

~~SECRET//NF~~

ENVELOPE

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

HEADER

P
130946Z FEB 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEACWD/CSSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

RUCOVAB/USCINCSOC [REDACTED] MACDILL AFB FL
RUEALGX/SAFE

P

130941Z FEB 91
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (RP).

SUBJECT: (b)(3):10 USC 424 FOLLOW-UP ON THREAT TO AMERICANS AT
EDLE PHILIPPINES (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 910206 - 910212.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(1):1.4(c)

SUMMARY: ~~(C)~~ THIS REPORT IS A FOLLOW-UP ON A POSSIBLE THREAT TO AMERICANS AT DOLE, PHILIPPINES. THREAT STILL VALID.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ ON THE EVENING OF 12 FEB 91, [REDACTED] TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE ASSASSINATION OF A FILIPINO WORKER AT DOLE ON 06 FEB 91. [REDACTED] DTG 110829Z FEB 91) AND THE POSSIBLE THREAT TO AMERICANS THERE. [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) THE LAST CONTACT WITH THE BILAAN GROUP WAS ON 10 FEB 91, AT WHICH TIME A MEETING WAS ARRANGED BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE BILAAN AND REPRESENTATIVES OF DOLE SECURITY FORCES AT 1100 HOURS ON 11 FEB 91. THE BILAAN DID NOT SHOW FOR THE MEETING.

2. ~~(C)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) FOR MORE DETAILS WHICH WOULD MAKE THE MOTIVE FOR THE KILLING CLEARER. [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHAT THE THREAT TO AMERICANS IS AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT AT DOLE. [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) THE FIRST REASON ADVANCED FOR THE KILLING WAS A PERSONAL DISPUTE INVOLVING A SIMPLE DISAGREEMENT WITH ANOTHER WORKER. HOWEVER, BASED ON SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL USING THE CALLSIGN "JAGUAR," [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) CONSIDERS THE THREAT TO AMERICANS AT DOLEFIL VALID. [REDACTED] THE BILAAN GROUP HAS MADE, IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER MOSLEM GROUPS, EXPLICIT DEMANDS FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND EXTORTION IS NOW A FACTOR IN THIS CASE. SPECIFIC DEMANDS AND TERMS WERE TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE 11 FEB 91 MEETING WHICH DID NOT OCCUR. [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424 DOLEFIL SECURITY IS COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) IN THE REGION. ACTUAL SITE OF THE ASSASSINATION WAS ON THE HIGHWAY BETWEEN PDLMDLDR AND DOLEFIL AND NOT ON DOLEFIL PROPERTY AS ORIGINALLY REPORTED.)

3. ~~(C)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) A PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY REPORT INDICATING THAT MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) CHAIRMAN NUR ((MISUARI)) INSTRUCTED MOSLEMS TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICANS BECAUSE OF THE WAR IN THE GULF. HOWEVER, [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) UTOH ((SALEM)), THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE MNLF, WAS "NOT VERY BENT ON FOLLOWING THE INSTRUCTION." [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) SALEM HAS GOOD CONTROL OVER HIS PEOPLE, BUT SOME GROUPS STILL ENGAGE IN COMMON PRACTICES OF CRIMINALITY WHICH DO NOT CONFORM TO MNLF GUIDELINES. [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) THE MISUARI INSTRUCTION, THE ASSASSINATION OF A DOLEFIL EMPLOYEE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE WITH ALLEGED BILAAN MOSLEMS, INCLUDING ONE USING THE CALLSIGN "LIBYAN BASE" AND THE MAGUINDANAO DIALECT, LEAD HIM TO BELIEVE THERE IS A REAL THREAT TO DOLEFIL AND ITS AMERICAN EMPLOYEES.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424 THIS FOLLOW UP ADDS LITTLE NEW INFORMATION TO THE ORIGINAL REPORT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AT THIS POINT, THERE IS STILL SOME CONFLICTING INFORMATION ON THE PRECISE MOTIVE FOR THE KILLING OF A FILIPINO WORKER AT DOLE. THERE IS ALSO SOME CONFLICTING INFORMATION REGARDING THE MNLF INSTRUCTION TO ATTACK AMERICAN INTERESTS. [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY REPORT INDICATING MISUARI'S INSTRUCTION TO STRIKE AMERICANS; HOWEVER, [REDACTED] (b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c) SALEM'S RELUCTANCE TO FOLLOW THAT GUIDANCE, AS WELL AS OTHER

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] MAKES THE THREAT LESS CERTAIN. [REDACTED] CONTACTED THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ON 910213 TO VALIDATE THE [REDACTED] INFORMATION. [REDACTED] REPORTS THAT NUR MISUARI IS PERSONALLY PRO- SAUDI ARABIA, AND HAS INSTRUCTED HIS SUBORDINATES NOT TO

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ATTACK AMERICANS. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c) HOWEVER, SOME OF MISUARI'S FIELD COMMANDERS ARE PRO-IRAQ, AND MIGHT POSSIBLY ACT ON THEIR OWN AGAINST AMERICANS.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ DOLE SECURITY STILL CONSIDERS THE THREAT TO AMERICANS A VALID THREAT. ~~(S//NF)~~ CONCURS WITH THAT ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE EVENTS AT DOLE AND OTHER AVAILABLE INFORMATION. (b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

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ADMIN

(b)(3);10 USC 424;(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i)

WARNING: (U) REPORT IS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ --
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MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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