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DTG

090452Z OCT 96

FROM

(b)(3):10
USC 424

TO

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

(b)(3):10
USC 424

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

THIS IS A RETRANSMITTAL DUE TO NON-RECEIPT BY SOME ADDRESSEES

(b)(3):10
USC 424

SERIAL: (U)

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) **INDONESIA** (ID).

(b)(3):10
USC 424

SUBJ: (U) CAUTION IN RULES OF

- ENGAGEMENT IN JAKARTA. (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED~~

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10
USC 424

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DO I: (U) 960801.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

REQS:

(b)(1),(b)
(3):10 USC
424, 1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10
USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) ABRI USING CAUTION IN DEFINING
THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN JAKARTA CIVIL
DISTURBANCES.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

TEXT: 1. (U) DISCUSSED THE RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT, I.E. THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS ON THE USE OF
DEADLY FORCE IN THE RECENT **RIOTING** IN JAKARTA WITH
SEVERAL SOURCES. WHILE THE INFORMATION IS NOT
IDENTICAL FROM ALL SOURCES, IT IS CONSISTENT WITH

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE STREETS. LOCAL NEWS RELEASES IMPLYING A "SHOOT TO KILL" ORDER IS IN EFFECT ARE INCORRECT.

(b)(1),(b)
(3):10 USC 2. (C) [REDACTED] DESCRIBED FOUR LEVELS OF SECURITY ALERT USED BY ABRI. THESE ARE CODED A, B, C, AND D. LEVEL D IS THE LOWEST LEVEL AND REFLECTS A NORMAL SITUATION WHERE TROOPS ARE NOT DEPLOYED OR ARMED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES. LEVEL C DEPLOYS TROOPS WITH NON-LETHAL **RIOT** CONTROL EQUIPMENT ONLY, I.E. WICKER OR PLASTIC SHIELDS, BATONS, AND POSSIBLY GAS MASKS. LEVEL B INCLUDES A 50/50 MIX OF **RIOT** CONTROL GEAR AND PERSONAL WEAPONS. LEVEL A IS FULLY EQUIPPED, COMBAT READY TROOPS; TROOPS AT LEVEL A EXPECT TO USE DEADLY FORCE.

(b)(3):10
USC 424 3. (C) [REDACTED] ON 27 JULY, ARMY TROOPS DEPLOYED AS BACK UP TO THE **RIOT** POLICE WERE AT LEVEL C. **RIOT** CONTROL POLICE WERE ALSO AT LEVEL C, BUT HAVE A GREATER LEVEL OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT INCLUDING HELMETS WITH NECK PROTECTION AND EYE SHIELDS, PLASTIC SHIELDS, PROTECTIVE VESTS, GAS MASKS AND WOODEN STAVES. THE **RIOT** POLICE WERE NOT ARMED AT THAT TIME. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE POLICE WERE IN TACTICAL CONTROL OF THE SITUATION FROM 0500 UNTIL 1400 ON 27 JULY.

(b)(3):10
USC 424 4. (C) [REDACTED] AS THE SITUATION DETERIORATED ON 27 JULY, MG SUTIYOSO, MILITARY AREA COMMANDER FOR METROPOLITAN JAKARTA, ASSUMED PERSONAL COMMAND OF THE SITUATION AND AUTHORIZED AN INCREASED READINESS LEVEL OF B. IT TOOK SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE WEAPONS WERE DELIVERED.

(b)(3):10
USC 424 5. (C) [REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING ARE THE CURRENT RULES FOR USE OF DEADLY FORCE. FIRST, ONLY ONE OR TWO SELECTED MARKSMEN IN EACH PLATOON HAVE LIVE AMMUNITION. THEY ARE NOT TO LOAD UNTIL ORDERED TO DO SO, THEN ONLY IF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE MET;
A. A **RIOTOUS** PERSON IN CUSTODY FOR A VIOLENT CRIME CONTINUES TO ATTACK SECURITY FORCES.
B. A **RIOTOUS** PERSON IS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A VIOLENT CRIME AGAINST PERSONS OR PROPERTY.
C. A **RIOTOUS** PERSON ATTACKS SECURITY FORCES OR INSTALLATIONS WITH VIOLENT INTENT.

(b)(3):10
USC 424 6. (C) [REDACTED] THESE STRICT LIMITATIONS HAVE BEEN BRIEFED IN DETAIL TO COMMANDERS AND TROOPS, FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER.

7. (C) [REDACTED] DESCRIBED THE SEQUENCE FOR

(b)(1),(b)
(3):10 USC
424,1.4 (c)

EMPLOYING DEADLY FORCE. WHEN NORMAL POLICE AND MILITARY RESTRAINTS WERE EXHAUSTED AND THE ORDER IS GIVEN TO USE FIRE ARMS, THE FIRST RESPONSE WAS TO USE RUBBER BULLETS. IF THIS DID NOT SUFFICE, LIVE AMMUNITION WOULD BE FIRED AS WARNING SHOTS OVER THE HEAD OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S). IF THIS STILL FAILED TO DETER THE INDIVIDUAL, THE TROOPS WERE AUTHORIZED TO FIRE ONLY TO DISABLE OR WOUND. WHILE EVERY ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO AVOID ANY CASUALTIES, [REDACTED] STATED (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT THE SECURITY FORCES COULD NOT BE REFUSED THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE.

(b)(1),(b)
(3):10 USC
424,1.4 (c) 8. (C) [REDACTED] NOTED THAT MUCH OF THE DAMAGE AND AT LEAST TWO OF THE DEATHS THAT OCCURRED DURING THE **RIOTS** ON 27 JULY OCCURRED BECAUSE ABRI WAS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE MOB VIOLENCE. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE SECURITY FORCES WERE STRICTLY UNDER ORDERS TO AVOID CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND NOT TO USE EXTREME FORCE. THIS OBSESSION MEANT THE SECURITY FORCES COULD ONLY PROTECT LOCATIONS WHERE THEY HAD LARGE NUMBERS OF POLICE OR TROOPS. THE **RIOTERS** KNEW THAT ABRI WASN'T USING WEAPONS AND REACTED WITH IMPUNITY. [REDACTED] POLICE FRUSTRATION NO DOUBT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EXCESSIVE BEATINGS SOME POLICE INFLICTED ON **MEGAWATI** SYMPATHIZERS.)

(b)(1),(b)
(3):10 USC
424,1.4 (c) 9. (C) [REDACTED] EMPHATICALLY STATED THAT NOT A SINGLE BULLET HAD BEEN FIRED DURING THE ENTIRE TIME FROM 27 JULY UNTIL 1 AUGUST. THE RESTRAINT HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED, ONLY THE DAMAGE AND THE POLICE ACTIONS.

(b)(3):10
USC 424 1. (C) [REDACTED] 1. (C) THOUGH MOST WEAPONS DO HAVE THEIR MAGAZINES INSERTED, THIS IS COMMON PRACTICE WHETHER THE MAGAZINES HAVE AMMUNITION OR NOT. WHERE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CHECK, WE HAVE FOUND AMMUNITION ONLY ISSUED (b)(1),1.4 (c) CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDELINES PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] THIS IMPLIES DEADLY FORCE WHILE KEEPING IT VERY RESTRICTED. IT ALSO EXPLAINS WHY ON SOME OCCASIONS WE HAVE OBSERVED MAGAZINES IN AMMO POUCHES WITH LIVE AMMUNITION.

2. (C) ALL OUR CONTACTS TO DATE HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT THAT THEY ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THE DANGER OF OVER REACTION OR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. SEPARATE REPORTING WILL DETAIL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CASUALTIES, CAUSES, AND REACTIONS OF ABRI TO THE EVENTS OF THIS WEEK.

//IPSP: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10
ADMIN USC 424

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INSTR: (U) [redacted] (b)(3):10
PREP: (U) [redacted] USC 424
ACQ: (U) [redacted]
DISSEM: (U) [redacted]
WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted] (b)(3):10
- [redacted] USC 424
DRV FM: (U) DIA [redacted] MSG 291330Z JAN 96
DECL: (U) ~~XT~~.
BT (b)(3):10
#7862 USC 424
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