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Defense Intelligence Reference Document

February 1994 DOD-2600-KN-94, Vol 1

North Korean Military Forces

North Korean Force Capabilities Handbook, Vol 1: National Military Overview



PROPIN (PR)

Caution-Proprietary Information Involved

FGI REL... Foreign Government Information


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North Korean Force Capabilities Handbook, Vol 1:

National Military Overview

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North Korean Force Capabilities Handbook, Vol 1:

National Military Overview

(U) Key Government Officials

- President: Kim Il-song
- Chairman of the National Defense Commission: Kim Chong-il
- Vice President: Yi Chong-ok
- Vice President: Pak Song-chol
- Vice President: Kim Yong-chu
- Vice President: Kim Pyong-sik
- Premier: Kang Song-san
- Minister of Foreign Affairs: Kim Yong-nam
- Minister of the People's Armed Forces: Marshal O Chin-u
- Minister of Public Security: Vice Marshal Paek Hak-nim

(U) Key Military Officials

- Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces: Marshal Kim Chong-il
- Minister of the People's Armed Forces: Marshal O Chin-u
- Director of the General Political Affairs Bureau, Ministry of the People's Armed Forces: Marshal O Chin-u
- Chief of General Staff, the Korean People's Army: Vice Marshal Choe Kwang
- Air Force Commander: General Cho Myong-nok
- Navy Commander: Admiral Kim Il-chol

(b)(1),1.4(c)

Type and Stability of Government

| Secretary General of the Kore | <u>an</u> |
|--|---|
| orkers' Party (KWP), Chairman of the Central People's Committee, and Chairman of the Central | al |
| ilitary Committee of the KWP. | (b)(1),1.4 |
| Both Kims are also listed ranking first and secon | ud |
| spectively, among the three-member Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the KWP. | (b <u>)(1),</u> 1.4 (c |
| spectively, unlong the three member startaing committee of the rotten 2 areas of the | and a second |
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| Kim Chong-il is expected to succeed his father, Kim Il-song, as ruler of North Korea. Kim Cready manages day-to-day affairs, although his father retains final control over important foreign | hong-il |
| fairs. | |
| m Chong-il's selection as successor is an unorthodox choice for a communist state. It was done sure that his father's policies will be continued. | San Carlotte Control of the Control |
| sure that his father's policies will be continued. | (b) (1), 1.4 (|
| As expected in a communist state, ideology plays an important role in North Korea. Pyongya | ng's |
| omestic and foreign policies, for example, are commonly explained as manifestations of juche (| self- |
| liance) sasang (thought), a North Korean version of socialist philosophy. | (b)(1), 1. |
| By using <i>juche</i> as a multifunctional ideolo | gical |
| War Hand has timbe atablished his landarship in North Varas by shear notitical area | matism. |
| oncept, Kim it-song has firmly established his leadership in North Korea by sheef pointcar prag | |
| (b)(1),1.4 (c) by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfu | nctional |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuessure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking U. | nctional |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking U. | nctional S. |
| (b)(1),1.4 (c) by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfu essure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking U. apperialism. | nctional |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. | nctional S. |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. | nctional S. |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. | nctional S. |
| (b)(1),1.4 (c) by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfu essure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking U. apperialism. | nctional S. |
| (b)(1),1.4 (c) by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfu essure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking U. apperialism. | nctional S. |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. | nctional S. |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. | nctional S. |
| by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Uniperialism. Military and Political Alignment | nctional S. |
| (b)(1),1.4 (c) by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. Military and Political Alignment | nctional S. (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
| (b)(1),1.4 (c) by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. Military and Political Alignment have enhanced North Korea's position within the Third World and buttressed its importance of the properties of the prope | nctional S. (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
| (b)(1),1.4 (c) by widening diplomatic activities, by neutralizing dysfuressure of fraternal intervention or control from external forces, and by relentlessly attacking Unperialism. Military and Political Alignment | nctional S. (b)(1),1.4 (c) |

External Threat and Governmen Counterstrategy


(b)(1),1.4 (c)


| | and nuclear attack across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) | and along the North |
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| orean coasts. | | |
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| | | (b)(1),1.4 |
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| | h Korea has always made national defense and military pr | eparedness its top |
| iority, and it continues to | o be a viable military threat to South Korea. | (b)(1),1.4 (|
| North Korea portrays | South Korea and the United States as hostile in order to m | obilize its own |
| litary and civilian sector | rs into a higher state of readiness. | |
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| ntornal The | reat and Covernment | |
| | reat and Government | (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
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| Counterstra | tegy | [the North (b)(1).1 |
| orean regime is concerne | tegy ed with | |
| orean regime is concerne | tegy ed with | the North (b)(1),1 |
| Counterstra | tegy ed with | [the North (b)(1).1 |
| orean regime is concerne | tegy ed with | the North (b)(1),1 |
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| orean regime is concerne | tegy ed with | the North (b)(1),1 |
| Counterstra | tegy ed with | the North (b)(1),1 |
| nternal The Counterstra | tegy ed with | the North (b)(1),1 |
| orean regime is concerne | tegy ed with | the North (b)(1),1 |
| Counterstra | tegy ed with | the North (b)(1),1 |


Foreign Influence


| Historical Evolution (b)(1), 1.4 (c) | c) |
|--|--------------------------------|
| Military Strategy and Doctrine | (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
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| (C) No foreign troops are present in North Korea. Soviet troops left North Korea after the establishment in 1948. Chinese troops left North Korea after the Korean armistice agree | |
| Foreign Military Presence (b)(1),1.4 (c) | (2)(1),111(3) |
| | (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
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| nuclear issue with the international community. The other was | norrade to its |
| One was a search for economic ties in its effort to bail itself out of economic stagnation and diplomatic isolat | |
| external sources of economic support to rescue its struggling economy. | (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
| nations with market economy systems. Given North Korea's heavy economic reliance o Union, the impact of Soviet disintegration was extremely distressing. Pyongyang had to | n the Soviet search for new |
| 1990, all the former East European socialist countries were reborn to emerge as newly of | By the end of democratic |
| (C) For Pyongyang, 1990 was one of its toughest years. | |
| North Korea's internal affairs. In his view, relationships among countries should be governointerference in one another's internal affairs; and fraternal assistance. | reignty; (b)(1),1.4 (c) |

(b)(1),1.4(c)









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| Throughout the 1980s, as South Korea's economy was experiencing dramatic economic growth, |
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| North Korea concentrated onits conventional military forces. The South |
| Korean response, constrained by its more pluralist political system, did not develop significant |
| momentum until the middle of the decade. |
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| (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
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| 1990-95 War Preparedness Plan |
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| Force Capabilities and Remaining Vulnerabilities |
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| (b)(1),1.4 (c) |
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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(5) If current economic and political trends continue in North Korea, the overall readiness and capabilities of North Korea's forces will decline by the end of this decade.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

| Intelligence | e and Sec | curity | |
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| | | (b)(1),1.4 (c) | |
| | | (6)(1),1.4 (6) | |
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