INDONESIAN FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

General

(C) Under the firm direction of Defense Minister and Armed Forces Commander in Chief, General Jusuf, the Indonesian military is actively undertaking an ambitious 5-year Armed Forces Development Program (1979-83). Now in its fourth year, the plan reflects Jusuf's determination to upgrade significantly military readiness and capabilities as a deterrent against domestic unrest and possible future security challenges from Vietnam, the Soviet Union, or China. Recognizing the military's numerous weaknesses, his goal has been to obtain a relatively small but highly trained and well-equipped force which, with sufficient reserves, could quickly detect and respond to any anticipated threat. Improvements being undertaken include upgrading of troop welfare, intensified unit retraining, selective strength increases, new force deployments, and the largest equipment procurement program since the Soviet-assisted buildup in the early 1960s. Jusuf has also moved to revitalize Indonesia's traditional populist-based territorial warfare concepts. This emphasis has spawned several new programs which attempt to improve military-civilian relations and to enlarge the civil defense structure. The apparent aim is not only to project the image of a strong united popular front, but also to encourage the transfer of the "revolutionary values" of the present ruling generation to younger officers in the next several years.

Military Upgrading Efforts

addition to being given increased pay and new housing, the Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM) has undertaken a multi-year effort to man fully, reequip, and extensively retrain most Army, Marine, and Air Force ground combat elements — the eventual goal being the highest possible unit readiness. Both the Army and National Police are also increasing forces, with the initial Army plan to expand from 195,000 to 226,000 and the Police from 112,000 to over 136,000 personnel by 1983. Despite noteworthy results, the military has experienced major problems in meeting quantitative as well as qualitative goals; setbacks have been common. From the start, programs have been plagued by poor planning; delays in manning, equipment acquisition, and base construction; and overriding operational commitments. Moreover, as continuing troop problems in Timor indicate, the upgrading programs have failed to prepare even the best forces for effective combat operations. Because of these problems, upgrading schedules have been revised, and some are now targeted for the next 5-year period (1984-1989).

(5) The Navy and Air Force are also receiving major attention. Significant emphasis has been placed on procuring new equipment to replace obsolescent weapons systems. Although force expansion remains relatively modest, primarily because of budget constraints, new deliveries to date, including approximately 16 new ships and 60 aircraft, have been considered essential in improving the military's fire-power, rapid deployment, and surveillance capabilities. While the Navy and Air Force have greatly benefited from modernization, they also have notable growth

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problems. The acquisition of new and more complex weapons systems has further burdened the services' already inefficient maintenance and logistic facilities. In some cases, the equipment has been procured without adequate logistic or training preparation.

Force Relocation and Election Preparations

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Expected Developments

(S) Under the driving influence of General Jusuf, the Armed Forces plan to undertake additional force improvements. The long-awaited division of HANKAM is also expected next year, allowing retired older-generation generals to retain control in a civilianized defense ministry while younger officers assume greater responsibility in a newly-created joint staff organization. Despite his often haphazard and hasty decisions, Jusuf should achieve further success in upgrading the country's combat units and in acquiring significant new armament. Although dissatisfied with past US security assistance, Jusuf and his aides continue to favor US equipment and will seek additional major US weapons systems. Despite certain gains, however, the Armed Forces are not likely to overcome soon their numerous handicaps. As a result, further delays and setbacks are expected, and the services will likely face increasing problems in keeping their new equipment operational.

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