</u>									
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>				
Yearly Total	10.4	0	938.1	431.9	99.2	34.9	39.8	21.5	80.4	84.2	1,168.0	572.6								
Communist Ships	7.9	0	651.4	347.9	50.6	28.8	22.5	21.5	62.2	83.0	794.6	481.2								
USSR	0	0	245.2	175.3	27.5	25.3	7.5	7.5	21.3	44.1	301.5	252.1								
Eastern Europe	7.9	0	77.7	17.2	9.0	0.5	14.4	14.0	28.8	24.3	136.8	56.1								
Communist China	0	0	319.7	151.1	15.1	3.0	0.6	0	11.9	13.5	347.2	18.5								
Cuba	0	0	8.8	5.0	0	0	0	0	.2	0.4	9.0	5.4								
Free World Ships	2.5	0	286.8	84.0	48.7	6.1	17.3	0	18.2	1.2	373.4	91.3								

^{a/} Identified imports and exports include some estimates of bulk cargoes, using methods which have proved to be highly reliable. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown. An additional unknown quantity of cargoes may have been carried by Chinese Communist coastal ships.

^{b/} Includes packaged POL carried on dry cargo ships.

^{c/} Includes an estimated 10,000 metric tons of coking coal from Communist China.

Note: All cargo imports were off-loaded at Haiphong except in two or three instances where foodstuffs were off-loaded at minor ports; Non Gai and Cam Pha ports are used exclusively for exporting coal.

AVERAGE TURNAROUND TIME IN NORTH VIETNAM, JANUARY—DECEMBER 1967

(FIGURES BASED ON SHIP DEPARTURES)

PORT OF HAIPHONG

MONTH	SOVIET		TANKER		SATELLITE		FREE WORLD		TANKER		CHICOM	
	CARGO NUMBER SHIPS	AVERAGE DAYS	NUMBER SHIPS	AVERAGE DAYS	CARGO NUMBER SHIPS	AVERAGE DAYS	CARGO NUMBER SHIPS	AVERAGE DAYS	NUMBER SHIPS	AVERAGE DAYS	CARGO NUMBER SHIPS	AVERAGE DAYS
JANUARY	11	7.6	4	8	4	9.5	3	9.3	-	-	-	-
FEBRUARY	14	5.9	4	10.2	2	6.5	5	13.8	1	19	-	-
MARCH	17	15.5	5	11.8	3	17.6	3	11.3	-	-	-	-
APRIL	10	15.9	5	6	4	18.2	4	6.9	-	-	-	-
MAY	9	19.5	3	8	3	33	5	11.4	1	5	-	-
JUNE	11	22.8	2	21	4	38	6	13.5	-	-	-	-
JULY	7	26.0	1	28	2	43.5	5	29.8	1	35	-	-
AUGUST	11	21.5	1	48	3	41.3	8	45.9	-	-	2	34
SEPTEMBER	8	12.9	2	10	1	33	6	30.2	1	34	5	13.2
OCTOBER	9	15.9	3	26.3	2	31	7	25.8	-	-	6	13.0
NOVEMBER	7	16.4	3	9	1	24	3	31.3	1	20	6	9.1
DECEMBER	16	16.7	5	6.0	1	21.0	6	15.8	-	-	5	7.4


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
SEABORNE IMPORTS TO NORTH VIETNAM DRY CARGO AND POL



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
AAA WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

AND THEIR
MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE AA RANGE




12.7-mm HEAVY MACHINEGUN
1,000 METERS


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
85-mm ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN K5-12
8,380 METERS




14.5-mm ANTIAIRCRAFT HEAVY MACHINEGUN MOUNT ZPU-4
ZPU - 1, ZPU - 2, AND ZPU - 4 (ILLUSTRATED) 1,400 METERS



57-mm ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN S-60
6,000 METERS OFF - CARRIAGE FIRE CONTROL
4,000 METERS ON - CARRIAGE FIRE CONTROL



100-mm ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN K5-19
11,890 METERS




37-mm ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN M1939
1,700 METERS

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
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ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM




75-mm Pack Howitzer (U.S. M1A1), HE Projectile, standard muzzle velocity 380 m/sec, maximum horizontal range 8,790 m, maximum rate of fire 16 rnds/min.




76-mm Field Gun (Soviet M1942, CHICOM Type 54), Heat, AP-T, and HVAP-T Projectile, standard muzzle velocity (HVAP-T) 960 m/sec, maximum horizontal range 13,300 m, maximum rate of fire 15 rnds/min, armor penetration (HVAP-T) 3.62 in. at 0° at 500 m.

105-mm Howitzer (US M2A1), HE Projectile, standard muzzle velocity 470 m/sec, maximum rate of fire 4 rnds/min. (the French 105-mm Howitzer M1950 is also in North Vietnam).




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
ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM



122-mm Howitzer (Soviet M1938), Heat and FRAG-HE Projectile, standard muzzle velocity 516 m/sec, maximum horizontal range 11,800 m, maximum rate of fire 5-6 rnds/min, armor penetration (heat) 7.87 in. at 0°.



57-mm Antitank Gun (Soviet M1943, CHICOM Type 55) HVAP and AP Projectile, standard muzzle velocity (HVAP-T) 1,270 m/sec, maximum horizontal range 8,400 m, maximum rate of fire 20-25 rnds/min, maximum armor penetration (HVAP-T) 5.5 in. at 0° at 500 m.



155-mm Howitzer (US M1), HE Projectile, standard muzzle velocity 560 m/sec, maximum horizontal range 15,080 m, maximum rate of fire 3 rnds/min.




85-mm Field Gun D-44; HE, AP-T, HVAP-T, and API-T Projectile; Standard Muzzle Velocity (AP-T) 2625 fps; Maximum horizontal range 15,650 meters; Maximum rate of fire 10 rnds/min; Armor Penetration (AP-T) 4 in. at 1000 m.

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
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
ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM




100-mm Field Gun M1944; HE and APHE-T Projectiles
Standard Muzzle Velocity 2953 fps; Maximum
horizontal range 21,000 m; Maximum rate of fire
8-10 rnds/min; Armor Penetration (APHE-T) 5.24 in.
at 914 m.



122-mm Field Gun M1931/37; HE, APHE-T, CP and
HEAT Projectiles; Standard Muzzle Velocity
2625 fps; Maximum horizontal range 20,800 m;
Maximum rate of fire 5-6 rnds/min; Armor
Penetration (APHE-T) 6.18 in. at 500 m.



130-mm Field Gun M-46; HE and AP Projectiles;
Standard Muzzle Velocity 3050 fps; Maximum
horizontal range 27,000 m; Maximum rate of fire
7-8 rnds/min; Armor Penetration 9 in.
at 1000 m.



152-mm Gun-Howitzer M1937; HE, APHE-T and CP
Projectiles; Standard Muzzle Velocity (HE)
2149 fps; Maximum horizontal range 17,265 m;
Maximum rate of fire 4 rnds/min; Armor
Penetration (APHE-T) 5.2 in. at 500 m.

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SUMMARY OF AIR ENGAGEMENTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM
SINCE 28 NOV 1967 AND AIRCRAFT LOSSES SINCE APR 1965

DATE TIME HA NOI	ACFT NO. & TYPE		WHERE	HOW ENCOUNTER DEVELOPED	NO. & TYPE WEAPONS FIRED		KILLS		REMARKS
	US	NVN			BY US	BY NVN	BY US	BY NVN	
28 Nov 0855-0905	12 F-4D	2 MIG-21	45 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG-21s attempted attack on MIG CAP for strike force ingressing to target	1 AIM 7E	1 AAM	0	0	Falcon Nash Hornet flts MIG-21 split. One fired missile on Fallon pass- ed through Nash flt pur- sued by Hornet, 2d MIG made hard left turn, observed by Nash flt radar and by Falcon 1 and 2 who attempted to engage.
28 Nov 0904	4 F-105D	1 MIG-21	45 NM NE of Hanoi	MIG-21 observed firing AAM at unidentified tgt	0	2 AAM	0	0	Locust flt observed MIG-21 fire two AAMs, missiles did not track flt. Possible same MIG- 21s involved above.
8 Dec 0757-0800	4 F-4D	2 MIG-21	50 NM NW of Hanoi	F-4s attacked MIG- 21s attempting attack to 3D NM N Hanoi	4 AIM 7	0	0	0	Gambit flt
12 Dec 0746	4 F-105 4 F-4D	1 MIG-21	35 NM NW of Hai- phong	MIG-21s attacked F- 105s pursued by F-4s.	20 MM	1 AAM	0	0	Hatchet (F-105) Olds (F-4s). F-105 damaged by AAM recovered safe- ly. F-105 fired 2D MM.
12 Dec 0750	8 F-105 4 F-40	1 MIG-21	3D NM NE of Hai- phong	MIG-21 attempting attack strike force pursued by F-4s	4 AIM 7E	2 AAM	0	0	Pistol, Crossbow (F-105) Hudson (F-4).
14 Dec 1715	2 F-8E 1 F-8C 1 A-4E	4 MIG-17	3D NM SE of Hanoi	4 MIG-17 engaged Iron Hand, F-8E MIG CAP engaged MIG Straggler	4 AIM 9D	8 AAM	1 MIG-17	0	Didaick 101/F-8C, Magic Stone 411 (A-4E) Iran Hand Superheat 204-205 (F8E) scored kill.
15 Dec 1235	2 RF-4C	1 MIG-17	35 NM N of Hanoi	1 MIG-17 made pass on recce flt	D	0	0	0	Dhara flt, 2 other flts reported MIG-21s airborne at this time.
15 Dec 1239	4 F-AD	3 MIG-21	Hanoi	1 MIG-21 fired on strike force enroute to target	D	2 AAM	0	D	Tomcat flt, Gobalt observed, 2 MIGs camouflaged, one silver.
16 Dec 0952-1000	4 F-4D	4 MIG-17	Kep Area	MIG-17s attacked by MIG CAP	20 MM 2 AIM 7	Cannon	0	0	Olds flt, 2 camouflaged, 2 grey/black.
16 Dec 1004	4 F-40	1 MIG-21	25 NM NE of Haiphong	MIG-21 made firing pass on MIG CAP on ingress	0	AAM	0	1F-40	Olds flt (same as above)
17 Dec 0726 0736	2 F-105F 2 F-105D 4 F-4D	4 MIG-17	Vicinity Kep Air- field	MIG-17s sighted by SAM suppression acft engaged by MIG CAP	1 AIM-4D 20 MM	1 AAM Cannon	0	0	Bobbin (F-105s) Shako (F-4s) Bobbin sighted four MIG-17 (2 camoufl- aged, 2 silver) 2 17s engaged by F-4s, 1 MIG- 21, 1 other 17 fired AAMs and Cannon at Bobbin.
17 Dec 1528 1533	7 F-105D	6-8 MIG-21	35 NM NW of Phuc Yen	MIG-21s made firing pass on strike force	20 MM	2 AAM	0	1F-105	8ass flt (1 lost) Locust flt (fired on MIG-21) several other flts observed MIGs.
17 Dec 1520	4 F-4D	4 MIG-17	30 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG CAP engaged MIGs on ingress	AIM-4 Cannon	Cannon	0	1F-4D	Hornet flt.

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SUMMARY OF AIR ENGAGEMENTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM
SINCE 28 NOV 1967 AND AIRCRAFT LOSSES SINCE APR 1965 (continued)

DATE TIME HANOI	ACFT ND. & TYPE		WHERE	HOW ENCOUNTER DEVELOPED	ND. & TYPE WEAPONS FIRED		KILLS		REMARKS
	US	NVN			BY US	BY NVN	BY US	BY NVN	
17 Dec 1530	4 F-40 4 F-105F	6 MIG-17	30 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG CAP engaged 1 MIG-17 in orbit, other MIGs attempt- ed engage F-105s	AIM-4 Cannon	2 AAMs	1 prob MIG-17	0	Gambit flt (F-4) otter (F-105) AIM-4 observed to impact 6 O'clock position of MIG, with orange black fire, F-105 flt reported 6 MIG-17 in this area. Probably same MIG-17s engaged above.
18 Dec 1148 1149	8 F-40	2 MIG-21	20 NM SW of Hai- phong	MIG CAP flt pursued and engaged MIG-21s	3 AIM-4 3 AIM-7E	Prob 2 AAM	0	0	Shako flt, Tomeat flt, Shako fired AIM-4, Tomeat AIM-7.
18 Dec 1154	4 F-40	1 MIG-17	20 NM SE of Hanoi	MIG-17 made firing pass on F-4s	0	1 AAM	0	0	Cobalt flt.
19 Dec 0732	20 F-105 8 F-4D	3 MIG-21 8 MIG-17	45 NM NW of Hanoi	Strike force in- gressing to tgt attacked by MIGs	2 AIM-7 Gannon	1 AAM Cannon	0	0	Bear, Zebra, Wolf, Shark (F-105), Nevada (F-105 Iron Hand) Falcon F-4D (Strike, MIG CAP) F-105 force attacked by 8 MIG-17s, elements of 3 flts fired on MIGs. F-4s engaged part of same MIGs. Iron Hand pursued by MIG-21, MIG CAP chased away.
19 Dec 1339 1349	4 A-4G 2 F-48	1 MIG-21 1 MIG-17	30 NM E of Hanoi	MIG-21 attacked strike group from Astern- MIG-17 attempted but did not engage	1 AIM-9	1 AAM	0	0	MIG CAP acquired Bogies on radar but WX precluded visual ID - broke off.
19 Dec 1525 1535	16 F-4D 12 F-105	4-6 MIG-21 4-8 MIG-17	30 NM W Hanoi	Strike forces en- route to target engaged by MIGs	8 AIM 7 4 AIM 4 Cannon	3 AAM Cannon	2 MIG-17 1 MIG-17 (prob)	0	Otter 1 and 3 each scored kill by Cannon - MIG-17 prob. Downed with Cannon by Nash Lead.
20 Dec 0805	4 F-105	4 MIG-17 2 MIG-21	55 NM N of Hanoi	Pairs of MIG-17s attack from 2 and 8 O'clock low positions - MIG-21s from high position	0	1-2 AAM Cannon	0	0	Bobbin flt.
30 Dec 1604	2 F-105F 2 F-1050 4 F-40	2 MIG-21	65 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG-21s attempted attoek on F-105s, chased by F-4s	4 AIM-7	1-2 AAM	0	0	Nash flt (F-4) Ozark flt (F-105), MIGs aggressive.
3 Jan 0745	16 F-1050	2 MIG-21	Vic Phuc Yen Air- field	MIG-21s made attack on US aircraft in tgt area	20 NM	4 AAM	0	0	Hatchet, Pistol, Simmer, Crossbow flts. Hatchet and Simmer saw AAM fired at Pistol, Hatchet 4 fired at 1 MIG, Simmer saw 4 AAMs fired.
3 Jan 0753- 0757	12 F-4D	4 MIG-17	25 NM ENE of Hanoi	MIG-17s attacked strike force in target area	20 NM 2 AIM-7 1 AIM-4	Cannon 1 AAM	2 MIG-17	0	Olds, Tampa, Hudson flts, Olds engaged MIGs while on egress; downed 1 w/AIM-4; Tampa downed another w/Cannon.
3 Jan 1540	4 F-105D 1 F-4D	2 MIG-21	40 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG-21s attacked strike force enroute target	0	3 AAM	0	1 F-105	Scuba flt, Calico flt, 2 MIG-21s engaged Calico; one attacked Scuba later.
4 Jan 1550	4 F-4D	4 MIG-17	30 NM N of Hanoi	MIG-17a attempting to attack strike force. Attacked by F-4Ds	2 AIM-7	Cannon	0	0	Falcon, 2 MIG-17s damaged.

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
SUMMARY OF AIR ENGAGEMENTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM
SINCE 28 NOV 1967 AND AIRCRAFT LOSSES SINCE APR 1965 (continued)

DATE TIME HANOI	ACFT NO. & TYPE		WHERE	HOW ENCOUNTER DEVELOPED	NO. & TYPE WEAPONS FIRED		KILLS		REMARKS
	US	NVN			BY US	BY NVN	BY US	BY NVN	
4 Jan 1602	4 F-105F	2 MIG-21	100 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG-21s made firing pass on Iron Hand	0	2 AAM	0	0	Otter.
5 Jan 0752	3 F-105F	4 MIG-17	Vicinity of Kep	MIGs attacked in target area	20 NM	Cannon	0	1 F-105F	Barracuda flt also saw 1 other MIG-17.
5 Jan 0752	4 F-105D	3 MIG-17	Vicinity of Kep	MIGs attacked in target area	20 NM	Cannon	0	0	Zebra - pnsa same MIGs as above, 1 MIG damaged, flt also saw 4 poss 8 MIG-21s same area.
5 Jan 0755	4 F-4D	2 MIG-21	40 NM N Hanoi	MIGs attempting attack strike force pursued by MIG CAP.	0	2 AAM	0	0	Killer, action observed by another flight in area.
6 Jan 1535	4 F-105D	2 MIG-21	45 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG sweep flt encountered MIGs	0	AAM	0	0	Bison flt.
6 Jan 1535	8 F-105D	2 MIG-21	50 NM NW of Hanoi	MIG sweep flt encountered MIGs	2 AIM-9	2 AAM	0	0	Marlin, King Fish flts.
6 Jan 1540	4 F-105D	1 Transp	50 NM NE of Hanoi	Military Transport brought under attack	20 NM	0	0	0	
14 Jan 0822	4 F-105	2 MIG-21	60 NM NW of Hanoi	MIGs attacked SAM suppression flight.	0	AAM	0	1 F-105D	Bobbin flight.
14 Jan 0822	EB-66	Prob. MIG-21	S. of 2030 near Laos/NVN Border		0	AAM ?	0	1 Prob. EB-66	
16 Jan 0755	2 F-4D	2 MIG-21	35 NM N Hanoi	MIGs attacked lead element of MIG CAP	0	2 AAM	0	0	Otter flt.
17 Jan 1530	4 F-4D	2 MIG-21	40 NM W Hanoi	MIG CAP attacked MIG-21s	5 AIM-7 2 AIM-4	0	0	0	Shark flt MIG-21 last observed in steep dive near ground.
18 Jan 1530	8 F-4D	4 MIG-17	20 NM NE Hanoi	MIGs attacked F-4s in tgt area	AIM-4	Cannon; LMIG-17	1 F-4D 1 F-4D (prob)	1 F-4D	Otter flt, Panda flt.
18 Jan 1530	4 F-4D	2 MIG-21	40 NM N Hanoi	MIGs made firing pass on F-4s	0	2 AAM	0	0	Sore Head flt.
18 Jan	4F-105D	2 MIG-17	45 NM NW Hanoi	MIGs attempted to attack F-105s	0	0	0	0	Locust flt, observed by Scuba, Bass, Gator, in area.

	By US	Confirmed	Probable	Total
OVERALL TOTAL AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN AIR ENGAGEMENTS SINCE APRIL 1965		18 F-105	1 A-1E	42
		3 F-8E	2 F-4C	
		1 F-4B	1 F-105	
		3 F-4C	1 EB-66	
		7 F-4D	1 F-4D	
		1 A-1E		
		1 RC-47		
		1 RF-101		
		1 A-4C		
	By NVN	73 MIG-15/17	9 MIG-17	111
		26 MIG-21	1 MIG-21	
		1 Transport	1 Transport	

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PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIAAP)

1 January 1968

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OPERATIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM
ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM

(*) The ROLLING THUNDER program is an air strike campaign against NVN, and consists of two primary elements -- air strikes against preselected JCS designated targets and armed reconnaissance strikes against fixed and moving targets.

(*) The military objectives of the ROLLING THUNDER program are to make it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the NVN/VC forces in SVN and to impose progressively increasing penalties on NVN if the support continues.

(*) ROLLING THUNDER 1 through 4 were planned as retaliatory actions, but were subsequently cancelled due to VNAF forces remaining on alert because of the Saigon coup. Joint participation with VNAF was considered a political necessity. The first actual ROLLING THUNDER strike was ROLLING THUNDER 5, a one-day, no recycle strike on 2 March 1965.


(*) The northward progression of the authorized armed reconnaissance area is shown on the map on page B-34 by ROLLING THUNDER numbers. These authorized areas included increasing geography except for the backward step in ROLLING THUNDER 48. This limitation was established for the ROLLING THUNDER operation after the 37-day standdown, 24 December 1965-30 January 1966. ROLLING THUNDER 49 continued the armed reconnaissance program during the month of March 1966, but increased the authorized area to all of NVN except for the northeast quadrant, returning to the same limitations previously established in September 1965 for ROLLING THUNDER 30.

(*) Changes in operating authorities during ROLLING THUNDER 50 through 53 provided greater flexibility to operating forces. On 9 July 1966 the entire area of NVN was opened up for armed reconnaissance except the Chinese Buffer Zone, the Hanoi 30 NM radius circle and the 10 NM radius circle around Haiphong. Controlled armed reconnaissance was permitted within the Hanoi circle over selected route segments near the periphery of the circle (see map, page B-34) and against dispersed POL targets anywhere in NVN except in the China Buffer Zone and in populated areas. However, during ROLLING THUNDER 53 on 23 December 1966 a prohibited area was established within 10 NM of Hanoi in which delivery of ordnance was not authorized.

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AIR ATTACK EFFORT - NORTH VIETNAM



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This constraint was temporarily relaxed in May 1967. By 30 June 1967, a four NM prohibited area was established around Haiphong. In both the Hanoi and Haiphong prohibited areas, strikes must be individually authorized at the Washington level.

(b) ROLLING THUNDER 57 was initiated on 20 July 1967 and remained in effect throughout the remainder of the year. Armed reconnaissance objectives were altered and operating authorities including the prohibition against attacks in the immediate Hanoi and Haiphong areas, remained as in the previous programs. Attacks were authorized against 16 targets. Armed reconnaissance objectives were expanded to include authorization to attack all major road, rail, and waterway LOC within the 30 NM Hanoi Restricted Area (excluding the 10 NM Hanoi Prohibited Area). On 9 August 1967, constraints were relaxed and attacks were authorized within the 10 NM Hanoi Prohibited Area and within the CHICOM Buffer Zone. Sixteen targets were authorized for attack. On 17 August 1967, 11 additional targets were added to the authorized target list. A bridge was added on 18 August 1967, and two storage areas were added on 19 August 1967. On 30 August 1967, an additional six targets were approved for strike. On 5 September 1967, 10 new targets including two ports (Cam Pha and Hon Gai) were added to the authorized target list. The constraint imposed on attack of the two ports was that strikes were authorized only when no ships were at the docking areas or within 2,000 yards of the docking areas. On 26 September 1967, attack was authorized against Phuc Yen Airfield; however, on 29 September 1967, the attack was suspended and not reauthorized until 23 October 1967. Seven additional targets were authorized, including another airfield, on 6 October 1967, and on 17 October 1967, a naval dispersal area was also authorized. The last target additions in 1967 to ROLLING THUNDER 57 occurred on 8 November 1967 when 17 targets were authorized for air strike.

a. Pauses during this ROLLING THUNDER program consisted of the Christmas Pause from 1800, 24 December 1967 through 1800, 25 December 1967, and the New Year's Pause from 1800, 31 December 1967 through 0600, 2 January 1968. All are Saigon times. No air strikes were permitted in NVN during these periods.


b. When ROLLING THUNDER 57 began on 20 July 1967, no air strikes were permitted within 10 NM of Hanoi. This constraint was lifted on 9 August 1967 but again reinstated for the period 24 August 1967 through 23 October 1967.

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DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION JCS NVN TARGETS

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JANUARY 1968

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c. No air strikes were authorized within the 4 NM Haiphong Prohibited Area between 30 June 1967 and 9 August 1967.

(b) The chart on page B-36 shows the overall level of attack effort by month after the 24 December 1965-30 January 1966 standdown

(c) There were 242 JCS designated targets on 31 December 1967. At that time, 204 had been authorized for attack, leaving 38 targets unauthorized. The percentage of destruction or neutralization of the significant target categories of NVN resulting from operations through 31 December 1967 is depicted on the chart on page B-38.

(d) The armed reconnaissance program has damaged or destroyed a considerable quantity of mobile and small fixed targets since its inception and has made it difficult and costly for NVN to support insurgency forces in SEA. The mobile targets included trucks, railroad rolling stock, and naval craft. The small fixed targets included bridges, ferry facilities, military barracks, and supply facilities. However, effective application of forces has been hampered by various restrictions while the preponderance of the effort has been directed at supplies and materiel after it has been fragmented out over the multiple lines of communication to the south and dispersed to operating locations.

(e) The NVN air defense system has developed into a formidable threat to US air operations in NVN. Defensive maneuvers against SAMs force aircraft to operate in the effective range of light and medium AAA weapons. The flow of SAMs, aircraft, munitions, weapons, and support equipment through land, sea, and aerial ports within de facto sanctuaries permits NVN to continue to improve its air defense effectiveness and support insurgency in the south.

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
SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS

PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIAAP)

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1 January 1968



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NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT AND MINING - NORTH VIETNAM

SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS - 1 JULY to 31 DECEMBER 1967

(e) Operation SEA DRAGON, a US Navy surveillance and interdiction operation of NVN military and logistic waterborne traffic between 17° and 17°30'N was initially authorized on 15 October 1966. This was later extended to 19°N. Subsequently, naval bombardment of suitable military targets ashore between 17° and 20°N latitude was also authorized on 23 February 1967, in addition to interdiction of military and logistic waterborne craft within the same limits. (See map, page B-40, for SEA DRAGON operating areas).

SEA DRAGON FORCES

(e) One cruiser and four destroyers are normally maintained on station patrolling the coastal waters off NVN. A spotter aircraft is normally available for target identification and fire adjustment contingent upon weather. On occasions, US aircraft assist SEA DRAGON forces with aerial bombardment of renumeration targets. Australian DDG has taken part, in rotation, as one of the four DDs normally on SEA DRAGON station.


SEA DRAGON RESULTS - ENEMY LOSSES

(e) The graph on page B-42 indicates the NVN watercraft sighted, destroyed, and damaged by naval surface forces during this six months period.

(e) Since NGF against suitable military targets ashore in NVN was authorized on 23 February 1967, naval surface operations have destroyed various targets to include coastal shore batteries and defense sites, EW radar and AAA sites, and military logistical and barracks areas. SEA DRAGON operations in consonance with air strikes have compounded NVN logistic, air defense, and other military problems.

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NVN WBLCSIGHTED/DESTROYED/DAMAGED BY SEA DRAGON FORCES



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SEA DRAGON RESULTS - US LOSSES

(*) SEA DRAGON forces have sustained minor ship damage and several casualties as a result of NVN coastal shore battery fire. During the period 4 November 1966 to 30 June 1967, 14 US ships were struck by enemy shore batteries and US personnel casualties were two KIA and eight WIA. During the period 1 July to 31 December 1967, six US ships were struck with three KIA and ten WIA.

NAVAL GUNFIRE AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES - 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1967

(*) In NVN, US Navy cruisers and destroyers have delivered a total of 164,913 rounds against suitable military targets afloat and ashore since the initiation of naval gunfire.

(*) The actual number of rounds of NGF expended against targets of all types, afloat and ashore, in NVN by month/by type during the last six months CY 1967 is indicated below.

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
8"/55	3,245	3,215	3,023	3,059	2,046	3,065	17,653
5"/54	6,565	3,764	3,655	2,105	3,440	5,629	25,158
5"/38	8,542	10,062	6,653	8,333	10,056	5,097	48,743
81-mm	-	6	8	15	63	50	142
3"/50	34	-	-	-	-	-	34
Total	18,386	17,047	13,339	13,512	15,605	13,841	91,730

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LAOS

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LAOS

Geography

(U) Laos, the only land-locked country in Southeast Asia is bordered on the north and northeast by Communist China and North Vietnam, on the south by South Vietnam and Cambodia, and on the west by Thailand and Burma. An elongated country, Laos spans almost 650 miles along its northwest-southeast axis. It is widest across the northern third, where it extends just over 300 miles; in the remainder, the width ranges from 60 to 100 miles. With an area of approximately 91,000 square miles, Laos is about the size of Wisconsin and Indiana combined.

(U) Most of Laos is mountainous or hilly; plains are limited to areas bordering the Mekong River and in scattered upland locations. The mountains and hills are highest and most rugged in the north, where they trend generally northeast-southwest and are characterized by rugged peaks and ridges; deep, steep-sided valleys; and numerous small basins. Most peaks in the north range from 4,000 to 7,000 feet in elevation. To the south, the mountains and hills are oriented generally north-south, are discontinuous, and contain peaks ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level.

(U) The Plaine des Jarres, situated in the rugged highlands about 110 miles north of Vientiane, is mainly gently rolling and grass covered.

(U) Near the southern end of Laos, the Plateau des Bolovens is situated at elevations generally between 3,500 and 4,000 feet. It is a rolling basaltic plateau bordered on the east, south, and west by 1,000 - to 3,000-foot high cliffs.

(U) Rivers in Laos have a maximum flow during September, and flooding of adjacent low-lying areas occurs at times; they have a minimum flow in March or April. The Mekong generally flows between steep, muddy banks. It has a high-water level normally between 25 and 40 feet above the level during the period of minimum flow. This river is mostly 500 to 800 yards wide upstream from Vientiane but widens to between 800 to 1,200 yards downstream from the capital.

(U) The climate of Laos is monsoonal, with a humid, rainy season from mid-May to mid-September (the southwest monsoon) and a relatively dry season from mid-October to mid-March (the northeast monsoon). Mean annual rainfall varies from 40 to 150 inches, with greatest amounts on the southwestern slopes of the mountains of central Laos. Approximately 70 percent of the annual rainfall occurs during the southwest monsoon and less than 10 percent during the northeast monsoon.

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Political Anatomy of Laos

(S/NPD) The Royal Lao Government since 1962 has operated at least in theory as a coalition embracing three separate and divergent political factions -- right-wing or the Conservatives, the Neutralists, and the left-wing or the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Communists). Cabinet positions are divided equitably among the three factions in order to retain a balance of power. A series of political assassinations in early 1963 resulted in the withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from the Vientiane government, and disaffection of Pathet Lao and Neutralist factions. Cabinet posts earmarked for the NLHX are filled temporarily by Neutralists or Conservatives but will return to Communist hands should they elect to rejoin the government. A growing Conservative element in the government is determined to permanently bar Communists from these posts but thus far have failed to gain sufficient support to effect government reorganization. The left-wing faction, while charging that the government is "illegal," seems willing to continue with present arrangements. The tripartite concept provides the Communists with an option to rejoin the government if the situation dictates.

(S/NPD) Internal pressures from the left, supported by Communist China and North Vietnam, have divided Laos militarily into two factions: one supported by the Communists; and the other composed of US-supported, anti-Communist opposition forces -- both Conservative and Neutralists.

(S/NPD) The 1 January elections for the National Assembly resulted in a clear majority for Souvanna, primarily because of the support of certain military commanders who controlled their own slates of candidates. Foremost among these are Generals Ouan, CINC Lao Army, Vang Pao the Meo Chieftain and Military Region 2 Commander, and Phasouk, commander of the Military Region 4. The National Assembly appears more cohesive and disciplined than its predecessor. It unanimously passed Souvanna's budget and, on 6 June, approved changes providing for an enlarged and slightly reorganized Cabinet. Stability in the non-Communist areas of Laos depends on the maintenance of cooperation between Souvanna, the military commanders, and the King. Souvanna, though personally aware that the security of Laos depends on US support, maintains a posture of neutrality and commitment to the tripartite governmental facade in order to retain international acceptance.

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(S/INT) Long standing military feuds fed by jealousy and ambition are recrudescing. The unsuccessful coup of 3 February 1965 led by Phoumi Nosavan, former Lao Army General, ended with his flight to Thailand and exile there; he was tried in absentia and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in late December 1966. Last October following the dissolution of the National Assembly two more crises followed in quick succession; the 17 October ouster of the Neutralist Army Commander, General Kong Le by a triumvirate of his colonels, and the 21 October bombing of Vientiane by General Ma's T-28 aircraft. The Lao Government is unwilling to permit Kong Le's return. After stays of varying length in Thailand, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, the General has moved to France for a stay of undetermined length. The Lao Government had sought to extradite General Ma and his fellow conspirators from Thailand where they have been since escape from Laos last October. A Thai court, however, dropped all criminal charges against them in June 1967 and granted them political asylum after ruling that the bombing action in Laos was a political act.

(S/INT) Future developments in the political structure in Laos will depend very largely on the outcome of events in South Vietnam. Should that country fall to Communism, in all probability the Communist forces would then exert stronger military pressure with the objective of establishing a Communist regime over all of Laos. If the Viet Cong falter in South Vietnam, the Pathet Lao would probably intensify the war in Laos with the objective of diverting Western resources from South Vietnam. In the event of a Viet Cong defeat in South Vietnam, the Pathet Lao will probably attempt to retain all the territory they now control. In the face of continued North Vietnamese support to Pathet Lao elements in these areas, the Royal Laotian Government in all probability could not seriously contest this.

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(●) Significant Personalities and Their Posts

Chief of State.....King Savang Vatthana
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister,
Minister of Defense.....Souvanna Phouma
*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister
of Economic Affairs and Planning.....Prince Souphanouvong
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of
Education.....Leuam Insisiengmay

Royal Laotian Armed Forces (FAR)

Commander in Chief FAR.....Maj Gen Ouane Rathikone
Deputy Commander in Chief FAR.....Maj Gen Bounpone Makthepharaks
Deputy Commander in Chief FAR.....Maj Gen Kouparasith Abbay
Chief Staff.....Brig Gen Oudone Sananikone
Tactical Headquarters, North Laos.....Maj Gen Ouane Rathikone
Commander FAR Military Zone I.....Brig Gen Tiao Sayavong
Commander FAR Military Zone II.....Maj Gen Vang Pao
Tactical Headquarters, South Laos.....Maj Gen Bounpone Makthepharaks
Commander FAR Military Zone III.....Brig Gen Kot Venevongsos
Commander FAR Military Zone IV.....Maj Gen Phasouk Somly
Commander FAR Military Zone V.....Maj Gen Kouparasith Abbay
Commander, RLAF.....Brig Gen Sourith Don Sasorith
Commander, River Flotilla.....Lt Col Sinthanavong Kindavong

The Neutralist Army (FAN)

Commander of FAN.....Col Somphet Sothsavan
Commander in Chief, Military
Zone IV.....Lt Col Khamko Phasouk

Communist Forces

Pathet Lao High Command.....Maj Gen Khamtay Siphandone
Commander Muong Soi Province.....Brig Gen Sisavath
Commander Sam Neua Province.....Maj Gen Khamtay Siphandone
Commander Xieng Khouang Province.....Maj Gen Singkapo Choulamany

* Leader of the Lao Communist Party or Neo Lao Hak Xat and not
actively participating in the government.

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(S) Insurgency

An estimated 29,830 Pathet Lao troops supported by 13,370* North Vietnamese cadre and regular troops as well as by 2,500 dissident Neutralists comprise the insurgent forces of the country. The Communist forces control about 40 percent of the country and exert influence on 25 percent of the population. Primary areas of Pathet Lao strength are the north, Plaine des Jarres, and eastern border areas in the Panhandle and the south. Overt Communist propaganda and influence are exerted through the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) Party.

(U) Military Alliances and Agreements

Agreement signed at Geneva, 23 July 1962, prohibits any military alliance inconsistent with neutrality of Laos, including SEATO. Under terms of the agreement, direct and unconditional aid from all countries, such as provided by AID, can be accepted. Laos, therefore has no military alliances but does receive limited training from a small French military mission which was permitted to remain in the country.

(S) Military Budget

For the fiscal year ending 30 June 1968 \$34,417,00; 51 percent of the budget and 21 percent of the GNP. Dollar values converted from Kip at the official exchange rate of 240 Kip to \$1.00.

(U) Manpower Resources

Population: 2,801,000 as of 1 January 1968; males (ages 15-49) - 672,000; physically fit - 360,000; average number reaching military age (18) annually, 1968 through 1972, about 25,000. Major components: Laotians - 56 percent; Meo - 24 percent; Thai - 10 percent; Others - 10 percent. Illiteracy (1967) 70-75 percent.

(U) Reserves

There is no organized reserve system.

(S) Mobilization Capacity

The various military factions in Laos are currently at or near maximum mobilization with available reserves.

(S) Conscription


Under provisions of 1950 decree, all able-bodied males are subject to 18 months compulsory military service. Rightist factions, however, are maintained by volunteers, since the pay is high in comparison to that of a few civilian jobs.

* In addition, there are an estimated 5,000 regular NVA personnel associated with the infiltration effort as well as approximately 12,000 North Vietnamese, largely civilian laborers, engaged in construction, maintenance and repair of infiltration-associated LOCs in Laos.

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DISPOSITION OF FRIENDLY FORCES



PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDIAPI

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1 January 1968

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Armed Forces

Army

(S/NPD) Mission: The mission of the 45,000 Royal Laotian Army (FAR), 9,400 Neutralist Army (FAN), and 5,100 Auto Defense du Choc (ADC) troops is territorial defense and counterinsurgency.


(S) Capabilities and Limitations: Although the FAR and FAN troops are able to oppose the Pathet Lao on relatively equal terms and have shown improvement, they usually cannot stand up to North Vietnamese Army forces. FAR, organized for internal defense, could provide little more than early warning against a major North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist incursion to the south.

(S) Most notable success by friendly forces has been Operation PRASANE, carried out during August 1966. Effective melding of ground forces with close air support enables FAR to make a successful incursion into traditional Pathet Lao territory in northern Luang Prabang Province. The successful summer 1966 FAR offensives and the May-June 1967 sweep of the Bolovens Plateau proved FAR and FAN can operate an effective team.

(S) Laotian troops are physically strong and agile, and familiar with local terrain and social conditions. They suffer from inadequate training; insufficient number of effective officers and NCO's; low-level of basic education; dependence on foreign assistance to train and maintain forces; lack of will to fight; and lack of logistical capacity for sustained field operations. They are also inclined to be indolent, fatalistic, and nonaggressive.

(S/NPD) Organization: FAR ground forces are organized into 72 battalions or battalion equivalents (24 infantry battalions, 38 volunteer battalions, six parachute battalions, one artillery regiment (4 groups (bns), and one armored "regiment" (4 company-size groups). The Royal Army forces are deployed generally in the western half of the country. Although FAN forces are moving towards incorporation into the FAR, they retain a separate status. These forces are organized into seven infantry battalions, one armored battalion, two volunteer battalions, five parachute battalions, and one artillery battalion. The FAN forces are concentrated in the Vang Vieng, Muong Soui, Lao Ngam, and Souvanna Khili areas. In addition, units of the separate company-sized guerrilla units of the ADC, under FAR control, are organized into 51 companies directly responsive to local regional FAR commanders.

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1 January 1968

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Navy

(S) Mission: The mission of the 450-man Laotian River Flotilla, under the control of the FAR, is to patrol the Mekong River and to provide troop support. While its capability to perform this mission is limited, it has significantly increased with the addition of six 60-foot diesel-powered river craft (provided by the French Military Mission; the engines, however, were provided by the US).

(S/NPD) Boat Strength: 6 LCM, 27 small patrol craft, 19 river cargo craft, and 1 yard floating dock. Most craft are normally stationed at Vientiane.

Air Force

(S/NPD) Mission: The mission of the 1,400-man Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) (an element of FAR) is to provide tactical air support, logistical support, armed and visual reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and paradrops for the Royal Laotian Army.

(S/NPD) Capabilities and Limitations: The RLAF is capable of providing transport and aerial resupply support and has an effective tactical air support capability, utilizing T-28 trainer aircraft as fighter/bombers. Accelerated training programs will, upon completion, satisfy current requirements. The RLAF is solely dependent on foreign sources for materiel and logistic support.

(S/NPD) Aircraft Inventory: Total - 60 No jets. 17 transports (C-47s), 7 helicopters (H-34Ds), 20 trainers (T-28Ds), 16 miscellaneous types (9 O-1s, 3 U-6As, 3 U-17As, 1 U-4). All aircraft are assigned to tactical units. Only two of the 20 T-28Ds are owned by the RLAF. Twenty-six additional T-28s are available at Muong Udon, Thailand, augmentation, combat, training, and photo reconnaissance.

(S/NPD) Organization: The RLAF is organized into five separate commands: Tactical Air Command; Air Transport Command; Air Materiel Command; Air Training Command; and Air Communications Command. Following the basic structure of the US Air Force, each command is organized into wings and squadrons.

Paramilitary Forces

(S) All paramilitary forces are now under the control of the FAR.

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(S/NO) Total Military Personnel Strength:

Royal Laotian Army (FAR)	52,450
Army	(45,500)
Air Force (FLAF)	(1,400)
River Flotilla	(450)
ADC	(5,100)
Neutralists (FAN)	9,400
Army	(9,400)
TOTAL	<u>61,850</u>


Communist Forces in Laos

(U) The mission of the Communist forces (Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese (NVN) is to win support of the people, overthrow the government, and establish a Communist regime.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The Communist forces are capable of effective guerrilla operations and of mounting conventional attacks of battalion size. Spearheaded by NVA cadres, Pathet Lao have been generally effective in offensive actions against the FAR and Neutralist forces. Without such cadres, Pathet Lao suffer from generally the same deficiencies as the FAR; low level of basis education, inadequate training, lack of will to fight, and ethnic diversity (40 per cent of the Pathet Lao troops are drawn from ethnic minority groups). The North Vietnam (NVA) Pathet Lao forces could overrun Laos with little difficulty, but without the NVA presence, the Pathet Lao would probably collapse both politically and militarily. Logistic support is entirely dependent on maintenance of existing roads and trails between Laos and North Vietnam. Operations "Samsone" and "Prasane" illustrate Communists vulnerability in areas which can be successfully isolated by government forces.

(S) Status of Arms and Equipment: The Communist forces are equipped with a variety of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and light recoilless rifles, some artillery and light antiaircraft artillery was obtained from numerous sources. The Communist forces were formerly supplied by the USSR, presently being supplied by North Vietnam and Communist China. In addition, weapons of US manufacture, captured from Neutralists and FAR, and others of French origin are utilized. Maintenance of weapons and supplies received from North Vietnam is generally adequate.

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
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(5) Personnel Strength and Units:

	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Infantry Battalions</u>	<u>Combat Sup- port Battalions</u>
Pathet Lao (PL)	13,220	27	29
Pathet Lao with NVA Advisors (PL/A)	9,500	31	
Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Army (PL/NVA)	12,000	34	
North Vietnamese Army (NVA)	8,480	21	1
Deuane Dissident Neutralists	1,180	7	3
Khamouane Dissident Neutralists	<u>1,320</u>	<u>7</u>	—
Total Communist Forces	45,700	127	33

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AIR OPERATIONS - LAOS

(S/NPD) The period 1 July-31 December reflects the changing monsoon season and the accompanying increase in FW forces and enemy activity in Laos. As reflected in the tables below, the sortie rate increased significantly in the October-December period. Results show a comparable increase.

(S/NPD) A marked increase in truck kills was experienced in late November-December 1967. Six hundred and seventy-nine trucks were destroyed and 131 damaged. During the same period, strikes on military complexes resulted in 373 secondary explosions and 464 fires. During this period a total of over 2,300 trucks were sighted. The volume of flow of enemy vehicles remained at a high level throughout the period. From the pattern of enemy activities, it appears that he is employing shuttle operations to move supplies southward. The employment of shuttle operations permits the enemy to concentrate road repair efforts. Successes of air strikes against road repair resources may have forced him to concentrate his repair effort in one segment at a time in order to support the required volume of traffic movement. Enemy efforts to cope with established interdiction efforts is being met by continued pressure. Overall, the continuing volume of traffic despite heavy loss and the shuttle employment of vehicle resources, possibly due to a shortage of LOC repair resources, indicates the extreme importance of the Laotian resupply effort to the enemy.

(S/NPD) On 25 December 1967, an enemy force overran facilities including the TACAN site channel 77/Lima site 61, at Muong Phalane. The attack consisted of combined mortar bombardment and infantry assault. Indications are that the attack was not random but was intended to knock out the site. Survey is underway to relocate site to a more secure area, possibly near Mukdaham, Thailand. In response to a JCS query on security of other TACAN sites in Laos, American Embassy, Vientiane indicates all reasonable precautions are being taken to safeguard all sites from similar enemy attack.

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ATTACK SORTIES IN LAOS

<u>Month</u>	<u>BARREL ROLL</u>	<u>STEEL TIGER</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>A/C Losses</u>
Jul	369	896	1,265	1
Aug	495	843	1,338	2
Sep	433	1,299	1,732	1
Oct	604	2,906	3,510	1
Nov	549	3,516	4,065	3
Dec	790	5,136	5,926	
				Total

TARGETS DESTROYED/DAMAGED - LAOS

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>*Dec 15</u>
Structures	97/22	57/27	50/00	91/20	64/28	1/4
Boats	9/24	1/0	2/11	7/0	9/0	0/0
Bridges	4/3	9/3	1/3	17/11	9/7	11/1
Gun Positions	14/16	11/21	16/3	39/17	130/55	43/17
Fords	0/0	1/0	4/4	3/4	5/8	3/13
Bunkers	19/5	10/3	8/2	12/2	11/1	19/1
POL Barrels	30/0	0/0	6/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Barges	1/13	6/5	0/1	2/1	6/0	1/0
Secondary Fires	451	530	496	821	1,557	925
Secondary Explosions	220	420	428	1,149	2,235	1,041

* Target information 15-30 December not available at compilation time.

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TRUCK DATA - LAOS
(Sighted/Destroyed/Damaged)

1967

	Northern & Central (BARREL ROLL)	Upper Panhandle (STEEL TIGER)	Lower Panhandle (STEEL TIGER/ TIGER HOUND)	Total
Jul	65/7/10	65/5/1	125/3/0	255/15/1
Aug	80/10/18	100/9/5	155/8/3	335/27/16
Sep	30/5/1	180/4/1	100/22/0	310/31/2
Oct	25/3/5	975/67/8	20/0/0	1,020/70/13
Nov	35/9/3	3,500/612/64	800/116/30	4,335/737/97
Dec (1-29)	100/12/5	4,100/621/86	1,380/170/25	5,580/803/116

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RESULTS OF AIR ATTACKS IN LAOS

	<u>JUL</u> Dest/Dam	<u>AUG</u> Dest/Dam	<u>SEPT</u> Dest/Dam	<u>OCT</u> Dest/Dam	<u>NOV</u> Dest/Dam	<u>DEC</u> Dest/Dam
Bridges	2/0	5/2	5/5	20/11	15/12	19/17
Vehicles	15/11	27/26	31/2	70/13	737/97	374/134
Fords/Ferries	3	3	8	19	33	50
Watercraft	3/32	1/9	0/4	7/0	5/4	4/7

CRATERED

Bridges/Ford Apprs Dam	1/0	3/0	2/2	8/3	22/1	41/34
Road Cuts	84(4)*	88(10)*	155(3)*	485(68)*	775(174)*	920(150)*

* () Included number of landslides.

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CAMBODIA

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CAMBODIA

Geography

(U) Cambodia is a small compact country that fronts on the Gulf of Siam and is bordered by Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam. The country has an area of 67,000 square miles, about the same as that of the state of Washington, and a population of approximately 6,541,000. The maximum north-south dimension is 275 miles and the maximum east-west dimension is 350 miles.

(U) Cambodia is made up mostly of plains, areas of hills and, in the northeast and southwest, some mountains. The central part of Cambodia consists of a low, nearly flat plain enclosed by flat to rolling plains. Mountains and hills range from gently rounded to steep and rugged; highest elevations approach 6,000 feet in the southwest.

(U) Vegetation consists primarily of wetland rice and open deciduous forest in the plains, and dense evergreen forest in the hills and mountains. Approximately 16 percent of the country is cultivated while 74 percent is forested.

(U) Principal drainage features are the Mekong, flowing south through the eastern part of the country, and the Tonle Sap lake in the west-central plains. The Mekong is generally 1,000 to 3,000 feet wide all year; it is 35 to 45 feet deep during high water (June through November or December) and mostly 10 to 15 feet deep at low water (December or January through May). The two major Cambodian tributaries to the Mekong are the Tonle Sap river and the Tonle Kong - Se San - Srepok river system. Tonle Sap lake, covering 1,200 square miles and 6 feet deep at low water, covers 3,500 square miles and is 36 feet deep at high water. The water from the lake flows southeast to the Mekong through the Tonle Sap river; from July through about October, however, when the Mekong floods, flow of the Tonle Sap river reverses into the lake.


(U) The country has a monsoonal climate consisting of two major seasons and two transitional seasons. The southwest monsoon or wet season (mid-May to early October) has frequently heavy precipitation, maximum cloudiness, and high humidity. In contrast, the northeast monsoon or dry season (early November to mid-March) has little precipitation, minimum cloudiness, and lower humidity. Seasonal temperature variations are small except at high elevations. The hottest months are during the spring transition when mean daily maximum temperatures are in the 90's (°F.) and mean daily minimums are in the mid-70's. The coldest months normally are December and January, averaging less than ten degrees cooler than the warmest months. Mean annual rainfall ranges from about 45 to 200 inches, the greatest amounts occurring in the southwest.

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1 January 1968

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(C) Cambodia has 290 miles of meter-gage railway, and 3,181 miles of highway, almost one-half of which is bituminous-surfaced.

Government

(S/ND) Government and Politics: The Royal Cambodian Government is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government. The throne has been vacant since the death of King Norodom Suramarit in 1960. A Chief of State position was established by the National Assembly on 18 June 1960 for Prince Sihanouk, who was unwilling to resume the Crown after abdicating the throne in 1955. Members of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (SRN) (Peoples's Socialist Community), a Socialist-Neutralist party founded and controlled by Sihanouk, occupy all 82 seats in the National Assembly as a result of elections on 11 September 1966. Sihanouk, following the resignation of Prime Minister Lon Nol, ostensibly for health reasons, invoked special powers granted by the National Assembly and assumed direct control of the government on 30 April 1967. The conservative Lon Nol government's political composition and economic policies generated a series of leftist-supported anti-government demonstrations which culminated in the outbreak of armed dissidence in western Cambodia during March-April. Although dissident activities have subsided, three Cambodian Army battalions are still deployed in the area. An "interim cabinet," formed on 2 May by Sihanouk and headed by Son Sann, which had only a 3-months' mandate, has been extended. Sihanouk's intervention has stabilized the situation, but leftist-exploited internal unrest could recur and reach more serious proportions if economic conditions continue to deteriorate.

(S/ND) Foreign Policy: The key factor in Cambodia's foreign policy is Sihanouk's concern over his country's security. The traditional animosity between Cambodia and Thailand and between Cambodia and South Vietnam is a major factor in Sihanouk's thinking. His advocacy of the policy of neutrality stems from his belief that this is the only way to preserve some independence for Cambodia and other small countries overshadowed by China.

Relations with Thailand and South Vietnam are poor and seem unlikely to improve in the immediate future despite the initiative by UN Secretary U Thant to develop a formula to resolve border difficulties and promote resumption of diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh which were broken off in October 1961. Cambodia and Thailand have accused each other of harboring subversive elements and of conducting a propaganda war. In addition, numerous border incidents further irritate Thai-Cambodian relations. The main issues between Cambodia and South Vietnam are border disputes and cross border activity/incidents. The latter problem is becoming more serious as evidence of Communist use of Cambodia continues to mount.

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(S/NP) Sihanouk's assessment that China will steadily increase its power and influence in Southeast Asia, and his belief that the best defense against Chinese-Vietnamese domination lies in good relations with Peking has led him to pursue an active policy of friendship towards China. In the meantime, China will continue to exploit any situation which will intensify Sihanouk's suspicions of the West. Should his attitude change, or become markedly less sympathetic to China, the CHICOMS would probably activate the subversive potential which exists in Cambodia. Sihanouk can be expected to continue to press for international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality. His recent efforts to display a more neutral posture may reflect his reappraisal of the Vietnamese War and Cambodian concern over the internal political turbulence in Communist China. Cambodia's less accommodating attitude towards the Communist powers may also be reflected in his recent claims of external Communist support of local dissidence, his reported actions to curb propaganda activity of the Chinese Communist Embassy, and recent arrests and deportations of several local Chinese on charges of smuggling Cambodian rice and other supplies to the Viet Cong. The recent recognition of Cambodia's present territorial borders by North Vietnam, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, however, may be a Communist move to reinforce Communist influence in Cambodia. Sihanouk's pleased reaction was to raise Hanoi's representation in Phnom Penh to Embassy level.

(S) Significant Personalities and Their Posts

Chief of State.....	Prince Norodom Sihanouk
Government Counsellor.....	Penn Nouth
Prime Minister.....	Son Sann
Chairman, High Council of	
National Defense.....	Gen Sisowath Monireth
Minister of Foreign Affairs.....	Norodom Phurissara
Minister of National Defense.....	Maj Gen Duong Sam Ol
Chief of Armed Forces General Staff.....	Lt Gen Nhiek Tiouloung
Chief of Intelligence.....	Lt Col Pheng Phan Y
Chief of Army Staff.....	Lt Gen Nhiek Tiouloung
Chief of Navy Staff.....	Comdr (Honorary) Pierre Coedes
Chief of Air Staff.....	Lt Gen Ngo Hou
Commander Headquarters,	
General Reserve.....	Brig Gen Khlot-Bouth
Commander Headquarters,	
Military Region I.....	Lt Col Sosthenes Fernandez
Commander Headquarters,	
Military Region II.....	Lt Col Thong Van Fan Muong
Commander Headquarters,	
Military Region III.....	Lt Col Chhuon Chhum
Commander Headquarters,	
Military Region IV.....	Col Chamrocum Sin
Commander Headquarters,	
Military Region V.....	Lt Col Neak Sam

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(S) Insurgency

The Khmer Seri (Free Cambodia) movement is a non-Communist, dissident organization which is dedicated to the ouster of Prince Sihanouk. Its operations are conducted from two separate headquarters, Saigon and Bangkok. At present, there are approximately 5,000 volunteers. Peasant dissatisfaction over the government's economic policies has led to a series of isolated armed disturbances since last spring. Sihanouk has initiated suppressive actions in each instance, blaming "Red Khmers" (Communist Cambodians) for the recurring dissident outbreaks. Leftist exploitation of peasant unrest, however, has not resulted in organized anti-government resistance.

(S) Communist Influence

Pro-Communist strength is centered in the Pracheachon (People's) Party, with an estimated membership of no more than 1,000 ethnic Khmers (Cambodians) and a hardcore of about 100, and in the Vietnamese and Chinese minorities. The Pracheachon Party holds no seats in the Assembly, but leftists are included in Sangkum, in the Government, and in the Counter-Government or shadow cabinet which was initially formed in October 1966 to monitor the Government. Although Cambodia's neutralist foreign policy has been weighted in favor of the Communist, a "cooling" Sino-Cambodian relationship is apparent in Sihanouk's recent claims of external Communist support of local dissidents and his actions to restrict propaganda activities of the Chinese Communist Embassy.

(S) Military Alliances and Agreements

Cambodia has no formal military alliances. Renouncing its earlier designation as a "Protocol State" under SEATO, Cambodia has exchange mutual defense assurances with Communist China. Military assistance was provided from the US for all three services until its termination in November 1963. Cambodia receives military training assistance and equipment from France; and receives equipment items from USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

(S) Military Budget

For the fiscal year ending 31 December 1967, \$56,912,000; 29.7 percent of the total budget, and 6.5 percent of the GNP. Dollar values converted from Riels at the official exchange rate of 35 Riels to \$1.00.

(U) Manpower Resources

Population: 6,541,000 as of 1 January 1968; males (ages 15-49) - 1,450,000; physically fit - 800,000; average number reaching military age (18) annually, 1968 through 1972, about 65,000. Major components: Cambodians - 86 percent; Chinese - 6 percent; non-Cambodian Indochinese - 7 percent; Others - 1 percent. Illiteracy (1967) 60-65 percent.

CAMBODIA
TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION
AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE ROYAL
CAMBODIAN ARMY

— Military Region Boundary

RG Royal Guard

GR General Reserve

0 25 50 75 Miles

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1 January 1968

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(U) Conscription

All males 21 to 32 years old are obligated to 18-months military service. Voluntary enlistments are for 3- or 6-year periods, with a minimum age of 18. Recruiting has been decentralized to the Military Regions which are given quotas to be filled as suited to conditions and population in each region. When volunteers are not numerous enough to meet the quotas established, the draft is resorted to. The air force and navy are not using the conscription law because it is not effective in acquiring personnel with specialized skills.

(S) Reserves

There is no organized reserve system in the army. Approximately 400 officers and noncommissioned officers are military school graduates who have served one year in the army and are available for recall to active duty. There are also about 4,000 trained veterans available. The navy and air force do not have a reserve system.

(S) Mobilization Capacity

Without outside logistic support, maximum mobilization would be reached on M+90 days with 48,000 troops comprising 53 infantry battalions and existing support units, plus security elements and 1,700 navy personnel. The air force has no significant mobilization potential.

Armed Forces


Army

(S/INT) Mission: The mission of the 32,000-man Cambodian Army is to assist in maintaining internal security, defend Cambodia against external aggression, develop primitive regions of the country through civil action, and direct a national sports program.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The army is capable of small unit tactical operations up to battalion size but would be incapable of organizing an effective defense against external aggression. It is capable of maintaining internal security against local dissident elements but incapable of eliminating Viet Cong bases or preventing Viet Cong use of territory for transit and operations into Vietnam. The effectiveness of the new Commando Battalions (lightly equipped guerrilla-type units) is greater than that of the standard infantry battalions.

(S) Organization: The army is organized into 53 battalions and three brigades which are widely dispersed throughout five military regions and a general reserve as follows: one parachute brigade (2 battalions); one artillery brigade (3 groups); one antiaircraft brigade (2 groups); 27 infantry (Battalion de Chasseurs -- BC); 19 Commando (special infantry) battalions; two royal guard battalions; three Phnom Penh battalions; one armored regiment (battalion-size); and one armored reconnaissance regiment (battalion-size). Technical and administrative elements under control of the Minister of Defense support all services.

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1 January 1968

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Navy

(S) Mission: The mission of the 1,400-man Cambodian Navy is patrol of coastal and inland waterways.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The navy is capable of only moderately effective patrol of inland waterways, and has a small capability for coastal patrol. All major ships are normally based at Ream and Churi Changvar and are vulnerable to the denial of access to the sea -- by mining the Mekong River or by restrictive action of the Republic of Vietnam which controls the lower Mekong. The 200-man naval infantry has no significant capability. There is no naval air arm.

(S/NPD) Ship Strength: 4 patrol (2 PC, 2 PT), 2 LSIL ships, 29 amphibious (19 LCM, 5 LCVP), 15 service craft (3 YTL, 2 AVR, 9 YP, 1 YTB).

(S/NPD) Organization: The navy is under the direct control of the Chief of Staff of the Royal Cambodian Navy. It is organized into Independent Naval Force (Sea Force), River Force, and Coastal Force.

Air Force

(S/NPD) Mission: The mission of the 1,500-man Cambodian Air Force is to provide Cambodia with an air defense capability. It supports the army with air transport and tactical ground support. It provides a pool of pilots for civil aviation.

(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The air force is capable of supporting army and aerial activities in civic action programs. It has a small air defense capability developed by the acquisition of MiG aircraft and radar equipment. There is a chronic shortage of trained personnel and its dependence on foreign sources of supply hamper any expansion of the present force.

(S/NPD) Aircraft Strength: Total - 137 13 jet fighters (MiG-17s), 12 light bombers (A-1Hs), 20 transports (6 An-2s, 2 Il-14s, 2 C-47As, 5 C-47Ds), 9 helicopters (1 Mi-4, 4 Alouette IIs, 2 Alouette IIIs, 2 UH-19s), 61 trainers (1 UMiG-15, 7 Lt-6Gs, 14 T-28Ds, 4 T-37Bs, 4 CM-170s, 8 Yak-18s, 23 Morane Saulnier 733s), 22 miscellaneous types (9 O-1As, 4 U-6As, 2 Cessna 170s, 1 UTVA-60, 6 Marcel Saulnier 315s).

(S/NPD) Aircraft in Operational Units: 122 21 jets (12 MiG-17 fighters, 4 Magister CM-170s, 4 T-37Bs, 1 UMiG-15 trainers), 92 props 12 light bombers (A-1Hs), 14 transports (2 C-47As, 5 C-47Ds, 2 Il-14s), 44 trainers (14 T-28Ds, 23 Morane Saulnier 733s, 7 Lt-6Gs), 22 miscellaneous types (9 O-1As, 4 U-6As, 1 UTVA-60, 2 Cessna 170s, 6 Marcel Dassault 315s), 9 helicopters (4 Alouette IIs, 2 Alouette IIIs, 2 UH-19s, 1 Mi-4).

(S/NPD) Organization: The air force is organized into one transport, one tactical air, one liaison, one helicopter, and one trainer squadron; all five squadrons are stationed at Phnom Penh.

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(S/MD) Radar:

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1	BIG BAR B	Phnom Penh AFLD (11-33N/104-52E)
1	FISHNET	Phnom Penh AFLD (11-33N/104-52E)
1	CROSS SLOT	Bed Chan. (11-34N/104-41E)
1	TOKEN	Tuk Srak (11-17N/104-30E)
1	FIRECAN	Pong Tuk AFLD (10-32N/104-22E)
1	FIRECAN	Phnom Penh AFLD (11-33N/104-52E)
1	DECCA-41	Phnom Penh AFLD (11-33N/104-52E)

Paramilitary Forces

Provincial Guard

(S) Mission: The mission of the 11,000-man Provincial Guard is to perform normal police operations. These operations are separate from or in coordination with the National Police. Additional duties are maintenance of public safety in rural areas and the guarding of sensitive points to include borders.


(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The Provincial Guard is capable of internal police and security duties under normal peacetime conditions; however, they are incapable of effective border control. Their capabilities are limited by a wide dispersal of guardsmen in small detachments, the lack of effective training, and by the unsatisfactory maintenance of equipment. During wartime they could maintain rural security and perform the static defense of strategic areas.

(S) Organization: The Provincial Guard is part of three separate agencies under the Ministry of the Interior. It is organized into General Staff and a General Brigade in Phnom Penh, a basic training school in Kompong Chhnang, and 19 provincial "brigades" (one for each civil province) ranging in size from 200 to 1,000 men; also includes about 2,500 urban police. It is at the disposal of the provincial governors and their subordinate political chiefs. In wartime they come under the control of the Ministry of Defense.

Others

(S) In addition to the foregoing paramilitary force which contributes substantially to Cambodia's ground force strength, there are 50,000 Chivapols, volunteer village defense troops, of which about 25,000 are armed and active. They are organized into small detachments and are equipped with old US and French small arms, which are being replaced by Chinese Communist weapons. The Chivapols assist in internal security and in wartime would serve as a source of manpower. There are also about 5,000 members of Royal Cambodian Socialist Youth who have received military training and are armed with 500 Belgian FN 7.6-mm NATO rifles.

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(S/NP) Total Military Personnel Strength

Army	32,000
Navy	1,400
Air Force	1,500
Provincial Guard	<u>11,000</u>
TOTAL	45,900

Viet Cong/NVA Use of Cambodia

(S/NP) The availability of Cambodian territory is of considerable psychological and military advantage to the Communists. They use it as a sanctuary to evade allied forces in South Vietnam and more extensively as a refuge for rest, training, medical care, storage of supplies, and as a convenient and secure route for the infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam.


(S/NP) The movement of foodstuffs, medicines, chemicals, and communication equipment from Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communists in South Vietnam and the Laotian Panhandle has alleviated some of the serious Communist logistical problems. The Communists continue to smuggle small quantities of arms from Cambodia to South Vietnam. Some of these arms probably are unauthorized diversions from those weapons imported for the Cambodian Government forces, but there is no evidence of large-scale diversions.

(S/NP) Cambodian territory is also used for the infiltration of additional Communist forces into South Vietnam. There are at least nine base areas that straddle the South Vietnam border, which serve as way stations, sanctuaries and training areas.

(S/NP) Sihanouk is aware that the Communists use Cambodian territory and that Cambodian businessmen smuggle food and material to the Communists. He has shown some concern over the situation, and has established roadblocks along main routes leading to the border in an attempt to curb smuggling which has caused a major drain on the economy. He has also made a nominal effort to stop the use of Cambodia by the Communists, but these measures have been local in scale, relatively ineffective, and transitory in nature. In addition, Prince Sihanouk has expressed an interest in expanding ICC (International Control Commission) activities along the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border.

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THAILAND

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THAILAND

Geography

(U) Thailand is in the heart of peninsular Southeast Asia. It has boundaries with Cambodia, Laos, Burma, and Malaysia and coast lines that front on the Gulf of Siam, the Strait of Malacca, and the Andaman Sea. Bangkok, the capital, with 2,000,000 population is within 500 nautical miles of Rangoon and Saigon. The land areas total nearly 200,000 square miles and the population totals over 32,000,000. The maximum north-south extent is more than 1,000 miles, and the maximum width is about 500 miles; the peninsular part of the country is only 10 miles wide at its narrowest part.

(U) Rugged, north-south trending mountains and hills dominate the northern and western parts of mainland Thailand and extend along the length of the peninsula in the south. Mountain and hill crests are generally 3,000 to slightly more than 6,000 feet, and are covered by open broadleaf forests with dense undergrowth and areas of grass. The area is drained mostly by south flowing streams. Two dissimilar plains, separated by a north-south trending belt of hills and low mountains, occupy the central and eastern parts of the mainland. The central part consists of flat to rolling plains from less than 15 feet on the delta in the south to about 650 feet in the north; it is drained by the Mae Nam Chao Phraya and its tributaries. The eastern part consists of flat to rolling plains - the Khorat Plateau, mostly less than 1,000 feet, and crossed by east flowing streams. Wetland rice covers extensive areas of the central plains and the Khorat Plateau. A nearly self-sufficient agricultural country, 22 percent of Thailand is in farms. Fifty-two percent of the country is forested. Peninsular Thailand consists of flat to rolling plains separated by groups of generally north-south trending hills and mountains. Dense forests cover most of these areas except for some coastal plains, partially planted to rice.


(U) Thailand has a tropical monsoon climate with two distinct seasons, a relatively wet season from mid-May through September, the southwest monsoon, a relatively dry season from November to mid-March, the northeast monsoon, and two short transitional periods. The mean annual rainfall throughout Thailand is generally between 40 to 60 inches, with higher amounts in the peninsula during the northeast monsoon. The spring transition is the hottest time of the year, with mean daily maximums in the middle and upper 90's; in the peninsula, temperatures remain in the upper 80's all year. Lowest temperatures occur during the northeast monsoon season, when mean daily minimums range from the high 50's to the low 70's, and mean daily maximums range from the mid-80's to the mid-90's.

(*) Thailand has 2,277 miles of meter-gage railway and over 7,500 miles of highway, almost one half of which is paved.

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ETHNIC GROUPS



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
Political Anatomy

(S) Thailand's military-dominated parliamentary government, which enjoys the support of a popular constitutional monarch, exercises control over a strongly centralized unitary state. Although martial law is being enforced in a few areas and a ban on political party activity has been in force since 1958, the government is nevertheless respected as a benevolent institution. A working alliance between Field Marshal Thanom and General Praphat, leaders of the military oligarchy since December 1963, has provided internal stability, sound fiscal and economic development policies, and continuity of a firm, pro-US orientation. A "permanent" constitution, now undergoing minor revisions after 8 years of drafting, is expected to be promulgated this year. In absence of strong pressure for democratization, regime's willingness to hold general election during 1968 probably will be contingent upon level of internal security threat posed by externally-supported Communist insurgency. Thanom and Praphat have denied their involvement, but preparations apparently are underway for formation of government party to assure post-election continuity of control by present ruling military leadership.

(S/INT) Thailand's primary national objective is to maintain its historic independence. King Phumiphon Adundet's great popularity and good working relations with the Prime Minister are factors contributing to the relative stability of the present regime. Currently and for the foreseeable future, the Thais see the threat to their survival as coming from China, and particularly, China under Communist control. This fear of domination by the colossus to the north influences the whole of Thailand's political and diplomatic outlook, explains its membership in SEATO, its distrust of Cambodia's pro-Chinese neutralism, and its fear of infiltration and subversion through Laos and Burma.

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1. ANG THONG
2. AYUTTHAYA
3. BURIRAM
4. CHACHOENGSAO
5. CHAINAT
6. CHAIYAPHUM
7. CHANTHABURI
8. CHIANG MAI
9. CHIANG RAI
10. CHON BURI
11. CHUMPHON
12. KALASIN
13. KAMPHAENG PHET
14. KANCHANABURI
15. KHON KAEN
16. KRABI
17. LAMPANG
18. LAMPHUN
19. LOEI
20. LOP BURI
21. MAE HONG SON
22. MAHA SARAKHAM
23. NAKHON NAYOK
24. NAKHON PATHOM
25. NAKHON PHANOM
26. NAKHON RATCHASIMA
27. NAKHON SAWAN
28. NAKHON SI THAMMARAT
29. NAN
30. NARATHIWAT
31. NONG KHAI
32. NONTABURI
33. PATHUM THANI
34. PATTANI
35. PATTHALUNG
36. PHANGNGA
37. PHET BURI
38. PHETCHABUN
39. PHICHIT
40. PHITSANULOK
41. PHRA NAKHON
42. PHRAE
43. PHUKET
44. PRACHIN BURI
45. PRACHUAP KHIRI KHAN
46. RANONG
47. RAT BURI
48. RAYONG
49. ROI ET
50. SAKON NAKHON
51. SAMUT SAKHON
52. SAMUT SONGKHAM
53. SAMUT PRAKAN
54. SARA BURI
55. SATUN
56. SING BURI
57. SISAKET
58. SONGKHLA
59. SUKHOHAI
60. SUPHAN BURI
61. SURAT THANI
62. SURIN
63. TAK
64. THON BURI
65. TRANG
66. TRAT
67. UDON
68. UDON THANI
69. UTHAI THANI
70. UTTARADIT
71. YALA

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(U) Significant Personalities and Their Posts

King.....Phumiphon Adulyadej (Rama IX)
Prime/Defense Minister.....Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
Minister of Foreign Affairs.....Col Thanat Khoman
Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Interior.....Gen Praphat Charusathien
Deputy Prime Minister.....Prince Wan Waithayakorn Worawan
Deputy Minister of Defense.....Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasap
Minister of Agriculture.....Prakat Sahakon
Minister of Communications.....Lt Gen Pong Punnan
Minister of Economic Affairs.....Sunthorn Hongladorn
Minister of Education.....Pin Malakun
Minister of Finance.....Dr. Serm Vinicchayakul
Minister of Industries.....Air Chief Marshal Muni
Wetchayan Rangsarit
Minister of Justice.....Attakari Nipon
Minister of National Development.....Pote Sarasin
Minister of Public Health.....Phamrat Naradun
Commander in Chief
Royal Thai Army.....Gen Praphat Charusathien
Deputy Commander in Chief.....Gen Krit Siwara
Assistant Commander in Chief.....Gen Tem Homsetee
Assistant Commander in Chief.....Gen Bhisit Chaimuanwongsa
Chief of Staff.....Gen Surakij Mayalarp
Commander, First Army Area.....Maj Gen Samran Patayakul
Commander, Second Army Area.....Lt Gen Dhongcherm Sangkhavanich
Commander, Third Army Area.....Maj Gen Aung Potiganit
Commander, Fifth Military Circle.....Maj Gen Cherm Prikshyajiva
Commander in Chief,
Royal Thai Navy.....Admiral Charoon Chalermtiarana
Deputy Commander in Chief.....Admiral Anada Nateroj
Assistant Commander in Chief.....Admiral Siri Grachangnetara
Chief of Staff.....Admiral Thavil Rayananonda
Commandant, Royal Thai
Marine Corps.....Rear Admiral Sophon Suyarnsettakorn
Commander in Chief,
Royal Thai Air Force.....Air Chief Marshal Boonchoo Chandrubeksa
Vice Commander in Chief.....Air Marshal Siri Muangmanee
Deputy Commander in Chief.....Air Chief Marshal Harin Hongskula
Chief of Staff.....Air Marshal Kamol Thejatunga
Deputy Chief of Staff, Opns.....Air Marshal Prasong Kunadilok

Communist Influence and Support

(S) The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) reportedly has a membership of not more than 1,000, of whom 300 are hard-core cadre. The party draws its members largely from the Chinese community and is subject to direction from the China-based Thailand Patriotic Front. The Bangkok-based CPT has long been thwarted in its efforts to gain popular support and representation in the Assembly by the country's socio-economic stability, firm anti-Communist policies, and security measures. Despite these handicaps, the CPT

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has organized and is currently directing the Communist movement in northeast, north, west-central, and mid-south Thailand. The arrest of some key Communist party officials in August may have seriously hampered party operations. The CPT is strongly influenced by Communist China and substantially supported by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao through propaganda, financial aid, and political and paramilitary training of Thai dissidents. Interrogations of Thai defectors disclose that since 1962 at least 470 Thai nationals have received training in North Vietnam. Reportedly, a number of ethnic Thais and Meos have been trained in Laos by the Pathet Lao. There is evidence of a continuing training program in Communist China where an estimated 650 Thais have received guerrilla training. There have been many low-level reports of Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese troops crossing the Mekong into Thailand. However, none of these troops have been intercepted by Thai forces, and no significant infiltration has been confirmed. Arms and weapons known to be held by Communist insurgents are World War II vintage of varied country manufacture including US. Anyone with adequate funds can buy arms freely in Thailand and most of those held by the insurgents are probably acquired in this way. There have been unconfirmed reports of the existence of some crew-served weapons. Weapons could also be bought in Laos and smuggled over, although there is no firm evidence of an established route.

Insurgency

(S) The level of Communist incidents has risen from approximately 41 in 1965 to about 580 in 1966 and, judging from statistics reported for the first eleven months of 1967, the number of incidents possibly will exceed 900 by the end of the year. Estimates of "hard-core" insurgent strength in Thailand have risen threefold since mid-1965. There are now an estimated 2,600-2,800 operating throughout the country.

(S/NPD) Northeast: During the second half of 1967, the level of insurgent activity in this area has declined from its recorded high in March (97) incidents. While the number of incidents dropped in most categories, the territory in which they occurred has enlarged and the numerical strength of the insurgents has increased. The expansion of activity into new areas probably reflected a Communist decision to surface an expanded capability in order to fragment government resources. The increase in insurgent strength to an estimated 1,500 hard-core Thai Communist insurgents is partially a reflection of better intelligence reporting. The increase is also a result of the influx of trained Thai insurgents from Communist China, North Vietnam and Laos. The insurgents did not mount a more aggressive campaign during the rainy season, as was expected. Increased government pressure in the 0910 Operation target areas, shortages of food and equipment and the arrests of key Communist Party leaders have temporarily reduced the insurgent's capabilities in the Northeast. It is also possible that the recent enforcement of martial law and the greater involvement of the army in government operations have made the insurgents reluctant at this time to increase their activity. The insurgents are supported in their efforts by 8-10,000 Thai sympathizers and by the direction, training, and support from Communist Chinese, North

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Vietnamese, and the Pathet Lao. There is strong evidence that North Vietnam helps finance the insurgent effort in this area by collecting funds from some 40,000 North Vietnamese refugees, the majority of whom are still considered to be under their influence. While a number of Communist subverted Vietnamese refugees have already been arrested by the Thai government, it probably did little sustained damage to the organization. Their concentration in areas of active insurgency and their proximity to key lines of communications and bases, including US installations, continue to underscore a potential security threat. The Thai government reportedly reached an agreement with the South Vietnamese government to repatriate the Communist subverted Vietnamese refugees to South Vietnam. Reports that unidentified helicopters are in fact enemy aircraft supporting the insurgents have not been substantiated. There is also evidence of a subversive movement forming along the Cambodian border region of the Northeast. The subversives are ethnic Thais, and their activity does not appear to be connected with longstanding Cambodian forays across the border into Thailand.

(S/NPD) North: About 50-70 insurgents are showing increasing aggressiveness in this area as evidenced by the two armed propaganda meetings recently held in Nan Province and the spate of armed encounters with government forces in the latter part of 1967. Increased capabilities are probably the result of political and guerrilla warfare training, which about 270 Meos and some of the lesser tribes have received in North Vietnam and Laos since 1965 and also from a number of Pathet Lao military training cadres who have been working with the Meos since 1959. As a result of the recent upsurge in insurgent activity, the Thai government is considering martial law and plans to implement the 0910 Counterinsurgency Plan in three districts of Nan and Chiang Rai provinces. In addition, the government has postponed indefinitely the withdrawal of the Kuomintang irregular forces from this border area since they represent a stabilizing influence against Communist infiltration.

(S/NPD) West-Central: In recent months, a deteriorating situation has come into focus in this Burmese border area. Insurgent strength is believed to number about 75, of whom one-third may be Karen tribesmen. Although small in number, this group has been able to mount successful ambushes of Royal Thai Government patrols. Government police raids have evidently not affected the professional insurgent capabilities. Martial law has been enforced in the affected areas and elements of the First Army have been deployed to this region.

(S/NPD) Mid-South: Communists are gaining strength in this region, where approximately 200 hard-core Communists are effectively coordinating low-level insurgent activity. This group is supported by an estimated 800 low-level Communists, and, considering the lack of government assistance and protection in isolated areas, by a large number of sympathizers. Until mid-1966, the Communist apparently concentrated almost solely upon building an organization, but since this time clashes between government forces and the Communists increased sharply. Recent increased activity may be a

INSURGENCY STATISTICS IN THAILAND
January - November 1967

I. <u>Casualties:</u>	<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North</u>	<u>Central</u>	<u>Mid-South</u>	<u>Malay-South</u>	<u>Total</u>
Communist KIA	105	8	5	20	3	141
WIA	15	1	0	1	0	17
Security Forces KIA	31	6	16	5	1	59
WIA	50	5	9	11	5	80
Civilian Officials KIA	30	1	1	4	0	36
WIA	10	0	0	2	0	13
Other Civilians KIA	72	2	2	5	0	81
WIA	16	4	0	1	0	21
II. <u>Communist-initiated Incidents:</u>	527	16	9	17	0	569
A. <u>Terrorism:</u>	219	9	4	16	0	248
Assassination (includes attempts)	87	4	3	14	0	108
Kidnappings	25	2	0	0	0	27
Other	107	3	1	2	0	113
B. Armed Propaganda	163*	2	0	1	0	166
C. Attacks	3**	2	1	0	0	6
D. Ambushes	7	1	3	0	0	11
E. Harassment of Security Forces	132	2	1	0	0	135
F. Sabotage	3	0	0	0	0	3
III. <u>Incidents Resulting from RTG Initiative:</u>	193	13	5	27	14	252
IV. <u>Total Armed Encounters (includes II C, D, E and III)</u>	335	17	11	29	14	406
V. <u>Total - All Incidents:</u>	720	29	14	46	14	821

* Eleven separate armed propaganda incidents accompanied by assassinations, three incidents accompanied by kidnappings, one propaganda incident accompanied by an incident of terrorism are not reflected in table.

** One attack on village accompanied by two kidnappings not reflected in table.

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forerunner of a concerted Communist drive. The Communists have probably had sufficient training and accumulated enough weapons to successfully ambush small police patrols, but so far they have not chosen to do so. As they gain strength and obtain more weapons, this may change. Propaganda leaflets and other Communist documents discovered in this area are very similar to those found in the Northeast. Considering the present widespread Communist organization and the inadequate government presence, terrorism is expected to increase.


(S/AFD) Malay-South: In this border region approximately 800-1,000 hard-core remnants of the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO), the military arm of the Communist Party of Malay, are apparently gaining support and supplies from the local Thai populace. Although their proposed aim is to overthrow the Malaysian Government, they constituted a potential threat to Thailand. There are reports that this terrorist group could draw an additional 2,500 auxiliary personnel if they stepped up their activity. Captured documents indicate that a Marx/Lenin school, established in 1966 for indoctrination and training of recruits, had given instruction or indoctrination to a total of 1,000 by mid-1967, indicating the measure of Communist success in this area. The Communists avoid contact with Thai officials, but have become increasingly open and blatant about their activities. There is unconfirmed evidence of a possible link between the Thai Communists operating in the mid-South and the Communists in this border region, probably through common Chinese Communist ties. The deteriorated situation places a further strain on the already overextended Thai security forces.

Counterinsurgency

(S/AFD) The Royal Thai Government has initiated a countrywide counterinsurgency program that utilized government authorities, civic action teams, and military security forces in overcoming Communist subversion and insurgency. The National Security Command is responsible for coordinating, on a national level, the various counterinsurgency measures under its direction. These activities include developing roads, improving rural medical facilities, organizing Mobile Development Units, constructing model villages; and, in southern Thailand, directing a joint Thai-Malaysian Intelligence Center. As a result of a recent reorganization, actual Communist suppression operations in the Northeast, North, and West Central areas are now being conducted by the army; these operations were formerly conducted by the Countersubversion Operations Command (CSOC). The CSOC, however, continues to monitor the policy and principles of counterinsurgency on a national level and is involved in a number of rapid economic and social development programs. Controlled by the Minister of Interior, the CSOC maintains its headquarters in Bangkok and is staffed by Army, Police, and Civil personnel. Subordinate to CSOC Headquarters are five Joint Security Centers (JSCs) and eight Civil-Police-Military units (CPMs). The JSCs serve as regional intelligence coordinating centers which provide intelligence reports and studies to the CSOC. The JSC at Nakhon Si Thammarat has been designated the "Suppression Coordination Supervision Division of the South." The JSC recently formed at Nakhon

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Pathom will also function as a direction and coordination unit similar to the Center in the South. CPM-1, which was the direction and coordination center in the northeastern provinces, has been redesignated Second Army Forward. The CPMs continue to both plan and direct police/military operations in the Mid-South. In addition, they have command authority over security forces in the province unless they are under a higher command for specific operations. Although the CSOC concept is sound, operational results have been meager because of security leaks, inadequate combat intelligence, delays resulting from lack of coordination, and ill-defined chain of command. The 0910 Counterinsurgency Plan, designed to sever Communist terrorists from their safe havens through a series of civic, political, psychological, and suppression activities has achieved a measure of success in its goals. Although it was initiated last January for use in the Northeast area, the plan was recently implemented in two provinces in the Northern region. With increased support from the military, the 0910 Plan does appear to have a good long-term potential. The Special Operations Centers (SOCs), which are manned, equipped, and supported by the nearest units of the army and Marine Corps, is another counterinsurgency program. Their mission is to gather and report intelligence information, to conduct civic action and psychological operations, and to prevent the spread of subversion.

(C) Military Alliances and Agreements

Thailand is a member of SEATO, which maintains its headquarters in Bangkok. It receives military aid under MAP from the US for all three services. Under US-Thai Special Logistics Action Thailand (SLAT) Agreement (March 1963), Thailand's logistics base is being expanded to support any future deployment of Allied military forces required for Thailand's defense. A Thai infantry company is assigned to the UN Command in Korea; a small air transport contingent, a volunteer regiment, and two naval ships are in South Vietnam; and an 11,000-man Royal Thai Army Volunteer Division will be deployed to South Vietnam in two increments by January 1969.

(C) Military Budget

For fiscal year ending 30 December 1968, \$162,000,000; 15 percent of total budget, 3 percent of GNP. (Army, \$60,870,000) Dollar values are converted from Baht at the official exchange rate of 20.8 Baht to \$1.00.

(U) Manpower Resources

Population: 32,939,000 as of 1 January 1968; males (ages 15-49) - 8,192,000; physically fit 5,000,000; average number reaching military age (18) annually, 1968 through 1972, about 315,000. Major components: Thai (including Thai-born "Chinese") - 92 percent; China-born Chinese - 3 percent; Malay - 3 percent; Other - 2 percent. Illiteracy (1967) 30-35 percent.

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(C) Conscription

Under the Thai draft law of 1954, males register at age 18. Those selected by lot are inducted for a 2-year term at the age of 21 in the army, navy, or air force. An annual class of 25,000 men are inducted semiannually (May, November) of an estimated 250,000 men annually available.

(S/NFD) Reserves

Upon release from the army, inductees serve 23 years in various classes of reserve status. There are no active reserve units. Limited reserve mobilization exercises have been conducted annually during the past few years. The standby reserve force on army rolls is 182,000. Under bilateral agreement of February 1966, there are about 4,400 recalled reservists currently serving as security guards at US installations. The navy has no known naval reservists. A reserve structure exists on paper for the air force, but there is no reserve training nor a practical plan for calling up reserves in an emergency.

(C/NFD) Mobilization Capacity

Without outside logistic support, full army mobilization could be reached on M+90 with 144,000 troops. The navy could mobilize with 23,750; air force mobilization beyond current levels without outside support is considered to be very small.

Armed Forces

(C) The Armed Forces maintain considerable prestige which results from a predominance of military in the government, business, and society. Military leadership generally has allied itself with the politically circumscribed but highly venerated monarchy in order to achieve national unity, improve the regime's image locally and internationally, and widen base of support among peasantry and other conservative elements. Military control is firmly entrenched and likely to remain key to political power in Thailand for a considerable period, although involvement of military leaders in corruption, regime's delay of democratic reforms, and close cooperation with US remain key targets of Communist propaganda.

Army

(C/NFD) Mission: The 99,800-man Royal Thai Army (RTA) is responsible for territorial defense and support of SEATO, with a company assigned to the UN Command in Korea. The army is traditionally employed as a political instrument by senior military officers.

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(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The army, supported by the National Police, is capable of only slight initial resistance to conventional attack of Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese forces. It could prevent aggression by Burma, Cambodia, or by the Pathet Lao acting independently, and it has a slight capability to maintain internal security against sustained guerrilla activities supported and directed by the Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese. The army's preparations for a conventional defense role have been modified in recent years in order to strengthen the country's counterinsurgency capabilities against the Communist threat. Army participation in the police and civilian agencies and countersubversion operations has increased considerable. There are now 7,000-8,000 troops committed to counterinsurgency, internal security, and development programs. Since completion of Special Forces counterinsurgency training in September 1967, RTA capability to conduct counterinsurgency and civic action has been significantly improved. One battalion at Sakhon Nakhon and another at Ban Pla Pak are presently fully committed to counterinsurgency activities. One alert company from each of the infantry regiments at Korat, Ubon, and Udorn provide support on request. Combat readiness is impeded by lack of adequate command supervision at all levels, insufficient combined arms and field training of units above battalion levels, inadequate air-ground operational training, preoccupation of senior officers with political and personal economic interests, lack of an effective logistic system to support units, inadequate combat intelligence support, and insufficient forward deployment of tactical forces. Dependence upon foreign sources for weapons and equipment also limits army's overall defensive capability.

(S) Status of Arms and Equipment: Weapons and equipment are predominantly of US origin, mainly of World War II vintage supplemented by more modern types. The acquisition of 4,500 M-16 rifles has increased the firepower, morale, and capability of troops engaged in Communist suppression operations.

(S/REF) Organization: The army is organized into four major military area commands, three of which contain one infantry division each, with a regimental combat team assigned to the fourth. The major combat units consist of three infantry divisions, one mechanized cavalry division, one antiaircraft artillery division (brigade), one independent regimental combat team, one special forces group (battalion), one airborne battalion, one field artillery division, and one volunteer regiment. Plans are currently in progress to convert the cavalry division into a regular infantry division in order to increase the army's counterinsurgency capability. In addition, there are Special Operations Centers (SOCs) which are directly under the Tactical Operations Center, Headquarters RTA, for control. The army air arm, with a total of 67 miscellaneous-type aircraft, of which 47 are assigned to tactical units, has very little capability to perform its mission of observation, rescue,

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reconnaissance, training, and some logistic support. The principal concentration of troops is in the Bangkok area and central Thailand and they serve as a coup deterrent and strategic reserve.

Navy

(S) Mission: The 21,800-man Royal Thai Navy (includes 7,500 Marines, 100 naval air and 500 WAVES) is responsible for the defense of the seaward approaches to Thailand (Gulf of Siam) by means of patrol operations, antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, and the transport and support of marine or other security forces conducting amphibious operations. In wartime, this mission would be carried out in conjunction with SEATO forces. Secondary missions of the navy are to assist the army in maintaining internal security and border security patrol along the Mekong River. One patrol (PGM) and one amphibious (LST) are presently operating in South Vietnam.


(S/INT) Capabilities and Limitations: The navy is capable of performing patrol missions and of providing transportation and support for amphibious operations. It can sealift one reinforced battalion. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, although limited by lack of experience in conducting ASW exercises, have improved because of modernization of its large submarine chasers and on-the-job training. Mine warfare forces have a small capability and the naval air has a modest surveillance/antisubmarine capability. The Marine Corps, one of the most effective services in Thailand, is capable of conducting small-scale (approximately battalion-size) landings against light resistance. One of the main weaknesses affecting operation of the navy's logistic system is a varied assortment of ships and equipment. Another is its dependence on foreign sources to supply petroleum products, ammunition, and spare parts. Three of the six river patrol craft (RPC) have been deployed to patrol the Mekong River.

(S) Status of Ships and Equipment: The navy's ships are generally in a low state of maintenance. The mass of its naval vessels were built during 1936-45 and include standard US and British World War II designs as well as ships built in Italy, Japan, and elsewhere before World War II. The age of these ships limits the navy's effectiveness. Postwar additions include ships and naval aircraft which are generally of US construction.

(S) Ship and Aircraft Strength

- 1 Destroyer Escort (DE)
- 35 Patrol (PF-11, PC-7, SC-8, PGM-7, BMR-2); 18 inactive
- 17 Mine Warfare (MSC-4, MMC-2, MSF-1, MSB-10); 5 inactive
- 40 Amphibious Ships and Craft (LST-3, LSIL-2, LSM-3, LSSL-1, LCU-6, LCM-19, LCVP-6) 5 MSBs inactive
- 11 Auxiliary (AG-1, AGS-1, AGSC-3, AO-2, AF-1, APC-2, ATF-1)
- 17 Service (YO-2, YP-1, YTL-3, YW-2, YFB-1, YTM-1, YAG-1, RPC-6)
- 7 Aircraft (S2F-6, HU-16D-1)

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1 January 1968

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(S/NPD) Organization: The navy's headquarters and main naval base are at Bangkok, and the Naval Station is at Ban Sattahip. The navy is organized into one fleet, consisting of one patrol, one anti-submarine, one mine warfare, and one service squadron. The Marine Corps consists of one brigade (RTC), and one service battalion.

Air Force

(S) Mission: The 21,400-man Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) is responsible for the air defense of the country, tactical air support of ground and naval forces, support of counterinsurgency units, and the aerial movement of personnel and equipment. Two C-47s are assigned to the UN Command in Korea and a 35-man contingent is conducting operational transport missions with the RVNAF in South Vietnam.


(S/NPD) Capabilities and Limitations: The air force is capable of engaging in tactical air operations including armed reconnaissance, air-to-ground support, and joint ground and amphibious operations. It has a limited capability to support the movement of personnel and equipment and a marginal to nonexistent capability for air defense. It is able to effect and maintain tactical air superiority against air forces in Southeast Asia, with the exception of Communist China and North Vietnam. As a result of an extensive reorganization, which was initiated in August 1967, the RTAF hopes to increase utilization of its aircraft by assigning like equipment together. Delivery of four F5A jet aircraft has increased the RTAF's close air support and all-weather capability. The RTAF's support for counter-subversive operations has also improved with the acquisition of additional H-34 helicopters. Poor utilization of resources, including personnel, has resulted in low in-commission rates, ineffective channels of command and guidance, improper assignment of personnel, and poor or inappropriate use of training. Logistic system is strained by arrival of new aircraft, deployment of units, and the lengthy supply procedures utilized for requisitions.

(S/NPD) Aircraft Strength: Total - 296 42 jet fighters (27 F-86Fs, 15 F-86Ls), 29 transports (8 C-123Bs, 21 C-47s), 53 helicopters (4 HH-43Bs turboprop, H-34C/Ds prop), 164 trainers (4 F-5As, 2 F-5Bs, 9 T-33As, and 7 T-37Bs jets, 47 T-28D, 69 T-6s, and 20 CHIPMUNKs prop), 14 miscellaneous types (11 U-10Bs, 2 C-45s, 1 C-54).

(S/NPD) Aircraft in Operational Units: Total - 240 39 jets (18 F-86Fs) 21 transports (7 C-123Bs, 10 C-47s), 144 trainers (4 F-5As, 2 F-5Bs, 8 T-33As, 7 T-37Bs, 47 T-28Ds, 24 T-6s, 16 CHIPMUNKs), 10 miscellaneous types (10 U-10Bs).

(S/NPD) Status of Aircraft and Equipment: All aircraft in the RTAF are of US origin with the exception of the T-30 (CHIPMUNK) trainers. Maintenance of fighter aircraft has improved; recent overall in-commission rates average approximately 60 percent. The radar network has improved considerably. Completion of the planned gap-filler sites and the Northwest Heavy Radar Site will give the RTAF an adequate AC&W system with respect to facilities.

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Paramilitary Forces

Border Patrol Police (BPP)

(C) Mission: The 7,600-man BPP has been expanding its regular police mission of maintaining border security and law and order by participating in active suppression of armed insurgency. The BPP is also responsible for various civic action programs devised to demonstrate government presence in remote border areas.

(S/REF) Capabilities and Limitations: The Border Patrol Police are well-accepted by local populace in the border area. Their training, arms and equipment status have significantly improved as a result of US assistance. Its overall force strength is considered inadequate for maximum effectiveness in conducting multi-purpose missions. The BPP is currently undergoing reorganization and expansion including addition of quick reaction counterinsurgency force of Mobile Reserve Platoons. These platoons are performing creditably, but airlift to date has been inadequate to take full advantage of their capability. The recent formation of the Thailand National Police Department (TNPD) Aviation Division, combining police air resources into a single manageable unit, plus current plans for developing an in-country helicopter training facility, will provide better organized air support to both quick reaction units and normal police operations. Within the next three years, the BPP plans to augment its force by some 3,000 men. In the meantime, by reorganizing the line platoons around lighter and better weaponry, it is hoped that even with less manpower per platoon they will increase their tactical capability and expand their operational areas. Political interference, budgetary limitations, and anticipated personnel procedures continue to reduce the overall effectiveness of this undermanned organization.

(C) Status of Arms and Equipment: Equipped with standard light infantry weapons. US aid is currently alleviating the shortage in small arms, communications equipment, and motor transport.

(S/REF) Organization: The BPP operates within eight regional commands. Recent reorganization plans call for 120 Line Platoons, 24 Mobile Reserve Platoons, 16 Heavy Weapons Platoons, and 9 Development Platoons, with newly adopted strength authorization of 30 men per platoon. Present known force consists of 114 Line Platoons and 21 Mobile Reserve Platoons. The BPP is a component of Provincial Police within the Thai National Police and under the Ministry of Interior control in peacetime. It is under the Minister of Defense Control in wartime or emergency period.

Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit

(C) Mission: The 500-man Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit is responsible for providing mobile force in support of BPP. Its wartime mission is to provide an airborne guerrilla striking force.

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(S) Capabilities and Limitations: The Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit is considered to be an effectively trained complement of the BPP and has a credible record of air rescue actions and border security operations. The 10-man operational teams of this unit can function independently. Its airborne capability is limited by the small size of the unit and inadequate air transport support.

(S) Status of Arms and Equipment: Units are equipped with small arms of US origin.

(S) Organization: Units are organized along the lines of a special force-type unit, and under the control of the Minister of Interior.

Other

(S) In addition to the foregoing paramilitary forces which strengthen the country's ground combat strength, there is a 22,000-man Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) which is a police-trained, part-time force established as a village defense-type organization to supplement the BPP in providing local security. Its effectiveness has been seriously limited in the past by inadequate training and obsolete weapons and equipment. Over 9,000 VDC trainees have completed a training program designed to prepare a countersubversion and village defense force of about 26,000 personnel, organized into 142 companies, two in each province plus one additional platoon in each of 42 sensitive border districts. VDC personnel and company-size units have participated successfully in field training exercises and countersubversion operations with army and BPP units.

(S) Special Action Forces (SAF), a component of the Provincial Police, are quick reaction units used to supplement police and military forces in sweep operations. There are presently twenty-two 50-man units in operation. In 1967, 840 of these men received counterinsurgency training.

(S) The Village Security Officer (VSO) Program became operational in October 1966. Since that time, some 1,300 armed men in approximately 190 sensitive villages have effectively contributed to the gathering of intelligence, served as guides and scouts in counterinsurgency operations, and conducted civic action/self-help projects. This force seems to be well received by the villagers. Plans are currently underway, however, to form a village security force which would absorb the existing units of the People's Action Teams and the Village Security Officers Program.

(S) There is also a Thai Marine Police unit (also known as Water Police) which is an antismuggling force of approximately 1,400 personnel and 116 watercraft of all types. Along the Mekong, the Marine Police program has upgraded Marine Police dockyard and maintenance facilities. The commissioning of 33 shallow-craft patrol boats has given that force a year-round patrol capability for the first time. The Marine Police role as a security force in Thailand will be enhanced when construction of 15 large patrol craft is completed in February 1968. Other missions of this force include enforcing law in harbor areas and preventing espionage and political disturbances in coastal areas.

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OPERATIONS IN THAILAND - BACKGROUND

~~(S)~~

(b)(1);1.4 (a)

Thailand is providing logistic and operating bases for current US operations in North Vietnam and Laos.


(S) The communists have declared publicly that Thailand is to be subverted in order to sever the nation's association with the West and to build popular support for a communist regime in Thailand. The communists' major effort is underway in the north-east rural areas where attempts are being made to exploit regional and ethnic differences, discontent with economic conditions, official corruption, and other central government shortcomings. Although the communists are not sufficiently organized and logistically supported to represent a direct threat to the Thai Government or to be capable of exerting control over any sizable, productive, or well-populated region of the country, they do pose a possible threat to US installations. The Royal Thai Government is taking corrective measures to curtail the terrorist activity which typifies the insurgent effort, and to remedy its past neglect of the northeast region of the country.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

S-4932/AP-4A

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Notice of Corrections to Southeast Asia Military Fact Book
AP-210-1-6-68-INT, dated January 1968

TO: Distribution List

1. The following pen and ink changes should be made to pages indicated.


- a. Page A-9, line 20, after the word "than" add "adequate. Additional."
- b. Page A-17, line 1 and 2, delete F-5Bs on line 1, 2 F-5Ds on line 2 and substitute "F-5B/Ds."
- c. Page A-17, line 3 add "9 L-20s)."
- d. Page A-63, line 19, change page A-61 to page "A-60."
- e. Page A-63, line 24, change page A-63 to page "A-62."
- f. Page A-63, line 38, insert "A-63a."
- g. Page A-64, line 12, change page A-63 to page "A-62."
- h. Page B-15, line 2, change 111 to "101."
- i. Page B-15, line 4, change 1 MI-4s to "12 MI-4s."
- j. Page D-9, line 12, add after 5 LCVP "5 LCU."
- k. Page D-9, after 2 C-47As add "5-C-47Bs."
- l. Page D-9, line 36, after 5 C-47Ds add "5-C-47Bs."

2. Page A-63a, attached, should be inserted as a new page.

3. The following pages should be replaced by the attached pages:

A-8, B-4, B-6, B-8, B-10, B-17, B-18, B-20 and D-2.

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)



1 Enclosure

9 pages (S)

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(U) Military Alliances and Agreements

South Vietnam receives military aid under MAP from the US for all three services. It is not a signatory of SEATO, although it is a protocol state which could receive protection from SEATO when threatened by external aggression. South Vietnam is not a signatory of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, and it generally does not attempt to adhere to these agreements. It is recognized "de jure" by 98 states, including the Vatican, and "de facto" by 8 states. At least thirty-two Free World nations have furnished or agreed to furnish some sort of aid. The following countries have sent varying size military contingents to aid the Government of Vietnam: Australia; Republic of China; Republic of Korea; New Zealand; Philippines; Thailand; and the US.

(C) Military Budget

For fiscal year ending 31 December 1967, \$355,932,000; 56 percent of total budget, 18 percent of the GNP. Dollar values converted from Piastres at the official exchange rate of 118 Piastres to \$1.00.

(U) Manpower Resources

Population: 17,194,000 as of 1 January 1968; males (ages 15-49) - 4,406,000; physically fit - 2,550,000; average number reaching military age (20) annually, 1968 through 1972, about 120,000. Major components: Annamites - 78 percent; Chinese - 8 percent; Moi - 5 percent; Cambodians - 4 percent; Others - 5 percent. Illiteracy (1967) 80-85 percent.

(C) Conscription

The partial mobilization decree of 25 October 1967, to take effect on 1 January 1968, envisions the following: (a) drafting by roster of young men between the ages of 18 and 33 years of age, 18-year olds will not be called up before the end of 1968; (b) requisitioning of specialists between the ages of 34 and 45; (c) suspension of discharges for military personnel aged 18 to 33, those with 6, 7, or 8 years service will not be retained; (d) recall of veterans still within the 18 to 33 age limit, exceptions would be made of those with more than six years of service; (e) abolition of draft deferments for men in government service and essential occupations; (f) limitation, according to standards to be set by the cabinet, of deferments for reason of education, religion, and residence abroad; and (g) mobilization in place, according to standards to be set by the cabinet, of certain specialists required by security organizations and businesses vital to the country's economic development.

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
Chain of Command

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

MINISTER OF DEFENSE
Nguyen Van Vy

CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF
Gen Cao Van Vien

• POSITION VACANT



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JANUARY 1966

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COMMUNIST (VIET CONG)

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



—— RVN CORPS BOUNDARY
—— VC MILITARY REGION(MR)BOUNDARY

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1 January 1968

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Government


(U) Hanoi, the capital of NVN, has a population of 400,000.* The country is politically divided into 17 provinces, two autonomous regions, two centrally governed municipalities, and one special zone. The NVN constitution provides for a national assembly, a highly centralized executive, universal suffrage for all citizens who are eighteen or older and for proforma elections for national and local assemblies. The ruling Communist political party - the Lao Dong (Vietnamese Workers) Party - has no organized opposition. It has approximately 700,000 members, comprising about three percent of the population. The Party is completely dominant and its members hold key posts in the government. It fully controls non-Communist national elements, and membership is a prerequisite to high military responsibility. The government is a Communist dictatorship and was so proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in 1945. The government has consolidated its political position and exchanges recognition with and receives aid from the Communist World. It seeks international recognition and unification of all of Vietnam under Communist control through political/insurgent action. The pressures of protracted war and the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute have generated some differences among the NVN leaderships; however, the interplay between the militant vs moderate and between the pro-Moscow and pro-Peiping factions has not reached a level which threatens the stability of the regime. North Vietnam, as a recipient of significant aid from both Communist China and the Soviet Union, officially has maintained an impartial attitude toward the Sino-Soviet dispute. An unprecedented, thinly-veiled attack against Mao Tse-tung's leadership in a recent issue of the Lao Dong Party journal, however, may be indicative of reportedly developing Sino-Soviet Vietnamese friction over the issue of China's Cultural Revolution, the conduct of the Vietnam war, and the question of peace negotiations.

(U) Significant Personalities and Their Posts

President and Chairman of the Lao... ..Ho Chi Minh
Dong (Communist) Party Central Committee
Bao Dong (Communist) Party 1st Secretary.....Le Duan
Chairman of Standing Committee of NVN.....Truong Chinh
National Assembly
Prime Minister.....Pham Van Dong
Deputy Prime Minister.....Pham Hung
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of.....Nguyen Duy Trinh
Foreign Affairs
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of.....Sr Gen Vo Nguyen Giap
National Defense
Deputy Prime Minister.....Le Thanh Nghi
Minister of Public Security (Alternate.....Tran Quoc Hoan
Member)

* This is an estimate based upon the present partial evacuation of the capital.

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(U) Significant Personalities and Their Posts (continued)

Commander in Chief, North Vietnamese.....Sr Gen Vo Nguyen Giap
Army (NVA)
Director, Research Bureau (responsible.....Sr Col Le Trong Nghia
for military intelligence)
Commander, Naval Forces, Coastal.....Sr Cpt Nguyen Ba Paht
Defense Bureau
Chief, Air Defense Command.....Unknown
Commander, Armed Public Security ForcePham Kiet
(APSF)

Agriculture, Economy, and Lines of Communication


(*) North Vietnam is predominantly an agricultural country with about 80 percent of the labor force engaged in this field. Agriculture accounts for about 45 percent of the gross national product (GNP). NVN's agriculture is mainly of the subsistence type; the main crops are rice, corn, sweet potatoes, manioc, and sugar cane. NVN is self-sufficient at a basic subsistence level. Caloric intake is 1,700-2,000 calories per day, per capita.

(S/NFD) The GNP for 1965 was estimated to equal US \$1.639 million which amounts to US \$92 capita. Major industries are food processing, textiles, machine building, mining, and cement. Foreign trade amounted to US \$299 million in 1965 (exports -- US \$104 million, imports -- US \$195 million). Eighty-five percent of the foreign trade is with the Communist countries and the remaining 15 percent is with non-Communist countries. The main exports are agriculture and handicraft products, coal, cement, and apatite. The principal imports consist of petroleum, steel products, railroad stock, vehicles, complex machinery and equipment, chemicals, medicines, and raw cotton. Considerable economic aid has been extended to NVN by Communist nations. Total non-military aid during the period 1955 to 1967 was US \$1.765 million of which Communist China supplied US \$705 million, USSR gave \$835 million, and the East European Communist countries furnished US \$225 million. The 1967 estimate of aid extended to NVN was about US \$340 million. NVN's main imports are petroleum, foodstuffs, industrial machinery and transportation equipment.

(*) The 665-route mile railroad system of North Vietnam is government-owned and operated and is generally adequate to meet the present military and economic requirements. The railroad system is relatively sparse; however, it is of prime importance in the area in which it serves. The lines serve the most densely populated regions, the largest industrial centers, and the principal port of Haiphong.

(*) Of the total route miles of rail lines in North Vietnam, there are approximately 520 miles of 3'3 3/8" gauge, 25 miles of 4'8 1/2" gauge, and 105 miles of dual-gauge (3'3 3/8" and 4'8 1/2"). All lines

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are single track and there is no electrification. The highway network totals about 7,300 miles of motorable roads, of which an estimated 700 miles have bituminous surface treatment; the remaining 6,600 miles have surfaces of crushed stone, gravel, or earth. Condition of these roads varies from poor to good. The highway network contains an estimated 10,000 crossings of possible significance, of which 3,000-4,000 are bridges. Although an estimated 2,500 bridges have been damaged or destroyed since the beginning of the air campaign, at least 1,500 (20 feet or over in length) remain on the selected highway system. There are 3,380 miles of inland waterways (1,500 miles navigable by shallow-draft river steamer during high water season (May-November) and about 900 miles navigable perennially). Freight carried in 1965 by rail was 790 million metric ton/km; by highway - 200 million metric ton/km; by waterways - 540 million metric ton/km; and by coastal shipping - 170 million metric tons/km. There are 13 ports (1 principal - Haiphong; 2 secondary; and 10 minor).

(C) The NVN merchant marine consists of six ships totaling 8,493 GRT, 11,589 DWT. It includes four cargo and two tankers. (Only two ships are over 1,000 GRT - November 1965.) The air transport fleet is made up of 54 aircraft, all of which are believed to be of military subordination. There are 14 airfields believed to have been in use since 1964. Three additional airfields are under construction. Of these, nine have permanent surface runways and 12 have runways in excess of 4,000 feet in length. Three of the fields are currently unserviceable as a result of US air strikes. NVN's minimal open-wire networks are supplemented by point-to-point radio. International telecommunication facilities are adequate and ample coverage is provided by radio and wired broadcast. There is no television in NVN. All lines of communication are subject to seasonal conditions.

(U) Insurgency

None


(C) Communist Influence

The Lao Dong (Communist) Party is completely dominant. Its members hold key posts in the government and they fully control non-Communist nationalist elements. As recipient of significant aid from both Communist China and the Soviet Union, North Vietnam officially has maintained impartial attitude toward Sino-Soviet dispute.

(C) Military Alliances and Agreements

Military alliances are prohibited under the 1954 Geneva Agreement; however, Chinese Communists have openly stated readiness to assist in defense of North Vietnam. The agreement also prohibits a net increase in war materiel, but terms have been violated and surface-to-air missiles, artillery, vehicles, and communications equipment, as well as aircraft and naval craft, have been provided by Communist World countries. Communist

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China and the USSR provide military support and train both NVA officers and NCO's including jet pilots. A secret tri-party agreement reportedly was signed last March permitting the transfer of Soviet aid to North Vietnamese ownership at the Sino-Soviet border for more expeditious transit across China to North Vietnam.

(S/MS) Value of Military Aid 1955 - 1967

Over US \$1.895 million in military aid has been provided during the period from the following countries: USSR - \$1.475 million, Communist China - \$420 million, and negligible amounts from the East European countries.

(U) Manpower Resources

Population: 18,707,000, as of 1 January 1968; males (ages 15-49) - 4,356,000; physically fit - 2,470,000; average number reaching military age (17) annually, 1968 through 1972, about 205,000. Major components: Kinh (Vietnamese) - 86 percent; Tay (Tha) - 3 percent; Muong - 2 percent; Thai - 2 percent; Nung - 2 percent; Others - 5 percent. Illiteracy (1967) 80-85 percent.

(C) Conscription

Compulsory military service system was implemented in 1959. All able-bodied males 17 to 30-years of age are subject to two or more years of service. In 1965, the period of service was extended indefinitely. Some males who have completed service have been recalled.


(C) Reserves

The reserve forces consist of: the Regional Forces, a lightly armed, full-time force organized on the basis of one battalion per province and subordinate to Military Region Headquarters; the armed provincial militia with headquarters elements in each provincial capital and units in each district; the self-defense forces organized in government agencies and civilian industry for local security and air defense; and a registered group, only partially armed, including overage, underage, and females, which has a potential reserve of about 3,000,000. Arms range from small arms and hand grenades to pikes and poles. The provincial militia and self-defense forces are organized into infantry-type units up to battalion size. Some training is provided by the army, Regional Forces, or the Armed Public Security Forces, depending on location of units in training.

(C) Mobilization Capacity (Army Forces)

Since mid-1965, North Vietnam has been mobilizing at an increasing rate to meet internal requirements and to provide for expanding commitments in South Vietnam and Laos. Manpower resources currently provide over

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
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
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NORTH VIETNAM RADAR INVENTORY

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1 January 1968

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CAMBODIA

Geography

(U) Cambodia is a small compact country that fronts on the Gulf of Siam and is bordered by Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam. The country has an area of 67,000 square miles, about the same as that of the state of Washington, and a population of approximately 6,541,000. The maximum north-south dimension is 275 miles and the maximum east-west dimension is 350 miles.

(U) Cambodia is made up mostly of plains, areas of hills and, in the northeast and southwest, some mountains. The central part of Cambodia consists of a low, nearly flat plain enclosed by flat to rolling plains. Mountains and hills range from gently rounded to steep and rugged; highest elevations approach 6,000 feet in the southwest.

(U) Vegetation consists primarily of wetland rice and open deciduous forest in the plains, and dense evergreen forest in the hills and mountains. Approximately 16 percent of the country is cultivated while 74 percent is forested.

(U) Principal drainage features are the Mekong, flowing south through the eastern part of the country, and the Tonle Sap lake in the west-central plains. The Mekong is generally 1,000 to 3,000 feet wide all year; it is 35 to 45 feet deep during high water (June through November or December) and mostly 10 to 15 feet deep at low water (December or January through May). The two major Cambodian tributaries to the Mekong are the Tonle Sap river and the Tonle Kong - Se San - Srepok river system. Tonle Sap lake, covering 1,200 square miles and 6 feet deep at low water, covers 3,500 square miles and is 36 feet deep at high water. The water from the lake flows southeast to the Mekong through the Tonle Sap river; from July through about October, however, when the Mekong floods, flow of the Tonle Sap river reverses into the lake.


(U) The country has a monsoonal climate consisting of two major seasons and two transitional seasons. The southwest monsoon or wet season (mid-May to early October) has frequently heavy precipitation, maximum cloudiness, and high humidity. In contrast, the northeast monsoon or dry season (early November to mid-March) has little precipitation, minimum cloudiness, and lower humidity. Seasonal temperature variations are small except at high elevations. The hottest months are during the spring transition when mean daily maximum temperatures are in the 90's (°F.) and mean daily minimums are in the mid-70's. The coldest months normally are December and January, averaging less than ten degrees cooler than the warmest months. Mean annual rainfall ranges from about 45 to 200 inches, the greatest amounts occurring in the southwest.

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SECRET

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SECRET



PREPARED BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIAAP)

1 January 1968

D-2

SECRET

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is intended to improve the Thai counterinsurgency posture and the operational readiness of the Thai armed forces and police establishments through an enlarged and accelerated program of training, additional equipment and facilities, and advisor assistance for counterinsurgency operations.

b. Expanding and improving the US logistical posture in Thailand, including LOC, to support current Thai-based US operations in SEA and to accept and support other major US combat forces if introduced.

(*) US strength in Thailand has increased to a total of almost 40,000 (see below) including three US Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings (see map, page E-22) and a US logistic base at Korat containing prepositioned equipment for a US Army infantry brigade. There are 15 B-52 aircraft with certain Army support units deployed at U Tapao. Operations into Vietnam commenced on 11 May 1967. US personnel strength in Thailand as of 6 July 1967 was as follows:

Air Force	30,453
Army	9,824
Navy/USMC/USCG	<u>42</u>
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS	40,319

(*) Certain military operations and all advisory efforts within Thailand are the responsibility of the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Thailand/Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group (COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAAG), a subordinate unified commander under the operational command of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). Air operations from Thai bases into Laos and against North Vietnam (and the US Air Force bases and facilities in Thailand which support these operations) are the responsibility of the Deputy Commander, 7th/13th Air Forces, Thailand, who is under the operational control of Commanders, 7th and 13th Air Forces respectively.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST
INTERVENTION
CAPABILITY

~~SECRET~~

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The last 14 pages
are denied in full IAW
FOIA b1 and b3
exemptions. Pages
not included.

CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITY TO INTERVENE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Ground Capabilities

(S//NF) The Chinese Communist ground force strength in the
Canton and Kunming Military Regions opposite Southeast Asia is

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

would further seriously degrade these theoretical
maximum Chinese Communist capabilities.

Air Capabilities:

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

without severely taxing their current aircraft inventory or exist-
ing airfield facilities.

Naval Capabilities:

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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(b)(1);1.4 (c)

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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(b)(1);1.4 (c)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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(b)(1);1.4 (c)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act