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FROM

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

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TO (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RUCUAAA/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE (b)(3):10 USC 424

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) MACDILL AFB FL (b)(3):10 USC 424

RHLBAAA/USCINCS (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

CONTROLS

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT ODB 14-92, **RWANDA** AND BURUNDI ,
, ETHNIC POWDERKEGS (U)

1. (U) KEY JUDGMENTS

A. ~~(S)~~ GROWING POLITICAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN **RWANDA** AND BURUNDI WILL CONTINUE TO THREATEN REGIONAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL AFRICA. MOREOVER, PRESSURES STEMMING FROM DEMOCRATIZATION, INSURGENCY, AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION WILL FURTHER INFLAME OLD ETHNIC RIVALRIES AND FUEL VIOLENCE.

B. ~~(S)~~ HARDLINE ELEMENTS IN THE ETHNICALLY SKEWED MILITARIES IN EACH COUNTRY WILL REMAIN POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO POLITICAL AND ETHNIC COMPROMISE. CHANCES ARE EVEN THAT PERCEIVED OR REAL DILUTION OF THEIR POWER WOULD SPARK A COUP, DERAIL REFORMS, AND LEAD TO WIDESPREAD ETHNIC VIOLENCE.

C. ~~(S)~~ **RWANDA'S** INSURGENCY WILL GO ON AS LONG AS THE RWANDON PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) CONTINUES TO RECEIVE SANCTUARY AND SUPPORT FROM UGANDA. IF LEFT UNCHECKED OR IF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, SPREADING VIOLENCE WOULD FURTHER DRAIN ALREADY LIMITED RESOURCES.

D. ~~(S)~~ CONTINUING VIOLENCE BY RADICAL HUTU DISSIDENTS IN BURUNDI MAY PROMPT ADDITIONAL CRACKDOWNS BY TUTSI HARDLINERS AND SLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF POWER, SHARING REFORMS. IT COULD ALSO FUEL SUSPICION OF RWANDAN SUPPORT FOR THE PALIPEHUTU AND BURUNDI AID TO THE RPF.

E. ~~(S)~~ REGIONAL RELATIONS WILL REMAIN STRAINED BY ETHNIC DIVISIONS THAT OVERLAP NATIONAL BORDERS, ASSOCIATED REFUGEE

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PROBLEMS, AND CHARGES OF FOREIGN COMPLICITY WITH DISSIDENTS. WESTERN ASSISTANCE AND MEDIATION WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO EASE TENSIONS AND AVOID CONFLICTS.

2. (U) OLD RIVALRIES FLARE

A. ~~(C)~~ POLITICAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS ARE INCREASING IN THE REMOTE, TINY, AND DENSELY POPULATED CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF **RWANDA** AND BURUNDI. PRESSURES FOR DEMOCRATIZATION, A CONTINUING INSURGENCY IN **RWANDA**, AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION HAVE INFLAMED TRADITIONAL STRAINS BETWEEN THE HUTU AND TUTSI ETHNIC GROUPS (ROUGHLY 85 PERCENT AND 14 PERCENT, RESPECTIVELY, IN BOTH COUNTRIES). BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE A HISTORY OF BLOODY ETHNIC RIVALRIES. FEARS OF RESURGENT VIOLENCE HAVE BEEN FUELED BY THE EMERGENCE OF ARMED ETHNICALLY BASED OPPOSITION GROUPS. THE TUTSI, DOMINATED RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE THE MAJORITY HUTU GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI, WHILE BURUNDI'S PARTY FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HUTU PEOPLE (PALIPEHUTU) PRESSURES THE MINORITY TUTSI REGIME IN BUJUMBURA. ASSOCIATED VIOLENCE HAS INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS AND IS THREATENING BOTH REGIONAL STABILITY AND THE POLITICAL REFORMS THAT OPPOSITION GROUPS IN EACH COUNTRY ARE DEMANDING.

3. (U) RPF INSURGENCY ,, THE FIRST DOMINO?

A. ~~(C)~~ PRIOR TO **RWANDA**'S INDEPENDENCE IN 1960, THE COUNTRY'S TUTSI MINORITY CONTROLLED THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY, DOMINATING THE HUTU MAJORITY IN A QUASI,FEUDAL FASHION. A BLOODY HUTU UPRISING IN 1959 RESULTED IN A SHIFT IN THE ETHNIC BALANCE OF POWER THAT HAS LEFT A LEGACY OF DISTRUST BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. OVER THE PAST THREE DECADES, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY TO ESCAPE HUTU DOMINANCE.

B. (U) RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT

(b)(1);1.4 (b);1.4 (d)

C. ~~(C/NF)~~ TENSIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS REFUGEE PROBLEM PEAKED IN 1990, WHEN 2,000-3,000 ARMED RPF DISSIDENTS CROSSED THE BORDER FROM NEIGHBORING UGANDA AND CLASHED WITH RWANDAN MILITARY TROOPS. SEVERAL MONTHS OF SPORADIC BUT INTENSE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE RPF LEFT SEVERAL THOUSAND DEAD AND PRODUCED A MILITARY STALEMATE. UNABLE TO HOLD CAPTURED TERRITORY, GUERRILLA FORCES FREQUENTLY RETREATED TO THEIR SANCTUARIES IN UGANDA.

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FIGHTING HAS EBBED AND FLOWED DESPITE THE FACT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN MARCH 1991. SMALL CONTINGENTS OF FRENCH, BELGIAN, AND ZAIRIAN FORCES WERE INITIALLY SENT IN TO BOLSTER THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BUT WERE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. MOST HAVE BEEN SINCE WITHDRAWN, AND ONLY 150 FRENCH TROOPS REMAIN.

D. (U) **RWANDA'S ARMED FORCES**

(S/NF) A LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE COMPRISING A 22,500-MAN ARMY, A 7,500-MAN GENDARMERIE, AND SMALL AIR AND NAVAL DETACHMENTS. . . FORCE STRENGTH EXPANDED FROM 12,500 IN 1990 TO MEET THREAT FROM RPF. . . ARMY RELATIVELY WELL-EQUIPPED AND ORGANIZED BY REGIONAL STANDARDS. . . PRIMARY MISSION IS INTERNAL SECURITY BUT FOCUS IS NOW ON EXTERNAL RPF THREAT. . . HAVE PERFORMED RELATIVELY WELL AGAINST RPF BUT WOULD BE HARD-PRESSED TO REPEL SUSTAINED ATTACK FROM UGANDA. . . RAPID EXPANSION HAS DILUTED PROFESSIONALISM AND INCREASED DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS.

E. (S/NF) THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER OF 1991, TENSIONS ALONG THE BORDER REMAINED HIGH AS REGIONAL AND ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, BROKERED TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF FAILED TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. HARASSING ATTACKS CONTINUED, AND MORE THAN 100,000 PEOPLE WERE LEFT DISPLACED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. HEAVY FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN IN NOVEMBER WHEN RPF FORCES MADE SEVERAL LARGE INCURSIONS INTO **RWANDA**. GOVERNMENT TROOPS WERE ABLE TO REPEL THESE AND SMALLER SUBSEQUENT ATTACKS IN JANUARY 1992, BUT THEY REMAIN UNABLE TO ELIMINATE OR STOP REBEL MOVEMENTS ON THE RWANDAN SIDE OF THE BORDER.

F. (S) FRENCH-SPONSORED TALKS IN PARIS BETWEEN THE RPF AND RWANDAN PRESIDENT JUVENAL HABYARIMANA'S REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS FLEXIBLE, BUT NEITHER SIDE TRUSTS THE OTHER. THE RPF CONTINUES TO DEMAND POWER, SHARING MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT, SECURITY FOR REFUGEES BEING REPATRIATED, AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION OF THE MILITARY. ITS PRIMARY MILITARY OBJECTIVE SEEMS TO BE TO ESTABLISH A FIRM FOOTHOLD INSIDE **RWANDA** SO IT CAN NEGOTIATE AS AN OPPOSITION FORCE ON RWANDAN SOIL.

G. (S) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR, HOWEVER, EXTENDS BEYOND THE REALM OF DEFINED POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES. WHILE THE INSURGENCY HAS FORCED HABYARIMANA TO ACCELERATE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REFORMS, IT HAS ALSO INFLAMED OLD ETHNIC FEARS AND AMBITIONS, FUELING HATRED AND CREATING A POTENTIAL CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. HOSTILITIES AND RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES HAVE NOT BEEN LIMITED TO MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS. ESTIMATES VARY, BUT RANDOM VIOLENCE BY HUTUS AND SECURITY FORCES AGAINST ETHNIC TUTSIS HAS RESULTED IN

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AT LEAST 300-400 DEATHS. DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CRISIS, THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ARRESTED OR DETAINED MORE THAN 8,000 SUSPECTED RPF SUPPORTERS (MAINLY TUTSIS). ALTHOUGH MOST HAVE BEEN RELEASED, THE EPISODE SERVED TO REINFORCE TUTSI ANGER AND FEARS. THE BACKLASH FROM THESE AND OTHER ABUSES WILL CONTINUE TO HINDER EFFORTS AT RECONCILIATION.

4. (U) BURUNDI - RESURGENT ETHNIC VIOLENCE

A. ~~(CONF)~~ IN CONTRAST TO **RWANDA'S** TUTSI POPULATION, BURUNDI TUTSIS HAVE RETAINED POWER SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1962, VIOLENTLY SUPPRESSING THE HUTU MAJORITY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. IN THE PAST 25 YEARS, MORE THAN 200,000 PEOPLE HAVE DIED IN ETHNIC VIOLENCE. PRESIDENT PIERRE BUYOYA HAS TRIED TO PROMOTE ETHNIC RECONCILIATION, BUT OLD HATREDS RUN DEEP. AN INCREASED NUMBER OF CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES AND ELEMENTS OF THE OUTLAWED PALIPEHUTU OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION HAVE HEIGHTENED TENSIONS IN RECENT MONTHS. THE LATEST INCIDENT OCCURRED IN NOVEMBER 1991 WHEN ARMED PALIPEHUTU DISSIDENTS STAGED SMALL SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST A NUMBER OF POLICE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN NORTHERN BURUNDI AND AROUND THE CAPITAL. THESE ACTIVITIES, AND A SUBSEQUENT MILITARY CRACKDOWN, RESULTED IN AT LEAST 500 DEAD, MORE THAN 40,000 NEW REFUGEES FLEEING THE COUNTRY, AND ANOTHER 40,000,50,000 PEOPLE DISPLACED WITHIN BURUNDI.

B. ~~(CONF)~~ THE SHEER MAGNITUDE OF THIS FALLOUT HIGHLIGHTS THE DEEP-SEATED FEAR OF RESURGENT ETHNIC VIOLENCE THAT IS SO PREVALENT AMONG THE POPULATION. THE HUTUS ARE STRUGGLING TO BALANCE THESE FEARS WITH THE NEW POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARE NOW BEING PRESENTED TO THEM IN PRESIDENT BUYOYA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM. MODERATE HUTUS RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO REFRAIN FROM PUSHING TOO HARD, TOO FAST, BUT RADICALS IN THE PALIPEHUTU ARE WILLING TO USE VIOLENCE TO FORCE THE TRANSITION. THEY DO NOT TRUST BUYOYA, AND THEY WANT TRUE MAJORITY RULE, NOT TUTSI-CONTROLLED POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS. ANY PERCEIVED DELAY IN REFORMS WILL INCREASE THE THREAT OF ADDITIONAL PALIPEHUTU VIOLENCE AND PROBABLE BACKLASH FROM TUTSI HARDLINERS.

C. (U) BURUNDI'S ARMED FORCES

(1) ~~(CONF)~~ A 13,100-MAN LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE WITH SMALL AIR AND NAVAL DETACHMENTS. . . MILITARY INCLUDES A 4,000-MAN GENDARMERIE AND POLICE. . . ARMY RELATIVELY WELL-TRAINED AND EQUIPPED BY REGIONAL STATES, DARDS. . . SUFFERS FROM LOGISTICS PROBLEMS. . . PRIMARY MISSION IS INTERNAL SECURITY BUT COULD REPEL ATTACK FROM **RWANDA**. . . WOULD REQUIRE EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO DEFEND

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AGAINST COMBINED OR SUSTAINED ATTACK FROM LARGER NEIGHBORS.

5. (U) MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

A. ~~(S)~~ AS PRESSURES IN BOTH COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO MOUNT, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE RESPECTIVE LEADERS' ABILITIES TO LIMIT OR CONTROL ANY ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE. A KEY FACTOR IN MAINTAINING THAT CONTROL WILL BE THE ROLE AND LOYALTY OF EACH PRESIDENT'S TRADITIONAL POWERBASE, - THE MILITARIES. THEIR SUPPORT FOR ONGOING REFORMS WILL BE ESSENTIAL.

B. ~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH THE HUTU-DOMINATED MILITARY IN **RWANDA** REMAINS LOYAL TO HABYARIMANA, GRDWING DISENCHANTMENT IS SURFACING. THE MILITARY HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED BY THE PRESIDENT'S FAILURE TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE RPF INSURGENCY. THE MILITARY STALEMATE HAS FURTHER UNDERMINED MORALE, DRAINED ALREADY, LIMITED RESOURCES, WEAKENED DISCIPLINE, AND SPAWNED ABUSES OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. SIMILAR FRUSTRATION WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA HAS LED SOME ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY TO CRITICIZE NEW, LEGALIZED OPPOSITION PARTIES, LABELING THEM TOOLS OF THE RPF. VIGILANTE ATTACKS AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO ROGUE MILITARY ELEMENTS. WHETHER THESE HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED BY THE PRESIDENT OR IF THEY ARE JUST INDICATIVE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HABYARIMANA IS HAVING CONTROLLING THE MILITARY IS UNCLEAR. A RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE OVER THE LAST 2 YEARS HAS PROBABLY DILUTED THE LEVEL OF PROFESSIONALISM AND COMPOUNDED DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE FORCE'S SHEER SIZE HAS INCREASED THE AMOUNT OF POWER THE MILITARY WIELDS. HABYARIMANA CAN ILL AFFORD TO NEGLECT OR UNDERESTIMATE ITS CONCERNS.

C. ~~(S)~~ LIKE HABYARIMANA, BURUNDI'S BUYOYA IS KEENLY AWARE OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE LOYALTY OF HIS MILITARY DURING HIS COUNTRY'S POLITICAL TRANSITION. COGNIZANT OF THE DANGER OF ANY POTENTIAL MILITARY BACKLASH, BUYOYA HAS SPENT A GREAT AMOUNT OF TIME TALKING WITH AND EXPLAINING HIS REFORMS TO THE TROOPS. WHILE DIA BELIEVES HE HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES, SOME TUTSI HARDLINERS REMAIN POTENTIAL OBSTACLES THAT THE PRESIDENT MUST DEAL WITH OR NEUTRALIZE. THEY RESENT BUYOYA'S FAILURE TO DEAL MORE HARSHLY WITH PALIPHEHUTU DISSIDENTS AND PROBABLY FEAR THE PRESIDENT IS GIVING THE HUTUS TOO MUCH TOO QUICKLY IN THE POWER-SHARING GAME. THE OVERZEALOUS MILITARY CRACKDOWN FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER UNREST IS INDICATIVE OF THIS SENTIMENT.

D. ~~(S)~~ THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY:
RWANDA **BURUNDI**

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1989,90 DIALOGUE/COMMISSIONS 1991
/STUDIES ON POSSIBLE
REFORMS.
JULY 1990 ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVE JANUARY 1992
TO MULTIPARTY SYSTEM.
JUNE 1991 NEW CONSTITUTION MARCH 1992\$
ADOPTED/APPROVED BY
REFERENDUM.
AUGUST,OCTOBER 1991 NEW PARTIES REGISTER AND APRIL 1992\$
BEGIN OPERATING.
NOVEMBER 1991 TALKS TO FORM TRANSITIONAL ,-
GOVERNMENT BEGIN.
LATE 1992\$ FIRST NATIONAL JANUARY,
MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS. MARCH 1993\$
\$PROPOSED OR PROJECTED DATES

E. ~~(CONF)~~ WHILE ADDRESSING TUTSI INTERESTS IN BURUNDI'S
MILITARY, BUYOYA IS ALSO TRYING TO APPEASE HUTU CONCERNS. THE
GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN TO INTEGRATE MORE HUTUS INTO THE ARMED FORCES,
BUT TUTSIS CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE OFFICER CORPS AND CONTROL ALL
KEY COMMAND POSITIONS. MOST HUTUS ARE BEING BROUGHT IN AT THE
LOWER RANKS, AND THE FEW WHO HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED FOR OFFICER
TRAINING WILL NOT ATTAIN COMMAND POSITIONS FOR AT LEAST 4 TO 6
YEARS. EVEN THEN, CONTINUING TUTSI BIAS IN THE PROMOTION PROCESS
WILL PROBABLY SLOW ADVANCEMENT AND FUEL TENSIONS. ANY ATTEMPT TO
ACCELERATE FORCE INTEGRATION MAY SUSTAIN ETHNIC TENSIONS AND

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UNDERMINE BUYOYA'S CONTROL. AS LESS EDUCATED OR TRAINED HUTUS ARE
BROUGHT IN, THE SITUATION MAY ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT THE MILITARY'S
CAPABILITIES AS LIMITED RESOURCES ARE STRETCHED THINNER AND AS THE
LEVEL OF PROFESSIONALISM DECLINES.

6. (U) DEMOCRATIZATION - FANNING THE FLAMES

A. ~~(C)~~ WHILE DEMOCRATIC REFORMS ARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE LONG-
TERM STABILITY, IN THE SHORT RUN, THEY ARE FUELING EACH COUNTRY'S
INHERENT INSTABILITY. LONGSTANDING ETHNIC HATRED AND MISTRUST ARE
HINDERING OR SLOWING EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE POWER,SHARING MEASURES
AND THE FORMATION OF NEW, STABLE, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.
REGIONAL AND CLAN RIVALRIES WITHIN THE RULING FACTIONS COMPOUND
PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE HUTUS AND THE TUTSIS, ADDING TO THE COMPLEXITY
OF EXISTING ETHNIC TENSIONS AND MAKING POLITICAL COMPROMISE THAT
MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. BURUNDI'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY HAS BEEN
SOMEWHAT SMOOTHER THAN WAS **RWANDA'S**, BUT BOTH COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO
FACE SIGNIFICANT ETHNIC-RELATED HURDLES THAT INCREASE THE RISK OF

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VIOLENCE.

B. ~~(S)~~ IN **RWANDA**, HABYARIMANA IS ATTEMPTING TO APPEASE COMPETING HUTU INTERESTS WHILE TRYING TO ADDRESS RPF DEMANDS FOR INCREASED TUTSI REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT. JANUARY 1992 DEMONSTRATIONS BY OPPOSITION PARTIES IN KIGALI HIGHLIGHT GROWING FRUSTRATION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FAILURE TO FORM A BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN BURUNDI, BUYOYA IS STILL TRYING TO BALANCE THE DEMANDS OF THE HUTU MAJORITY WITH THOSE OF TUTSI HARDLINERS, WHO FEAR THEY ARE GIVING UP TOO MUCH POWER. ALTHOUGH MANY MORE HUTUS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE GOVERNMENT, THE RAW BALANCE OF POWER REMAINS HEAVILY SLANTED IN THE TUTSIS' FAVOR. AS THE RESPECTIVE TRANSITIONS PROCEED, BOTH LEADERS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO SEEK COMPROMISE AMONG MODERATES WHILE ATTEMPTING TO CO-OPT OR NEUTRALIZE HARDLINERS.

7. (U) REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

A' ~~(S)~~ ADDITIONAL ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN EITHER **RWANDA** OR BURUNDI MAY CREATE BROADER REGIONAL PROBLEMS. THIS INCLUDES SPILLOVER OR CROSS-BORDER DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH THE OTHER, LARGER NEIGHBORING STATES OF UGANDA, ZAIRE, AND TANZANIA.

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ AS MISPERCEPTIONS AND FEARS AMONG THE VARIOUS PLAYERS INCREASE, VIOLENCE MAY SPREAD, AND LOW-LEVEL REGIONAL CONFLICT COULD EASILY DEVELOP. TENSIONS BETWEEN **RWANDA** AND UGANDA, AND **RWANDA** AND BURUNDI, HAVE ALREADY INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE RWANDAN MILITARY'S SHELLING OF RPF POSITIONS INSIDE UGANDA AND BUJUMBURA'S CHARGES OF RWANDAN SUPPORT TO THE PALIPEHUTU HAVE ONLY FANNED THE FLAMES. IN RECENT MONTHS, UGANDA'S PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS THREATENED TO RETALIATE IF THE RWANDAN MILITARY FAILS TO CEASE ITS ALLEGED BORDER VIOLATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, A NUMBER OF RWANDANS IN BURUNDI HAVE BEEN DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING AS BUYOYA'S REGIME LOOKS FOR POSSIBLE TIES BETWEEN KIGALI AND BURUNDI DISSIDENTS. WHILE NONE OF THE GOVERNMENTS WANTS TO SEE ANY ADDITIONAL STRAINS IN STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS, VARIOUS INTERNAL FACTIONS ARE PRESSURING THEM TO ADDRESS THESE PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREATS OR CHALLENGES. THESE ISSUES, WHEN COUPLED WITH THE LARGE NUMBER OF DISPLACED PEOPLE ALONG THE VARIOUS BORDERS (INCLUDING ARMED DISSIDENTS), CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE SMALLEST SPARK COULD QUICKLY SPIRAL OUT OF CONTROL.

C. ~~(S/NF)~~ INCREASED TENSIONS WILL CONTINUE TO INVITE OUTSIDE MEDDLING. UGANDA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RPF IS THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLE. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING SANCTUARY FOR THE RPF, UGANDAN ASSISTANCE HAS INCLUDED SMALL AMOUNTS OF FOOD, MEDICINE, AND

LOGISTIC SUPPORT. UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY BLATANT MILITARY AID, BUT KAMPALA EVIDENTLY PROVIDES SOME LIMITED ASSISTANCE.

D. ~~(S/NF)~~ MOTIVATING FACTORS BEHIND UGANDA'S INVOLVEMENT ARE NOT LIKELY TO FADE AWAY. IN ADDITION TO SOME REPORTED PERSONAL ETHNIC AFFILIATION WITH THE TUTSIS, MUSEVENI FEELS A DEBT TO THE RWANDAN REFUGEES IN HIS OWN ARMY WHO HELPED HIM SEIZE POWER IN 1986. MANY SENIOR RPF COMMANDERS WERE TRAINED MEMBERS OF MUSEVENI'S NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY (NRA) AND PROBABLY CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH THE NRA. MUSEVENI IS ALSO UNDER INCREASING DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO RETALIATE AGAINST RWANDAN MILITARY OPERATIONS ALONG THE BORDER. CONNECTED WITH THIS, OF COURSE, IS UGANDA'S DESIRE TO RID ITSELF OF AN INCREASINGLY BURDENSOME REFUGEE PROBLEM. THOUGH NOT OVERWHELMING, IT IS A DRAIN ON KAMPALA THAT MUSEVENI WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO END. THE LAST THING HE WANTS IS ANOTHER ARMED GROUP ON UGANDAN TERRITORY THAT MIGHT SOMEDAY CHALLENGE HIS CONTROL.

E. ~~(S/NF)~~ CHARGES OF LIBYAN MEDDLING WILL ALSO HEIGHTEN REGIONAL TENSIONS. BUYOYA (WHO EXPELLED LIBYAN DIPLOMATS FOR MEDDLING IN BURUNDIAN POLITICS) HAS CHARGED THAT QADHAFI'S AGENTS IN **RWANDA** ARE AIDING THE PALIPEHUTU. AT THE SAME TIME, KIGALI BELIEVES THE BULK OF THE RPF'S WEAPONS FROM UGANDA ARE OF LIBYAN ORIGIN.

F. ~~(S)~~ VARIOUS REGIONAL EFFORTS TO QUELL TENSIONS PROBABLY HAVE A LESS, THAN, EVEN CHANCE OF SUCCESS. BOTH ZAIRE AND TANZANIA HAVE AT SOME POINT ATTEMPTED TO PLAY THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR. TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI HAS MANAGED TO GET MUSEVENI AND HA8YARIMANA TOGETHER FOR PERIODIC TALKS, BUT THE RECENT UPSWING IN HOSTILITIES ALONG THE UGANDAN BORDER INDICATES BOTH LEADERS HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO IN ANY JOINT EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

G. ~~(S/NF)~~ ZAIRE, ONE OF THREE COUNTRIES TO DEPLOY TROOPS IN **RWANDA** LAST YEAR AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO BOLSTER THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT, FACES A DIMINISHED CAPACITY AS A MEDIATOR. KINSHASA'S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WAS LARGELY THE RESULT OF MUTUAL SECURITY PROVISIONS IN THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF THE GREAT LAKES (CEPGL) ,, A REGIONAL COOPERATION ALLIANCE INVOLVING ZAIRE, BURUNDI, AND **RWANDA**. THE CEPGL MAY YET PROVIDE THE BEST VENUE FOR REGIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF HOSTILITIES, BUT, CONSIDERING ZAIRE'S OWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS, WESTERN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. WHAT IS LEFT OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN KINSHASA IS NOW IN NO POSITION TO INTERVENE AND MUST DEPEND HEAVILY ON FOREIGN RELIEF AGENCIES TO CARE FOR THE HUGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES THAT HAVE COME INTO EASTERN ZAIRE FROM BURUNDI (APPROXIMATELY 30,000). THE DISORGANIZED STATE OF ZAIRE'S MILITARY

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FORCES IN THE INTERIOR LEAVES THE SECURITY SITUATION ALONG THE BURUNDI AND RWANDAN BORDERS EXTREMELY UNCERTAIN. KINSHASA'S ABILITY TO CONTROL ANY POSSIBLE SPREAD OF CROSS-BORDER ETHNIC VIOLENCE IS PROBABLY VERY LIMITED. INITIATION OF LOW-LEVEL VIOLENCE IN THE AREA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE.

8. (U) OUTLOOK

A. ~~(S/NF)~~ DIA BELIEVES THAT BOTH **RWANDA** AND BURUNDI WILL
/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

GRADUALLY IMPLEMENT POLITICAL REFORMS OVER THE NEXT 6-12 MONTHS BUT THAT VIOLENCE WILL NOT CEASE BECAUSE SOME ELEMENTS WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT POWER-SHARING COMPROMISES. THE SIZE OF CONTINUING THREATS TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATIONS WILL DEPEND ON THE ABILITIES OF THE RESPECTIVE HEADS OF STATE AND OTHER MODERATES TO GRADUALLY CO-OPT OR NEUTRALIZE THE REMAINING HARDLINERS ON BOTH SIDES. THE MILITARIES, IN PARTICULAR, COULD QUICKLY TURN ON THEIR RESPECTIVE LEADERS IF THEY PERCEIVE ANY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF POLITICAL OR ETHNIC POWER.

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ IN **RWANDA**, THE STALEMATED RPF INSURGENCY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE, BUT THE DISSIDENTS ARE UNLIKELY TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT OR COMPLETELY DERAILED THE TRANSITION. THE SCOPE AND DURATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL DEPEND ON THE LEVEL OF CONTINUED UGANDAN SUPPORT TO THE RPF AND ON WHETHER WAR FATIGUE AND CASUALTIES FINALLY FORCE THE RPF TO COMPROMISE AT THE BARGAINING TABLE. UGANDAN SUPPORT FOR ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WILL BE A KEY TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND KIGALI WILL PROBABLY STEP UP ITS EFFORTS TO APPEASE KAMPALA'S CONCERNS. UNTIL THEN, MUSEVENI WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT RPF MILITARY PRESSURE TO ENSURE TUTSI PARTICIPATION IN ANY NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES. HOWEVER, HE IS UNLIKELY TO ALLOW UGANDA TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES ALONG THE BORDER (UNLESS, OF COURSE, RWANDAN TROOPS BEGAN CONDUCTING HOT-PURSUIT OPERATIONS INTO UGANDA).

C. ~~(S/NF)~~ IN BURUNDI, ETHNIC POWER SHARING WILL COME FIRST IN THE GOVERNMENT AND SECOND IN THE MILITARY. FOR THE NEAR TERM, BUYOYA APPEARS CAPABLE OF APPEASING HARDLINERS, BUT AT SOME POINT DILUTION OF TUTSI CONTROL MAY PROMPT A CHALLENGE TO HIS LEADERSHIP FROM WITHIN THE MILITARY.

D. ~~(S/NF)~~ A POSSIBLE, BUT LESS LIKELY, SCENARIO MAY ENTAIL INCREASED OR MORE WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE. DOMESTIC POLITICAL REFORMS IN EITHER COUNTRY COULD BE DERAILED BY HARDLINERS WHO INSTIGATE RENEWED LARGE-SCALE ETHNIC MASSACRES OR POSSIBLY EVEN ATTEMPT A COUP. THE THREAT IS SLIGHTLY GREATER IN **RWANDA** BECAUSE AN

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EXTERNALLY SUPPORTED INSURGENCY ALREADY EXISTS. BURUNDI'S HISTORY OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE, HOWEVER, IS INDICATIVE OF HOW QUICKLY THINGS MIGHT SPIRAL OUT OF CONTROL THERE ALSO. CROSS-BORDER REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN EITHER SITUATION COULD ESCALATE AS HUGE NUMBERS OF DISPLACED PERSONS ATTEMPT TO FLEE INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE. THIS WOULD SEVERELY STRAIN ALREADY HARD-PRESSED HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. THE TRANSIENT NATURE OF LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION WOULD INCREASE HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS AND ACCELERATE THE SPREAD OF AIDS (ALREADY WIDESPREAD IN THE REGION). AS SCARCE RESOURCES WERE FURTHER STRETCHED, DESPERATION WOULD FUEL VIOLENCE, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MILITARY UNITS MIGHT QUICKLY DETERIORATE. THE RISK OF UNSANCTIONED CROSS-BORDER MILITARY OPERATIONS COULD FOLLOW. UGANDA, IN PARTICULAR, MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO STEP UP SUPPORT FOR THE RPF.

E. ~~(CONF)~~ DIA BELIEVES THE LEAST LIKELY OUTCOME IS A PEACEFUL CONCLUSION OF ONGOING POLITICAL REFORMS AND ASSOCIATED POWER, SHARING MEASURES. THIS IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY GIVEN THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN BOTH COUNTRIES. HARDLINERS IN THE RULING ELITES FEEL THREATENED AND WOULD HAVE TO BE ISOLATED AND FORCED TO COMPROMISE. ONLY ONCE ASSURED OF LEGITIMATE PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN TRANSITIONAL OR DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS WOULD ARMED DISSIDENTS BE WILLING TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND COOPERATE. AMNESTY FOR DISSIDENTS AND THE SECURITY OF REFUGEES BEING REPATRIATED WOULD HAVE TO BE GUARANTEED. INTEGRATION OF OPPOSITION OR MINORITY ETHNIC ELEMENTS INTO THE MILITARIES WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT, PROBABLY REQUIRING INCREASED WESTERN ASSISTANCE.

9. (U) IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

A. ~~(C)~~ BOTH **RWANDA** AND BURUNDI WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE WEST FOR GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT IN ONGOING ATTEMPTS AT CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION. IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ARENAS, NEITHER OF THESE COUNTRIES HAS THE KIND OF EXPERIENCE OR EXPERTISE THAT WILL BE REQUIRED TO NURTURE COMPLEX REFORMS. WESTERN GUIDANCE ON ELECTORAL CODES, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS, AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT WILL BE ESSENTIAL. THE SUCCESS AND STRENGTH OF NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS WILL HINGE ON CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS FOR ECONOMIC REFORMS. HOWEVER, WESTERN PLAYERS MUST FIRST CONFRONT A NUMBER OF SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES.

B. ~~(C)~~ MOST NEAR-TERM DIFFICULTIES WILL CENTER ON HUMANITARIAN AID. ALTHOUGH WESTERN RELIEF AGENCIES HAVE THUS FAR BEEN ABLE TO HANDLE MOST REFUGEE-RELATED ASSISTANCE, UNTIL FULL-FLEDGED REPATRIATION EFFORTS CAN BEGIN, LARGE AMOUNTS OF AID MAY BE

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REQUIRED. FOOD AVAILABILITY IS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM YET, BUT DISTRIBUTION OF IT IS. MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN IN ISOLATED AREAS MAY COMPOUND LOGISTICS PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TRYING TO SUPPLY THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS WHO ARE NOW DISPLACED ACROSS THE REGION.

C. ~~(C)~~ MORE SERIOUS WILL BE THE THREAT OF INCREASED VIOLENCE. WHILE THE BLOODIEST EPISODES HAVE OCCURRED IN OUTLYING AREAS, RECENT EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT VIOLENCE IN THE CAPITALS IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. WESTERN NATIONALS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE TARGETED, BUT THEY COULD BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE SHOULD ETHNIC HOSTILITIES ESCALATE OUT OF CONTROL.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c);Sec. 1.4(d)

IF UGANDAN AID TO THE RPF INCREASES, ADDITIONAL FRENCH OR WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE MILITARY MAY BE NEEDED TO CURB THE SPREAD OF INSURGENCY. OVER THE LONG TERM, INCREASED SECURITY AID TO BOTH COUNTRIES MAY BE NECESSARY TO HELP INTEGRATE AND DEPOLITICIZE THE FORCES.

D. (U) THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION AS OF 15 FEBRUARY 1992.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. (U) ~~CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES:~~

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