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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

HEADER

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TO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC/

INFO RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

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RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

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RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC

MACDILL AFB FL

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUWSMXI/USCINCTrans

SCOTT AFB IL

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

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RUEALGX/SAFE WASHDC

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CONTROLS

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SERIAL: (U)

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) INDONESIA (ID).

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USC 424

//IPSP: (U)

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY

(b)(3):50
USC 3024
(i)

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- FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT

- CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 990427. (b)(3):10 USC 424

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (C)

SUMMARY: (C) (b)(1),1.4 (b) DISCUSS EAST TIMOR MILITARY STRATEGY, COVER-UPS DURING RECENT MILITARY TRIALS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT. MILITARY PERSONNEL BELIEVE PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S EAST TIMOR POLICY WAS A MISTAKE - MADE WITHOUT PROPER CONSULTATION - POORLY THOUGHT OUT - AND WITHOUT NECESSARY PREPARATION OR ADEQUATE TIME TO "SOCIALIZE" THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE. (b)(3):10 USC 424

TEXT: 1. (C) (b)(1),1.4 (b) VISITED

(b)(1),1.4 (b)

2. (C) (b)(1),1.4 (b) SAID THAT GENERAL WIRANTO AND THE MILITARY SENIOR-LEVEL LEADERSHIP ARE NOT TRYING TO DELIBERATELY UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENT'S EAST TIMOR POLICY. POINTING TO WIRANTO'S "PATTERN OF DECISION-MAKING," HE CLAIMED THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IS RELUCTANT TO PUT THE MILITARY INTO DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION. WIRANTO WANTS TO AVOID A LARGE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION DUE TO CONCERNS TNI WILL AGAIN BE ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THUS, WIRANTO'S MISSION STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN VAGUE, WHILE THE ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS HAS ALSO FAILED TO PROVIDE CLEAR GUIDANCE ON EAST TIMOR. AS A CONSEQUENCE, (b)(1),1.4 (b) CLAIMED THAT EAST TIMOR MILITARY COMMANDER COL TONO ((SURATMAN)) HAS BEEN CONFUSED AND UNSURE WHAT TO DO. AGGRAVATING MATTERS, (b)(1),1.4 (b) SAID THE LOCAL TIMORESE TERRITORIAL TROOPS HAVE BEEN HELPING BOTH SIDES IN THE CONFLICT WITHOUT AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION TO TRADITIONAL SUPPORT TO THE PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS, THERE ARE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF TIMORESE TROOPS WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS AND ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THEM, HE SAID. (POL COMMENTS. WE HAVE HEARD THIS FROM PRO-INDEP SOURCES AS WELL).

3. (C) (b)(1),1.4 (b) SAID THAT MOST SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS WERE NOT HAPPY WITH PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S EAST TIMOR POLICY BECAUSE THE ARMED FORCES WERE NOT CONSULTED IN THE DECISION. HE SAID THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT POLICY HAS CREATED "AN ECHO EFFECT" THROUGHOUT INDONESIA ENCOURAGING SEPARATIST ACTIVITY IN PLACES LIKE ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA. THE EAST TIMOR POLICY HAS HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON MILITARY MORALE BECAUSE, IN THE PAST, THE MILITARY ALWAYS FOLLOWED NATIONAL POLICY AND DIRECTION FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL. NOW IT LOOKS LIKE THAT PAST POLICY HAS BEEN REVERSED AND THAT MILITARY SACRIFICES IN EAST TIMOR ARE NOT RECOGNIZED (ONLY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES). THEREFORE, AT LEAST TO SOME EXTENT,

MILITARY MEMBERS FEEL A SENSE OF BETRAYAL OVER THE NEW POLICY.

4. (C) (b)(1), 1.4 (b) DISCUSSED THE RECENT MILITARY TRIALS OF KOPASSUS SOLDIERS CHARGED WITH KIDNAPPING/TORTURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND POLICE PERSONNEL CONVICTED OF SHOOTING SEVERAL STUDENTS AT TRISAKTI LAST YEAR. (b)(1), 1.4 (b) ADMITTED IN FRONT OF HIS STAFF THAT HIGH LEVEL OFFICER COVER-UPS WERE POSSIBLE IN THESE CASES. BUT, IF SO, IT WAS FOR THE GREATER GOOD OF THE NATION, HE SAID. IF YOU PURSUE THE MORE SENIOR PEOPLE INVOLVED, IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE WELFARE OF THE NATION. TO OUTSIDE OBSERVERS, IT MAY LOOK LIKE THE MILITARY IS PROTECTING ITS OWN, HE SAID, BUT NO ONE WILL EVER BE 100 PERCENT SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF SUCH TRIALS ANYWAY. WHAT WAS DONE AT THE JUNIOR LEVEL IS GOOD ENOUGH, HE SAID. BESARIMAN POINTED OUT THAT THE CIVILIAN LEGAL SYSTEM IS CORRUPT AND CAN BE EASILY MANIPULATED BASED ON PERSONAL INTERESTS - RATHER THAN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ANY COVER-UPS THAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED IN THE MILITARY COURTS WERE DUE TO NATIONAL NOT PERSONAL INTERESTS, HE SAID.

5. (C) ON EAST TIMOR, (b)(1), 1.4 (b) SAID THE "CONSULTATION PROCESS" (I.E., CHOICE BETWEEN AUTONOMY OR SEPARATION) WILL BE BASED ON A SAMPLING OF THE POPULATION, AND NOT ON A ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE FORMULA. HE SAID THE PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS ARE "SCARED TO DEATH" OF INDEPENDENCE BECAUSE OF PROBABLE RETALIATION AGAINST THEM AND LOSS OF THEIR PROPERTY. IF INDEPENDENCE BECOMES MORE LIKELY, THE MILITIAS WILL BECOME MORE DESPERATE AND BRUTAL IN THEIR TACTICS. HE PREDICTED.

6. (C) (b)(1), 1.4 (b) DESCRIBED THE CURRENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA. HE SAID A BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT THE AVERAGE MUSLIM IS POORLY EDUCATED, EXTREMELY POOR AND HAS BEEN LEFT BEHIND IN MANY AREAS. AS A RESULT, POOR MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ARE EASILY PROVOKED AND INFLUENCED BY DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES INTERESTED IN CREATING UNREST. NO SINGLE GROUP IS INVOLVED IN A GRAND CONSPIRACY. RATHER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GROUPS MAKING TROUBLE, HE SAID.

7. (C) (b)(1), 1.4 (b) SAID THAT WHILE SOEHARTO AND OTHERS ARE "PLAYING GAMES IN THE BACKGROUND," THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL COMMITMENT BY THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT TO REFORM OR CHANGE. HABIBIE AND HIS CABINET ARE ALL PART OF THE "NEW ORDER" (SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT) AND IT WOULD BE COUNTER TO THEIR PERSONAL INTERESTS TO SUPPORT TRUE REFORM, HE SAID.

(b)(1), 1.4 (b)

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COMMENTS:

1. (C)

SPOKE WITH BELIEVE PRESIDENT

HABIBIE'S DECISION ON EAST TIMOR WAS A MISTAKE -MADE WITHOUT PROPER CONSULTATION - POORLY THOUGHT OUT - AND WITHOUT NECESSARY PREPARATION OR ADEQUATE TIME TO "SOCIALIZE" THE AUTONOMY PACKAGE. (b)(1),1.4 (b) ALSO GENERALLY AGREED THAT IN A FREE AND FAIR CONSULTATION PROCESS, MOST EAST TIMORESE RESIDENTS, FARMERS, BLUE COLLAR WORKERS, ETC., WOULD CHOOSE AUTONOMY RATHER THAN INDEPENDENCE. THE WEST IS MISLED BY THEIR DEPENDENCE ON A SMALL GROUP OF ELITIST, EDUCATED TIMORESE FOR THEIR VIEW ON THE POPULARITY OF INDEPENDENCE.

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(b)(1),1.4
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2. (C) POL COM MENTS: POL OFFS 12 TRIPS INTO EAST TIMOR OVER PAST 30 MONTHS HAS ENABLED HIM TO SPEAK WITH A BROAD CROSS SECTION OF THE EAST TIMORESE PUBLIC. (HE SPEAKS INDONESIAN AND PORTUGUISE.) HIS CONCLUSION IS THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF EAST TIMORESE IN A FREE VOTE, WOULD CHOOSE INDPENDENCE OVER AUTONOMY.

3. (C) THERE SEEMSTO BE A GOOD BIT OF RATIONALIZATION IN THE COMENTS BY (b)(1),1.4 (b)

(b)(1),1.4 (b) IF WAS NOT CLEAR ON MILITARY POLICY BEFORE GENERAL WIRANTO'S TRIP TO DILI THE PREVIOUS WEEK, THERE SHOULD NO LONGER BE ANY CONFUSION. DURING A VISIT TO EAST-TIMOR THIS WEEK, (b)(1),1.4 (b) TOLD

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (b) AND OTHER EMBASSY VISITORS THAT WIRANTO PERSONALLY DIRECTED HIM TO "TAKE FIRM ACTION AGAINST ANYONE USING FORCE TO INTIMIDATE OR THREATEN THE PEACEFUL CONSULTATION PROCESS." BOTH (b)(1),1.4 (b) ARE CONSIDERED TO BE PRO-REFORM OFFICERS. THEIR DEFENSIVE ATTITUDES SHOW HOW DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO TRULY CHANGE THE PERVASIVE MILITARY CULTURE THAT HAS DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST 32 YEARS.

(b)(1),1.4
(b)

4. (U) 12 MAY IS THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY SHOOTINGS. THERE ARE CONTNUED CALLS TO REOPEN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THIS INCIDENT. ON 990502 THE RECTOR OF TRISAKTI UNIVERSITY CLAIMED THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY HAD TRIED TO BURY THE CASE AND SAID HE HOPES A NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BRING THE REAL SHOOTERS TO TRIAL.

(b)(1),1.4 (b)

5. (U)

PLEASE REFER ANY

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS TO DIA

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